>>>>>Proof--God (by the last Prop.) and all his attributes are
eternal, that is (by Def. viii.) each of his attributes expresses
existence. Therefore the same attributes of God which explain
his eternal essence, explain at the same time his eternal
existence--in other words, that which constitutes God's essence
constitutes at the same time his existence. Wherefore God's
existence and God's essence are one and the same. Q.E.D.
<<<<<Corollary I.--Hence it follows that God's existence, like
his essence, is an eternal truth.
<<<<<Corollary II.--Secondly, it follows that God, and all the
attributes of God, are unchangeable. For if they could be
changed in respect to existence, they must also be able to be
changed in respect to essence--that is, obviously, be changed
from true to false, which is absurd.
XXI. All things which follow from the absolute nature of any
attribute of God must always exist and be infinite, or, in other
words, are eternal and infinite through the said attribute.
>>>>>Proof--Conceive, if it be possible (supposing the
proposition to be denied), that something in some attribute of
God can follow from the absolute nature of the said attribute,
and that at the same time it is finite, and has a conditioned
existence or duration; for instance, the idea of God expressed in
the attribute thought. Now thought, in so far as it is supposed
to be an attribute of God, is necessarily (by Prop. xi.) in its
nature infinite. But, in so far as it possesses the idea of God,
it is supposed finite. It cannot, however, be conceived as
finite, unless it be limited by thought (by Def. ii.); but it is
not limited by thought itself, in so far as it has constituted
the idea of God (for so far it is supposed to be finite);
therefore, it is limited by thought, in so far as it has not
constituted the idea of God, which nevertheless (by Prop. xi.)
must necessarily exist.
We have now granted, therefore, thought not constituting the idea
of God, and, accordingly, the idea of God does not naturally
follow from its nature in so far as it is absolute thought (for
it is conceived as constituting, and also as not constituting,
the idea of God), which is against our hypothesis. Wherefore, if
the idea of God expressed in the attribute thought, or, indeed,
anything else in any attribute of God (for we may take any
example, as the proof is of universal application) follows from
the necessity of the absolute nature of the said attribute, the
said thing must necessarily be infinite, which was our first
point.
Furthermore, a thing which thus follows from the necessity of the
nature of any attribute cannot have a limited duration. For if
it can, suppose a thing, which follows from the necessity of the
nature of some attribute, to exist in some attribute of God, for
instance, the idea of God expressed in the attribute thought, and
let it be supposed at some time not to have existed, or to be
about not to exist.
Now thought being an attribute of God must necessarily exist
unchanged (by Prop. xi., and Prop. xx., Cor. ii.); and beyond the
limits of the duration of the idea of God (supposing the latter
at some time not to have existed, or not to be going to exist)
thought would perforce have existed without the idea of God,
which is contrary to our hypothesis, for we supposed that,
thought being given, the idea of God necessarily flowed
therefrom. Therefore the idea of God expressed in thought, or
anything which necessarily follows from the absolute nature of
some attribute of God, cannot have a limited duration, but
through the said attribute is eternal, which is our second point.
Bear in mind that the same proposition may be affirmed of
anything, which in any attribute necessarily follows from God's
absolute nature.
XXII. Whatsoever follows from any attribute of God, in so far as
it is modified by a modification, which exists necessarily and as
infinite, through the said attribute, must also exist necessarily
and as infinite.
>>>>>Proof--The proof of this proposition is similar to that of
the preceding one.
XXIII. Every mode, which exists both necessarily and as
infinite, must necessarily follow either from the absolute nature
of some attribute of God, or from an attribute modified by a
modification which exists necessarily, and as infinite.
>>>>>Proof--A mode exists in something else, through which it
must be conceived (Def. v.), that is (Prop. xv.), it exists
solely in God, and solely through God can be conceived. If
therefore a mode is conceived as necessarily existing and
infinite, it must necessarily be inferred or perceived through
some attribute of God, in so far as such attribute is conceived
as expressing the infinity and necessity of existence, in other
words (Def. viii.) eternity; that is, in so far as it is
considered absolutely. A mode, therefore, which necessarily
exists as infinite, must follow from the absolute nature of some
attribute of God, either immediately (Prop. xxi.) or through the
means of some modification, which follows from the absolute
nature of the said attribute; that is (by Prop. xxii.), which
exists necessarily and as infinite.
XXIV. The essence of things produced by God does not involve
existence.
>>>>>Proof--This proposition is evident from Def. i. For that of
which the nature (considered in itself) involves existence is
self-caused, and exists by the sole necessity of its own nature.
<<<<<Corollary--Hence it follows that God is not only the cause
of things coming into existence, but also of their continuing in
existence, that is, in scholastic phraseology, God is cause of
the being of things (essendi rerum). For whether things exist,
or do not exist, whenever we contemplate their essence, we see
that it involves neither existence nor duration; consequently, it
cannot be the cause of either the one or the other. God must be
the sole cause, inasmuch as to him alone does existence
appertain. (Prop. xiv. Cor. i.) Q.E.D.
XXV. God is the efficient cause not only of the existence of
things, but also of their essence.
>>>>>Proof--If this be denied, then God is not the cause of the
essence of things; and therefore the essence of things can (by
Ax. iv.) be conceived without God. This (by Prop. xv.) is
absurd. Therefore, God is the cause of the essence of things.
Q.E.D.
*****Note--This proposition follows more clearly from Prop. xvi.
For it is evident thereby that, given the divine nature, the
essence of things must be inferred from it, no less than their
existence--in a word, God must be called the cause of all things,
in the same sense as he is called the cause of himself. This
will be made still clearer by the following corollary.
<<<<<Corollary--Individual things are nothing but modifications
of the attributes of God, or modes by which the attributes of God
are expressed in a fixed and definite manner. The proof appears
from Prop. xv. and Def. v.
XXVI. A thing which is conditioned to act in a particular
manner, has necessarily been thus conditioned by God; and that
which has not been conditioned by God cannot condition itself to
act.
>>>>>Proof--That by which things are said to be conditioned to
act in a particular manner is necessarily something positive
(this is obvious); therefore both of its essence and of its
existence God by the necessity of his nature is the efficient
cause (Props. xxv. and xvi.); this is our first point. Our
second point is plainly to be inferred therefrom. For if a
thing, which has not been conditioned by God, could condition
itself, the first part of our proof would be false, and this, as
we have shown is absurd.
XXVII. A thing, which has been conditioned by God to act in a
particular way, cannot render itself unconditioned.
>>>>>Proof--This proposition is evident from Ax. iii.
XXVIII. Every individual thing, or everything which is finite
and has a conditioned existence, cannot exist or be conditioned
to act, unless it be conditioned for existence and action by a
cause other than itself, which also is finite, and has a
conditioned existence; and likewise this cause cannot in its turn
exist, or be conditioned to act, unless it be conditioned for
existence and action by another cause, which also is finite, and
has a conditioned existence, and so on to infinity.
>>>>>Proof--Whatsoever is conditioned to exist and act, has been
thus conditioned by God (by Prop. xxvi. and Prop. xxiv., Cor.)
But that which is finite, and has a conditioned existence, cannot
be produced by the absolute nature of any attribute of God; for
whatsoever follows from the absolute nature of any attribute of
God is infinite and eternal (by Prop. xxi.). It must, therefore,
follow from some attribute of God, in so far as the said
attribute is considered as in some way modified; for substance
and modes make up the sum total of existence (by Ax. i. and Def.
iii., v.), while modes are merely modifications of the
attributes of God. But from God, or from any of his attributes,
in so far as the latter is modified by a modification infinite
and eternal, a conditioned thing cannot follow. Wherefore it
must follow from, or be conditioned for, existence and action by
God or one of his attributes, in so far as the latter are
modified by some modification which is finite, and has a
conditioned existence. This is our first point. Again, this
cause or this modification (for the reason by which we
established the first part of this proof) must in its turn be
conditioned by another cause, which also is finite, and has a
conditioned existence, and, again, this last by another (for the
same reason); and so on (for the same reason) to infinity.
Q.E.D.
*****Note--As certain things must be produced immediately by God,
namely those things which necessarily follow from his absolute
nature, through the means of these primary attributes, which,
nevertheless, can neither exist nor be conceived without God, it
follows: 1. That God is absolutely the proximate cause of those
things immediately produced by him. I say absolutely, not after
his kind, as is usually stated. For the effects of God cannot
either exist or be conceived without a cause (Prop. xv. and Prop.
xxiv. Cor.). 2. That God cannot properly be styled the remote
cause of individual things, except for the sake of
distinguishing these from what he immediately produces, or rather
from what follows from his absolute nature. For, by a remote
cause, we understand a cause which is in no way conjoined to the
effect. But all things which are, are in God, and so depend on
God, that without him they can neither be nor be conceived.
XXIX. Nothing in the universe is contingent, but all things are
conditioned to exist and operate in a particular manner by the
necessity of the divine nature.
>>>>>Proof--Whatsoever is, is in God (Prop. xv.). But God cannot
be called a thing contingent. For (by Prop. xi.) he exists
necessarily, and not contingently. Further, the modes of the
divine nature follow therefrom necessarily, and not contingently
(Prop. xvi.); and they thus follow, whether we consider the
divine nature absolutely, or whether we consider it as in any way
conditioned to act (Prop. xxvii.). Further, God is not only the
cause of these modes, in so far as they simply exist (by Prop.
xxiv., Cor.), but also in so far as they are considered as
conditioned for operating in a particular manner (Prop. xxvi.).
If they be not conditioned by God (Prop. xxvi.), it is
impossible, and not contingent, that they should condition
themselves; contrariwise, if they be conditioned by God, it is
impossible, and not contingent, that they should render
themselves unconditioned. Wherefore all things are conditioned by
the necessity of the divine nature, not only to exist, but also
to exist and operate in a particular manner, and there is nothing
that is contingent. Q.E.D.
*****Note--Before going any further, I wish here to explain, what
we should understand by nature viewed as active (natura
naturans), and nature viewed as passive (natura naturata). I say
to explain, or rather call attention to it, for I think that,
from what has been said, it is sufficiently clear, that by nature
viewed as active we should understand that which is in itself,
and is conceived through itself, or those attributes of
substance, which express eternal and infinite essence, in other
words (Prop. xiv., Cor. i., and Prop. xvii., Cor. ii.) God, in so
far as he is considered as a free cause.
By nature viewed as passive I understand all that which follows
from the necessity of the nature of God, or of any of the
attributes of God, that is, all the modes of the attributes of
God, in so far as they are considered as things which are in God,
and which without God cannot exist or be conceived.
XXX. Intellect, in function (actu) finite, or in function
infinite, must comprehend the attributes of God and the
modifications of God, and nothing else.
>>>>>Proof--A true idea must agree with its object (Ax. vi.); in
other words (obviously) that which is contained in the intellect
in representation must necessarily be granted in nature. But in
nature (by Prop. xiv., Cor. i.) there is no substance save God,
nor any modifications save those (Prop. xv.) which are in God,
and cannot without God either be or be conceived. Therefore the
intellect, in function finite, or in function infinite, must
comprehend the attributes of God and the modifications of God,
and nothing else. Q.E.D.
XXXI. The intellect in function, whether finite or infinite, as
will, desire, love, &c., should be referred to passive nature and
not to active nature.
>>>>>Proof--By the intellect we do not (obviously) mean absolute
thought, but only a certain mode of thinking, differing from
other modes, such as love, desire, &c., and therefore (Def. v.)
requiring to be conceived through absolute thought. It must (by
Prop. xv. and Def. vi.), through some attribute of God which
expresses the eternal and infinite essence of thought, be so
conceived, that without such attribute it could neither be nor be
conceived. It must therefore be referred to nature passive
rather than to nature active, as must also the other modes of
thinking. Q.E.D.
*****Note--I do not here, by speaking of intellect in function,
admit that there is such a thing as intellect in potentiality:
but, wishing to avoid all confusion, I desire to speak only of
what is most clearly perceived by us, namely, of the very act of
understanding, than which nothing is more clearly perceived. For
we cannot perceive anything without adding to our knowledge of
the act of understanding.
XXXII. Will cannot be called a free cause, but only a necessary
cause.
>>>>>Proof--Will is only a particular mode of thinking, like
intellect; therefore (by Prop. xxviii.) no volition can exist,
nor be conditioned to act, unless it be conditioned by some cause
other than itself, which cause is conditioned by a third cause,
and so on to infinity. But if will be supposed infinite, it must
also be conditioned to exist and act by God, not by virtue of his
being substance absolutely infinite, but by virtue of his
possessing an attribute which expresses the infinite and eternal
essence of thought (by Prop. xxiii.). Thus, however it be
conceived, whether as finite or infinite, it requires a cause by
which it should be conditioned to exist and act. Thus (Def.
vii.) it cannot be called a free cause, but only a necessary or
constrained cause. Q.E.D.
<<<<<Corollary I--Hence it follows, first, that God does not act
according to freedom of the will.
<<<<<Corollary II--It follows, secondly, that will and intellect
stand in the same relation to the nature of God as do motion, and
rest, and absolutely all natural phenomena, which must be
conditioned by God (Prop. xxix.) to exist and act in a particular
manner. For will, like the rest, stands in need of a cause, by
which it is conditioned to exist and act in a particular manner.
And although, when will or intellect be granted, an infinite
number of results may follow, yet God cannot on that account be
said to act from freedom of the will, any more than the infinite
number of results from motion and rest would justify us in saying
that motion and rest act by free will. Wherefore will no more
appertains to God than does anything else in nature, but stands
in the same relation to him as motion, rest, and the like, which
we have shown to follow from the necessity of the divine nature,
and to be conditioned by it to exist and act in a particular
manner.
XXXIII. Things could not have been brought into being by God in
any manner or in any order different from that which has in fact
obtained.
>>>>>Proof--All things necessarily follow from the nature of God
(Prop. xvi.), and by the nature of God are conditioned to exist
and act in a particular way (Prop. xxix). If things, therefore,
could have been of a different nature, or have been conditioned
to act in a different way, so that the order of nature would
have been different, God's nature would also have been able to
be different from what it now is; and therefore (by Prop.
xi.)that different nature also would have perforce existed, and
consequently there would have been able to be two or more Gods.
This (by Prop. xiv., Cor. i.) is absurd. Therefore, things
could not have been brought into being by God in any other
manner, &c. Q.E.D.
*****Note I--As I have thus shown, more clearly than the sun at
noonday, that there is nothing to justify us in calling things
contingent, I wish to explain briefly what meaning we shall
attach to the word contingent; but I will first explain the words
necessary and impossible.
A thing is called necessary either in respect to its essence or
in respect to its cause; for the existence of a thing
necessarily follows, either from its essence and definition, or
from a given efficient cause. For similar reasons a thing is
said to be impossible; namely, inasmuch as its essence or
definition involves a contradiction, or because no external cause
is granted, which is conditioned to produce such an effect; but
a thing can in no respect be called contingent, save in relation
to the imperfection of our knowledge.
A thing of which we do not know whether the essence does or does
not involve a contradiction, or of which, knowing that it does
not involve a contradiction, we are still in doubt concerning
the existence, because the order of causes escapes us,--such a
thing, I say, cannot appear to us either necessary or
impossible. Wherefore we call it contingent or possible.
*****Note II--It clearly follows from what we have said, that
things have been brought into being by God in the highest
perfection, inasmuch as they have necessarily followed from a
most perfect nature. Nor does this prove any imperfection in
God, for it has compelled us to affirm his perfection. From its
contrary proposition, we should clearly gather (as I have just
shown), that God is not supremely perfect, for if things had been
brought into being in any other way, we should have to assign to
God a nature different from that, which we are bound to
attribute to him from the consideration of an absolutely perfect
being.
I do not doubt, that many will scout this idea as absurd, and
will refuse to give their minds up to contemplating it, simply
because they are accustomed to assign to God a freedom very
different from that which we (Def. vii.) have deduced. They
assign to him, in short, absolute free will. However, I am also
convinced that if such persons reflect on the matter, and duly
weigh in their minds our series of propositions, they will reject
such freedom as they now attribute to God, not only as nugatory,
but also as a great impediment to organized knowledge. There is
no need for me to repeat what I have said in the note to Prop.
xvii. But, for the sake of my opponents, I will show further,
that although it be granted that will pertains to the essence of
God, it nevertheless follows from his perfection, that things
could not have been by him created other than they are, or in a
different order; this is easily proved, if we reflect on what
our opponents themselves concede, namely, that it depends solely
on the decree and will of God, that each thing is what it is. If
it were otherwise, God would not be the cause of all things.
Further, that all the decrees of God have been ratified from all
eternity by God himself. If it were otherwise, God would be
convicted of imperfection or change. But in eternity there is no
such thing as when, before, or after; hence it follows solely
from the perfection of God, that God never can decree, or never
would have decreed anything but what is; that God did not exist
before his decrees, and would not exist without them. But, it
is said, supposing that God had made a different universe, or
had ordained other decrees from all eternity concerning nature
and her order, we could not therefore conclude any imperfection
in God. But persons who say this must admit that God can change
his decrees. For if God had ordained any decrees concerning
nature and her order, different from those which he has
ordained--in other words, if he had willed and conceived
something different concerning nature--he would perforce have
had a different intellect from that which he has, and also a
different will. But if it were allowable to assign to God a
different intellect and a different will, without any change in
his essence or his perfection, what would there be to prevent
him changing the decrees which he has made concerning created
things, and nevertheless remaining perfect? For his intellect
and will concerning things created and their order are the same,
in respect to his essence and perfection, however they be
conceived.
Further, all the philosophers whom I have read admit that God's
intellect is entirely actual, and not at all potential; as they
also admit that God's intellect, and God's will, and God's
essence are identical, it follows that, if God had had a
different actual intellect and a different will, his essence
would also have been different; and thus, as I concluded at
first, if things had been brought into being by God in a
different way from that which has obtained, God's intellect and
will, that is (as is admitted) his essence would perforce have
been different, which is absurd.
As these things could not have been brought into being by God in
any but the actual way and order which has obtained; and as the
truth of this proposition follows from the supreme perfection of
God; we can have no sound reason for persuading ourselves to
believe that God did not wish to create all the things which were
in his intellect, and to create them in the same perfection as
he had understood them.
But, it will be said, there is in things no perfection nor
imperfection; that which is in them, and which causes them to be
called perfect or imperfect, good or bad, depends solely on the
will of God. If God had so willed, he might have brought it
about that what is now perfection should be extreme
imperfection, and vice versa. What is such an assertion, but
an open declaration that God, who necessarily understands that
which he wishes, might bring it about by his will, that he
should understand things differently from the way in which he
does understand them? This (as we have just shown) is the height
of absurdity. Wherefore, I may turn the argument against its
employers, as follows:--All things depend on the power of God.
In order that things should be different from what they are,
God's will would necessarily have to be different. But God's
will cannot be different (as we have just most clearly
demonstrated) from God's perfection. Therefore neither can
things be different. I confess, that the theory which subjects
all things to the will of an indifferent deity, and asserts that
they are all dependent on his fiat, is less far from the truth
than the theory of those, who maintain that God acts in all
things with a view of promoting what is good. For these latter
persons seem to set up something beyond God, which does not
depend on God, but which God in acting looks to as an exemplar,
or which he aims at as a definite goal. This is only another
name for subjecting God to the dominion of destiny, an utter
absurdity in respect to God, whom we have shown to be the first
and only free cause of the essence of all things and also of
their existence. I need, therefore, spend no time in refuting
such wild theories.