bunch. Their withdrawal following the US-mediated accord is tactical,
not strategic. They will be back. They will do their best to present
the Albanians as intransigent, irrational and belligerent during the
process of negotiating autonomy for the province. This will not be
difficult. The recent crisis radicalised even the moderate Albanians
(like Rugova). Their demands ARE likely to be zany and unacceptable.
This will be Milosevic's chance to convert the West to his side. He
will act the peacemaker, the moderate, the conciliator - and let the
Albanians do the dirty work of threats, walkouts and occasional terror.
There will be war in Kosovo. It is only a matter of time and nerves.
Milosevic has plenty of both - the Albanians and their Western
supporters none. The incident has escalated into a mini cold war.
Russia has mobilized select units of its army and moved its anti
aircraft missiles to counter a possible NATO strike. The new rulers of
the Kremlin are old cold war hands and habits die hard in Russia.
Kosovo is a golden opportunity to destabilize NATO (by provoking Turkey
against Greece, for instance). I have expounded upon this elsewhere.
Once a real war breaks, the Albanians in Macedonia will be tempted to
join in the fray. Though ethnically different - they are not
nationalistically indifferent. Hitherto, KLA has failed to establish a
presence on Macedonian soil and inter-ethnic clashes have been
surprisingly limited and subdued. Still, the potential is there. The
Albanians in Macedonia are concentrated in a well-defined geographical
triangle. They could demand the same autonomy that their northern
brothers are trying to extract from Milosevic. Moreover, they are
better integrated into the political and economic life in Macedonia.
Following the next elections (18/10) they are likely to hold the
balance of power. And they are getting more and more adept at using it.
They feel like second class Macedonians. They would like to become
first class Albanians. So, there will be clashes and tension in
Macedonia over Albanian demands for greater autonomy.
Then there is the Serb-Macedonian tortured relationship. As I said,
Macedonia was the last to (reluctantly) secede from the Yugoslav
Federation. It escaped harm by aiding and abetting the Serbs during the
siege. Macedonia was a vital (also corrupt and lucrative) bloodline,
connecting Greece to Serbia (through the Vardar river). Politicians and
businessmen (in Macedonia, these are linked vocations) made fortunes.
Smugglers and other criminal elements flooded the country, never to go
back. The two regimes are not friends but they maintain the
Hillary-Bill marriage: power sharing, convenience, the occasional
extramarital fling. Serbia will not attack Macedonia as long as it
maintains express neutrality. NATO will not compromise this neutrality
because it does not want additional trouble in its hinterland if it
invades Serbia. As long as this (admittedly shaky) tacit understanding
prevails - there is no "Serbian risk".
To sum up: I do not see Macedonia flaring up. A guerrilla type war of
attrition is conceivable but with limited targets (autonomy for the
Albanians within a well defined swathe of territory). These demands
will be finally met because the Macedonians are hedonists, peaceful and
easygoing as opposed to the neurotically tense Albanians and Serbs.
Blood may be spilled in the process - but sparsely and symbolically. No
major disruption will occur. The economy will thrive on the conflict.
It is a pathological, parasitic, short-term kind of prosperity - but it
is prosperity, althesame.
It is when the area clams down sufficiently for the West to lose
interest - that Macedonia should begin to worry. Who will then finance
the insane trade deficit? Who will support the eerily strong currency?
Who will cater to the military needs of this nascent democracy? Who
will save it from its own robber barons, crony capitalists, corrupt
politicians and outright criminals?
The only hope is foreign investments. It is worth repeating. Macedonia
can achieve market discipline, functioning public institutions, a
tolerable level of corruption and internal economic (and thereby
political) stability only through the discipline imposed by foreigners.
Perhaps the Yugoslav Federation was not such a bad idea after all.
It is said that Tito drank only Czech beer. But Tito is dead and the
list of preferred immigration targets among all these warring
nationalities does not include Prague. They would rather go to Germany
or Russia. There is no real risk of a wave of refugees knocking down
Czech border defences. But with its depressed economy and surging
crime, Prague regards every potential immigrant as a potential threat.
If the gates are not opened to them willingly - the refugees might
choose to knock them down.
(Article published September 19-25, 1998 in "Middle East Times")
Return
The Black Birds of Kosova
The Onset of Cultural Imperialism
The real war over Kosovo hasn't even started yet. When NATO coerces
Yugoslavia into submission, when the smoke clears and the charred
remains of corpses and houses cleared - then the REAL conflict will
erupt. It will be a conflict between moderate Albanians (as represented
by Ibrahim Rugova) and radical Albanians (the outlandish
Maoist-Islamist admixture represented by the KLA). And it will be
bloodier by far.
This is because this new type of war can never be decided, not even by
way of weapons. It is a clash of cultures, a battle enjoined by
civilizations. And it cuts across the Kosovars as sharply as it
separates the West from Yugoslavia. Thus the Kosovo war will be
continued by the Kosovars themselves because they, too, are culturally
split along the same inflamed lines (Liberal versus Non-liberal). "But,
surely" - you would say - "there is nothing new about THIS". But there
is.
In the past, nations or clusters of nations or tribes went to war ONLY
in order to protect national or tribal or group interests. More food,
more space, control over important lines of transport and
communications, access to markets, women (to ensure reproduction), the
elimination of a foe or a potential foe, loot, weaponry - hard, cold
interests underlied all armed conflicts.
Culture and religion were used as fig leaves to disguise the true
nature of wars. The colonial wars of the 18th and 19th century were
ostensibly fought with the aim of educating the savages, converting
them to the right religion and bestowing upon them the blessings of
civilization. Mineral wealth, routes of transport, strategic vantage
points - were all presented as secondary afterthoughts or side
benefits. This is the way it was presented to the public. The truth, of
course, was absolutely the opposite.
The Kosovo conflict is the first war in history where WYSIWYG (what you
see is what you get). Europe in general and NATO in particular have no
interests in the godforsaken piece of land known as Kosovo and
Metoxhia. It is not strategically located (it is all but inaccessible).
It is poor (except some minerals of which there is a world glut). It is
not strictly "European". It is partly Moslem and allied with the likes
of Iran, Osama Bin Laden and Albania. It involves a small number of
people (1.8 million). Operation Allied Force is NOT about the defence
or furthering of self-interests. It is about conflicting cultures.
The West is trying to impose its culture - liberal and capitalist -
upon other societies. Whenever popular opinion (even if expressed
democratically and peacefully) does not conform to Western values - the
West does its best to undermine the choice as well as the chosen. The
West's definition of a legitimate regime is very peculiar and not very
rigorous logically. A legitimate regime is one chosen by the people
providing its values are Western values or closely conform to them. All
other regimes - no matter how strongly upheld by free public opinion -
are not legitimate, even illegal and can be deposed and disposed of
with moral impunity. Khomeini came to power on the crest of a wave of
unprecedented popular support and he supplanted a cruel and corrupt
dictator. Milosevic was freely elected by a majority wider than
Clinton's. In Algeria and Turkey freely elected Islamists governments
were toppled (or prevented from taking office, in the case of Algeria)
by the army with the West's enthusiastic though mute consent. This
"Allende Syndrome" is in play now in Kosovo.
It is politically very incorrect, I am sure, to say that only a small
minority of humans adhere to Western values (and most of the adherents
only pay lip service to them). Human rights are an alien concept in
Africa and the Balkans. Individualism is an alien - even repulsive -
concept in China, Japan and most of South East Asia. Competition is a
value derided in most parts of the world. Income disparity and the
toleration of abject poverty as an inescapable consequence of
capitalism (the "Anglo-Saxon Model") are rejected even in Continental
Europe itself. Freedom of Speech is much more curtailed in France than
in the USA. Privacy is less respected in the USA than in France.
Western values are not universal even in the West.
The nations and societies of the Balkans are used to solving their
problems by employing ethnic cleansing, armed brutality, suppression of
civilian population and decimation of the elites of the enemy. This is
not a value judgement. It is a statement of historical fact. Bulgaria
has done it to its Turkish citizens as late as 1995. It used to be the
same (and much worse) in Western Europe until 1945. Nations - like
human beings - have a growth trajectory. It cannot be hastened or
imported. It must grow from within, by integrating experiences,
including painful and traumatic ones. Peaceful co-existence often
follows and is the result of a devastation so great that no other
alternative but peaceful co-existence is left. Any foreign intervention
serves only to exacerbate the situation by increasing the number and
intensity of inter-ethnic grudges. The seeds of the current conflict in
Kosovo were sown by the Ottoman Turks as early as 1912. Foreign
interventions tend to boomerang in the Balkans. Actually, they
boomerang everywhere. Ask Israelis how they fared in the Lebanese
quagmire.
The West should have respected the Balkanian way of conducting their
affairs and resolving their differences. It should have left them to
slaughter each other in peace. These are young nations (having been
freed from all foreign occupation only as late as 1945 after centuries
of subjugation). They need to learn from their OWN experiences. They
need to reach the point of exhaustion beyond which there is only
peaceful co-existence. Violence solves nothing, on the contrary, it
just reinforces the Balkanian conviction that he who carries the big
stick has justice on his side.
But how did this apparent transition from interest-wars to culture-wars
transpire?
Indeed, the transition is only apparent. The key is the transformation
of culture from something ethereal and transcendent - to a strong
self-interest as any other. Once culture became an asset to protect,
cultural wars were certain to erupt. Thus, it is still self-interest at
the basis of it all but this time the self-interest protected and
furthered is cultural dominance and hegemony.
It started rather innocuously and inadvertently. The Americanisation of
the world was perceived to be the historical equivalent of the Pox
Romania. This was a false analogy. The Pox Romania was rampant
pluralism. The Pox Americana is rampant homogeneity.
Then the West (notably America) suddenly realized the economic
dividends on cultural homogeneity (for instance as evident in various
forms of intellectual property - movies, music, software, TV,
internet). Culture - the oft-neglected stepsister of economics - became
an INDUSTRY. A money-spinner. It was well worth the West's while not
only to sell mass produces culture to homogenized markets - but also to
make sure that these markets were peaceful, stable, accessible and
free. If necessary, this was to be secured by force.
Paradoxically, in this age of moral relativity and political
correctness - the West is ASHAMED to admit that this is a cultural war
where one of the parties is trying to impose its cultural values on the
other for utterly utilitarian reasons. Instead, the war is presented as
a matter of national interest of the OLD TYPE.
But then what IS the OLD TYPE of the national interest of the USA,
Europe, EU and NATO? Isn't it the preservation and immutability of
existing borders? The suppression of irredentist and separatist
movements? The abolition of terror? The prevention of large-scale
dislocations of endemic populations? And if so, wasn't the best way to
ensure all the above - to allow Milosevic to cruelly and ruthlessly
eradicate the KLA and intimidate the local population into submission?
Hasn't the West adopted these very tactics (of encouraging local
bullies to suppress and even eliminate local restive populations) in
Latin America in the 70's and 80's and in Africa in the 60's and 70's?
Didn't the West (wisely) turn a blind eye on China, Russia, Israel,
Iraq (prior to 1990) and others only recently when they did to their
population what Milosevic did not dare to do to his?
The Kosovo war - it is clear - is CONTRARY to any conceivable OLD TYPE
self-interest of the West. It costs the West dearly and will cost it
even more - and not only in monetary terms. The loss of prestige, moral
standing, world support, economic resources, world trade (the blocking
of the Danube) far outweighs any possible rendition of the old school
"national interest". It is the protection and propagation of the West's
culture that is at stake, replete with human rights, civil rights,
capitalism, individualism and liberalism. It is a defining war - not
only militarily (the future of NATO) but also culturally (the identity
of the future global market). Poor Milosevic, look what he got himself
into.
(Article published May 10, 1999 in "The New Presence")
Return
The Defrosted War
Russia's Role in a Brave, New World
A president (almost) impeached. An important politician sacked due to
incompetence. Business tycoons under investigation. The USA? No, this
is the new, post-communist, Russia. Many firsts, meagre experience,
numerous blunders. Is it democracy in action? No, it is simply
autocracy exposed. The same machinations went on in Ivan the Terrible's
court, the same conspiracies enshrouded Peter the Great's cabin, the
same conflicts besieged Stalin. Ask Khrushchev.
The great mistake of the West is the deeply ingrained naive belief in
progress. History is cyclical. Otherwise we could have learned nothing
from it. The nations of the Balkans will still be dividing and
re-dividing their blood stained enclaves and the Russians will still be
under autocratic rule and the Americans will still be moralizing in the
year 3000. History teaches us fatalism or, at least, determinism.
Russian autocrats refined the art of divide et impera (divide and
rule). They always had a keen eye for conflicting interests. They
pitted one group against another dangling carrots aplenty in front of
the drooling vassals. The recent shuffle was no different.
There are three major camps in Russia today. There are the "Reformists"
- young, well-educated, pro Western, with economic savvy,
forward-looking, corrupt. There is the "Old Guard" - old, guarded,
backward, centralist, anti Western (actually, anti American), corrupt.
And there are the nationalists - ideologically eclectic, rigid,
radical, dangerous, corrupt.
Yeltsin is the ultimate puppet master. The Old Guard was good to
stabilize a nose-diving economy and a disintegrating body politic. They
new where the levers are and how to use them, they possessed all the
right dossiers, they were chums with the Communist Duma. But they
proved to be too independent and too dangerous. They aspired to the
presidency (Primakov). They were too anti-Western and, thus, risked the
only reliable source of financing in the absence of tax collection (the
IMF funds). They espoused geopolitical brinkmanship. They were cold war
in an era of defrosted war. There is no money in cold war mantras. In
an age when money is the only ideology - they did not adhere to the
party line. They posed a threat not only to Yeltsin's authority - but
also to the economic well being of Russia.
Having looked into the abyss in the early stages of the Kosovo crisis
(remember the re-directed ballistic nuclear missiles) - Yeltsin engaged
in a surprisingly elegant volte-face. He appointed Chernomyrdin, a
pro-Western, quasi-Reformist, to contain the Kosovo damage. And he
fired Primakov, the hawk. The IMF gave Russia 4.5 billion dollars that
it swore blue in the face not to give Russia only a month before. A
coincidence, needless to add.
Yeltsin doesn't give a hoot about Kosovo. All he wanted was to
re-establish his domestic authority and to quash especially insolent
and increasingly dangerous investigations into his murky financial
dealings. Kosovo was an added bonus. A joker in an already excellent
hand. Yeltsin put it to deft use.
By sending Chernomyrdin to sort out the Balkan mess, Yeltsin killed a
flock of birds with nary a stone. He signalled to the West that a
pro-Western, pro-Reformist team is in control again and that the bad
guys have been consigned to oblivion. He signalled to the Duma and to
politicians of every colour and denomination who is the boss. The Duma
took the hint and promptly dropped the impeachment charges and
confirmed the nondescript (but very ominous) Stepashin as the next
scapegoat. He enhanced the geopolitical standing of Russia and already
converted some of it into hard cash, averting an otherwise certain
default of the Russian Federation. He allied himself with most of the
"progressives" and "liberals" of the world from China to the Guardian
in London. And, in his role as peacekeeper, he effectively extricated
Russia from the war psychosis that Messrs. Primakov et al. were trying
to plunge Russia into.
But why did the West - especially the USA - collaborate with this St.
Vitus dance?
Because they wanted Yeltsin o achieve all the above goals. Because it
served to neutralize Russia as a potential, backdoor combatant, a-la
Vietnam. Because they really had no more effective channel of
communication to Milosevic. Because it is better to have your dependent
as mediator - then a real independent. Because they had o choice: many
NATO members would have protested had Russia's help been rejected. And
because Russia has to be part of any future settlement.
Sometimes, as Freud said, a cigar is just a cigar. Only this time it is
a smoking cigar. There is more to the intricate USA-Russian
choreography than meets the eye. The USA is in no hurry to finish this
particular "air campaign". Meetings are scheduled a week apart. The
same proposals and the same envoys keep shuttling back and forth.
This is because Russia and the USA see eye to eye. They want Serbia
weakened and Milosevic dead (if possible). They understand that "Great
Serbia" is Milosevic's dream - but the world's nightmare. Everyone is
holding out. Everyone - Russia included - want the Serbs to cease to be
a viable fighting force. As time passes, Russia will become more and
more confrontational but this time the culprit and the recipient of
their vitriolic diatribes is likely to be Milosevic. It is good for the
West and it is good for Russia because it is Russia that will fill in
the vacuum left by the debris of the Milosevic regime. The USA couldn't
be happier. It wants out of the Balkan - never to come back.
At this stage, the poor nations of the Balkan are deluded into
believing in a future, Western sponsored, "Balkan Marshal Plan". They
are in for a rude awakening. The minute the war ends - the USA will
vanish, leaving the resulting mess to the natives, to a fragmented
Europe and to Russia, who asked for it by getting involved.
The only money likely to be invested in the region by the USA is in the
reconstruction of the Chinese embassy.
(Article written on May 19, 1999 and published May 24, 1999
in "The New Presence")
Return
The Bones of the Grenadier
Endgame in the Balkans
The (cyclical) victory of capitalism led westerners of all colours and
stripes to believe in solving problems by throwing money at them.
Prosperity, international trade, foreign investment, globalisation and
joint ventures are the new magic formulas. Mathematically put this
superstition is often presented thus: the propensity to fight decreases
in direct proportion to the amount of economic common interests of the
potential rivals. Thus, instead of tackling core issues - the West
tries to drown them in a green deluge of US dollars. Where the west
should have tackled a corrupt and autocratic mentality (Russia) - it
commits funds through the IMF instead. Where it should have applied
itself to interethnic tensions and rivalries (the politically correct
phrase denoting racism) - it rebuilds infrastructure.
If the "throw money at the problem" theorem were right - and it never
was, not even once in human history - the Yugoslav wars of secession
and succession would have never erupted. Former Yugoslavia was
economically independent and prosperous. It constituted an effective
and dynamic free trade zone between its six constituent republics.
Resources were allocated within it with reasonable efficiency.
Macedonia produced raw materials. Slovenia processed them. Croatia
consumed them, added some industrial products of its own and all of
them traded with Serbia, the seat of the administration. Yugoslavia was
rather self sufficient and conducted much of its value added and
trading activities in-house. The gap between its GDP and GNP only a
decade ago, reflects what used to be this rather efficient and
lucrative market, a mini-EU in the Balkans. The envy of all other
socialist countries it was mooted to become member of the EU (then, the
EEC) when the thought of the Czech Republic as a member would have
elicited condescending smiles. Heavy industry, light manufacturing,
construction and engineering all flourished. Yugoslavia's exports
boomed. It had a proto-capitalistic system of ownership and a
Japanese-style system of management. It introduced the IMF and its
reforms in 1980, when Tito was still alive and years before any other
socialist country. The reforms of Ante Markovic (the 1989-91 federal
prime minister) are still a model of "free enterprise with a socialist
bend". On purely economic grounds, the Yugoslav wars were and are a
colossal insanity.
The new Yugoslavia endured economic devastation to fight a losing war
aimed at securing the interests and safety of Serb minorities in the
newly formed Republics of former Yugoslavia (NOT to establish a
"Greater Serbia" as Western propaganda has it). Macedonia withstood a
multiple embargo by its neighbours Greece and Bulgaria because it
wouldn't change its name or the historical status of its language. The
economic price that Macedonia was forced to pay was mind boggling (the
affair with Greece is dormant now but far from over) - and it was
nothing compared to the Serb tally. The Jews, in contrast, were busy
signing economic agreements with Germans less than 6 years after the
holocaust. A different order of priorities, surely.
Having lived in the Balkans and worked there for almost a decade, I am
forced to conclude that economic arguments are absolutely meaningless
when they clash with the proud and romantic nationalism of the likes of
the Serbs. If offered in isolation, economic incentives will do nothing
to reduce future conflicts or contain them. Marshal plans, future EU
membership (or current EU "new" association), IMF soft loans, World
Bank effective grants - will all fail to preclude future armed
conflicts as they have always failed in the past.