allowed to enter the camp, but were passed on directly to the women’s
concentration camp, or an exception was made, and they were temporarily
billeted for one or two days until they were transported to other
places.
At the same time conditions in France also took an unfavorable turn
for the Third Reich. After the defeat on the East Front the lack and
in correlation the want of manpower rose in Germany. Sauckel went to
Paris and negotiated with Laval for the delivery of forced labor.
This development reflected itself in the KL Buchenwald by deliveries
of French prisoners of war from the German concentration camp in
Compiegne. The poetical talents of the German Security Service and
its sneering attitude toward these victims expressed themselves in
designating this action as the “Meerschaum Operation”, which was
followed in 1944 by another operation termed the “Spring Zephyr”. The
large mass transports which arrived in KL Buchenwald from the West are
compiled in Table 7.
_Table 7_
--------------+---------+-----------------------------
Date | Number | Origin
--------------+---------+-----------------------------
21 May ’43 | 50 | Compiegne via KL Mauthausen
27 June ’43 | 962 | Compiegne
4 Sept. ’43 | 896 | Compiegne
18 Sept. ’43 | 926 | Compiegne
30 Oct. ’43 | 911 | Compiegne
16 Dec. ’43 | 921 | Compiegne
19 Jan. ’44 | 1,940 | Compiegne
24 Jan. ’44 | 1,991 | Compiegne
29 Jan. ’44 | 1,580 | Compiegne
8 May ’44 | 967 | Brussels
14 May ’44 | 2,052 | Compiegne
14 May ’44 | 1,667 | Compiegne via KL Auschwitz
22 May ’44 | 891 | Brussels
19 June ’44 | 574 | Brussels
3 July ’44 | 435 | Compiegne
6 Aug. ’44 | 1,080 | Compiegne
10 Aug. ’44 | 827 | Compiegne
20 Aug. ’44 | 1,650 | Compiegne
21 Aug. ’44 | 1,246 | Compiegne
5 Febr. ’45 | 285 | Penal Prison Gross-Strehlitz
--------------+---------+-----------------------------
Total | 21,851 |
--------------+---------+-----------------------------
Frenchmen and Belgians formed the bulk of these transports. However,
all these transports also contained nationals of other countries,
who were living temporarily or permanently in France, and were also
delivered to Buchenwald.
The stream of mass transports stopped after the Red Army had
reconquered the greater part of the Ukraine. However, many “normal”
additions continued to arrive, i.e. prisoners from the Germany
prisons, but also 90% foreigners, who were sent to the concentration
camps on the orders of Himmler. Nevertheless, these additions could
not have covered the disastrously increased demand, brought about by
the inconsiderate waste of manpower, if the SS had not uncovered new
sources.
Beginning in the early summer of 1944 Hungarian Jews were dragged into
German slavery in undiscernible masses. They were followed in August by
the civilian Polish population evacuated from Warsaw.
It is characteristic of the continually increasing catastrophic shaping
of the conditions in the Third Reich, that the services conducting
the arrests were no longer in a position to properly register the
prisoners. Whereas the transport directing services sent lists along
containing the records of the prisoners in the first mass transports
from the Soviet Union, France and Belgium, such lists did not accompany
the Hungarians and Poles coming from Warsaw.
Most of these transports passed through the KL Auschwitz where the
prisoners probably were subjected to a first examination. Whoever
appeared fit for work was provided with some scant clothing and after
a few days sent on. In Auschwitz they were designated as “Transport
Jews”, and no one took the trouble anymore to review their records.
That work was left to the concentration camps to which the individuals
were finally committed. The SS regarded the labor commitment as their
first duty, and the prisoners engaged with the reception of the
additions were faced with the greatest to determine the records of
the additions so that the SS would not simply use them up as numbers.
Only the fact that we insisted on carrying out the still existing
order regarding the reception of the additions and did not ignore the
regulations, which would have greatly pleased the SS it is now possible
to report--who passed through the camp, who died in the camp--and in
the near future it will be possible to give information to the brutally
torn apart family members, relatives and acquaintances on the fate of
their relatives.
The same applies to the Hungarian Jews, the Poles evacuated from
Warsaw, the Polish Jews, Poles, Estonians and the Lithuanians, who had
been interned in the labor camps in the East. They had been committed
as foreign workers and in part had lived together with their families.
When the demand for labor arose and with the approach of the Red Army
in spite of the fact that they were not guilty of any transgressions,
they were dragged off to the German concentration camps. In many cases
these separations only took place here upon their arrival at the
railroad station; where the families were ruthlessly torn asunder,
parents from their children, husbands from their wives, brothers from
brothers and sisters from sisters.
During the Summer and the Fall of 1944 the following transports from
the East arrived in the KL Buchenwald.
_Table 8_
-----------+------+-----------------+--------------------
Date |Number|Type of Prisoners| Origin
-----------+------+-----------------+--------------------
24 May ’44| 1,000| Hungarian Jews |Auschwitz
2 June ’44| 1,000| Hungarian Jews |Budapest
18 June ’44| 1,000| Hungarian Jews |Auschwitz
16 July ’44| 2,500| Hungarian Jews |Auschwitz
5 Aug. ’44| 1,459| Polish Jews |
13 Aug. ’44| 2,651| Evacuated Poles |Warsaw
15 Aug. ’44| 1,999| Evacuated Poles |Warsaw via Auschwitz
9 Nov. ’44| 615| Hungarian Jews |Graz
18 Jan. ’45| 2,840| Polish Jews |
20 Jan. ’45| 1,446| Polish Jews |
-----------+------+-----------------+--------------------
Also other domestic political events reflected themselves in new
additions for the KL Buchenwald. After the disturbances at the
University of Oslo 349 Norwegian students arrived at Buchenwald on 13
January 1944. Due to the intervention of the Swedish government they
were better treated than the other prisoners. They were housed apart
from the others, kept their civilian clothes, received the same food
as the troops and for several months were given instruction courses
and political education by SS instructors. Evidently they were to be
converted to Nazism. The efforts of the SS, however, were in vain. Not
one volunteered for the SS. Therefore 117 of them were first sent to a
SS camp on 7 July 1944 and the rest of them on 23 October 1944, where
they had to do heavy work on the field fortifications. When the Front
moved closer they were evacuated from the SS camp and on 12 December
1944, with other Norwegian students who had not yet been in Buchenwald,
making a total of 492 men, they were again delivered to Buchenwald. On
1 March 1945 they were evacuated to the KL Neuengamme.
In 1942 a change swept over the German concentration camps--instead
of being detention camps for political opponents they became labor
camps for the German war industries. Early in 1942 the high-ranking
SS leaders organized the DAW [Deutsche Ausruestungs-Werke-German
Equipment Works]. The DAW paid the camp administration a modest sum for
the services of a prisoner with the result that the camps soon became
self-supporting and the stockholders, having friendly relations with
the military authorities and cheap labor at their disposal, were soon
counted amongst the greatest war profiteers. Thusly, they had found
a new means for garnering profits for the SS and its leaders out of
state monies. For example, the Camp Commander Pister of Buchenwald was
elected a director of the DAW-Buchenwald at a considerable monthly
salary.
A further development plants were constructed and installed with
machinery in the concentration camps. A railroad between Buchenwald
and Weimar was built in record time, and the so-called Gustloff Works,
consisting of 13 immense workshops were erected in the immediate
vicinity of the camp. In addition increasing numbers of prisoners
were employed in existing equipment plants. Sauckel himself obtained
the first prisoners for the Sauckel Works in Weimar. At first they
were only employed there and transported back and forth daily in
automobiles. At a later date an equipment headquarters with shelters
for the prisoners was installed close to the factory. Further outside
headquarters soon followed in pronounced Nazi plants such as the
Hasag-Leipzig, and at other points.
The largest and the most terrible of the outside headquarters was
soon provided with the cover name of “_Dora_” and mentioned only
with fear and fright by the prisoners. What at first had been only
an assumption very soon became a certainty. The senseless and cruel
V-weapons were a specialty of the SS. Their satanical plan provided for
the construction of these weapons by those foreigners whose countries
were to be totally destroyed by them. Possibly they also thought that
the employment of prisoners isolated from the rest of the world would
help to better guard their secret coupled with the hope that the Allied
air power would not bomb the plants out of consideration for their
countrymen. Everything in connection with the production was treated as
a top-secret. Prisoners who were in the respective headquarters were
designated as “secret carriers.” In so far as it concerned the Reich
nationals and the Czechs, they had to be reported specially to the Main
Office of the Reich Security, the Central Office of the Gestapo, to
prevent the possibility of a premature discharge.
The most important centers of production were the outside headquarters
“Dora” near Nordhausen/Harz, and “Laura” near Saalfeld/Thuringia. In
the workshops Nos. 4-7 of the tremendous Gustloff Works separate parts
for the V-weapons were also manufactured. At the “Dora” and “Laura”
plants underground, bomb safe factories were constructed without any
regard for the waste of manpower or the living requirements of the
prisoners as regards air, sleep or nourishment. One transport after
another of unfortunates went to these outside headquarters from
Buchenwald--never to return. The number of the victims of death soon
reached record heights and was increased by the victims of explosions
and plant accidents. Those who became unfit for work were sent to such
isolated camps as Lublin and Bergen-Belsen, where they were for the
greater part liquidated by gas poisoning or injections.
The civilian additions were not in sufficient numbers to fill the
gaps, therefore new transports arrived continuously from other camps
which after a few days in Buchenwald for the necessary recording
photographing and physical examination, were passed to the notorious
outside headquarters.
The Service Group Command D of the Economic Administration Main Office
in Berlin-Oranienburg was the Central Office for the distribution
of the labor forces to the German concentration camps. Orders were
issued from there as to how many and what type of prisoners were to
be transported to other camps, that is, how many prisoners were to be
committed to labor by the various outside headquarters. At first this
Service Command issued a strict order that no political Reich nationals
were to be shipped in these mass transports. The administrations of
the various concentration camps strictly observed this rule in their
own interests, not because they wanted to spare these Germans but
because they were needed to perform the administration and disciplinary
duties which the SS really should have handled had it not been for
their lack of capability and ambition. We prisoners, therefore, had
the great advantage of regulating many things ourselves, which by
direct intervention of the SS would have aggravated considerably the
already insupportable living conditions of all the inmates of the camp.
Furthermore it is evident that every SS commander endeavored to keep
his trained people because the new prisoners would only have meant
trouble and work. In addition, regulations from the Reich Security
Main Office forbade sending certain prisoners with the transports
to assure a degree of isolation. Except for a few individual cases,
this regulation applied in particular to the half-jews. On orders
of the Reich Security Main Office all these as in Germany arrested
“half-breeds”, Grade 1, as they were officially designated, were sent
to Buchenwald and were not allowed to be transferred to another camp.
Thusly it came about, that when larger transports were assembled,
especially for the notorious outside headquarters or camps, the least
capable and the latest additions were selected from the blocks and
commands and sent away again. At the new places these persons were just
as unfit for labor as at the previous ones, in other words, they were
undesirable. After their arrival they very often had to be quarantined
for some time. The attempted regulation of the distribution from
one central office and the increasing impossibility to control this
manpower, resulted in thousands of prisoners being continually on the
move. They therefore, could not be committed to labor as the paper
records seem to indicate.
From the Fall of 1943 to the Fall of 1944 the transports compiled in
Table 9 arrived in Buchenwald from other concentration camps, which for
the greater part had already been destined for shipment to “Dora” and
other outside headquarters.
_Table 9_
-------------+--------+----------------------------+----------------
Date | Number | Type of Prisoner | From KL
-------------+--------+----------------------------+----------------
22 Sept. ’43 | 300 | Mostly Russians | Gross Rosen
22 Sept. ’43 | 210 | 149 Russians and oth. | Natzweiler
14 Oct. ’43 | 650 | 373 Frenchmen | Ravensbrueck
| | 144 Russians and oth. |
17 Oct. ’43 | 849 | Mostly Russians | Mauthausen
19 Oct. ’43 | 311 | Mostly Russians and Poles | Stutthof
21 Oct. ’43 | 300 | Mostly Russians and Poles | Auschwitz
21 Oct. ’43 | 200 | Mostly Russians and Poles | Natzweiler
21 Oct. ’43 | 506 | Mostly Jugoslavs | Flossenburg
23 Oct. ’43 | 1,539 | Mostly Poles | Auschwitz
30 Oct. ’43 | 1,025 | Mostly Jugoslavs and |
| | Russians | Dachau
20 Nov. ’43 | 375 | Mostly French and Poles | Mauthausen
21 Nov. ’43 | 417 | Mostly French and Russians | Dachau
12 Dec. ’43 | 200 | Russians and Poles | Auschwitz
25 Jan. ’44 | 400 | Germans and Russians | Sachsenhausen
3 Mar. ’44 | 421 | Mostly Czechs | Auschwitz
11 Mar. ’44 | 413 | Mostly Poles | Gross Rosen
2 Apr. ’44 | 202 | Czechs | Auschwitz
7 Apr. ’44 | 883 | Gypsies | Auschwitz
28 May ’44 | 350 | Mostly Poles and Russians | Stutthof
24 June ’44 | 2,000 | Mostly Poles and Russians | Auschwitz
29 July ’44 | 200 | Russians and Poles | Bergen-Belsen
3 Aug. ’44 | 510 | Gypsies | Auschwitz
3 Aug. ’44 | 400 | Russians and Poles | Neuengamme
16 Aug. ’44 | 1,350 | Jews various nations | Stutthof
27 Sept. ’44 | 1,085 | | Natzweiler near
| | | Dora
1 Oct. ’44 | 1,500 | Poles and Russians | Auschwitz
-------------+--------+----------------------------+----------------
In this table transports of less 200 prisoners from other camps and
transports which went directly to the outside headquarters without
passing through the main camp, are not listed.
The greater number of these additions, as well as the afore mentioned
additions from the East and West proceeded quickly and intact to the
outside headquarters of the equipment industry and only the completely
emaciated in the camps until they died of old age or decrepitude. After
months of the severest physical labor in those headquarters under the
worst living conditions (bad food, no rest even during their free
time, with out any sanitary installations, during months no thorough
bodily cleansing and no change of underwear) they either perished
[or were sent to] miserable concentration camps Lublin, Auschwitz or
Belsen-Bergen not for recreation--but for final liquidation. This
exploitation of the work potential of their slaves to the last gasp was
termed by the SS “shredding”. In this manner they reduced every one
they could lay their hands on to shreds--Russians, Poles, Hungarians,
Jugoslavs, Frenchmen, Jews and Christians--they would have annihilated
the population of a whole continent, if the Allied armies had not put a
stop to matters by their victorious advance.
By reason of all these transports from the West and the East and from
the other concentration camps the number of the additions, the camp
strength and the number of death cases rose as shown in Table 10.
_Table 10_
----------+-----------+----------+---------------
| | | Camp Strength
Month | Additions | Deaths | end of month
----------+-----------+----------+---------------
July ’43 | 1,725 | 191 | 15,796
Aug. ’43 | 4,537 | 118 | 19,641
Sept. ’43 | 5,444 | 123 | 24,688
Oct. ’43 | 9,048 | 109 | 33,377
Nov. ’43 | 4,454 | 314 | 35,112
Dec. ’43 | 3,734 | 967 | 37,319
Jan. ’44 | 8,017 | 1,000 | 42,833
Feb. ’44 | 1,979 | 880 | 41,240
Mar. ’44 | 5,065 | 1,311 | 43,371
April ’44 | 4,788 | 560 | 45,830
May ’44 | 9,655 | 390 | 54,287
June ’44 | 9,986 | 460 | 61,156
July ’44 | 7,398 | 347 | 66,609
Aug. ’44 | 17,170 | 742 | 82,391
Sept. ’44 | 4,251 | 497 | 84,505
Oct. ’44 | 6,728 | 770 | 55,473
----------+-----------+----------+---------------
On the 6 October 1944 the camp strength reached its highest figure
amounting to 89,134 prisoners. On 29 October 1944 the auxiliary
headquarters “Dora” became an independent concentration camp with the
name of KL Mittelbau containing 32,532 prisoners who were at that
time attached to the various auxiliary headquarters. The names of
these prisoners were removed from the Buchenwald records and the camp
strength reduced accordingly.
On 24 August 1944 at noon the equipment plants belonging to the
concentration camp were bombarded and completely destroyed. Not a
single high-explosive bomb fell into the prisoners camp but a few
incendiary bombs, diverted by the wind, set fire to the prisoners
tailor shop, shoemaker shop, laundry and the disinfection station
without injuring a single prisoner. The SS had not provided air raid
shelters for the prisoners, in fact they did not even allow the
prisoners to go into the camp during an air raid alarm. The prisoners
were compelled to remain in the workshops or in their immediate
vicinity. Bomb proof shelters or trenches for protection against
bomb fragment had not been constructed for the prisoners. During an
attack the water supply was shut off in the entire camp. Prisoners who
attempted to escape from the high-explosive and the incendiary bombs by
running into the open were shot down by the SS guards without mercy.
Consequently, the air bombardment caused the death of 364 prisoners.
It is not possible to determine now how many were shot down by the SS
troopers. It is a fact however that Thaelmann, who allegedly was killed
during the attack was an inmate of the Buchenwald camp. The prisoners
had reason to be grateful that the pinpoint bombing of the Allied Air
Force greatly reduced the number of victims.
The bombardment not only destroyed the factory buildings but also the
important administration offices of the SS in Buchenwald, especially
the so-called “Political Section,” in which the personal records of
the prisoners were kept. Therefore no new prisoners were allowed to be
shipped to the camp for a while. Those additions which were recorded in
September 1944 were sent directly to the auxiliary headquarters, and in
particular to “Dora”.
After the failure of the attempt on the life of Hitler on 20 July 1944
Himmler took over command of the Home Front Army. The concentration
camp Buchenwald soon reflected the results of this event. On 22 August
1944 the operation, given by the code name of “Gitter” [trellis], was
conducted throughout the entire territory of the Reich, by which the
remainder of the former functionaries of the Anti-Fascist Parties, who
were still at liberty, were arrested and sent directly to the nearest
concentration camp. On the 22 or 23 August 1944 about 750 “trellis”
prisoners arrived from the immediate surroundings of Weimar within
a few hours. Further transport from Saxony, the Rhineland and from
Westphalia were anticipated. However, after the attack of the Allied
Air Forces on the 24 August 1944 these transports could no longer be
made. In other Fascist circles this “trellis” action must also have met
with some opposition. The details and the reasons were not known at
that time. In any case, the Weimar Gestapo arrived in the camp a few
days later briefly examined the arrested persons and then set most of
them free.
If this was merely a police measure to use the camp temporarily as a
lodging place for arrested persons, Himmler soon found other ways and
means to increase the number of the slaves of the SS by new additions.
In November 1944 the first prisoners of a new category arrived which
was termed “Zwischenhaft II” (intermediate custody II). This category
included members of the Wehrmacht who had been condemned by the
military courts to severe penal prison sentences for desertion and
absence without official leave from their units. These soldiers were
sent to the concentration camp for “intermediate custody” and to be
set to work. It was Himmler’s plan to have these soldiers finish the
balance of their penal prison sentence after the end of the war.
According to orders from the highest authorities in Berlin they all
had to be sent to the KL “_Mittelbau_” or in other words to “Dora.” At
“Dora” they were probably put to work on the dangerous manufacture of
the secret weapons, because being long term prisoners they were not
to be spared. Furthermore, no difficulties could arise in the future
because they could not be given a discharge on account of the secret
nature of their work.
These intermediate prisoners were by no means only German Reich
nationals, but among them were also members of all the European nations
who had joined the German Wehrmacht as volunteers. In these months,
even Himmler delivered members of his own SS units who were guilty of
misdemeanors, to the concentration camps. In December 1944, January and
February 1945 several small transports of Croatians, Turka (members of
a Mohammedan SS formation) and Frenchmen, at the time in SS uniforms
arrived in the camp as prisoners.
Other political events in occupied Europe brought new additions to
the concentration camps. In September 1944 a large raid was carried
out in Denmark, against the Danish police, especially in Copenhagen.
On 30 September 1944, 1,480 Danish police functionaries arrived in
the KL “Buchenwald,” after having been detained a few days in the KL
“Neuengamme.” They were followed by 473 men on 5 October 1944. They
were soon put to work and long columns of them had to carry building
materials. However, they did not stay very long in the camp. The first
200, mostly high-ranking police officers, were removed by the Danish
Red Cross on 8 December 1944, and as far as it was known here, taken to
an internment camp in Schleswig Holstein. The next transport of 1,604
Danes left on 17 December 1944 and the balance followed during January
and February 1945. The unaccustomed severe climate of Buchenwald,
to which they had been transported at the beginning of the winter,
demanded a relatively high total of victims. In the few months of their
sojourn, approximately 90 Danes died.
X.
When the Auxiliary Headquarters “Dora” was declared an independent
concentration camp in October 1944, the construction work had been
completed and the production of V-weapons was running at full speed. In
connection therewith the demand for unskilled labor had diminished a
little.
The establishment of a new and even more notorious auxiliary
headquarters near Ohrdruf in Thuringia with the designation “S III”,
soon caused Buchenwald to experience a new increase in mass transports.
In all haste an underground factory was to be built there, without any
regard for any wastage of manpower. Again mass transports from all
concentration camps either passed through Buchenwald or went directly
to their point of destination. Again mass transports left Buchenwald
itself for the new auxiliary headquarters. The SS found the SS ordered
all the prisoners to fall in on the roll-call grounds, the latter were
then closed off and the SS selected 1,000 prisoners for “S III”, who
were shipped off that same night. The first large transport of 1,000
men arrived in the new headquarters on 20 November 1944. Already within
a month the strength of the headquarters rose to 7,500 men and reached
a maximum figure of 13,726 prisoners on 27 March 1945.
The increasing inefficiency of the administrative machine in the higher
offices soon manifested itself very clearly. The new headquarters were
put under the command of the Wehrmacht. The prisoners were struck
off the records of the camp strength of the various concentration
camps and were to be incorporated into the new headquarters. This soon
proved itself impossible on account of the enormous inflow and the
lack of experienced help. Therefore the whole headquarters had to be
taken over again into the camp strength of the KL Buchenwald. It was
absolutely unknown which prisoners were in “S III” and the SS had it
compiled with the help of prisoners, a complete record of all the camp
inmates. At that time the rolls disclosed a strength of 7,648 men of
which about 2,000 were in the so-called North Camp and approximately
5,500 in the South Camp. Before the lists sent to the KL Buchenwald
could be checked, 1,400 completely exhausted prisoners arrived at
Buchenwald from “S III” on 12 December 1944. They gave the camp its
first shocking impression of the horrible conditions in Ohrdruf. On
their arrival at the Buchenwald railroad station more than 200 of the
1,400 prisoners had already died or were well spent and exhausted that
they were unable to give their names or numbers. The transport lists,
sloppily compiled by the SS, did not check. Prisoners were listed that
did not come with the transport and vice-versa, consequently it was
impossible to accurately identify later the dead. The SS management did
not send the next transport of “shredded” workers to Buchenwald but to
the concentration camp Bergen-Belsen, where their final liquidation in
the remoteness of the Lueneburger Heide, presumably, could be carried
out less openly and more expeditiously.
The tragic end of the exterior headquarters is probably known by this
time. At the approach of the victorious Allied troops the headquarters
set out on foot in the direction of Buchenwald. Anyone who could not
keep up with the marching column was shot. From 4 to 7 April 1945 about
9,300 prisoners (in view of the chaotic conditions which also existed
here, an accurate count could not be made) arrived in Buchenwald. On
the 9 and 10 April 1945 the SS evacuated the majority of them from
Buchenwald. From all that has been learned so far about them it is
probable that this transport was annihilated completely. At the end of
March, according to the local reports, about 12,000 prisoners were in
“S III”. The prisoners who did not arrive in Buchenwald, by the SS in
the “S III” camp or on the road.
_Table 11_
--------------+--------+------------------------------+----------------
Date | Number | Type | From KL--All
| | | to S III
--------------+--------+------------------------------+----------------
19 Nov. ’44 | 778 | Hung. Jews | Sachsenhausen
24 Nov. ’44 | 500 | Hung. Jews | Sachsenhausen
26 Nov. ’44 | 1,000 | Jews | Stutthof
27 Nov. ’44 | 500 | Jews | Sachsenhausen
29 Nov. ’44 | 500 | Lithuanians, Poles, Russians | Stutthof
2 Dec. ’44 | 353 | Polish jews | Camp Plaszow
5 Dec. ’44 | 1,997 | Various | Dachau
7 Dec. ’44 | 500 | Poles | Auschwitz
13 Dec. ’44 | 2,496 | Various | Dachau
18 Dec. ’44 | 425 | Mostly Poles | Auschwitz
26 Dec. ’44 | 394 | Mostly Poles | Natzweiler
--------------+--------+------------------------------+----------------
In the following Table 12 transports are listed, consisting of
prisoners from “S III” no longer capable of working, which were
transferred to other camps. It is to be assumed, that at least a
portion of these prisoners were not recorded as additions in the camps
of their destination, because they were condemned to be liquidated and
therefore, not booked on the rolls of the camp strength.
_Table 12_
-------------+--------+---------+--------------
Date | Number | Type | Destination
-------------+--------+---------+--------------
14 Febr. ’45 | 500 | Various | Bergen-Belsen
24 Febr. ’45 | 1,884 | Various | Bergen-Belsen
25 Febr. ’45 | 500 | Various | Bergen-Belsen
-------------+--------+---------+--------------
In addition to the above there was one transport of 1,002 “invalids”,
the greater number of which had also been in “S III”, or had keen
destined for “S III”, but were sent directly from Buchenwald to the KL
Bergen-Belsen.
Of the new arrivals booked by “S III” in the period of 24 December 1944
to 26 February 1945, the records indicate that 1,460 prisoners died in
Ohrdruf.
XI.
The advance of the Red Army compelled the evacuation of the large
concentration camps in the East. The result was a maddening increase in
arrivals and a horrible, almost inconceivable increase of unnecessary
suffering and senseless sacrifices. The offensive on the Vistula River
began 13 January 1945. Within a short time the Red Army reached a
menacing position close to the concentration camp Auschwitz, where
there must have been about 80,000 prisoners. Auschwitz had to be
evacuated. Shortly thereafter, the concentration camp Gross Rosen near
Breslau had to be cleared. The first transports of evacuated Jews from
the KL Auschwitz on open railroad cars arrived here on 22 January 1945,
which were soon followed by others. In those days it was bitterly
cold. These human beings had been traveling for days, insufficiently
clad and underfed. In the overcrowded railroad cars their comrades had
died from weakness and exhaustion, and to save themselves the living
had to throw the dead bodies from the moving train. The commandant of
the camp received complaints from the regions through which the trains
had passed, that corpses had been found on the railway embankments.
The arrivals very often dragged themselves from the railroad station
to the camp with their last ounce of strength. Prisoners, the camp
guards and the fire department had to proceed with two-wheeled carts
and handcarts, usually, and for transporting building materials to the
station to load up the collapsed persons and the dead bodies. The camp
streets were littered with lost blankets, caps, overcoats, mess kits
and collapsed human beings, who had not been able to drag themselves
any further.
An accurate count of the additions was no longer possible. A check
on the number of those leaving the point of departure and on how
many had died on the way, escaped, or had simply remained behind
also was no longer possible. Likewise the administrations of the
dissolved camps did not know which prisoners had been transported to
Buchenwald. The Reich Security Service sent a teletype letter to all
the concentration camps, who had received additions from Auschwitz and
Gross-Rosen, requesting that lists of the newly arrived prisoners with
their old prisoner’s number be forwarded as soon as possible to the
administration of the Auschwitz concentration camp, which latter in the
meantime had been transferred to the KL Mittelbau. The concentration
camps Auschwitz and Gross-Rosen, as well as other camps and prisons in
the East and the West had to be evacuated in great haste and many of
the inmates came to Buchenwald.
The transport which came here will be listed in detail in Table 13 and
Table 14 will show the increases in the camp strength in the additions
and the death cases.
_Table 13_
-------------+----------+--------------------+---------------------------
Date | Number | Type of Prisoner | Origin
-------------+----------+--------------------+---------------------------
24 Dec. ’44 | 916 | Polish Jews | Budapest via Vienna
25 Dec. ’44 | 1,913 | Hungarian Jews |
17 Jan. ’45 | 263 | Various | Cologne and
| | | Aix-la-Chapelle.
17 Jan. ’45 | 2,740 | Polish Jews | Tschenstochau.
20 Jan. ’45 | 1,446 | Polish Jews | Tschenstochau.
22 Jan. ’45 | 2,224 | Jews diff. nations | Auschwitz.
23 Jan. ’45 | 917 | Jews diff. nations | Auschwitz.
26 Jan. ’45 | 3,987 | Various | Auschwitz.
3 Febr. ’45 | 291 | Various | Kuestrin.
5 Febr. ’45 | 285 | French a. Belgians | Prison Gr. Strehlitz.
7 Febr. ’45 | 250 | Various | Kuestrin.
10 Febr. ’45 | 6,805 | Various | Gross-Rosen.
24 Febr. ’45 | 464 | Russians | Gross-Rosen.
26 Febr. ’45 | 290 | Various | Exterior Hdg. Gross-Rosen.
| | Various | { Gross-Rosen to Exterior.
5 Mar. ’45 | 580 | | { Hdqtrs. Leipzig.
7 Mar. ’45 | 905 | Mostly Jews | Gross-Rosen.
12 Mar. ’45 | 399 | Mostly Poles | Gross-Rosen.
30 Mar. ’45 | 280 | Various | Natzweiler.
-------------+----------+--------------------+---------------------------
_Table 14_
----------+-----------+-----------+-------------------
Date | Additions | Deaths | Camp Strength End
| | | of month
----------+-----------+-----------+-------------------
Nov. ’44 | 10,305 | 612 | 59,261
Dec. ’44 | 12,555 | 1,113 | 63,048
Jan. ’45 | 24,197 | 2,002 | 80,297
Febr. ’45 | 13,066 | 5,523 | 86,232
March ’45 | 6,560 | 5,531 | 80,436
----------+-----------+-----------+-------------------
The further expansion in the last 11 days of the existence of the
National Socialistic concentration camp Buchenwald was influenced by
the ever closer approaching Allied Armies. The last of the exterior
headquarters located in the West returned to the camp of origin
Buchenwald. On 6 April the number of the prisoners amounted to about
47,700 men. The balance of 31,598, mostly employed in exterior
headquarters east of Buchenwald, did not return to the camp. At this
time nothing is known of their fate.
The SS began to evacuate the camp on April 6, 1945. It succeeded in
transferring 28,285 prisoners to other camps. The transports in detail
are given in Table 15.
_Table 15_
-------------+----------+-------------------+----------------
Date | Number | Type of Prisoners | Destination
-------------+----------+-------------------+----------------
6 Apr. ’45 | 3,105 | Jews | KL Flossenbuerg
7 Apr. ’45 | 1,500 | Various | Leitmeritz
7 Apr. ’45 | 4,800 | Mostly Jews | KL Flossenbuerg
9 Apr. ’45 | 9,600 | Various | Dachau
10 Apr. ’45 | 9,280 | Various | Unknown
| ------ | |
Total | 28,285 | |
-------------+----------+-------------------+----------------
When the KL Buchenwald was liberated by the Allied Armies on 11 April
1945 there were still about 21,000 prisoners on the Ettersberg.
# # # # #
_Annex I_
Tabular Survey of the Numerical Expansion at the Buchenwald
Concentration Camp
----------+----------+----------------------------------+---------
| | Decrease | Camp
| +---------+--------+------+--------+ strength
Month | Increase | Disch. | Trans. | Died | Total | end of
| | | | | | month
----------+----------+---------+--------+------+--------+---------
July ’37 | 930 | | | | 1 | 929
Aug. ’37 | 1,414 | | | 8 | 48 | 2,295
Sept. ’37 | 180 | | | 7 | 55 | 2,420
Oct. ’37 | 109 | | | 2 | 60 | 2,469
Nov. ’37 | 133 | | | 9 | 75 | 2,527
Dec. ’37 | 146 | | | 22 | 112 | 2,561
+----------+---------+--------+------+--------+---------
Total | 2,912 | | | 48 | 351 |
----------+----------+---------+--------+------+--------+---------
----------+----------+---------+--------+------+--------+---------
Jan. ’38 | 139 | | | | 67 | 2,633
Febr. ’38 | 140 | | | | 45 | 2,728
Mar. ’38 | 138 | | | | 60 | 2,806
April ’38 | 236 | | | | 42 | 3,000
May ’38 | 1,785 | | | | 54 | 4,731
June ’38 | 3,103 | | | | 111 | 7,723
July ’38 | 463 | | | | 258 | 7,928
Aug. ’38 | 348 | | | | 485 | 7,791
Sept. ’38 | 3,059 | | | | 379 | 10,471
Oct. ’38 | 428 | | | | 711 | 10,188
Nov. ’38 | 10,098 | | | | 2,181 | 18,105
Dec. ’38 | 185 | | | | 7,262 | 11,028
+----------+---------+--------+------+--------+---------
Total | 20,122 | | | 771 |11,655 |
----------+----------+---------+--------+------+--------+---------
----------+----------+---------+--------+------+--------+---------
Jan. ’39 | 184 | | | | 1,727 | 9,485
Febr. ’39 | 113 | | | | 949 | 8,649
Mar. ’39 | 45 | | | | 30 | 8,664
Apr. ’39 | 13 | | | | 2,314 | 6,363
May ’39 | 20 | | | | 713 | 5,670
June ’39 | 103 | | | | 250 | 5,523
July ’39 | 166 | | | | 297 | 5,392
Aug. ’39 | 155 | | | | 165 | 5,392
Sept. ’39 | 3,314 | | | | 62 | 8,634
Oct. ’39 | 5,373 | | | | 1,232 | 12,775
Nov. ’39 | 50 | | | | 448 | 12,377
Dec. ’39 | 17 | | | | 587 | 11,807
+----------+---------+--------+------+--------+---------
Total | 9,553 | | | 1,235| 8,774 |
----------+----------+---------+--------+------+--------+---------
----------+----------+---------+--------+------+--------+---------
Jan. ’40 | 24 | | | | 875 | 10,956
Feb. ’40 | 21 | | | | 654 | 10,323
Mar. ’40 | 14 | | | | 1,518 | 8,819
Apr. ’40 | 67 | | | | 900 | 7,986
May ’40 | 19 | | | | 372 | 7,633
June ’40 | 26 | | | | 321 | 7,338
July ’40 | 250 | | | | 318 | 7,270
Aug. ’40 | 1,168 | | | | 239 | 8,199
Sept. ’40 | 52 | | | | 144 | 8,107
Oct. ’40 | 196 | | | | 502 | 7,801
Nov. ’40 | 96 | | | | 286 | 7,611
Dec. ’40 | 592 | | | | 763 | 7,440
+----------+---------+--------+------+--------+---------
Total | 2,525 | | 1,772 | | 6,892 |
----------+----------+---------+--------+------+--------+---------
----------+----------+---------+--------+------+--------+---------
Jan. ’41 | 50 | | | | 128 | 7,362
Feb. ’41 | 452 | | | | 217 | 7,597
Mar. ’41 | 236 | | | | 513 | 7,320
Apr. ’41 | 505 | | | | 336 | 7,489
May ’41 | 288 | | | | 992 | 6,785
June ’41 | 231 | | | | 209 | 6,807
July ’41 | 2,695 | | | | 920 | 8,582
Aug. ’41 | 396 | | | | 496 | 8,482
Sept. ’41 | 251 | | | | 363 | 8,370
Oct. ’41 | 251 | | | | 468 | 8,153
Nov. ’41 | 277 | | | | 520 | 7,910
Dec. ’41 | 258 | | | | 257 | 7,911
+----------+---------+--------+------+--------+---------
Total | 5,890 | | 1,522 | | 5,419 |
----------+----------+---------+--------+------+--------+---------
----------+----------+---------+--------+------+--------+---------
Jan. ’42 | 554 | | | | 479 | 7,986
Febr. ’42 | 480 | | | | 349 | 8,117
Mar. ’42 | 2,843 | | | | 2,154 | 8,806
Apr. ’42 | 521 | | | | 673 | 8,654
May ’42 | 452 | | | | 1,505 | 7,601
June ’42 | 1,019 | | | | 620 | 8,000
July ’42 | 1,996 | | | | 1,147 | 8,849
Aug. ’42 | 1,715 | | | | 678 | 9,886
Sept. ’42 | 1,709 | | | | 1,520 | 10,075
Oct. ’42 | 984 | | | | 2,228 | 8,831
Nov. ’42 | 794 | | | | 533 | 9,092
Dec. ’42 | 1,044 | | | | 619 | 9,517
+----------+---------+--------+------+--------+---------
Total | 14,111 | | 2,898 | | 12,505 |
----------+----------+---------+--------+------+--------+---------
----------+----------+---------+--------+------+--------+---------
Jan. ’43 | 2,500 | | | 111 | 742 | 11,275
Febr. ’43 | 1,291 | 94 | 377 | 175 | 646 | 11,920
Mar. ’43 | 2,474 | 40 | 1,582 | 311 | 1,933 | 12,461
Apr. ’43 | 2,773 | 1,102 | 299 | 507 | 1,908 | 13,326
May ’43 | 2,339 | 38 | 807 | 379 | 1,224 | 14,441
June ’43 | 1,858 | 122 | 348 | 211 | 681 | 15,618
July ’43 | 1,727 | 39 | 1,317 | 191 | 1,547 | 15,796
Aug. ’43 | 4,537 | 57 | 517 | 118 | 692 | 19,641
Sept. ’43 | 5,444 | 41 | 233 | 123 | 397 | 24,688
Oct. ’43 | 9,048 | 41 | 209 | 109 | 359 | 33,377
Nov. ’43 | 4,454 | 27 | 2,378 | 314 | 2,719 | 35,112
Dec. ’43 | 3,734 | 35 | 525 | 967 | 1,527 | 37,319
+----------+---------+--------+------+--------+---------
Total | 42,177 | 1,636 | 8,592 |3,516 | 14,375 |
----------+----------+---------+--------+------+--------+---------
----------+----------+---------+--------+------+--------+---------
Jan. ’44 | 8,017 | 49 | 1,454 |1,000 | 2,503 | 42,833
Febr. ’44 | 1,979 | 44 | 2,648 | 880 | 3,572 | 41,240
Mar. ’44 | 5,065 | 96 | 1,527 |1,311 | 2,934 | 43,371
Apr. ’44 | 4,788 | 120 | 1,649 | 560 | 2,329 | 45,830
May ’44 | 9,655 | 133 | 675 | 390 | 1,198 | 54,287
June ’44 | 9,986 | 464 | 2,193 | 460 | 3,117 | 61,156
July ’44 | 7,398 | 311 | 1,287 | 347 | 1,945 | 66,609
Aug. ’44 | 17,170 | 217 | 429 | 742 | 1,388 | 82,391
Sept. ’44 | 4,221 | 1,139 | 471 | 497 | 2,107 | 84,505
Oct. ’44 | 6,728 | 981 | 34,047| 732 | 35,760 | 55,473
Nov. ’44 | 10,305 | 698 | 5,207 | 612 | 6,517 | 59,261
Dec. ’44 | 12,555 | 2,076 | 5,579 |1,113 | 8,768 | 63,048
+----------+---------+--------+------+--------+---------
Total | 97,867 | 6,328 | 57,166 |8,644 | 72,138 |
----------+----------+---------+--------+------+--------+---------
----------+----------+---------+--------+------+--------+---------
Jan. ’45 | 24,197 | 190 | 4,756 | 2,002| 6,948 | 80,297
Febr. ’45 | 13,066 | 257 | 1,351 | 5,523| 7,131 | 86,232
Mar. ’45 | 6,560 | 488 | 6,337 | 5,531| 12,356 | 80,436
+----------+---------+--------+------+--------+---------
Total | 43,823 | 935 |12,444 |13,056| 26,435 |
==========+==========+=========+========+======+========+=========
TOTAL 1937| | | | | |
to 31 | | | | | |
MARCH | | | | | |
1945: | 238,980 | | |33,462|158,544 |
----------+----------+---------+--------+------+--------+---------
_Annex II_
Copy of a letter from the SS Main Office of Economic Administration to
all concentration camps.
SS Main Office of Economic Administration
Service Group D Concentration Camp
D III/Az.: 14 h (KL) 12.42 Lg/Wy
Oranienburg
28 December 1942
Regarding: Medical Activities in the Concentration Camps
Reference: without
Enclosure: 1
SECRET
TO the 1. Camp Doctors of the Concentration Camps Da., Sh., Bu., Neu.,
Au., Rav., Flo., Lu., Stu., Gr-Ro., Nied., Natz., Hinz., Mor., Herzog.,
Mau.,
Copy to the Camp Commandants.
In the inclosed a compilation of the current arrivals and departures
in all the concentration camps is sent to you for your information. It
discloses that out of 136,000 arrivals about 70,000 died. With such a
high rate of death the number of the prisoners can never be brought
up to the figure as has been ordered by the Reichsfuehrer of the SS.
The 1. camp doctors must use all means at their disposal to reduce
essentially this death rate in the various camps. The best doctor in a
concentration camp is not the one, who believes that he must stand out
for uncalled severity, but the one who by his supervision and exchange
keeps the working capacity at the various labor commands at the highest
possible level. The camp doctors must supervise more often than in
the past the food of the prisoners and, with the approval of the
administration, submit improvement proposals to the camp commandants.
These, however, must not only appear on paper, but must be controlled
regularly by the camp doctors. Furthermore, the camp doctors are to
see to it that the working conditions at the various labor places are
improved as much as possible. To this purpose it will be necessary that
the camp doctors inspect the labor places on the ground and convince
themselves about the conditions of work.
The SS Reichsfuehrer has ordered that the death rate absolutely must
be reduced. For this reason the aforementioned has been ordered and a
monthly report on this matter is to be submitted to the Chief of the
Department D III. The first report to be submitted on 1 February 1943.
[Signature illegible]
Klueder[?]
SS Brigadefuehrer and Major General of the Arms
_Survey_
For the month of June-November 1942
------+------------------------------------
Month | Arrivals
------+------------------------------------
| Deliveries Uberst [?] Total
------+---------+--------+---------+-------
June | 10,322 | 1,575 | 11,897 | 873
July | 25,716 | 6,254 | 31,970 | 907
Aug. | 25,407 | 2,742 | 28,149 | 581
Sept. | 16,763 | 6,438 | 23,201 | 652
Oct. | 13,873 | 5,345 | 19,218 | 1,089
Nov. | 17,780 | 4,565 | 22,345 | 809
+---------+--------+---------+-------
Total| 109,861 | 26,919 | 136,870 | 4,711
------+---------+--------+---------+-------
Table continued ...
------+--------------------------------------
Month | Departures
------+--------------------------------------
| Dischrg, Uberst [?] Dead Exek. Total
------+---------+--------+-------+-----------
June | 1,903 | 4,080 | 243 | 6,899
July | 4,340 | 8,536 | 477 | 12,260
Aug. | 2,950 | 12,733 | 99 | 16,363
Sept. | 6,805 | 22,598 | 144 | 30,199
Oct. | 6,334 | 11,858 | 5,945 | 25,235
Nov. | 5,514 | 10,805 | 2,350 | 19,478
+---------+--------+-------+-----------
Total| 27,846 | 70,610 | 9,267 | 112,434
------+---------+--------+-------+-----------
COPY OF DOCUMENT 2176-PS
CONFIDENTIAL
REPORT OF INVESTIGATING OFFICER HEADQUARTERS THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
Office of the Judge Advocate
APO 403
AG 092 (3 JA-132) GNMCJ 17 June 1945
SUBJECT: Report of Investigation of Alleged War Crimes.
TO: Commanding General, Twelfth Army Group, APO
655, U. S. Army.
I. _AUTHORITY_
1. This investigation was conducted in conformity with Letter, European
Theater of Operations, 24 February 1945, by Eugene S. Cohen, ASN
O-1573121, Major, 514th Quartermaster Group, APO 403, United States
Army, Investigator-Examiner, during the period 6 May 1945 to 15 June
1945, and pursuant to directive of Commanding General, Third United
States Army, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit 1.
II. _MATTERS INVESTIGATED_
2. Murder by shooting, beating, use of poison gas, drowning, starving,
injections, stoning, exposure, burning, and choking of nationals of
twenty-three (23) nations, including members of the United States armed
forces, of the German civilian population working under the German
armed forces and of other nationals under the orders of said German
armed forces, in violation of Article 2 of the Geneva Prisoner of War
Convention (Par 73, Rules of Land Warfare, Article 2 of same, Par 25,
26, 30, and 31, Rules of Land Warfare).
III. _PROCEEDINGS_
3. _a._ The testimony of all witnesses examined in the course of this
investigation and which is attached and made a part hereof was secured
through the use of interpreters where requisite, after the witness
had been sworn by me, through the interpreter, under the authority of
Article of War 114, in the following form: “You swear (or affirm) that
the evidence you shall give in this investigation now being conducted
by me shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
truth. So help you God.” Where practicable, the witness was given an
opportunity to sign his testimony in my presence and, in all cases, it
was signed after such testimony had been read back to the witness in
his own language by the interpreter. The use of a stenographic reporter
was impracticable under existing conditions.
The interpreter was sworn in the following form: “You swear (or affirm)
that you will truly interpret this investigation now being conducted by
me. So help you God.”
_b._ The transcribed testimony of each such witness whose name is
below listed is hereto attached as an Exhibit--the number of which
is indicated immediately following the witness’ name. As a further
aid, the name of each camp in the chain at which the said Exhibit was
prepared is listed alongside the name of the witness:
* * * * * * *
_c._ Other Exhibits:
_Description_
(_a_) (Exhibit 4 is a report by an International Committee set up
by this Investigation, and same is sworn to in due form by the two
witnesses named. The report is further documented with the names of
others who helped compile the facts and figures).
(_b_) Journal Record of victims between certain dates, including
information as to name, nationality, residence, date of birth, date of
death, manner of death, and the names of guards performing the actual
execution. (Ex. #214)
(_c_) “Totenbuch,” or Book of the Dead, representing names of victims,
nationality, residence, date of birth, date of death, and manner of
death, between certain dates. This is a sample of small journals which
were later incorporated in the permanent records which number sixteen
(16) volumes and which will be submitted in a supplemental report. (Ex.
#215)
(_d_) Specimen of poisonous gas used in gas chamber at Mauthausen and
Gusen No. 1 and No. 2. (Ex. #216)
(_e_) Rubber hose used by SS Guards to beat prisoners in the Mauthausen
Chain of Camps. (Ex. #217)
(_f_) Heavy whip used by SS Guards to beat prisoners in the Mauthausen
Chain of Camps. (Ex. #218)
(_g_) Cat of Nine Tails Whip used by SS guards. (Ex. #219)
IV. SUMMARY OF FACTS
4. A certificate by the Investigator-Examiner is attached hereto in
separate form, summarizing the camp and methods of working them in the
present investigation.
_a._ Between 1,500,000 and 2,000,000 political prisoners are known to
have been incarcerated and labeled for extermination at the Mauthausen
system of concentration camps from available records. The Chain
consisted of between 23 and 30 individual camps between the years 1941
and 1945, the number varying as the smaller of these were occasionally
evacuated when certain jobs had been finished (see Exhibits 4, 81, and
213).
_b._ Of the camps affiliated with Mauthausen, the present investigation
covered 13 of them of which the largest were Mauthausen, Gusen, Number
1 and Number 2, Ebensee, Steyr, and Gunskirchen. Others in the list
situated in Third Army Territory were Linz, Numbers 1, 2 and 3, Wells,
Lenzing, Schlier, and Enns. The victims of this Chain of camps were
murdered by the SS Guards working in these camps under the command of
Franz Ziereis, Commandant and George Bachmayer, Assistant Commandant,
both now deceased, whose headquarters were at the fortress in
Mauthausen (see Exhibits 209, 210, and 212).
_c._ Evidence reveals that the orders for the systemic decimation of
these prisoners originated in Berlin under the direct orders of SS
Fuehrer Heinrich Himmler (see Exhibit 4).
_d._ American Forces liberated this camp on 5 May 1945 and this
Investigator-Examiner and his team commenced this investigation on 6
May 1945.
_e._ The victims of the Mauthausen Chain of concentration camps are in
the process of compilation and will be submitted in a supplementary
report.
5. It may be added that one of the functions of the International
Committee formed by this investigator to assist in the investigation of
these camps was to arrange for each nation to copy the names of each
of its dead from the available records in order to notify the next
of kin. Therefore, it is confidently concluded that each such nation
already has a list of its own dead with all information regarding
their manner of death and the statistics thereupon. This International
Committee was selected from the inmates by the team and consisted of
the most distinguished members selected by the prisoners themselves.
The Committee numbered six men as principals and many assistants have
greatly helped the investigation in securing the best witnesses and
covering all phases in the preparation of this case for trial (see
Exhibit 4).
6. _Enemy Individuals_
_a._ See Exhibit 2.
_b._ Wanted notices for all perpetrators are in the process of
preparation.
V. _CONCLUSIONS_
The evidence collected in this case shows very clearly that the
whole purpose of the Mauthausen Chain of concentration camps was
extermination of human beings for no other reason than their opposition
to the Nazi way of thinking. There is no doubt that Mauthausen was the
basis for long term planning. It was constructed as a gigantic stone
fortress on top of a mountain flanked by small barracks.
Mauthausen, in addition to its permanency of construction, had
facilities for a large garrison of officers and men, and had large
dining rooms and toilet facilities for the staff. It was conducted with
the sole purpose in mind of exterminating any so-called prisoner who
entered within its walls.
The so-called branches of Mauthausen were under direct command of the
SS officials located there. All records, orders, and administrative
facilities were handled for these branches through Mauthausen. The
other camps, including Gusen and Ebensee, its two most notorious and
largest branches, were not exclusively used for extermination but
prisoners were used as tools in construction and production until
they were beaten or starved into uselessness, whereupon they were
customarily sent to Mauthausen for final disposal.
The responsibility for the deaths of these victims lies definitely
with the Nazi Party and with the SS men who executed its commands.
Men like Himmler, Ziereis, Bachmayer, Schulz, Giesler, Pelzer, and
other names in Exhibit 2 are but the arch criminals. However, although
direct evidence is not established against all the members of the SS
Guards in this disreputable Chain, the inescapable presumption is
that all of them are prima facie guilty of these mass murders and the
burden of proof is upon them individually to prove his innocence. In
this connection the SS organization was purely a voluntary one and its
purposes were obviously criminal, in violation of the Hague and Geneva
Conventions, and the rights of humanity.
It is the belief of the Investigator-Examiner that the theory of
“Association des Malfaiteurs” should be employed most stringently in
a case as virulent and as atrocious as the Mauthausen set-up (see
Certificate attached hereto).
/s/Eugene S. Cohen
EUGENE S. COHEN, Major, QMC,
JA Section, Third US Army, Investigator-Examiner.
3 JA-132
# # # # #
CERTIFICATE OF OFFICER INVESTIGATING MAUTHAUSEN CONCENTRATION CAMP.
I hereby certify as follows:
1. The Mauthausen Chain of Concentration Camps varied in number from
twenty to thirty or more, depending on the needs of any specific work
assignment.
2. As shown in Exhibits 21, 22, and 201, the captured records indicated
the names of most of these camps, which varied in size from the huge
fortress of Mauthausen itself, to a small detached lager similar to
Steyr or Lenzing. Lenzing for example, like Steyr (See Exhibits 86, 194
and 195) were detachments from Mauthausen sent and billeted in barracks
to run two large factories.
3. The map herein included as Exhibit 201 shows the locations of these
named camps with most important route number leading to them. It is
thus seen that the majority of these camps were located East of the
River Enns (which flows into the Danube and passes through Steyr and
Enns-Township, Austria), and, therefore, are of Russian concern, since
this river is the present International Occupation Boundary between
ourselves and the Soviet Union.
4. However, the remainder of the camps (as shown in Exhibit 201),
amounting roughly to about 13, have been accounted for in this present
investigation. (See list of Exhibits.) The so-called most notorious of
these camps are, of course, first Mauthausen (ranked with Auschwitz
as by far the largest and worst of all Concentration Camps); Ebensee
(ranked by many as worse than Dachau yet only an inferior Aussenlager
(Branch to Mauthausen)); Gusen, divided into two large branches named
Numbers one and two and of large size in themselves; Gunskirchen and
Steyr, (see Exhibit 84), numbering at capacity five-thousand people.
(See Exhibit 195.)
5. Many of these camps were evacuated almost immediately upon
liberation, even so large a one as Gunskirchen. (See Exhibit 84.) This
camp was said to have numbered as many as 20,000 prisoners at one time,
but however, Gunskirchen, like Steyr and Lenzing and the Linz Group
(Exhibit 22), and even Ebensee, were not equipped for Mass Murder
(Extermination), like Mauthausen and the Gusens, and when deaths were
“required” other than through starving, beatings, exposure, or lack of
hygienic treatment, the prisoners were dispatched either to Mauthausen
or the Gusens where _all_ were labelled for eventual annihilation. (See
Exhibit 4 as a conclusive Exhibit which in itself, makes a complete
case against the perpetrators involved.)
6. The total count of victims is impossible to estimate, but with
Hartheim Castle (a building used for mysterious disposal of people),
(see Exhibit 213) almost 2,000,000 are counted from the German Records
themselves. (Also see again Exhibit 4).
7. As to the perpetrators or murderers, a complete list of leaders
and some 10,000 (approximately) other SS names are included in this
investigation. Descriptions are included whenever possible and at all
events, Name, Rank, Date of Birth, Last Residence, and Residence of
Next of Kin (to whom they might return) are given. (See Exhibit 2, and
valuable Exhibit 213 which lists the victims between certain dates,
giving their names, nationalities, Dates of Birth, Day of Death, Method
of Death, and Names of Guards doing the killing).
8. All Camps presently investigated are as follows:
Mauthausen, Gusen (Nos. 1 and 2), Linz (Nos. 1, 2, and 3), and Ebensee.
Wels, Gunskirchen, Lenzing, Steyr, and Schlier are also taken care
of as part of the chain and as indicated heretofore. All others were
either in Russian or British areas. All these camps have been treated
as one case. However, a Supplemental Report is now being prepared to
follow the present one in a short time. It should be noted that Franz
Ziereis, Commandant of the Mauthausen Chain and Georg Bachmayer,
Assistant Commandant, are now dead. (See Exhibits 181, 182, 183, 184,
185, 209 and 210.)
9. Besides the books made Exhibits in this present report, sixteen
Totenbucher (Books of the dead, as described in Exhibit 4) have been
photographed in micro-film and although ready cannot be received in
time to submit in this present report.
Additional still photographs and more than 1000 feet of motion pictures
have been taken by an official Signal Corps Team and will also be
submitted in the Supplemental Report.
/s/ Eugene S. Cohen
EUGENE S. COHEN,
Major, QMCorps, Investigating Officer.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2187-PS
Main SS economic administration office Office group chief D
--concentration camps--D I/Az : 14 e 3/Ot/S;--
Oranienburg, 14 July 1943
Re: Beating of female prisoners
Ref: Reichsfuehrer-SS B. Nz. I/1891/41 Ads.Sk/Fe.--of 7 July 1943
Enclosures / none
REGISTERED
To the camp commandants of concentration camps, Au., Rav., Herz.,
Lub. and Stutthof.
The Reichsfuehrer-SS and Chief of the German Police has ordered that
the execution of sentence on Russian women has to be done by Polish
women and on Polish and Ukrainian women by Russian women.
As a reward the prisoners inflicting the punishment may be given a few
cigarettes.
Under no circumstances may German prisoners be employed to inflict
punishment. Also other prisoners due for punishment themselves are not
to be employed for this purpose.
per sig. Liebehenschel
SS-Obersturmbannfuehrer
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2189-PS
SS Economic Administrative Main Office
Office Group Chief D
Concentration Camps, D 1/Az: 14e 3/L/Ot.
Oranienburg, 11 Aug. 1942.
_Re_: Punishment by Beating.
_Ref_: none
_Encl_: none
To the camp commandants of concentration camps. Da, Sah, Bu, Mau, Flo,
Neu, Au, Gr-Ro, Natz, _Nie_, _Stu_, _Arb_, _Rav_, _and prisoner of war
camp Lublin_.
The Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police has ordered that
punishment by beating will be executed in concentration camps for women
by _prisoners_--under the ordered supervision.
In order to coordinate this order the main office chief of the main SS
Economic Administration Office, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and General of
the Waffen-SS Pohl, has ordered, effective immediately, that punishment
by beating will also be executed by prisoners in concentration camps
for men.
It is forbidden to have foreign prisoners execute the punishment on
German prisoners.
The order for punishment will read on page 2 under “executors”.
The following prisoners have executed physical punishment on the--
1. __________________________________ prison number
2. __________________________________ prison number
[signature illegible]
SS-Brigadefuehrer and Major General of the Waffen-SS
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2194-PS
REICH DEFENSE LAW
G-300
Top Secret
The Ministry for Economy and Labor Saxony
Dresden and 6 for September 1939
Tel: 52151/Long Distance 52051
Ref: Wbv:407g
To The Reich Protector in Bohemia and Moravia, Transportation Section,
Attention of Construction Chief, Counselor Hirches or Representative
in the Office.
_Prag_
[STAMP]
The Reich Protector in Bohemia and Moravia
received, Prag, 5 Sept. 1939. No. 274.
Enclosed please find a copy of the Reich Defense Law of 4 Sept. 1938
and a copy each of the decrees of the Reichsminister of Transportation
dated 7 October 1938--RL/W10.2212/38, Top Secret--and of 17 July
1939--RL/LV 1.2173/39, Top Secret, for your information and observance.
By order--
3 Encl.: SIGNED: Kretzschmar.
Completed at Dresden 4 September 1939
3 Enclosures. SIGNED: Schneider.
Receipt for the letter of 4 September 1939, wbv:407g with 3 enclosures
signed 5 September 1939 and returned to Construction Counselor
Kretzschmar.
File: Wbv Signed: HI.
# # # # #
Top Secret
Enclosure 2. RL/LV 1.2861/39G
The Reichsminister for Transportation.
RL/V 1.2173/39
Berlin 17 July 1939
44 plus 2 copies.
No. 45.
To the Subordinate Authority of the Reich and the States as well as the
General Authority of the States to whom are attached:
(_a_) Waterways Deputies (Wbv).
(_b_) Deputies for Local Transportation (Nbv).
(_c_) Deputies for ocean traffic. (Sbv).
To each one individually:
Subject: Protection of the secrecy of the law for the Reich
Defense. (RV--Gesetz).
Ref: Decree of 7 October 1938 RL/W 10.2212/38,
Top Secret.
The leader has agreed to the tacit omission of the secrecy protection
of the Reich defense law of 4 September 1938 transmitted with the
corresponding decree. In spite of the greater ease in business
correspondence thus created, the following limitations, which are
herewith brought to your attention for compliance, have been ordered by
the competent office.
1. _It remains prohibited_ to cite the Reich Defense law in public or
in connection with laws to be promulgated, as well as publication of
the contents of the law in its entirety.
2. _It is permitted_
_a._ the mention of all installations founded on the Reich Defense
Law and their functions in public without referring to the law;
_b._ the co-signature of laws which are prepared and announced in
peace time for war.
Deputy
Signed: Baur.
# # # # #
SECRET STATE MATTER!
To GRS Nr. 10/39
Enclosure for RL/LV. I.2861/39 g.
The Reich Traffic Minister
RL/W 10. 2212/38 secret state matter
Berlin, W8, Wilhelmstrasse 80, the 7th October 1938
47 and 3 copies
Examination Nr. 49
To the following Reich and State authorities from whom have been
ordered
(_a_) deputies for water ways,
(_b_) deputies for the local traffic,
(_c_) deputies for ocean traffic
--but especially--
Subject: Reich Defense Law [Reichsverteidigungsgesetz].
Enclosed is transmitted copy of the Reich Defense Law signed by the
leader and Reich chancellor on 4 September 1938. The promulgation
remains suspended.
Deputy
Signed: Baur.
To wbv.: 407 g.
# # # # #
TOP MILITARY SECRET
To GRS Nr. 10/39 1432
Reich Defense Law of 4 September 1938.
The Reich cabinet has decided on the following law which is announced
herewith.
I. _State of Defense_
par. 1
(1) As possessor of the complete power of state, the leader and Reich
chancellor can decree for the Reich territory or its parts a “State of
Defense”.
(2) If the political situation demands it, the leader and Reich
chancellor decrees the “Mobilization”. The mobilization can be limited
to a part of the Reich or of the armed forces.
par. 2
(1) Once the territory of operation is determined the chief of the army
and the commanders of the armies have upon declaration of the state of
defense without further order the authority to exercise executive power
in this operational territory.
(2) The commanders exercising executive powers can, effective for the
territory of operations, promulgate laws, institute special courts,
and issue directives to the officials and offices competent in the
territory of operations, with the exception of the supreme Reich
officials, the supreme Prussian country officials, and the Reich
leaders of the NSDAP. The lawfulness of directives precedes directives
from otherwise superior offices.
(3) The boundaries of the territory of operations are determined by the
supreme commander of the armed forces.
(4) Special directives for the case of a surprise threat to the Reich
territory.
If a part of the Reich territory is surprised by a military threat,
and if special decrees for defense against this danger cannot be
awaited, then the commanders of the imperiled service commands have
the right to issue the directives which cannot be delayed and which
are necessary for the protection of the imperiled territory to all
non-military offices within their sphere of command. The same rights
apply to the commanding admirals of the Navy in case of surprise
threats against the coastal territory, and to the commanders of air
districts in case of surprise attacks from the air within the framework
of their war tasks. The execution of these directives has precedence
over the other commitments and the directives of superior offices. The
named commanders can transmit their right of issuing directives to
subordinate officers down to the village counselor.
par. 3
(1) With the declaration of the state of defense the plenipotentiaries
for the Reich administration (GBV) named by the leader and Reich
chancellor takes over the uniform leadership of the non-military
administration with exception of the economic administration.
To him are subordinate--
the Reich minister of the Interior
the Reich minister of Law
the Reich minister for science, education and popular education,
the Reich minister for religious matters,
the Reich office for regional order.
(2) The GBV must comply with the demands of the supreme command of the
armed forces (OKW) which are of considerable importance for the armed
forces. If the demands cannot be brought in accord with the affairs
of the Reich administration the leader and Reich chancellor makes the
decision.
(3) The GBV has the right within his sphere to issue laws with the
accord of the OKW and GBW which differ from the existing laws.
par. 4
(1) With the declaration of the state of defense the chief deputy for
economics (GBW), appointed by the leader and Reich chancellor, takes
over the direction of the economy except for the armament industry.
(2) It is the task of the GBW to put all economic forces into the
service of the Reich defense, and to safeguard economically the life of
the German nation. To him are subordinate--
the Reich minister of economics,
the Reich minister of nutrition and agriculture,
the Reich minister of work,
the Reich chief of forestry,
the Reich commissar for price control.
He is furthermore responsible for directing the financing of the Reich
defense within the realm of the Reich finance ministry and the Reich
bank.
(3) The GBW must carry out the demands of the OKW which are of
considerable importance for the armed forces; and he must insure
the economic conditions for the production of the armament industry
directed immediately by the OKW according to its demands. If the
demands of the armed forces cannot be brought into accord with the
affairs of economy, then the leader and Reich chancellor decides.
(4) The GBW has the right within his sphere to issue laws with the
consent of the OKW and GBV which differ from the existing laws.
par. 5
(1) The Reich postal minister, the Reich transportation minister, and
the general inspector for the German road net are, with the declaration
of the state of defense, bound to the demands of the OKW for the
immediate affairs of the armed forces.
(2) The following will get orders from the OKW:
(_a_) the _Reich transportation minister_ for the use of means of
transportation,
(_b_) the _Reich postal minister_ for the use and distribution of the
complete communication connections to the armed forces and the other
agencies.
(3) The Reich transportation minister must comply, with the declaration
of the state of defense, with the demands of the GBW according to
the directions given to him by the OKW for the use of the means of
transportation.
(4) In the sphere of the Reich postal minister, of the Reich
transportation minister, and of the general inspector for the German
road net, the chief of the OKW has the right to promulgate laws in
accord with the GBV and GBW which differ from the existing laws.
par. 6
The Reich ministers and chief Reich offices carry out the tasks within
their spheres on their own responsibility, regardless of the special
competence of the chief of the OKW, of the GBV, and of the GBW,
according to paragraphs 3, 4 and 5.
par. 7
For the shaping of the political mill of the people the deputy of the
leader of the NSDAP is responsible. He uses for that the NSDAP, its
formations and coordinated units.
II. _State of War_
par. 8
(1) If the fight with an external enemy is forced upon the German
people, the leader and Reich chancellor declares the state of war.
(2) With declaration of the state of war, the war laws and war decrees
come into force without further order. The legal consequences provided
in other laws for the state of war become effective.
par. 9
If the state of defense is not already declared beforehand, the decrees
about the state of defense go into effect with declaration of the state
of war.
III. _Preparatory Measures_
par. 10
The Reich Defense Council (RVR).
(1) The task of the Reich Defense Council consists in peace time in the
decision on all measures for the preparation of the Reich defense and
the gathering together of all forces and means of the nation according
to the directions of the leader and Reich chancellor. The tasks of the
RVR in war time will be specially determined by the leader and Reich
chancellor.
(2) The leader and Reich chancellor is chairman in the RVR. His
permanent deputy is general field marshal Goering. He has the right to
call conferences of the RVR. Permanent members of the RVR are--
the Reich minister of air and supreme commander of the air force,
the supreme commander of the army,
the supreme commander of the navy,
the chief of the OKW,
the deputy of the leader,
the Reich minister and chief of the Reich chancellery,
the president of the secret cabinet council,
the chief plenipotentiary for the Reich administration,
the chief plenipotentiary for economics,
the Reich minister of foreign affairs,
the Reich minister of the interior,
the Reich finance minister,
the Reich minister for popular enlightenment and propaganda,
the president of the Reich bank directory.
The other Reich ministers and the Reich offices directly subordinate
to the leader and Reich chancellor are consulted if necessary. Further
personalities can be called as the case demands.
par. 11
The Reich Defense Committee (RVA).
(1) The Reich defense committee is the working committee of the RVR. It
prepares the decisions of the RVR, sees to their execution, and secures
collaboration between armed forces, chief Reich offices, and party.
(2) Presiding is the chief of the OKW. He regulates the activity of the
committee and gives the directions to the GBV and GBW and to the Reich
ministries not subordinated to them and to the chief Reich offices
according to the decisions of the RVR, which directions are necessary
for securing their uniform execution.
(3) The RVA is composed of the OKW, deputy of the commissioner for the
four year plan, the leader staffs of the GBV and GBW, and the Reich
Defense officials.
(4) Chief office officials for the Reich defense (RV-Referenten) and
their deputies are commissioned by the deputy of the leader, by the
Reich chancellery by each Reich Ministry, by the Reich leader of the
SS and chief of the German police, by the Reich work leader, by the
Reich forest master, by the chief inspector for the German road net,
by the Reich office for regional order, by the Reich bank directory,
and in the Prussian state ministry. The RV-Referent and his deputy are
immediately subordinate to the minister or the state secretary, and to
the chief of the Reich office, resp.
par. 12
The uniformity of the preparations for the start and the course of the
mobilization is secured by the OKW.
As regards the actual formulation of the preparations, the GBV and GBW
make the arrangements for their sphere.
par. 13
The Chief Plenipotentiary for the Reich Administration (GBV):
The GBV conducts the preparations for the Reich defense in the sphere
of the ministries and Reich offices subordinate to him according to
paragraph 3. They are bound by his directions already in peace time.
par. 14
The Chief Plenipotentiary for Economics (GBW):
(1) The GBW conducts the economic preparations for the Reich defense
as far as they do not come in the sphere of the OKW as regards the
armament industry.
(2) The GBW must secure the economic conditions for the production of
the armament industry immediately directed by the OKW according to its
demands.
(3) The ministries and Reich offices named in paragraph 4 (2) are,
within the framework of these directives, already bound for the
preparation of the Reich defense to the directions of the GBW, the
Reich transportation minister to his demands according to paragraph 5
(3).
IV. _Final Directions_
par. 15
Penal Directions.
Whoever acts against the orders of a decree promulgated on the basis
of this law, on purpose or negligently, will be punished with a jail
sentence and money fine or with one of these punishments, if the act is
not punishable with a heavier sentence according to other decrees.
par. 16
Execution and Completion Directives.
The OKW promulgates in agreement with the GBV and GBW the law and
administrative directives necessary for the execution and completion of
this law.
par. 17
The law takes effect immediately.
Berchtesgaden, the 4th September 1938.
The leader and Reich chancellor
signed Adolf Hitler
signed Goering
General Field Marshal
The deputy of the leader
signed R. Hess
The Reich Minister of the Interior
signed Frick
The Chief Plenipotentiary for Economics
signed Walther Funk
The Reich Foreign Minister
signed Ribbentrop
The Chief of the OKW
signed Keitel
The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery
signed Dr. Lammers
# # # # #
Berchtesgaden, the 4 September 1938
_Note to the Reich Defense Law_
1. The Publication of the Reich Defense Law of 4 Sept. 1938, remains
suspended.
2. The following laws and cabinet decisions are reputed effective
immediately.
A. Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935.
B. Decision of the Reich Cabinet of 4 April 1933 to form a Reich
Defense Council.
C. Rectification and completion of 13 Dec. 1934 of the decision of the
Reich Cabinet of 4 Apr. 1933.
D. Decision of the Reich Cabinet of 21 May 1935 on activity of the CB
in peace times.
The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellery,
(signed) Adolf Hitler
The Reich Minister and Chief of Reich Chancellery
(signed) Dr. Lammers
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2195-PS
_File Memorandum_
Today I visited General Oshima. The conversation ranged over the
following subjects:
1. The Fuehrer speech, which pleased him very much, especially because
it had been spiritually warranted in all its features.
2. We discussed conclusion of a treaty to consolidate the triangle
Germany/Italy/Japan into an even firmer mold. He also told me that,
together with German counter-espionage [Abwehr], he was undertaking
long-range projects aimed at the disintegration of Russia and emanating
from the Caucasus and the Ukraine. However, this organization was to
become effective only in case of war.
3. Furthermore he had succeeded up to now to send 10 Russians with
bombs across the Caucasian frontier. These Russians had the mission to
kill Stalin. A number of additional Russians, whom he had also sent
across, had been shot at the frontier.
4. We then discussed the Mohammedan movement. He told me that a
Japanese officer had worked in Afghanistan, but he had been expelled
later because of suspicion that he had attempted to overthrow the
Afghan government. I told him that I had a police officer there and
that the two could very well collaborate once he again had someone
there.
5. He told me confidentially that he had bought a piece of real estate
in Falkensee under the name of a middleman. Six Russians were employed
there, writing and printing leaflets, which were flown into Russia
from Poland in small balloons, when the wind was favorable. He had
reports and proofs from Russia that they had arrived in good condition
and that they were obviously being passed around among the people very
diligently.
6. Also he had bought a motor boat in order to bring leaflets from
Roumania to the Crimea via the Black Sea. However, this had miscarried
in the fall, but he would repeat it once more in summer.
Berlin, 31 January 1939
The Reichsfuehrer-SS:
(signed) H. Himmler
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2199-PS
SECRET
Copy
SS Economic-Administrative Main Office
District Group D--Concentration Camps--DI/1 Az.: 14 f 5/L/Ot.
Secret diary Nr. 645/42
Oranienburg, 12 Sept 42
Concerns: Return of urns of inmates deceased in concentration camps.
Reference: Chief of Security Police [Sipo] and the SD-ND1a-838/42--of
7.9.42
Encl: None
To the Commanders of Concentration Camps, Da., Sa., Bu., Mau., Flo.,
Neu., Au., Gro.-Ro., Natz., Nie., Stu., Arb., Rav., and Prisoners of
War, Camp Lublin.
According to a communication of the Chief of the Security Police and
the SD and conforming to a report of the Chief of Security Police and
SD in Prague, urns of deceased Czechs and Jews were sent for burial to
the home-cemeteries within the Protectorate.
Based on different events (demonstrations, erecting of posters inimical
to the Reich on urns of deceased inmates in halls of cemeteries in the
home-communities, pilgrimages to the graves of deceased inmates etc.)
within the Protectorate, the delivery of urns with the ash remnants
of deceased Nationals of the Protectorate and of Jews is henceforth
prohibited. The urns shall be preserved within the Concentration Camps.
In case of doubt about the preservation of the urns oral instructions
shall be available at this agency.
The Chief of the Central Office
sig: Liebehenschel,
SS-Obersturmbannfuehrer.
Correctness of Copy is certified:
Natzweiler, 16 September 1942
sig: [illegible signature]
SS Oscha. und Stabsscharf.
# # # # #
SECRET
Copy
SS Economic-Administrative Main Office
District Group D
Concentration Camps--D I/1/Az.: 14 e 3/Ot./U.
III
Oranienburg, 4 April 1942
_Concerns_: Lashing [Pruegelstrafen]
to the Concentration Camp Commanders of Da., Sah., Bu., Mau., Flo.,
Au., Gr. Ro., Natzw., Nie., Stu., Arb., Rav., and Commander of
Prisoner of War Camp Lublin.
The Reich Fuehrer-SS and Chief of the German Police has decreed that
when the word “more severe” [verschaerft] is added in his orders for
lashings, the execution of the sentence must be undergone with bare
seat [unbekleidetes Gesaess]. (This includes male as well as female
prisoners in protective or preventative custody.)
In all other cases the previously decreed punishment by Reichfuehrer-SS
remains the same.
The Chief of the Central Office
sig: Liebehenschel
SS-Obersturmbannfuehrer
FdRda
sig: [illegible]
SS Oberscharfuehrer und Stabsscharfuehrer
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2219-PS
To the General Field Marshal
At Present in Vienna, 14 July 1939
Sir:
If I may add something about myself, it is the following: I know that
I am not of an active fighting nature, unless final decisions are at
stake. At this time of pronounced activism [aktivismus] this will
certainly be regarded as a fault in my personality. Yet, I know that
I cling with unconquerable tenacity to the goal in which I believe.
That is Greater Germany [Grossdeutschland] and the Fuehrer. And if
some people are already tired out from the struggle and some have been
killed in the fight, I am still around somewhere and ready to go into
action. This, after all, was also the development until the year 1938.
Until July 1934 I conducted myself as a regular member of the party.
And if I had quietly, in whatever form, paid my membership dues--the
first one, according to a receipt, I paid in December 1931--I probably
would have been an undisputed, comparatively old fighter and party
member of Austria, but I would not have done any more for the union.
I told myself in July 1934 that we must fight this clerical regime on
its own ground in order to give the Fuehrer a chance to use whatever
method he desires. I told myself that this Austria was worth a mass. I
have stuck to this attitude with an iron determination because I and my
friends had to fight against the whole political church, Freemasonry,
Jewry, in short, against everything in Austria. The slightest weakness
which we might have displayed would undoubtedly have led to our
political annihilation; it would have deprived the Fuehrer of the means
and tools to carry out his ingenious political solution for Austria, as
became evident in the days of March 1938. I have been fully conscious
of the fact that I am following a path which is not comprehensible to
the masses and also not to my party comrades. I followed it calmly and
would without hesitation follow it again because I am satisfied that
at one point I could serve the Fuehrer as a tool in his work, even
though my former attitude even now gives occasion to very worthy and
honorable party comrades to doubt my trustworthiness. I have never paid
attention to such things because I am satisfied with the opinion which
the Fuehrer and the men close to him have of me.
[Seyss-Inquart]
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2220-PS
SECRET
Letterhead
THE REICH Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery
RK.318D g III
Berlin W8, April 17th, 1943.
Vosstrasse 6, at present: FIELD-quarters.
Mail must exclusively be directed to Berlin address.
To the Reichsfuehrer-SS and Chief of the German Police. Herr Himmler
Ref: The situation in the Government General.
Dear Mr. Reichleader,
We had agreed at our conference on March 27th of this year that written
texts should be worked out about the situation in the Government
General, on which our intended, mutual report to the Fuehrer, could be
based.
The material gathered for this purpose by Lieutenant General Krueger
was submitted to you immediately. Based on this material, I have had
a sketch prepared, which sums up the most important points of this
material, sub-divides them in a way quickly to grasp, and finally
points out the kind of measurements to be taken.
The memorandum was checked, together with SS Lieutenant General Krueger
who agrees with it in full. Part of it I herewith submit to you.
(signed) Dr. Lammers.
# # # # #
Copy to RK. 318 D g III. F.Q. April 12th, 1943
SECRET!
Ref: The situation in the Government General.
A. _The task of the German Administration in the Government General._
The German Administration in the Government General has to fulfill the
following tasks:
1. For the purpose of securing food for the German people, to increase
agricultural production and utilize it to the fullest extent, to
allot sufficient rations to the native population occupied with work
essential for the war effort and to deliver the rest to the armed
forces and the homeland.
2. To employ the manpower of the native population in the Government
General itself only for war important purposes, and to put at the
homeland’s disposal such manpower which is not needed for the purpose
mentioned above.
3. To consolidate German folkdom in the Government General and by means
of inland settlement in particular to create a stronghold of German
folkdom in the eastern border districts, also by means of colonization
with racial Germans, transferred from other places, thus safeguarding
these very border districts.
4. To safeguard the Government General as a transit zone for
replacements and supplies to the East front.
5. To obtain troops as far as possible from the native population for
the fight against Bolshevism.
B. _Wrong ways chosen for the fulfillment of these tasks._ The German
administration in the Government General has failed by a wide margin
in achieving the tasks listed under A. Although, in the year of 1942,
one succeeded in meeting the delivery quota of agrarian products for
the armed forces and the homeland at a relatively high percentage,
namely over 90% and also met the demands of the homeland concerning
the conscription of labor in general, one has to consider two things
on the other hand: First, these accomplishments in the year of 1942
were achieved for the first time, prior, f. i. only 40,000 German tons
[Translator’s remark: 2206 lbs. avoir p. makes a ton] bread grain
had been delivered to the Armed Forces. Secondly, and above all, one
had failed to create for the bringing about of such achievements the
necessary organizational, economic, and political basis, which is
absolutely required, if such achievements shall not strongly affect
the entire situation, may eventually cause chaotic conditions in the
future. This failure of the German administration can for one thing be
explained by the system of the German administrative and governmental
activity in the Government General, personally represented by the
Governor General, and secondly, by the wrong basic principles of policy
in all those questions, which were decisive for conditions in the
Government General.
II. _The failure in basic principles of policy._
1. The realization of the task, listed in A 1, necessitates in the
first place a strict and clear-cut structure of economics, as well
as a disciplined and clear-cut official economic policy, accompanied
by an elimination as totally as possible of clandestine trading and
black markets. This stipulates above all the fullest utilization of
the harvest and its public management, the stopping of all trade
enterprises, which are not essential to the war and the care to be
taken for a clear-cut management in war essential enterprises.
The German administration was in no respect capable of living up to
these requirements. In the matter of raising food it took a request of
a delivery contingent for the Reich and the Armed Forces amounting to
750,000 metric tons of bread grain in the summer of 1942, in order to
have the attempt made, of drawing up an inventory of food products.
For this purpose a census was taken. The result however turned out to
be unreliable. The utilization of the harvest [Ernte-erfassung] did
not even permit the full delivery of the contingent for the Reich and
the Armed Forces (instead of 750,000 metric tons only 690,000 tons)
let alone the ample feeding of the native population working for
German interests. While 1.4 million metric tons were demanded, only
1.2 million metric tons of bread grain could be taken hold of, of
which 690,000 m.t. were delivered to the Reich and the Armed Forces,
so that for roughly 16 million natives only 510,000 m.t. were left.
Accordingly, the weekly bread rations for the normal consumer had to
be cut down to only 1050 g, compared with 1675 g in the Protectorate
and 2600 g in the annexed Eastern territories. To make supplies
available for the native population, black markets and clandestine
trading were tolerated to the greatest extent, resulting in prices
entirely unattainable for the population, working for German interests.
A married Polish official, without children, with High school education
f.i. has a net income of 234.27 Zloty per month. Compared with this,
the prices in the clandestine trade are:
1 kg. rye bread 11.00 Zloty
1 ” potatoes 2.40 Zloty
1 ” pork 80.00 Zloty
1 ” bacon 160.00 Zloty
1 ” butter 170.00 Zloty
Under such conditions the foreign worker remains at his place of work
for about 4 to 5 days per week only in order to purchase the missing
provisions for himself and his family on the remaining other days.
Daily ransackings, robberies, murders and other crimes are further
consequences of these conditions.
The farmer received, as an incitement for delivery of his
agrar-products, premium certificates for the obtaining of commodities
(articles needed for farming, household necessities, salt, cigarettes,
brandy, etc.). These commodities very often could not be had, however,
despite the fact that they were obtainable in any desired quantity in
the clandestine trade, but at exorbitant prices.
(1 bricklayer’s brush = 1 cow
1 dz. (Drusch) coal = 30.00 Zloty
1 pair of boots = 1500.00 ”
1 horse shoe nail = 3.00 ”
1 pair of wooden slippers = 2 calves
1 dress = 1 cow)
The consequences of this situation naturally lead to a severe curbing
of the farmer’s willingness to produce. Instead of reducing prices in
the trade section by means of taking the necessary measures in regard
to the management, a decree of the Governor General recommended, to
adjust the prices of agrar-products to the prices of commodities, which
were as much as 300 to 4000% higher.
The trade economics are entirely built up according to capitalistic
viewpoints, with the aim of earning quickly and much and any planned
leadership, which might take war requirements into consideration, is
lacking. There is a lack of state supervision and of guidance in the
line of production and in the line of trade. The German individual
business man as a “trustee” on his own, of enterprises personally
directed by him, is given a free hand to do what he wants, in the
unrestricted play of forces. These trustees very often make use of
former Polish and Jewish owners of enterprises as agents empowered
to sign in their names. These trustees make tremendous profits in
clandestine trading, tolerated by the Government, and make them
within the shortest time. Prohibition of production and control of
individual management, as requested by the Armament Inspection (Lt.
Gen. Schindler), were not carried out. Part of the trade production
is directed only at putting at the disposal of the native population
objects for the trade-in of food; metals, materials for spinning,
leather, etc., are thus being drained off from the war economy.
2. _The Utilization of Manpower._ The most important presupposition for
a proper and relatively frictionless regulation to utilize manpower
taken from the native population within the Government General itself,
as well as within the Reich, are normal conditions in the sphere of
economics. Lack of this coordination influences the steering of labor
employments unfavorably in many respects. If it would be possible
to provide the population, working in the interest of Germany, with
the minimum of food needed, and everyday objects, and to render
impossible the access to other items by way of black market channels
and clandestine trade, then the reserves of manpower at hand would
volunteer for employment as planned, of their own volition. This
would mean a basis for a sensible shaping of agrarian property-units.
It is necessary in this respect that parts of the population thus
available may then be employed in such work which will guarantee them
a satisfactory standard of living. After failing to have created the
necessary supposition for a well-planned and well-steered employment
of manpower, the utilization of manpower is confronted with the
greatest difficulties. It is clear that these difficulties have been
increased by the elimination of Jewish manpower. But it is incorrect
to consider this elimination as the cause of difficulties. If the
necessary basis for proper management of manpower had been given, the
elimination of Jewish manpower would not have caused any difficulties
worth mentioning. As things were, the utilization of manpower had to
be enforced by means of more or less forceful methods, such as the
instances when certain groups appointed by the Labor Offices, caught
Church and Movie-goers here and there and transported them into the
Reich. That such methods not only undermine the people’s willingness
to work and the people’s confidence to such a degree that it cannot be
checked even with terror, is just as clear as the consequences brought
about by a strengthening of the political resistance movement.
3. _The Treatment of the Native Populations._ Can only be led into the
right channels based on a foundation of a clear-cut and well-organized
administration and management. Only such a foundation permits that the
native population may be handled strictly if necessary, even severely.
On the other hand, it can be dealt with in a big-hearted manner and
may be granted certain liberties, especially in cultural respect,
causing a certain amount of contentment. Without such a foundation,
severity would only strengthen the resistance movement and meeting the
native population half way would only undermine the German reputation.
That this foundation is missing can be concluded from the facts
mentioned above. Instead of trying to create this basis, the Governor
General inaugurates a promotion of cultural life on the part of the
Polish population, which knows no bounds in itself. Under prevailing
circumstances however and last, but not least, in connection with our
military situation last winter, this could only be explained as a
weakness and thus had to bring about exactly the opposite results of
the aspired aim.
PARTIAL COPY OF DOCUMENT 2222-PS
HEADQUARTERS 12TH ARMY GROUP OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE APO 655
REPORT OF INVESTIGATION of ALLEGED WAR CRIME
_Summary_
Nature of violation: Mistreatment, torture and Murder of Allied
nationals.
Place and Date: 31 concentration camps all in vicinity of Nordhausen,
Germany from 23 August 1943 to 10 April 1945.
Victims: Approximately 52,000 nationals of 18 Allied countries.
Perpetrators: German SS troops and civilians.
# # # # #
CONFIDENTIAL
Information to Establish Prima Facie Case Required by SHAEF Court of
Inquiry
25 May 1945
SUBJECT: Murder and maltreatment of Political Prisoners and Prisoners
of War in Mittelbau (Dora) Concentration Camps, near Nordhausen,
Germany.
TO: Commanding General, Ninth United States Army, APO 339, U. S. Army.
FROM: War Crimes Investigating Team 6822, U. S. Army.
Date and Time: 11 April 1945 to 14 May 1945. Own File Ref: 315.
1. _Nature of violations._ Murder and maltreatment of political
prisoners and prisoners of war in Mittelbau (Dora) concentration camps
near Nordhausen, Germany. (Map Ref: GSGS 4346, M-52:D-12.)
2. _Place, date, time._ 23 August 1943 to 10 April 1945.
3. Brief resume of incident. Nordhausen, Germany, a city of
approximately 39,000 peacetime population, is located eighteen
miles east of the Harz Mountains. In August 1943 (Exhibit A), the
construction of a V-bomb factory was undertaken in tunnels dug into the
foothills of the Harz Mountains about two miles north of Nordhausen.
The area was operated by a combination of commercial firms known as
Mittelwark which was charged with the construction of V-bombs. The
operating personnel was made up of forced laborers who were used in
both the construction of the tunnels and manufacture of the V-bombs.
These laborers were, with the exception of the German overseers,
composed of a number of nationalities the majority of which were
Russians, Poles, French, Belgians, and Czechs, in that order. There
were also Norwegians, Danes, Hollanders, Spanish, Italians, Hungarians,
Bulgarians, Latvians, Yugoslavians, Greeks, Albanians, Rumanians,
Estonians, and the records also show (Exhibit 81) one American as
having been in the camp (Exhibit A-1). There were thirty-one (31) camps
which were utilized for housing the forced laborers and which were, in
most cases, located in the vicinity of the area in which the laborers
were utilized. These camps were known as:
Artern
Ballenstedt
Blankenburg
Bleicherode
Dora
Ellrich
Gross Werther
Harzungen
Hohlstedt
Ilfeld
Ilsenburg
Kelbra
Klein Bodungen
Kleissingen
Mackenrode
Nixei
Nordhausen (Boelcke-Kaserne)
Osterhagen
Osterode
Quedlinburg
Regenstein
Rossla
Rottleberode
Sollstedt
Sonderhausen
Tettenborn
Trautenstein
Walkenried
Wickerode
Wieda
Wolffleben
The camps were guarded by SS troops (Exhibit A-1), and SS troop
headquarters were located at Dora (Exhibit 86). The SS personnel were
assisted in their guard duties by block leaders who, for the most
part, were Kapos (Capos), which was the name given to German Civilian
Criminals who had been released from imprisonment for the specific
assignment as block leaders in the aforementioned camps.
Between 75,000 and 80,000 forced laborers (Exhibit A-1) were shuttled
into, and a few out of, these installations. A complete indifference
to the welfare of the prisoners was exhibited by their guards and
custodians. Drinking water and water for washing, in the first stages
of the operation of Dora proper, was found only wherever the forced
laborers could find a leak in the pipes (Exhibit EEE). At the time
of the liberation hundreds of bodies to which death had come from
starvation and bombings were strewn about Bolke Kaserne. These bodies
were emaciated, and bony prominences of the skeletons were conspicuous
under the skin. These bodies were laid in rows in various conditions
of decomposition. A pile of naked bodies, the result of one day’s
deaths, was found under the stairway at the Bolke Kaserne camp (Exhibit
87). Small piles of bodies were about the building (Exhibits 89, 90,
91, & 92). In their weakened condition the living were compelled to
relieve themselves in their beds from which they were too weak to move.
Deposits of human feces were frequent throughout. Both living and dead,
in many cases, were in the same beds (Exhibits CC, DD, EE, & FF). The
mental condition of the prisoners had degenerated with their physical
condition, and due to a lack of water some were drinking their own
urine (Exhibits A-1 & DD). Some effort had been made to burn some of
the bodies, and the partially burned, blackened bodies of 100 children
lay about the premises. No organized effort was made to bury the dead
(Exhibits EE & FF).
The diet at the camps varied. At Dora the daily diet consisted of one
litre of very thin soup, 400 grams of bread, 50 grams of margarine, and
three times a week one slice of horse (hard) sausage or beef jelly,
the equivalent of 70 grams of meat. One spoonful of marmalade and one
spoonful of cream cheese once a week, and irregularly one canteen cup
of black, ersatz coffee (Exhibits GG, HH, RR, SS, TT, UU, & EEE). This
diet contained 1100 calories per day per man (Exhibit O). Deaths from
starvation were numerous (Exhibits MM, UU, & JJJ).
During the period of construction of the camp at Dora no housing
facilities were present. Prisoners for three months were required to
sleep in the tunnels in which they worked. Many of them died from
respiratory diseases contracted in the damp tunnels, and others died of
heart ailments due to the under ground pressure (Exhibits A, A-1, TT,
UU, CCC, & EEE). They were permitted to leave the tunnels during this
period but once a week, and then only for roll call which lasted from
one to three hours.
Transport was the name given to movements, whether they were made by
vehicle or on foot, to the transfer of prisoners from one installation
to another. When travel was by rail, groups numbering as high as
130 were placed in cattle and freight cars and during the inclement
weather were given no extra clothing (Exhibits A, Q, GG, HH, and EEE).
Of one group of 4,500 men and 500 women who were moved from Monowitz
to Nordhausen in January 1945, a trip lasting approximately eight
days, only twice were the passengers given food, at which times each
was given one-half loaf of bread and 106 grams of meat. Upon arrival
at Mittelbeau in the Nordhausen area, between 1,000 and 1,300 of the
travelers were dead (Exhibits A-1, & Q). On the 8th, 9th, 10th, and
11th of March 1945, 2,000 prisoners were taken from Nordhausen to a
so-called Red Cross Camp near Bolkenberg. They travelled by wagon and
on foot, and were given three days food for the ten day trip. 1,000 of
the 2,000 died within three days (Exhibit A). Of 1,600 prisoners who
came to Bolke Kaserene from Ellrich 250 died within three days (Exhibit
A). Approximately 100 prisoners a day, suffering from malnutrition,
tuberculosis, etc., were shipped from Dora to Bolke Kaserene to be
“hospitalized” (Exhibit A-1). As the Allied troops neared the vicinity
of the camps, evacuation of the prisoners was attempted by the use
of the so-called transports, and as transportation by rail became
impossible due to tactical operations, prisoners were in some instances
released and in other instances removed from their transports and taken
to areas, there to be murdered by their overseers (Exhibits DDD, FFF,
GGG, HHH, & III).
The SS guards shot laborers upon the slightest pretext. Six prisoners
were shot one day because they had left their place of work to go
to the water closet (Exhibits A, N, O, LL, QQ, & SS). Beatings were
frequently administered upon the slightest provocation by SS guards
and Kapos (Exhibits A, F, G, H, I, J, L, M, O, R, S, T, U, V, AA, PP,
QQ, RR & TT). One instance of a prisoner’s failure to tip his hat to an
SS man was sufficient justification for his being beaten (Exhibit V).
Executions were often performed without apparent trial under the
shallow guise of the condemned man having been a saboteur. 75
prisoners were hanged on 10 March 1945 at Dora (Exhibit K). On 13
March 1945 twelve others, including a Yugoslavian Doctor, who was
accused of administering too carefully to the prisoner’s ailments
and as being a saboteur were hanged (Exhibit K). 35 were hanged in
one day (Exhibit JJ). 80 were hanged in February 1945 for having
built a radio transmitter (Exhibits OO & SS). An engineer who was
accused of tampering with a voltmeter was hanged (Exhibit TT). On many
occasions the entire personnel of the camp were forced to witness the
hangings (Exhibits O, JJ, & VV). This area was visited by many high
Nazi officials, including Goebbels and Himmler. Himmler spoke to the
personnel at Dora on one of his visits there (Exhibits A-1 & TT).
10,000 (Exhibit A-1) forced laborers who died or were killed at Dora
and auxiliary camps were cremated at Buchenwald and Dora. Medical
attention was of the most meager type (Exhibit HH). Deaths at Dora and
the Mittelbeau camps varied, and were caused by starvation and diseases
contributed to thereby (Exhibit EEE). At Dora estimated deaths were as
high as eighty (80) per day (Exhibit N).
/s/ Fulton C. Vowell
FULTON C. VOWELL
Signature P. 13 of Document Major, JAGD,
Commanding Officer, WCIT 6822, U. S. Army
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2224-PS
THE END OF THE MARXIST CLASS STRUGGLE
Pages 1 and 2, Issue 381, 2 May 1933, of “NSK”. National Socialist
Party Press Agency [NSK, Pressedienst der NSDAP--the official news
agency of the NSDAP]. Edited by Wilhelm Weiss. Responsible for
communications of the Reich Press Office. Dr. Otto Dietrich, Reich
Press Chief. Published by Franz Eher’s Successor, Munich.
NSK. The Action Committee for the protection of German labor reports:
On 1 May 1933 the entire German people has made a mighty profession
of confidence to the new governmental leadership and to the German
folk community. The greatest event of the day was the unanimous stand
which the entire German working class in all its strata, in all levels
and trades, has taken up, behind the government of Adolf Hitler. The
flags of the new Reich, the symbols of the National Socialist uprising
and of German socialism fluttered in the workers’ districts of the
cities just as on the farms, on factory smokestacks and on trade union
headquarters, on state buildings and on homes in all German cities.
1 May 1933 was the death hour of the Marxist class struggle. Workers
from the factories, manual and intellectual workers, clerical
employees--they all marched behind the swastika banner. The folk
community is here--the most splendid and exalted dream has become
reality. The working masses have testified to their faith in National
Socialism.
But as yet the trade associations of the German working class, the
representative bodies of workers and employees, were in the hands
of Marxist leaders, who did not guide the German labor movement for
the benefit of the working German people, but only considered it as
the shock troop of their crazy international Marxist class-struggle
ideology.
National Socialism, which today has assumed leadership of the German
working class, can no longer bear the responsibility for leaving
the men and women of the German working class, the members of the
largest trade organization in the world, the German Trade Union
movement, in the hands of people who do not know a fatherland that is
called Germany. Because of that, the National Socialist Factory Cell
Organization [NSBO] has taken over the leadership of the trade unions.
The NSBO has eliminated the old leadership of the Trade Unions of
the AGDB [General German Trade Union League] and of the AFA [General
Independent Employees’ Federation].
New German labor leaders have replaced senile ward-heelers [verkalkte
Bonzen]. The proven pioneers of the National Socialist Factory Cell
Organization [NSBO], who have fought to the limit for the rights of
German labor from the beginning, have taken over the leadership of the
trade union associations. That proves that the struggle of National
Socialism is not directed against the trade union idea as such, but
only against the bureaucratized leaderships, because they are the foes
of the German labor movement. The old, painstakingly attained rights of
the workers’ and employees’ associations will not be touched. On the
contrary, the new National Socialist trade union leadership will make
good the harm inflicted on the German working class by class struggle
and internationalism.
On 2 May 1933 the National Socialist Factory Cell Organization took
over the leadership of all trade unions, all trade union buildings were
occupied and most stringent control has been organized over financial
and personnel matters of the organizations.
The leadership of the Action Committee for the Protection of German
Labor has been assumed by Party Member Dr. Ley, Deputy: Schmeer.
The leadership of the General German Trade Union League has been
taken over by Party Member Schumann. Party Member Muchow takes care
of the fundamental questions of organization. Party Member Biallas is
responsible for press and propaganda.
Party Member Peppler assumes leadership of the General Independent
Employees’ Federation [AFA].
Party Member Mueller assumes leadership of the “Bank for Workers,
Employees and Civil Servants”.
Auditing has been taken over by Party Member Brinkmann.
German workers and employees! Help us to build a new Germany of
national liberty and socialist justice. Help to transform the trade
unions to the media of fruitful work. Maintain discipline, then your
work will be accompanied by success, to the benefit of the entire
German people, but primarily of German workers and employees.
The new National Socialist trade union leadership will attempt to make
good the damage done to the German working class by class struggle and
internationalism. We appeal to the entire German people, to trade union
members of all shades and associations.
Have confidence in the proven fighters of the National Socialist
Factory Cell Organization!