The Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor
Adolf Hitler
The Reichs Minister of the Interior
Frick
The Reich Minister of Finance
Count Schwerin von Krosigk
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2341-PS
1939 REICHSGESETZBLATT, No. 38, 2 MARCH 1939, PAGE 371
Decree on the education and careers of German officials of 28 February
1939
* * * * * * *
Par. 2.
The applicants must belong or have belonged to the party or one of
its formations. In the selection the personal aptitude and character
are decisive. Honorably discharged workers and soldiers (cf. par. 16
(1) and par. 17 of the decree on the care for soldiers and workers in
the form of 29 Dec 1937--RGBl I, p. 1417) and children of child-rich
families have preference. For pension applicants the special decrees
apply.
* * * * * * *
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2342-PS
1936 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 369
Law on the People’s Court and on the 25th amendment to the Salary Law
of 18 April 1936
The Reich Cabinet [Reichsregierung] has passed the following law which
is hereby promulgated:
CHAPTER I
ARTICLE 1.
The People’s Court is a regular Court in the sense of the law on
judicial organizations.
ARTICLE 2.
The People’s Court is comprised of one president and the necessary
numbers of presidents of the senate and councillors as main official
members [hauptamtliche Mitglieder].
ARTICLE 3.
The president, the presidents of the senate and the councillors are
appointed for life-time. They have to be qualified for the judge’s
office and must have completed their 35th year of age.
ARTICLE 4.
The honorary members of the People’s Court are appointed by the Fuehrer
and Reichs Chancellor for the duration of 5 years upon recommendation
of the Reichsminister of Justice.
ARTICLE 5.
Senates are formed at the People’s Court, the number of which is
determined by the Reichsminister of Justice.
ARTICLE 6.
If it is necessary for lawful course of affairs, permanently employed
judges may be called in temporarily as assistant judges to the People’s
Court in case of an accumulation of business. The delegation of an
assistant judge may be called off before the end of the time, for which
the assistant judge has been called in, only if the emergency, by which
it was caused, does no longer exist.
ARTICLE 7.
The office of the public prosecutor at the People’s Court is filled
by one or several Reich prosecutors or State prosecutors. They are
nonjudicial officials, must however be qualified for the judge’s office.
ARTICLE 8.
At the People’s Court an office will be established which will be
filled with the necessary number of recording officials.
CHAPTER II
ARTICLE 9.
The Reich pay law of 10 December 1927 (RGBl I, p. 349) will be changed
as follows:
1. To the pay class A will be added:
a. in pay group Ib after “directors of law courts”: “Chief State
Prosecutors at the People’s Court”;
b. in pay group 10a after “Sergeant of the German Supreme Court”
[Reichsgerichtswachtmeister];
2. To the pay class B will be added:
a. in pay group 3b under Section “Reichministry of Justice” before
“president of the highest court of Justice” [Kammergerichtspresident]:
“President of the People’s Court”;
b. in pay group e under section “Reichministry of Justice” after
“Senate President at the German Supreme Court,”: “Senate president at
the People’s Court, Reich Prosecutor as head of the State Prosecutor’s
office at the People’s Court” and in note I after “German Supreme
Court”: “and at the People’s Court as well as the Reich Prosecutor as
head of the State Prosecutor’s office at the People’s Court”;
c. in pay group 8 under Section “Reichministry of Justice” before
“Presidents of District Courts at Courts with 30 or more organic
[planmaessig] judges in the district”: “Councillors at People’s Courts”.
ARTICLE 10.
Of the positions printed in the budget of the Reichministry of Justice
for the financial year of 1935 (individual plan IX) at Chapter 2
(German Supreme Court) the following positions are transferred to
Chapter 2a (People’s Court):
Group B 7: 1 Reich Prosecutor.
Group A 2b: 2 Chief State Prosecutors.
Group A 2d: 4 senior judges in law courts of justice (6 of whom to be
transformed in future).
Group A 4b: 6 Chief inspectors of the Government.
Group A 4c: 2 inspectors of the Government.
Group A 7: 6 Secretaries.
Group A10: 6 Sergeants of the German Supreme Court
[Reichsgerichtswachtmeister].
(2) In the budget of the Reichministry of Justice (Individual Plan IX)
the following organic positions will be newly created in Chapter 2a
(People’s Court):
Group B 3b: President of the People’s Court.
Group B 6: 2 Senate presidents at the People’s Court, 1 Reich
Prosecutor (under transformation of the Reich Prosecutor’s position
of Group B 7 transferred from the German Supreme Court). They
receive an irrevocable extra pay of 1000 RM which can be added to
the base pay, for purpose of pension [pensionsfaehig].
Group B 8: 6 Councillors at the People’s Court.
Group A 1b: 2 Chief State Prosecutors at the People’s Court.
Group A 2b: 2 Chief State Prosecutors.
Group A 10a: 1 Chief Messenger’s supervisor.
He receives extra pay for this position of 300 RM which can be added
to the base pay for the purpose of pension [pensionsfaehig] and is
irrevocable.
5 Sergeants of the People’s Court under transformation of 5
positions of sergeants of the German Supreme Court taken over from
the German Supreme Court.
CHAPTER III
In as far as laws or other regulations refer to the Chief Reich
Prosecutor as authority of indictment at the People’s Court, his place
will be taken by the Reich Prosecutor at the People’s Court.
CHAPTER IV
The Reichministry of justice will issue the legal and administrative
regulations necessary for the execution of this law.
CHAPTER V
(1) This law shall take effect as of 1st April 1936.
(2) The honorary members of the People’s Court appointed on the basis
the former regulations continue to remain in office according to their
appointment hitherto. The same holds good with regard to members who
have to be qualified for the judge’s office. On 31st October 1936
however those are being eliminated who will not have been appointed up
to this date to main official members of the People’s Court.
(3) If members of the German Supreme Court and Reich Prosecutors are
being transferred to the People’s Court up to 1st April 1937, they will
receive in case of their being retired at least the pension to which
they would have been entitled if they had remained in their former
positions at the German Supreme Court.
Berlin, 18. April 1936
The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor
Adolf Hitler
The Reichministry of Justice
Dr. Guertner
The Reichministry of Finances
Count Schwerin von Krosigk
The Reich War Ministry and Supreme
Commander of the Armed Forces
von Blomberg
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2344-PS
RECONSTRUCTION OF A NATION
[Aufbau Einer Nation]
by Hermann Goering, 2nd Edition, Published by E. S. Mittler & Son,
Berlin 1934, [Page 89].
* * * * * * *
Against the enemies of the State, we must proceed ruthlessly. It cannot
be forgotten that at the moment of our rise to power, according to
the official election figures of March 1933, six million people still
confess their sympathy for Communism and eight million for Marxism....
_Therefore, the concentration camps have been created, where we
have first confined thousands of Communists and Social Democrat_
functionaries.
* * * * * * *
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2347-PS
1935 REICHSVERWALTUNGSBLATT, Vol. 56, No. 29, Pages 577-578, dated 20
July 1935
(Editorial Board: A. Mirow, _Dr. H. H. Lammers_, H. Pfundtner, Dr. O.
Koellreutter, Dr. F. A. Medicus)
II. COURT DECISIONS
Survey of decisions of the Supreme Administrative Court
[Oberverwaltungsgericht]
Police in General
(Rush-reprint)
Since the Law on the Secret State Police [Geheime Staatspolizei] of 30
November 1933 (GS.S. 419) became effective, decisions of the Office of
the Secret State Police [Geheimes Staats Polizeiamt] can no longer be
contested according to the provisions of the Law on the Administration
of Police. The only remedy against them is a complaint to the superior
authority.
Legal status of the Bureau of the Secret State Police according to the
Law on the Secret State Police of 30 November 33.
On September 4 1934 the Association Secretary filed a suit against the
Secret State-Police at the District-Administrative Court in Berlin. The
association asserted that on 23 August 1934 their president had been
informed by two officials of the office of the Secret State-Police that
the assets of the association would be sequestrated for the purpose of
an eventual confiscation.
With the decision of 1 November 1934 the District-Administrative Court
decided to dismiss the suit.
The appeal of the plaintiff against this decision could not have any
success.
The District-Administrative Court in this case dismissed the suit on
the ground of the inadmissibility of such an action to this court.
According to the principle of enumeration quoted by the judge of first
instance a suit can be filed with the administrative courts only if
legal provisions expressively rule to that effect. The right of legal
redress as provided by the law relating to the Police-Administration
applies according to the wording of this law only to the police orders
issued by the ordinary police-authorities, i.e. the police-authorities
of the community, the district, or the province. The sequestration
order in question has not been issued by an ordinary police-authority;
on the contrary it had been issued by the Office of Secret
State-Police, the legal status of which has been provided by the Law of
30 November 1933.
With this law an authoritative status was given to the Secret
State-Police which was basically different from the one at the
time it was created, based on the Law of 26 April 1933. By virtue
of this last-mentioned law, the Office of the Secret State-Police
should act in political matters “at the side of or in the place of
the ordinary police-authorities” and “should have the status of a
Province-Police-Authority”....
This legal status was changed, as the District-Administrative-Court
properly recognized, when the “Secret State-Police” was created. An
authoritative organization was created thus, the status of which
is expressly determined by law to be exempt from the sphere of the
Minister of Interior, otherwise competent in all Police matters.
Section 1, subsection 1, sentence 1 and 2 of the Law of 30 November
1933 quotes:
“The Secret State Police is forming an independent branch of the
interior administration. Its chief is the Prime Minister”. The
conception “interior administration” here is not used in the usual
meaning of today according to which this word designates the specified
affairs within the sphere of the Minister of the Interior--as for
instance in comparison with the administration of commerce or public
instruction, etc....
That the Secret State Police became an independent organization is
clearly shown on one side by the fact that it is subordinated as a
whole to the Prime Minister, and then by the creation of special
authorities designated with specific names.
Concluding from all this the legal status of the Office of the Secret
State Police since the Law of 30 November 1933 became effective is the
following: The office is part of a special authoritative organization,
the “Secret State Police” which forms an independent branch of the
Administration of the Prussian State. It has, like the Secret State
Police as a whole, its special field as to the nature of its tasks:
the management of affairs of the political police. Therewith the
characteristic signs are given of a “Special Police Authority” within
the purview of Section 2, subsection 2 and section 8 of the Law
relating to the Administration of the Police, an authority detached
from the organization of the ordinary police-authorities entrusted with
a special police task. It cannot be considered part of the limited
circle of police authorities, i.e. State [Landes] authorities, Kreis
or local authorities, pursuant to Section 2, subsection 1 of the Law
relating to Police-Administration, as in relation to them it figures
rather as a central authority pursuant to the mentioned provisions of
Section 3, subsection 2 of the law of 30 November 1933.
From the thus signified character of the Office of the Secret State
Police, which therefore doubtlessly forms a special-police-authority
it can be concluded that its orders as mentioned before,
are not subject to the provisions of the law relating to the
Police-Administration in regard to means of redress. Neither does the
Law of 30 November 1933 provide for the contesting of a decision by
a suit (filing an appeal) at the administrative court. Therefore the
party affected by such orders has only the general legal remedy of a
complaint to the supervisory authority.
Decree of 2 May 1935 III. C. 43/35
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2348-PS
Statement of Standarten Fuehrer Walther Rauff made on 19 October 1945:
I hereby acknowledge the attached letters, written by Dr. Becker
(Lieut.) on 16 May 1942 and received by me on 29 May 1942, as a genuine
letter.
I did on 18 October 1945 write on the side of this letter a statement
to the effect that it was genuine.
I do not know the number of death vans being operated and cannot even
give an approximate figure.
The vans were built by the Saurer Works, Germany, located, I believe,
in Berlin. Some other firms built these vans also.
In so far as I am aware these vans only operated in Russia.
In so far as I can state these vans were probably operating in 1941,
and I personally feel that they were operating up to the termination of
the war.
I do not personally know the number of persons killed in the death vans.
I would like to state that the reason why Dr. Becker wrote this letter
to me was due to the fact that I was the chief of the Section under
which were included such divisions as
(1) Ammunition
(2) Telephone
(3) Telegraph
(4) Radio
(5) All Trucks.
This group was known as II D.
When this letter was received, I referred it to a Captain Pradl for
appropriate action. The letter was discussed by Captain Pradl and
myself, and I believe that Pradl was instructed by me to have the
technical matters, of which the letters complained, remedied. I only
saw Dr. Becker once or twice and had no part in the actual appointing
of Dr. Becker to this position. I was never present when the death vans
were operating with persons in them being killed, however I did see
a death van as a sample and was interested merely from a technical
viewpoint. I was chief of this technical section from February 1940
until March 1940.
From May 1940 to May 1941 I was in the German navy. From September 1941
to May 1942 I was in Prague. I then became chief of the section again
from May 1942 to June 1942.
I wish to point out that my specific interest in these death vans was
the lower part where the motor was located.
I wish to state that my immediate superior was an individual of
ministerial grade by the name of Standarten Fuehrer Siegert. He was
chief of AMT II RSHA, and Siegert gave me orders to supply the chassis
of these death vans. Insofar as I can recall I only supplied 5 or 6.
The immediate superior of Standarten Fuehrer Siegert was Obergruppen
Fuehrer Reinhardt Heydrich, chief of S. D.
The immediate successor of Siegert was an individual by the name of
Spacil who succeeded Siegert around July or August of 1942, taking over
the same duties and same responsibilities as Siegert and remaining
chief of the section until the termination of the war. I believe that
Siegert returned to a position in the Ministry of Finance on being
relieved by Spacil.
I understand that this statement was made under oath and I hereby swear
that all statements contained in this affidavit are the truth, the
whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help me God.
Standarten Fuehrer Rauft
Witnessed by the following:--
Captain J. F. C. Bagshaw,
Captain G. K. Heller,
Captain C. A. Crowther.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2349-PS
THE MYTH OF THE 20TH CENTURY
by Alfred Rosenberg
Published by Hoheneichen Publishing House, Muenchen 1941.
[Page 215]
We recognize today that the central maximum values of the Roman and
the Protestant Church as negative Christianity do not correspond to
our soul, that they are in the way of the organic forces of the Nordic
racially determined peoples, must give way to them (these forces),
and must let themselves be re-evaluated in the sense of a Germanic
Christianity. That is the thought behind today’s religious searching.
* * * * * * *
[Page 514]
The idea of honor--national honor--is for us the beginning and end of
our entire thinking and doing. It does not admit of any equal-valued
center of force alongside of it, no matter of what kind, neither
Christian love, nor the Free-Masonic humanity, nor the Roman philosophy.
* * * * * * *
[Page 608]
A German religious movement which would like to develop into a
folk-church will have to declare that the idea of neighborly love is
unconditionally to be subordinated to the idea of national honor, that
no act of a German church may be approved which does not primarily
serve the safeguarding of the folkdom.
* * * * * * *
[Page 616]
A German religion will, bit by bit, present in the churches transferred
to it, in place of the crucifixion the spirit of fire--the heroic--in
the highest sense.
* * * * * * *
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2351-PS
THE ARCHIVE, Vol. 34-36, Page 1716
compiled by Ernst Jaenicke, Berlin.
Edited by Alfred-Ingomar Berndt.
Published by Otto Stollberg, publishers, Berlin, March 1937.
[Rosenberg in a speech on 7 March 1937 stated:]
The education of youth can only be carried out by those who have
rescued Germany from disaster. It is therefore impossible to demand one
Fuehrer, one Reich and one firmly united people as long as education is
carried out by forces which are mutually exclusive of each other.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2352-PS
THE ARCHIVE, Vol. 43-45, Page 1029
compiled by Ernst Jaenicke, Berlin,
Edited by Alfred-Ingomar Berndt.
Published by Otto Stollberg, publishers, Berlin, November 1937
[Kerrl said in a speech at Fulda, 27 November 1937:]
We cannot recognize that the Church has a right to insure that the
individual should be educated in all respects in the way in which it
holds to be right; but we must leave it to the National Socialist State
to educate the child in the way it regards as right.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2353-PS
BASIC FACTS FOR A HISTORY OF GERMAN WAR AND ARMAMENTS ECONOMY
[Page 35]
IV
The influence of central organization on development and activities of
the war economy organization
Centralization of the Supreme Reich authorities, ordered in case of
war, has influenced the development and the activities of the war
economy organization to such an extent, that it is necessary to discuss
this matter in detail.
The foundations had already been laid for the central organization of
the Supreme Reich authorities in the event of a war, prior to 1933
in many discussions and decrees, but it was radically altered when
the national socialists came into power and especially by the decease
of Reichpresident von Hindenburg. The latest orders were decreed
in the Reich Defense law of May 21, 1935, supposed to be published
only in case of war, but already declared valid for carrying out war
preparations. As this law (see Appendix IV, 1) fixed the duties of the
Armed Forces and the other Reich authorities in case of war, it was
also the fundamental ruling for the development and activity of the war
economy organization.
* * * * * * *
XV
[Page 135]
War and Armament Economic Measures from entry into Austria (1938 till
mobilization 1939)
The discussion between the Fuehrer and the Austrian Chancellor of State
Schuschnigg on February 12, led to the military-political measures
against Austria, which concluded with the entry into Austria on
March 13. This action against Austria, disguised under the code name
“Action Otto” prepared in a short time, has resulted in a wealth of
experience of utmost importance, for the preparation of mobilization
and especially for the economic preparations, and has in the course of
the year led to changes in the regulations regarding mobilization.
* * * * * * *
[Page 136]
The action was prepared and started without the cooperation of the
WStb. The result was, that the military measures created great
confusion in the economic sphere leading to unpleasant conditions for
the army and also for the economy for the time being.
* * * * * * *
[Page 141]
The experience gained during the action in Austria caused the OKW to
issue new regulations, preparing the separating of the mobilization
of the Armed Forces from the mobilization of the civilian elements.
Mobilization of the Armed Forces without public announcement (X-case)
was prepared; nevertheless there should be the possibility of
proceeding at any time from the mobilization of the Armed Forces only,
to a general mobilization of State, Nation and Economy. The basic idea
is, that all actions and regulations in case-X are based on Civil law,
a state of defense has not been declared and martial law has not been
proclaimed. The appropriate measures were ordered on July 5 by the
OKW. WStb and GBW expressed justifiable misgivings regarding these new
regulations, as mobilization of the Armed Forces before mobilization
of economy would create considerable confusion and endanger the smooth
running of the economic mobilization. On the demand for a divided
mobilization was necessary from a military-political point of view, it
was accepted in spite of the objections of the WStb and GBW.
* * * * * * *
[Pages 142-143]
The first _planned_ action of the war economy organization during
an actual operation was at the time of the entry into the Sudeten
territory. Liaison officers of the OKW [WStb] were attached to the
corps commandos, they were in charge of technical war economy units and
finally, War Economy Offices for special missions were created to take
over definite Economic departments. The military-political developments
during the occupation of the Sudeten German territory evolved in
such a manner, that the liaison officers as well as the technical
war economy units and the offices of WWi were rarely in action. The
planned preparation for action by these administrative units and their
activities in the Sudeten German territory nevertheless provided
experience which was also very valuable for the later Mob-preparations.
Primarily it was admitted by all departments, that the installation of
the liaison officers of the OKW [WStb] at the corps commandos is of
great value not only to the troops but also for OKW, and is a necessity
in modern warfare. This proved especially valuable insofar as the
chiefs of the Civil government were as a rule not instructed in their
duties and authority, and the offices for special missions, first had
to give them the necessary directives for their task.
* * * * * * *
[Page 146]
At the beginning of the year 1939 a new level was reached as regards
the military-political situation--the occupation of Bohemia and
Moravia by the German army and the abrogation of the sovereignty of
Czechoslovakia. These operations also were prepared “war economically”
by the creation of war economy units, who had, as in the case
Sudetenland, a very small scope for action. Immediately after the
occupation, a war economy inspectorate for special missions was set
up, which took over all the duties of the Czechoslovak secretaryship
general for National Defense and which was transformed into the
Inspectorate of War Economy Prague on March 30, 1939 already. The main
duties of the Inspectorate are:
Utilization of the total industrial economy of the Protectorate for
the purpose of Reichdefense;
Control of manufacture of war material for at home and abroad and
Effect synchronization of demands to be made by military and civilian
Reich authorities and the industrial economy of the Protectorate.
Furthermore they are assigned:
The instruction of the Reichprotector on the economic demands to be
made in the interest of Reichdefense and to advise him concerning
legislation resulting therefrom;
Air raid precautions in industry and guarding of factories and the
Defence Measures [Abwehrmassnahmen] in the factories.
* * * * * * *
XVIII
[Pages 181-184]
Execution of the economic mobilization
Before discussing the actual process of the economic mobilization
I regard it as my duty, to give my opinion on the possibility of
successful warfare as regards war economy, from my experience as
Chief of the WStb gained during August 1939. During this time many
conferences were held with the then Generaloberst Keitel discussing our
readiness for war and conditions in regard to armaments as compared
with that of the prospective enemy states. During all these discussions
I maintained the point of view, that a war with Poland would present
no problem for us, but that for a great world war of long duration,
our economic structure would be too weak and that, in the case of a
world war, decisive measures, conforming to a total war, would have to
be carried out immediately. These objections and the resulting demands
were nevertheless ignored.
The process of German mobilization in 1939 was most intensively
influenced by the progress of the military-political situation and
was carried out with the idea of surprising the enemy, at the right
moment. The experience gained during the operations against Austria,
Sudetenland and Czechoslovakia, which led to separate and camouflaged
mobilization, formed the basis for the measures to be taken. The
tension, existing between Germany and Poland since July, was used to
take all the measures, necessary for a surprise attack on Poland.
Some of these preparations as far as war economy was concerned were
the acceleration of the delivery of armaments, which in particular
was carried out by the branches of the Armed Forces and, for the
organization of War-economy, the forming of war economy units to be
attached to the attacking armies.
After August 1, the formation and distribution of VO of WStb took
place, they were attached to the AOK; on August 24, formation of war
economy units for the attacking armies concerned. On August 25, orders
for the camouflaged mobilization were released, with Aug. 26, ordered
as the first X-day. (see Appendix XVIII, 1 and Appendix XVIII, 2). In
this manner the form of mobilization was ordered, which represented the
most unfavorable form for the mobilization of war economy. Reiterated
objections against divided mobilization, submitted by WStb as late
as August 24, were overridden by the Chief of OKW, while the Supreme
Command was of the opinion, that a war with Poland did not necessitate
a General mobilization, and any other form of mobilization was out of
question for political reasons.
On August 25 18.30 a copy of case X was remitted to the inspectorates
of War economy (copy, see Appendix XVIII, 3).
The decree of August 25 orders expressly that case X shall not be
extended in its entirety to civilian matters. Even though it was
ordered that future proposed mob measures must not be endangered by
unplanned demands, requisitions and commandeerings, there was still
considerable danger in the mobilization being divided and carried out
at different times. This was especially applicable as far as economy
was concerned insofar as regulations for economy read that with the
utmost consideration of economy in general only the most important war
factories should be maintained at their former level and that only
isolated war factories should be immediately speeded up to produce
a large output. These regulations, in consideration of the Economic
Policy which was to oppose every unnecessary change, and also of the
kind of propaganda adopted were bound to endanger the planned process
of economic mobilization.
The preparations, covering many years of work, for the mobilization
of Economy were consequently, for the most part, invalid. This
regulation was unfortunately to become an inconvenience later on when
starting up the Armaments Industry and the economy of war and was even
noticeable for the first four years of the war up to the declaration
of total war in 1943. A large number of the measures, contained in the
preparation for mobilization of the WStb and invalidated by the above
regulation, were not executed until 1943 as a result of demands by the
Reichminister for Armaments and ammunition.
On August 27, 1939, the regulation on the administration of economy was
issued, whereby the Oberpraesidenten were charged with executing and
directing all economic measures of the GBW. Included in this was the
official founding of the District Economy offices, the Provincial Food
offices [Landesernaehrungsaemter], Offices of forestry and economy of
timber [Holzwirtschaftsaemter] forming finally the organization, that
should have been in force long ago as a result of the mobilization
order by GBW.
* * * * * * *
[Pages 273-275]
B. War Economy
The year 1940 was the first acid test for the value and necessity
of the War Economy organization. After it had proved its value at
home by the measures taken to strengthen the war economy of Germany
especially in reestablishing the German war industry and reconstructing
the armament industry and had earned the constant appreciation of
Field Marshal Goering and the Reichminister for War, it now remained
to prove that the organization was also able to support the combat
troops, to administer the economy of occupied countries and put it into
operation again, and that there was an absolute necessity for such an
organization in the present war. That this point of view is correct, is
proved by the fact, that all allied as well as enemy states constructed
similar organizations, imitating the German pattern.
The operations against Denmark and Norway and the western campaign
against Holland, Belgium and France brought full proof; the year 1942
has more than confirmed this point of view.
_1. War Economy Measures during the occupation of Denmark and Norway_
The occupation of Denmark and Norway brought for the German War Economy
organization a gratifying and manifold task. The office Wi Rue was
informed of the planned execution of these operations at the end of
February, and thereupon ordered the preparation of the measures to be
taken as regards war economy. It was decided, that a small staff under
the direction of Major Neef (Group leader in the dept. of raw materials
Wi Rue) should carry out the appropriate, preliminary preparations, for
the organization which were to be carried out in accordance with the
directives of OKW-WFA and the Oberquartiermeisters of group XXI charged
with the operational preparations. Commander in chief of Group XXI was
von Falkenhorst, General in the infantry; Colonel of General staff
Baentsch, Oberquartiermeister. The war economy specialists, coordinated
under Major Neef, was assimilated into the staff of group XXI on March
20, under the title “Group War Economy” and VO of OKW/Wi Rue office.
The first performance of the group was the compilation of material
on the economic structure of Denmark and Norway. Then it worked on
the war economy and armament part of the “Demands of OKW to the
political plenipotentiaries of the Fuehrer in the Danish and Norwegian
Governments”, and the economic measures in the “Special instructions on
conduct during occupation of Denmark and Norway”.
Furthermore, special tasks were given to the war economy officers
concerned and their first duties defined as follows:
a. Support of the military commanders in the utilization of the economy
of the country in the interest of the armed forces;
b. Identification and safeguarding of supplies against unauthorized
seizure or transport;
c. Starting or restarting of production plants; any further war economy
and armament tasks should be undertaken only by special order of OKW.
The working staff was able, during the four weeks available, to compile
detailed material, providing the respective war economy departments
with valuable material for their duties. All necessary orders,
directives and so forth were issued in a special calendar in order of
mobilization.
* * * * * * *
[Pages 276-282]
On April 2 it was decided to select April 9 as the day on which the
operation should be carried out.
The execution of the operation was on the whole carried out according
to plan. Provision was made that the WO should reach their posts
together with their respective staffs, namely, Major Neef by air,
the WO Osbjerg and Aarhus over-land, the remaining gentlemen in the
warships in which the staffs were transported, while all WO, though
partly under heavy fighting, reached their objective on April 9,
Major Neef was not able to reach Oslo until April 12, because of the
opposition near Oslo.
The unified War Economy Organization which had been prepared for Norway
and Denmark depended upon the regulation that the Senior Command for
special missions XXXI in Denmark was subordinate to group XXI in
Norway. When it soon became evident that this arrangement did not work
because of distances and because of the conflicting behavior of the
Norwegian and Danish governments, it was decided on April 10 to make
the Senior Command for Denmark directly subordinate to the Commander in
Chief of the Army, while group XXI together with the forces operating
in Norway was to remain subordinate to the OKW. As a result of this
change it also became necessary to divide the War Economy organization.
The War Economy Liaison Office Denmark was placed under the supervision
of the administrator of Danish economy, on the staff of the political
plenipotentiary of the Fuehrer in Copenhagen; the organization Norway
under Major Neef remained attached to group XXI.
In Norway as well as in Denmark the assignment of War Economy Offices
to the military detachments has proved successful. The War Economy
Offices were burdened with so many problems that their small staff
barely sufficed; they were very quickly maids of all work.
As soon as the offices were well established in their new districts and
the most important military problems had been settled, they quickly
attended to the construction of the War Economy Organization.
In Norway for the first few days after the occupation, the German
Ambassador Dr. Braeuer, remained the political plenipotentiary of
the Fuehrer. As Foreign Office commissioner, dealing with economic
problems, Min. Direktor Sarnow of the Reich Wi. M. was attached to him.
Major Neef immediately tried to secure a definition of the fields of
work. However, when this did not meet with any success, for the sake
of the work, he arranged with Min. Dir. Sarnow that the office of WO
Norway as should be incorporated into the Staff of the commissioner
dealing with economic problems, as Main Division II. This measure,
however, was never carried out, because both Dr. Braeuer and Min.
Dir. Sarnow were recalled on April 22 and the Gauleiter of the NSDAP
Terboven was named by the Fuehrer as Reichcommissioner of the occupied
Norwegian territories. All attempts by Major Neef to clarify the status
and spheres of activity with the 2nd in Command of the Reich Commissar
Gauwirtschaftsberater Otte, were for the time being unsuccessful. On
April 27 the former Liaison Office was changed to the War Economy Staff
Norway. The WO as a branch office was subordinate to the latter.
In Denmark, Commander Dr. Forstmann quickly succeeded in coming to
an understanding with the German Ambassador von Renthe-Fink and his
commercial attaché Dr. Krueger in regard to the spheres of activity. On
May 27 the office was renamed “War Economy Staff Denmark.”
The details concerning the establishing of the War Economy offices,
their growth, and their manifold tasks have been thoroughly described
in the accounts of the WStb Denmark and Norway. Hence, within the scope
of this report the details will not come under discussion. In short,
attention should only be drawn to the tasks as a whole, and the most
important experiences during this first large-scale operation of the
War Economy Organization.
The problems which faced the war economy officers during the
occupation of Denmark and Norway were very extensive and embraced
both military as well as economic problems in all fields of economy.
The military leaders were glad that officers trained in war economy
were at their disposal, who were qualified to solve questions of an
economic-organizational character and, as authorities, could negotiate
with Danish and Norwegian Officials. At this moment the manner in which
the War Economy Organization had been formed, proved its worth in that
there was personnel trained in military as well as industrial and
commercial fields. Thus it happened that problems were entrusted to the
WO which really lay beyond the scope of their activities. The following
may be named:
Supplying troops with food, Motor vehicles and fuel,
Procuring billeting possibilities for the troops,
Securing money and regulating the currency problem,
Procuring material (cement, wood, etc.),
Providing coal,
Regulating transportation,
Loading troops onto ships,
Procuring raw materials and finished products,
Putting the fishing industry into operation,
Rationing food for the armed forces and the civilian population,
Rationing of fuel,
Cooperating with the sailings of ships putting in and out,
Administering the loading of ships,
Checking over claims for compensation for war damage and requisitions,
Utilization of fish garbage and the manufacture of fish flour,
Price regulations for the purchase and renting of real estate for the
armed forces,
The loaning of horses and seed for agriculture.
These and similar problems had to be taken over by the WO, because the
competent offices of the Armed Forces Departments were not there or
were not in the position to solve these problems.
Only after these problems had been solved, was it possible for the
WO to cope with the real problems affecting war economy, which dealt
immediately with the seizing and securing of the most important
agricultural supplies and the reestablishing of the means of
subsistence.
Then the problems in Denmark and Norway shaped themselves in different
ways as a result of the war situation (see appendix XX, 6). As early as
June 15 the order could be issued regarding Denmark that the country be
treated as being in the domestic theatre of operations; and therefore
it was possible to quickly begin to make full use of the Danish defense
and armament industry. The exploitation of the armament industry in
Norway could only follow at a slower pace and at a later period,
because it was regarded as being enemy territory. The utilization of
the Danish and Norwegian economy followed within the framework of
the “Proposals by the armed forces for the regulating of the general
questions in regard to war and armament economy.” (see appendix XX, 7).
Very soon it was necessary for the Wi Rue department and the War
Economy offices in Denmark and Norway to take sharp measures in order
to avoid duplication of work and the overlapping of the WT in Danish
and Norwegian concerns. Above all, it was important for the sake of
currency stabilization to keep a firm hand over the buyers of the WT,
because they were causing danger to the currencies of the countries
by flooding them with fiduciary monetary tender. It very soon became
finally necessary to adopt measures to make the raw material available
for those orders placed with Denmark and Norway, because, in part, the
raw materials needed for the purpose of filling these orders were not
to be had there.
In order to hasten the process of getting Norwegian industry into
operation again, the Wi Rue Amt. sent German industrial and economic
personnel to Norway, who, as middlemen, were to quickly establish
confidential relationships and who on account of their expert knowledge
were to accelerate the revival of Norwegian Economy.
The experiences of the first months of the occupation show that it is
absolutely necessary to provide units operating independently with War
Economy Offices, since in a modern war economic problems are submitted
to the commanders which can only be solved by trained personnel. It is
self evident that, later on, a major portion of the problems must be
transferred to the civilian Economic departments, which will be set
up, and that the soldier confines himself to the solution of economic
problems that serve the troops, as long as no solution is found, as
later proved to be the case, in the Netherlands.
The staffing of the WO for Denmark and Norway was in most cases
too small, because the problems were too complex and the fields of
operation allotted to them were too large.
Yet it is an established fact that the War Economy Offices, in Denmark
and Norway especially, rendered invaluable services to the troops
during the first months and that an organization for the reopening of
industrial operations and to carry out the commissions of the WT was an
absolute necessity.
Moreover, the outstanding work of the War Economy offices in Denmark
and Norway was the main reason for the fact that, in 1941, it was
possible to carry out, according to plan, the enormous work for the
defense of the country, which was required of the Economies of Denmark
and Norway by the Supreme Command.
* * * * * * *
[Pages 283-284]
_2. Campaign in the West_
The operations against France, Holland and Belgium brought about the
first real use of the war economy organization in enemy territory. It
was accomplished in close cooperation with General Qu. of the Army.
At the start of the war, the Armed Forces operating in the West were,
by reason of the experience gained during the campaign in Poland,
supplied with Army Economic Officers [Armeewirtschaftsfuehrer-A Wi Fue]
who simultaneously were the liaison with the armament offices in the
border territory.
The primary duties of the A Wi Fue attached to the Western armies were
the tasks of economic evacuation and immobilization and only at the
end of 1939 did the preparations for the entry into Holland, Belgium
and France come to the foreground. The process of economic evacuation
in the homeland rested mainly with the competent Rue commandos of
the homeland, who had arranged the necessary preparations by way
of mobilization, in accordance with the clearance measures already
prepared during peacetime.
Especially in the Saar territory the VO had a complicated task to
perform, and was able to demonstrate the value of its existence for
defense also.
* * * * * * *
[Pages 313-315]
_Negotiations with friendly and neutral states on war economy and also
delivery of war material._
The year 1940 brought special problems for the office of Wi Rue as far
as trade in war material was concerned as a result of the deliveries,
necessitated by the military political situation, to Russia, Finland,
Roumania and Italy.
As previously reported in 1939, according to the German-Russo treaty
of August 19, 1939, the German deliveries on credit were to attain
in the next two years the sum of 200 millions RM, 120 millions RM,
thereof during the first year. It was indicated that German deliveries
of material to the value of 500 millions RM were desired during the
first year alone. As such quantities of machines, vehicles, apparatus,
etc., could not be obtained from the production point of view in such a
short time, and as the Russians had also included war material in their
request, the preponderant desire, from the beginning, at the Foreign
office and the Reichministry of economy was, to put at the disposal of
the Russians as much finished war material as possible.
As reported previously, the Russians had made ready for their first
reciprocal delivery valuable foods and raw material (1 million tons
cereals, 500,000 tons wheat, 900,000 tons of oil by-products, 100,000
tons of cotton, 500,000 tons phosphates, 80 millions RM of timber,
10,000 tons of flax, manganese, platinum, and the transit for 1 million
tons of Soybeans), and in consideration of the importance of these
quantities to the German war economy and the importance which the
Supreme Command attached to the maintaining of pleasant relations with
Soviet Russia, the question of immediate reciprocal deliveries became
steadily more pressing.
The desire to produce war material became stronger from week to week,
so strong that OKW created a special Referat at Wi Rue charged with
working on the Russian demands and arranging them in accordance with
the German production program. Appendix XX, 21 and XX, 22 gives an idea
of the progress of the arrangements.
As the Russians delivered quickly and well, it was imperative to
accelerate German deliveries. Consequently the German High Command
decided to offer the Russians even more war material, that was already
manufactured or under construction, and whose monetary value was
great. The great cruiser Luetzow especially came into this category,
other ordnance installations for ships, patterns for heavy artillery
and tanks and important patents [lizenzen] for war material. As these
contracts for this material did not satisfy the Russian requests, the
Fuehrer ordered, on March 30, that--as far as necessary--the delivery
of war material to the Russians should have priority over the delivery
to the German Armed Forces.
This order put some of the Army departments in a difficult position,
as the High command also wanted production for the German requirements
stepped up and demanded punctual delivery.
On August 14, the Chief of Wi Rue, during a conference with
Reichmarshal Goering, was informed, that the Fuehrer desired punctual
delivery to the Russians only till spring 1941. Later on we would have
no further interest in completely satisfying the Russian demands.
This allusion moved the Chief of Wi Rue to give priority to matters
concerning Russian War Economy.
By the end of October 1940, Reichmarshal Goering insisted once more,
on pressure being exerted for accelerated deliveries to the Russians
according to plan, (file notice from Oct. 5, see Appendix XX, 23).
Later on the urgency of the Russian deliveries diminished, as
preparations for the campaign in the East were already under way.
The Russians carried out their deliveries as planned, right up to the
start of the attack; even during the last few days, transports of
India-rubber from the Far East were completed by Express transit trains.
* * * * * * *
[Pages 323-324]
The production program ordered by decree of the Fuehrer on Aug. 20,
and instituted by reason of urgency, on Sept. 20, was stepped up again
on Sept. 27, and amended insofar as the equipment under the code word
“Achse” (African campaign) was to be given priority over all other
equipment, including the ones in the special category.
As both the Army and Minister Todt were urging the high priority of the
Panzer-and Achse-program, the Navy demanded its “Seeloewe”-measures
accelerated and aerial armaments were being even more intensified,
the Chief of Wi Rue office, at a conference of Chiefs of departments,
presided over by Fieldmarshal Keitel, pointed to the difficulties
of accelerating everything at the same time, with the bad situation
as regards manpower. He demanded once more a clarification of the
organization, which was really the most important thing. Resulting from
this the following decision was made by the WFSt on Dec. 3.40, enclosed
as Appendix XX, 35.
This decision affected future measures as follows:
1. there is no longer any mention of an Invasion of England but only of
a siege of England.
2. aerial defence of the homeland was placed at the top of the list for
the first time.
3. the prospective big action (Russia) mentioned for the first time,
and its postponement to some later date admitted as possible.
Shortly before--on Nov. 6, 1940--Reichmarshal Goering, for the first
time made a statement to the effect, that we should prepare ourselves
for a long war, and therefore planning of raw material should be
considered in this perspective, (see file on Report at Beauvais on Nov.
6.40, Appendix XX, 36).
At the beginning of December, instructions were received, that for the
time being there was no question of an Invasion of England, and that
the “Seeloewe”-preparations should merely be concluded.
* * * * * * *
[Pages 368-373]
_War Economy_
The year 1941 was, as far as war economy was concerned, mostly
dominated by the preparations, respectively the execution of the action
in the Balkans, the war in the East and the war in Africa.
The respective preparations go back to the year 1940. The development
of the Italo-Albanian-Greco war, the establishing of a German military
mission in Roumania and the possibility of German participation in the
Italian war in Africa had led as early as August 1940 to a War Economy
Staff Roumania and in October a War Economy Staff Africa being created
by the office of Wi Rue to deal with the problems connected with
these theatres of war and charged with working out all the questions
appertaining thereto. By the middle of November 1940 Colonel Gen. staff
Spalcke was delegated to Roumania as member of the German military
mission, and charged with the representation for war economy in the
Balkan countries and in Africa and the completion of the necessary
basis as regards war economy for an operation were intensively
processed in the office of the Wi. Rue.
In November 1940, the Chief of Wi Rue together with Secretaries of
state Koerner, Neumann, Backe and General von Hanneken were informed by
the Reichmarshal of the action planned in the East.
By reason of these directives the preliminary preparations for the
action in the East were commenced by the office of Wi Rue at the end of
1940.
The preliminary preparations for the action in the East included first
of all the following tasks:
1. Obtaining of a detailed survey of the Russian Armament industry, its
location, its capacity and its associate industries.
2. Investigation of the capacity of the different big armament centers
and their dependency one on the other.
3. Determine the power and transport system for the industry of the
Soviet Union.
4. Investigation of sources of raw materials and Petroleum (crude oil).
5. Preparation of a survey of industries other than armament industries
in the Soviet Union.
These points were concentrated in one big compilation, “War Economy of
the Soviet Union” and illustrated with detailed maps, etc.
Furthermore a card index was made, containing all the important
factories in Soviet-Russia, and a lexicon of economy in the
German-Russian language for the use of the German War Economy
Organization.
For the processing of these problems a task staff, Russia, was created,
first in charge of Lieutenant Colonel Luther and later on in charge of
Brigadier General Schuberth. The work was carried out according to the
directives from the Chief of the Office resp. the group of depts. for
foreign territories with the cooperation of all departments, economy
offices and any other persons, possessing information on Russia.
Through these intensive preparative activities an excellent collection
of material was made, which proved of the utmost value later on for
carrying out the operations and for administering the territory.
Simultaneously detailed investigations were made of the situation as
regards fuel and rubber in the case of a major action in the East, on
the basis of the demands made by the Chief of General Staff of the
Armed Forces and the Gen. Qu. of the Airforce, which will be discussed
later on.
Included in the processing of the Russian problem were matters of war
economic nature connected with the Balkans and Africa.
_Balkans_
While the preparations for the Russian Campaign could be completed
as planned, the measures for the action in the Balkans had to be
improvised on account of the unsuccessful revolutionary outbreak in
Yugoslavia. Only Colonel Wendt, as VO was sent to AOK--12 in Roumania
at the beginning of January as planned, and given charge of T. B. 13.
The preparations were arranged for an entry into Greece only. When
the revolt in Yugoslavia started, the preparations had to be altered.
Department IV of VO AOK--12 was divided, the one half under Colonel
Wendt to follow the assault of AOK--12, direction Belgrade, the other
half under Captain v. Illberg to accompany the forces attacking towards
Greece. Half a battalion each of T.B. 13 was put at the disposal of
Colonel Wendt and Capt. v. Illberg, respectively.
With the arrival of the second army Col. Fach was installed VO in
charge of T. B. 6 and 8. Furthermore he had specialists at his
disposal, familiar with the economy of Yugoslavia and Greece. Dr. Pook
of the Wi Rue Office was dispatched to manage copper mines at Bor.
Details of operations and results of the war economy units during the
action in the Balkans; (see report of OKW (Wi Rue Bureau) No. 27438/41
secret, of June 4, 1941, Appendix XXI, 10).
Even during the operations, organization of a War Economy Staff Serbia
with a Wi. Commando at Belgrade was ordered, the staff was closely
connected with Consul General Neuhausen charged with the Economic
Administration of Serbia, by the Reichmarshal.
Also
a. a war economy officer Agram for the territory of Croatia and
b. a Rue-commando Klagerfurt for the Yugoslavian territories turned
over to the Reich, were appointed (see Appendix XXI, 11).
The war economy staff Serbia quickly became of great importance for
supplying the troops operating in the Balkans, and later on deserved
much credit for the utilization and securing of the Yugoslavian raw
materials, important for German armaments and by organizing the
transport of these raw materials. The seizing of the still usable
factories in Serbia and Croatia for assimilation into the German
Armament Industry had already been started in April (s. Wi Rue Bureau
No. 22-261/62 of April 29, 41. Appendix XXI, 12 and XXI, 13) and
represented useful support for the W. T. especially for repair work
but also for the manufacture of material of all kinds. The concerns
processing raw material could be built up in the course of time to
form a valuable support for the German war economy, the deliveries of
copper, bauxite, tin, chromium, asbestos and mica were of considerable
importance.
As the territory of Greece, by order of the Fuehrer (see appendix, Wi
Rue Bureau No. 22-263/41 2 of May 29, Appendix XXI, 14) was ceded to
the Italians for economic exploitation, war economy offices were only
installed in Greece where needed by the Army or for the security of
transportation.
There was one Wi Kdo each established in Salonica and Athens. At
the same time the confiscation and utilization was ordered of the
factories, in the areas of Salonica and Athens occupied by German
troops, necessary for war economy and armament (see Wi Rue Bureau, No.
22-263/41 s. file XXI, 15). The factories in Athens were especially
important as repair plants for the airforce. But also by the delivery
of oil and tobacco to the army and to the homeland the war economy
offices rendered considerable service.
* * * * * * *
[Pages 380-381]
The compilation was the result of the deliberations concerning
the planned operation in the East, ordered by the Reich Marshall
in November 1940. The Office of Economy and Armament [Wi Rue
Amt] had taken pains to give a completely objective picture of
the situation regarding Defense and armament economy [wehr--und
Ruestungswirtschaftliche Lage] of the USSR and had held it necessary,
to refer to the points which might cause difficulties for a military
operation.
The result of this work compiled carefully on the basis of safely
proved facts is summed up at the end as follows:
“Any operation leading to the occupation of the European part of USSR
(without the Ural territory), will bring the following results:
I. During the first months Germany will be relieved in the field of
nutrition and raw materials, if a quick seizure should succeed in
a. _preventing the destruction of stocks_
b. _capturing the mineral oilfields of the Caucasus undestroyed and_
c. _solving the problem of transportation._
II. _For longer duration_ of the war an _effective relief_ is dependent
on the following prerequisites:
a. _in all fields_:
1. _on the solution of the transportation problem,_
2. _On the staying_ [_verblieb; translator’s note: may also mean:
“whereabouts”_] _of the people (population) and winning them over to
collaborate._
b. _in the field of agriculture_:
1. _on preventing destruction of the “M.T.S.” and the possibility of
replacing their pool of tractors and machines by taking up production
again in the USSR._
2. _on the possibility of fuel supply._
c. _in the industrial field_:
1. _on the capture of powerworks undestroyed or on their fast
restoration._
2. _on securing the delivery of raw materials not existing in the
European part of the USSR to the industry._
III. _The supplying of Germany with India-rubber, tungsten, copper,
platinum, tin, asbestos and manila hemp remains unsolved_ until
communication with the Far East will be established.
IV. The territory south of the mouth of Volga and Don inclusive of the
Caucasus must be included in the operation. _The Caucasian fuel supply
is indispensable for the exploitation of the occupied territories._
V. _In the field of just the armament-industry_ it will lead to taking
possession of about 75% of the total _Russian armament industry and
almost 100% of the precision tool-manufacturing and optical industry_.
_The USSR will keep about 25% of the mere armament and scarcely 1% of
the precision tool-manufacturing and optical industry._”
* * * * * * *
[Pages 404-406]
In addition to the Italian negotiations, until June 1941 the
negotiations with Russia were accorded a great deal of attention. The
Fuehrer issued the directive that, in order to camouflage German troop
movements, the orders Russia has placed in Germany must be filled as
promptly as possible. Since the Russians only made grain deliveries,
when the Germans delivered orders placed by the Russians, and since
in the case of individual firms these deliveries to Russia made it
impossible for them to fill orders for the German armed forces, it
was necessary for the Wi Rue office to enter into numerous individual
negotiations with German firms in order to coordinate Russian orders
with those of the German from the standpoint of priority. In accordance
with the wishes of the Foreign Office, German industry was instructed
to accept all Russian orders, even if it were impossible to fill them
within the limits of the time set for manufacture and delivery. Since,
in May especially, large deliveries had to be made to the Navy, the
firms were instructed to allow the equipment to go through the Russian
Acceptance Commission, then, however, to make such a detour during its
transportation as to make it impossible for it to be delivered over the
frontier prior to the beginning of the German attack.
As a result of the visit of the Hungarian Minister, Excellence Bartha,
the trade in war material with Hungary came once more into the
foreground. Above all, the Hungarians demanded German help in equipping
their air force, as well as anti-aircraft guns, searchlights, and
listening devices, tanks, artillery and communications equipment, and
heavy guns. For this they offered free facilities for the manufacture
of gauges and fuses, artillery equipment, trucks and tank trucks.
The Hungarians were promised help in almost all fields, however, not
until the summer of 1942, because it was thought that by this time the
campaign in the East would have come to an end. Technical help for the
saving of raw material with the issuing of licenses was offered them
immediately. The shifting of German orders to Hungary was put into
effect.
The negotiations with Roumania and Finland covered more ground, because
both states made considerable demands for the improvement of the
equipment of their units designed to fight against Russia. First of
all, the Roumanians asked for anti-aircraft equipment, prime movers,
and trucks for the motorization and artillery equipment of all kind;
moreover, they asked that the artillery and munition orders placed
in France and with the Boehler works be executed. The Finns demanded
long-range guns, anti-aircraft guns, fuses, airplanes and help in
carrying out motorization. In accordance with the directive from the
Fuehrer, the Roumanians were promised help as much as possible, while
the Finns were to be put off until later.
When the operations opened in the East, the demands became greater and
more urgent; the Finns, especially, called for raw materials and fuel.
These demands were met in the case of both these countries as much as
possible.
Bulgarian wishes lay, particularly, in the field of motorization and
communications and in the delivery of armoured reconnaissance cars and
tanks. Only small deliveries could be made; in general the Bulgarians
were instructed that these states, which were actually in the battle,
must receive first delivery.
Moreover, the negotiations with Turkey were of special importance.
The office of Wi Rue was instructed to specially cultivate these
negotiations, and to offer as much war material to the Turks as
possible, on the one hand for military-political reasons, on the other
hand, in order to force the Turks to make deliveries of chromium. Since
the Foreign Office wanted in full to assure the treaty for deliveries
of Turkish chromium for the year 1942/43, more deliveries of war
material, which partly constituted former Turkish orders, were promised
for 1942.
* * * * * * *
[Page 479] History will know only a few examples of cases where a
country has directed even in peacetime all its economic forces so
deliberately and systematically towards the requirements of war as
Germany was compelled to do in the period between the two world wars.
* * * * * * *
[Page 38] In the (Reich Defense) Law the appointment of a General
Plenipotentiary for the Economy was provided for, a post for which
Reichsbank President Dr. Schacht was contemplated. He was to have
the right to give directions on economic questions to all ministries
concerned with economic problems. He was charged with the preparation
of all economic war measures with the exception of the armament
industry which was to be handled by the Army High Command.
* * * * * * *
[Page 59] If it is said for example, that “not the economy, but
politics represents fate”, this principle should be recognized only
with the reservation that politics may receive its decisive impulse
from the economic necessities of a nation. The fundamental urge to
expand a nation which does not find the basis for its food production
in its own soil, is an imperative for the shaping of policy.
* * * * * * *
[Page 84] If it was possible in a few years to develop the thirty-two
monopoly factories of the Treaty of Versailles into an armament
industry sufficient for our large army, this is due very largely to the
work of the offices of the Military Economy Organization.
* * * * * * *
[Page 127] In spite of the limitations in rearmament ordered by the
Minister of War in 1937, the demands of the Army for steel remained so
high that the Minister of Economics announced his misgivings regarding
the economy as a whole. The War Minister stated that, in view of
the existing foreign exchange situation, the condition of the whole
economy, and thereby of rearmament, was jeopardized by a continuous
fall of exports, and consequently he requested the introduction of raw
material quotas, by means of which the management of rearmament and of
other important programs was to be accomplished.
* * * * * * *
[Page 145] Complaints about excessive loads of work at factories and
about continuous modifications of order schedules were received all
the time from industry. By means of the spreading of orders and the
admission of new firms, the Military Economy Organization and the
armament offices succeeded in carrying out the armament programs more
or less according to plan and to fulfill the demands of the leaders.
* * * * * * *
[Pages 173-174] The enlargement of gunpowder and explosives production
was started as a large scale action. At the suggestion of the Economy
Staff, Field Marshal Goering ordered the drafting of a plan for
the manufacture of gunpowder and explosives in 1938 and charged
General-Director Krauch of I. G. Farben with the execution of this
plan. The plan was set up on July 12th, 1938, as the so-called
“Karinhall” plan and scheduled the creation of a capacity of 12,000
tons of gunpowder per month, 19,000 tons of explosives, and 4,000 tons
of poison gas until October 1st, 1940. By October 1st the capacity was
to be
Gunpowder 18,000 tons,
Explosives 24,000 tons,
Poison gas 8,000 tons, per month.
In view of numerous difficulties, particularly due to the lack of
foreign exchange for the purchase of machines, due further to a
smaller allocation of raw materials and shortage of workers, the speed
of production contemplated by Dr. Krauch could not be maintained;
consequently the scheduled figures could not be reached by the time of
the outbreak of war.
* * * * * * *
[Pages 181-182] The course of German mobilization in 1939 was greatly
influenced by the development of the military-political situation and
was guided by the idea of a surprise of the enemy. The experiences made
during the operations against Austria, Sudetenland, and Czechoslovakia,
which led to a partial and camouflaged mobilization, formed the basis
of the measures to be taken. The tension existing between Germany and
Poland since July was used in order to prepare all measures necessary
for a surprise attack against Poland.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2354-PS
ORGANIZATION BOOK OF THE NSDAP
[Organisationsbuch der NSDAP] 5th, 6th and 7th Edition, Central NSDAP
Press, 1938, Munich
[Fifth Edition, Pages 367-371a]
Training of the S.A.
In order to obtain uniform training, a systematical arrangement of
three major groups is provided:
_a_ ideological education and training
_b_ general training
_c_ active service
These groups comprise essentially the following individual fields:
_Group a_:
1. Education and training according to the doctrines and aims of the
Fuehrer as they are set forth in the “Kampf” and in the party program
for all phases of our lives and our National Socialist ideology.
2. The teachings of the history of the German people for the tasks of
our time.
3. Exercise of the National Socialist doctrine of duty.
_Group b_:
1. Security police service,
2. Physical exercises,
3. Marching exercises,
4. Terrain service,
5. Small-caliber shooting practice,
6. Gas and air-raid protection,
7. Service of special units, (Maritime, Communications, Engineers, and
Cavalry units).
_Group c_:
1. Assemblies and demonstrations
2. Contests and performance examinations for S.A. sport insignia
3. Security service
4. Home service (catastrophe service, etc.)
The training of leaders is the prerequisite for the total training. The
suitability of the SA leaders for their positions was first established
through examinations.
Leaders designated as suitable will be educated and trained step by
step according to the previously mentioned points of view and according
to the special educational guidance of the Office of the Chief of Storm
Troops [Oberste SA-Fuehrung].
The SA Sport Insignia [Page 369]
The new state demands a resistant, hardened generation. In addition to
the ideological education of the mind, a fighting training of the body
must be required by means of simple, useful, and natural body exercises.
In order to create increased incentive and aims for the endeavors of
youth, I reestablish the
SA Sport Insignia
for the entire SA and for all its former branches, which is earned by
means of a performance test after a conscientiously executed period of
training.
In order to give conscious expression to the fostering of a valiant
spirit in all parts of the German people, I further decide that this
SA Sport Insignia can also be earned and worn by persons who are
not members of the movement, inasfar as they comply racially and
ideologically with the National Socialist requirements.
Enforcement regulations are decreed by the Chief of Staff.
Berlin, 15 February 1935.
Chief of Storm Troops [Der Oberste SA-Fuehrer]
Signed: Adolf Hitler
* * * * * * *
The performance test includes three groups of exercises:
Body exercises,
Military sports,
Topographical (naval) services.
Group I Body exercises:
100-meter race,
Broad jump,
Shot-put,
Throwing of hand grenades,
3000-meter race.
Group II Military sports:
25-Kilometer march with pack,
Firing of small-caliber arms,
Aimed throwing of hand grenades,
200-meter cross-country race with gas masks over 4 obstacles,
Swimming or bicycle riding,
Basic knowledge of first aid in case of accidents.
Group III Terrain service:
Orientation,
Terrain observation,
Estimate of terrain,
Estimate of distance,
Camouflage,
Observing and reporting,
Utilization of terrain and general behavior in terrain service.
Special regulations for SA naval units:
Group I Body exercises:
unchanged
Group II Military sports:
15-kilometer march with pack instead of 25-kilometer.
Group III Naval service:
25 minutes of long-distance rowing in cutter seamanship
in and on the boat, throwing of lines,
knotting and splicing,
signaling and transmitting of Morse code messages,
compass, designation of navigable water,
navigation lights, rules on turning aside,
general seamanlike behavior while in naval service.
***
[Sixth Edition, Pages 359, 364a, 364b, 365]
Structure of the S. A.
1. S.A. Units
The S.A. extends over the whole Reich territory.
It is organized according to political and local [Landsmannschaftlich]
viewpoints into S.A. groups as follows:
S.A. Group--Alpenland
S.A. Group--Bavarian Ostmark (Govt. Dist. lower Bavaria, upper
Palatinate and upper Franconia)
S.A. Group--Berlin-Brandenburg (Province Mark Brandenburg and Greater
Berlin)
S.A. Group--Danube
S.A. Group--Franconia (Govt. Dist. central and lower Franconia)
S.A. Group--Hansa (Free City of Hamburg and Mecklenburg)
S.A. Group--Hesse (Parts of the Free State of Hesse, upper Hesse, the
Province of Hesse, and Hesse-Nassau)
S.A. Group--Highland (Hochland) (Govt. Dist. upper Bavaria and Swabia)
S.A. Group--Palatinate (Govt. Dist. Rhenish Palatinate, Saar, and
Rhenish Hesse)
S.A. Group--Middle (Province of Saxony and Free State of Anhalt)
S.A. Group--Lower Rhine (Parts of Rhine Province and the Ruhr
District)
S.A. Group--Lower Saxony (Parts of Province of Hannover and Free
State of Brunswick)
S.A. Group--Nordmark (Province of Schleswig-Holstein, Free City of
Luebeck)
S.A. Group--North Sea (parts of Province of Hannover and Westphalia,
Free State of Oldenburg, Free City of Bremen)
S.A. Group--Ostland (Province of East Prussia and Free State of
Danzig)
S.A. Group--Ostmark (Province of Grenzmark)
S.A. Group--Pomerania (Province of Pomerania and parts of Grenzmark)
S.A. Group--Saxony (Free State of Saxony)
S.A. Group--Silesia (Province of upper and lower Silesia)
S.A. Group--Sudeten
S.A. Group--Suedmark
S.A. Group--Southwest (Free State of Baden and Wurttemberg)
S.A. Group--Thuringia (Free State of Thuringia)
S.A. Group--Warthe
S.A. Group--Vistula
S.A. Group--Westphalia (Province of Westphalia)
S.A. Group--Westmark (Rhine Province and part of the Province of
Hesse-Nassau)
2. Special Units [Identical with corresponding passage in 5th and 7th
editions]
In order to comply with the manifold demands on the services of the
S.A. during demonstrations, assemblies, catastrophes, and accidents, as
well as to preserve the efficiency of S.A. men, S.A. members have been
organized into special and technical units. There are: Marine, Mounted,
Communications, Engineer and Medical units.
Their organization into companies, battalions, and so forth, and their
subordination are variously regulated according to location and the
given circumstances.
_a._ Marine S.A.: The Marine S.A. includes all S.A. men who by
occupation are or have been sailors of the merchant marine, the navy,
or interior shipping, as well as men who are connected with shipping in
any way or particularly interested in it.
The seagoing S.A. men, who come into contact with the population of
other countries, should represent National Socialist will and thought
[Wollen and Denken].
For this reason their ideological education and professional training
is a main mission of the marine S.A.
This schooling and training is given aboard ship in the board troops
[Bordtrupps] and on land in the marine S.A. units.
Further tasks are service in catastrophes and accidents, especially
those caused by water. For this purpose thorough training in seamanship
is given each marine S.A. man.
_b._ Mounted S.A.: As the mainstay of the national socialist riding
corps [NSRK], the S.A. cavalry is responsible for the training of
German youth in riding and driving, before military service, as well as
additional training in riding for men already in the service (compare
discussion on Page 373 “National Socialist Riding Corps”). The S.A.
cavalry further cultivates riding and driving activities within the S.A.
_c._ Communications S.A.: The task of the Communications S.A.
is to enable the responsible leader during assemblies and other
demonstrations and in the catastrophe service to exercise control
over subordinated or employed units. The training therefore
extends primarily to telephone service. Beyond that, however, the
communications S.A. men are also trained in sending and receiving
Morse Code signals. The “Communications Certificate of the S.A.” is
a certificate of merit for those S.A. men who wish to enlist in the
signal corps of the armed forces.
_d._ Engineers S.A.: The tasks of the S.A. engineers include
catastrophe protective service during incidents capable of damaging the
German national property.
Every S.A. engineer has to prove in thorough technical examinations his
degree of training and his initiative [Einsatzbereitschaft].
The examinations are entered in a performance book, which also contains
the “S.A. Engineers Certificate” as certificate of merit.
_e._ Medical S.A.: The S.A. doctors and S.A. medical personnel
organized into medical units will supervise and care for the bodily
health and efficiency of the individual S.A. man as well as units under
their jurisdiction.
Schools of the S.A. for special units
_a._ Marine S.A. Schools: The following schools are available for
training the marine S.A.: Marine S.A. school “DUSTERNBROCK” and
the training sailing ship “DUHNEN.” The school “DUSTERNBROCK” has
to accomplish above all practical and theoretical training in boat
service, in row, sail and power boat, according to the regulations of
the navy.
The continuation of seamanship training takes place on the seagoing
training ship “DUHNEN.” Here one gets used to the ship and learns
to know and serve it in all its parts and equipment, and here also
knowledge of weather and steering is taught and applied.
_b._ Reich Riding Leadership School. (See under
REICHSREITERFUEHRERSCHULE on page 373).
_c._ Reich Communications School of the S.A.: Here the S.A. leaders of
communications units are trained in all particulars of communications.
Here they also become eligible through examinations for the “S.A.
Communications Certificate.”
THE S.A. REGIMENT “FELDHERRNHALLE”
The S.A. Regiment “Feldherrnhalle” has its seat in Berlin, Voss-Strasse
1. It consists of six garrisoned battalions stationed in: Berlin,
Munich, Hattingen, Krefeld, Stettin, and Stuttgart.
S.A. General [Obergruppenfuehrer] Hermann Goering was appointed by
the Fuehrer on 12 January, 1937, as Chief of the S.A. Regiment
“Feldherrnhalle”. The S. A. regiment is directly subordinated to
the chief of staff. Its mission, beyond regular S.A. service, is to
supervise bureaus of the S.A., the party, and the state. It is to be
ready at all times for any and all purposes.
[Seventh Edition, page 359, 367]
BRANCHES OF THE S.A.
1. S.A. Units
The S.A. embraces the entire territory of the Reich. It is divided
according to political and local (LANDSMANNSCHAFTLICH) points of view
into the following groups:
S.A. Group--Alpenland (District /Gau/ Upper Danube, Salzburg,
Tyrol-Vorarlberg)
S.A. Group--Bayernwald (Govt. Dist. Lower Bavaria, Upper Palatinate
and Upper Franconia)
S.A. Group--Berlin-Brandenburg (Province Mark Brandenburg and Greater
Berlin)
S.A. Group--Danube (Gau Lower Danube, Vienna)
S.A. Group--Elbe (Province of Saxony and Free State of Anhalt)
S.A. Group--Franconia (Govt. Dist. Central and Lower Franconia)
S.A. Group--Hansa (Free City of Hamburg and Mecklenburg)
S.A. Group--Hesse (Parts of the Free State of Hesse /Upper Hesse/,
the Province of Hesse, and Hesse-Nassau)
S.A. Group--Highland (Hochland) (Govt. Dist. Upper Bavaria and Swabia)
S.A. Group--Palatinate (Govt. Dist. Rhenish Palatinate, Saar
District, Rhenish Hesse, Lorraine)
S.A. Group--Central Rhine (Rhine Province, Part of the Province of
Hesse-Nassau, Luxemburg)
S.A. Group--Neckar (Part of the Free State of Baden and Wuerttenberg)
S.A. Group--Lower Rhine (Parts of the Rhine Province and of the Ruhr
District)
S.A. Group--Lower Saxony (Part of the Province of Hannover and Free
State of Brunswick)
S.A. Group--Nordmark (Province of Schleswig-Holstein, Free City of
Luebeck)
S.A. Group--North Sea (Parts of the Province of Hannover and
Westphalia, Free State of Oldenburg, Free City of Bremen)
S.A. Group--Upper Rhine (Parts of the Free State of Baden and Alsace)
S.A. Group--Oder (Province of Grenzmark)
S.A. Group--Pomerania (Province of Pomerania and parts of Granzmark)
S.A. Group--Saxony (Free State of Saxony)
S.A. Group--Silesia (Province of Upper and Lower Silesia)
S.A. Group--Sudeten (Reich Gau Sudetenland)
S.A. Group--Suedmark (Gau Styria and Carinthia)
S.A. Group--Tannenberg--(Province of East Prussia)
S.A. Group--Thuringia (Free State of Thuringia)
S.A. Group--Warthe (Reich Gau Wartheland)
S.A. Group--Vistula (Reich Gau Danzig--West Prussia)
S.A. Group--Westphalia (Province of Westphalia) * * *
WITHDRAWAL FROM THE S.A.
Service with the S.A. is and remains voluntary. As in recruitment for
the S.A. no advantages may be promised and no pressure whatsoever may
be exerted, the S.A. man should have the possibility to withdraw from
the S.A. if he believes that he can no longer agree with S.A. views or
if he is not in a position to fulfill completely the duties imposed
on him as a member of the S.A. On presentation of honorable reasons
in a corresponding written petition, the S.A. member can be “released
from the S.A. by own request.” However, if he shows no interest or
if he has joined the ranks of the S.A. merely because of a whim or
for the sake of a good opportunity, there ensues a “discharge from
the S.A. according to number 127_b_ of the SADV/1” (official measures
for insuitability for service in the S.A.). If he is guilty of any
disciplinary or political or possibly criminal offenses, the competent
disciplinary officer can declare him as “punished with permanent
discharge from the S.A.” In serious cases “exclusion from the S.A.” can
be declared.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2355-PS
1938 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 258
Second Law on the Right to Vote for the Reichstag, 18 March 1938.
The government of the Reich has decided to pass the following law which
is proclaimed herewith:
Article 1
The electoral list for the Reich shall replace the electoral list for
the Kreise.
Article 2
One or more candidates may be nominated on the electoral list for the
Reich.
Article 3
For the elections to the Reichstag in Austria, the same general rules
which are valid for the elections to the Reichstag apply, inasmuch as
the requirements of the plebiscite in Austria of 10 April 1938 do not
necessitate different regulations.
Article 4
The Reich Minister of the Interior is authorized to change the orders
on the procedure of the elections as much as may be necessary, in order
to simplify this procedure.
Berlin, 18 March 1938.
The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor
ADOLF HITLER
The Reich Minister of the Interior
FRICK
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2357-PS
SPEECH BY HITLER BEFORE REICHSTAG, 20 February 1938
DOCUMENTS OF GERMAN POLITICS [Dokumente der deutschen Politik] Part
VI, 1, Pages 50-52.
In the fifth year following the first great foreign political agreement
of the Reich, it fills us with sincere gratification to be able to
state that in our relations with the State with which we had had
perhaps the greatest differences, not only has there been a detente,
but in the course of these years there has been a constant improvement
in relations, * * * This good work, which was regarded with suspicion
by so many at the time, has stood the test, and I may say that, since
the League of Nations finally gave up its continual attempts to
unsettle Danzig and appointed a man of great personal attainments as
the new commissioner, the most dangerous spot from the point of view
of European peace has entirely lost its menacing character. The Polish
State respects the national conditions by this State, and both the
city of Danzig and Germany respect Polish rights. And so the way to a
friendly understanding has been successfully paved, an understanding
which, beginning with Danzig, has today, in spite of the attempts of
certain mischief-makers, succeeded in finally taking the poison out of
the relations between Germany and Poland and transforming them into a
sincere, friendly cooperation.
Relying on her friendships, Germany will not leave a stone unturned to
save that ideal which provides the foundation for the task which is
ahead of us--peace.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2358-PS
SPEECH DELIVERED BY HITLER IN THE SPORTSPALAST IN BERLIN ON 26
SEPTEMBER 1938
[Quoted from the Voelkischer Beobachter, Munich Edition, special
edition for Tuesday, 27 September 1938.]
“I have conducted really a practical peace-policy during these years.
“I approached all apparently impossible problems with the firm
determination to solve them in a peaceful manner even at the cost of
more or less heavy German concessions. I am a front-line soldier myself
and I know the hardships of a war. _I wanted to spare the German people
from it._ I approached therefore problem after problem with the solid
determination to try everything for a peaceful solution.
“The most difficult problem with which I was confronted was that of our
relations with Poland. There was a danger that Poles and Germans would
regard each other as hereditary enemies. I wanted to prevent this. I
know well enough that I would not have been successful if Poland had
had a democratic Constitution. For these democracies which indulge
in phrases about peace are the most blood-thirsty war agitators.
In Poland there ruled not a democracy but _a man_; and with him I
succeeded, in precisely one year, in coming to an agreement which, for
10 years to begin with, entirely removed the danger of conflict. We
are all convinced that this agreement will bring lasting pacification.
We realize that there are two peoples which must live together, and
neither of which can do away with the other. A people of 33 millions
will always strive for an outlet to the sea. A way to understanding,
then, had to be found. * * *”
“And now we are confronted with the last problem which must be solved
and which will be solved. It is the last territorial claim which I have
to make in Europe, but it is a claim from which I will not swerve, and
which I will satisfy, God willing.”
* * *
“I have little to explain. I am grateful to Mr. Chamberlain for all his
efforts. I have assured him that the German people want nothing but
peace; but I have also told him that I cannot go back beyond the limits
of our patience.
“I assured him, moreover, and I repeat it here, that when this
problem is solved there will be no more territorial problems for
Germany in Europe. And I further assured him that from the moment
when Czechoslovakia solves its other problems, that is to say, when
the Czechs have come to an arrangement with their other minorities,
peacefully and without oppression, I will no longer be interested in
the Czech State. And that, as far as I am concerned, I will guarantee.
We don’t want any Czechs at all. But I must also declare before the
German people that in the Sudeten German problem my patience is now
at an end. I made an offer to Herr Benes which was no more than the
realisation of what he had already promised. He now has peace or war
in his hands. Either he will accept this offer and at length give the
Germans their freedom, or we will get this freedom for ourselves.”
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2360-PS
SPEECH BY HITLER BEFORE THE REICHSTAG, 30 January 1939
[Quoted from the Voelkischer Beobachter, Munich Edition, Tuesday, 31
Jan. 1939.]
“On account of this intolerable provocation which had been aggravated
by a truly infamous persecution and terrorization of our Germans there
I had resolved to solve once and for all, and this time radically, the
Sudetan German question. On May 28 I ordered (1) that preparations
should be made for military action against this state by October 2.
I ordered (2) the immense and accelerated expansion of our defensive
front in the West.”
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2367-PS
Voelkischer Beobachter, South German Edition
Nr. 123/124 Saturday and Sunday 2 and 3 May 1936
The Fuehrer begins speaking now amid the cheers of the whole of Germany:
“The lies that Germany will pounce upon Austria tomorrow or the day
after are being spread again (jeers and laughter of the crowd). I
ask myself: Who are these elements who do not want peace and mutual
understanding, who must stir up and sow distrust continuously, who are
they in reality?”
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2368-PS
EXTRACTS FROM SPEECH BY HITLER BEFORE REICHSTAG
30 January 1937
DOCUMENTS OF GERMAN POLITICS [Dokumente der deutschen Politik] Part
VI, 2, Page 42.
“By a series of agreements we have eliminated existing tensions and
thereby contributed considerably to an improvement in the European
atmosphere. I merely recall an agreement with Poland, which has worked
out to the advantage of both sides. * * *
“True statesmanship will not overlook realities, but consider them.
The Italian nation and the new Italian State are realities. The German
nation and the German Reich are equally realities. And to my own
fellow-citizens, I would say that the Polish nation and the Polish
State have also become a reality. * * *
“The German Reich with its strong Army will protect her own security
and her own honor. But, fully convinced that there is for Europe no
greater good than peace, the German Reich will always be a responsible
and conscious promoter of the European peace idea. * * *”
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2371-PS
1933 MINISTERIAL GAZETTE FOR THE PRUSSIAN INTERNAL ADMINISTRATION
[Ministerialblatt fuer die Preussische Innere Verwaltung] Page 503
Execution of ordinance for security of people and state (national
security)
Dated: 28 Feb. 1933 (RGBl I, Page 83)
Rd. Erl. d. M.d. J. (KDR) 3.3.1933--II--1121 (Circular)
As a defense against the criminal, communist activities and a means of
ruthless suppression of this source of peril, whose extremely dangerous
scope has been revealed at the last minute, the Reich president decided
on 28 Feb. 1933 to proclaim the decree for the protection of the people
and the state. Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, page 83.
For the actual application of the measures authorized in this decree, I
give the following directions:
1. Sect. 1 of the decree not only suspends temporarily articles
114, 115, 117, 118, 123, 124 and 153 of the constitution; it rather
eliminates all other Reich and state limitations in this matter, as far
as this is necessary or practical in order to reach the aims of this
decree. Within this framework police officials thus may go beyond the
restrictions laid down by the provisions of sections 14 and 41 of the
Prussian police code, their orders still remain police ordinances of
police warrants and thus as far as form is concerned remain subject to
the applicable regulations. However, violations are punished according
to sect. 4 of the decree which in this respect prevails, according
to p. 4 of the preceding decree. Conforming to the aim and purpose
of the decree, the additional permissible actions will be directed
primarily against the communists, but also against all those working
with the communists or even indirectly supporting or promoting their
criminal aims. To avoid any blunder, I remind you that the decree for
the protection of the people and state, dated 28 Feb. 1933, should be
used against members or institutions other than communist, anarchist or
social democratic parties or organizations, when such measures serve
for the defense against such communist tendencies in their broadest
meaning. In other cases the decree of 2 April 1933 shall be applied.
Labor unions shall not be put on the same level with social-democratic
organizations.
2. The local police has principal jurisdiction for all those police
measures, which are permissible after the legal limitations mentioned
under 1. have been removed. The jurisdiction has been changed by my
decree of 3 Feb. 1933, (G.S. page 33) based on section 3 par. 5 of
the Prussian police Code. Consequently all regulations dealing with
the suspension of a periodical or the restriction of property have
to be issued from the state police offices. Regulations concerning
personal liberty, the right to assemble and congregate, or restrictions
concerning the secrecy of mails, communications, telegraph and cable
may be ordered by the district police only, (Section 3, part 2, P.V.G.).
3. All orders under Section 1 of the decree of 28 Feb. 1933 must be
in writing and signed by the competent chief of police of his general
appointed deputies or a deputy appointed for such a measure. In cases
of restriction of personal liberty, freedom of speech including freedom
of press and property rights the involved person is to be served at the
latest at the beginning of the procedure with a certified copy of such
an order statement. In cases of interferences with the secrecy of mail,
postal service, telegraph and cable one certified copy of the order is
to be sent immediately to the post office concerned, as well as to the
regional postal office. This order does not affect the existing formal
requirements and prerequisites under which restrictions of personal
liberty, of free speech incl. free press, of the right to organize and
assemble, interference in the secrecy of postal, telegraph, and cable
services, orders of search and seizure, and limitations upon property
rights, could be carried out in accordance with prevailing legal
provisions.
4. The state police departments have to keep themselves informed on all
measures taken in their districts in accordance with sect. 1, of the
decree of 28 Feb. 1933, and they have to report to me on the 5th and
20th of each month on measures taken in the second, resp. first half
of the preceding month. Unless specially ordered, individual measures,
including the suspension of periodicals in accordance with section 1 of
this decree need not be reported unless it concerns a very important
case.
5. If on principle (see figure 1, par. 2 of this circular) or for some
special reason the application of the decree for the protection of
the people and state (RGBl I, Page 83) dated 28 Feb., 1933, seems out
of question or not advisable, the provisions of the decree for the
protection of the German people (RGBl I, page 35) dated 4 February
1933, and the applicable executive directions remain in effect
unchanged.
To all police dept. M Bli v. 1, page 233.
# # # # #
Reorganization of the political police Circular decree of the Ministry
for the Interior of 26 April 1933--II 1000/53
In order to guarantee effective counter-measures against all activities
endangering the existence and security of the state, the state
government has decided to reform the organization of the political
police more severely than before and to create the necessary conditions
for speedy and successful operations. For this purpose and for the
benefit of a uniform supreme management of the political police the
Office of Secret State Police (which is) directly subordinated to
myself has been established in Berlin SW 11, Prinz Albrechtstrasse
8 by the law of 26 April 1933 printed in annex 1 (Gesetz-Sammlung,
Seite 122) (collection of laws, page 122). Its duty is to investigate
all political activities endangering the state by special executors
with the assistance of outside bureaus for the individual provincial
police districts (State-Police-Bureaus) and with the support of the
ordinary police authorities within the entire territory of the state,
to collect and exploit the results of these investigations, to keep
myself, the Minister for the Interior, permanently informed, to prepare
and provide at all times the necessary proofs for my decisions, and
finally to report all politically important observations and statements
also to other police authorities and provide them with suggestions.
Furthermore the Office of the Secret State Police is authorized within
the sphere of its activity to request political measures from other
police-authorities and to give them instructions.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2372-PS
1936 REICH MINISTERIAL GAZETTE [RMBl]--Part V, Pages 1344-5
Unified designation of the Offices of the Secret State Police in the
Reich
(Decree of RF-SS and Chief of German Police in the Reich Ministry of
Interior 28 August 36)
After the Reichsfuehrer SS was installed as Chief of the German Police,
the unified direction of all branches of the police and also the
designation of the offices must become pronounced.
The greatest differences existed previously among the individual states
[Laender] in the field of the political police. At present there are
17 different designations. The unified form of the credentials of the
officials of the political police calls for a unified designation of
their offices in order to eliminate confusion and misunderstanding
among outsiders. Also the simplification of the business transactions
calls for assimilation.
1. Therefore the political police of the German states will carry the
designation of Secret State Police [Geheime Staatspolizei] from 1
October 1936 on.
2. The state central authorities of the Secret State Police carry the
designation
_a._ in Prussia:
Secret State Police Bureau [Geheime Staatspolizeiamt]
_b._ in the rest of the state:
State police main office [Staatspolizeileitstelle] or State police
office (Staatspolizeistelle)
and so
in Baden State police main office Karlsruhe
in Bayern State police main office Munich
in Wuerttenburg State police main office Stuttgart
in Sachsen State police main office Dresden
in Anhalt State police office Dessau
in Braunschweig State police office Braunschweig
in Bremen State police office Bremen
in Hamburg State police office, Hamburg
in Hessen State police office Darmstadt
in Luebeck State police office Luebeck
in Mecklenburg State police office Schwerin
in Oldenburg State police office Oldenburg
in Thueringen State police office Weimar
The state police directive offices have the tasks of a state police
office for the area of their jurisdiction, a final regulation hereon is
withheld. * * *
To the Prussian secret state police office in Berlin, the political
police of the exterior Prussian states.--For information to the
Prussian Ministry President as chief of the Prussian secret state
police, the state cabinet of exterior Prussia, the main office
Ordnungs-Police, the Prussian state criminal police office in Berlin,
the Prussian Supreme and Government President.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2373-PS
EXCERPTS FROM GERMAN PUBLICATIONS
1. “The first chairman is responsible for the entire leadership of the
movement. He divides the work among the committeemen, subordinated to
him, as well as among the otherwise necessary collaborators. Each of
these gentlemen is therefore fully responsible for the tasks that have
been allotted to him. He is subordinate only to the first chairman, who
has to concern himself with the cooperation of everyone responsible.
Through selection of persons and issuance of general directives he must
bring about this collaboration himself.
“This law of essential responsibility has gradually become a matter of
course within the movement, at least insofar as it concerned the party
leadership.”
(MEIN KAMPF, Adolf Hitler, Munich, 1933, page 661)
2. “How shall I give expression, my Fuehrer, to what is in our hearts?
How shall I find words for your deeds? Has there ever been a mortal
as beloved as you, my Fuehrer? Was there ever belief as strong as the
belief in your mission? God sent you to us for Germany.”
(Goering, Speeches and Writing, [Reden und Aufsaetze]
Munich, 1938, page 326)
3. “Above all was God’s hand which has visibly guided the Fuehrer and
his Movement. Only those who have no faith, claim that chance has
persecuted us. In reality Moltke’s word was proven to be true in regard
to the Fuehrer and the Party; namely, that in the long run only the
strong will have good luck. What had been prepared quietly and had
grown organically during ten years, swept over all of Germany like a
torrent on 30 January 1933 and during the time which followed. There
was nobody in the country and in the world who could have escaped the
powerful, resounding rhythm of these events. It was as if a whole
people awoke from its sleep, threw off in one quick move the chains
which oppressed it and rose like a Phenix out of the ashes of a fallen
system. And out of the flame and enthusiasm with which the masses of
millions of people yielded to Hitler and his idea, the cry which once
before at the time of the crusades had made Germany rise, seemed to
come again: ‘It is God’s will!’
“And as he gave us his blessing, he denied it to the others. Although
they called for him loudly from their pulpits and party-seats, their
work was not his work, their faith was not his faith and their will not
his will.
“It is not mere chance that millions in Germany are of the holy
conviction that National Socialism is more than politics, that in it
the word and the will of God proclaim itself, that the bulwark it has
created against Bolshevism was conceived on higher inspiration as the
last salvation of Occidental culture before the threat of Asiatic
atheism.”
(Joseph Goebbels, From Kaiserhof to Reich Chancellery,
[Vom Kaiserhof zur Reichskanzlei], 1934, page 12.)
4. “It is with pride that we see that one man is kept above all
criticism--that is the Fuehrer.
“The reason is that everyone feels and knows: he was always right and
will always be right. The National Socialism of us all is anchored in
the uncritical loyalty, in the devotion to the Fuehrer that does not
ask for the wherefore in the individual case, in the tacit performance
of his commands. We believe that the Fuehrer is fulfilling a divine
mission to German destiny! This belief is beyond challenge.”
(Hess, Speeches [Reden] Munich, 1928, page 25;
Radio speech at Cologne, 25 June 1934)
5. _The Technique of the State_--“Therefore the Fuehrer principle in
administration means; instead of the results of a majority vote, to
entrust in each case the decision to a definite person with clear-cut
authority who will be solely responsible toward above and who will
carry out the execution of the decision toward below.”
(Hans Frank, German Law, [Deutsches Recht]
V. 11, Berlin, 1941, p. 2626;
also Otto Koellreutter, German Administrative Law,
[Deutsches Verwaltungsrecht], Berlin, 1938, p.8.)
* U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1946--693257
# # # # #
Transcriber’s note
Punctuation and spelling has been maintained except where obvious
printer errors have occurred. Since these documents were written
by different individuals there can be variants in spelling and
capitalization between them.
This volume has no German diacritics, only French diacritics. As a
result, Goering and Fuehrer are spelled without umlauts throughout.
Use of asterisks in text denote missing/illegible words. Separation of
individual documents is indicated with
# # # # #
Tables that were wider than the default margin were formatted to
fit.
A fact was corrected on Page 626: “I separated this service already in
1941 from the troops.” It was changed to 1931.
A couple of sentences had missing words. The following missing words
were added:
Page 399: “Jeschonnek shares the opinion we should to Bardufoss”
“Jeschonnek shares the opinion we should =go= to Bardufoss”
Page 433: “would then have a compartment all themselves” “would then
have a compartment all =to= themselves”
One sentence had an unclear adjective and was changed:
Page 851: “laws and cabinet decisions are repeated effective
immediately” “laws and cabinet decisions are =reputed= effective
immediately”