of the European people is a greater historic fact and present reality
than any of those brief heritages of common life for a few short
centuries of one or other sections of the race, giving rise to the
national tongues. Personally, one may sympathise with the scholar's
preference for a survival of Latin as the language of Europe, as it was
during the Roman Empire, as it was during the Middle Ages, and as it
would have remained but for the outburst of Nationalist particularism
during the sixteenth century. One may lament, with a loyal European like
Talleyrand, what that outburst has cost Europe; led by the ambition of
the House of Capet in France, of the Tudor in England, and the princes
of North Germany, plunderers of the Teutonic knights. No doubt it is
true that thousands of millions of pounds and millions of lives have
been wasted by that particularism--strange step-child of the unifying
Renaissance. From the æsthetic side, it is vain to argue whether Keltic
be a purer tongue, more passionately expressive, Spanish more majestic,
or Italian liquid music. The sieve of the gods seems hitherto to let
through, for the world of the European race, only two of the great
tongues--French and English."
In a word, for all æsthetic purposes, let the various harmonies of all
the tongues of the European race continue to enrich the choir,
enshrining memories of the past. But for the political field of action
the trumpet of command and order should sound a note clear from its
being single.
Any incidental inconvenience, such as must arise to the first generation
of immigrants to the American Commonwealth, must only be treated as
transitory, and, as far as possible, provided against. Very few
Europeans who do not know English have business in the law-courts or
public offices. In the years preceding the late war, only five out of
every hundred cases in the Transvaal law-courts were between people not
conversant with English. For this small minority, in all the public
offices and the courts, competent interpreters can be provided.
VII.--LEGISLATIVE MEASURES
It may be well that I should add some suggestions as to the measures
which I at present hold should be taken to put into force the general
lines of legislation, already sketched out as suitable for the carrying
out of the Imperial policy as already defined. But it should be
understood that these suggestions are only intended as furnishing
material for discussion. In the absence of fuller information as to
future needs and emergencies, it would be unwise to finally advocate
concrete measures. What is, in my mind, of importance is not any
specific measure, but the principles of Imperial policy on which I have
insisted. If it can be shown to me, in the future discussions on these
matters, in which I hope to take part on my return to South Africa, that
other measures are better suited to carry out the consistent policy I
have defined, I shall be prepared to advocate such other measures.
In the first place, I think that in view of the wide divergence of
opinion and interest, among the British residents quite as much as among
the Boers, a consultative body, nominated by the High Commissioner,
should be appointed to advise on any projected legislation. For some
time, while the form of Crown Colony Government is continued, advice
from such a body will be specially needful. Apart from the maintenance
of law and order, the interests of the great mining groups,
representation of shareholders resident in Europe is by no means
necessarily the same as those of the rest of the British residents, or
indeed those of the Imperial Government. Among such matters of
divergence of interest may be enumerated the scale and method of
taxation on the mines, no matter for what Imperial purpose--British
immigration, State irrigation works, or university and general
education. The maintenance of the present very high rate of wages of the
European miners is another subject. British residents in the towns,
shopkeepers, importers, professional men and their employees, are
concerned in the maintenance of a high rate of wages for the miners, as
the money is spent in the country, not in Paris or Berlin. Again, the
introduction of the truck system, the supply of goods by the miners to
their employees, European or Kaffir, while it would increase the profits
of mining shareholders in Europe, would destroy the means of existence
of the bulk of the British residents in the towns.
Amongst the Boers, there is almost as great divergence of interest
between the wealthy farmers, desirous of keeping together their vast
cattle ranches of 6000 acres, and the class of Bijwoners (tenants at
will on an over-lord's land), whose interest would be favoured by the
dividing up of cattle ranches, and the encouragement of small farmers
who would be agriculturists.
For this reason, a consultation body should be thoroughly representative
of all classes.
Direct legislation favouring British immigration of agriculturists is
plainly necessary, and as well the creation of State irrigation works.
Such steps, it is reassuring to know, have already been taken.
Personally, I am in favour of village ownership of agricultural lands
being instituted, a system with which the Boers are already familiar, in
connection with the cultivation of the lands owned by the towns.
To promote the prosperity of British residents in the towns, and as well
to secure a market for agricultural produce, the truck system should be
prohibited by law; and the compound system, under which the Kaffir
workmen in mines are not only supplied with goods but confined to
barracks called "compounds," should also be prohibited. Neither system
has hitherto been in force in the new Colonies.
As regards the Gold Law, the new British administration has established
a tax of ten per cent. on the net profits of each mine, and has retained
the previous system as well, of taxing the possession of mining areas.
It will require some time to see how the present method of levy affects
the growth of the British population. Personally, I have not been
convinced by the arguments in favour of the "claim license" system: it
is held by its opponents that it tends to throw all the mining areas
into the possession of the great mining groups, the areas being
forfeited to the State in times of depression by poorer men who are
unable to continue to pay. Suggestions deserving consideration have been
made as to the advisability of the State developing gold areas already
in the possession of the State.
As regards the arrears of claim licenses accruing during the war against
the expelled British inhabitants, I have strongly advocated in the
London press their entire remission. The Boer burgher on commando is
held to be exempted; it is difficult to see why the expelled British
should not also be exempted.
Another measure which I have supported is that of the arming of all
British civilians, for reasons already enumerated. An essential to the
measure being successful, being loyally supported, is that, on the Boer
model, the officers of the corps should be elected by their men. British
colonists, with their traditions of liberty and independence, will never
submit to being compulsorily placed on military service and subjected to
the orders of officers whom they have not chosen.
No measure of greater political moment can be taken than the thorough
organising of a system of education, from the university to the school.
I am one of those who support the making of the Gold Reef city a great
university centre.
As regards the Native Law, I advocate as little as possible alteration
in the laws already in force. The Boer theory of the position of the
Kaffir--as not an equal, but entitled to justice, under tutelage to a
government directed by European ideals--is the sound one.[2]
Asiatic immigration in any form, whether of British Indians from India,
or Chinese from Hong-Kong or elsewhere, would be a measure fraught with
disaster to the future of European civilisation. With the exception of
some employers of labour in Rhodesia and Natal, South African
opinion--British, Boer, even Kaffir--is opposed to Asiatic immigration.
Even the employers referred to only desire to encourage the importation
of Asiatics as manual labourers, not as owners of the land or traders in
the towns.
FOOTNOTES:
[2] In the _Fortnightly Review_, August 1902. Ideal with this subject:
"Negrophilism in South Africa."
THE AFRICANDER PARTY
ITS ORIGIN, ITS GROWTH, ITS AIMS
BY THE HON. A. WILMOT
_Member of the Legislative Council, Cape Colony; Author of "History of
Our Own Times in South Africa," &c., &c._
One of the greatest statesmen whose experience and ability have assisted
the Imperial Government declares that it was only after two years'
residence that he understood the political problems affecting South
Africa. Hundreds rush in where Milners fear to tread, and the little
knowledge which induces superficial views and rash judgment on a merely
_primâ facie_ case are now at present, as they have been in the past,
among the causes which impede the progress of a vast country which we
hope will yet become a great federated dominion under the British crown.
It is because of the vital importance of going to the root of the
political questions affecting South Africa that this paper is written.
The origin of the Africander party is traceable principally to
discontent with British rule. The Cape Colony, as our readers know, was
obtained by conquest in 1806, and by purchase from the Netherlands for
six million pounds sterling in the year 1814. Mr. Paul M. Botha, Member
of the Orange Free State Volksraad for Kroonstadt, states the case from
the Dutchman's point of view, and tells us that as England said that
South Africa was her country she ought to have governed it, instead of
which she shirked responsibilities and was guilty of the most glaring
inconsistencies. One day England blew hot and the next cold. "One moment
she insisted on swallowing us, and the next moment she insisted on
disgorging us." For example, the Orange Free State was declared British
territory because a governor said, "You can never escape British
jurisdiction." Then we were abandoned because the next governor said,
"The country was a howling wilderness." The Transvaal was annexed, and
Sir Garnet Wolseley declared: "The rivers will sooner run back in their
courses than that England will give back the Transvaal." Shortly after
that the Transvaal was retroceded, after Majuba, because the British
Ministry said, "We have been unjust in annexing this country."[3]
The slavery question, Mr. Botha tells us, was handled with astounding
negligence and ignorance of the circumstances of the people. Although
England was perfectly right in emancipating the slaves, yet the way it
was done irritated, annoyed, and disgusted the people, and sowed seeds
of distrust which have never been eradicated. England failed to carry
out effectively her promises of compensation.
On the minor grievances, such as Slagter's Nek and other so-called
injustices of England, Mr. Botha lays no stress. "It was a rough period,
and rough measures were used by all Governments." He significantly adds
that what he has heard of the cruelty of the Dutch East India Company's
officials makes him think that anyhow British rule was heaven to that of
the Dutch. Whatever a well-educated man like Mr. Botha may say, we know
that the rank and file of the Dutch throughout South Africa are taught
to "Remember Slagter's Nek." Nothing can be more unjust than to blame
the British power for executing rebels, caught red-handed and sentenced
to death in perfect accord with both evidence and law by a competent
Court, whose members were themselves of Dutch extraction. Nevertheless
this is one of the heavy popular grievances.
Mr. Botha says that England's weak and spasmodic policy in South Africa
has made the Boer what he is to-day--distrustful and contemptuous of
British statesmen. By further receding into the interior, and having to
fight wild beasts and hordes of Kaffirs, the Boer became blown out with
vanity at his own prowess, and more and more ignorant. Through this
ignorance it is easier to mislead than to lead him. A man who plays upon
his vanity and prejudices against England quickly obtains influence. A
loud talker and blusterer gets a better hearing than a quiet reasoner.
"I ascribe this to want of education and complete isolation on the
veldt."
As a marked illustration in support of Mr. Botha's view which has come
under the present writer's observation, let us tell what occurred
shortly before the war to a nephew of the Speaker of the House of
Assembly who had to travel through the Transvaal to look after some
landed property. This gentleman, who spoke the Taal perfectly, met at
one place about two dozen Dutchmen who were, like the Laird of Cockpen,
"greatly ta'en up with the 'fairs of the State." The first question,
"Can we beat the British?" was answered by a unanimous "Yes, we have
done so before, and can, of course, easily do so again." Second. "Tell
me, Carls, could we beat England and France united?" "Certainly," said
every one, "there can be no doubt about it." But now interposed a new
speaker. "How if we had to fight England, France, and Germany?" The
reply was unanimous. "We can beat them all three." No wonder that the
people of the Lord, as they believed themselves to be, took the bit
between their teeth at the time of the ultimatum. Not even Paul Kruger
could then have stopped the war, for they felt perfectly assured of
victory.
With a religion which has not unfitly been described as a superstition
based upon the Old Testament, there is profound ignorance accompanied by
prejudice of the most deep-rooted character. Mr. Botha tells us that
unfortunately the ministers of the Dutch Reformed Church, "greedy for
the fat lamb, the fowl, and the purse," foster this ignorance. One
Predikant had actually the audacity to tell his congregation that God
_must_ help His chosen people, otherwise He would lose His influence.
Mr. Botha defends his own people against charges of treachery, and gives
it as his fixed opinion that a just and firm Government with uniformity
of treatment will not only control and satisfy the Boers, but eradicate
in time that feeling of distrust and fear which was engendered in their
minds by the halting and unequal policy of England. He admits at the
same time that it is to Britain that they owe peace, and that it was
Britain that protected them from foreign invasion and saved them from
continual civil strife. Then comes most important evidence. President
Brand of the Free State recognised in the misgoverned Transvaal a subtle
enemy. Indeed, it is scarcely remembered that in 1857 the burghers of
the South African Republic invaded the Orange Free State territory and
declared that it belonged to them. Paul Kruger was subsequently raised
up, in the opinion of his followers, to be a Moses, whose mission was to
deliver "De Africander Natie" from British bondage. Mr. Botha asks us to
let him tear this veil of false romance away. "We know him," he tells
us, "as an avaricious, unscrupulous, and hypocritical man, who
sacrificed a whole people to his cupidity." Krugerism spread over South
Africa, using the Bond, the press, and the pulpit to further its
schemes.
[Illustration: AT THE HEAD OF UMGENI FALLS, HOWICK, NATAL.]
Let it be fully understood--the Bond was the _fons_ and _origo_ of the
South African war--Krugerism powerfully co-operating. The idea of the
Africander Bond took root at the Paarl in the Cape Colony in the years
1879 and 1880. Of course, as we have seen, there was abundant
preparation, but events in the Transvaal hastened proceedings.
Enthusiastic, educated men, such as Reitz, Te Water, and the students of
the Theological Seminary at Stellenbosch felt patriotic desires wildly
coursing in their veins, but the honour of formulating a definite
plan of organisation belongs to the Rev. S. J. du Toit, who then edited
_De Patriot_ newspaper at the Paarl. _De Transvaalse Oorlag_ was
published by Messrs. D. T. du Toit & Co. of the Paarl in the year 1881.
It was the retrocession of the Transvaal under the direction of Mr.
Gladstone in the last-mentioned year that enabled the Bond to assume a
very definite shape, and to obtain immense and widespread power.
Carl Borckenhagen, editor of the _Bloemfontein Express_, and F. W.
Reitz, who succeeded Sir J. Brand as President of the Orange Free State,
and was subsequently State Secretary of the Transvaal, earnestly joined
the Bond. The former was a German, whose honest and intense hatred of
England was apparent in all his leading articles, while the life-dream
of the latter was to see the establishment of the Dutch Republican
United States of South Africa.
Branches of the Bond were formed in the Cape Colony, the Transvaal, and
the Orange Free State, and in 1882 the first Congress of the Bond was
held at Graaff Reinet. A very astute and profoundly able plotter was
already at work in the person of Mr. J. H. Hofmeyr, who had started "The
Farmers' Protection Society" with the expressed purpose of watching over
Dutch farmers, and stirring them up to take an interest in politics.
Hitherto the Dutch bucolic mind had lain fallow. It was now to be
cultivated in order that it might produce fruit at parliamentary
elections, and, as a more powerful means to that end, "The Farmers'
Protection Society" was amalgamated with the Bond in the year 1883. Mr.
J. H. Hofmeyr then assumed the reins of management, and, as a Member in
the House of Assembly for Stellenbosch, began to wield a power which at
last developed into that of a colonial Earl of Warwick, or king-maker.
Ministries were formed at his bidding, and cabinets accepted his
control.
Certainly Mr. Hofmeyr very wisely and astutely modified the ostensible
objects of the Bond, and he was helped to do so by the fact that the
Hollander party in the Government at Pretoria became stronger than the
Africanders. Indeed, the Rev. S. J. Du Toit, the founder of the Bond,
was worsted in the Transvaal by the men from the old country. But to
make up for this, their march in the Cape Colony was so triumphant that
the President of the Bond at the Paarl Congress in June 1900 was able to
glory in the fact that since 1884 the Cape Colony had been ruled under
responsible government almost exclusively by the aid of the Africander
Bond. In 1885 there were twenty-five Bond Members of Parliament who held
the balance of power, and there can be no doubt that Sir Thomas
Upington, Sir Gordon Sprigg, and Mr. Rhodes sought and accepted their
support.
When Mr. Rhodes became Prime Minister in 1890 he was in harmony with the
Bond, but certainly did not sympathise with its real object. Each party
masked its idea, and each party thought that it was successfully using
the other for its own objects. Objects diametrically opposite: Mr.
Rhodes desired the supremacy of the British Imperial Power, and the
Africander party really aimed at the formation of a Republican South
Africa.
The Bond, says Mr. Theo. Schreiner ("The Africander Bond," &c., p. 29)
was for many years the only organised political body in the Cape Colony,
and it exercised a political tyranny which crushed all true political
life and thought under its iron heel. While it deliberately refused to
take the reins of Government, it constantly aimed at increasing the
number of its Members in Parliament, and at making it impossible for any
Ministry to exist without its support. Arguing apparently from facts,
Sir Hercules Robinson, in his farewell speech at Cape Town in April
1889, went so far as to say that there was no longer any permanent place
in South Africa for direct Imperial rule.
A Bond Congress was held at Kimberley in 1891, when Mr. Rhodes made a
very bold but unsuccessful attempt to get the Dutch to join with the
English of the Cape Colony against the iniquitous rule and anti-British
policy of the South African Republic. Another Congress was held at Port
Elizabeth, when there was an attempt made to capture the Bond by means
of British friendship. Indeed the changed attitude of this Association
deceived many people, as under the extremely able leadership of Mr.
Hofmeyr it assumed the position of a great benevolent society, which
desired all Colonists, both English and Dutch, to join it, in order to
help forward the progress of South Africa. Nevertheless, it is very
significant that the Rev. S. J. du Toit lost the high position he had
previously held in consequence of his supposed anti-Transvaal
sympathies, and at the same time the influence of the South African
Republic greatly increased. "Blood is thicker than water." The close
alliance of sympathy more and more knit together the Dutchmen of the
States and of the Colonies.
But the Jameson Raid of 1895 removed every estrangement. Just before
this event President Kruger showed his hand by venturing on a dangerous
step, which really meant an open breach of the Convention. He closed the
drifts, or fords, by which goods carried on the Cape and Natal railways
entered the Transvaal, intending by this act to force traffic over his
own Delagoa Bay line. He was informed by a joint ultimatum from the
Imperial Government and the Cape Colony that his action could not be
permitted, and he rescinded his declaration.
It is not necessary to give a history of the Jameson Raid. No event
since Majuba had so much played into the hands of the party in favour of
an "Africander Natie." Cromwell's words when General Leslie's army left
its strong position, "The Lord has delivered them into our hands,"
clearly expressed the sentiment which on this occasion animated the
minds of Bond members. The Transvaal enormously increased its armaments,
preparations for war virtually commenced, and the entire sympathy of the
Africander party in the Cape Colony went out to their brethren of the
South African Republic.
Mr. Hofmeyr was a leader who thoroughly deserved the title of "the
mole," as he metaphorically burrowed under the political platform, and
concealed his methods and aims with great subtlety. He saw the danger of
pursuing openly the programme expressed in the motto of his party, and
clothed the ideas of Africanderism in a constitutional garb. However,
when considering the real aim of the Bond, we shall prove that this
association never abandoned its original programme.
It must be admitted that, in some respects, there is an analogy between
Daniel O'Connell, as leader of the Irish National party, and J. H.
Hofmeyr, the "Ons Jan" of Africanderism. Both ostensibly were in favour
of working only on constitutional lines, and both were defeated by
extremists, who saw no other way of obtaining success than by recourse
to arms. In the case of the Young Ireland party, with such leaders as
John Michell, Smith O'Brien, and Gavan Duffy, a very futile insurrection
was quickly crushed; while, so far as J. H. Hofmeyr was concerned, a
much greater conflagration resulted. The great fire was really lit by
him--at least he constantly added fuel to it--and when too late made
futile efforts to extinguish the flames. O'Connell was much more honest,
as he openly opposed the Young Irelanders, and retired broken-hearted
from the arena.
Hofmeyr undoubtedly did not raise a finger to stop the furious onward
march of his party. _Ons Land_ indeed encouraged this movement, and the
editor, Mr. Malun, was completely under the great leader's influence.
Certainly at the end, as will be seen if the correspondence ever comes
to light, Hofmeyr tried to stop the mad career of the Republics. No one
saw more clearly than he did that it was absolute folly to fight the
British nation, but his interference came too late.
O'Connell fought more straightforwardly. Never for a moment did he admit
that the policy of force was justifiable; while, on the contrary,
Hofmeyr had not the moral courage to step publicly into the arena and
denounce it. He was always occult in his mode of fighting.
Unfortunately, in posing as a friend, he became the most dangerous enemy
of his own people.