NAZI CONSPIRACY
AND AGGRESSION
_VOLUME IV_
_Office of United States
Chief of Counsel For Prosecution
of Axis Criminality_
[Illustration]
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON · 1946
CONTENTS
_Pages_
Document number 1409-PS through document number
2373-PS arranged numerically 1-1107
(A descriptive list of documents appears at the end of the last
volume.)
A collection of Documentary Evidence and Guide Materials Prepared by
the American and British Prosecuting Staffs for Presentation before the
International Military Tribunal at Nurnberg, Germany, in the case of
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, THE UNITED KINGDOM
OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, and THE UNION OF SOVIET
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
--against--
HERMANN WILHELM GOERING, RUDOLF HESS, JOACHIM von RIBBENTROP,
ROBERT LEY, WILHELM KEITEL, ERNST KALTENBRUNNER, ALFRED ROSENBERG,
HANS FRANK, WILHELM FRICK, JULIUS STREICHER, WALTER FUNK, HJALMAR
SCHACHT, GUSTAV KRUPP von BOHLEN and HALBACH, KARL DOENITZ, ERICH
RAEDER, BALDUR von SCHIRACH, FRITZ SAUCKEL, ALFRED JODL, MARTIN
BORMANN, FRANZ von PAPEN, ARTHUR SEYSS-INQUART, ALBERT SPEER,
CONSTANTIN von NEURATH, and HANS FRITZSCHE, Individually and as
Members of Any of the Following Groups or Organizations to which They
Respectively Belonged, Namely: DIE REICHSREGIERUNG (REICH CABINET);
DAS KORPS DER POLITISCHEN LEITER DER NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHEN
DEUTSCHEN ARBEITERPARTEI (LEADERSHIP CORPS OF THE NAZI PARTY); DIE
SCHUTZSTAFFELN DER NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHEN DEUTSCHEN ARBEITERPARTEI
(commonly known as the “SS”) and including DIE SICHERHEITSDIENST
(commonly known as the “SD”); DIE GEHEIME STAATSPOLIZEI (SECRET STATE
POLICE, commonly known as the “GESTAPO”); DIE STURMABTEILUNGEN DER
N.S.D.A.P. (commonly known as the “SA”) and the GENERAL STAFF and
HIGH COMMAND of the GERMAN ARMED FORCES are as defined in Appendix B
of the Indictment,
Defendants.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1409-PS
1938 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 1709
Order concerning the Utilization of Jewish Property of 3 December 1938
On the basis of Article 1 of the Second Regulation by the Administrator
for the Four Year Plan based on the Decree of November 24, 1938 for the
Reporting of Jewish-owned Property (RGBl I, 1668), the following is
decreed in cooperation with the competent Reich Ministers:
Chapter I _Industrial Enterprises_
Article 1
The owner of a Jewish industrial enterprise (Third Regulation under
the Reich Citizenship Law of 14 June 1938, RGBl I 627) may be ordered
to sell or liquidate the enterprise within a definite time. Certain
conditions may be stipulated in the order.
Article 2
1. A trustee may be appointed for Jewish industrial enterprises, the
owners of which have been ordered to sell or liquidate (Article 1), for
the temporary continuation of the enterprise and for the completion
of the sale or liquidation, especially if the owner of the enterprise
has not complied with the order within the definite period and his
application for an extension of time has been rejected.
2. The trustee is empowered to undertake all judicial and extrajudicial
actions and legal measures, which the business of the enterprise,
its liquidation or sale require. His authority replaces any legally
required power of attorney.
3. The trustee must exercise the care of a responsible businessman and
is subject to State control.
4. The owner of the enterprise is to pay the expenses of the trustee in
connection with his work.
Article 3
1. The owner of the Jewish industrial enterprise is to be notified of
the instructions specified in Articles 1 and 2.
2. In case of absence of the person affected, notification may
take place through publication in the Deutsche Reichsanzeiger and
Preussische Staatsanzeiger. In these cases the day of publication is to
be considered the day of notification.
Article 4
As soon as the owner of the enterprise is notified of the order through
which a trustee is appointed according to Article 2, he loses the right
to dispose of the property for the administration of which the trustee
has been appointed. He regains this right only if the appointment of
the trustee expires.
Article 5
The consent for the sale according to Article 1 of the Decree based
on the Decree of April 26, 1938, for the Reporting of Jewish-owned
Property (RGBl I, 415) is necessary also in such cases in which the
sale has been ordered; this also applies to the sale by a trustee.
Chapter II _Land and Forest Enterprises Real Estate and other Property_
Article 6
A Jew (Article 5 of the First Regulation under the Reich Citizenship
Law of November 14, 1935) (RGBl I, 1333), may be ordered to sell
wholly or partly his land or forest enterprise, his other land or
forest properties, his other real estate or other properties within a
definite time. Certain conditions may be stipulated in the order. The
regulations of Article 2 to 4 are to be applied accordingly.
Article 7
1. Jews cannot legally acquire real estate and mortgages.
2. The regulations of Article 2, 4, 5 and 6 of the Decrees based on the
Decree of 26 April 1938, for the Reporting of Jewish-owned Property
(RGBl I, 415) are to be applied accordingly.
3. At the foreclosure of real estate, the court ordering such sale must
reject bids if there is reason to suspect that the bidder is a Jew.
4. The rejection according to Paragraph 3 loses its force if the bidder
protests against it immediately (Article 72, Paragraph 2 of the Law
Regarding Foreclosure) and if he proves that he is not a Jew.
5. If, as is provided in (4) the bidder protests the rejection of an
offer, the decision on the public adjudication must not be made before
two weeks after the conclusion of the auction.
Article 8
1. Jews require authorization to dispose of real estate and mortgages.
They require authorization to dispose of other property if the sale
has been ordered according to Section 6 of this decree. This also
applies in the case of a trustee disposing of said property.
2. The regulations of (1) also apply to contracts in which an
obligation to sell is assumed.
3. The regulations of Article 1 (2) and Article 2 of the Regulation
under the Decree of 26 April 1938 for the Reporting of Jewish-owned
Property (RGBl I, 415) are to be applied accordingly. In disposing of
immovable property, the regulations of Articles 4, 5 and 6 of said
Decree are also to be applied accordingly.
4. In case of foreclosure of a piece of land, the bidder requires
authorization for his bid; a bid for which the necessary authorization
is not proven immediately is to be rejected. Where the Reich Law
regarding Foreclosure and Forced Administration is in force, in cases
of Article 81, (2) of said law, public adjudication to a person other
than the highest bidder is permissible only if the person can prove
that consent was given for this deal.
Article 9
1. The authorization according to Article 8 replaces those
authorizations required according to the Regulation regarding Traffic
in Real Estate of 26 January 1937 (RGBl I, 35), the Settlements (RGBl
I, 659), the First Decree for the Execution of the Law of 17 August
1937, Regarding the Protection of the Reich Frontiers and Reprisals
(RGBl I, 905) as well as according to price fixing regulations.
2. At the sale of land or forest enterprises or the granting of
usufruct in such enterprises, the authorization according to Article
8 replaces the authorization according to Article 1 of the decree
based on the Decree of 26 April 1938 for the Reporting of Jewish-owned
Property.
Article 10
1. If a Jew sells a piece of land which is situated within the confines
of Berlin, the Reich Capital Berlin has a right of preemption for the
purpose of carrying out the measures of the General Building Inspector
for the rebuilding of the City.
2. Articles 12 and 13 of the Decree of 5 November 1937 Regarding the
Reconstruction of the Reich Capital Berlin (RGBl I, 1162) are to be
applied accordingly.
3. The right of preemption does not exist if the Reich, one of the
German States, or the National Socialist Party is involved in the legal
transaction as a buyer.
Chapter III _Compulsory Deposit of Securities_
Article 11
1. Within a week after this decree goes into effect, Jews must deposit
all their stocks, shares in mines, bonds, and similar securities at a
foreign exchange bank. New securities must be deposited within a week
after their acquisition. The holder of securities belonging to a Jew
may not deliver them to anyone but a foreign exchange bank for the
account of the Jew.
2. Insofar as securities are already deposited at a foreign exchange
bank on behalf of Jews or titles registered or coupons deposited
with an administrative authority for which preferred annuities will
be granted, the Jews must immediately notify the said bank, the
Administration of Public Loans or the administrative authority by a
written declaration of the fact that they are Jews. In case of (1)
Sentence 3, this declaration must be made to the said holder.
3. The deposits and the registered titles are to be marked as Jewish.
Article 12
The disposing of securities deposited as Jewish, as well as the release
of such securities require the consent of the Reich Minister of
economics or an authority named by him.
Article 13
The provisions of Articles 11 and 12 do not apply to foreign Jews.
Chapter IV _Jewels, Gems and Objects of Art_
Article 14
1. Jews are forbidden to acquire, pawn or sell objects of gold,
platinum or silver as well as precious stones and pearls. Such
objects, except in the case of existence of attachments on behalf of
a non-Jewish creditor at the time when this decree goes into effect
may only be acquired by public purchasing offices, established by the
Reich. The same applies to other jewels and objects of art insofar as
the price of the individual objects exceeds one thousand Reichsmarks.
2. The provisions of (1) does not apply to foreign Jews.
Chapter V _General Regulations_
Article 15
1. The authorization for the sale of Jewish enterprises, Jewish real
estate, or other Jewish property can be given under conditions that may
consist in the payment of money by the buyer on behalf of the Reich.
2. Authorizations of the kind mentioned in Paragraph 1 may also
be granted with the proviso that the Jewish seller is to receive
obligations of the German Reich or registered titles against the German
Reich instead of the total or partial consideration as provided for in
the sales contract.
Article 16
The regulations specified for Jews in Article II also apply to
industrial enterprises as well as organizations, foundations,
institutions, and other enterprises which are not industrial, insofar
as they are to be considered Jewish according to the Third Regulation
under the Reich Citizenship Law of 14 June 1938 (RGBl I, 627).
Article 17
1. The higher administrative authorities are qualified to issue
instructions based on the regulations of Article I and II insofar as
the special provisions of Paragraphs 3 and 4 are not to be applied. The
higher administrative authorities are also to supervise the appointed
trustees.
2. Section 6 of the Decree of 26 April 1938 determines which
authorities are higher administrative authorities within the meaning
of this Decree Regarding the Registration of Jewish Property
(Reichsgesetzblatt I, p. 414) with the proviso that the following
authorities are qualified:
In Anhalt--the Anhalt State Ministry, Department of Economics;
In Baden--the Baden Minister of Finance and Economics;
In Wuerttemberg--the Wuerttemberg Minister of Economics;
In Austria--the Reich Commissar for the Reunion of Austria with the
German Reich or the authorities named by him;
In the Sudeten German territories--the Government Presidents.
3. Insofar as it is a question of agricultural property, the
Oberpraesident in Prussia (Agricultural Department) and the Higher
Settlement Authorities in the non-Prussian States take the place of
the higher administrative authorities. Insofar as it is a question of
forest property, the Higher Forest Authorities take the place of the
higher administrative authorities.
*******
[Articles 18 to 23 are not necessary for understanding of law]
Article 24
This decree goes into effect on the day of publication.
Berlin, 3 December 1938
Reich Minister of Economic Affairs
Walter Funk
Reich Minister of Interior
Frick
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1412-PS
1938 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 1579
Decree relating to the payment of a fine by the Jews of German
nationality of 12 Nov. 1938.
The hostile attitude of the Jewry towards the German people and Reich,
which does not even shrink back from committing cowardly murder, makes
a decisive defense and a harsh punishment (expiation) necessary. I
order, therefore, by virtue of the decree concerning the execution of
the 4-year Plan of 18 Oct. 1936 (RGBl I, page 887) as follows:
Section 1
On the Jews of German nationality as a whole has been imposed the
payment of a contribution of 1,000,000,000 Reichsmark to the German
Reich.
Section 2
Provisions for the implementation are issued by the Reich-Minister of
Finance in agreement with the Reich-Ministers concerned.
Berlin, 12 November 1938.
The Commissioner for the Four Year Plan
Goering
General Field-Marshal.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1415-PS
1938 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 1676
Police Regulation of the Appearance of Jews in Public of 28 November
1938
On the basis of the Decree of 14 November 1938 Regarding the Police
Decrees of the Reich Ministers (Reichsgesetzblatt I, P. 1582), the
following is decreed:
ARTICLE 1
The Government Presidents in Prussia, Bavaria, and the Sudeten German
areas, the proper authorities in the remaining provinces of the old
Reich, the district captains (the Mayor in Vienna) in Austria and
the Reich Commissar of the Saar district may impose upon Jews, both
subjects of the German State and stateless Jews (Article 5 of the
First Decree of 14 November 1935, Regarding the Reich Citizen Law,
Reichsgesetzblatt I, p. 1333), restrictions as to place and time to the
effect that they may not enter certain districts or may not appear in
public at certain times.
ARTICLE 2
Whoever wilfully or negligently violates the regulations of Article I
is to be fined up to 150 Reichsmarks or punished with imprisonment up
to six weeks.
ARTICLE 3
This police decree goes into effect the day after its promulgation.
Berlin, 28 November 1938
The Reich Minister of Interior
By order:
Heydrich.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1416-PS
1935 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART 1, PAGE 1146
The Reich Citizenship Law of 15 Sept 1935
The Reichstag has adopted unanimously, the following law, which is
herewith promulgated.
Article 1
1. A subject of the State is a person, who belongs to the protective
union of the German Reich, and who, therefore, has particular
obligations towards the Reich.
2. The status of the subject is acquired in accordance with the
provisions of the Reich- and State Law of Citizenship.
Article 2
1. A citizen of the Reich is only that subject, who is of German- or
kindred blood and who, through his conduct, shows that he is both
desirous and fit to serve faithfully the German people and Reich.
2. The right to citizenship is acquired by the granting of Reich
citizenship papers.
3. Only the citizen of the Reich enjoys full political rights in
accordance with the provision of the laws.
Article 3
The Reich Minister of the Interior in conjunction with the Deputy of
the Fuehrer will issue the necessary legal and administrative decrees
for the carrying out and supplementing of this law.
Nurnberg, 15 Sept 1935 at the Reichsparteitag of Liberty
The Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor
Adolf Hitler
The Reichs Minister of the Interior
Frick
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1417-PS
1935 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART 1, PAGE 1333
First Regulation to the Reichs Citizenship Law of 14 Nov. 1935
On the basis of Article 3, Reichs Citizenship Law, of 15 Sept. 1935
(RGBl I, page 146) the following is ordered:
Article 1
1. Until further issue of regulations regarding citizenship papers,
all subjects of German or kindred blood, who possessed the right to
vote in the Reichstag elections, at the time the Citizenship Law came
into effect, shall, for the time being, possess the rights of Reich
citizens. The same shall be true of those whom the Reich Minister of
the Interior, in conjunction with the Deputy of the Fuehrer, has given
the preliminary citizenship.
2. The Reich Minister of the Interior, in conjunction with the Deputy
of the Fuehrer, can withdraw the preliminary citizenship.
Article 2
1. The regulations in Article 1 are also valid for Reichs subjects of
mixed, Jewish blood.
2. An individual of mixed Jewish blood, is one who descended from one
or two grandparents who were racially full Jews, insofar as does not
count as a Jew according to Article 5, paragraph 2. One grandparent
shall be considered as full-blooded if he or she belonged to the Jewish
religious community.
Article 3
Only the Reich citizen, as bearer of full political rights, exercises
the right to vote in political affairs, and can hold a public office.
The Reich Minister of the Interior, or any agency empowered by him, can
make exceptions during the transition period, with regard to occupying
public offices. The affairs of religious organizations will not be
touched upon.
Article 4
1. A Jew cannot be a citizen of the Reich. He has no right to vote in
political affairs, he cannot occupy a public office.
2. Jewish officials will retire as of 31 December 1935. If these
officials served at the front in the World War, either for Germany or
her allies, they will receive in full, until they reach the age limit,
the pension to which they were entitled according to last received
wages; they will, however, not advance in seniority. After reaching the
age limit, their pension will be calculated anew, according to the last
received salary, on the basis of which their pension was computed.
3. The affairs of religious organizations will not be touched upon.
4. The conditions of service of teachers in Jewish public schools
remain unchanged, until new regulations of the Jewish school systems
are issued.
Article 5
1. A Jew is anyone who descended from at least three grandparents who
were racially full Jews. Article 2, par. 2, second sentence will apply.
2. A Jew is also one who descended from two full Jewish parents, if:
(a) he belonged to the Jewish religious community at the time this
law was issued, or who joined the community later; (b) he was married
to a Jewish person, at the time the law was issued, or married one
subsequently; (c) he is the offspring from a marriage with a Jew, in
the sense of Section 1, which was contracted after the Law for the
protection of German blood and German honor became effective (RGBl I,
page 1146 of 15 Sept 1935); (d) he is the offspring of an extramarital
relationship, with a Jew, according to Section 1, and will be born out
of wedlock after July 31, 1936.
Article 6
1. As far as demands are concerned for the pureness of blood as laid
down in Reichs law or in orders of the NSDAP and its echelons--not
covered in Article 5--they will not be touched upon.
2. Any other demands on pureness of blood, not covered in Article
5, can only be made with permission from the Reich Minister of the
Interior and the Deputy of the Fuehrer. If any such demands have
been made, they will be void as of 1 Jan 1936, if they have not been
requested from the Reich Minister of the Interior in agreement with
the Deputy of the Fuehrer. These requests must be made from the Reich
Minister of the Interior.
Article 7
The Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor can grant exemptions from the
regulations laid down in the law.
Berlin, 14 November 1935
The Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor
Adolf Hitler
The Reich Minister of the Interior
Frick
The Deputy of the Fuehrer
R. Hess
(Reich Minister without Portfolio)
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1419-PS
1939 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 864
Law concerning Jewish Tenants of 30 April 1939
The Reich Government has enacted the following law which is hereby
promulgated:
Article 1 _Abatement of the Tenancy Protection Provisions_
A Jew cannot invoke the protection of the tenancy laws where the
landlord in giving notice to vacate the premises can furnish him with a
certificate from the communal authorities that his shelter is assured
for the time subsequent to the expiration of the tenancy. This does not
apply where the landlord is also a Jew.
Article 2 _Premature Dissolution of Lease_
A lease may be dissolved, where only one of the parties to it is a
Jew, by the other party at any time within the legal term of giving
notice, notwithstanding that the lease is signed for a specified time,
or that the stipulated time of giving notice is longer than that fixed
by law. The landlord, however, may not give notice for vacating the
premises earlier than the term agreed upon, where he does not furnish
certificate from the communal authorities that the shelter of the
tenant has been assured elsewhere subsequent to the vacating of the
premises.
Article 3 _Sub-Leases_
Sub-leases may be concluded only between Jews and Jews. Permission to
sublet is not necessary where the house owner is also a Jew.
Article 4 _Billetting_
1. Where the communal authority so requires, a Jew shall be required to
receive Jews as tenants or as sub-tenants in premises which he occupies
as owner or on the basis of a tenancy, or has rented from another
Jew. Where he refuses to make an appropriate agreement with the new
tenant, the communal authority may fix the terms of such an agreement
with binding force on both parties. The amount of the rental and the
compensation to the owner for the sub-lease shall be determined by the
communal authority, and where it is not the controlling rent authority,
in concurrence with the competent rent control authority.
2. The commune is entitled to receive fees for establishing agreements
and sub-leases.
3. A tenancy, or sub-lease entered into under (1) may be dissolved
by the owner or the sub-tenant only with the consent of the communal
authority.
Article 5 _New Tenancies_
Jews may rent to others new or vacant premises only upon the consent of
the communal authority. The provisions of Article 4 shall apply to such
premises respectively.
Article 6 _Application to Cases of Limited Ownership_
Where the application of Articles 1-5 depends on the premise that
the lessor is a Jew, the owner of the parcel of land, or the person
entitled to its use shall be considered the lessor, notwithstanding he
cannot sign a lease, or has not signed the lease because of limitations
upon his power over such property.
Article 7 _Mixed Marriages_
Where the application of this law depends on the premise that the
lessor or the lessee is a Jew, the following shall apply in cases of a
mixed marriage of a lessee or a lessor:
1. Where the wife is a Jew, and where there are offsprings from the
marriage, even where the marriage is no longer valid, the provisions of
the law do not apply.
2. Where the husband is a Jew and there are no offspring, the
provisions shall apply, no matter where the wife or the husband is the
tenant or the lessor.
3. This does not apply to offsprings who are considered as Jews.
Article 8 _Right of Disposal_ [_Verfuegungsrecht_]
1. Where the right of disposal of a parcel of land (property or right
to use) [Nutzungsrecht] is transferred by a Jew to a non-Jew, after
the effective date of this law, the provisions of this law shall apply
as before the transfer, though a giving of notice to vacate before the
time fixed is not permissible. This applies also to further transfers
of the right of disposal.
2. The provision of (1) shall not apply to premises which the
beneficial owner shall desire to occupy himself, or to premises
which shall not be claimed for use of Jewish tenants by the communal
authority. A certificate from the communal authority is sufficient
proof that claim to these premises has been relinquished.
Article 9 _Term of Vacating Premises_
1. Where a Jew is forced to vacate premises under the provisions of
this law, an extension of the time limit for vacating may be granted
to him only where he can furnish a certificate from the communal
authorities that other shelter cannot be found for him, owing to
obstacles, or where the immediate vacating of the premises cannot be
undertaken without serious danger to the health of one of the persons
affected. The term fixed may be extended in accordance with the same
premises stated above.
2. The provision of (1) shall respectively apply insofar as the person
forced to vacate has not terminated the lease, where the obligation to
vacate has not been pronounced in a judgment, or where the premises for
the granting of a time extension do not occur until after the judgment
has been pronounced. The local court having jurisdiction over matters
of vacating shall render a decision on the extension of time on the
application of the person required to vacate. Where a time extension
is granted and no judgment to vacate has been rendered so far, the
decision shall contain also the statement that after the expiration of
such extension the premises shall be vacated; this decision shall be
the equivalent of an executable order of dispossession.
3. An immediate appeal against a decision refusing to grant an
extension of time is permissible, even in such cases where only a
decision against time extension is being protested by the tenant.
4. Until the premises are vacated, both parties to the renting
agreement shall be held to observe the same rules and regulations as
before the termination of the agreement.
5. The procedure under (2) shall be subject to the same court costs and
lawyer’s fees as the procedure for temporary stay of distraint. For
the estimate of costs Article 10 (1) shall apply correspondingly.
Article 10 _Order of Definition_
1. Who shall be considered a Jew, shall be determined by the definition
given in Article 5 of the First Regulation under the Reich Citizenship
Law of 14 November 1935 (RGBl I, 1333).
2. The definition of Jewish enterprises under Article 1 of the Third
Regulation under the Reich Citizenship Law of 14 June 1938 (RGBl I,
627) shall be followed except insofar as Article 9 applies. A change in
the ownership of a Jewish enterprise shall be considered as a change of
the right of disposal in the sense of Article 8.
Article 11 _Treatment of Pending Legal Actions affecting Leases_
1. Where a legal action against a Jew or the marriage partner of a
Jew is pending when this law takes effect, the court may stay the
proceedings on the application of the plaintiff, in order to make it
possible for him to give the notice required under the provisions of
this law. Where the plaintiff has given notice to terminate the lease,
he may petition for the reopening of the case and change the plea from
termination to dispossession. Where the legal action is terminated by
the quitting of the tenant, or his acknowledgment of the obligation to
vacate, the court costs shall be voided; the costs out of court shall
be borne by the tenant.
2. Where the tenant retracts the legal action for lease termination,
the court costs shall be voided and the costs out of court shall be
borne by each of the contending parties for himself.
Article 12 _General Reporting Requirement_
1. The communal authority may issue orders for reports on premises
rented to Jews, or on premises which may be used for the shelter of
Jews in accordance with the provisions of this law.
2. Whoever shall not, either wilfully or through negligence make such
obligatory report, shall be punishable by a fine up to 150 Reichsmarks
or by custody.
Article 13 _Claims for Indemnity_
No claims shall be made for indemnity against orders issued by the
communal authority in accordance with the provisions of this law.
Article 14 _Exceptions; Authorization_
1. The effectiveness of this law in the Ostmark and in the Sudeten
German Territories shall be reserved to a later date.
2. The Reich Minister of Justice and the Reich Minister of Labor
with the concurrence of the Reich Minister of the Interior shall
be authorized to issue instructions for the administration and
the enforcement of this law, as well as introduce the appropriate
provisions in Austria and in the Sudeten German Territories.
Berlin, 30 April 1939
The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor
Adolf Hitler
The Reich Minister of Justice
Dr Guertner
The Reich Minister of Labor
His Deputy: Dr Krohn
The Deputy of the Fuehrer
R. Hess
The Reich Minister of the Interior
Frick
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1422-PS
1943 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 372
Thirteenth Regulation under the Reich Citizenship Law of 1 July 1943
Under Article 3 of the Reich Citizenship Law of September 15, 1935
(RGBl I, 1146) the following is ordered:
Article 1
1. Criminal actions committed by Jews shall be punished by the police.
2. The provision of the Polish penal laws of 4 December 1941 (RGBl I,
759) shall no longer apply to Jews.
Article 2
1. The property of a Jew shall be confiscated by the Reich after his
death.
2. The Reich may, however, grant compensation to the non-Jewish legal
heirs and persons entitled to sustenance who have their domicile in
Germany.
3. This compensation may be granted in the form of a lump sum, not
to exceed the ceiling price of the property which has passed into
possession [Verfuegungsgewalt] of the German Reich.
4. Compensation may be granted by the transfer of titles and assets
from the confiscated property. No costs shall be imposed for the legal
processes necessary for such transfer.
Article 3
The Reich Minister of the Interior with the concurrence of the
participating higher authorities of the Reich shall issue the legal
and administrative provisions for the administration and enforcement
of this regulation. In doing so he shall determine to what extent the
provisions shall apply to Jewish nationals of foreign countries.
Article 4
This regulation shall take effect on the seventh day of its
promulgation. In the Protectorate Bohemia and Moravia it shall apply
where German administration and German courts have jurisdiction;
Article 2 shall also apply to Jews who are citizens of the Protectorate.
Berlin, 1 July 1943
The Reich Minister of the Interior
Frick
Chief of the Party Chancellery
M. Bormann
Reich Minister of Finance
Count Schwerin von Krosigk
Reich Minister of Justice
Dr. Thierack
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1430-PS
[Excerpt of Volume 222 issued by the Reichsfuehrer of the Chief of the
Reichs Security Main Office--RSHA]
SECRET
SEIZURE OF LEADING MEN OF THE SYSTEM ERA.
[Nazi expression for the 14 years of the Weimar Republic]
June 1939
CONTENTS
I. Index and Statistics Page 1
II. Synopsis of Various groups Page 3
III. Statistics of Various groups Page 8
IV. List of all the persons Page 17
INDEX AND STATISTICS OF ALL PERSONS SEIZED
In all the following were seized: 553 Persons
Divided thus:
Group 1. Marxists--Communists 192 Persons
Group 2. Liberalists--Pacifists 82 Persons
Group 3. Confessional Parties 76 Persons
Group 4. Right Opposition [Rechtsopositienen] 73 Persons
Group 5. Prominent Austrians of the System Era 48 Persons
Group 6. Scientists 17 Persons
Group 7. Artists 18 Persons
Group 8. Writers--Journalists 47 Persons
STATISTICS
Of all the people seized the following are:
Jews 58--(10%)
Free Masons 45--(9%)
Temporarily, or at the present time
still in protective custody,
prison or penitentiary 102--(19%)
I. In the country there are: 349--(63%)
1. Remaining in their old professions or
returned to them.
(Mainly State or official positions) 61--(11%)
2. People receiving pensions 109--(20%)
II. Living Abroad 204--(37%)
1. Politically prominent people working on
emigration 138--(25%)
2. Distribution in the various countries:
France 61
Switzerland 26
England 19
The States 17
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1435-PS
Speech of Min. Speer on 24 Febr. 1942 to the Gauleiter meeting. From
Vol. 38--1
*******
_Gauleiter meeting 24 Febr. 1942. Munich_
[_Page 4_]
I am grateful to fact that, also Party member Dr. Todt, in
January, personally ordered the complete stoppage of work on his
Reichsautobahnen as well as released all specialists and German Workers
for the railroad construction in the East and his PWs for the armament
industry.
[_Page 8_]
I therefore proposed to the Fuehrer at the end of December that _all_
my labor force, including specialists, be released for mass employment
in the East.
Subsequently the remaining PW’s about 10,000, were put at disposal of
the armaments industry by me.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1437-PS
1938 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 262
Second Order
supplementary to the law concerning the re-uniting of Austria
with the German Reich
Dated 18 March 1938
The following order is issued by virtue of Article III of the law
concerning the re-uniting of Austria with the German Reich, dated 13
March 1938 (RGBl I, page 237).
Article 1
The Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of German Police in the Reich Ministry
of the Interior can take measures necessary for the maintenance of
security and order, even beyond the legal limits otherwise set on such
measures.
Article 2
The Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of German Police in the Reich Ministry
of the Interior can delegate his powers to other departments.
Article 3
The order comes into force on the date of publication. Berlin, March
18th, 1938
The Reich Minister of the Interior
Frick
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1438-PS
1938 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 1453.
3rd. Order
supplementary to the decree of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor
concerning the administration of the Sudeten-German territory
Dated 22nd October 1938
The following order is issued by virtue of Section 9 of the decree of
the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor concerning the administration of the
Sudeten-German territory, dated 1st. October 1938 (Reich Law Gazette,
Page 1331):
Article 1
The Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police in the Reich
Ministry of the Interior can take the administrative measures necessary
for the maintenance of security and order, even beyond the legal limits
otherwise set on such measures.
Article 2
The Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of German Police in the Reich Ministry
of the Interior can delegate his powers to other departments.
Article 3
The order comes into force on the date of publication.
Berlin, 22nd. October 1938.
The Reich Minister of the Interior
Frick
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1439-PS
TREATY OF PROTECTION CONCLUDED BETWEEN THE GERMAN REICH AND THE STATE
OF SLOVAKIA,
March 23, 1939
[From 1939 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART II, PAGE 606.]
Between the German Government and the Slovak Government, a treaty
was signed on 18 March 1939 in Vienna and on 23 March 1939 in Berlin
extending protection by the German Reich to the State of Slovakia.
The treaty became effective on March 23, 1939; its text is published
hereinafter.
Berlin, March 24, 1939.
VON RIBBENTROP
Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs
_Treaty of Protection to be extended by the German Reich to the State
of Slovakia_
The German Government and the Slovak Government have agreed, after
the Slovak State has placed itself under the protection of the German
Reich, to regulate by treaty the consequences resulting from this fact.
For this purpose the undersigned representatives of the two governments
have agreed on the following provisions.
ARTICLE 1. The German Reich undertakes to protect the political
independence of the State of Slovakia and the integrity of its
territory.
ARTICLE 2. For the purpose of making effective the protection
undertaken by the German Reich, the German armed forces shall have
the right, at all times, to construct military installations and
to keep them garrisoned in the strength they deem necessary, in an
area delimited on its western side by the frontiers of the State of
Slovakia, and on its eastern side by a line formed by the eastern
rims of the Lower Carpathians, the White Carpathians and the Javornik
Mountains.
The Government of Slovakia will take the necessary steps to assure
that the land required for these installations shall be conveyed to
the German armed forces. Furthermore, the Government of Slovakia will
agree to grant exemption from custom duties for imports from the Reich
for the maintenance of the German troops and the supply of military
installations.
Military sovereignty will be assumed by the German armed forces in the
zone described in the first paragraph of this Article.
German citizens who, on the basis of private employment contracts, are
engaged in the construction of military installations in the designated
zone shall be subject to German jurisdiction.
ARTICLE 3. The Government of Slovakia will organize its military forces
in close agreement with the German armed forces.
ARTICLE 4. In accordance with the relationship of protection agreed
upon, the Government of Slovakia will at all times conduct its foreign
affairs in close agreement with the German Government.
ARTICLE 5. This treaty shall become effective as of the date of its
signature and shall be valid for a period of twenty-five years. The two
governments will reach an understanding on the extension of this treaty
in due time before the expiration of that period.
In witness whereof the representatives of the two parties have signed
the above treaty in duplicate.
Vienna, March 18, 1939. Berlin, March 23, 1939.
For the German Government:
VON RIBBENTROP
For the Slovak Government:
DR. JOZEF TISO
DR. VOJTECH TUKA
DR. F. DURCANSKY
[Cf. Document 2793-PS, which is the secret protocol to this treaty.]
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1445-PS
Berlin, 15 June 1940.
Minutes about the Conference at the Reich Ministry of Economics on 14
June 1940, 1600 hours
_Represented_:
Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Ambassador Clodius)
Representative for the Four Year Plan (Director of Ministry Gramsch)
Reichsfuehrer S.S.
Foreign Exchange Department
Clearing Institute
Reich Ministry for Economics (various representatives)
O.K.W., Wi Rue Amt (I a M3)
_Subject of the Conference_:
Utilization of the Belgian Dutch capital investments in South East
European corporations.
_Result_:
After a discussion of several hours the following regulations were
considered as necessary:
_a._ Immediate order by the Reichskommissar for the Netherlands and the
Military Commander for Belgium. Issue of a regulation for prohibition
of the disposal, destruction or transfer of securities held in these
countries, furthermore a compulsory registration of the owners and
trustees, an embargo on bank deposits, finally the cancellation of
regulations about securities which contain change of locations of
firms. (Compare paragraph A of document I a M3 of 23 May 1940.)
_b._ In addition to this, after thorough consideration, shall be issued
a legal regulation corresponding to the German law for foreign exchange
regarding the disposal of foreign securities. In this law it shall
be made possible to void with retroactive power change of locations
of firms which took place since the beginning of the war. Provisions
shall be made also for the appointment of Commissars to corporations
and holding companies where after expiration of the registration date
securities are hidden.
_c._ In addition to this it shall be put into effect in the South-East
states by the Mission chiefs that, where a permit is already required
for the transfer of shares, no permit of any kind shall be granted and
that in regions where no permit for the sale of shares is necessary,
a law for these permits shall be established, but as a matter of
principle these permits shall not be granted.
_d._ Finally the attempt shall be made to gain an influence through the
Dutch holding companies over their owned subsidiaries in view of the
German economic warfare. (Compare with paragraph B of notice I a M3 of
23 May 1940.)
_e._ A confiscation of securities shall be disregarded because this
would be against international law.
_f._ The regulation drafts shall be completed by the Reich Ministry
of Economics (R.W.M.) with assistance of the Labor Board of the
Reich Ministry of Finance (A.A. des R.F.M.) and the Army High
Command--Economy Armament Division (O.K.W. Wi Rue Amt.)
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1456-PS
Berlin, 20 June 1941
Chief of Agency for
Armament Economy
[Chef Wi-Rue Amt]
Colonel Jansen
MEMORANDUM
Following is the new conception of the Fuehrer, which Minister Todt has
explained to me and which has been confirmed later on by Field Marshal
Keitel:
Par. I
The course of the war shows that we went too far in our autarchical
endeavors. It is impossible, to try and manufacture everything we
lack, by synthetic procedures or other measures. For instance, it is
impossible, to develop our motor fuel economy to a point where we
can entirely depend on it. All these autarchical endeavors ask for a
tremendous amount of manpower, and it is simply impossible to provide
it. One has to choose another way. What one does not have, but needs,
one must conquer. The commitment of men which is necessary one single
time, will not be as great as the one that is currently needed for the
running of the synthetic factories in question. The aim must also be to
secure all territories, which are of special interest to us for the war
economy, by conquering them.
At the time the 4-year-plan was established, I issued the statement
where I made it clear that a completely autarchical economy is
impossible for us, because the need of men will be too great.
Nevertheless, my solution was always to provide the necessary reserves
for missing stocks resp. to secure the delivery in wartime through
economic alliances.
Par. II
In a conference between Todt--Pleiger--Thomas, it was determined:
Matter: “Detailed orders to the mining industries”.
Par. III
Todt suggests the construction of heavy special machinery at Krupp’s
and Skoda’s.
[Signed] THOMAS
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1458-PS
“THE HITLER YOUTH”
by Baldur von Schirach
_Published by Koehler und Amelang, Leipzig 1934._
_In place of a foreword._
My Fuehrer! It is five years now since you gave me the mission to
take over leadership of the National Socialist youth. At that time
you explained to my collaborators and to me the idea of this youth
organization. What you preached to us at that time as aim and demand,
my Fuehrer, has taken on shape here before you. You asked at that
time from me and my collaborators that we should create a community
of youth in which no other law should be binding for the process of
reconstruction but the law of achievement.
Here, among the leaders of the Hitler youth are the sons of the
poorest who exercise command over hundreds of thousands. What do the
conceptions of poverty and richness mean in face of the reality of
this community? In future days only those will be called poor who did
not belong in their youth to this community. And further, my Fuehrer,
you demanded from my collaborators and from me that we should not only
unite the youth in enthusiasm, but also by discipline and order. We
fought for years laboriously for this end, but today even this demand
is fulfilled and proudly we feel ourselves as a worthy part of your
great National Socialist Movement.
But we were powerless regarding one of your demands. You told us then
it would appear as a great success to you if we succeeded to hold
together in one organization of the German one hundred thousand German
youth. My Fuehrer, you forgot, that you had given this organization
your name.
You asked for one hundred thousand, and it was all who came. There is
one thing which is stronger than you, my Fuehrer, that is the love of
the young Germany for you.
There are many gay hours in the year of the youth. This one, however,
is in every year our happiest. Because more than other people, my
Fuehrer, we feel to be chained to your person by our name. Your name is
the happiness of the youth, your name, my Fuehrer, is our immortality.
Baldur von Schirach to the Fuehrer at the occasion of the inspection of
the Hitler Youth at the Reichs party day 1936.
Chapter 1
From Union [Bund] to Nation [pp. 13-19]
That which was formerly called the German youth movement [Jugend
bewegung] is dead. This statement has nothing to do with ill will.
No youth leader of our time will deny the merits of the scout
[Wandervogel] Karl Fischers in his work with the German youth movement.
That youth movement was as right for its own time as the Hitler Youth
is right for the present. Without any doubt, many ideas and the form
of life [Lebensform] of the Youth Movement helped to create the
prerequisites on which the H J is building: The idea of self-leadership
on the part of the youth, the declaration to fight against the
standards of bourgeois society, the will to folkdom, homeland, or
comradeship and many others, are akin to the feelings of the H. J. And
yet: The first step into public life, the meeting which took place
on 11 and 12 October 1913 on the “Hohen Meissner”, remained only an
impulse. The best thing about the speech on the “Hohen Meissner” were
the people who listened to it [p. 14]. What today’s youth is looking
for in this, for the youth movement so important meeting, is the
sincere will to form, to create.
We, today, see clearer than the generation of that time that the value
of their youth movement was in their silent work. The greater German
idea and the really valuable return to folkdom and simplicity are
achievements of the youth movement which seem to us more significant
than the numerous manifestoes which were handed down to us. They
had the courage to let themselves be ridiculed, a courage which the
National Socialist Fighter of a decade later also had to have. And we
must, if we want to do justice to this youth movement, look less to
the picture of their actual appearance but more to the determination
with which they followed their ideals. The political reality of youth
was their cleanness, their decent behaviour, their political change
[Umbruch]. The Youth movement was one of the few pleasant phenomena of
the Wilhelmman era and it is characteristic for that time that youth
was so delightful because it declared war on its time. Few leagues
[Buende] of the postwar time have a right to refer to the former youth
movement. They were a true copy of its weaknesses without its virtues.
They ignored the lesson of the great war. They forgot that the time of
a free and easy youth movement had undergone a break by the death of
two million, which imposed on them the duties of unity and masculine
constraint [Gebundenheit und maennliche Zucht--p. 15]. What was right
up to 1 August 1914 was wrong after 9 November 1918.
Some attempts were made to create a synthesis of youth and a militant
movement [Wehrbewegung], attempts which started from the right
principles. These attempts failed because their leaders were either
representatives of pure militarism or at best of some lesser political
ideas. Therefore, it was reserved to Adolf Hitler, the creator and
supporter of an ideology [Weltanschauung], to determine the road of
German youth. From the former youth movement the Hitler youth took over
this or that form, out of the front of the World War it was given its
content by Adolf Hitler. Its organization also has its prerequisite in
the great war; its bearing is military, as was the bearing of those
who came from the youth movement and who died in their gray coats in
Flanders.
Just as the youth of the “Hohen Meissner” felt, the front as the more
important, so do we. Between the summer of 1914 and the spring of today
lies a long dreary time through which we all passed consciously or
unconsciously. Even those of us who had not been born at that time know
it, every German knows it. As long as the German people will live, this
time will live in their minds [p. 16].
That at that time a whole nation stood in arms, Catholics and
Protestants, beggars and millionaires, peasants and clerks, merchants
and laborers, and that they all obeyed one will and were only Germans,
nothing but Germans, that also started us on the march. No title, no
privilege of birth, not a lot of money nor anything special of any kind
made a difference then.
We also want the same thing. The black years of war have passed, the
spirit of the warrior remains. Again youth in Germany does not want
profits, nor personal gain, but renders service and sacrifices to the
community. That is the idea of the HJ: A comradeship of those Germans
who do not want anything for themselves. Because they do not want
anything for themselves they can do everything for their great nation.
Not a youth with new rights--a generation of strict fulfillment of duty.
The postwar period showed a sad picture of party-bound youth. “Whoever
controls youth, controls the future” was the slogan, given the German
National club to the Communist thieves’ den. Every lobby was dealing
in youth. And they were successful. Young Germany took everything for
gospel truth, sold itself today to this one, tomorrow to that one
till finally, disappointed and disgusted, it turned its back on all
these activities. Then came the time of exclusive sports, of exclusive
indulging in entertainments and living to the fullest, the time of
exclusive study, [p. 17]. “Politics is nonsense,” was the reply given
to party functionaries.
When Adolf Hitler began to speak this attitude was shaken. But now the
satisfied citizen used the same argument which youth had found against
him. He called for peace, for self-possession, for order. “Youth should
not mix in politics,” because the defensive slogan of all the bourgeois
parties which began to lose their young people to the Fuehrer. Anyone
who at that time, 1924-25, among youth stood up for Adolf Hitler
might have found that even youth leaders anxiously tried to avoid the
alleged danger of influencing youth politically in the direction of
National Socialism. Many comrades and I myself had to leave a militant
organization [Wehrorganisation] to which I had become quite attached,
because I had made a speech for Adolf Hitler there. At that time, many,
like myself drew a dividing line between themselves and their friends
and relatives and exchanged fight for the new ideal for the quiet life
of a well protected home.
We were not yet able to account for our conception in detail, we simply
believed. And when Hitler’s book, “Mein Kampf” was published it was our
bible which we almost learned by heart in order to be able to answer
the questions of the doubters and superior critics. Almost every one
who today is leading youth in a responsible position joined us during
those years [p. 18].
Again Youth was divided by politics but this time the problem was
different. It was no longer a matter of national parties, of liberal
and democratic ideas, it was this: Germany or Marxism, Germany or
reaction. But youth also had been slightly infected with party ideas.
Youth did not want to be convinced, it wanted to be overruled. Not
the accuracy of the idea was questioned, but an attempt was made to
prove that with such a small following it could not be successful. The
National Socialist movement was regarded as a fractional party, the
honest but, because of its pettiness, hopeless attempt of a man of
whom it was not known if he had the necessary knowledge, the essential
education. A bricklayer from Vienna, a man without college education,
a self-taught person should liberate Germany? That was at best very
doubtful.
As there are old people who are young, there are also among the youth
some who are old. I have met them in the universities, in the youth
movement, everywhere. The people who are old in their hearts are like
a pestilence to a healthy people. They represent the tenacious and
embittered resistance against every new idea. But youth is an attitude.
The paralyzed Chamberlain whose lips are forming words which only his
wife can read and transcribe represents eternal youth as much as the
old Goethe in his last days. His Faust, the Ninth Symphony and the will
of Adolf Hitler are eternal youth and know neither time nor death [p.
19].
Yet there are men who are born old and are living their lives as if
they were 70 years old. During the years of our fight we overcame
those people and we fight them again and again. They are the living
dead. Their coldness kills every slight stir of a new life. Only the
collective force of passionate youth is able to destroy them.
Let us do away with the old! Only eternal youth shall have its home _in
our Germany_.
Chapter 2
The development of the Hitler Youth movement [p. 20, par. 1].
The idea for the foundation of a National Socialist youth organization
came from the Fuehrer himself, while the name Hitler Youth was
originated by Julius Streicher, who also named the Brown House. The
name of the man who deserves the credit for having set up the first
groups of the H. J. is Kurt Gruber.
At the time of the beginning of the H. J. Kurt Gruber had just
graduated from Law School. He devoted himself with great energy to his
new task. From a small cellar in Plenen which served as Reichs office,
we first organized a number of Saxonian H J groups, energetically
assisted by the present Reich Governor in Saxony, Martin Mutschinanon.
*******
Here I would also like to mention that since 1928, Alfred Rosenberg
also took a special interest in the National Socialist Youth. At that
time we were trying to come to an understanding with the leagues.
Alfred Rosenberg negotiated with the Eagles and Falcons, the “bensen”,
and other leagues without fundamental results. I realized at that time
that an understanding with the leaders of the leagues would never be
possible [p. 23] and devoted myself to the principle of the totality of
the Hitler Youth, which in the year 1933 cost all those leagues their
independent existence.
When, in 1930, the Fuehrer himself took over the high command of the
SA [Storm Troops] and Ernst Roehm started his new office as Chief of
Staff, the National Socialist Youth organizations were centralized in
the SA. Kurt Gruber resigned. His nervous state was such that he was
physically unable to continue his work. On 30 October 1931, the Fuehrer
appointed me as Reichs youth leader of the NSDAP with the rank of a Lt.
General [Gruppenfuehrer] in the SA. My old comrade, Dr. von Reuteln was
given the leadership of the students’ league and also the leadership of
the HJ, under my command. Now the organization of the HJ was thoroughly
overhanded, which was necessary because Kurt Gruber had not been able
to fully devote himself to his tasks as a leader especially during
the last months of his activities. Dr. von Reuteln continued his
work as a consultant for economic questions in the Executive Office
[Reichsleitung] of the NSDAP but still found time for official trips
and for night work at his desk to which the HJ owes the tightening of
the threads of its organization which had become rather loose. At that
time I had to go temporarily to Kufstein where I stayed with friends in
a little mountain inn in order to avoid a prison term of three months
[p. 24]. The previous year I had spoken against the Versailles dictate
from the steps of Cologne University, violating a government order
and, to begin with, was locked up in the Cologne prison, the so-called
“Klingelpuetz”, which then often housed Dr. Robert Ley, at that time
regional leader of Koeln-Aachen and another leading party comrade,
Tom Winkelnkemper. There I stayed for 8 days till my case came up in
court and was then sentenced to 3 months in prison without a time of
probation according to the emergency decree by the Reichs President. I
was very lucky to be set free after the sentence was passed. With great
joy I still think of the dear Cologne party comrades who, headed by Dr.
Ley stood in a mass before the gates of the prison when I was released.
It was high time, I flew to Munich. The following day I took the train
to Graz and was able to give to the Graz Student meeting the directive
which was needed by the Fuehrer. The National Socialist Student League
[Studentenbund] won its decisive victory. A National Socialist was
unanimously elected leader of the German student body [Studentenschaft].
Since that time around 12 months had gone by and I had reason to fear
that I would be torn away any day now from my organizational work
with the National Socialist Youth. My co-workers came to Kufstein for
the most important conferences and I frequently crossed the border at
night, raced through [p. 25] Germany in our “Nurnberg”, announced a
meeting in Chemnitz while I made a speech in Berlin, and thus I escaped
my well-deserved “vacation” in Cologne. Then came the time of Groener.
One evening the Fuehrer came to my apartment in Munich and informed me
that he intended to appoint me Reichsleader of the NSDAP the following
day, and to take the National Socialist Youth organizations out of
the SA. Since prohibition of the SA was threatening we might have
avoided the simultaneous prohibition of the HJ. The Fuehrer bases the
necessity of such a measure on the principle for which he stood from
the beginning, and which I have used in this book as a motto: “Youth
must be led by Youth”.
By some accident the prompt announcement of my appointment was held
up. Soon after this conversation the SA and with it the HJ were
forbidden by Mr. Groener. Through Reuteln I raised some half-hearted
objections with Groener, referring to the fact that at the time of
prohibition I was no longer a member of the SA, but, of course, without
results. There was no other way out but to continue work underground.
Thus originated the National Socialist Youth movement, the NSJB [NS
Jugendbewegung] without uniform, without insignia. At that time we
traveled through Germany dressed like bandits. Blue sailor caps, white
shirts [p. 26] and a brown sweater or some kind of civilian coat. But
we recognized each other everywhere. At this time the HJ gained its
best human material. Whoever came to us during this illegal time, boy
or girl, risked everything. Thousands upon thousands were thrown out of
their schools or became unemployed--but they clung the more tenaciously
to our flag. It was a great time and as strange as it might seem we
were never happier than at that time when we lived in constant danger.
With pistols in our pockets we drove through the Ruhr district while
stones came flying after us. We jumped every time we heard a bell ring
because we lived in constant fear of arrests and expected our houses to
be searched. I have hardly one piece of furniture in my possession that
was not attached.
One day even my “Nurnberg” was confiscated. That was going too far.
They could have all the wardrobes and chests as far as I was concerned,
but the car to us meant freedom, mobility, our work. The Fuehrer was
then at Obersalzberg. I called him up and out of his own pocket he gave
me the money to pay the printer who had the car attached. I breathed
freely again, we were able to continue our work.
At about this time I had a conference with Dr. von Reuteln, as a result
of which I also took over the leadership of the Students’ League and
the HJ as [p. 27] such. This came about in the most friendly manner.
Reuteln wanted to get free anyhow to devote himself to his great
tasks in the economic-political field, I myself wanted to exchange my
somewhat formal responsibility for the HJ into a real one. We parted
as the comrades which we still are today. Between us never existed any
fundamental difference on essential points and The National Socialist
Youth owes a deep gratitude to the man who outlined their road in a
severe and straightforward manner.
The membership of the National Socialist Youth organisation had grown
to about 35,000. The number of applications was mounting day by day.
We requested more office space from Reichs Treasurer Schwarz and
he created generous working possibilities for us by putting at our
disposal the entire top floor of the hotel “Der Reichsadler” in Munich.
For the time being we had some space.
With the moving into the hotel “Reichsadler” an unpleasant tension
began to make itself felt which existed between the youth and Gregor
Strasser, who had installed the offices of the organizational
department in the same building. In my apartment on Koenigenstrasse I
was lucky enough to be able to express my apprehensions about Strasser
to the Fuehrer. Otherwise I never discussed these things with anybody,
with the exception of Julius Streicher. But I received [p. 28] reports
from all parts of the Reich through the youth organization. I knew
what course Strasser was taking, who, at that time, was at the heights
of his power. I knew of his connections and, from the beginning on,
I was instinctively convinced of his unreliability in regard to his
character. Gregor Strasser was an enemy of the National Socialist Youth
out of the same instinct. It was, after all, a Hitler-Youth and not a
Strasser Youth.
The greatest worry of the years of struggle of 1930/31 was the lack of
money. Very often we did not have the few gallons of gasoline which
we needed for traveling. Another drawback was that none of us was,
at that time, a member of the Reichstag and, therefore, had no free
transportation. The reason was that we had not reached the necessary
age of 25. Our compensation for expenses was just sufficient to cover
our bare living expenses. By writing and lecturing I was able to make
enough money to pay my own fare. Despite all the difficulties we were
able to make all the necessary trips. The success of my staff was based
on its mobility. Good leadership is not characterized by answering
letters on time but by its contact with the fighting community. Thus
the Fuehrer had brought us up and he preached again and again not to
lose myself in paper work--one of the greatest and wisest teachings
which I received from him.
*******
The HJ [Hitler Youth] used the winter of 1932/33 for many
demonstrations [p. 31]. We drove through all of Germany and called the
youth to the HJ. I will never forget a Fuehrer appeal in the beginning
of January in Berlin, at the start of which I was searched for weapons
by the police. Twenty days later we were in power. The most magnificent
success was the conquest of the formerly Marxist industrial workers
youth of the German West. Here my co-worker Hartmann Lauterbacher
achieved great things.
I will never forget the hour when we were sitting in the office of the
district Ruhr-Niederrhein during an intermission between demonstrations
on 30 January and received the news of Adolf Hitler’s appointment to
the post of Reichs Chancellor. That same night I spoke in Herford in
Westphalia. We all felt saved. The policemen [Schupos] who, on the
previous day, were still persecuting us, greeted us with raised hands.
It was one great fraternization. I spoke in two meetings, and going
from one to the other I caught such a cold that shivering with fever
I had [p. 32] to go home the next day, but in all my fever phantasies
one thing remained vivid, that which we had won on that day: Hitler in
power, Hitler in power. As soon as I had recovered I went to Berlin via
Wuerzberg, Nurnberg where we had 2 demonstrations. Now the problem was
to apply the victory of the movement to the entire youth. Our cabinet
ministers were overburdened with their new tasks and were working
day and night. We could not wait till they would find time to solve
the youth question by their own initiative. Therefore, we had to act
ourselves. My co-workers met in my Munich apartment and advised me
to occupy the Reichs committee [Reichsausschuss] of the German Youth
Leagues. I commissioned General [Obergebietsfuehrer] Nabersberg with
50 members of the Berlin HJ to make a surprise raid on the Reichs
Committee in the Alsenstrasse early the next morning. This was done
and at noon the press had the report that the HJ had taken over the
leadership of the Reichs Committee. The Reichs Committee was headed
by an excellent man, General Vogt. As much as a surprise the turn of
events was to him at first as quickly did this Prussian officer adjust
himself to the new situation. I took his job away from him but he
understood that this was a necessity and that only from the HJ the
great unification of German Youth would be possible, on which, after
all, he had worked all his life. General Vogt did not step aside [p.
33] and was not offended, but remained intensely and truly interested
in the objectives of the HJ and its aims. His book, “The German
Boy-Service” [Der deutsche Jungendienst] is one of the most valuable
books of German youth literature. And we are all proud of the fact that
General Vogt today belongs to the Reichs Youth leadership and wears the
Gold Honor insignia of the HJ.
In the Reichs Committee [Reichsausschuss] we got a tremendous amount
of material. All at once we were able to determine the strength of all
the German youth leagues and to summon the influential personalities
in these youth leagues. From this point I recognized the necessity of
coming to grips with the Greater German Union. I appointed my co-worker
Karl Nabersberg as my representative on the Reichs Committee and
traveled through Germany in order to take a stand against The Greater
German Union in many demonstrations. In the meantime I gained control
over the Reichs league for German youth hostels [Reichsverband fuer
deutsche Jugendherbergen] in a manner similar to the one employed
with the Reichs Committee; with its leadership I commissioned a young
merchant from Hamburg and bearer of the Golden Honor Insignia [Goldenes
Ehrenzerchen] of the NSDAP, Johannes Rodatz.
The Greater German Youth League [Grossdeutscher Jugendbund] was a
combination of various leagues and organizations which came under the
leadership of the deserving chief of staff of the fleet, Admiral von
Trotha. This admirable man, who had served our Fatherland in war and
peace with unselfish [p. 34] devotion fundamentally had the same ideas
and plans for the Greater German League as I had for the Hitler Youth.
That the Greater German League [Grossdeutscher Bund] could not fulfill
these tasks was not the fault of the “Admiral”, as he was respectfully
called by his Youth, the difficulties lay in the period itself. The
Greater German League was not a political union, that is, leagues
which partly were opposed to National Socialism were to be found in
the Greater German League as well as organizations which ideologically
were in agreement with the NSDAP, without, however, drawing any
conclusions from it. The unification of youth could never be achieved
by the external centralization of partly opposed leagues, but only by a
philosophy of life which had to be accepted by the young generation as
a new law for life. Only the Hitler Youth represented this idea.
The differences between the Greater German League and the HJ grew from
day to day. Friction, even frequently actual fighting, were day-by-day
occurrences. This state of affairs could not be settled by compromise.
We could not be satisfied with incorporation of the Greater German
League as, always the incorporation of a youth league into the HJ for
us was not even discussed. As all of us once, and that during difficult
times, gave our unconditional pledge to Adolf Hitler, especially today
every young German must be able to do so [p. 35]. The so-called and
often praised individual life [“Eigenleben”] of such leagues is, in the
last analysis, nothing but another form of “joiner tendency”. “Either
all or nothing” is the principle of National Socialism.
The position which I gave to the HJ was not strong enough to overcome
the last quaint introspection [Eigenbroetelei] within the youth. Nobody
saw that as clearly as the Fuehrer who was convinced of the necessity
of giving to the leader of the HJ that backing by the state which he
needed for his work. When we discussed these things I asked the Fuehrer
to refrain from attachment to one specific ministry, a wish which was
readily recognized by the Fuehrer. The Fuehrer himself stated that a
ministry cannot exist without bureaucracy, but bureaucracy is death to
youth. He intended to create an agency which in its freedom should have
the possibility to work. Thus, in the Reichs Chancellory, in the middle
of June 1933, he appointed me Youth leader of the German Reich [Jugend
fuehrer des deutschen Reiches] by clasping hands. Reich Minister Dr.
Frick, as their competent minister for youth questions, drew up the
respective document. I was given authority to appoint representatives
of the states [Landesbeauftragte] to carry out my instructions and I
appointed the district leaders to these positions in all the states in
execution of my right.
The first thing I did was to dissolve the Great German league. Since I
headed all [p. 36] German youth organizations and I had the right to
decide on their leadership, I did not hesitate for a moment to take
this step, which was for the HJ the elimination of an unbearable state
of affairs. The leader of the Great German Bund, Admiral von Trotha,
set an example of rare human greatness to German youth when he, after
the incorporation of all leagues and organizations had been completed,
one day made an end to all the fights and quarrels of the past years
and, after his appointment to Honorary Leader [Ehrenfuehrer] of the
Navy Hitler Youth, devoted himself unconditionally to the service in
Adolf Hitler’s youth movement. Only to great personalities it is given
to put youth to shame and at the same time obligate by a noble example.
At that time many a German boy will have asked himself if he would
be able to act in the same way in a similar situation and honestly
answered with a “no”. From an educational point of view it was the
most important deed that the Admiral, after his organization had been
smashed, again adjusted himself to the tasks of the new generation out
of his military sense of duty and his love for youth. When, today, the
blue columns of our Navy Hitler Youth pass by their honorary leader,
their eyes are not only shining with enthusiasm for the Admiral who
once at a grave hour won eternal honor for the German Reich, but they
also know in their hearts that this man is part of [p. 37] themselves.
Following the incorporation of the “Stahlhelm” into the SA we were
able to carry out the incorporation of the “Scharnhorst”, the youth
organization of the “Stahlhelm”. But the “Scharnhorst” had to give
up it’s individual existence when it joined the HJ. The individual
“Scharnhorst” boys were detailed to the local branches of the HJ. This
step would never have been possible without the initiative of Reichs
Minister Saldte who was completely convinced of the necessity to create
a large youth organization, which, also according to his opinion,
could only be the HJ. That the many small and unimportant groups and
leagues were incorporated goes without saying and took place without
any resistance. The Marxist youth as well as all political youth
organization I prohibited after the occupation of the Reichs Committee.
The one million members of the HJ which we had on 30 January 1933 had
now grown to a round three million. Only the two large confessional
groups, the Protestant and the Catholic youth, were opposed to us. They
already had lost a great number of their members to us but they still
remained powerful factors in the life of German youth. Again and again
I called together the district leaders [Gebietsfuehrer] of the HJ in
order to discuss this subject. Again and again these true and tenacious
fighters announced: We won’t stop now. From the last boy to the Reichs
Youth leader we agreed that the HJ never should and would give in as
regards this question.
Chapter 3
Hitler Youth and Confessional Youth [p. 38]
Towards the end of 1933 discussion about the eventual incorporation of
the evangelical youth took place between the newly appointed Reichs
Bishop Ludwig Mueller and myself. With great satisfaction we from the
HJ could ascertain that the Reichs Bishop was fundamentally ready to
lead the members of the evangelical youth leagues into the HJ, a point
of view which differed somewhat from that of the chairman of the Young
Men’s Protestant Work [Evangelisches Jungmaennerwerk], Dr. Stange. Dr.
Stange actually tried to interfere with this new development against
the will of the majority of his followers, but without success. And
in December 1933 the Reichs Bishop and myself were able to inform the
Fuehrer that incorporation of the protestant youth into the HJ had
become a reality.
Through the agreement with the Reichs Bishop the HJ believes to
have shown the way by which a later understanding with the Catholic
Youth Leagues also would be possible. By this agreement evangelical
youth organizations in the old sense, that is leagues, which overlap
the activities of the HJ are no longer in existence. As spiritual
communities the Protestant [p. 39] groups continue to live in their
innate field, namely that of the Protestant creed. The HJ guarantees
their protestant members a certain evening each week for their
confessional, religious activities. The agreement with the Reichs
Bishop follows verbatim:
1. The Protestant Youth Work [Evangelisches Jugendwerk] recognizes
the unified state political education of German youth by the National
Socialist State and the HJ [Hitler Youth] as representatives of the
philosophy of the State.
The youth of the Protestant Youth Work below 18 years of age is to
be incorporated into the Hitler Youth and its subordinated branches.
Anyone within this age group who does not become a member of the HJ,
from now on shall not be a member of the Protestant Youth Work.
2. Education in regard to open air sports (including gymnastics and
sports) and in regard to state politics, up to 18 years of age, shall
take place only within the HJ.
3. All members of the Protestant Youth Work shall wear the official
uniform of the Hitler Youth according to their membership in the HJ.
According to this agreement the Protestant youth was incorporated into
the Hitler Youth. With very few exceptions the young followers of the
Reichs Bishop were glad to be freed from the inner struggle of the past
months [p. 40]. The Reichs Bishop acted like a true spiritual advisor
of this young community when he, by this agreement, opened for them the
doors to the HJ and thus the doors to the people and the State.
The confessional youth league [Konfessioneller Jugendbund] has no right
of existence in our time. While the young German in the period of
National Socialism is drawn to the community and thereby the attitude
and way of living of the HJ, sometimes some dark pang of conscience
holds him back to give in to this urge, to follow really his innermost
thoughts. Particularly the catholic youth societies led their members
into moral conflicts for which an educator of the youth cannot account.
By promises for a life beyond they tried to hold the youth back from
the disinterested surrender to the state. As if the all powerful would
condemn this service on the people and could see anything objectionable
in it. Because the youth does not make any difference between poor and
rich, Protestant and Catholic, I am accused of being a “heathen” who
does not believe in anything and instills the seed of the antichrist
in the hearts of the unsuspecting youth. And yet, considering the
confessional composition of our people, a real community of our
youth can only exist if confessional questions are not discussed in
this community, special confessional leagues are not tolerated. The
Christian doctrine is attacked in the HJ as little as any [p. 41] other
doctrine; the HJ does not care for class or confession but only for
the Germandom. In this sense my slogan is to be understood; “The HJ is
neither Protestant nor Catholic, it is German”.
The church proclaims its right for a religious education. An
uncontested and uncontestable right. The state, on the other side,
demands through the HJ to exercise the ideological, political education
and here the state has a claim which is as valid as that of the church.
In fact a number of Catholic youth leaders are not concerned with this
religious education. They occupy their youth organizations with tasks,
accomplishment of which falls into the domain of the HJ. Home evenings
(social gatherings), hikes, camps, games, sports, and training do not
need a confessionally directed leadership, and yet it is exercised
stubbornly by a certain circle of catholic youth leaders. Instead of
bringing the German youth together where it can be united and should
be united, these so called educators and youth leaders try to present
even the cooking on hikes as a religious matter and think the young
boy’s soul could be harmed if he saw that outside of the Catholic youth
organization other people lived. The fact that since National Socialism
seized the power, about 1½ millions of youths from the camp of the
Catholic youth organizations joined the HJ manifests that the spirit of
the followers is better than that of the leadership and shows how in
the long run confessional, bourgeois thinking must capitulate before
German socialism.
A short while after the National Socialist revolution the beaten
political parties undertook another feeble attempt to keep at least
the youth somehow. The attempt failed; the youth of the bourgeois
parties pledged itself to the socialism of Adolf Hitler. The youth
leagues followed this example. Even the Protestant youth recognized the
demand of the time and followed in faithful fulfillment of their duties
the voice of their conscience. But on the spot where once the proud
Zentrum stood that we could see work hand in hand with the Marxist
traitors of the people in the Reichstag, there stands today a group of
the Catholic youth organizations and opposes the “We” of our community
with the “I” of their societies.
Who wants Germany without compromise is an arch-enemy of any
confessional principle in a state organization. Who would retreat here
a hand’s width and be he a minister of the new Germany, would betray
the tragic fight of the German people for its freedom. May the German
people recognize the lesson of the last thousand years and for the
first time proclaim an unconditional negation of all separating forces.
There is no reason why there should not be found a solution in the
question of the youth education to the satisfaction of the church as
well as of the HJ, so much the more as the HJ does not restrict in
any way the religious activities of its members. Neither attendance
at the Sunday services nor participation in other church gatherings
is being made difficult for the Catholic Hitler boys on the part
of the leadership of the HJ. If, on the occasion of some big youth
demonstrations which don’t take place too often, it was occasionally
difficult for technical reasons to make it possible for the young
people to attend church services it is by no means an indication of a
sometimes alleged “anti-religious” attitude of the HJ. I even am of
the opinion that religious meetings and arrangements in particular
religious youth leagues are not at all in contradiction to the
totalitarian claim of the HJ. Every effort which aims to deepen and
intensify religious life must not only be welcomed by a responsible
youth leadership but also be furthered. I believe to have shown by the
treaty with the Reich bishop of the Protestant church that the HJ is
willing to concede necessary space to the religious youth education.
However, it must be demanded that under the cover-name of religious
education the youth should in no way be influenced politically.
The experiences of the past taught us that the confessional youth
organizations do not occupy themselves exclusively with religious
questions. The National Socialist movement as pillar of the state
cannot be blamed if by reason of past experiences it makes security
arrangements which should ban all dangers for the future.
If the church visits of the youths do not correspond the expectations
of the churches, it is not the fault of the youth. The real cause
of this attitude of the youth is to be looked for in the want of
comprehension with which some catholic youth leaders and unfortunately
too many priests oppose the education of the HJ. They believe not to
be able to part with the sport education of the catholic youth and
overlook that the religious education itself suffers by the fight over
the competences.
Many Catholic Germans look with disgust at the mean fight which certain
catholic youth leaders lead today for their existence and hundreds
of thousands of catholic Hitler boys don’t have any appreciation of
it that there should exist outside the HJ sport a catholic sport and
catholic calisthenics. As faithful Catholics they stick to the church
but they cannot see why this church demands all of a sudden territory
which has nothing to do with religious education.
No reasonable man in Germany can give a reason for the necessity of
the existence of catholic youth organizations in their present form
(catholic boys scouts, “German Jugendkraft”, etc.) and many important
leaders of the catholic church have long been of the opinion that these
organizations have no right of existence in the National Socialist
state. The catholic youth itself--this I maintain by reason of the
continuous going over, even of whole groups to the HJ--wants to
cooperate in the National Socialist state. And not as confessional
specialist league but as HJ.
Catholics and Protestants have the same rights in Germany. This is
not only valid for their relationship to the state but especially for
their relationship to the National Socialist movement. If, however,
the catholic youth is advised not to join the HJ, then this part
of the German youth is deprived of a right which today every other
young member of the community possesses. “Give to the emperor what
is the emperor’s and to God what is God’s”. This profound wisdom of
Christ shows us even today the possibility to terminate the tension
between HJ and confessional youth organization. If the HJ leader works
exclusively according to the instructions given to him and only cares
for the ideological (that is to say the physical, mental and moral)
education of the youth in his charge in Adolf Hitler’s sense and the
priest just as exclusively for the religious, moral education within
direction of the church and is nothing but a German servant of God, all
prerequisites of a peaceful and confident work are given.
For the solution of the catholic youth question in Germany there is
but one way, which is agreeable to both parties; The Catholic youth
organization restricts itself to the spiritual realm and gives up the
expensive and unnecessary administration and leadership apparatus
of the general presidents and secretaries [General praesidenten
und sekretaere]. If the priest of every locality cares spiritually
for the youth as part of his community, the church has sufficient
occasion to exercise its religious education. The thought, to appoint
Protestant and Catholic so called field chaplains or HJ chaplain
is against our comradeship and therefore cannot be accepted. If a
celebration of the National Socialist youth is held by a catholic and
protestant clergyman, every boy and every girl feels the difference
of the confession as a wall between them. Where a short while ago two
young Germans marched shoulder to shoulder goes then a Catholic and a
Protestant and with them the sorrow of the German history.
Unity and community then becomes disunity and cleavage. Then the two
millions of the great war would really have died in vain and so would
the dead of the Feldherrnhalle [p. 47]. And those twenty one who as
pioneers of the new unity were hunted to death by the Marxists and
“Zentrum” leaders won’t belong to us any more.
But we are spirit of their spirit. The idea for which they died is also
the idea of our life. Their fight is our destiny [pp. 64-65].
Self-leadership of youth is not to be understood from the bureaucratic
point of view that every one at the age of 30 must resign from
leadership. The principle: “Youth must be led by youth” is to be
understood according to its meaning and not literally. Therefore, I
principally do not apply any age limit. All set patterns are deadening.
Germany is the country of the youth movement. Youth movement and youth
self-leadership of youth are inseparable. It is not the purpose of the
youth movement to give to young people a possibility to satisfy any
power instincts. On the contrary, youth leadership means to be more
severe with oneself than with the following. The HJ is a school for
leaders. A leader in the true sense of the word is always the creative,
the disciplined one.
Therefore, the way to leadership shall be made difficult for a boy.
If he is destined for it he will overcome the difficulties. But never
shall there be another key to the gate of leadership than achievement.
It is a matter of indifference who holds the key, the son of a worker,
the son of a peasant or the son of a scientist. Only one thing is
decisive: He must be of the aristocracy of achievement, of the only
aristocracy which is known to the new youth [pp. 68-69].
A single will leads the HJ. The power of authority of the HJ leaders,
that of the smallest as well as of the largest unit is absolute,
i.e., he has the unlimited right to give orders because he bears the
unlimited responsibility. He knows that the responsibility of the
higher one comes before that of the lower ones. Therefore, he submits
silently to the instructions of his leaders even if they are directed
against him personally. To him as well as to all young Germany the
history of the HJ is proof of the fact that a youth community also
can only be successful if it unconditionally recognized the authority
of leadership. The success of National Socialism is a success of
discipline. The structure of National Socialist Youth is built on the
foundation of discipline and obedience. The teachings of the time of
persecution apply even more to the period of victory and power. The
small boy [Jungvolkjunge] who joins the movement of Adolf Hitler at the
age of ten learns to subordinate his own little will to the laws which,
strictly followed, are building states and making nations happy but
which, when violated, result in the loss of freedom, in the collapse of
folkdom. In the course of the following years he learns that discipline
and subordination are not inventions of despotism that they have not
been created by a few with a lust for power in order to secure their
personal positions but that they are the prerequisites for the life of
the nation and thereby for his own life.
The great value of the organization for the youth lies in the
following. In the circle of boys of his own age he gains, partly while
playing, a knowledge which must be employed, especially to the life of
the adult. And while he is being trained for discipline in a manner
corresponding to his emotional life and his capacity to learn, he will
see that his blind obedience affords the possibility of success to his
group [Gefogschaft]. What is acquired in young years in the struggle
with small tasks later serves the state in its big tasks.
Chapter 4
Work Abroad [pp. 154-162]
The Reich Youth leadership does not pursue foreign politics.
The Fuehrer created the Office of Foreign Affairs for the foreign
activities of the National Socialism. What is done within the Foreign
Department of the Reich Youth leadership never means an overcrossing of
Party offices and State offices. The HJ deals with the youth and not
with big politics. And even where the youth contacts the youth of other
nations to exchange young people for study trips or camps, contact is
made outside the political sphere. It is the purely human agreement
of youth among themselves which in this way the Reich Youth leadership
attempts to achieve.
During the last year the most important meetings between German and
foreign youth were:
The visit of the HJ in Hungary.
The counter visit of the Levente youth in Germany.
The German-English Youth Camp near Hamburg.
The trip of Department Leader Nabersberg to England and Turkey.
A lecture of Karl Nabersberg in Paris on the occasion of a meeting of
the “Sohlbergkreis”.
The visit of a Finnish Study Group [Studiengesellschaft].
Also on the occasion of the visits of foreign youth leaders (i.e.
Greek, Chinese and Japanese) to the Reich Youth leadership, contacts
were made with foreign youth organizations.
Every nation has the interest that its youth has a political outlook
reaching as far as possible. Especially the National Socialist Germany
is strongly interested that her youth knows and respects other nations
as early as possible. The better the youth of Europe understands
each other, the nicer for the future. A basic principle of the youth
exchange is: no propaganda. Hitler boys who go abroad do not travel
as propagandists of National Socialism; their task is not to teach,
but to learn. They should see the beauty of the foreign landscape and
explore the national characteristic of the host-country. I believe
in a cooperation of the European youth at the basis of an agreement;
its only program point should be: to know each other. It would be an
utopian idea to believe that such a cooperation would improve the
world. Probably the world would not improve but the people could become
juster. In this connection we welcome the international exchange of
pupils and only desire that it might be extended beyond the circle of
pupils to the youth of all professions. The activity of the Foreign
Department of the Reich Youth leadership is not only concerned with
the relationship of the HJ to the youth of other nations, although
this field is most clearly in evidence. It cares, in close cooperation
with the League for Germandom Abroad [Volksbund fur das Deutschtum im
Ausland], for the youth of the German settlements abroad, in Europe and
South America, and awakens in the Reich German Youth the understanding
for the brothers and sisters abroad.
In a special main branch, the Central Office for Volksdeutsche Youth
Work [Mittelstelle fuer Volksdeutsche Jugendarbeit], which took over
the main tasks of the Central Office of German Youth in Europe, which
in 1933 was attached to the organization of the Reich Youth leadership,
the following fields are being worked on:
1. Borderland trips and trips abroad of the entire German youth.
2. “Volksdeutscher” labor service.
3. Schooling in the Reich of German youths living abroad.
The borderland trips and trips abroad offer the possibility to give the
young Germans abroad the contact with the new Germany by Reich German
Youth hiking groups in form of performances (folk songs, folk dances
and plays performed by laymen). At the same time, a selection by these
youth hiking groups should be made in the German settlements abroad
among those who appear suitable as youth leaders and therefore are to
be called to the Reich for schooling.
All borderland trips and trips abroad of youth hiking groups and
individual youth hikers have to be authorized by the hike office of the
central office. Thereby the hikes of the “wild hikers” should finally
be prevented which were not always to the good of the German reputation
abroad. On the other side the hikes should be arranged according to a
certain plan, so that they can be directed into certain sections where
a visit seems really appropriate.
A special task of the central office is the so-called Volksdeutsche
Labor Service which has the task of a systematic schooling of German
Youth leaders living abroad. In four specially suited labor camps the
sense of the labor service is clearly demonstrated to the Germans
living abroad by special schooling methods, in order that they can
apply what they learned in their home organization.
Another branch of the Foreign Department has the task to combine the
Reich German boys and girls inasmuch as is possible in youth groups in
which National Socialist ideas are conveyed to them. To this effect
the groups receive books and youth literature free of charge and
especially such which establish the spiritual contact with the Reich
German HJ. The work program provides the establishment of schooling
camps of several weeks duration for German youths from abroad who above
all should convey to the future leaders the experience of the present
fatherland. Through our own press service, the Foreign Department tries
to protect the rights of the German youth abroad in the Reich German
Press. The daily appearing press service “Space of the East” [Ostraum]
brings short news about the movement of the German youth organizations
abroad and the German school abroad for Lithuania, Letland, Esthonia,
Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Rumania, and Yugoslavia. Another
paper “The School Review for Germans Abroad” [Die Auslandsdeutsche
Schulschaù] is delivered to a great number of German schools of higher
learning. Furthermore the branch participates in the youth periodicals
published by the Reich Youth leadership or in cooperation with it, and
furnishes the German daily newspapers with articles of a principle
nature about questions of the youth abroad, as well as the German
newspapers abroad with news from the Reich and the German groups beyond
the frontier. The branch “Press” in the Foreign Department is thereby
the rallying point for the news on the movement of the German Youth
abroad and the schools in the Reich for the Germans abroad.
The branch “School” of the Foreign Department is of special importance.
Its task is essentially to communicate to the HJ sufficient knowledge
about the Germandom of the borders abroad and of foreign politics.
To carry through the schooling in the units, borderland and foreign
lecturers were appointed who on central instruction of the chief
lecturer had to carry out the schooling in the individual units. The
first instruction week for lecturers abroad on a systematic execution
of the training program, was held from 4 to 10 December 1933 in
Potsdam. The training program uses the following aides:
1. A regularly appearing schooling-letter with a publication of 65,000
2. Literature on the subject in general which is distributed to the
lecturers abroad
3. The periodical “People and Reich”
4. Contributions in newspapers and periodicals
The training of the co-workers staff is to be extended by a number
of additional training weeks and by supply of training material and
establishment of competent libraries in the Oberbanne. Furthermore,
special attention for the localities less than 100 km from the frontier
is intended.
The colonial branch keeps awake the memory of the cultural, scientific,
economic and military achievements in the former German colonial
territory within the organizations under the order of the Reich Youth
leadership. Beyond this, the German youth shall be informed about the
importance of colonial possession for the supply of the home economy
with colonial products and raw materials. It will be taken into
consideration concerning this schooling that the guiding line of the
German population policy which aims at the utilization of the space
in the East will not be violated. In the historical schooling the
“colonial-guilt-lie” and the thereby intended defamation of the German
people--also in regard before the colored nations--will be emphasized
and it will be pointed out that equal terms for the German people are
only obtained when these parts of the Versailles shame dictate are also
rectified.
Special colonial lecturers who are assigned to the headquarters of
the HJ and BDM down to the Bann and Unterbann will attend to the
carrying out of these tasks. These lecturers also will be prepared for
the solution of their tasks in courses in the Reich Leader School in
Potsdam and within the districts and subdistricts. The literature at
present on hand about colonial questions which, however, is only for
limited use for the schooling within the HJ since it was written under
different political conditions, will be put at the disposal as work
material. New material, in accordance with timely requirements, is in
preparation and will serve in the future as basis for all work. The
youth should be informed every three months by a “schooling-letter”
about everything worth while in the field of the colonial question
which should come down to the sub-leaders of the whole HJ and BDM. In
this direction, friendly cooperation with the biggest society, the
German Colonial Society, takes place; material is exchanged. As much as
the promised shipping space is available, members of the HJ (colonial
lecturers) should be sent to the former German colonial territories so
that they can learn at the spot the present-day conditions and give the
Germans there a sign of our attachment. Supported by what they have
seen and lived, they should after their return work here to enlighten
the HJ in the country.
It would lead us astray to go into the details of the activities of
the Foreign Department. Generalobergebietsfuehrer Karl Nabersberg
devoted much energy to these duties and gave up even the leadership of
the staff of the Reich Youth leadership with which he was charged for
a time in favor of this task which had his particular interest. The
thought that every Hitler boy and every BDM girl regardless in which
part of the world they are, form a great comradeship and march together
in spite of local separation in one direction and live and work in the
same spirit was realized by the Foreign Department of the Reich Youth
leadership.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1462-PS
1939 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 709
First execution order to the law for the HITLER YOUTH (General
Regulation) of 25 March 1939
Based on Article 4 of the law for the Hitler Youth of 1 December 1936
(Reichsgesetzblatt I, page 993), I Order:
Article 1
1. The youth leader of the German Reich is solely competent for all
missions of the physical, ideological and moral education of the entire
German youth of the Reich area outside of the house of the parents and
the school. The competence of the Reichminister for science, education
and public orientation remains unaffected as far as private education
and social education are concerned.
2. The following problems are transferred from the sphere of action
of the Reich and Prussian Minister for science, education and public
orientation to the sphere of action of the youth leader of the German
Reich:
All affairs of youth care, the youth hostel system as well as of the
accident and liability insurance in the interest of youth care.
The question of competence for the year’s service on farms [LandJahr]
is left to a special regulation.
3. The youth leader of the German Reich with the Hitler youth is
subordinated to the Financial authority of the NSDAP.
Article 2
1. The Cadre Hitler Youth [Stamm HJ] exists within the Hitler Youth.
2. Whoever was a member of the Hitler Youth since 20 April 1938, is a
member of the Cadre Hitler Youth.
3. Juveniles, who have had at least one year of good conduct in the
Hitler Youth, and fulfill the conditions of ancestry for the acceptance
into the NSDAP, may be accepted into the Cadre Hitler Youth. More
specific regulations will be issued by the Reich Youth leader of the
NSDAP in agreement with the Fuehrer’s deputy.
4. The acceptance into the Cadre Hitler Youth of persons over 18 years
of age, who are to be used in the leadership and administration of the
Hitler Youth, can take place immediately.
5. Only the Cadre Hitler Youth is an affiliate of the NSDAP.
6. Membership in the Cadre Hitler Youth is voluntary.
Article 3
The Reichminister of the Interior will appoint the national agencies,
subordinated to the youth leader of the German Reich, in agreement with
Fuehrer’s deputy and the Reichminister of Finance.
Article 4
The members of the Hitler Youth are entitled, and are obliged, if
ordered, to wear the prescribed uniform.
Berlin, 25 March 1939
The Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor
Adolf Hitler
The Deputy of the Fuehrer
R. Hess
The Reichsminister and Chief of Reich Chancellery
Dr. Lammers
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1463-PS
Diary of the Navy 1944
The Commander in Chief of the German Navy, Admiral Doenitz.
“This war is a naval war and it will be decided on the High
Seas.”--Admiral Doenitz.
Admiral Karl Doenitz was born in Berlin-Gruenau on 16 September 1891,
the son of an Engineer. He attended school in Berlin, Jena and Weimar.
He entered the Imperial German Navy as a cadet on 1 April 1910 and
was promoted to Lieutenant on 27 September 1913. As an ensign he was
ordered to the light cruiser “Breslau”. There he witnessed the outbreak
of the first world war when he was in the Mediterranean sea. His
experiences while on this cruiser which later became the “Midilli” of
the Turkish Navy he described in a little book published during the
last war while he was a lieutenant (jg). The title of the book was
“The cruises of the ‘Breslau’ in the Black Sea”. Doenitz who served
as watch officer and adjutant received the Iron Cross 2nd class on 7
January 1915. For a time he was air observer near the Dardanelles and
subsequently in charge of a naval aviation squadron near San Stefano.
On 5 May 1916 he received the Iron Cross first class and in the fall of
that year returned to Germany.
For a long time it had been the young officer’s burning desire to
become an officer on a submarine. This wish of the young lieutenant
(jg) was fulfilled when he was ordered to submarine school 2
December 1916. This proved decisive in the life of this officer
who indefatigably worked for the development of his weapon. Doenitz
became at first watch officer on the Submarine “U-39” whose commanding
officer, Lt (sg) Forstmann was one of the most successful submarine
officers of the last war. Inspired with great daring, Forstmann was an
officer who knew how to train aggressive and responsible commanders.
Doenitz always remembers with special gratitude the decisive influence
of his former teacher. After an artillery course Doenitz on 1 March
1918 became Commander of “UC-25” and later “UB-68”. With these boats he
carried on successful warfare against merchant shipping in the Atlantic
and the Mediterranean.
Lt. (jg) Doenitz placed himself at the disposal of the German Navy,
dishonorably mutilated by the Versailles dictate, and aided in its
reconstruction. He became a staff officer; he took over, during the
attempted coup d’etat of Kaff, the command of the torpedo boat V5
which was usable but without a commander. For three years then he was
commander of a torpedo boat, and became afterwards officer in charge
of torpedo inspection and for another three years filled a responsible
position with the Naval High Command. After one year’s sea duty as
navigation officer on the light cruiser “Nymphe” Doenitz became chief
of the first squadron of Torpedo boats newly built for the German Navy.
In the fall of 1928 Doenitz was promoted to lieutenant commander.
While Doenitz already earlier was making plans for the reconstruction
of the German U-boat fleet his new position for the first time, gave
him the opportunity to put down his experiences and suggestions in
the form of memoranda written for his superiors and other influential
personalities. During this time, the organizational plans and other
prerequisites were already formulated which made possible the
subsequent rapid construction of new German U-boats. This was followed
by another period during which he attended service schools and
undertook sea duty. On one of his trips he went to India for several
months. In 1934, he became Commanding officer of the Light cruiser
“Emden” which at that time undertook a cruise in the Indian Ocean.
When in 1935 Doenitz returned from this trip the Commander in Chief of
the German Navy during a tour of inspection in Wilhelmshaven told him
to his surprise that he was appointed Chief of the “Weddigen” U-boat
flotilla. From this date, 27 September 1935, started the ceaseless
construction of the new U-boats. At first two 250-ton boats were
built. Doenitz lately promoted to Commander, devoted himself to his
new duties with passionate zeal and after untiring day and night work
he was able in a very short time to present an extensive plan for the
reorganization of U-boat warfare. Again Doenitz donned his working
clothes to drill and train his young officers, personally and with
pitiless pace. He succeeded in closing a gap of 17 years, during which
no training took place, with a few months of tireless work. Day after
day, night after night, week after week he stood on the bridge of one
of his U-boats indoctrinating the men in his charge, by hard thorough
training, with the spirit of the men who manned the submarines during
World War I. At the same time he collected new technical experience
and new improvements in the development of different submarine types.
Doenitz knew no let-down for himself. Regardless of weather, season or
time of day he went with the boats, instructed and trained their crews,
and led them through thousands of miles in the Baltic and North Sea * *
*
One must recall, that after World War I a skillfully directed British
propaganda campaign created a world-wide general impression that the
submarine as a naval weapon was a thing of the past since superior
defensive measures had been instituted, namely the convoy system, and
that in future naval engagements, submarines would be of only secondary
importance. Commander Doenitz’ opinion was diametrically opposite; “The
massing of boats in convoy must be answered by massing of U-boats to
attack the convoy.” This maxim became the basis of his whole training
program. The wolf pack tactics which later became so famous were
originated and tested at a time of complete peace. The cruises in the
Baltic and North Sea were followed by the first Atlantic maneuvers *
* * Doenitz surrendered personal command over the U-Boat only after
the number of flotillas increased, in order to devote himself to
higher tasks of leadership. After the outbreak of the war, about 4
years after the first U-boats were commissioned, the new weapon was in
excellent condition and carried the stamp of a personality which was
our ideal combination between commander and front-line officer. Doenitz
on 28 January 1939 was promoted Commodore of U-boats and entered the
war with but 40 of his elite boats. They attacked immediately within
the first day. And at once this new weapon was a brilliant success.
On 18 September 1939, Doenitz received a cluster to the Iron Cross
1st class, for his success in the Baltic during the Polish campaign.
When the position of “leader of U-boats” was changed into that of
“Commander” Doenitz was promoted to Rear Admiral on 1 October 1939.
* * * Prien went to Scapa Flow. There was a fighter. He knew it and
said over and over: “I was only the paw of the Big Lion. What I did,
I could do because I was his disciple.” All the “old guard” thought
the same way and so did the commanding officers who returned to their
bases with flags of victory flying. The crew likewise was inspired by
the old man. With unparalleled enthusiasm and matter of factness, they
undertook every dangerous mission against the life-line of the enemy
who controlled the sea, a control which they undermined, and brought
again the terror of the U-boats to the Seven Seas to the surprise of
the whole world. In an endless chain, the U-boat Commanders reported
success after success to their chief. In spite of the fact that his
duties took on unmeasurable proportions since the beginning of the
huge U-boat construction program the Chief was what he always was and
always will be, leader and inspiration to all the forces under him.
A clear regard for the essential and the decisive, power to act and
aggressiveness are his main characteristics. In spite of all his duties
he never lost touch with his men and he showed a masterly understanding
in adjusting himself to the changing fortunes of war.
Doenitz was in charge of the Naval operations Command Post situated on
land. It is one of the strange and difficult characteristics of this
form of Naval warfare that the Commander cannot be with his men, cannot
make decisions on the spot but is forced to study the situation and
give orders thousands of miles away from the actual location. The very
strong ties between Doenitz and his men proved themselves in this case.
They never felt, and that was said many times in mess halls and on
enemy missions, that they had to make any of their difficult decisions
alone. Tiny, brief answers following rendered radio reports proved that
the Chief day and night was monitoring painstakingly their reports just
as if he was with them, as if he stood on the bridge beside them * * *
On 21 April 1940 Doenitz received the Knight’s Cross to the Iron Cross,
a reward of the Fuehrer, which put the unique accomplishments of this
battle-tested officer in its true light. On September 1940, he was
promoted to Vice Admiral, a year and a half later on 14 March 1942
he was promoted to Admiral, a reward for the heavy damages inflicted
on the new enemy, the U.S.A. On 30 January 1943 Doenitz received the
Supreme Command of the Germany Navy from the Fuehrer and concurrently
was promoted to Gross Admiral.
For the huge successes of the U-boats Doenitz received on 7 April
1943 in recognition of his unique achievements in U-boat warfare from
the Fuehrer personally as the 223rd Soldier of the Wehrmacht, the Oak
Wreath to the Knights Cross of the Iron Cross.
Even though the field of activity of the C in C of the German Navy has
experienced a tremendous extent on his personal leadership in U-boat
warfare and the personal care for his submarines, sailors, and for all
units of the German Navy will also in the future remain the supreme law
of all his action. Confidence merits confidence. The navy of Greater
Germany will prove that it is worthy of its C in C.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1472-PS
[CABLE]
Date 16 December 1942
URGENT--SECRET
TEXT:
In accordance with the increased recruitment of manpower into the
concentration camps, which was ordered by 30 January 1943, the
following may be applied in the Jewish sector.
1. Total amount: 45,000 Jews.
2. Start of transportation 11 January 1943.
3. Completion of transportation 31 January 1943.
The Reichsbahn [German State owned railway] cannot make available
special trains for the evacuation during the period 15 December 1942/10
January 1943 on account of the increased leave traffic of the Armed
Forces.
4. Breakdown: The 45,000 Jews consist of 30,000 Jews from the
Bialystock district, 10,000 Jews from the Theresienstadt Ghetto. Among
those are 5,000 able-bodied Jews who, so far, have been utilized in
the Ghetto for necessary minor jobs, and 5,000 Jews who are generally
incapacitated; also Jews over sixty years of age, in order to reduce
in the interest of the extension of the Ghetto the excessive number
of inmates to slightly below 48,000. I request special permission for
this. As heretofore, only the Jews who have no special connections and
relations, and who have no important decorations, have been earmarked
for deportation; 3,000 Jews from the occupied areas in the Netherlands,
2,000 Jews from Berlin which equals 45,000. In the total of 45,000
are included physically handicapped [underlined] and others (old Jews
and children). In making a distribution for this purpose, at least
10,000 to 15,000 laborers [underlined], will be available when the Jews
arriving at Auschwitz are assigned.
The Chief of the security police and the SD
Dept. IV, Div. B, Sec. 4, a-2093/42 g (391)
By Order of MUELLER
SS Gruppenfuehrer
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1481-PS
3.2.28 [in pencil], Fi 6/25 1.
Secret State Police
Munich State Police District Office
B. No. 52401/37 11 B.
Munich, 20 January, 1938.
Decree
By virtue of par. 1 of the Reich President’s order for the protection
of people and state of the 28.2.33 (RGBl 1 p. 83) the following decree
is issued:
The Guild of the Virgin Mary [die Marianische Jungfrauenkongregation]
of the Bavarian diocese, including the diocese of Speyer, together
with its branches and associations and the Societies of Our Lady
[Jungfrauenvereinen] attached to it, is by police order to be dissolved
and forbidden with immediate effect.
The property belonging to the dissolved Guild is to be confiscated by
the police. Not only is property in cash to be confiscated, but also
any stock on hand and other objects of value. All further activity is
forbidden the dissolved Guilds, particularly the foundation of any
organization intended as a successor or as a cover. Incorporation
as a body into other women’s societies is also to be looked on as a
forbidden continuation of activity. Infringement against the above
prohibition will be punished according to para. 4 of the order of
28.2.1933.
Reasons
In a parish in Nurnberg the Guild of the Virgin Mary, going outside
the sphere of the work proper to it, has occupied itself for years,
to a most far reaching degree, with arrangements of a worldly and
popular sporting character. Furthermore the president of the society
has continuously supplied the Guild of the Virgin Mary, from its
committee-members down to the women in charge of its groups, with
seditious material, which served for seditious discussions. Furthermore
the Guild of the Virgin Mary, particularly its leading circles, were
trained and mobilized for purely political and seditious tasks.
The whole behaviour of the Guild of the Virgin Mary had therefore to
be objected to from various points of view. It could be repeatedly
observed that the Guild engaged in purely worldly affairs, such as
community games, and then in the holding of “Social Evenings”.
This proves incontestably that the Guild of the Virgin Mary was active
to a very great degree in a manner unecclesiastical and therefore
worldly. By so doing it has left the sphere of its proper religious
task and entered a sphere of activity to which it has no statutory
right. The organization has therefore to be dissolved and forbidden.
Signed. Beutel.
certified copy--[signature illegible]
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1482-PS
Berlin, 20 July 1935
The Reich and Prussian Minister of the Interior
III P 3701/5
Secret
Special Delivery Letter!
[Stamp]
The Reich Governor in Bavaria 22 July 1935--one enclosure
Sign: Fi 6 July 22
[apparently signature, illegible]
SUBJECT: Confessional youth organizations.
A direct endangering of public security and order has resulted from
the recently observed intensive activity of confessional, particularly
Catholic youth organizations, which have in numerous cases considerably
overstepped the limits imposed on them by political development and
therefore in many places led to clashes with the organizations which
stand behind the government, particularly the Hitler youth.
I therefore respectfully request that, on the basis of paragraph 1 of
the decree of 28 February 1933, the confessional youth organizations
be forbidden to wear uniforms or uniform-like clothing and to assemble
publicly with pennants and flags and that the wearing of insignia and
the wearing of uniform costume as a substitute for uniforms as well as
any outdoor sport activity be prohibited.
I respectfully request that I be immediately informed of your
disposition (of the matter).
Signed: Dr. FRICK
certified: [signature illegible]
Ministerial Chancellery Secretary
[stamp] settled 1 August
To the provincial governments (for Prussia: to the deputy chief and
inspector of the Prussian secret state police)
Munich M [signature illegible]
Copies
To Reich Minister Kerrl, Reich Minister for Science, Education,
and Public Training, and the Reich governors with a request for
cognizance.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1498-PS
The Reich and Prussian Minister of the Interior, VI 7770/3014
Berlin NW 40, Koenigsplatz 6, 6 Nov. 1934
[telephone numbers, cable address]
[Stamp]
Reich Governor of Bavaria 7 Nov 1934----enclosures
GG 1/7 .m.
SPECIAL DELIVERY LETTER
To the State Governments for Prussia:
_a._ The Prime Minister--office of Secret State Police.
_b._ The Minister of Science, Art and Public Education.
_c._ The provincial Presidents and District Presidents.
_For Information_
To The State Secretary and Head of the Praesidium Chancellery.
The State Secretary and Head of the Reich Chancellery.
The Minister of Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda.
Reich Governors (of the States).
Executive Board of the NSDAP, Division for the Cultural peace in
Berlin.
The Reich Bishop in _Berlin-Charlottenburg_.
Subject: Evangelical Church Controversy.
Lately there is an increase in cases in which ill-timed reports
regarding the Evangelical Church reach the public. I therefore
forbid--till further notice--all publications in the daily newspapers,
in pamphlets or handbills, which are concerned with questions of
the Evangelical Church, except only official announcements of the
Church Government of the Reich. My edicts of 17 August 1934--III
3033/3014--and of 1 November 1934--III 7570/3014--are to that extent
abrogated.
[signed] FRICK
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1514-PS
Command of Mil. District VI
Dept. of Prisoners of War V Az. K 3 Nr. 1417/44 secret.
Soest, Westphalia, 27 July 1944
Phone: 1455/140.
SECRET
Reference: 1. OKW Az. 2f 24. 19b Chief of PW/general (Id) Nr. 1998/44
secret of 16.7.44
2. OKW Az. 2f 24. 19b AWA/PW general I (VIb) Nr. 2339/42
secret of 27.8.42
3. Mil. District VI, dept PW’s Az. K 8/a Nr. 751/42 secret
of 4.9.42
4. Mil. District VI, dept PW’s V Az. K 18/VI Nr. 1948/44 of
11.7.44
5. OKW Az. 2f 24. 11 Chief of PW/general (VIa) Nr. 979/43
secret of 19.4.43--reported by decree Mil. District VI,
dept PW’s Nr. 1015/43 secret.
6. Mil. District VI, dept PW’s Az. K 8 R Nr. 314/42 secret
of 7.4.42
7. Mil. District VI, dept PW’s V, Az. K 11 Nr. 1125/44
secret of 11.7.44
Subject: Delivery of prisoners of war to the secret state police.
Enclosed is the decree I referred to.
The following, summarizing ruling is issued with respect to the
delivery to the secret state police:
1. _a._ According to the decrees 2 and 3, the commander of the camp
has to deliver Soviet prisoners of war in case of punishable offenses
to the secret state police and to dismiss them from imprisonment of
war, if he does not believe that his disciplinary functions suffice to
prescribe punishment for violations committed. Report of the facts is
not necessary.
_b._ Recaptured Soviet prisoners of war have to be delivered first to
the nearest police office in order to ascertain whether punishable
offenses have been committed during the escape. The dismissal from
imprisonment of war takes place upon suggestion of the police
office, Section A 6 of the decree referred to in No. 4 regarding the
contraction of all regulations on the Arbeitseinsatz prisoners of war
who have been recaptured and refuse to work.
_c._ Recaptured Soviet officers who are prisoners of war, have to be
delivered to the _Gestapo_ and to be dismissed from imprisonment of
war. (Section C 1 of the decree referred to under 4 and under 5).
_d._ Soviet officer prisoners of war, who refuse to work and those who
distinguish themselves as agitators and have an unfavorable influence
upon the willingness to work of the other prisoners of war have to be
delivered by the responsible Stalag to the nearest state police office
and to be dismissed from imprisonment of war. (Section C 1 of the
decree referred to under 4 and 5).
_e._ Soviet enlisted prisoners of war, refusing to work who are
ringleaders and those who distinguish themselves as agitators and
therefore have an unfavorable influence upon the willingness to work of
the other prisoners of war, have to be delivered to the nearest state
police office and to be dismissed from imprisonment of war. (Section C
2 of the decree, referred to in 4).
_f._ Soviet prisoners of war (enlisted men and officers), who with
respect to their political attitude have been sifted out by the
special purpose command [Einsatzkommando] of the security police and
the security service, have to be delivered upon request by the camp
commander to the special purpose command and to be dismissed from
imprisonment of war. (Decree referred to in 6).
_g._ Polish prisoners of war have to be delivered if acts of sabotage
are proven, to the nearest state police office and to be dismissed from
imprisonment of war. The decision rests with the camp commander. Report
of the deed is not necessary. (Decree referred to under 7).
2. A report on the delivery and dismissal from imprisonment of war
in the cases mentioned under #1 of this decree, to the Mil. District
Command VI, dept of prisoners of war, is not necessary.
3. Prisoners of war from all nations have to be delivered to the secret
state police and to be dismissed from imprisonment of war, if a special
order of the OKW or of the Mil. District Command VI, department for
Prisoners of War, is issued.
4. Prisoners of war under suspicion of participating in illegal
organizations and resistance movements have to be left upon request to
the Gestapo for the purpose of interrogation. They remain prisoners of
war and have to be treated as such. The delivery to the Gestapo and
their dismissal from imprisonment of war has to take place only by
order of the OKW or of the Mil. District Command VI, dept of prisoners
of war.
In case of French and Belgian prisoners of war and interned Italian
military personnel, approval of Mil. District command VI, dept. of
prisoners of war, has to be obtained--if necessary by phone--before
delivery to the Gestapo for the purposes of interrogation.
By order of the Mil. District Commander
The commander of prisoners of war
The deputy
[signed] FLEMM
1 enclosure.
Distribution:
Oflag VI/A, B, C, D.6,
Stalag VI/A, C, D, F, G, J.326 (VI/K)
Construction work battalion of PW (BAB) 6, 7, 12, 17, 18, 26, 35, 39,
45, 46, 106.
PW Roof repair battalion VI, XVI
PW Glass installation Battalion VI, XVI
District commander rear area of PW/Z.V. Staff/Counter intelligence
officer
file 5
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1517-PS
TOP SECRET
MEMORANDUM
About Discussions [of Rosenberg] with the Fuehrer on 14 December 1941
To begin with, I [Rosenberg] asked the Fuehrer about my speech in the
Sportpalast and referred to several points which seemed to call for
further discussion. The Fuehrer was of the opinion that the speech was
given prior to the declaration of war by Japan and therefore under
different suppositions, but in view of this, still desires to think
over several points. It probably would not be appropriate if I were
to officially say that the provinces in the East were to remain under
Germany. I said thereupon that I, too, had considered this point, that
one can probably only say that the Eastern Provinces [Ostland] will
remain under German protection. The Fuehrer was of the opinion, only to
go so far that the provinces never would come under communism and now
from the German side appear as secured.
I remarked on the Jewish question that the comments about the New York
Jews must perhaps be changed somewhat after the conclusion (of matters
in the East). I took the standpoint, not to speak of the extermination
[Ausrottung] of the Jews. The Fuehrer affirmed this and said that they
had burdened the war upon us and that they had brought the destruction;
it is no wonder if the results would strike them first.
The Fuehrer further said that he did not deem it necessary to order
forth the other nations to contribute as yet, since they can produce
therein a legal claim for later. He does that from time to time in
single negotiations. I told him that I, too, had written that down
as a question. I would comply with these instructions to edit more
carefully the corresponding paragraphs in my speech. The Fuehrer agreed
throughout that I had touched upon the Asiatic conflict.
Following, I laid before the Fuehrer the outline of a religious
tolerance decree, to which the Fuehrer consented after careful
consideration.
Then I came to talk about the lecture of Professor Schuessler, to
whom Dr. Dietrich had given instructions to evaluate the political
testament of Peter the Great in an address. Dr. Dietrich had not
previously informed me thereon. Upon my indication that this testament
is a forgery out of the 18th Century, the Fuehrer thought that the
authenticity was contradicted by a German scholar in the 19th Century.
Thereupon I pointed out that this so-called testament was written in
Polish circles and that it then was converted and changed by Napoleon
in the political strife. However, I would make an accurate check. I
asked the Fuehrer for a general rule that if the Fuehrer had specific
desires over the press to have Dr. Dietrich inform me of these to
insure a regulated working arrangement.
The Fuehrer replied to the question by the military commanders in the
occupied Eastern territories about the marriage of persons belonging
to the Armed Forces with inhabitants of these territories that no
marriages will be permitted during this war. After the war a relaxation
could be introduced to agree with the political limits and blood
relationship.
I then spoke about the relation with Reich Commissioner Koch and told
the Fuehrer that Koch had, through various declarations, created the
impression among the officers of the High Command of the Armed Forces
(OKW) as if he dealt directly with the Fuehrer and otherwise decided
to rule without Berlin. Similar utterances that he made the law were
made to collaborators and he also told me once that he regarded himself
as coordinated. I made it clear to him that here exists a distinct
official relation. I spoke with him regarding the above and I hope that
clarification over the cooperation will result. I have only the wish
that the Fuehrer no longer will receive Koch alone but only in my
presence. The Fuehrer agreed immediately.
Then I told the Fuehrer of the visit by General Kitzinger, who said
that he was assigned with the thrashing of the harvest. For this
purpose he was promised several divisions which have not yet arrived.
Moreover, they took from him other units. The Fuehrer said that he
would see to it that a change will be enforced and that divisions will
be given him. On the conditions of the captured prisoners Kitzinger
remarked that because of malnutrition [Entkraeftung] in the camps in
his territory, some 2500 prisoners die daily. Anyhow, they are already
unable to consume good food and one must count on it that not very many
will remain. Aside from that, the manpower in the country is large
enough--the land even partly over-populated.
I further asked the Fuehrer if he had scrutinized the memoir on the
establishment of Turkish legions. What I surmise, since the High
Command of the Armed Forces (OKW) issued an order, is that beside the
Turkish-Aserbeidschander Legion, other Caucasian legions will be set
up also. The Fuehrer affirmed the question, and I once more referred
to the danger of a Panturanian movement. I reported further about the
petition of the Crimean tartars from Constantinople and the request
to visit the prison camps and to inspect the countrymen. I told the
Fuehrer that I had denied this request which he absolutely affirmed.
The only thing one could do would be to segregate the 250 captured
Crimean tartars with respect to Turkey, and to handle them accordingly.
In conclusion, the Fuehrer once more emphasized that he later wished
to have the Crimea cleaned out. I told him that I, too, had given
much consideration to the renaming of the towns and thought to rename
Simferopol to Gotenburg and Sevastopol to Theodorichhafen--this
according to the instructions of the Fuehrer himself.
Then I suggested a boundary settlement between Nikolajew and
Transnistry to the Fuehrer, because the way things are, the Rumanians
can look into all the shipbuilding installations; just an insignificant
regulation will prevent this. I had also made this suggestion to
General Field Marshal Keitel. The Fuehrer looked at the map and agreed
to such a boundary regulation.
Finally, I told the Fuehrer that I had in mind to go to Riga in January
and to visit other territories during the next year. I begged the
Fuehrer to allow me to obtain several coaches for a special train. I
have already started dealings over the procurement of such coaches in
Holland. The Fuehrer thought this all right and agreed with my wish.
Thereupon I gave the Fuehrer an aforementioned letter of a Japanese
scholar over the Japanese and National Socialistic Philosophy of Life
as related to Christianity, over which we talked for a long time. The
Fuehrer took the memoir with him, which immediately engrossed him.
Berlin, 16 December 1941
R/H
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1519-PS
The National Socialist German Workers Party Party Chancellery
Fuehrer Headquarters
30.9.1941
The Director of the Party Chancellery
[Stamp]
Gau Training Office, Franken
No. 2131
Received 8 Oct. 41
Sent
CONFIDENTIAL
Circular No. 21/41 Confidential
(not for publication)
_Subject: Treatment of Soviet Prisoners of War_
For your information please find enclosed a regulation of the Supreme
Command of the Armed Forces, dated 8.9.1941 on the treatment of Soviet
prisoners of War. This regulation is _confidential_!
Heil Hitler!
sgd. Bormann
One appendix overleaf
Certified:
Distribution:
Gauleiters
Kreisleiters
# # # # #
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
Az. 2f 24.11 General Armed Forces Dept./P.W. (I)
No. 3058 41 Confidential
Berlin--Schoeneberg, 8.9.1941
2 Appendices Badenschestrasse 51
CONFIDENTIAL
_Subject_: Regulation for the treatment of Soviet prisoners of war.
_Reference_: 1. OKW/P.W. 26/41 Most Secret dated 16.6.1941 (only for
the P.W. commandants in Service Command I and the
General Government).
2. OKW/P.W. 2144/41 Secret dated 26.6.1941.
3. OKW/P.W. 2401/41 Secret dated 17.7.1941.
4. OKW/P.W. 15 No. 5015/41 dated 2.8.1941
Appended is a collation of and/or additions to the orders already
issued in various directives on the treatment of Soviet prisoners
of war. The directives, already issued by Supreme Command General
Headquarters for the operational areas, have been considered. By this
order any orders on this subject become invalid so long as no direct
reference is made to them in the appendix.
Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
By order of
Reinecke
# # # # #
Appendix to Diary--No. 3058/41
Confidential dated 8.9.1941.
CONFIDENTIAL
Regulation for the treatment of Soviet PWs in all prisoner of war camps.
I. _Treatment of Soviet PWs in general._
_Bolshevism is the deadly enemy of Nazi Germany._ For the first time,
the German soldier is encountering not only a military opponent, but
one, at the same time, steeped in the ideas of Bolshevism so pernicious
to the people. The fight against National-Socialism has become part
of his system. He conducts it by every means in his power: Sabotage,
seditious propaganda, incendiarism, murder. The bolshevist soldier has
therefore lost all claim to treatment as an honourable opponent in
accordance with the Geneva Convention.
It is therefore in keeping with the respect and honour of the German
Armed Forces, that _every German soldier_ should hold himself severely
aloof when dealing with Soviet prisoners of war. Treatment must be
cool but correct. Any indulgence or even friendly disposition is to
be punished very severely. The feeling of pride and superiority of
the German soldier ordered to guard Soviet PWs, must at all times be
visible even in public.
The order for ruthless and energetic action must be given at the
slightest indication of insubordination, especially in the case of
Bolshevic fanatics. Insubordination, active or passive resistance must
_immediately_ be broken completely by force of arms (bayonets, butts
and firearms). The regulations on the use of arms in the Armed Forces
can be applied only to a limited extent as these regulations apply
under the assumption that _conditions will be generally peaceful_. With
Soviet PWs it is already necessary for reasons of discipline, that the
use of arms should be severe. Anyone carrying out an order, who does
not use his weapons or does so with insufficient energy, is punishable.
PWs attempting to escape are to be fired on without previous challenge.
No warning shot must ever be fired. The regulations already made, in
particular H. Dv. 38/11, page 13, etc., are invalid with regard to that
point. On the other hand, no arbitrary action is permitted. PWs who
are obedient and willing to work are to be treated correctly. However,
caution and mistrust must never lapse when dealing with PWs. The use of
arms against PWs is, as a rule, legal.
Any contact between PWs and the civilian population must be prevented.
This applies particularly to the occupied area. The segregation of
higher-ranking PWs (Officers and NCOs), which has already been effected
by the field forces, must be strictly maintained in the area of the
Armed Forces Commanders and within the Reich. Any communication between
higher-ranking personnel and the men, even by signs, must be rendered
impossible.
Camp-police must be formed from suitable Soviet PWs in the camp and in
the larger fatigue details to be employed in carrying out the orders
and upholding the discipline of the commandant. Within the wire fence,
the camp police may be armed with sticks, whips or other similar
weapons to enable them to carry out their duties effectively. The use
of this kind of weapon by _German soldiers_ is absolutely forbidden.
With the offer of better food, treatment and accommodation, an
executive body should be created in the camp; this would decrease the
work of the German guard personnel.
II. _Treatment of members of racial groups._
In accordance with orders issued to date, PWs have already been
divided up, according to their race, in the “Home Organisation”
[heimatorganisation] (General Government and Service Command I) as
well as in the camps within the Reich. The following racial groups are
concerned:
Racial Germans
Ukrainians
White Russians
Poles
Lithuanians
Latvians
Esthonians
Rumanians
Finns
Georgians.
In so far as it has been impossible for special reasons to carry
out this separation, it must now be done at once. This applies, in
particular, to PWs newly captured in the Area of the Armed Forces
Commanders.
Members of the following racial groups must be speedily sent home:
Racial Germans
Ukrainians, White Ruthenians
Latvians
Esthonians
Rumanians
Finns
Lithuanians
Special orders will be issued on the manner in which this release is to
be effected.
Should the attitude of individual members of these racial groups arouse
the suspicion that they could be detrimental or dangerous to the German
people or to National-Socialism, they are to be debarred from release
and will be dealt with in accordance with section III.
III. _Segregation of civilians and politically undesirable PWs taken
during the Eastern campaign._
1. _Intentions._ The Armed Forces must rid themselves of all those
elements among the PWs which must be considered as the driving
forces of bolshevism. The special conditions of the Eastern Campaign
demand _special measures_ which can be carried out on their own
responsibility, free from bureaucratic and administrative influences.
2. _The way to reach the appointed goal._ A. Apart from directing PWs
into camps according to their nationality (see section II) PWs (also
members of racial groups) and any civilians in the camps are to be
divided as follows:
_a._ those politically undesirable
_b._ those politically harmless
_c._ those especially reliable in the political sense (who could be
employed in the reconstruction work in the occupied areas).
B. Whereas the work of separation according to nationality, rank, etc.,
is undertaken by the camp organisation itself, the Reichsfuehrer-SS has
assigned _Special purpose units of the Security Police and the Security
Service_ for the work of classifying PWs according to their political
opinions. They are immediately subordinate to the Chief of the Security
Police and the SD, have received special training for their special
duties and carry out the measures and inquiries, within the framework
of the camp organisation, according to regulations which they have
already received from the Chief of Security Police and the SD.
There must be the closest cooperation between the commandants,
especially their defense officers, and the special purpose units.
3. _Further treatment of groups segregated in accordance with No. 2._
A. _Military personnel._ The special purpose unit of the Security
Police and SD decides what persons are to be segregated as “politically
undesirable elements”. Should individuals, considered as suspicious,
later prove themselves to be _unsuspicious_, they should be sent back
to the camp with the other PWs. Requests made by the special purpose
units for other persons to be handed over, must be complied with.
Officers will very often be liable for segregation as “political
undesirables”. Even soldiers captured in civilian clothes, count as
military personnel.
B. _Civilians._ If they are harmless, efforts must be made to send them
back quickly to the occupied area. The competent Armed Forces Commander
(and/or the commander in the army area to the rear) decides the time
this is to be brought about, with the approval of the competent office
of the Chief of the Security Police and SD. The condition for this
return is the assurance of employment in some work in their hometown
or in specially created Labour-formations. The Armed Forces Commander
(and/or the commander in the army area to the rear) is responsible for
guarding them on the return journey. If possible, the camp will provide
an escort unit. Politically undesirable civilians are to be treated as
under A.
C. _Reliable persons_ are to be separated from politically undesirable
persons and directed into some other work of camp administration.
(Special attention must be paid to racial Germans: it is, however quite
possible that, even among these, there may be elements that must be
considered as “politically undesirable”.)
Should the reliable persons seem especially suited for employment in
the reconstruction work in the occupied area, a request for release
made by the special purpose unit of the Security Police and SD can be
opposed only if there is an interest in any specific individual from
the point of view of defense.
IV. _Employment of Soviet PWs._
1. _General._ Soviet PWs may be employed only in squads completely
separate from civilians and PWs of other nationalities. (Employment
in groups). The only places of work which can be considered are these
where the PWs can work under the _constant_ supervision of the guard
personnel. The separation from civilians and PWs of other nationalities
must be enforced, not only in the billets, but also at the place of
work. It must be stressed, in this connection, that the guard personnel
must not be prevented from immediate use of their weapons out of
consideration for a third person.
2. _Special regulations for employment within the Reich._ The main
principle for the employment of Soviet PWs within the Reich, is the
assured security of German life and German property.
The Armed Forces authorities in charge of employment have the sole
responsibility for the orderly employment of Soviet PWs.
Therefore, employment, first and foremost, must be taken up in work
connected with the Armed Forces. In the case of employment in the civil
sector, the local employment authorities can make suggestions, but
the decision, contrary to the regulations on the employment of other
PWs, rests with the Armed Forces authorities. In cases where all the
conditions for constant supervision and complete separation from the
civilian population cannot be complied with by a civilian place of work
employment cannot be approved. Should one of these conditions lapse
later on, the fatigue detail is to be withdrawn forthwith.
In addition, the instructions OKW/PW (15) No. 5015/41, dated 2.8.41 is
to be followed in detail. Anyone breaking it will be severely punished.
3. _Guard duties._ The best possible trained energetic and prudent
guard personnel are to be chosen to guard the Soviet PWs and constantly
instructed by the Training Officer of the Military base camp [A. O. des
M. Stammlagers].
At least one guard must be assigned to each 10 PWs. There must,
however, never be one guard alone on duty. Should a fatigue detail
consist of _no more than_ 10 men, 2 guards must be employed to guard
them. Guards should be equipped with hand grenades if possible. Those
guarding larger squads must also be issued with machine guns or
sub-machine guns.
Places of work must be frequently examined by officers or experienced
NCOs. They are responsible for seeing that the orders given are carried
out to the letter.
The notes, attached as an appendix, are to be made available for
thorough and detailed perusal.
The billets of Soviet PWs on fatigue details are to be under constant
guard, even at night, and are to be inspected from time to time by the
supervising authorities.
V. _Final remarks._
PW-commandants are to be made personally responsible that under
all circumstances the above regulations are strictly observed by
subordinate units. This duty may in no case cease or be influenced by
a change in offices. Therefore all offices and units newly concerned
and employed in this sphere must be made thoroughly acquainted with the
content of the regulations.
# # # # #
Appendix to the Order of OKW/Gen. Armed Forces Dept. PW section No.
3058/41 Secret dated 8.9.1941 (for free distribution!)
Notes on the guarding of Soviet Prisoners of War.
_Bolshevism is the deadly enemy of Nazi Germany_
For the first time in this war, the German soldier is encountering
not only a military opponent, but one, at the same time, politically
educated, who sees in communism his ideal and in National-Socialism,
his most provocative enemy. In the fight against National-Socialism,
every method is, to him, legal: sniping, guerrilla warfare, sabotage,
incendiarism, seditious propaganda, murder. Even a Soviet soldier in
captivity, however harmless he may appear on the surface, will snatch
any opportunity to show his hatred of everything German. It is quite
possible that the PWs received corresponding instructions on how to
act in captivity. It is essential, therefore, to treat them with the
utmost vigilance, the greatest caution and complete mistrust.
The principles to be followed by guard personnel are:
1. Ruthless action at the slightest indication of insubordination
or disobedience. Weapons are to be used unsparingly to put down
resistance. PWs attempting to escape are to be fired on immediately
(without a challenge) with the firm intention of hitting them.
2. Any _conversation_--even on the march to and from the place of
work--unless it concerns absolutely necessary official instructions,
is _utterly forbidden_. No smoking at all is allowed on the march to
and from the places of work--as well as during work. In the same way,
all conversation between PWs and _civilians_ is to be prevented, if
necessary by force of arms--even against the civilians.
3. At the place of work also, a constant and careful supervision by
German guard personnel is required. Each guard must always _keep a
sufficient distance_ from the PWs to enable him, at any time, to use
his weapons _without delay_. Never turn your back on a PW.
4. Slackness is out of place even with a _PW who is obedient and
willing to work_. He interprets it as weakness and draws his own
conclusions.
5. When German soldiers are ruthlessly carrying out given orders with
all severity and harshness, any arbitrary action, maltreatment and,
above all, the use of clubs and whips is forbidden. This would be out
of keeping with the honour of German soldiers as armed men.
6. The appearance of seeming harmless on the part of bolshevist PWs
must never lead to the slackening of the above instructions.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1520-PS
Notes about a discussion with the Fuehrer at the Fuehrer Headquarters
on the 8th of May 1942.
Present at first Reich Minister Dr. Lammers [also Bormann and
Rosenberg, the author of the notes].
I began with reporting to the Fuehrer about the results of the 1941/42
collection of the NSDAP of books for the German Armed Forces resulting
in more than 9 million books, from which 46,000 libraries were formed.
Then I dealt with certain reproaches raised against the Ministry East.
The article in the “information service” of the Ministry for Propaganda
concerning construction and aims of the Ministry East appeared without
any knowledge whatsoever on my part. I had, as a matter of principle,
agreed with the Ministry for Propaganda that no publications whatsoever
regarding the occupied Eastern Territories should be published without
my express consent. This became essential because even ministers talked
about the “_Policy of Colonisation_” in the East.--Then it was also
said that I had declared 650 men as unfit for war service and thus
deprived the armed forces of them, and that I also left 90 officers
without work as an advance command in Taganrog. I want to state that,
because of the newly reinforced decree, the Ministry East has handed
over 650 men; however, up to a few weeks ago only 240 men have been
called away. As concerns the 90 men in Taganrog, this is not a measure
taken by me but by the Economic Staff East and the armed forces
armament staff, resp. Therefore, this matter was none of my affair.
Furthermore, this advance commando has been dissolved.
As regards the resettlement of the Germans from Lithuania, the Fuehrer
said that he was under the impression that people who had already
settled here would have to be resettled again. I told the Fuehrer that
it was not so, this was a matter concerning more than 30,000 settlers
capable of resettlement who were still detained in camps and who were
worn down by the prolonged camp life.
At last I referred to the new Molotov memorandum regarding supposed
horrors and our economic measures, which, as a matter of fact, refers
to some statements in the so-called “Green Folder” of the economic
staff East of the 4-year Plan. Presumably such statements had been
discovered on the body of a shot agrarian leader; a year ago I had
already expressed my concern about the too-clearly expressed tendencies
of those statements. A number of agrarian leaders already had been
killed, also three territorial commissioners already have been killed
fighting the partisans.
Thereafter I described to the Fuehrer the considerations which caused
me to grant _self-administration_ to the Baltic countries. First of
all this was not proclaimed by Law, but it was only my _decree_ to the
Reich Commissioner with the corresponding directives. In practice it
meant nothing beyond a confirmation of an already existing state of
affairs and the abolition of a certain uncertainty. We were very short
of officials and were thus forced to be most economical with human
material. However, frequently efforts were noticeable to meddle with
the trivialities of life which necessitates new demands and withdraws
too many soldiers from the armed forces. It left the doors open for
some people to escape army service. Furthermore, self-administration
was connected with an increased willingness to work. After all there
were enough safety clauses whereby the self-administration could not
undertake anything without the sanction of the Commissioner General.
In order to eliminate any possible political danger, an exception
has been made with _Riga_. Riga has 10-12,000 officials and was to
receive a German mayor who is not subordinated to the Lithuanian
self-administration. Thereby a personal political policy of the
Lithuanian Directorate would be avoided. By this measure Riga would be
an experiment for annexed administration.
We also created an historical alibi and had demonstrated that we were
meeting the Baltic nations more than half way. If at a later date this
would not be acknowledged, we had every justification to proceed more
drastically. The Fuehrer kept all decrees and regulations in order to
examine them. Yet during the whole of the report he made no comments.
Afterwards the Fuehrer asked how all those economical measures were
looked upon by the part of the Germans, whereupon I replied that, of
course, the entire economical management was in German hands, and
that this fact had produced a deterioration of the morale. Generally
speaking the monopolistic companies and the ZHO [Zentralhandelsges.
Ost--Eastern Central Trade], are fundamentally necessary, only they
have to be supervised. Dr. Lammers interjected that private profits had
to be throttled in order to avoid too strong a group of profiteers.
I once more referred to the question of monopolies and wished to
ascertain whether the Fuehrer intended an absolute tobacco monopoly
for here, whereupon he declared that he was particularly interested in
the retail monopoly. The question of arranging for the producers could
still be settled at a later date. I replied that the economic leaders
have not yet agreed upon the question of the producers. The opinion is
frequently prevalent, that the production itself need not necessarily
be a direct state monopoly. I told the Fuehrer that I shall have the
whole question examined once again.
Then the problem of _religious freedom_ for the occupied Eastern
territories was discussed. The Fuehrer consulted Reichsleiter Bormann,
who already had gathered much experience by the preparations for
the Wartheland and for Austria. I explained the situations in the
East was that various large ecclesiastical groups being formed, but
that one should not allow such development to take place without
supervision, but that one ought to direct same and that the intended
decrees, respectively orders, were for the purpose of protecting
us from unanticipated surprises. Bormann entirely agreed with this
attitude, he merely questioned if the Reichminister East, who also had
some standing in Germany, would not produce too close a dependency
by a law which might have repercussions inside the Reich. What was
to be understood under “religious freedom” was to be interpreted
_by the Churches_, and he could anticipate, that such a law would
produce hundreds of new letters and complaints on the part of the
churches within the Reich. The Fuehrer considered a number of twists
and forms which would eliminate such a danger, and after discussing
its suitability the Fuehrer read the decree and gave his consent.
Finally it was agreed that the whole question was not to be settled _by
myself_ in the form of a law, but that the Reich Commissioners take the
existing religious freedom so to speak for granted and would decree
the necessary executive orders. I was then to watch the development
continuously and retain the executive control. It is easily possible
that the leaders of the churches in the Ukraine would combine in order
to elect a patriarch. I pointed out that this was already the case for
all practical purposes and that a steering of the matter is necessary.
The Fuehrer asked me if I really thought that all the Ukrainians
were faithful adherents of the church. I replied that with the older
generation and the women it was certainly the case, the youth were
already somewhat unaccustomed to church. Furthermore I had transported
from Kiev to Berlin the “Atheist Museum”. In this the writings of the
national writer of the Ukraine, Schewischenko, are quoted and may be
possible to publish them in the Ukrainian language in a sense which
in truth was not for the church. Also such freedom of expression of
opinion has also to be guaranteed. Moreover the Fuehrer emphasized
that after the war he would proceed against the churches with the
fitting measures; he believed that he was still able to do something
because of his authority which at a later date would be difficult for
anybody else. He would not forget the attitude of the church during the
war. I told the Fuehrer that I carried out church political lectures
in a small circle in my lecture house in Dahlem, in which the whole
problem was thoroughly examined, so that in the future the necessary
ideological fight would also be carried out with the necessary
knowledge and on the necessary scale.
Then the treatment of the countries which were Germany’s wards was
discussed. I pointed out that some representatives interpreted the
point of view of the master race, by travelling up and down the
country with the whip. It is true, formerly one used to say of the
Slavs that they liked to be thrashed. But this had changed radically.
Now the situation was that the public thrashing meant the same as for
the Orientals “the losing of face.” Even the Bolshevics mistreated
the prisoners abominably behind the walls, but never in public view.
A number of incidents had occurred caused by thoughtless talk. It
is necessary that our foreign representatives also know how _to
keep silent_. The Fuehrer read the draft of my decree for the Reich
Commissioner Ukraine and gave his consent to it.
I then described to the Fuehrer the reception of the _three delegations
of farmers_ in grateful acknowledgment of our agrarian legislation
and produced all our propaganda, such as circulars, pamphlets,
posters, translations of German writings, etc. The difficulty here,
too, was that it had taken a long time until the 18 waggons could be
transported. A part had remained in the Government General. The whole
action was very successful. I then submitted to the Fuehrer photographs
of Ukrainian men and women who were working in the Heinkel works. The
Fuehrer expressed his surprise at the extraordinary good looks and even
beauty of the people.
I then dealt with the _employment of foreign workers_ in the occupied
Eastern territories. I had appointed a special delegate for this who
had been very active lately to cultivate all those existing connections
and to institute new ones. At first the Danish minister Larsen had
travelled the Eastland with the General-Director Junker who was
the chief of the Danish committee for employment in the East. This
journey already had produced tangible, practical results: in Port
Kunda a large cement works was being rebuilt, the machinery would be
delivered within a few weeks. After an initial starting time about
75,000 tons of cement will be produced annually. Further erections of
cement works would be possible. The completion of peat works could now
be prepared in order to benefit from it in the following year. Two
experts had to be sent there, and within a few weeks one could start
with the installations. The same applies to large plaster factory,
to the completion of concrete and wooden shoe factories. Since it
will probably become impossible in the future to continue to provide
the population with leather shoes. The factory will be capable of a
daily output of 10,000 shoes. Furthermore, a number of other business
plannings are also being considered. Especially the oil factory at
Libau is ready to be taken over, also creameries, shipbuilding plants,
etc. All those works thus promise a considerable increase in production
for the coming years. Negotiations had taken place also with the Dutch,
and Reich Commissioner Seyss Inquart had just now submitted a first
draft regarding the employment of Dutch people in the region of Libau.
It is planned to hand over to the Dutch people 500,000 ha of land to
be cultivated under stipulation that after delivery of all that is
claimed by the German administration, they are permitted to export
the surplus to Holland. Some of the details had still to be settled.
The Fuehrer thought one could as a matter of principle admit Dutchmen
to the East, because if there were not more than 1000 people, then
they would be absorbed. He did not wish large colonies. The matter
was left undecided, to be thoroughly investigated. Moreover the DAF
German Workers Front had bought a wharf at Varna in order to tackle the
building of concrete ships.
I then reported to the Fuehrer the planning of central office for
planning in the East, and I gave him the names on the committee for the
general policy, economics, etc. The supreme authorities of the Reich
had sent their emissaries. Naturally nothing would be done at this
stage in which might somehow hamper the war production.
Then the discussion turned to Caucasia and _the policy of the AA_
[Foreign Ministry] towards the Eastern territories. I reported to
the Fuehrer that, for some time, we had picked out the best of the
prisoners by commissions of the Ministry East. The OKW had now
established the Turkestan Legion through direct collaboration with
us. According to my information received from the manager of chief
section “Policy”, the camp is in perfect condition, the Commander has
learned the Turkestan language, and the Turkestans have accepted German
military terms and have an anti-Bolshevist attitude. The legions of the
Caucasians would be modeled on similar lines. If one had not in the
beginning on the part of the SD, called all those peoples “Asiatics”,
had them shot or left to their fate, there would be more troops at the
disposal of the German Reich today. A new flag was created for the
Turkestan legion, the half moon was done away with and in its place
put bow and arrow. I showed the Fuehrer the individual symbols for the
designs for flags for the Georgians, Armenians, Aserbeidschanians,
Cubancossacks, and Kalmucks. The Fuehrer had no objections against
these designs, however, he asked my opinion about the Armenians.
I stated that Armenia was the best bolt between Turkey and
Aserbeidschan, and thus could stop a Panturanian movement towards the
East. Generally speaking the Armenian people themselves are stationary,
a people of farmers who had considerable industrial skill.
I then described to the Fuehrer our relationship with the Foreign
Ministry. The Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs claimed the political
handling of the Eastern territories, in as far as it has not been taken
over directly within our administration. I said that the Reich Foreign
Minister had formed a large Eastern committee and had despite our
protests convoked in increasing measure the most varied emigrants. I
read to the Fuehrer a list of emigrants from Turkey, from Paris, from
Switzerland, all of whom were staying at the Adlon Hotel in Berlin.
Two of them, according to our information, were well-known espionage
agents. I thought it extremely risky to assemble here these emigrants
from all parts of the world. The Fuehrer listened in surprise. I said
that we prepared years ago already for the Eastern question. In this
connection we had made possible the studies of Dr. Benzing and assigned
him upon request for a certain period to the AA. The AA then created
for him a separate department for planning and appointed him to be a
Regierungsrat [Advisor of the Government].
It subsequently refused to return him to us. The same applies in the
case of the Turkestanian Kayum. The questions had long been discussed
with him. We had merely loaned him to the AA for the purpose of
broadcasting propaganda. Now the AA was sending him to Paris, in order
to collect emigrants. The Fuehrer gave the strictest instructions to
the Reich Minister Dr. Lammers, to inform the AA officially that it
had to discontinue its activities in the East instantly. It was also
to release the retained personalities to the Ministry East, and he did
not wish any further inquiries. I further explained that I had talked
to State Secretary v. Weizsaecker a few weeks ago and requested him
to inform the Reich Foreign Minister that I was looking forward to
speaking to him personally. Weizsaecker said that the two points of
view differed. When Weizsaecker was asked about it after some time, he
said that he did not understand from this talk that _he_ was to arrange
the meeting between Ribbentrop and myself. We have interpreted this
remark that the matter was to be put off until after the Congress of
emigrants had been convoked in Berlin. Some days ago we were informed
by a liaison man of the AA that they did not at all consider the
attitude which I had reported to the Fuehrer in regard to the Caucasian
people, as binding for them but that it was of a purely private
character. The Fuehrer once more emphasized his point of view.
I then reported to the Fuehrer on the work of the preparatory
reconstruction staffs. With the exception of a few personalities whom
the Fuehrer preferred not to have employed or preferred to be used
in Germany the Fuehrer accepted the proposed list of personalities.
The tasks of Reich Minister Speer and his relationship with me were
then thoroughly discussed. The Fuehrer said that he, for example,
had made the worst experiences in regard to the matters of railroad
traffic by the fact that the Government General had its own railroad
administration between the front lines and the Reich. Because of these
circumstances a lot of misunderstandings and frictions were caused.
The separate administrations did not function and interfered with the
uniform technical direction so that very nearly catastrophic conditions
resulted, if the _entire_ administration of railroad traffic had not
been transferred to the Reich Ministry of Communication. Only by these
means had it become gradually possible to increase the daily number
of trains from 125 to 220. For the construction of main thoroughfares
and armament works it is also necessary that a central office has
control, and Speer already proved at the beginning of his official
duties that he knew how to tackle a job well. He succeeded to solve
many a technical task in very short time, which normally would have
taken months, and he, the Fuehrer, was most satisfied with this choice.
I told the Fuehrer that I had promised my utmost support to Speer from
the very beginning and that I had accepted in principle his first
drafts for an arrangement, with the only exception of two points, that
is this arrangement should remain in force beyond the duration of the
war and secondly, that the department Chief of the O.T. [Organisation
Todt], who should have a rank of about Oberregierungsrat, should be
able to pass a decision against the Reich Commissioners.
The Fuehrer thereupon stated repeatedly that the Reich Ministry Speer
would be dissolved on the very day peace was declared and all his
present tasks would be split up. The management of the artery roads
through the East, however, had still technically to be centrally
conducted. They are, therefore, tasks for the immediate war effort.
Speer also neither has the intention nor the commission to start
building houses now, but he must be empowered to prevent the building
anywhere of large administrative palaces or similar buildings, which
are not war essential. Dr. Lammers suggested to include by way of
agreement or decree of the Fuehrer, that this decree was only for
the duration of the war. I then described to the Fuehrer the present
general situation, according to which new plenipotentiaries-in-chief
endeavoured to carry out direct actions in the occupied Eastern
territories, overlooking those dignitaries who were appointed by the
Fuehrer himself. At the moment the problem of the employment of labor
was under discussion. In those places where the commissioners-in-chief
had been informed in good time and had the possibility to enlighten
the populations concerned, it was possible to achieve a considerable
voluntary readiness for work. In many other instances one adopted
measures of enforcement immediately, without taking any consideration
of the commissioner-in-chief, with the result that in certain towns a
flight into the woods took place, in order that they would not be--to
use their own phrase--deported. Those men would decidedly increase
the number of partisans and thus endanger our lines of supply. Other
forced laborers had left the trains going into the Reich during the
night, with the result that they arrived half empty at the frontier
of the Government General. They, too, would constitute a danger. As a
result at places which were included in the Four Year Plan themselves,
the very Four Year Plan had withdrawn workers who were partially
lost, and thus the opposite result was achieved, that is a noticeable
deterioration of the situation and ill feeling of the population. I
already received a number of reports from the Ukraine and from Latvia
which confirm this state of affairs. If now medium or lower technicians
proceeded similarly without regard of the commissioners-in-chief, these
conditions would deteriorate considerably without thereby achieving
the technical effects. I point out that development. If Reich Minister
Speer would retain his authority in its old form, I would be forced to
decline the responsibility for conditions in the future and, in any
case, could not be subjected to criticism if the political situation
would worsen very decisively thereby. The Fuehrer listened to the
report most attentively, as was my impression, and then he said that,
in any case, the arterial roads had to be secured by technical means
in order to supply the frontier with guns and ammunition. The matter
was then discussed once more. I pointed out what great effort it took
me to restrain the supreme Reich authorities from interfering with
the occupied Eastern territories; the arguments, however, were so
convincing, that one realized to a large extent that the direction
of the East could only be carried out centrally. If this painfully
achieved position was now to be broken by such a far-reaching decree
for Speer, the tendency would revive everywhere to interfere with
the occupied Eastern territories disregarding the Ministry East. The
Fuehrer said that under no circumstances should that happen, and he
instructed Dr. Lammers, that he was to reject such demands on the
Fuehrer’s orders.
Dr. Lammers was ordered to draft a formulation of the tasks of Reich
Minister Speer in the occupied Eastern territories in relationship to
myself for the duration of the war.
In the course of the discussion a number of other matters were also
dealt with. The Fuehrer approved the final version regarding uniforms
of the occupied territories. I reported to him the results of the
exhibition in Agram, Bruxelles and of the work progress of the
exhibition “Fight for Europe”.
The question of the awarding the iron cross to the Estonians,
Lithuanians, and Latvians to a problem of the OKW. The Armed Forces are
in favor of such awards. However, there are some political objections.
The Fuehrer believes to see a danger in it, that in case of future
complications the bearer of the EK [iron cross] might have to be
subjected to disciplinary punishment. I explained that soldiers of the
Baltic nations--according to many utterances--looked upon an award as
a guarantee for Reich citizenship. Thereby the political effect of
a Germanisation and on the other hand the skimming of nationalistic
forces would become possible. The matter was to be examined once again.
I informed the Fuehrer of my intention to start my first official
journey into the Eastland on the 14th May. The Fuehrer authorized me to
extend his greetings to the appointed administrative corps.
I then reported to the Fuehrer the results of metal collection in the
Eastland which produced 2,500 tons. By collecting those metals still
available in the economy, the figure would be raised to 3,500 tons. The
collection of wools too had reached the average of the Reich.
I handed the Fuehrer a file note regarding the development of rubber
plantations, which has been fostered by the foreign policy office of
the NSDAP since 1936. Despite all the official refusals the plants were
at first cultivated in Athens, later on the Reich Food Minister granted
a few acres of land in Germany. Now it is cultivated in the Wartheland
and in the Government General, and later on in the Ukraine where from
1943 on more than 100,000 ha will be worked. The harvest will then
provide enough to fill the gap which is still open from synthetic
rubber production.
During the report I turned the conversation toward the planning
departments of the ministry. I said that after nearly one year no
high official had yet been appointed because of the many discussions
with the competent Reich departments. I mentioned the case of party
member Cranz who was supposed to be my immediately subordinated chief
of press in the East, but whom the ministry of finance did not want to
grant to me as a Ministerialdirektor. Dr. Lammers was of the opinion
that one could not start right away with the highest ranks. If Cranz
was now appointed Ministerialrat then he could be promoted within a
year. I said that Cranz was already a year in the Ministry. Nor was
it a question of appointing the _major_ Cranz, but of the journalist
who had followed this profession for nearly 20 years. I said that
the ministry also had to be on an equal footing in its negotiations
with the Reich Commissar. This was not an ordinary Special department
ministry [Ressortministerium], but it had other, far more extended
tasks. The Fuehrer agreed with this point of view and asked about
how large the Reich Commissioners Offices were. After mentioning the
number of rooms I added that a Reich Commissioner was in reality like a
minister president, who was governing a large country. Here, too, the
Fuehrer agreed, and he said that to begin with he was not much in favor
to create a ministry for the East Commission. I was surprised, because
Dr. Lammers had made out to me that just the creation of a ministry was
the wish of the Fuehrer. I told the Fuehrer that at that time I had
made special propositions. I then requested Dr. Lammers to give me his
support in this matter.
Signed: R.
Berlin, 13th May 1942.
R/H.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1521-PS
BAVARIAN POLITICAL POLICE
Copy
Munich, Briennerstr. 50, August 24th, 1934
Telephone 28341-46
Reg. No. 33668 I 1 Nh must be quoted in further correspondence. To the
Bureau of Secret State Police--Central Office
_Berlin S.W. 11_
Prinz Albrecht St. 8.
Reference
National mourning on the occasion of the death of Reich President and
Generalfeldmarschall von Hindenburg; here--the carrying out of para.
III of the decree of the Reich Government dated 2.8.34.
Enclosure
1 Copy
Several telephone reports which reached here as early as the evening
of the 2nd of August, 1934, from offices of the Party and regional
[Bezirk] authorities, concerning refusal to sound the funeral knell
ordered by the Reich Government, and also numerous written reports,
caused the Bavarian Political Police to come to the decision, a copy of
which is enclosed, and which has already been submitted to your office.
The result was as follows: In more than 70 parishes bells were not
tolled on the 2nd of August, in 20 parishes on the 2nd and 3rd of
August, and in 4 parishes on the 2nd, 3rd and 4th of August. The reason
given in about 56 cases was that no definite order had been issued
from the responsible diocesan office, or dean’s office. Of the clergy
involved, 32 in all are politically tainted--two of them read holy
mass on the 26th of July for the deceased Chancellor of the Austrian
Confederation Dollfuss, or remembered him in a sermon and had prayers
said for him. It appears that no special order of the senior church
authorities was necessary for this. In one case the sacristan was
interrupted in ringing the knell by the priest.
When asked for an explanation by enraged fellow Germans and fellow
party members, every possible excuse was used--let us only call
attention to the following ones, to show what type they were:
Alleged disturbance of the religious service.
Nothing is done on orders from lay authorities.
Absence, either accidental, or alleged to be by reason of duty.
Alleged state of decay of the belfry.
Alleged defectiveness of the bells.
Alleged ignorance of the decree of the Reich Government.
Hindenburg was a Protestant; by a decree of the Bavarian Ministry of
Public Worship and Education (Resolution of the State Minister for
Education and Public Worship, dated 29.6.34, No. I 19763) the vicar was
only pledged to obey the order of the church authorities with respect
to the ringing of church bells.
Alleged incompetency.
Bells had only been rung in the morning on the occasion of the 20th
anniversary of the outbreak of war.
On his own authority, the bishop of Wuerzburg, Matthias Ehrenfried,
a _sufficiently well-known_ cleric, fixed the ringing of bells for
the morning, between 11-0 and 12-0 o’clock. [pencil note referring to
underling] How so?
Another minister had the incredible lack of taste to point out that
the enforced ringing of church bells when Kurt Eisner was shot, had
been the occasion of the order that this should in future only be done
by order of the church authorities. The mentioning of the name of the
immortal President of the Reich von Hindenburg in the same breath as
an incident connected with Eisner, the traitor and Jew, is the most
despicable feature [Gemeinheit] of the affair.
From the foregoing it is not difficult to see that the Catholic clergy
in their intolerance, have done their utmost to disturb the peace
between laymen and clergy. There is no doubt that the obstructive
attitude of the clergy is due, on the one hand, to that fact that the
deceased Reichpresident was a Protestant, and on the other, to the
fact that the Catholic Church was to obey a suggestion made by the
National-Socialist Reich Government. The conduct shown in this case
provides once more a clear evidence of the international attitude and
lack of German feeling and perception in Catholic clerical circles.
In three cases the taking into protective custody, in order to
guarantee them personal safety, of refractory clergy could not be
avoided, in the interests of the maintenance of public security and
order, and on account of the anger of the people.
The following clergy are in question:
The Parish priest, Father Johann Quinger of Altenkunstadt BA.,
Lichtenfels. He was taken into protective custody on 3.8 on the express
order of the State Ministry of the Interior, because he assaulted SA
leaders and SA men who were ringing the bells against his wishes. He
was released from custody on 10.8.34.
The Parish priest, Father Ludwig Obholzer of Kiefersfelden BA
Rosenheim. For his personal safety he was in police custody from 2400
hours on the 2.8.34, till 1000 hours on 3.8.34. On 5.8.34, he said
sarcastically in his sermon, referring to the SA men who had carried
out the ringing of the funeral knell on their own account, “Lord
forgive them, for they know not what they do!”
The Parish priest, Father Johann Nepomuk Kleber of Wiefelsdorf, BA.,
Burglengenfeld, refused to ring the church bells on the 2nd and 3rd.
He is badly tainted politically and had to be taken into protective
custody from the 5th to the 8th of August 34 in the interests of his
own safety.
The behaviour of the diocesan office of the _archbishopric of Munich
and Freising_, [underlined in red pencil], which is in accordance with
the principle “Attack is the best defence” deserves special note. In
two letters of the 10th and 11th of August 1934 a touching complaint
is lodged about the behaviour of members of the SA and the Party on
ringing the church bells without authorization, and also about the
fact that the clergymen named above were restricted in their personal
liberty. In this connection it should be stressed that the clergy
concerned were treated with extreme leniency. We could refer here to
the case of Quinger, where the SA men, in spite of the injuries which
the clergyman inflicted on them, with exemplary discipline did not
return the assaults. The State authorities did everything to ensure
the continuance of worship undisturbed. Moreover, the length of
imprisonment was confined in all cases to the minimum.
It must again be pointed out, most emphatically, that the unspeakable
behaviour of the clergy concerned in this matter leads us to deduce
the existence of a very special frame of mind, and spotlights the true
internal attitude of the Catholic clergy to the National-Socialist
State. It is not to be wondered at if here and there, in face of
the incredible behaviour of the clergy and the threadbare excuses
they used, the people and the SA resorted to an act of self-defense
which was not perhaps in conformity with strict law, but was very
understandable. Narrow-minded jurisprudence, as the elders of the
church choose to practice it, is not in place here, and is not
understood by the mass of the people, as events have shown.
Since the diocesan office of the archbishopric of Munich and Freising
has announced that it will also “report” the incidents to the Reich
Ministry of the Interior, it is absolutely necessary to acquaint the
above office with the contents of the present report.
By order
signed Brunner
[Stamp]
Reich Governor of Bavaria
28 Aug. 1934 1/1
enclosures
Mark Ge 2/28.8
(Above) _Copy_ to the Reich Governor of Bavaria, for the attention of
State Secretary Hofmann, Munich, requesting that it should be noted.
By order
Jenner [?]
Copy checked 24.9.34. [Several illegible initials]
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1526-PS
Copy
Prof. Dr. Wolodymyr Kubijowytsch,
Chairman of the Ukrainian Main Committee.
Cracow, February 1943.
To the Governor General, Reich Minister Dr. Frank.
Your Excellency:
Complying with your wish I send you this letter, in which I should
like to state critical conditions and the painful happenings, which
create especially grave conditions for the Ukrainian population within
the General-Government. As to the German-Ukrainian relations and the
general situation of the Ukrainian people, I have included all that in
my letter, known as well to you, which I addressed to the Secretary
of State Dr. Buehler as far back as December 1942. In that letter I
stressed mainly the alarm of the Ukrainian population in regard to the
uncertainty about their national future within the New Europe. Here I
would like to quote some real happenings and add my reflections on them.
The center of these is the question: Shall the Ukrainians work
successfully in favor of final victory; they must be granted the
security which, while absolutely necessary to them, unfortunately
does not exist. For under the present conditions the Ukrainians are
neither sure of their possessions nor of their lives. The matter of
re-privatisation has not yet been settled. Inhuman treatment, severe
pressure to forced labor, unfounded arrests, and lastly the shootings
of great numbers are happenings not too infrequent these days.
I. _Question of Re-privatisation._
Of primary importance for the further shaping of German-Ukrainian
relations is the problem of re-privatisation. The whole Ukrainian
people have connected with the German victory in the East their hope
that now all remainders of the Bolshevist Regime shall be extinguished
finally.
The views of the Ukrainian people are basically those of private
property and economy. The Ukrainian peasant is prepared to undergo the
greatest privations and sacrifices in favor of the State, if only he
be allowed to work in tranquility; this feeling of inner tranquility
he can but gain in the knowledge that the soil on which he and his
ancestors have toiled, will remain his property in the future. The
Ukrainian population received with gratitude the proclamation of your
Excellency of 1 August 1941 in which, you Sir, have solved this problem
at its roots and have stated re-privatisation to be the general rule
for the economy of the State. Now, however, the attitude of some
authorities looks as if the re-privatisation would be questioned still
and as if in the new social order there was no place for private
property. This situation is very cleverly made use of by the hostile
whispering propaganda. Especially widely has the rumor been spread that
private property has not yet been reintroduced for the reason that a
large action of resettlement of the Ukrainians from Galicia to the East
is to be expected.
Actions, such as measures of adjusting real property at the expense
of peasant property (in the districts of Tarnopol, Rawa, Ruska,
Kalusch, etc.), survey of real property of peasants (in the district of
Czortkow) and imposing of fees for the use of land (Czortkow, Zloczow,
etc.) give such rumors the appearance of probability (enclosure 1).
It is clear that for this reason there appears a great alarm and
nervousness amongst the rural population which must badly influence the
inclination for work and the output of agricultural production.
The uncertainty as well as all the consciously false interpretations of
such measures through the whispering propaganda, could only be ended by
a definite carrying out of the principle of the Proclamation mentioned.
_II. Measures for finding labor._
The general nervousness is still more enhanced by the wrong methods of
finding labor which have been used more and more frequently in recent
months. The wild and ruthless man-hunt as exercised everywhere in towns
and country, in streets, squares, stations, even in churches, at night
in houses, has badly shaken the feeling of security of the inhabitants.
Everybody is exposed to the danger, to be seized anywhere and at any
time by members of the police, suddenly and unexpectedly, and to be
brought into an assembly camp. None of his relatives knows what has
happened to him only months later one or the other gives news of his
fate by a postcard.
I beg to mention some instances with their respective proofs:
_a._ During such an action a pupil in Sokol lost his life and another
one was wounded (enclosure 2).
_b._ 19 Ukrainian workers from Galicia, all provided with identity
cards, were assigned in Cracow to a transport of “Russian
prisoners-of-war” and delivered into a punitive camp in Graz
(enclosure 3).
_c._ 95 Ukrainians from Galicia, recruited for work in Germany by
the labor offices in the middle of January, were sent to Pskow in
Russia, via Eastern Prussia, where most of them died under
distress (enclosure 4).
_d._ Seizure of workers under pretext of military recruitment
(Zalesczyki); kidnapping schoolboys during school time (Biala
Podloaska, Wlodawa, Hrubieschow) (enclosure 5).
_III. Question of Personal Security._
Treatment of human beings.
Already the kind of treatment meted out to our compatriots by the lower
instruments of the German authority, adds much to make the general
situation more grave. The Ukrainians expected the treatment of members
of those nations who fought against Germany, because they belong to
a people who have never done anything against the Germans and their
interests. Now every Ukrainian cannot fail to become convinced that
most of the Germans do not make any distinction, and that they are
accustomed to treat all peoples of the East similarly, whether friend
or foe. Too often the Ukrainian is exposed to the danger, when dealing
with the lower authorities, to be personally insulted, to be slandered,
even to be ill-treated. Innumerable instances could be mentioned
proving this sort of treatment. In the enclosure I give only a small
selection of especially grave cases (enclosure 6).
Wholesale shootings.
Of much worse character are the wholesale shootings of absolutely
innocent persons, such as happened in Lubycza Koroliwska and then in
Lwow and Czortkow.
In Lubycza Koroliwska, district of Rawa Ruska, 46 peasants, including
31 Ukrainians, were shot without trial (4 October 1942) (enclosure 7).
During the second half of November 1943, 28 Ukrainians were shot in
Lwow, 56 in Czortkow, also without trial. (enclosure 8).
Arrests in December 1942.
In December 1942 the police undertook a cleansing action among the
so-called disturbing elements, leading very soon, however, to wholesale
arrests of innocent, quiet citizens. They are under arrest and in
danger to lose their good health for certain, if not their life.
(enclosure 9).
How acute and well founded this fear is, is proved by what happened to
6 Ukrainian girls from Kolomea, who were arrested in February 1942 and
who disappeared without leaving any trace. (enclosure 10).
Revision in the St. George Cathedral, Lwow.
In connection with the cleansing action mentioned above a raid was
carried out even in the St. George’s cathedral in Lwow. The fact
itself, especially because of the behavior of the police at this place
which is sacred to the Ukrainians, produced a deep resentment and bad
feelings amongst the population. This was used by hostile propaganda at
once. Generally, it is pointed out that not even during the Bolshevist
occupation raids took place on the hill of St. George, and that several
visits by Bolshevist professors and students were always undertaken
with great respect for the place and the person of the Metropolitan.
Special action against the asocial elements.
Since 15 January a special action began against the so-called asocial
elements in Galicia. In the whole area about 5,000 persons were
arrested. The purpose of this action was said to be the removal of
those elements, who did not wish to work, were active in the black
market and by so doing made the work of the authorities more difficult.
This action however, did not obtain the right result, and the victims
were leading personalities of the Ukrainian cultural and economic life
as well as employees of several state authorities and members of the
Ukrainian Aid Committee.
These wholesale arrests raised an extraordinary nervousness and anxiety
among the delegates of our committee and in large spheres of the
Ukrainian population.
_IV. Irregular conditions and Partisan nuisance in the District of
Lublin._
[This chapter deals with partisan activity and the risks to which the
loyal Ukrainian population is exposed thereby. Irrelevant].
_V. Collective responsibility._
General remarks.
The Ukrainian people consider as particularly painful the application
of methods of collective responsibility. The large masses of the
people generally have no understanding for the principle of collective
responsibility; they take it as absence of justice to be punished for a
deed one has neither done nor approved of. Generally, the principle of
collective responsibility may be considered as justified if applied to
a racial community which is homogenous. The partisan nuisance, however,
is particularly spread out in the mixed Polish-Ukrainian areas, and
the Ukrainian community can by no means bear any responsibility for
misdeeds done by Poles. But even in areas with the almost homogenous
population, as e.g. in Galicia, the Ukrainian people could only be held
responsible if they were possessed of some means of executive power
towards those members. Today they have no such means. For the reasons
stated, the application of the principle of collective responsibility
against the Ukrainian people is unjust and inexpedient in its present
state of organization and especially in the mixed areas. The collective
responsibility often hits the leading circles in town and country whose
feelings are pro-German, but who are powerless against both the Polish
dissenters and against their own irresponsible hot-heads and despairing
persons.
Thus it happens that the collective responsibility which has the
purpose of exterminating anti-German elements quite to the contrary
annihilates or weakens positively pro-German elements and creates bad
feelings and bitterness. Thus in the district of Lublin about 400 such
Ukrainians perished.
We mention but some of the most convincing instances:
Wholesale shootings.
On 25 December 1942 the military police surrounded the village of
Przewale, in the district of Zamose, area of Lublin, herded together a
large number of Ukrainians and Poles. When the manager of the estate
declared he needed the Poles for work, the Poles were set free, the
Ukrainians, however, numbering 16, were shot dead; among the persons
shot was a 15 years old girl, Eugenie Tybyczuk (encl. 15).
In the village of Nodosow (district of Lubin) 8 pro-German Ukrainians
who had been persecuted by the Poles because of their patriotic views
in pre-war time, were shot on 30 October 1942.
On 29 January 1943 in the village of Sumyn (collective community of
Tarnowatka, district of Lublin) 45 Ukrainians, including 18 children
between the ages of 3 and 15 were shot, and on 2 February 1943 in the
villages of Pankow and Scharowola (collective community of Tarnowatka)
19 Ukrainians were shot, including 8 children, aged 1 to 13 years
(encl. 16).
The greatest bitterness is created by the killing of innocent children,
because the population is unable to understand that the German
authorities could consent to or order such deeds.
The tragic events in Lubycza Koroliwska and Kubycza Kniazi (districts
of Rawa Ruska, area of Lublin) have been mentioned above (encl. 7).
Conclusion.
The happenings in Galicia mentioned in this report have been submitted
to Governor Dr. Waechter and the Department Head Dr. Bauer in writing
and verbally. We repeat them herein, in order to complete the picture
of the General Government.
* * * * * * *
Cracow, 25 February 1943.
# # # # #
_Table of Enclosures._
1. The surveying measures in the area of Czortkow.
2. The events at Sokal.
3. The behavior of the Polish employees of the labor office.
4. Minutes (fate of the Ukrainian workers in Pskow).
5. Memorandum for the files (false recruiting of workers to the
Reich).
6. Memorandum for the files (ill-treatment of Ukrainians).
7. Shooting of 46 peasants in Lubycza Koroliwska, district of Rawa
Ruska.
8. Shootings in Lwow and Czortkow in November 1942.
9. Arrests in Galicia in December 1942.
10. Uncertain fate of arrested Ukrainian women students from Kolomea.
11. List of some well-known Ukrainian citizens, arrested in January
1943 in the area of Kolomea, Stryj, and Kamionka Strumilowa.
12. Arrests and shootings of persons unfit for work in the district
of Sanok.
13. Anti-Ukrainian activities of persons unfit for work in the
district Biljoraj.
14. Activities of partisans in the district of Biala Podlasko during
the second half of the year 1942.
15. Shooting of 16 Ukrainians in the village of Przewale.
16. List of the Ukrainians shot in the village of Sumin, community of
Tarnowatka on 29 January 1943.
_Enclosure 1._
_The Surveying Measures in the District of Czortkow._
In September of last year the Chief Inspectorate of agricultural land
[Hauptlandinspektion] in Czortkow was formed under the management of
the former District Surveyor [Kreislandinspektor].
Employed were the engineers-surveyor Jwanenko, a Russian, and the
draughtsman Sach, a Pole; further the land-surveyors from Brzezany
and Tarnaopol and some other German employees who were brought to
Czortkow. Travelling in the district of Czortkow they drew maps showing
the position of the communities with special regard to all farms and
marking the better farms. About the middle of December the activities
of this institution ceased, probably up till the end of April 1943.
Rumor has it that German peasants to the number of 50,000 who are to be
transferred from Germany into this district should be settled on these
better farms.
_Enclosure 2._
_The Events at Sokal._
On 24 October 1942 between 13 and 14 hours, when the school boys went
home from school, they were stopped by detachments of military police
on the street and together with other people were formed into one
unit. There was a panic as nobody knew what was going to happen to
these people. People began to flee from the streets. The school boy
Jaroslau Meda who was just passing with his father, the secretary of
the collective community of Parchacz also started to run. The father
tried to calm him and called him back as there was no danger. A
military policeman, however, saw him fleeing and shot at him wounding
him fatally, so that he died in the local hospital half an hour later.
At the same time two military policemen went into the Ukrainian hostel
for schoolboys and took away some boys. The others were at lunch in
the dining-room and therefore remained unnoticed. In front of the
schoolboys’ hostel the schoolboy Wassyl Krawtschuk was caught by a
military policeman and wounded so seriously in the thigh by a bayonet
that he had to be taken to hospital.
The student of theology Osyyp Karawan was severely beaten until he
fainted.
The public school teacher Michael Duliba was beaten publicly.
It is to be stressed that nobody knew that this action of collecting
people was to procure workers to load carrots at the station. When
the headmaster of the public school informed the manager of the local
labor office by phone and asked for his help, the latter replied he
had no time to spare for this matter at the moment. Thereafter, the
headmasters of the Ukrainian schools informed the manager of the local
labor office that they would put their boys at the disposal of the
authorities in every case there was unforeseen and undelayable work to
be done in town after having received fair warning provided no other
labor was available.
_Enclosure 3._
Copy
Zborow, 6 Oct. 1942
Ukrainian Aid Committee, Branch Zborow.
To the Ukrainian Main Committee in Lwow.
Department for food.
Subject: The behavior of the Polish employees of the labor office in
Cracow towards our laborers.
We present the minutes prepared by our office together with Mr. Procyk
Lukas on 28 September 1942 who returned from Germany.
He reports:
Ukrainian laborers coming to Cracow, though provided with certificates
and identification papers, are being transferred by the Polish
employees of the labor office together with the transports of Russian
civilian and brought to punitive camps.
Many Ukrainians fell victim to such Polish provocations. The situation
of these people is all the more tragic, as they do not know the
German language and their certificates and identification papers were
destroyed by the above mentioned Polish employees.
Below we give a list of the Ukrainian laborers who are in the punitive
camp in Graz as Russians and refugees:
[Follows a list of 19 names].
The situation of the above named is tragic. I was lucky to escape. With
complete confidence in me and tears in their eyes they asked me to
report their condition to the Committee.
[signed] Procyk Lukas.
_Enclosure 4._
Minutes.
Michaljlo Kost, Bohdan Janiw, Iwan Baran (son of Iwan), Iwan Baran
(son of Mykola) and Olexa Chimjak, all from Koniuschky, Koroliwiski,
district of Komarow, were sent by the labor office for work to Germany
on 12 January 1942.
They came to Pwzemysk, where they stayed for a whole week awaiting
medical inspection. After the medical inspection they were joined to
the transport which was to go to Germany. However, they were driven via
Warsaw, East Prussia to Russia and were brought to the town of Pskow.
With them were 95 Ukrainian lads from Galicia, including 18 lads from
the village of Koniuschky, Koroliwiski. They were accompanied by a
military escort. On 28 January 1942 they arrived in Pskow. At first,
they worked in the woods felling trees, later building a bath-house.
In the beginning they received half a loaf of bread as daily ration,
and later one loaf for seven persons daily, black coffee at breakfast
and supper and soup at dinner time.
They never had a day off, they had to work even on Sundays. Terrible
frost persisted throughout--to 58 centigrades (below zero), but the
lads got no warm clothes, they worked in the clothes they had brought
with them. After arriving in Pskow the workers lived in unheated huts
without beds. The huts were made from wood and it was very cold there;
only after two weeks were they billeted in a hall with beds, but they
were unable to get warm with the blankets they had brought with them.
Many of them fell ill from hunger and cold, 18 had to be taken to
hospital (there was no room for several persons) where they remained
for 2 to 3 weeks. The sick were refused bread, because they were said
to be simulants. In the hospital the sick received 50 grammes of bread
and some warm water and some soup and potatoes at about 16 hours.
Anyone unfit for work was sent away forcibly. Many escaped from
the huts during the winter, one died. 13 lads from the village of
Koniuschky, Koroliwiski escaped, three were arrested, and we know
nothing about the others; they certainly did not return home.
5 of the above mentioned lads were declared unfit for work by a
military commission and sent to Lwow and then home where they arrived
completely exhausted. Of the 95 persons in the hutments in Pskow up
to April, only 14 remained, 8 from the district of Jarowiw and 1 from
Grodek. Those 14 persons, hungry and weak, were released to go home.
These workers received no pay.
Komarow, 22 April 1942.
Confirmed by signature: Mychajlo Kost,
Bohdan Janiw,
Iwan Baran.
_Enclosure 5._
_Memorandum for the files._
In November of last year an inspection of all males of the age groups
1910 to 1920 was ordered in the area of Zaleschozyki (district of
Czortkow). After the men had appeared for inspection, all those who
were chosen were arrested at once, loaded into trains and sent to the
Reich. Such recruiting of laborers for the Reich also took place in
other areas of this district. Following some interventions the action
was then stopped.
The labor office in Biala Podlaska carried out the recruiting for work
of the students at the commercial college. When the officials recruited
more students than ordered, the main doors and doors to the class-rooms
were locked; consequently a panic amongst the students broke out, and
even some students fled through the windows.
Similar events occurred in Wlodawa and Hrubieschow in consequence of
which the schools were closed for some time.
_Enclosure 6._
_Memo for the files._
_Re: Ill-treatment of Ukrainians._
_a._ On 11 November 1942 Irene Malaschtschuk, a public school girl
working in a German food store in Czortkow, was, whilst working
(attending to German customers) hit in the face several times by a
Security Policeman without any reason whatsoever. When questioned why
he did it, she received the answer: because you did not pay any special
attention to me.
_b._ In September 1942 a meeting took place in Chodorow in the presence
of the District Farmer of Stryj, the District Agricultural Expert,
the Chairman of the Ukrainian Aid Committee, the Land Commissioner,
the District Farmer, the Chairman of the Delegation in Chodorow,
and mayors and bailiffs of the district of Chodorow concerning the
delivery quotas. During the discussion of the quota action the District
Farmer said that the communities of Hranky, Kuty, and Bortniky had not
delivered their ordered quota of vegetables, then he ordered the Mayor
of Hranky, Kuty to come up and hit him in the face in front of the
assembly.
_c._ The chief of the price control office in Zloczow, H. Mok, who
personally controls the delivery of foodstuffs into the town, stopped
a woman on the way who was carrying a few kilos of carrots. Mr. Mok
ordered his interpreter, a Jew, to search the woman; the Jew did it
in such a manner as to offend the dignity of a human being and of the
woman.
_d._ The District Farmer Benzin in Biala Polaska shot at innocent
Ukrainian peasants from the villages of Polenow and Nosow, whilst on
duty on 30 July 1942, two of whom died. Benzin was arrested, but the
event caused great indignation in the whole area.
_e._ On 9 August 1942 the Ukrainian student Iwan Wowtschyschyn was
beaten without any reason whatsoever by a Polish railroad policeman on
the station in Przemysl; when the student tried to defend himself, he
was fatally wounded with the bayonet.
Generally, there are strong complaints all over the country about the
way Polish members of the railroad police treated Ukrainians.
_Enclosure 7._
_Shooting of 46 peasants in Lubycza, district of Rawa Ruska._
In the early morning on Sunday, 4 October 1942, some groups of the
Special Service detachments, stationed near Belsez, came to the
village of Lubycza Koroliwska and Kubysca Kniazi and called out all
male villagers. The men were convinced that it was a matter of some
urgent work for the village and obligingly hurried to the place of
assembly. There they were formed in rank and file and requested to name
2 saboteurs within two minutes otherwise every fifth man would be shot.
As, however, no acts of sabotage had been committed in the village, no
saboteurs could be named. Then, 45 men and 1 woman were chosen from the
crowd and shot dead in two groups in the presence of their relatives,
viz. in Lubycza, Koroliwska and Kubycza, Kniazi.
Amongst the 46 shot were 31 Ukrainians.
The pretence for these tragic mass-shootings was a fire which occurred
in the stables of the said Special Service detachments near Belsez
during the night of 3-4 October, when 3 horses were said to have
perished. Probably this fire was set alight by the carelessness of the
stable-boys and was extinguished at once.
The community of Lubycza, Koroliwska has been known as one of the most
loyal of the whole district. The very same day (4 October 1942) the
Governor of the province of Galicia, during a celebration in Lwow,
especially mentioned the community as one conscious of their duties
regarding the delivery of their quotas; this was officially published
(Lwiwski Wisti) (Lemberger Nachrichten 6 October 1942).
The village Kubycza is 8 km. away from the place where the fire took
place. The above mentioned stable is not within the village boundaries
of Lubycza, Koroliwska.
It should be noted here that in spite of repeated assurances given by
the District Captain [Kreishauptmann] the injured families in Lubycza,
Koroliwska have so far not received any compensation.
_Enclosure 8._
As a reprisal for the shooting of a member of the German police in
Lwow who was killed by an unknown perpetrator in the second half of
November 1942, 28 Ukrainians were shot in Lwow, and 56 in Czortkow who
were at the time in prison in these towns. Nobody was told the reason
for the shooting, and the shootings in Czortkow were carried out in
broad day-light before the eyes of the frightened population. Among
the persons shot were many suffering from typhoid who were taken from
the hospital whilst unconscious, loaded on to trucks, and taken to the
place of execution.
These shootings were to be considered as reprisals against the
so-called “Bandera” group. Among the persons shot were elderly citizens
who had no connection whatever with the activities of this group, as
for instance Dr. Olexa Kossak, lawyer from Kolomea, engineer Andrij
Pjaseckyj, head-gamekeeper in Janiw near Lwow all of whom had been
vouched for not only by myself and Dr. Kost Pankiskyj, but by Reich
Germans as well.
_Enclosure 9._
_Arrests in Galicia in December 1942._
In December 1942 the police made arrests among the so-called restless
elements.
In the whole province of Galicia arrests were made, especially among
the young people among whom followers of the partisans were looked for.
On this occasion a number of elderly citizens were arrested, who were
but vaguely connected with the suspects. Thus, for instance, the owners
of houses where the suspect lived as a lodger were arrested as well as
guests present in the house at the time of arrest. On interventions
by the representatives of the Ukrainian Main Committee in Lwow the
police answered in order to release the persons arrested by mistake.
Since then 2½ months have passed and the persons arrested by mistake
are still in prison. They are treated there as criminals and are not
certain of their lives.
A typical example of this is the fact that 50 Ukrainians died of misery
and hunger in the prison in Czortkow. The Ukrainian Aid Committee in
Czortkow tried to obtain a permit to send food to the prisoners, but
without success; although the commander of the police agreed, the
prison-commander insisted that the command of the Lwow police had to
grant permission.
_Enclosure 10._
_Uncertain fate of arrested Ukrainian women students._
On 5 February 1942, 6 Ukrainian women students and school girls from
Kolomea were arrested and in the spring sent on to Czortkow. Since then
their relatives are unable to obtain any news about their fate.
The personal data of the arrested:
[follow 6 names together with names of respective parents and date
and place of birth].
_Enclosure 11._
_List_ of some well-known Ukrainian citizens, members of the Ukrainian
Aid Committee and employees of the State Administration, the
Self-Government and the Economic Authorities, also of the old men and
students who were arrested in January 1943 in the districts of Kolomea,
Stryj, and Komionka, Strumilowa:
[follows names by localities.]
_Enclosure 12._
_Arrests and shootings of persons unfit for work in the District of
Sanok._
During the period from 18 to 24 January 1943 about 300 persons were
arrested in the neighborhood of Sanok in accordance with lists compiled
some time before by the local mayors on orders of the authorities. Some
of them were soon set free, but the fate of the rest is unknown to us
and their families. The shootings which are daily taking place on the
Jewish cemetery promise no good.
On 17 and 18 January 1943 many persons from the districts Sanok and
Jaslo were arrested in the station in Tarnow whilst riding in the
direction of Cracow; so far their families have no news about their
fate. Thus, for instance 4 persons were arrested from the village of
Losie, district Jaslo, viz.:
[follow 4 names and addresses.]
One of them went to see a doctor in Cracow, the others were on business
trips to Warsaw.
On 18 January 1943, 14 persons who were unfit for work were shot
together with 80 Jews in Ustrzyki Dolne; they were buried together in
a ditch. Among these 14 were old men and invalids, for instance from
Lutswyska; Iwan Lesky, 68-70 years old, invalid of the Austrian Army
who worked as a tiler, Jurko Schkrabak and his wife, both about 70
years of age, and 3 other unknown persons, a female beggar from Ustrzky
called “Haramsymka”. We do not know the names of the other people
shot. It should be pointed out that the Ukrainians celebrated a second
Christmas evening on that day called “Schtschedryj Wetschir”.
As this holiday is celebrated by the Ukrainians with great piety,
the shootings of these innocent people on this holy day caused great
indignance and embitterment. These events depress the Ukrainian
population. The view is current that now the shootings of the Jews
come to an end those of the Ukrainians begin. The case of Ustrzyki is
commented upon as follows: The Germans do not care about any non-German
sanctity and holidays, they even shoot Ukrainians on the Ukrainian
“Schtschedryj Wetschir” (the case in Ustrzyki).
The Ukrainian population is suspicious of all orders given by the
German authority and even keep away from the soup kitchens, for fear
that those in need may be considered as beggars and shot.
_Enclosure 13._
_Anti-Ukrainian activities of partisans in the District of Bilgoraj._
* * * * * * *
_Enclosure 14._
_Activities of partisans in the district of Biala Podlaska during the
second half of 1942._
* * * * * * *
_Enclosure 15._
_Shooting of 16 Ukrainians in Przewala._
On 17 December 1942 the population of Zubowice, district of Tyschowce
was moved away and racial Germans were settled in their place. The
Polish population of Zubowice, warned the day before by a certain
Kolesche of the coming evacuation fled, but the Ukrainians stayed and
were evacuated to the little town of Tyszowce and its suburbs, with
the help of the representatives of the Ukrainian Aid Committee. This
evacuation affected 128 Ukrainian families, 486 persons in all.
Some days later a few farms in Zubowice and the surrounding country
as far as the village of Przewale were burnt down. It is obvious that
these fires were started by escaped Poles who hid in the forests or
the neighboring Polish villages, for all farms burnt down belonged to
Poles prior to the evacuation; the Ukrainians who were evacuated in
an organized manner and went willingly to destinations far off, viz.
Zamlynie and Dubyna, were certainly not interested in burning down
farms in Zubowice, particularly not their own farms.
As reprisal the arrests in Zamlynie and the shooting of persons in the
village Przewale, near Zubowice, were carried out on 24 December 1942.
This village is inhabited by 337 Poles and only 122 Ukrainians. On
intervention by the Local Farm Administrator Poles have been separated
and released from amongst the people arrested at random, the remaining
Ukrainians, however, among them the 58 years old Ukrainian teacher
and trustee of the Aid Committee in Zamosc, Banda Onofer, and his 75
years old mother-in-law Marie Rewus were shot. The names of the other
Ukrainians who were shot are: (follows a list of 10 names including one
of a person aged 80 years).
_Enclosure 16._
_List of the Ukrainians shot on 29 January 1943 in the village of
Sumin community of Taranwatka._
[Follows a list of 45 names, giving family state, age, and remarks.
Remarks to No. 16: Wounded, in hospital, to No. 19: Village Mayor, to
No. 31: Wounded, in hospital, No’s: 39 & 45: wounded, in hospital.]
Total 8 men, 19 women, 18 children.
The delegate: Pastor Matwijtschuk.
# # # # #
_List of Ukrainians shot 2 February 1943 in the villages of Pankow
and Scharowola._
[Follows a list of 19 names, giving family state, age and remarks.
Remarks to No’s: 4, 14, 15, 16, 17: Wounded].
Total 4 men, 7 women, 8 children. In the village Pankow 5 Poles have
been shot. In the village Scharowola 6 Poles have been shot.
Delegation Ukrainian Aid Committee Tomascho Lubelsko.
Delegate: Matwijtschuk.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1531-PS
I.
Reich Security Head Office Amt IV
Bk. No. 409/39 Top Secret
Berlin, 26 October 1939
_Top Secret_
_a._ To all State Police District Offices.
_b._ To the Gestapo office (according to restricted distribution C.)
_For information_
_a._ To all inspectors of the Security police and the SD.
_b._ To the Inspector-General of the reinforced SS-Death’s Head Units
(with 8 copies for the camps).
_Subject_: Execution of protective custody.
By order of the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police,
all prisoners under protective custody due for transference to a
concentration camp will, during the war, be assigned to a special
penal section. The only exceptions will be prisoners under protective
custody, who are assigned to a camp as a preventative police measure,
(particularly those under index A), or those who are expressly exempt
on the nominal role.
* * * * * * *
In order to achieve a further deterrent effect, the following must, in
future, be observed in each individual case.
* * * * * * *
3. _The length of the period of custody must in no case be made known_,
even if the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police or the
Chief of the Security Police and the SD has already fixed it.
The term of a commitment to a concentration camp is to be openly
announced as “until further notice.”
In serious cases, there is no objection to the increasing of the
deterrent effect by the spreading of a cleverly carried out _rumor
propaganda_, more or less to the effect that, according to hearsay,
in view of the seriousness of his case, the arrested man will not be
released for 2 or 3 years.
4. In certain cases, the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German
Police will order flogging in addition to detention in a concentration
camp. Orders of this kind will, in future, also be transmitted to the
State Police District Office concerned. In this case too, there is no
objection to spreading the rumour of this increased punishment as laid
down in Section 3, paragraph 3, in so far as this appears suitable, to
add to the deterrent effect.
5. Naturally, particularly suitable and reliable people are to be
chosen for the spreading of such news.
* * * * * * *
By Order
(signed) Mueller
Authenticated: (signed) Bleeck
Chancellery employee
# # # # #
II
Chief of the Security Police and the SD
Bk. No. IV--226/42 Top Secret
Berlin, 12th June 1942
120 Copies 110th Copy
TOP SECRET
_As Top Secret_
to all Chiefs of the Security Police and the SD
to all Directors of Groups IV A, IV B, IV C, and IV E of the Reich
Security Head Office
to all Commanding Officers of the Security Police and the SD
to all Heads of the State Police District Offices
_For Information_
to the Inspectors of the Security Police and the SD
_Subject_: Third degree
_Enclosure: 1 receipt_
In order to simplify things the Decree of the Chief of the Security
police and the SD of 1.7.37 Bk. No. 28 (II) 301/37 Secret (to be
destroyed according to sealed orders) will be superseded by the
following new ruling, with immediate effect:
1. Third degree may only be applied if it is clear from preliminary
investigation that the prisoner can give information on important
facts, as social or subversive to the State and to the Reich, but will
not disclose what he knows, and the information cannot be obtained by
investigation.
2. Third degree may, under this supposition, only be employed against
Communists, Marxists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, saboteurs, terrorists,
members of resistance movements, parachute agents, anti-social
elements, Polish or Soviet-Russian loafers or tramps. In all other
cases, my permission must first be obtained.
3. Third degree may not be used to extort confessions of a prisoner’s
own crimes. Also this method may not be employed against persons who
are temporarily detained by law for further investigations.
My previous permission is also necessary in exceptional cases.
4. Third degree can, according to the circumstances, consist, among
other methods, of very simple diet (water and bread), hard bunk,
dark cell, deprivation of sleep, exhaustion drill, but also in the
administration of flogging (for more than 20 strokes a doctor must be
consulted).
I. V.
(signed) Mueller
Authenticated: (signed) Nellmuth
Registered Secretary (Female)
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1534-PS
Berlin, W.8., Wilhelm Street 79, 30 January 37
My Fuehrer:
I thank you for the confidence which you have placed into me during
the four years of your leadership and for the honour you do me in
offering to admit me to the party. My conscience forbids me however to
accept this offer. I believe in the principles of positive christianity
and must remain faithful to my Lord and to myself. Party membership
however would mean that I should have to face without contradiction
the steadily aggravating attacks by party offices on the Christian
confessions and those who want to remain faithful to their religious
convictions.
This decision has been infinitely difficult for me. For never in my
life I have performed my duty with greater joy and satisfaction than
under your wise state leadership.
I ask to be permitted to resign.
With German Greetings!
Your very obedient,
(signed) Baron v. Eltz.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1536-PS
TOP SECRET
Reich Minister for Air and C-in-C Air Force [initials written in ink]
12 August 1938
Draft
General Officers only
2 copies 2nd Copy
Access only through officer
General Staff 5.Division No. 21/38. Top Secret General Officers only
(Ic)
Re: Freudenthal Affair
Ref: Abwehr II No. 42/38. Top Secret General Officers only.
A. As Appendix 1 please find enclosed a translation by Major d.G.
Moericke on which the following comment is made:
1. The report from the Abwehrstelle Breslau still does not prove that
the real circumstances are known to the two Sudeten Germans or even
widely in Sudeten German circles. Nevertheless, there is still no need
for Czech authorities to have any knowledge of them.
If the worst comes to the worst it is a question, in eventual remarks
made by Macholdt to Pilz, of suppositions which are nevertheless very
near to the truth of the matter.
2. For the time being there is no reason for stopping preparations for
the Fr. operation.
3. Punishable behaviour on the part of Major Moericke cannot be deduced
purely from the Abwehrstelle report. Rather, as far as can be seen
from here, has Major Moericke carried out the task allotted to him
skilfully and provided good evidence.
B. In the course of further preparations, the following measures are
recommended:
1. Not a single word on the matter will be mentioned to informers
[V-Leute].
2. The fields will not be purchased through middlemen. Neither will
any influence be brought to bear on the owners in order to effect any
change in the cultivation of the land according to local custom and the
time of the year.
3. In the event of the suspected endangering of our plans, as a result
of treachery, then it will be a question of sham reconnoitring of
landing grounds in other areas and spreading of rumors as a camouflage.
4. It is worth considering whether Macholdt and Pilz cannot be called
back to Germany on some pretext and retained here temporarily.
C. Further to the preparations which have already been carried out, the
following proposals have been made by the Luftwaffe:
1. Continual supervision of the state of the agricultural cultivation
of the landing grounds in question, in accordance with Appendices 2, 3,
4.
2. Continual supervision of the area around Freudenthal with regard to
whether Czech defence measures against their intended employment are
being undertaken.
Reconnoitring of further landing grounds, if possible by 10 September,
in the following areas:
_a._ Freudenthal--Spachendorf--Hof--Braunseifen--Freudenthal.
_b._ Around Sternberg (up to a radius of 5 km).
_c._ Around Olmuetz (up to a radius of 10 km).
As landing grounds are considered flat open stretches, above all dry
meadows and clay strips with a surface area of approximately 500 × 500
m. and larger.
If possible it is requested that photographs similar to Appendices 3
and 4 are brought along.
By order of
Schmidt
Distribution:
Abwehr II, 1st Copy received with 4 appendices
General Staff 5th Division (Ic), 2nd Copy 13/8
[signature illegible]
# # # # #
Appendix 1 to Reich Minister for Air and C-in-C Air Force. General
Staff 5th Division. No. 21/38. Top Secret General Officers only
dated 12.8.38.
TOP SECRET
Berlin 4.8.1938
General Officers only
Access through Officer only
Transaction
Major of the General Staff Moericke, Air Attaché at the German
Legation, Prague, states:
I was ordered by the General Staff of the Air Force to reconnoitre
the land in the region Freudenthal/Freihermersdorf for landing
possibilities.
For this purpose I obtained private lodgings in Freudenthal with the
manufacturer Macholdt, through one of my trusted men in Prague.
I had specifically ordered this man to give no details about me to M,
particularly about my official position.
I used my official car [Dienst Pkw] for the journey to Fr. taking
precautions against being observed.
The manufacturer M. is head of the Sudeten German Glider Pilots in
Fr. and said to be absolutely reliable by my trusted man. My personal
impression fully confirmed this judgment. No hint of my identity was
made to him, although I had the impression that M. knew who I was.
At my request, with which he complied without any question, M.
travelled with me over the country in question. We used M’s private car
for the trip.
As M. did not know the country around Beneschau sufficiently well,
he took with him the local leader of the F.S., a Czech reservist of
the Sudeten German Racial Group, at the time on leave. He was in
uniform. For reasons of camouflage I was entirely in agreement with
this--without actually saying so.
As M., during the course of the drive, observed that I photographed
large open spaces out of the car, he said “Aha, so you’re looking
for airfields!” I answered that we supposed that, in the case of any
serious trouble, the Czechs would put their airfields immediately
behind the line of fortifications. I had the intention of looking over
the country from that point of view.
To my question as to when the farmers in this part were generally in
the habit of ploughing up the fields he answered: “Always immediately
after the harvest.”
I thought that in this way he wanted to express the fact that the
Czechs would no longer be able to use the fields as airfields even
shortly after harvest.
Before leaving Fr. I bound M. to absolute secrecy as regards what he
had seen.
From the conversation between M. and the Leader of the F.S. in
Beneschau, whose name I do not know, I noticed that they knew several
of the Abwehr informers [V-Leute] in Freudenthal and Beneschau. Both M.
and the 2nd companion are minor informers [V-Leute].
As I have at the moment no incentive to believe that M. has not kept
his promise, I can only presume that Pilz is the same person as the
leader of the F. S. in Beneschau, who, accompanied us at the time,
and a subordinate informer [V-Mann] to the informer [V-Mann] in the
Security Office [Abwehrstelle] at Breslau.
I believe it to be out of the question that the real purpose of my
reconnaissance be known.
Should measures be invoked against Macholdt or Pilz on the grounds of
the report from the Security Office at Breslau, I urgently request a
hearing beforehand.
Moericke, Major d. G.H.
g. w. o.
Schmidt, Maj. d. G.
# # # # #
Appendix 2 to Reich Minister for Air and C-in-C of the Air Force,
General Staff 5th Division.
No. 21/38. Top Secret General Officers only dated 12.8.38.
[Section of map]
General Officers only
Access through Officer only
Appendix 3 to Reich Minister for Air, etc.
[photograph]
Landing-ground south of Freudenthal; taken from southern edge of
Freudenthal looking west.
Appendix 4, Sectional picture of airfields _a_ and _b_ [4
photographs].
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1538-PS
SECRET
Office Foreign Intelligence Dept Foreign Affairs Nr 173/41 (g.K.Chefs
III org)
May 24, 1941
[Stamp] Air-Corps-Operational, 7 copies
Staff I a, 2 copies
May 24, 41
No. 279.
[Stamp] TOP SECRET
(to be forwarded) By Officer only
To be presented to the Chief of the Armed Forces High Command.
[Marginal note:]
The Military Attaché Tokio reports with No. T 47 signed May 23.
In interview with Akita on handling of relations between Japan and USA
in the press, desire was expressed to hear Okamoto on the form in which
Japan would start hostilities in case of a war between USA and Germany.
Instead of a reception by Okamoto visit with Akita who explained:
[Marginal note:]
To be presented to the Chief of the Office Foreign Intelligence
(simultaneously for ZL).
1. In case USA enters war, Japan acknowledges treaty obligations at
once. However, would not open hostilities immediately. Preparations for
attack on Singapore and Manila stand.
2. Possible war Russia-Germany causes USA entry into war. Japanese
action as mentioned under 1 plus preparation of possible attacks (on)
Vladivostok and Blagowesqensk.
[Marginal note:]
(To be presented to the) Operational Staff of the Air-Forces I. C.
3. Conclusion of conflict with China important before new tasks for
Japanese Armed Forces. I am stressing first that Japanese recognition
of obligations under treaty needs confirmation by immediate opening of
hostilities.
Signature: Bueckner
U R Ia
Schmid [in crayon]
May 24
Copy to:
L.
3 Skl
Sonderstb H.H.K.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1541-PS
TOP MILITARY SECRET
The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces High Command/armed forces.
Command Staff/armed forces, Section L Nr. 33 406/40
TOP SECRET
Matter of Chief Fuehrer #9
Only through Officer 13 December 1940
[illegible notations] 12 Copies, 9th Copy
Direction Number 20
Operation Marita
1. The result of the battles in Albania is not yet decisive. Because
of a dangerous situation in Albania it is doubly necessary that the
British endeavor be foiled to create airbases under the protection of a
Balkan front, which would be dangerous above all to Italy as well as to
the Rumanian oil fields.
2. My plan therefore is (_a_) to form a slowly increasing task force in
Southern Rumania within the next months.
(_b_) After the setting in of favorable weather, probably in March, to
send this task force for the occupation of the Aegean North coast by
way of Bulgaria, and if necessary to occupy the entire Greek mainland
(Operation Marita). The support of Bulgaria is to be expected.
3. For the _concentration of the task force_ in Rumania are necessary:
(_a_) The 16th Panzer Division which arrives in December on an army
mission, and whose task remains unchanged.
(_b_) Following will be a task force of about seven divisions (final
wave) to be dispatched to Southern Rumania. Engineers in the required
strength for the preparation of the Danube crossing can conveniently be
attached for transport to the 16th Panzer Division (as instructional
troops). The field commander of the army will await my decision for the
proper moment for them to be employed on the Danube.
(_c_) Preparations are to be made for further transport to take in the
calculated maximum for the operation Marita (total of 24 divisions).
(_d_) It is the mission of the Air Force to give air protection to the
concentration, as well as preparing the necessary primary and reserve
installations on Rumanian soil.
4. The _Operation Marita_ itself is to be prepared on the following
basis:
(_a_) The primary mission of the operation is the occupation of the
Aegean coast, and the Bay of Saloniki. It may be necessary to continue
the attack across Larissa and the Isthmus of Corinth.
(_b_) Flank protection against Turkey will be the task of the Bulgarian
forces, although it is to be secured and strengthened through the
alerting of German Forces.
(_c_) It is not certain whether the Bulgarian forces will take part
in the attack. Likewise the Yugoslavs position cannot yet be clearly
determined.
(_d_) It will be the mission of the _Air Force_ to support the drive of
the army in all phases, to liquidate the opposing air force, and, as
far as possible, to occupy British strongpoints on the Greek Islands
through airborne landings.
(_e_) The question in which fashion the Operation Marita is to be
supported by the Italian forces, and how coordination of the operations
is to take place, awaits a later decision.
5. The military preparations which will produce exceptional political
results in the Balkans demands the exact control of all the necessary
measures by the General Staff.
The transport through Hungary and the arrival in Rumania will be
reported step by step by the General Staff of the armed forces and are
to be explained at first as a strengthening of the Germany Army mission
in Rumania.
Consultations with the Rumanians or the Bulgarians which may point to
our intentions as well as notification of the Italians are each subject
to my consent; also the sending of scouting missions and advanced
parties.
6. After the completion of the Operation Marita it is contemplated to
use the access of the forces used therein for a _new undertaking_.
7. I anticipate reports from the Chiefs concerning their plans, which
has already taken place as regards the Army. I want to be presented
with exact timetables for the planned preparations, as well as for the
necessary recallings from the armament industry (reconstruction of
Furlough Divisions).
Signed: Adolf Hitler
Witnessed: [signature illegible] Captain in the General Staff
Distribution:
Commander of the Armies (Operational Section), 1st Copy
Commander of the Navy (Sea War Direction), 2nd Copy
Commander of the Air Force (Air Force General Staff), 3rd Copy
Chief of the German Army Mission to Rumania, 4th Copy
_Supreme Command of the Armed Forces:_
Command Staff, 5th Copy
Section L, 6-9 Copies
UNV, 10th Copy
Chief of Army Transport Forces, 11th Copy
Foreign Counter Intelligence Office, 12th Copy
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1544-PS
File Memorandum
on my parting visit with the Chancellor
After an exchange of irrelevant courtesies, the conversation turned
to the speech of the Chancellor [Bundeskanzler]. I said to him that
though he had used very cordial expressions on the German mission of
Austria his dramatic advocacy of her independence which he apparently
considered threatened had drowned out this testimony to a large extent,
to say nothing about some unnecessary pinpricks against Germany. To
his assertion that he had reestablished his authority in the country
by this speech I added that this speech also had provoked a debate
yesterday in the French Chamber. In my opinion it was greatly to be
regretted that the Austrian question had again become the center of
European discussions. For Germany an Austrian independence supported
by French and Czech crutches was intolerable, for it would lead to
arguments which might easily endanger the peace concluded recently.
The Chancellor admitted this without qualifications and requested
me to inform the Reich Foreign Minister as soon as possible that
neither he nor any other political agency in Austria had instigated
this debate in the French Chamber, and that he shared my opinion on
its extraordinarily disrupting effects. On my request he stated his
willingness to publish Sunday morning an article in the official paper
“Wiener Zeitung” (Viennese Newspaper) in which he would clearly detach
the problem of Austrian independence from French interests. And he had
instructed the Austrian press to carry only meagre excerpts of the
debate in the Chamber.
I then introduced into the conversation the widespread opinion that
he had acted under “brutal pressure” in Berchtesgaden. I myself had
been present and been able to state that he had always and at every
point had complete freedom of decision. The Chancellor replied he had
actually been under considerable moral pressure, he could not deny
that. He had made notes on the talk which bore that out. I reminded
him that despite this talk he had not seen his way clear to make any
concessions, and I asked him whether without the pressure he would have
been ready to make the concessions he made late in the evening. He
answered: “To be honest, no!” It appears to me of importance to record
this statement.
In parting I asked the Chancellor never to deceive himself that Austria
could ever maintain her status with the help of Non-German, European
combinations. This question would be decided only according to the
interests of the German people. He asserted that he held the same
conviction and would act accordingly.
Vienna, 26 Feb 1938
/s/ Papen
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1546-PS
N. THE OCCUPATION OF NORWAY ON 9 APRIL 1940.
[RAEDER MEMORANDUM]
In the beginning of October 1939, I had a discussion on the Norwegian
question with the Commander of Naval Group East, Admiral Carls, with
whose opinions I completely agreed. After that I gave the Fuehrer an
oral report on the dangers of an occupation of Norwegian bases by
the British and on the possibilities to forestall such a move. The
Fuehrer to whom I submitted a short memorandum promised to think it
over. About at the beginning of December, the Fuehrer received reports
on the activity of the National Samling movement in Norway under the
leadership of Quisling and its successes. The incorporation of Norway
into a Germanic empire under German leadership and with elimination
of English influence was the aim of this movement. These matters were
obviously carried to the Fuehrer by Rosenberg. Around the 12 Dec.
1939 the Fuehrer commanded the OKW to effect the preparations for
the occupation of Norwegian bases in the coming spring. As it was a
question of an operation of _all three branches of the Armed Forces_
it had to be worked out by the Armed Forces High Command in which the
special Naval adviser took the chief part and took the lead in working
it out in accordance with a memorandum prepared by the Sea Warfare
Command and in close cooperation with the Sea Warfare Command.
I had left the _Danish Question_ open in my report to the Fuehrer
supposing that after the occupation of the Norwegian coast the English
influence in Denmark could be completely eliminated in such wise that
the intelligence service there could not cause any more harm and the
Danish Government would comply with the demands of the German High
Command without function. However, the Fuehrer decided to occupy
Denmark at the same time.
The Navy made the decision to transport the _first group_ of the
occupation troops with their equipment on warships and to land them
under their immediate protection. Even though the combat-readiness
of the warships was impaired by loading them with troops, by this
method the possibility of a punctual landing at the ordered time was
best provided for. Further groups with munition and supplies were to
be loaded on steamships which were to arrive simultaneously or soon
after the warships. The difficulty was that at that time the divisions
of the army still demanded to be transported with all equipment and
“rear echelon service” while a considerable limitation of their
equipment would have been necessary and possible. Considerable demands
of transport space were made by the Air Forces for their ground
organization for which no experience existed at all up till then.
The Navy had already in peacetime an organization of “Naval Service
Offices” in all large German ports which worked in close touch with
the Merchant Marine and were at all times exactly informed of the
location and the readiness for sailing of the German merchant ships of
their area. Material for the rebuilding of these ships for transport
purposes was at their disposal, plans for such rebuilding were ready in
their hands. In January these offices received directives to have the
necessary transport space ready in spring. A transport in a westerly
direction was given as the reason for camouflage purposes. The Air
Force did not join this organization that also was very favourable for
secrecy, but gave the order for their extensive transports to a certain
firm with which it had already cooperated at the time of the transports
to Spain. This included certain dangers for secrecy and eliminated the
experience of the Navy. Moreover, the command of the Air Force did not
approach with particular enthusiasm this task in the work of which not
the Air Force, but the not so well liked Navy, had the leading part. In
the Navy the impression existed that some things could have been better
done with regard to the reconnaissance of airfields in Norway and to
the preparations for the improvement and the building of airfields.
The preparations for the enterprise were rendered more difficult
by the long and very cold winter of 1939/40 which delayed quite a
bit the bringing up of the steamers involved in the transport from
the eastern part of the Baltic Sea and their loading. With all the
effort to forestall the English in the occupation--their unneutral
action against the German supply ship in Flekkefjord in 1940 made the
apprehension of the German Command appear only too well founded--the
date for the landing was fixed by the Fuehrer not earlier than on
April 9, 1940 in which regard it could not be helped that according to
the latest information received the English planned an enterprise in
Norwegian waters for April 8--it remained open whether mine-laying on
occupation of air bases. My request to fix the landing on April 7 was
unfortunately not granted by the Fuehrer.
The general order for the execution of the landing was signed by the
Fuehrer; detailed directives valid for all armed forces were given
by the High Command in which, as already mentioned, the special Navy
adviser took the lead. The ports of embarkation were distributed from
Wesermmende to Stettin-Swinenmende along the coast. The transportation
of the troops to the ports was undertaken only in the last hours before
departure without their knowing where they were being transported. It
was particularly difficult for the keeping of the secret that for the
enterprise in Northern Norway some units of Southern German mountain
troops were destined whose appearance in Northern Germany was already
conscious enough by itself. But we succeeded in keeping them uncertain
about the destination until to their complete surprise, they were
embarked on the destroyers in Wesermmende in the night of April 7. The
number of the Army and air units I cannot state anymore from memory at
present. Also, the composition of the landing troops I can give only in
general terms.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1551-PS
1936 REICHS MINISTERIALBLATT i.V., PAGES 946-948
Assignment and Channels of the Chief of German Police within the
Ministry of the Interior of 26 June 1936
(1) For your information, I publish in the enclosures my edicts,
concerning the appointment of a chief of regular police and that
of a chief of security police (enclosure (1)), and concerning the
administrative divisions within the realm of the German police
(enclosure (2)), effective today.
(2) Official communications in regards to police matters with Reich and
Prussian Ministry of the Interior are to be handled as follows:
(_a_) Letters and communications for me personally, as well as letters
and communications of fundamental importance, are to be addressed:
To the
Reichsleiter SS and Chief of German Police in the Reich Ministry of
the Interior
Berlin SW 11
Prinz-Albrecht Str. 8
(_b_) Letters and communications, which refer to matters to be handled
by the headquarters of the regular police according to my edict about
the administrative divisions within the realm of the Chief of German
Police, are to be addressed:
To the
Reichsleiter SS and the Chief of German Police in the Reich Ministry
of the Interior (Chief of Regular Police)
Berlin NW 7
Unter den Linden 74
(_c_) Letters and communications, which refer to matters to be handled
by the headquarters of the Security Police according to my edict about
the administrative divisions within the realm of the Chief of German
Police, are to be addressed:
To the
Reichsleiter SS and the Chief of German Police in the Reich Ministry
of the Interior (Chief of Security Police)
Berlin SW 11
Prinz-Albrecht Str. 8
Phone # Chief of German Police: A2 (Flora) 0040
Phone # Chief of Regular Police: A2 (Flora) 0034
Phone # Chief of Security Police: A2 (Flora) 0040
To the lower agencies, the communities and community organizations as
well as bodies of public law.
To the highest Reich officials, the Prussian Prime Minister, the
Prussian Minister of Finance, the General Manager of the German
Railroad, the Directorate of the Reichsbank by copy.
# # # # #
Berlin, 26 June 1936
Inclosure #1
The Reichleiter SS and Chief of the German Police in the Reich
Ministry of the Interior
Appointment of a Chief of Regular Police and a Chief of Security Police
(1) On the basis of the execution edict of the Reich Minister of the
Interior to the edict of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor, in reference
to the appointment of a Chief of German Police, I herewith appoint
General of Police Kurt Daluege as chief of the regular police and SS
Gruppenfuehrer Reinhard Heydrich as Chief of the Security Police.
(2) From the entire police force [Vollzugspolizei] the following come
under:
The Chief of Regular Police:
Safety Police [Schutzpolizei]
Rural Police [Gendarmerie]
Local Police [Gemeindepolizei]
The Chief of Security Police:
The Political Police
The Criminal Police
(3) The authority over fields of action of the Chief of German Police,
not mentioned here, is explained in the plan of administrative division
(Inclosure #2)
To the (a) General of Police Daluege, (b) SS Gruppenfuehrer Heydrich.
# # # # #
Inclosure #2 Berlin 26 June 1936
The Reichleiter SS and Chief of the German Police in the Reich Ministry
of the Interior O/S No 2/36
Administrative division within the realm of the Chief of German Police
On the basis of #1 of the edict of the Reich and Prussian Minister of
the Interior of 25 June 1936 (not published), for the execution of the
edict of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor regarding the appointment of
a Chief of German Police, I therefore order (with permission of the
Reich- and Prussian Minister of the Interior):
1. The functioning of the branches, under the jurisdiction of the Chief
of German Police, will be handled by two (2) headquarters:
_a._ The regular police, which will include the following branches:
Household, pay, welfare, economy and police law.
General administrative affairs of the state police, as far as they
concern the regular police.
Safety police.
Traffic police.
Rural police [Gendarmerie], local police [Gemeindepolizei], civil
service legal affairs.
Medical and veterinary affairs.
National defense and army matters, as far as they have been put under
the jurisdiction of the regular police. Personnel affairs of
officials of the regular police.
(The security police is to participate in all actions, which affect the
security police).
The headquarters “Regular Police” is entrusted with the functioning of
the following branches in conjunction with the headquarters “security
police” if the latter are concerned:
Administrative police; and
Personnel affairs of police presidents and police directors.
_b._ The security police, which will include the following branches:
Political police,
Lodge affairs, freemasonry, fraternity affairs, criminal police,
Disciplinary affairs within the criminal police,
General administrative affairs of the state police, as far as the
security police is concerned,
Press law,
Weapons law and traffic with arms,
Passports affairs:
General cases.
Special cases.
Agreements with foreign states about the free passage of the border
[kleinen Grenzverkehr].
Foreign legionnaires (passport matters).
Immigration of Jews from the East.
National defense and army matters, as far as they have been put under
the jurisdiction of the security police.
Alien affairs:
General cases.
Police regulations for foreigners.
Special cases.
Fugitives [refractaere], deserters.
Deportations.
Reimbursement.
Foreign workers.
Border disputes.
Extradition of foreigners.
Registration of foreigners.
Statistics of foreigners.
Border disputes; Foreign Legion.
Personnel affairs of all officials of the security police.
Personnel affairs of all officials of the political and criminal
police.
(The regular police is to participate in all actions, which affect the
regular police).
2. I confer the leadership of the headquarters Regular Police upon
General of Police Daluege. I confer the leadership of the headquarters
Security Police upon SS Gruppenfuehrer Heydrich.
3. The chiefs of the headquarters Regular Police and Security Police
will sign:
For the Chief of the German Police
“acting for”
For the Reich and Prussian Minister of the Interior
“by order”
The chiefs of the headquarters Regular Police and Security Police in
their offices, in which cases their department heads and assistants are
to sign:
“by order”
* * * * * * *
To _a._ General of Police Daluege
_b._ SS Gruppenfuehrer Heydrich
Communication to ______________________
Report on Sterilization in Germany and occupied countries to be sent to
the members of Committee I Submitted by Dr. B. Ecer ANNEX B
Detailed Statement on the murdering of ill and aged people in Germany
1. The murdering can be traced back to a secret law which was released
sometime in Summer 1940.
2. Besides the Chief Physician of the Reich Dr. L. Conti, the
Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler, the Reichs Minister of the Interior Dr. Frick
as well as other men, the following participate on the introduction of
this secret law:
_a._ The Councillor of the Ministry Dr. Herbert Linden of the Reich’s
Ministry of the Interior.
_b._ Dr. Staehle-Nagold, the Chief Physician of Wuerttemberg.
_c._ Councillor of Medicine /Obermedizinalrat/ Dr. Hermann
Pfannmueller, Director of the Sanatorium and Nursing Institution
Eglfing-Haar near Munich.
_d._ Professor Dr. Werner Heyde, Director of the Psychiatric and
Neurological Clinic in Wuerzburg.
* * * * * * *
3. As I have already stated, there were / after careful calculation
/ at least 200,000 mainly mentally deficient, imbeciles, besides
neurological cases and medically unfit people /these were not only
incurable cases/, and at least 75,000 aged people.
4. The murders were mainly accomplished in Muensingen/Wuerttemberg and
Linz o/Danube; several gas-chambers with cremation chambers directly
attached were constructed there. As the gas-chambers are next to the
training grounds of the troops in Muensingen, it is believed that the
mentally deficient who were murdered there, were used for experimenting
with new poison-gases.
5. The transport from the institutions to the gas-chambers is carried
out by SS Kommandos. These call themselves “Gemeinnuetzige Transport
A. G., Berlin, Luetzowufer.” This Limited Company also stores the
individual medical case histories of the murdered inmates of the
institutions.
6. The inmates of the many smaller and middle-sized institutions
were murdered almost without exception. The larger institutions are
partly--to keep up the pretence to the outside world--still at hand,
but they now only have a fraction of the original number of their
inmates; for example there are now only some 500 inmates instead of
2500 in Berlin-Buch; in Stadtroda/Thueringen only about 150 instead
of 600; in Kaufbeuren/Bayern only 200 instead of 1000, etc. Of the
larger Sanatoriums and Nursing Institutions the following were already
closed down completely some time ago; Illenau/Baden 800 inmates;
Berlin/Herzberge 2500 inmates, Kreutzburg/Oberschlesien 1500 inmates;
Sonnenstein/Sachsen 800 inmates; Werneck/Unterfranken-Bayern 111
inmates; Steinhof/Wien 3000 inmates, and others, most probably now also
Schleswig with 1000 beds. Guenzburg with 400 etc. etc.
* * * * * * *
Written in December 1941,
/sgd/ Dr. T. Lang
This is to certify, that the above report by Dr. T. Lang dated Dec.
1941 is part of the original report of the Czechoslovak War Crimes
Commission.
Nurnberg 8. Dec. 1945 for Col. Dr. Ecer
Capt. Dr. Hochwald
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1573-PS
SECRET
Copy
The chief of the Security Police and the Security Service. IV D 3-3
B/41 g.Rs.-
Berlin, 18 Jun. 1941
TOP SECRET
Express letter
To all state police Administrative office
(To the State Police, attention SS Stubaf. RR. Nosske or
representative at Aachen)
_Subject_: Measures to be taken against Emigrants and civilian
workers who came from the great Russian areas and against
Foreign workers.
_Reference_: None
To prevent the unauthorized and arbitrary return of Russian, Ukrainian,
White Ruthenians, Cossack and Caucasian emigrants and civilian workers
from the territory of the Reich to the East and to prevent attempts
at disorder by foreign workers in the German production, I decide as
follows:
1. The managers of the branch offices [Stuetzpunkt] of the
Russian, Ukrainian, White Ruthenian and Caucasians trustee office
[Vertrauensstellen] as well as the relief committee and the leading
members of the Russian, Ukrainian, White Ruthenian, Cossack and
Caucasian emigration organisations are to be notified immediately that
they are not allowed to leave their domicile without permission of
the security police until further notice. Also they are to be told
to apply the same measures to the members who are under their care.
Their attention is to be called to the fact that they will be arrested
because of unauthorized leaving of the place of work and domicile.
I request you to have a check up of the attendance of branch office
leaders if possible by daily requests in these concerns.
2. Emigrants and foreign workers are to be arrested if it seems
necessary in the situation if there is no doubt of their guilt and if
they are under the suspicion of having been active for the U.S.S.R.
in transmitting news. The measure is to be in readiness, however, it
should not be executed before the pass word “Fremdvoelker” has been
transmitted by means of Urgent telegram.
3. In case of refusals to work or in making propaganda for the enemy or
suspicion of sabotage among all foreign laborers arrests and protective
custody should be applied most strictly.
4. Persons who violate issued decrees or who try to provoke
disturbances in factories or meetings by inflammatory speeches to the
emigrants or foreign workers are also to be arrested.
5. It is an absolute necessity for the maintenance of German production
to its capacity that emigrants and foreign workers remain at their
places of work. In case, conditions in certain communities require
that special measures be taken to reach this objective. I ask for
appropriate action and report.
The RSHA to be kept posted how these measures are carried out. The
decree also is to be applied to emigrants who came from the Baltic
states--Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians.
By order
/s/ MUELLER
Certified correct: /s/ Signature
(L.S.) Chancellery clerk.
# # # # #
Aachen, 3 July 1941
_Note_: The original decree can be found under IIIc under File No.
20/41 top secret
Koernert
Krim-Assistent
SECRET
Secret State Police, State Police Bldg.-Aachen
II E br.-No. 6/41 top Secret
Aachen, 22 Jan. 1942
1. The written record of these proceedings was worked out and sent
through as a secret matter under II E under No. 303/41.
2. R II deliver taken care of 22. Jan.
3. To the Top Secret File
By order
[illegible] Koer
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1574-PS
SECRET STATE POLICE [Gestapo]
Secret Police Office, Reich Security Head Office. IV C 2--5719/
4540/43 g
Berlin SW 11 Prinz Albrecht Strasse 8. 19 January 1944 Warrant for
“Protective Custody”
Christian Name & Surname: _James_, Cook Steele.
Date and Place of birth: 29.20.1918 at Malseta, S. Rhodesia
Occupation: Warrant Officer
M or S: Married
Nationality: British Subject
Race (to be stated in case of non-Aryans)
Address: Gresham Farm Marandellas, S. Rhodesia
is being taken in protective custody.
Reasons
It has been established by the State Police that he/she endangers the
existence and the security of the people and the state by his/her
conduct, in that he/she has been proved to be guilty of activities to
the detriment of the German Reich and there is reason to suspect that
he would, if released, commit acts prejudicial to the interests of the
Reich.
received 23.1.44. 1400 hrs
[initials]
(Sgd) Dr. Kaltenbrunner
Certified correct: (sgd) Kriminalrat
Steele should not know of the existence of this warrant [written in
pencil; illegible initials follow].
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1582-PS
Bra/V
SS-Untersturmfuehrer Dr. med. Sigmund RASCHER
MUNICH, Trogerstr. 56
Dear Dr. Rascher:
Shortly before flying to Oslo, the Reichsfuehrer SS gave me your letter
of 15 May, 1941, for partial reply.
I can inform you that prisoners will of course be gladly made available
for the high-flight researches. I have informed the Chief of the
Security Police of this agreement of the Reichsfuehrer SS, and
requested that the competent official be instructed to get in touch
with you.
I want to use the opportunity to extend my cordial wishes to you on the
birth of your son.
I shall refer as soon as possible to the second part of your letter.
Heil Hitler
By order [initials] R Br
SS-Sturmbannfuehrer
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1583-PS
SECRET
Reichsfuehrer SS.
RG/V
Field Command Post 16 November 1942
Personal Headquarters, Reichsfuehrer SS
1. To SS Lt. Gen OHL, BERLIN
Dear OHL,
The following struck me during my visit to Dachau on the 13 Nov 1942
regarding the experiments conducted there for the saving of people
whose lives are endangered through exposure [Unterkuhlung] in ice, snow
or water and who are to be saved by the employment of every method or
means:
I had ordered that suitable women are to be set aside from the
Concentration Camp for these experiments for the warming of those who
were exposed. Four girls were set aside who were in the Concentration
Camp due to loose living, and being prostitutes, they formulate a
danger of contagion. Among those four was a 21 year old girl named
Ursula Kraus, who naturally was not to be set aside for this. Kraus
was a person under the care of the State [Fuersorgezoegling] and has
already been sick twice with venereal disease. Nevertheless she belongs
to that type of girl upon whom the attempt must be made in order to
save her for the German people and for her own later life.
In addition, I found during this opportunity that some madmen in the
women’s Concentration Camp had told the feminine prisoners at the
time of selection of prostitutes for the Camp brothel, that those who
volunteered would be released after a half year.
I order:
1. Only such prostitutes are to be selected for the Camp brothel who
from the beginning can be taken for granted as not being able to be
saved for a later regulated life, judging from their previous living
and bearing. Also, that we are not guilty of spoiling a person who
could still be saved for the German people. Such women can only be
released from the Concentration Camp if they according to their age, do
not constitute a destruction to the youth, to health (by contagion), or
to the public welfare and security. The money which they earn in the
camp brothel shall be an old-age security for them.
2. Fundamentally, all youths who can still be saved are to be
segregated from the older prostitutes in living quarters and work. A
difference must be made between those who cannot be reformed,--who must
remain isolated in the camps, and those who came into the camp to be
reformed and can eventually be saved. The best and most ideologically
inclined custodians are to be employed for the latter.
In addition, I refer to the fact that the whipping penalty as a whole
but especially for women, is to be the last measure, it is only to be
used
_a._ if all other punishment such as arrest, solitary confinement, diet
of bread and water, hard labor, were of no avail.
_b._ in individual cases of desertion or in actual attacks, which
must be inflicted for intimidating and especially exemplary reasons.
The whipping penalty is no instrument for responsible commanders or
supervising custodians who are too lazy or incompetent to reeducate. In
all cases in which food was stolen, the guilty one is to be placed on
bread and water from 3 to 5 days as punishment for first offense. The
whipping penalty is only then to be inflicted upon repeated offenses.
I ask you to personally check the conditions in the women’s
concentration camps. Otherwise we must feel guilty since girls who
could still be saved will be ruined for always through false treatment
and repeated bad company in which we placed them (exactly as is the
case in the prisons and reform schools of the law).
Heil Hitler!
Your
(signed) H. Himmler
2. Inspector of the Concentration Camps, Oranienburg
Carbon copy with request for acknowledgment.
SS Lt. Col.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1584-I-PS
Teletype Goering to Himmler, dated 14 February 1944
TOP SECRET
CHIEF REICH SECURITY OFFICE
Teletype Section
URGENT
Transmitted by [Initials]
Received
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Hour | Day | Month | Year | from | by
240 | 15 | 2 | 44 | E2 | [Initials]
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FS--No. 24411
t-KR-RM Asien Nr. 0170 14/2 2030--QEM--GKDOL--to Reichsfuehrer-SS
Reichs Minister Himmler, Berlin SW 11-Reference: Letter Journal No.
72/44.-
Subject: Formation of the 7th Airforce group squadron for special
purposes 7 (Z.B.V.7)
I received your request to form another squadron of airforce group for
special purposes 7 (Z.B.V.7) and ordered examination by the air force
operational staff [Luftwaffenfuehrungsstab]. At the same time I ask you
to put at my disposal as great a number of Concentration Camp [K Z]
convicts as possible for air armament, as this kind of manpower proved
to be very useful according to previous experience. The situation of
the air war makes subterranean transfer of industry necessary. For work
of this kind Concentration Camp [KZ] convicts can be especially well
concentrated at work and in the camp. Such installations are necessary
in order to secure production of the now fully developed most modern
airplanes. The Fuehrer upon his visit in Insterbrug has attached great
value to these airplanes. Intermediate negotiations have already been
held between my and your departments. I would be especially grateful
for your support in carrying out this task.
Heil Hitler--Yours Goering, Reich Marshal of Greater Germany. ADF
391/44 GKDOS.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1584-III-PS
TOP SECRET
The Reichsfuehrer-SS Field Command Post.
Personal Staff 10 March 1944
Diary No.
_Subject_: Use of Prisoners in the air craft industry-M.
To the SS-Brigadefuehrer FEGELEIN
_Fuehrer Headquarters_
Dear Hermann!
Enclosed I am sending you copy of a letter for your information. It was
given to the Reich marshal on 9 March 1944 by the Reichsfuehrer-SS.
Heil Hitler!
(initialled) DR
1 enclosure
# # # # #
9 March 1944
1879/44 secret Field-command office
Subject: Employment of prisoners in the aviation industry.
Reference: Teletype of 14 February 1944.
Top Reich Secret
Most honored Reichsmarshal
Following my teletype letter of the 18 Feb. 44 I herewith transmit a
survey on the employment of prisoners in the aviation industry.
This survey indicates that at the present time about _36000 prisoners_
are employed for the purposes of the air force. An increase to a total
of _90,000 prisoners_ is contemplated.
The production is being discussed, established and executed between the
Reich ministry of aviation and the chief of my economic-administrative
main office, SS-Obergruppenfuehrer and General of the Waffen-SS, Pohl
respectively.
We assist with all forces at our disposal.
The task of my economic-administrative main office, however, is not
solely fulfilled with the delivery of the prisoners to the aviation
industry as SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Pohl and his assistants take care of
the required working speed thru constant control and supervision of the
workgroups [Kommandos] and therefore have some influence on the results
of production. In this respect I may suggest consideration of the fact
that in enlarging our responsibility thru a speeding up of the total
work, better results can definitely be expected.
We also have for some time adjusted our own stone-quarries to
production for the airforce. For instance in Flossenbuerg near Weiden
the prisoners employed previously in the quarry are working now in the
fighter plane program for the Messerschmitt corporation, Regensburg,
which saw in the availability of our stone-mason shops and labor forces
after the attack on Regensburg at that time a favorable opportunity for
the immediate partial transfer of their production. Altogether 4000
prisoners will work there after the expansion. We produce now with 2000
men 900 sets of engine cowlings and radiator covers as well as 120,000
single parts of various kinds for the fighter ME 109.
In Oranienburg we are employing 6000 prisoners at the Heinkel works now
for construction of the HE 177. With that we have supplied 60% of the
total crew of the plant.
The prisoners are working without fault. Up till now 200 suggestions
regarding the improvement of work have been handed in at Heinkel from
the ranks of the prisoners, which were used and were rewarded with
premiums. We are increasing this employment to 8000 prisoners.
We also have employed female prisoners in the aviation industry. For
instance at the mechanical workshops in Neubrandenburg 2500 women
are working now in the manufacture of devices for dropping bombs and
rudder control. The plant has adjusted the total serial production to
employ prisoners. In the month of January 30,000 devices as well as 500
rudder controls and altitude regulators have been manufactured. We are
increasing employment to 4000 women. The performance of the women is
excellent.
In our own plant in Butschowitz near Bruenn [Brno] we produce also
for the air force, there however with civilian workers. This plant
supplies 14,000 wooden-built rear control apparatus for ME 109 to the
Messerschmitt corporation, Augsburg.
The movement of manufacturing plants of the aviation industry to
subterranean locations requires _further_ employment of about 100,000
prisoners. The plans for this employment on the basis of your letter of
14 Feb 1944 are already under way.
I shall keep you, most honored Reichsmarshal, currently informed on
this subject.
Heil Hitler
(initialed) HH
Use of Prisoners for the Aircraft Industry.
-----------------------+---------------+---------+-----------------------
| Number of | |
| Prisoners | Man-Hrs |
+-------+-------+---------+
Camp & Plant |planned| used | January | Production
-----------------------+-------+-------+---------+-----------------------
_Auschwitz_: | | | |
| | | |
AA fortification staff,| | | |
Auschwitz | 250 | 191 | 48,788 | Construction of AA
| | | | positions.
| | | |
Ost-Maschinenbau GmbH, | | | |
(Factory), | | | |
Schwientochlowitz | 1,500 | 730 | 196,067 | AA gun production:
| | | | _prod. result Jan_:
| | | | 105 guns.
| | | |
Siemens & Schuckert, | | | |
Auschwitz | 1,500 | 90 | 19,240 | at first completion
| | | | of plant, later
| | | | switch and control
| | | | instruments for night
| | | | fighters.
| | | |
_Buchenwald_: | | | |
| | | |
Erla-Maschinenwerk | | | |
GmbH., Leipzig | 2,800 | 1,550 | 176,105 | air plane parts
| | | | production
| | | | _prod. result_
| | | | _Jan_:
| | | | 360 wings for BF 109
| | | | 290 fuselages BF 109
| | | | 304 tail assemblies
| | | |
Junkers-Flug-& | | | |
Motorenwerke AG., | | | |
Schoenebeck | 2,000 | 1,310 | 362,619 | air plane parts
| | | | production
| | | |
Polte, Arnstadt | 100 | 87 | 24,112 | finishing of AA
| | | | cartridge cases;
| | | | _prod. result Jan_:
| | | | 181,000 AA
| | | | cartridge cases.
| | | |
Leichtmetallwerke | | | |
Rautenbach Wernigerode| 1,200 | 772 | 189,832 | production of cylinder
| | | | blocks for airplane
| | | | motors
| | | |
_Dachau_: | | | |
| | | |
High frequency research| 15 | 15 | 3,290 | high frequency
| | | | development
| | | |
BMW, Munich-Allach |12,000 | 3,434 | 908,606 | air plane motor
| | | | production--
| | | | construction &
| | | | subterranean building
| | | |
Dornier Works GmbH., | | | |
Neuaubing | 3,000 | 60 | 9,527 | at first construction
| | | | of workers’ camp,
| | | | later plane part
| | | | production.
| | | |
Engineer Kimmel, Munich| 25 | 23 | 7,925 | building of radio
| | | | measuring instruments
| | | | _prod. result Jan_:
| | | | 35 RC-generators.
Air force research | | | |
institute, Munich | 400 | 40 | -- | building of air force
| | | | research institute
| | | | Ottobrunn
| | | |
Messerschmitt AG., | | | |
Augsburg-- | | | |
” Haunstetten | 3,400 | 2,695 | 740,640 | air plane production
| | | | Me
” Gablingen | 600 | 352 | -- | air plane production
| | | | Me
” Dachau | 600 | 192 | 35,766 | manufacture of plane
| | | | parts
” Kottern | 1,000 | 341 | 57,050 | first building of
| | | | factory, then plant
| | | | parts production
| | | |
Air force planning | | | |
office, Sudelfeld | 25 | 25 | 4,660 | building of
| | | | experimental station
| | | | for high frequency
Praezifix, Dachau | 400 | 356 | 94,067 | production of standard
| | | | plane parts and
| | | | screws
H. Sachse KG. Kempten. | 1,000 | 374 | 91,630 | first building of
| | | | factory/start
| | | | production of
| | | | propeller control
| | | | instruments.
| | | |
_Flossenbuerg_: | | | |
| | | |
Dt. Erd- & Steinwerke | | | |
GmbH, Floss. | 4,000 | 1,911 | 422,158 | plane parts production
| | | | for Me _prod. result
| | | | Jan_: 900 noses &
| | | | radiator covering;
| | | | 120,000 parts.
| | | |
Erla-Maschinenwerk | | | |
GmbH, | | | |
Johanngeorgenstadt | 600 | 564 | 117,524 | air plane parts
| | | | production.
Milsen | 500 | 30 | -- | air plane parts
| | | | production.
| | | |
Geramic Works Bohemia, | | | |
Neurohlau | 100 | 100 | 10,764 | plane parts
| | | | production.
| | | |
Luftfahrtgeraetewerk, | | | |
Zwodau | 1,500 | 199 | 28,314 | instrument prod. for
| | | | air force.
| | | |
_Herzogenbusch_: | | | |
| | | |
Dt. Erd- & Steinwerke | | | |
GmbH. Herzogenbusch | 600 | 411 | 35,248 | air plane
| | | | disassembling plant
| | | | _prod. result Jan_:
| | | | 12 planes
| | | | disassembled
| | | | 35 motors ”
| | | | 120 wings ”
| | | |
Air force field | | | |
construction office 3 | 1,000 | 265 | 64,800 | runway construction
| | | | for airport.
| | | |
_Mauthausen_: | | | |
| | | |
Dt. Erd- & Steinwerke | | | |
GmbH., Mauthausen | 500 | 423 | 82,632 | plane parts
| | | | construction for Me
| | | | _prod. results
| | | | January_:
| | | | 25 plane fuselages
| | | |
Flugmotoren GmbH., | | | |
Wiener-Neudorf | 3,000 | 1,983 | 417,328 | first building, later
| | | | plane parts prod.
| | | |
Heinkel-Werke AG, | | | |
Schwechat | 3,200 | 2,065 | 486,206 | air plane parts
| | | | production
| | | |
_Natzweiler_: | | | |
| | | |
Dt Erd- & Steinwerke | | | |
GmbH, Natzweiler | 400 | 261 | 63,221 | disassembling of Ju
| | | | motors & welding of
| | | | air torpedoes.
| | | |
_Neuengamme_: | | | |
| | | |
Jastram, | | | |
Hamburg-Bergedorf | 80 | 80 | 21,554 | air plane parts
| | | | production
Messap GmbH., | | | |
Hamburg-Langenhorn | 120 | 110 | 31,422 | production of fuse
| | | | mechanisms
| | | | _prod. result Jan_:
| | | |16 800 balance wheels
| | | | S30
| | | |53 900 balance wheels
| | | | S60
| | | |15 600 time fuses S30
| | | |46 700 time fuses S60
| | | |
_Ravensbrueck_: | | | |
| | | |
Air ministry testing | | | |
ground, Peenamuende-W | 600 | 598 | 125,000 | building
| | | |
Geraetewerk Pommern | | | |
GmbH, Stargard | 550 | 283 | 81,129 | production of aerial
| | | | torpedoes
| | | |
Heinkel-Werke AG, | | | |
Barth. | 2,000 | 1,721 | 435,155 | air plane production
| | | |
Mechan. Werkstaetten | | | |
GmbH. Neubrandenburg | 4,000 | 1,981 | 529,126 | production of bomb
| | | | release mechanism and
| | | | Fz.G.76; _prod. Jan._
| | | | 23,000 lock 50/X
| | | | 1,500 lock 2000
| | | | 150 PVC 1006
| | | | 500 rudder
| | | | machines
| | | | 400 ER 4 L-“2”
| | | |
Siemens & Halske, | | | |
Berlin, work | | | |
Ravensbrueck | 2,400 | 872 | 242,867 | communication
| | | | equipment
| | | | product. (e.g. throat
| | | | microphones)
Silva-Metallwerke | | | |
GmbH, Genthin | 600 | 596 | 154,224 | production of AA
| | | | ammunition
| | | | _prod. result Jan._:
| | | | 518 200 2-cm shells
| | | | 927 500 2-cm shells
| | | | (various styles)
| | | | 965 000 13-mm shells
| | | |
Veltener-Maschinenbau | | | |
GmbH., Volten | 600 | 596 | 146,873 | production of plane
| | | | parts.
| | | |
_Sachsenhausen_: | | | |
| | | |
Heinkel-Werke AG, | | | |
Oranienburg | 6,500 | 5,939 |1,699,978| plane mass production.
| | | | _Prod. result_
| | | | 15 plane bodies He 177
Luftschiffbau Zepplin | | | |
GmbH, Oranienburg | 300 | 221 | 54,006 | production and repair
| | | | of balloons
| | | | _prod. result Jan_:
| | | | 120 balloons repaired
| | | | and part work for
| | | | 40 new balloons.
| | | |
_Ostland | | | |
Concentration | | | |
Camp_: | | | |
| | | |
Air force field | | | |
building direction. | | | |
Spilve | 1,000 | 1,000 | 280,776 | building of airport.
| | | |
Field building | | | |
direction 3/I, Kauen | 1,000 | 829 | 222,186 | building of airport.
| | | |
AA booty repair shop, | | | |
Kauen | 200 | 162 | 4,920 | rebuilding of booty AA
| | | |
Kopperschmidt & Soehne,| | | |
Riga | 20 | 20 | 6,160 | production of plane
| | | | turrets.
| | | |
It was recently agreed | | | |
to use further: | | | |
| | | |
_Buchenwald_: | | | |
| | | |
Anhydrit |10,000 | -- | -- | plane production of
| | | | Ju underground
| | | |
Ago, Oschersleben | 1,500 | -- | -- | plane production
| | | | Focke-Wulf fighters.
| | | |
_Gross-Rosen_: | | | |
| | | |
Famo, Bunzlau | 1,500 | -- | -- | servicing of FW night
| | | | fighters, Ta 154.
| | | |
_Mauthausen_: | | | |
| | | |
Esche II |10,000 | -- | -- | kind of production to
| | | | be decided by air
| | | | Ministry.
| | | |
_Natzweiler_: | | | |
| | | |
Geraetewerk Pommern | | | |
GmbH., branch | | | |
Diedenhofen | 600 | -- | -- | production of aerial
| | | | torpedoes.
|90,785 |35,839 |8,733,495|
-----------------------+-------+-------+---------+-----------------------
The Chief of the
SS Economics Administration Main Office
Berlin, 21 February 1944 (signed) Pohl I. [?]
SS Obergruppenfuehrer and General of Armed Forces SS.
The Reich Minister for Armament and War Production
TAE-No. 475/44 top secret
(Signed) Pohl
[Initialled] HH
Berlin, Pariser Platz 3, 17 April 1944.
Phone: 11 00 52
Pohl
TOP SECRET
Fighter staff, attention: Field Marshal MILCH
Fighter staff, attention: Chief of office SWR
_For Information_
Reichsfuehrer-SS and chief of the German Police, Reichleader HIMMLER
Head of armament office Lt Gen Dr Ing. h. c. Waeger
Plenipotentiary-General for Construction, Director Stobbe-Dethleffsen
1. Using tables and drawings as an illustration I have in conjunction
with Field Marshal Milch informed the Fuehrer on the work of the
fighter staff in pointing to the extraordinarily pleasing and
successful cooperation of the newly created organization with all
offices and works. He is cognizant of the fact that the greatest part
of the transfer has been fixed according to plan and that as the
first step the decentralization above the ground can be concluded by
approximately August and that the second step aiming at the total
subterranean security of the most sensitive works will be concluded by
the end of the year.
2. Field Marshal Milch has reported as a result of the meeting on
construction of the “central planning” to the Fuehrer, that of
the amount of construction demanded, because of the extraordinary
aggravation of the all-over situation, only the most important part of
the construction work could be accomplished. The Fuehrer demands that
in spite of that both the large plants, each of at least 600,000 qm,
which he demanded should be constructed with all energy. He consents
that one of these works will not be built in concrete but in accordance
with the proposal as an enlargement and in the immediate vicinity of
the present central works as the so-called central construction and
will come under the management of the Junkers works.
The Fuehrer agrees to the suggestion that the second large building
project will, because of lack in labor and material, not be carried
out on German territory, but on suitable ground (first of all gravel
foundation and possibilities for transportation) in the immediate
proximity of the border, on French, Belgian or Dutch territory,
as long as the plant is constructed behind a fortified zone. The
suggestion to build on French territory is favored by the fact that
it will then be much easier to make the necessary labor available. In
spite of that the Fuehrer asks to try, to construct this second works
in an essentially secure territory, namely in the Protectorate. If
the labor can not be supplied there either, the Fuehrer wants to get
in touch in person with the Reichsfuehrer SS and will cause him to
provide the approximately 100,000 men required, thru the securing of
corresponding Jewish contingents from Hungary. The Fuehrer demands that
a meeting take place with him shortly in order to discuss the details
in the presence of the men concerned.
3. An immediate task for the central construction besides assuring the
supply of the bottleneck products of the Junkers works which is to be
executed step by step, is the planning and securing of ME 262 at the
rate of 1000 a month and of an additional fighter plane at the rate of
2000 a month.
Heil Hitler
signed: SPEER
Certified: Capt. Stein
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1590-PS
[several illegible notations]
Re: Taking of hostages
OKH received: 1 Oct. 1941
5 copies--copy
OKH/Gen. Qn.
(W. Bfh. Suedost)
Military Commander, South-East
Attacks on members of the Armed Forces lately committed in the occupied
territories gave reason to point out that it is advisable that military
commanders always have at their disposal a number of hostages of
different political tendencies, namely:
1. nationalist
2. democratic-bourgeois, and
3. communist
It is important that among them shall be well-known leading
personalities or members of their families, whose names are to be made
public.
Depending on the membership of the culprit, hostages of the
corresponding group are to be shot in case of attacks.
It is asked that commanders be accordingly instructed.
[partly illegible notation]
Chief of the Armed Forces High Command
(signed) Keitel.
Complied with in France and Belgium.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1600-PS
The State-Picture Gallery in Dresden
The Director. Dresden-Al, 1 June 1940.
To: Ministerialrat Dr. Hanssen
Berlin W 8, Wilhelmstr. 64
Dear Ministerialrat!
Permit me to express my thanks for having sent me the copy of the
letter of the State Secretary Dr. Landfried.
I herewith enclose a copy of my letter of 16 March 1940 to Reichsleiter
Bormann, referring mainly to the _confiscated property of the convents
in the Ostmark_. In accordance with the Fuehrer’s decree on Jewish
property, a generally applicable procedure may be recommended in this
case, too; the Fuehrer should have the final word in the distribution
to the individual consumers, rather the first option on any purchase.
This regulation should be made to be retroactive as of the time of the
assumption of power if possible.
Heil Hitler!
Yours faithfully
H. Posse.
1 enclosure.
# # # # #
At the Fuehrer’s present HQ, 16 Jan 41 Bo/Fu
R.L.M.B.
1. Director Dr. Posse, _Dresden-Hellerau_
_Personal!_
_Registered!_
Tunnigtweg 14
Dear Dr. Posse!
Enclosed herewith I am sending you the pictures of the altar from the
convent in Hohenfurth near Kruman. The convent and its entire property
shall be confiscated in the immediate future because of the attitude,
hostile towards the State, of its inhabitants.
It shall be up to you to decide whether the pictures shall remain in
the convent at Hohenfurth or be transferred to the museum in Linz after
the latter shall be completed.
I await your decision in the matter.
Heil Hitler!
Faithfully yours,
[initialed by Bormann]
Enclosures
2. Presented again: 3 May 1941.
# # # # #
Dresden-Al, 16 May 1941
The State-Picture Gallery in Dresden.
The Director.
The Reichsleiter Martin Bormann,
Berlin W 8, Wilhelmstr. 64
_Personal!_
Dear Reichsleiter!
I report that I have returned today from a weeks trip to Oberdonau and
Vienna. Besides checking on the confiscated convents and monasteries,
the main reason for my trip to Linz and Oberdonau was to find out
_whether any of the confiscated convents offered facilities suitable
for temporarily storing the collections acquired by the Fuehrer_.
After having seen the convents at Hohenfurth, St. Florian,
Krenesmunster, Schloegel, Wilhering etc., and after having discussed
the matter with Gauleiter Eigruber and his deputies, I found that
the _convent in Krenesmunster is extremely suited for this purpose_.
There are in this convent 50-60 rooms that can be locked; the various
new acquisitions can be stored there temporarily. There is also
the “Emperor’s Stall” there, 25 m long, and a flight of 7 rooms in
good shape, at present the picture-gallery of the convent, not very
valuable, is on exposition. From time to time, the newly acquired
collections may be presented to the Fuehrer there.
Krenesmunster is situated in the woods, far away from industrial area;
therefore, a threat from the air hardly exists.
In case the Fuehrer should agree with the proposal to have
Krenesmunster as a depot for Linz, it is suggested that the Germans
from Bessarabia who are at present living in the convent, be moved into
another convent, in order to safeguard the stocks, particularly against
fire.
Therefore, I beg to have the Fuehrer state his intentions regarding
their proposal which is also supported by Gauleiter Eigruber not only
is the collection Lanz in Amsterdam, packed in the meantime, awaiting,
also several other collections of paintings for which there’d hardly
be space enough in Munich, are ready, and so is Dr. Topfer’s library
which was bought in Switzerland. Also very rich stocks, already packed
and stored in Vienna, confiscated from Jewish owners, and many new
acquisitions from Vienna could be brought to Krenesmunster. This
way, room could be made in Vienna and what remains of confiscated
art-treasures could be distributed.
Heil Hitler!
Yours faithfully
H. Posse.
# # # # #
Report on the trip, undertaken on orders to Cracow and Warsaw, so as to
ascertain the kind and the amount of confiscated art-treasures.
It was impossible to carry out the order as such, as well as that part
of it which drafting of a plan as to how to dispose of the confiscated
art treasures, since most of them were still packed away in cases and
were either stored in Cracow, or in other places, particularly in
Warsaw ready for shipment to Cracow.
Since 6 October, under the direction of Understate secretary Dr.
Muhlmann, as the special deputy of General Field Marshall Goering
and as the Director of the Department of Science and Training, the
storing of all the valuable Art treasures has been in full swing with
assistance of suitable experts from Berlin, Vienna, and Breslau, and,
so far as I could determine it has been almost completely carried out.
Works of art and culture, mainly from Warsaw were saved, particularly
from the badly damaged chateau of the Kings whose furniture and
interior decorations were salvaged to a large extent. In Cracow,
box-cars containing the works of art secured from public, clerical and
private ownership arrived almost daily. The Art treasures are being
collected in the particularly suitable building of the Jagellonic
Library in Cracow and are being set up there properly, a task which may
be finished by February 1940. As soon as the task of collecting shall
be finished and an inventory is made so that a complete survey of the
entire valuable Polish Art-treasure can be made, I shall again travel
to Cracow so as to carry out the order given me.
The official pictorial service is photographing all important works of
art little by little. The governor general shall present these pictures
in the form of a photo-Album to the Fuehrer.
I was able to gain some knowledge on the public and private collections
as well as clerical property in Cracow and Warsaw. It is true that
we cannot hope too much to enrich ourselves from the acquisition of
great Art works of paintings and sculptures there with the exception
of the Veit Stoss-altar and the plates of Hans von Kulmbach in the
Church of Maria in Cracow, the Raffael, Leonardo and Rembrandt from
the collection Czarborpki and several other works from the National
Museum in Warsaw--works of a rather high value of whose existence we
in Germany had already known. Richer and more extensive is the Polish
stock of “objects d’art”, such as handicraft in gold and silver of
German origin to a large part, (particularly from the Church of Maria
and the cathedral of Wawel) tapestries, arms, porcelains, furniture,
bronzes, coins, valuable parchment-scrips, books, etc. Those were the
principal fields of interest for Polish collectors, besides their
interest in Polish National Art, particularly of the 19th century. It
is characteristic that apart from original paintings so many copies
can be found in Polish castles and private collections (for example
Czartoryski, Wilano etc). However, many thousand works of art of all
kinds ought to be found in the Jagellonic Library.
As I said before, I shall not be able to make proposals regarding
the distribution as long as an inventory of the entire material
does not exist. However, I should like to reserve for the museum
in Linz the three most important paintings of the Czartoryski
collection, namely the Raffael, Leonardo and Rembrandt which are at
present in the Kaiser-Frederick Museum in Berlin. We in Dresden are
particularly interested in the interior decorations of the castle
of the Kings in Warsaw since Saxonian architects and artists have
created them; therefore, the suggestion is made that the salvaged
parts of it (panellings, doors, inlaid floors, sculptures, mirrors,
glass-chandeliers, porcelains etc) be used for the interior decoration
of the Pavillion of the “Zivinges” in Dresden.
A number of fine drawings of Albrecht Durer’s and other old German
masters kept in the Ossolinemm in Lemberg, has fallen into Russian
hands. Maybe at least Durer’s 27 pieces could still be salvaged for
Germany.
While in Warsaw, a Polish colleague of mine whom I have known, for
quite some time told me that the storing of the art treasures was
begun already in June 1939; by the end of July the entire official
museum property was packed in cases and ready for shipment. In spite of
that the Poles did not manage to carry any important stocks away and
save them for themselves, with the exception of the famous tapestry,
collection of Wawel, the riding costumes kept there also, arms and
historically valuable pieces like the blood-banner of the Prophet
which, as far as I could ascertain, fell into Russian hands.
/s/ Hans Posse.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1602-PS
Dr. med. Sigmund RASCHER MUNICH, 15 May 1941
Trogerstrasse 56
Dear Reichsfuehrer,
My sincere thanks for your cordial wishes and flowers on the birth
of my second son. This time, too, it is a strong boy, though he has
come 3 weeks too early. I may send you a picture of both children
incidentally. * * *
For the time being I have been assigned to the Luftgaukommando VII,
Munich, for a medical course. During this course, where researches
on high-altitude flights play a prominent part (determined by the
somewhat higher ceiling of the English fighter planes) considerable
regret was expressed at the fact that no tests with human material had
yet been possible for us, as such experiments are very dangerous and
nobody volunteers for them. I put, therefore, the _serious_ question:
can you make available two or three professional criminals for these
experiments? The experiments are made at “Bodenstaendige Pruefstelle
fuer Hoehenforschung der Luftwaffe”, Munich. The experiments, by which
the subjects can, of course, die, would take place with my cooperation.
They are essential for researches on high-altitude flight and cannot
be carried out, as has been tried, with monkeys, who offer entirely
different test-conditions. I have had a very confidential talk with a
representative of the air forces Surgeon who makes these experiments.
He is also of the opinion that the problems in question could only be
solved by experiments on human persons. (Feeble-minded could also be
used as test material). * * *
I hope sincerely, highly esteemed Reichsfuehrer that, in spite of the
immense burden of work you carry, you are in the pink of health.
With my heartiest wishes, I am with Heil Hitler your gratefully devoted
(signature) S. RASCHER
(Z--2)
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1616-PS
Dr. S. RASCHER SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer
Munich, 17 February 1943
To the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police Mr. Heinrich
Himmler
Berlin SW 11 Prinz Albrecht Str. 8
Dear Reichsfuehrer!
Enclosed I present to you in condensed form a summary of the results of
the experiments made in warming up people who have been cooled off by
using animal heat.
Right now I am attempting to prove through experiments on human beings
that it is possible to warm up people cooled off by dry cold just as
fast as people who were cooled off by remaining in cold water. The
Reich physician SS, SS-Gruppenfuehrer Dr. Gravitz doubted very much
that that would be possible and said that I would have to prove it
first by 100 experiments. Up to now I have cooled off about 30 people
stripped in the open air during 9-14 hours to 27°-29°. After a time
corresponding to a transport of one hour, I put these subjects in a
hot bath. _Up to now_ every single patient was completely warmed up
within one hour at most, though some of them had their hands and feet
frozen white. In some cases a slight fatigue with slightly rising
temperature was observed on the day following the experiments. I have
not observed any fatal results from this extremely fast warming up. I
have not so far been able to do any warming up by “Sauna” as ordered
by you, my dear Reichsfuehrer, as the weather in December and January
was too warm for any experiments in the open air, and right now the
camp is closed on account of typhoid and I am not allowed therefore to
bring the subjects to these experiments into the SS-Sauna. (I have been
vaccinated several times and continue myself to make the tests within
the camp in spite of the typhoid in the camp.) It would be best if I
were transferred to the Waffen-SS soon and could go together with Neff
to Auschwitz and * * * the question of the warming up of persons who
have frozen on land * * *.
[rest of document missing]
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1617-PS
SECRET
The Reichfuehrer SS
Berlin, SW 11, B. Prinz Albrecht Strasse 8 Field Command Post
November 1942
Dear Comrade Milch!
You will recall that through General Wolff I particularly recommended
to you for your consideration the work of a certain SS Fuehrer,
Dr. Rascher, who is a physician of the air force on leave [Arzt des
Beurlaubtenstandes der Luftwaffe].
These researches which deal with the behavior of the human organism
at great heights, as well as with manifestations caused by prolonged
cooling of the human body in cold water, and similar problems which are
of vital importance to the air force in particular, can be performed
by us with particular efficiency because I personally assumed the
responsibility for supplying asocial individuals and criminals who
deserve only to die [todeswuerdig] from concentration camps for these
experiments.
Unfortunately you had no time recently when Dr. Rascher wanted to
report on the experiments at the Ministry for Aviation. I had put
great hopes in that report, because I believed that in this way the
difficulties, based mainly on religious objections, which oppose Dr.
Rascher’s experiments--for which _I_ assumed responsibility--could be
eliminated.
The difficulties are still the same now as before. In these “Christian
medical circles” the standpoint is being taken that it goes without
saying that a young German aviator should be allowed to risk his life
but that the life of a criminal--who is not drafted into military
service--is too sacred for this purpose and one should not stain
oneself with this guilt; at the same time it is interesting to note
that credit is taken for the results of the experiments while excluding
the scientist who performed them.
I personally have inspected the experiments, and have--I can say this
without exaggeration--participated in every phase of this scientific
work in a helpful and inspiring manner.
We two should not get angry about these difficulties. It will take at
least another ten years until we can get such narrow-mindedness out
of our people. But this should not affect the research work which is
necessary for our young and splendid soldiers and aviators.
I beg you to release Dr. Rascher, Stabsarzt in reserve, from the air
force and to transfer him to me to the Waffen-SS. I would then assume
the sole responsibility for having these experiments made in this
field, and would put the results, of which we in the SS need only a
part for the frost injuries in the East, entirely at the disposal of
the air force. However, in this connection I suggest that with the
liaison between you and Wolff a _“non-Christian” physician should
be charged, who should be at the same time honorable as a scientist
and not prone to intellectual theft_ and who could be informed of
the results. This physician should also have good contacts with the
administrative authorities, so that the results would really obtain a
hearing.
I believe that this solution--to transfer Dr. Rascher to the SS,
so that he could carry out the experiments under my responsibility
and under my orders--is the best way. The experiments should not be
stopped; we owe that to our men. If Dr. Rascher remained with the air
force, there would certainly be much annoyance; because then I would
have to bring a series of unpleasant details to you, because of the
arrogance and assumption which Professor Dr. Holzloehner has displayed
in the post of Dachau--who is under my command--about me in utterances
delivered to SS Colonel Sievers. In order to save both of us this
trouble, I suggest again that Dr. Rascher should be transferred to the
Waffen SS as quickly as possible.
I would be grateful to you if you would give the order to put the low
pressure chamber at our disposal again, together with step-up pumps,
because the experiments should be extended to include even greater
altitudes.
Cordial greetings and Heil Hitler!
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1618-PS
S. RASCHER
Intermediate report on intense chilling experiments in the Dachau Camp,
started on 15 August 1942
_Experimental procedure_
The experimental subjects (V P) were placed in the water, dressed in
complete flying uniform, winter or summer combination, and with an
aviator’s helmet. A life jacket made of rubber or kapok was to prevent
submerging. The experiments were carried out at water temperatures
varying from 2.5° to 12°. In one experimental series, Occiput and brain
stem protruded above the water, while in another series of experiments
the Occiput (brain stem) and back of the head were submerged in water.
Electrical measurements gave low temperature readings of 26.4° in
the stomach and 26.5° in the rectum. Fatalities occurred only when
the brain stem and the back of the head were also chilled. Autopsies
of such fatal cases always revealed large amounts of free blood,
up to ½ liter, in the cranial cavity. The heart invariably showed
extreme dilation of the night chamber. As soon as the temperature in
these experiments reached 28°, the experimental subjects (VP) died
invariably, despite all attempts at resuscitation. The above discussed
autopsy finding conclusively proved the importance of a warming
protective device for head and Occiput when designing the planned
protective clothing of the foam type.
Other important findings, common in all experiments, to be mentioned.
Marked increase of the viscosity of the blood, marked increase of
hemoglobin, an approximate five fold increase of the leukocytes,
invariable rise of blood sugar to twice its normal value. Auricular
fibrillation made its appearance regularly at 30°.
During attempts to save severely chilled persons, it was shown that
rapid re-warming was in all cases preferable to slow re-warming,
because after removal from the cold water, the body temperature
continued to sink rapidly. I think that for this reason we can dispense
with the attempt to save intensely chilled subjects by means of animal
heat.
Rewarming by animal warmth--animal bodies or women’s bodies--would be
too slow. As auxiliary measures for the prevention of intense chilling,
improvements in the clothing of aviators come alone into consideration.
The foam suit with suitable neck protector which is being prepared
by the German Institution for textile research [Deutsches
Textilforschungsinstitut] Muenchen-Gladbach deserves first priority
in this connection. The experiments have shown that pharmaceutical
measures are probably unnecessary if the flier is still alive at the
time of rescue.
(signed) Dr. S. Rascher
Muenchen--Dachau, 10 September 1942.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1621-PS
SECRET!
The Reichsfuehrer SS Personal Staff
File Nr. 19/9/43a/Pers/V
Command Post, 12 November 1942
[Rubber Stamp]
Personal Staff, Reichsfuehrer SS
[illegible notation] Administration
Secret/
SECRET!
1. To SS Major General Rauter
The Hague
Dear Major General,
The SS Captain Dr. Rascher is in need of medico-physiological
appliances. He points out that there are sufficient appliances at the
University of Leyden and at the University of Utrecht, which could be
put to use.
The Reichsfuehrer SS asks you to attempt to obtain these appliances,
which would still have to be listed in detail by SS Captain Dr.
Rascher resp. by SS Colonel Sievers, through the Reich Commissar.
SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer Dr. Rascher resp. SS-Standartenfuehrer Sievers
will submit the list directly to you.
Heil Hitler!
(signed) Brandt
Transmitted to
2. SS Colonel (SS-Standartenfuehrer) Sievers
3. SS Captain (SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer) Dr. Rascher, with the request
that the above be noted and the necessary steps taken.
[Signed illegible]
SS-Lieutenant Colonel
# # # # #
SECRET!
[Rubber Stamp]
Personal Staff Reichsfuehrer SS
(illegible notation)
SECRET
Dr. S. Rascher, SS Captain
SECRET!
File Memorandum.
Procurement of medico-physiological appliances is so difficult in
Germany that the continued conduct of experiments is seriously
endangered. If the necessary appliances cannot be procured, it will
be very much more difficult to build up the Institute for Functional
Research in Military Science within the framework of the Ancestral
Heritage Organization [Ahnenerbe].
The Institutes of the Universities of Leyden and Utrecht, however, are
very plentifully equipped with the very best scientific appliances at
both these universities is not feasible, however, since the University
of Leyden is, and will remain, closed, notwithstanding all rumors,
and since the University of Utrecht works with only half its usual
enrollment.
SS Lieutenant Colonel Sievers therefore suggests that the Reichsfuehrer
SS write a letter to Reich Governor Dr. Seyss-Inquart saying that it is
request that the Reich Governor put the appliances of the University
Institutes concerned at the disposal of the Ancestral Heritage
Organization [Ahnenerbe], initially on a loan basis.
(signed) Dr. Rascher
Munich, 12 November 1942
[Handwritten notation]
Dr. Brandt to Reuter
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1637-PS
1938 REICHS MINISTERIALBLATT, i. V., PAGES 1089-1091
Acceptance of members of the Security Police into the SS of the
N.S.D.A.P. of 23 June 1938.
Ministerial-Blatt of the Reich and Prussian Ministries of the Interior,
Berlin, 1938
No. 28, p. 1090
_Appointments, Wages, Maintenance, Service Regulations_
Circular of the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police in the
Reich Ministry of the Interior for 23.6.1938--S-V 3 No. 72/38
-------------------------+-------------------------+--------------------
The | The | Corresponds to the
-------------------------+-------------------------+--------------------
Criminal-assistant | Office helper | SS Sergeant
aspirant in preparatory | [Amtsgehilfe | [SS
service | Betenmeister] | Unterscharfuehrer]
[Kriminal-Assist-Aniv. | |
im Verbereitungsvienst] | |
-------------------------+-------------------------+--------------------
Criminal-Assistant | Superintendant | SS-Staff Sergeant
aspirant | [Hausmeister] | [SS-
[Kriminal-Assist-Aniv] | | Scharfuehrer]
-------------------------+-------------------------+--------------------
Criminal assistant | Police office assistant.| SS-Technical
[Kriminal-Assist] | [Pol-Buereassist] | Sergeant [SS-
| Police-Prison-Technical | Oberscharfuehrer]
| Sergeant. [Poli- |
| Gefaengnisoberwachtm] |
-------------------------+-------------------------+--------------------
Chief Criminal | Police-Prison-Master | SS-Master Sergeant
Assistant. | Sergeant [Pol- | [SS
[Krim-Oberassist] | Gefaengnis-Hauptwachtm]| Hauptscharfuehrer]
-------------------------+-------------------------+--------------------
Criminal secretary | Police-secretary | SS-Lieutenant
[Krim-Sekretar] | [Pol-Sekretar] | [SS-
Criminal district | Office-Secretary | Untersturmfuehrer]
secretary | [Kanzleisekretaer] |
[Krim-Bez. Sekretar] | Police secretary first |
| class |
| [Pol-Obersekretaer] |
| Technical secretary |
| [Techn-Sekretaer] |
-------------------------+-------------------------+--------------------
Criminal inspector | Ministerial registrator | SS-First
[Krim-Inspektor] | [Min-Registrator] | Lieutenant [SS-
Criminal commissar up | Police inspector | Obersturmfuehrer]
to 15 years of service | [Pol-Inspektor] |
[Krim-Kommissar] | Assessor |
| [Assessor] |
-------------------------+-------------------------+--------------------
Criminal commissar with | Police inspector | SS-Captain
over 15 years of | [Pol-Inspektor] | [SS-
service | with 300 Reichsmark | Hauptsturmfuehrer]
[Krim-Kommissar] | additional salary. |
Criminal counsellor | Police inspector first |
[Krim-Rat] up to 15 | class |
years of service. | [Pol-Oberinspektor] |
| Government-Assessor |
| [Reg-Assessor] |
| Police counsellor up to |
| 15 years of service. |
| [Pol-Rat] |
-------------------------+-------------------------+--------------------
Criminal counsellor with | Police counsellor with | SS-Major
over 15 years of | over 15 years of | [SS-
service [Krim-Rat] | service. [Pol-Rat] | Sturmbannfuehrer]
Criminal director | Office-counsellor |
[Krim-Direktor] | [Amtsrat] |
Government and criminal | Government-counsellor |
counsellor | [Reg-Rat] |
[Reg. u. Krim-Rat] | |
-------------------------+-------------------------+--------------------
Government counsellor | Government counsellor | SS-Lieutenant
first class and | first class | Colonel [SS-
criminal counsellor. | [Oberreg-Rat] | Obersturmbann-
[Oberreg.-und Krim.-Rat] | | fuehrer]
-------------------------+-------------------------+--------------------
Government and criminal | Government director | SS-Colonel
director | [Reg-Direktor] | [SS-
[Reg.-und Krim.- | Ministerial | Standartenfuehrer]
Direktor] | counsellor [Min-Rat] |
Reich-criminal director | |
[Reichskrim-Direktor] | |
------------------------+-------------------------+--------------------
With the aim of fusing members of the German Police with the
“Schutzstaffel” of the National Socialist German Workers Party into one
uniformly turned out State Protective Corps [Staatsschutzkorps] of the
National Socialist Reich, I decree as follows:
I. (1) Members of the Security Police can upon request be received into
the Schutzstaffel of the _NSDAP_ if they
1. fulfill the general requirements of the SS and
2. _a._ Up to 30.1.1933 (inclusive) have been members of the NSDAP
or of its affiliates (the Sturmabteilung, the National Socialist
Motor Corps, the Hitler Youth) even if they have meanwhile
honorably resigned from these affiliates.
or
_b._ for a static period [seit einem ... liegenden Zeitpunkt]
before 30.1.1933 were sponsoring members of the SS
[Foerderndes Mitglied]
or
_c._ Have seen service for at least three years in the Security
Police under the direction of the Reichsfuehrer SS and have
proven themselves.
(2) Permit for admission of a wider circle of persons I reserve for
myself.
(3) Admission according to the general requirements is not affected by
this circular.
II. 1. Upon transfer into the SS, the grade held in the police will be
changed to a corresponding one in the SS. Former members of the SS, SA,
NSKK (National Socialist Drivers Corps) who held a higher rank, will be
incorporated with the same high rank. When promoted within the security
police, an assimilation of ranks will take place in every case.
3. I myself will make decisions about incorporation of members of the
security police with higher ranks.
4. The employees of the security police will be put into that SS rank
which corresponds to their rank as civil servant, according to their
jobs.
5. Members of the security police incorporated into the SS up to
the publication of these ordinances will be promoted to the SS rank
corresponding to their police rank, provided they do not already hold
such, or a higher SS rank.
III. 1. Members of the security police incorporated into the SS will be
assigned to the units of the security service of the Reichsfuehrer-SS,
according to more detailed instructions of the chief of the security
police and of the security main office of the Reichsfuehrer-SS.
2. The chief of the security police and of the security main office
regulates the SS-service relations [Dienstverhaltnisse] and obligations
of the members of the security police who were incorporated into the SS.
IV. 1. The applications of members of the security police for admission
to the SS are to be directed to the chief of the security police
through service channels.
2. The applications are to be submitted according to the following
sample:
_SAMPLE_:
(Place and date)
I herewith request admission to the security service of the
Reichsfuehrer-SS in conformity with the circular of the
Reichsfuehrer-SS and Chief of the German police in the Ministry of
the Interior of June 23rd, 1938-S.V.3 number 72/38 (R M Bli V. page
1089)
First and last name: _______________________________________
____________________________________________________________
(rank and office)
Day, month and year of birth: ______________________________
Place of birth: ____________________________________________
Party membership number, district [Ortsgruppe]: ____________
Last SS-, SA-, NSKK or HJ rank and number,
last SS, SA-, respectively HJ district
[Dienststelle]: ____________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
Separated from the SS etc. on the __________________________
(with indication, whether transferred directly to the police, or, if
otherwise, which service relations in the meantime)
Day of joining the NSDAP, SS, SA, HJ _______________________
Helping member [Foerderndes Mitglied] of the SS since: _____
Working in the security police since: ______________________
To The Chief of the security police through channels.
* * * * * * *
V. This circular is to be brought to the attention of all members of
the security police.
To the Reichsstatthalter, the state governments, the Reichscommissioner
for the Saarland, the Prussian supreme and government presidents,
the office of the secret state police [Gestapo], the Reich criminal
police office [Reichskrim-Pol-Amt], the federal police main offices
[Staatspol-Leitstellen] and federal police office [Staatspol-Stellen],
the criminal police main offices [Krim-Pol. Leitstellen] and criminal
police offices [Krim-Pol Stellen], the commander of the leaderschool of
the security police [Kommandeur der Fuehrerschule der Sicherheitspol].
To the SS main office, the main office for security
[Sicherheitshauptamt], the security service leaders [SD-Fuehrer] of the
higher levels of the SS [SS-Oberabschnitte] and the security service
lower levels [SD-Unterabschnitte]. by copy.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1638-PS
1938 REICHS MINISTERIALBLATT, iV, PAGE 1906
Cooperation of the Agencies of the General and Interior Administration
with the S.D. of the Reichsfuehrer SS (SD) of 11 Nov. 1938
(1) The Security Service of the Reichsfuehrer SS (SD) has, as the
intelligence organization for Party and nation--in particular for the
support of the Security Police--important missions to fulfill. The
SD thereby becomes active on a national mission. This necessitates a
close and sympathetic cooperation between the SD and the authorities
for general and internal administration. Therefore, inquiries of the SD
are to be answered in the same way as inquiries of all national office
are treated. Likewise, the sections of the SD are obligated to furnish
information to the general and internal administration.
(2) Business between the SD and the Reich Ministry of the Interior
proceeds solely through the Chief of the Sicherheitshauptamt, business
between the SD and the remaining authorities of general and internal
administration only through the higher levels of the SD. Business
between the authorities for general and internal administration of
the SHA proceeds through the Reich Ministry of the Interior, business
between the authorities for general and internal administration and
the other SD offices in Prussia through the Regierungs-Praesident or
Ober-Praesident, in the other provinces through the corresponding
authorities. In doubtful cases the combined decision of the Reich
Ministry of the Interior and of the Reichsfuehrer SS should be obtained.
Supplement for municipalities, municipal groups, other corporate bodies
of the public law: I request, to act accordingly.
To lower authorities municipalities, municipal groups, other corporate
bodies of the public law.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1639-A-PS
Mobilization Book for the Civil Administration 1939 Edition [Pages 2-18]
Armed Forces High Command Berlin, 18th Feb 1939
No. 265/39 g.Kdos. I IVa. 125 copies, 101st copy
Re: Reprint of Mobilization Book for the Civil Administration.
1. Enclosed is the Reprint for 1939 of the “Mobilization Book for the
Civil Administration” with the request to destroy Mobilization Books
(Z), hereby made obsolete, at the beginning of the new mobilization
year.
2. The Reprint takes effect on the 1st April 1939. The annexes V, XIX,
and XX will be forwarded after their completion.
3. An expression of opinion on the proposals handed in here will not
take place in detail any more, insofar as the expression has not
already been made.
4. The necessity of cooperation between Ministers and the highest Reich
agencies is not always pointed out in the column “Remarks”. It is to be
understood that the cooperation needed for preparations and carrying
out of the measures must be guaranteed, even without an express
directive.
Chief of the Armed Forces High Command.
Keitel.
Distribution list on the next page.
Distribution’s List: Copy
Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor 1
Deputy of the Fuehrer 2- 3
Attention SS Brigadier General _Knoblauch_
Prussian State-Ministry 4- 5
Attention Counsellor of the Ministry _Bergbohm_
Ministry for Foreign Affairs 6- 7
Attention Counsellor of the Legation Dr. _Freiherr v.d.
Heyden-Rynsch_
GBV [Plenipotentiary-General for Administration] Chief of
Operational Staff
Attention State Secretary Dr. _Struckart_
for Reich Ministry of the Interior 8- 9
for Reich Ministry of Justice 11-12
for Reich Ministry of Science, Education and Popular
Culture 13-14
for Central Reich Office for regional planning 15-16
GBW [Plenipotentiary-General for Economics] Chief of the
Operational Staff
Attention Ministerial Director _Sarnow_ for GBW
[Operational Staff] 17-18
for Reich Ministry of Economics 19-20
for Reich Ministry of Food and Agriculture 21-22
for Reich Labor Ministry 23-24
for Reich Chief Forester 25-26
Reich Ministry of Finance 27-28
Attention Counsellor of the Minister, Privy Counsellor
Dr. _Bender_
Reich Ministry of Finance 29-30
Attention Finance President _von Dietz_
Reich Ministry of Communications 31-33
Attention Chief of Section of the Ministry _Baur_
Reich Ministry of Communications 34-35
Attention State Railway Director Dr. _Ebeling_
Reich Postal Ministry 36-37
Attention Counsellor of the Ministry _Honold_
Reich Ministry for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda 38-39
Attention Lt Colonel _Wentscher_
Reichbank Directorate 40-41
Attention Reichsbank Director Dr. _Mueller_
Inspector General of the German Highways 42-43
Attention Government Construction Counsellor _Henne_
OKH (Army High Command) (2nd Section of the General Staff
of the Army) 44-73
OKM (Navy High Command) (A.II) 74-81
Reich Ministry for Air Travel and Air Force High Command
(2nd Section of the General Staff of the Air Force) 82-93
_OKW_: (Armed Forces High Command)
L Ia 94
L Ia Prop. 95
L II 96
L IVa 97
L IVb 98
L IVd 99
WNV 100
W Stb 101-103
A Ausl./Abw. (Foreign Intelligence Section) 104-106
AWA (J) 107
WH 108
Being kept by L IVa 109-125
# # # # #
Part I
_of the Mobilization Schedule for the Civil Administrative Authorities_
_Introduction to the Mobilization Schedule for the Civil Administrative
Authorities._
A. _Principles & Concepts_
1. Preparedness for defense on the part of the whole nation is the
condition for an effective defense of the Reich.
2. It is through _mobilization_ that Wehrmacht, Economy, State and
People are carried over from a state of peace to a state of war.
The mobilization of the Wehrmacht comprises:
(_a_) The securing of the necessary foundations for the establishment,
leadership and supplying of the needs of the war-Wehrmacht,
(_b_) the building up of peace units to war strength,
(_c_) the establishment of new war units,
(_d_) the establishment of the reserve Wehrmacht.
_The Mobilization of Economy_ comprises the collecting of all
_economic_ forces and holding them in readiness to work at their
highest capacity in the service of the conduct of the war.
_The Mobilization of State & People_ comprises:
(_a_) the turn-over of State Leadership and the life of the people
to the requirements of the conduct of the war as regards politics,
sociology and constitutional law; and
(_b_) making available for the conduct of the war all the material
forces of the people.
3. A case of war can arise instantaneously or start as a result of
foreign political tension. The preparation and schedule of mobilization
must take both possibilities into account.
The “_state of defense_” and the “_state of war_” in the sense of R.V.
Law will be ordered expressly in accordance with the Reichs defense law
by the Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor.
With the declaration of the “_state of war_”, the war laws and
regulations come into force without further orders. The legal
consequences provided in other laws for the state of war also become
effective.
If no “_state of defense_” has previously been ordered, the regulations
concerning the state of defense will come into force with the
declaration of the state of war.
It is to be reckoned with that foreign political considerations (war
guilt question, etc.) will not give rise to a declaration of a state
of war, even if it should come to armed conflict with a foreign enemy.
Legal provision is therefore to be made by which regulations for “war”
in various laws will come into force for the case in question. These
regulations must be formulated in such a way that no “war” exists as
understood in international law.
For this reason the legal consequences provided in the various laws for
the “the case of war” will not come into force with the mobilization
decree (X or mobilization case).
4. The _period of tension_ possibly preceding a case of war must be
exploited to the limit of foreign political endurance in order that the
Reich may be made ready for war.
For these reasons the _3 following stages must be distinguished from
each other in the schedule of mobilization_.
4. _a._ “_The period of tension_”
During the period of tension the fundamentals for the reliable
execution of the mobilization proper should be created, and individual
measures for mobilization should be taken in advance, whereby as far as
possible foreign political liability and any kind of provocation abroad
are to be avoided.
These “_advance measures_” will be arranged in the mobilization plans
of the armed forces, according to stages of tension. Within these
advance measures there will be no distinction of special stages for
the civil administration, since it is necessary to have a much more
flexible regulation.
The advance measures will be executed on the basis of peace
legislation. The fact and the purpose of the advance measures are to
be camouflaged as much as possible within the civil administration
concerned.
The “_period of tension_” as such will not be ordered; it is merely the
technical term for a period of special political tension in foreign
relations, during which preparatory measures (advance measures) can be
ordered.
4. _b._ _Mobilization without public announcement_ (“_X case_”):
While its purpose is to be camouflaged as far as possible, it is to
bring about the systematic mobilization of the armed forces, and
if necessary the camouflaged mobilization of the state, economy and
people. A possibility exists that “Case X” will only be ordered for the
armed forces or parts of it.
If no official announcement of the state of defense is made, the
execution of the mobilization must be assured through administrative
channels. The peace time laws: Law relating to Participation in
Defense measures, emergency service decree, etc. (Wehrleistungsgesetz,
Notdienstverordnung, u.a.) adapted for camouflaged mobilization will
serve as legal basis.
Case X may be ordered without being preceded by the measures provided
in sub 4a.
4. _c._ _General mobilization with public announcement._
(“_Mobilization case_”--“_Mob case_”):
This includes the mobilization of the armed forces and the state of
the national economy as well as of the entire people, if no special
limitations have been ordered in the mobilization decree (for instance
local limitations). In the normal case, the order for general
mobilization initiates the provided mobilization measures of the armed
forces, and of all civil authorities and offices, with the exception
however of specially designated measures for the supervision and
checking of the information service.
In all cases these measures will only come into force by a special
order of the Supreme High Command of the Armed Forces.
Just as in Case X, the execution of general mobilization is based on
the peace laws adapted for a camouflaged mobilization.
The general mobilization (Mob case) can be ordered without being
preceded by the period of tension or by mobilization without official
announcement (Case X).
5. _Publication and Execution of Mobilization Measures._
5. _a._ The measures provided for the _period of tension_ will be
ordered singly, in groups or in their entirety by the Fuehrer &
Reich Chancellor (after considering proposals from the appropriate
Reich Dept.) on the application of the Chief of the OKW, or of the
Plenipotentiary for the Reich Administration or the Plenipotentiary
for Economy who will act in conjunction with the Chief of the OKW.
The measures ordered by the Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor will be
communicated to the highest civil administrative authorities through
the OKW, and to the Departments under the Plenipotentiaries for the
Reich Administration and Economy through the latter.
The measures ordered have to be carried out according to the
instructions of the highest Reich authorities, provided that the
authorities of the Armed Forces have not been specially ordered to
charge the intermediate and lower civil authorities with the execution
of the measures.
This is applicable for the following cases (or, as circumstances may
dictate, not till the incidence of Case X or general mobilization).
(1) _Evacuation and clearing of battle territory_ according to
directives for the “evacuation of Reichs territory threatened by the
enemy”, Vol. 1, Nos. 14 and 15, or (respectively) “clearing of the
battle territory of the west” and the corresponding provisions for the
East.
(2) _Establishment of the Frontier Guards_ incl. initiation of the
attached special intelligence network acc. to the provisions for the
VGAD of Sept. 1937 No. 24 & Appendix 10, No. 12.
(3) _Establishment of the VGAD_ incl. initiation of the special
intelligence network acc. to the provisions for the VGAD of Sept. 1937,
App. 1, No. 2 & App. 10, No. 12.
(4) _Establishment of Field Police Units--Key Words_ (not code numbers)
may be agreed with the military authorities for these measures.
The purpose of all other key words made known to the civil authorities
by the military commands is exclusively that of informing the
authorities concerned about measures coming within the _military_
sphere. Those key words are not to be entered in the mobilization
calendar, but are to be added on a special sheet.
Notwithstanding all this, a _mutual understanding_ with military
authorities concerning the _preparation_ of the various measures
in time of peace and their _execution_ (after proclamation through
civilian channels) in war time is absolutely necessary wherever
military and civil measures come into contact.
5. _b._ Case X _(Mobilization without public announcement)_ is ordered
by the Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor. Publication to the highest Reichs
authorities is carried out in the same manner as for the “advance
measures”.
Various mobilization measures will be decreed within the civil sphere
through release [Ausloesung] of code words, or through special order if
Case X applies only to the armed forces or parts of it.
The measures for mobilization are carried out by the highest Reichs
authorities under their exclusive responsibility with the limitation
that the fact of mobilization must not be mentioned publicly
(diplomatic channels, press, public proclamations and announcements,
radio, etc.). To achieve this purpose it must be stressed that it is
necessary to camouflage the individual measures as much as possible
without endangering their execution ... The main purpose is not to
offer legal grounds to the prospective enemy for the opening of
hostilities or their own mobilization. For that purpose, the necessary
suspension of various measures contained in Section II (mobilization)
of the mob. calendar will be ordered by the High Command of the Armed
Forces.
In principle every proclamation and suspension of code numbers during
the period of tension or in case X must be made known to the High
Commands of the three branches of the Armed Forces by the High Command
of the Armed Forces.
5. _c._ _General mobilization with public announcement_ (case of
mobilization):
The general mobilization will be decreed publicly by the
“Mobilization-order” of the Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor.
5. _d._ Preparations are being made to enable parts of the Wehrmacht
to move out at increased speed. In order that the units of the Army &
the Navy to whom this applies may be _prepared to move out_ and the
Luftwaffe _prepared to take off_, the civil administration authorities
are required to render special assistance. This measure may be ordered
during the period of tension.
As this preparedness (for moving out or taking off) only applies
to certain territories of the Reich and only affects certain
administrative authorities, the latter will receive their instructions
direct from those Wehrmacht authorities in whose territory the
preparedness for moving out or taking off is being established. In
addition, the order to prepare for the march-out or take-off will be
communicated to the appropriate Reich ministries, the G.B. and so on,
by the OKW.
6. _Dissemination of the mobilization orders through the various
administrative channels_:
In case of mobilization the general mobilization with public
announcement (case of mob.) will be announced to the Reichs authorities
etc., the intermediate and lower civil authorities by a mob. cable
through the DRP [German Reichs Postal Service].
The DRP organizes for that purpose a dissemination plan in agreement
with the other Reichs authorities. The “general mobilization” will also
be made public by means of radio, public announcements, etc.
The highest Reichs authorities will issue individual orders in their
spheres for the “period of tension” and for “Case X”. Announcements
concerning the stages of mobilization and the measures to be taken
therefor will not be circulated through district cables by the DRP.
All mobilization orders are to be passed on by the quickest means to
the subordinate authorities.
If the orders are passed on by phone, the identity of the civil servant
transmitting the order is to be ascertained by appropriate questioning,
in order to guard against deception. If doubts remain as to the
identity of the person calling, they are to be dispelled by a further
call.
The ordering of measures which concern, directly or indirectly, offices
of the armed forces or authorities of other departments must be made
known to those authorities.
If an authority learns about the stages of mobilization through
unofficial channels, then it must immediately be ascertained through
contact with superior authorities whether measures may be taken. The
means of dissemination of mob. orders must be defined in the mob.
calendars of the authorities. It is assumed that the night and day
telephone service will be organized within the framework of the advance
measures for the period of tension.
_B. Preparations for Mobilization._
_Principles for the drafting of the “Mobilization Schedule for the
Civil Administrative Authorities”._
7. The mobilization plans of the Wehrmacht and the Mobilization
Schedule for the civil administration provide the responsible State
Government with a general survey of the volume of preparations for
mobilization and of their political scope. They have been so adjusted
to each other that the unification of the entire mobilization is
secured.
8. The mobilization schedule for the civil administrative authorities
comprises in general all the measures of the civil state administration
which on the one hand directly support the operational capacity of the
Wehrmacht, or on the other hand serve the preparedness for war on the
part of state, economy and people.
9. The mobilization stages discussed sub. no. 4--
(a) period of tension
(b) mobilization without public announcement (Case X)
(c) general mobilization with public announcement (mob. case)
form the _basis_ for the drafting of the “mobilization schedule for the
civil administration”.
9. _a._ The _advance measures for the period of tension_ form the
content of _Section I_ in every part of the mobilization schedule.
The advance measures for the civil administrative authorities in the
period of tension are made flexible to conform to any development of
the political & economic situation. Insofar as the advance measures
for the civil administration give direct support to the Wehrmacht,
they will be ordered from case to case so as to conform to the advance
measures of the Wehrmacht.
9. _b._ The measures for _mobilization_ form the content of _Section
II_ in every part of the mob. schedule, with the proviso that in
the case of “mobilization without public announcement (Case X)”
they will be carried out according to the provisions of No. 4.b
without publication, whereas in the case of general mobilization with
public announcement (mob. case) they will as a rule be subject to no
restrictions. The specially designated measures (code number) for the
supervision and checking of the intelligence service will in _no_ case,
however, come into force except by special order of the OKW (No. 4.c).
The advance measures for the period of tension are printed in red in
Section II (mobilization).
The purpose of the said summary in Section II is to afford a complete
survey in case mobilization should arise suddenly (without a previous
period of tension).
The mob. measures common to all administrative authorities are listed
in a special _Part II of the mobilization schedule_. They are not
included in the separate parts of the mob. schedule.
10. Every part of the “Mobilization Schedule for the civil
administrative authorities” (and therewith all the highest Reich
Departments) is furnished with certain _code numbers_ with which the
various measures are to be designated at all times.
The purpose of these code numbers is to enable certain measures to
be put into effect quickly and under certain circumstances to be
camouflaged. In order to guard against confusion with the code numbers
of the Wehrmacht units, the letter _Z_ (for Zivilverwaltungen- i.e.
civil administration) is to be set _before_ the code number wherever
code numbers are given in the mob. schedule of the civil administration.
11. The “mobilization schedule for the civil administrative
authorities” contains in--
_Part I_
The introduction to the mob. schedule No. 1-100
for the civil administrative
authorities
_Part II_
Measures applicable to all Code No. 0101-0500
administrations and in its subsequent
parts measures of the various
supreme Reich Departments.
_Part III_
Foreign Office Code No. 0501-1000
_Part IV_
Reich Ministry of the Interior Code No. 1001-1500
_Part V_
Reich Ministry for Popular Code No. 1501-2000
Enlightenment & Propaganda
_Part VI_
Reich Ministry of Justice Code No. 2001-2500
_Part VII_
Reich Ministry for Science, Code No. 2501-3000
Education and Popular Culture
_Part VIII_
Reich Traffic Ministry (Motor Code No. 3001-3500
traffic, shipping & waterways)
_Part IX_
Reich Post Code No. 3501-4000
_Part X_
Reich Traffic Ministry Code No. 4001-4500
(Railway Sections)
_Part XI_
General Inspector for German Code No. 4501-5000
roadways
_Part XII_
Special measures of the Plenipotentiary Code No. 5001-5500
for Economy
_Part XIII_
Reich Ministry for Economy Code No. 5501-6000
_Part XIV_
Reich Ministry for Food and Code No. 6001-6500
Agriculture
_Part XV_
Reich Ministry of Finance Code No. 6501-7000
_Part XVI_
Reich Ministry of Labor Code No. 7001-7500
_Part XVII_
Reich Forests Director Code No. 7501-8000
_Part XVIII_
Reichbank Directorate Code No. 8001-8500
_Part XIX_
Reich Department for Space Code No. 8501-9000
Regulation
_Part XX_
NSDAP Code No. 9001-9500
12. The various civil administrations will in their own sphere of
authority keep _mobilization calendars_ based on the general measures
set forth in the “mobilization schedule for civil administrative
authorities”.
These calendars will comprise the individual measures and explanations
necessary for the execution of the general measures in the same order
and with the same code numbers as in the mobilization schedule.
That the code numbers of the mobilization schedule should agree with
those on all mob. calendars is necessary to enable the measures ordered
in accordance with the mob. schedule to be passed on quickly and
camouflaged.
_The mobilization calendars of the civil administrative authorities_
shall be drafted and passed on in the same way in compliance with the
executory provisions laid down by the OKW.
_C. Securing of sufficient money to cover mobilization._
13. The money set aside in the Reichsbank establishments for the
purposes of the armed forces and the civil administration in the case
of mobilization may be used for the advance measures and for the
mobilization without public announcement (“Case X”).
The absolutely necessary payments before the publication of a
mobilization order are to be entered under a special section of
the present budget appropriations for the time being and will be
transferred to the war budget later on, unless otherwise directed. This
regulation is to be added to all mobilization calendars.
_D. Dates for Mob. Preparations in the Civil Administration._
14. In order that a new measure should be included in the mobilization
schedule for the civil administrative authorities, application must be
made to the Chief of the Reich Defense Committee (Section Defense of
the Reich in the OKW).
15. In order that consistency may be preserved in preparing measures
for the calendar for any mobilization year, alterations, and where
possible, new measures should only be applied for once a year--at the
latest--November 1st.
On the basis of such applications the mob. schedule will be altered by
the following 1st of February in such a way that it will be decisive
for calendar preparations for the current mob. year (April 1-March 31).
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1642-PS
Distribution List for the Secret map of the Soviet Union (European part)
OKW--(Supreme Command Armed forces):
Keitel, Jodl, Warlimont, Munch, Wedell, Canaris 6
Office for the Four year plan:
Koerner, Neuman, Gramsch and 12 others 15
Foreign office:
Grosskopf 2
OKH--(High Command Army):
Brauchitsch and Quartermaster-General 3
OKM--(High Command Navy):
Raeder and 1 other 2
Propaganda Ministry:
Goebbels, Gutterer 3
Reichs Ministry for Economy:
Funk 11
Police:
Himmler and 3 others 4
--
36
Own Ministry:
Sch., Mall., Leibl, Siew., Korpp, Meyer, Dreyer 8
--
44
[illegible] 2
--
46
and 50 persons
_Title of map_:
Union of the Socialist
Soviet republics
European part
scale 1 : 400000000 kilometer
Map I
OKW /(Supreme Command of the armed forces)
Office for Economy and armament/
Economy
(Wi Rue Amt/Wi)
1. March 1941
[Explanatory note: The map was found among the Rosenberg documents in a
red folder carrying the remark “Frontiers”, with a distribution list in
Rosenberg’s own handwriting. This distribution list refers apparently
to plans worked out by Rosenberg for the administration of the occupied
territories as the map shows lines in blue pencil indicating possibly
the extent of the intended administration through the Rosenberg
Ministry.]
SYNOPSIS OF DOCUMENT 1643-PS
Synopsis of letter written 29 November 1942 by Dr. Casdorf to various
Reich officials: Leader of the SS; Chief of the German police; Main
Government Office of Economics of the SS.
Invitation extended to various responsible officials for a meeting
to be held on 17 December 1942 at 10 o’clock, for the purpose of
discussing the legal aspects of the confiscation of property by the SS
for enlarging the concentration camp at Auschwitz as suggested in the
attached letter.
# # # # #
Synopsis of letter written 7 November 1942 by SS General Pohl to the
Reich Minister of Finance for the enlargement of the concentration
camp at Auschwitz.
The Reichsfuehrer of the SS expressed the wish that the territory of
Auschwitz concentration camp should be increased to about 4640 acres
and become a private estate owned by the Reich. The area in question
(to be confiscated as soon as possible) belonged to various owners such
as (1) Jewish and Polish private land owners, (2) towns in which most
of the industrial property belonged to the Poles and the Jews, (3) the
Polish State, (4) the community, (5) the church, (6) racial Germans.
Different authorities were in charge and different rules had to be
applied which made the transfer of property an impractical legal
procedure. For this reason, the Minister of Justice introduced a
new regulation on 23 May 1942 which made a new system of property
registration possible.
The SS suggests that the Reichskommissar, for the securing of the
German element, should be authorized to transfer estates under
categories 2-6. Racial Germans should be compensated for their estates
in money or in allotting other ground properties to them.
It is desired that all authorities concerned should be notified and
invited for a discussion on this subject. In this meeting, Dr. Fiedler
(Office of the Reichskommissar for the strengthening of the German
element) and Mr. Korch [Zentralbodenamt] should participate.
# # # # #
Synopsis of teletype letter from the Chief of the ORPO to the
Regierungspraesident in Kattowitz, 8 December 1942, forwarded to the
Reich Minister on 9 December 1942.
The chief of police orders:
The creation of an independent police district for the concentration
camp and quarters [Lager und Wehnsiedlung] for inmates in Auschwitz,
headed by the camp commandant. This new regulation will not
affect the police functions of the Landsrat in Bielitz or of the
Regierungspraesident in Kattowitz. The commander of the camp will be
the police chief of the town of Auschwitz. The disciplinary measures
ordered by the camp commander against the camp inmates should not have
the character of police measures, and his functions as camp commander
and police chief should be kept distinct. The field police can be
ordered by the camp commandant for special duty within the camp itself;
but such an order can be given only by the camp commander.
# # # # #
Synopsis of a copy of minutes of meeting held on 17 and 18 December
1942 about the confiscation of territory for the enlargement of the
Auschwitz concentration camp.
In order to be able to enlarge the territory of the Auschwitz
concentration camp, it would be expedient to transfer all the estates
to be confiscated to the “Zentralbodenamt” which is an agency of the
Reichsfuehrer SS. However, in order to carry out this transaction, all
those agencies which are at present responsible for the various types
of real estate in question, have to give their approval.
The officials in charge of the church property and of the former Polish
State property gave their consent to release the estates under their
jurisdiction to the Zentralbodenamt. However, the representative of
the Reich Minister of the Interior claimed that he had no authority to
dispose of the property.
Of the community, in spite of arguments to the contrary from other
officials, a further discussion on 21 December 1942 was to be held
between the representatives of the Reich Ministry of the Interior and
the Reichsfuehrer SS.
On 18 December 1942 the representative of the Haupttreuhandstelle Ost
agreed to release the estates under their jurisdiction and empower
the officials in charge to initiate the transactions. The still
remaining legal requirements for the release of properties belonging
to industrial enterprises, racial Germans, and the town of Auschwitz
were finally discussed. The list of participants appears on page
4. Attached, an authorization from the Reich Minister of Finance
(Haupttreuhandstelle Ost) issued 12 January 1943, giving full power
of attorney to the Bodenamt of the Reichsfuehrer SS to make out the
necessary declarations in regard to the real estates.
# # # # #
Synopsis of teletype letter from Dr. Hoffman, representing the Reich
Ministry of the Interior, to the Regierungspraesident in Kattowitz,
dated 22 January 1943.
The territory of the Auschwitz concentration camp will be changed into
an independent estate. For this purpose it must become the property
of the Reich, represented by the Reichsfuehrer SS. This transaction
must be carried out quickly. Land belonging to the Auschwitz district
or to former Reich communities will be transferred after individual
agreements have been made between the owners and the Reichsfuehrer SS
or his agencies. The other community property will be transferred to
the Bodenamt from the respective communities through the mediation of
the Regierungspraesident. Regardless of how much of a property will
become part of the new concentration camp estate, it will have to be
purchased in its entirety. After the measurements have been completed,
the part not needed for the camp estate will be returned to the
original owner. In the Interior the Reichsfuehrer will administer the
property.
Finally the legal aspects of the compensation are discussed.
# # # # #
Synopsis of letter from Dr. Hoffman, representative of the Reich
Ministry of the Interior, to the Oberpraesident of Kattowitz, dated
9 June 1943.
Inquiry as to whether the new Auschwitz estate has already been formed.
# # # # #
Synopsis of letter from the Chief President of Upper Silesia to the
Reich Minister of the Interior, dated 16 August 1943.
Since the new estate of the concentration camp Auschwitz could not
be created fast enough because two private properties could not be
purchased, the President of Upper Silesia issued a decree creating
a new district for Auschwitz. This decree, issued 31 May 1943, is
attached in two copies. It gives a detailed description of the border
line of the newly created Auschwitz district. Relevant maps are
enclosed in folder.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1650-PS
SECRET STATE POLICE--STATE POLICE OFFICE COLOGNE
Branch Office, Aachen
To be transmitted in secret--To be handled as a secret government
matter.
DOR. BERLIN NUE 19 507 March 4 1944 1430--WF--
To all State Police Directorates except PRAGUE and BRUNN--Inspectors of
the Security Police and of the Security Service.
Subject: Measures to be taken against captured escaped prisoners of
war who are officers or not working non-commissioned officers,
except British and American prisoners of war.
The Supreme Command of the Army has ordered as follows:
1. Every captured escaped prisoner of war who is an officer or a not
working non-commissioned officer, except British and American prisoners
of war, is to be turned over to the Chief of the Security Police and of
the Security Service under the classification “Step III” regardless of
whether the escape occurred during a transport, whether it was a mass
escape or an individual one.
2. Since the transfer of the prisoners of war to the security police
and security service may not become officially known to the outside
under any circumstances other prisoners of war may by no means be
informed of the capture. The captured prisoners are to be reported
to the Army Information Bureau as “escaped and not captured”. Their
mail is to be handled accordingly. Inquiries of representatives of
the Protective Power of the International Red Cross, and of other aid
societies will be given the same answer.
3. If escaped British and American prisoners of war who are officers or
not working non-commissioned officers, respectively, are captured they
are to be detained at first outside the prisoner of war camps and out
of sight of prisoners of war; if Army owned buildings are unavailable
they are to be placed in police custody. In every instance the Corps
Area Command will request speedily the Supreme Command of the Army
(Chief, Prisoner of War Section) for a decision as to whether they
are to be turned over to the Chief of the Security Police and of the
Security Service.
In reference to this, I order as follows:
1. The State Police Directorates will accept the captured escaped
officer prisoners of war from the prisoner of war camp commandants and
will transport them to the Concentration Camp Mauthausen following the
procedure previously used, unless the circumstances render a special
transport imperative. The prisoners of war are to be put in irons on
the transport--not on the station if it is subject to view by the
public. The camp commandant at Mauthausen is to be notified that the
transfer occurs within the scope of the action “Kugel” [translator’s
note: the literal translation of “Kugel” is “bullet”]. The State
Police Directorates will submit semi-yearly reports on these transfers
giving merely the figures, the first report being due on 5 July 1944
(sharp). The report is to be made under the reference “Treatment of
Captured Escaped Prisoners of War who are officers within the Scope
of the Action ‘Kugel’.” In the case of special events, reports are to
be submitted immediately. The State Police Directorates will maintain
exact records.
2. For the sake of secrecy, the Supreme Command of the Armed Force has
been requested to inform the prisoner of war camps to turn the captured
prisoners over to the local State Police Office and not to send them
directly to Mauthausen.
3. Captured escaped British and American officers and not working
non-commissioned officers are to be detained in police custody in a
city in which a State Police office is located provided the Army has no
suitable quarters. In view of the existing crowding of police prisons,
the State Police officer will accept captured prisoners only if the
Army actually does not dispose of any suitable space. The prisoner of
war camp commandants are to be contacted in reference to their quarters
immediately after the receipt of this order. In the interest of the
secrecy of this order, confinement outside of police jails, e.g. in
Labor Education Camps is not permissible.
4. If escaped prisoners of war who are officers and not working
non-commissioned officers except British and American prisoners of
war are captured by police authorities, reasons of practicability
render it unnecessary to return the prisoner to the prisoner of war
camp commandant once the facts have been clarified adequately. The
prisoner of war camp is to be informed of the capture and is to be
requested for a transfer under the classification “Step III”. Captured
escaped British and American prisoners of war who are officers and
non-commissioned officers are always to be turned over to the Army.
5. The city and county police authorities are not to be informed of
this order.
Chief of the Security Police and of the Security Service
IV D5d--B.NR. 61/44 GRS.--For the Chief--(signed) Mueller.
SS General.
Branch Office Aachen. Aachen 6 March 1944
_IV D No. 26/44 g Rs_
1. Two extract copies were made of this order.
1st Copy to IV A--6 March.
2nd Copy to IV D--2 March.
2. To be filed with IV C.--IV 3 Noted.
ROSCHER 19 June
[two illegible signatures]
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1652-PS
1933 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 135
Decree of the Reichs President for Protection against treacherous
Attacks on the Government of the Nationalist Movement 21 March 1933
On the basis of Article 48, Par. 2 of the constitution the following is
decreed:
Par. 1
1. Any person possessing a uniform of an organization supporting the
government of the nationalist movement without being entitled thereto
through membership in the organization or otherwise, will be punished
with imprisonment up to two years.
2. Any person wearing the uniform or an insignia representing
membership of an organization designated in Par. 1, without being a
member of the organization, will be punished with imprisonment of at
least one month.
Par. 2
1. Whoever commits a punishable act against persons or objects or
threatens the same and while so doing wears or carries with him
the uniform or insignia designating membership in an organization
of the kind listed in Section 1 (1) without being a member of the
organization, will be punished with a penitentiary sentence; in case of
mitigating circumstances, with imprisonment of not less than 6 months.
2. If the offense was committed with the intention to incite a revolt
or to create fear or panic among the populace or to cause difficulties
for the German Reich in its foreign affairs, the punishment is a
penitentiary sentence of from 3 years to life. In especially severe
cases the death penalty may be exacted.
3. According to these regulations a German can also be prosecuted if he
has committed the offense in a foreign country.
Par. 3
1. Whoever purposely makes or circulates a statement of a factual
nature which is untrue or grossly exaggerated or which is apt to
seriously harm the welfare of the Reich or of a state or the reputation
of the national government or of a state government or of the parties
or organizations supporting these governments, is to be punished,
insofar as no more severe punishment is decreed in other regulations,
with imprisonment up to two years and, if he makes or spreads the
statement publicly, with imprisonment of not less than three months.
2. If through this deed, heavy damage for the Reich or a state
resulted, penitentiary punishment can be exacted.
3. Whoever commits an act through negligence, will be punished with
imprisonment up to 3 months, or by a fine.
Par. 4
Whoever has acquired membership in an organization surreptitiously is
counted as a non-member in the application of this decree.
Par. 5
This decree becomes effective on the day following its publication.
Berlin, 21 March 1933
Reichs President
von HINDENBURG
Reichs Chancellor
Adolf HITLER
Reichs Minister of the Interior
FRICK
For the Reichs Minister for Justice
The Deputy of the Reichs Chancellor
von PAPEN
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1653-PS
1934 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 81
First regulation concerning the new building of the Reich of 2 February
1934
Under the authority of Article 5 of the law on the Reconstruction of
the Reich from 30 January 1934 (Reichsgesetzblatt I, page 75), the
following decree is published herewith:
Article 1
To exercise sovereign rights--a function which was transferred from
the provinces onto the Reich--shall be a function exercised by the
provincial governments as a mandate and on behalf of the Reichs, since
the Reich shall not make use of its right to exercise this function,
either generally or in individual cases.
Article 2
Treaties or agreements in the realm of administration which the
provinces may have concluded among each other or with the Reich shall
not be affected by this transfer of the sovereign rights from the
provinces onto the Reich.
Article 3
1. Laws need the assent of the competent Minister of the Reich.
2. In his own domain the competent Minister of the Reich may order that
the drafts of laws be submitted to him before the law is published.
Article 4
The highest echelons of the provincial governments shall, within the
realm of their tasks, obey the orders issued by the competent Ministers
of the Reich.
Article 5
Employees of the provincial governments may be transferred into the
Reich’s civil service, and employees of the government of the Reich may
be transferred into the civil service of the provinces.
Article 6
This decree became valid on 30 January 1934.
Berlin, 2 February 1934
The Minister of the Interior
FRICK
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1654-PS
1935 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PAGE 369, Nr. 28 dated 16 March 1935
TO THE GERMAN PEOPLE!
When in November 1918, the German people trusting the assurances given
in Wilson’s 14 points, laid down their arms, after four and a half
years of glorious resistance in a war which they never wanted, they
believed, not only to have rendered a service to tortured mankind but
also toward a great idea. Suffering the most, under the consequences
of this insane battle, millions of our people faithfully grasped at
the thought of a reorganization of the relationship between people.
This would be improved by the elimination of secret diplomatic cabinet
politics on one hand, and the horrible means of war on the other. The
harshest results of defeat which are history appeared, to many German
people as the necessary sacrifices in order to free the world once and
for all of similar horrors.
The idea of the League of Nations has probably not aroused a more
hearty approval in other nations than in the German which lost all
earthly happiness. And so it was easy to understand, why the German
people occupied and fulfilled the inane requests for destruction of
armaments. The German people, and especially the administration, were
convinced that through their fulfillment of orders for disarmament,
laid down at Versailles, an international disarmament program was
going to be started and guaranteed. For only in a fulfillment of
these orders, by both sides, lies a moral sensible justification for
a demand, which if unilaterally imposed and executed, will lead to
eternal discrimination and with that, to a declaration of inferiority,
of a great nation. But such a peace treaty could never be the
prerequisite for a real inner reconciliation of the people and with
that lead to a pacification of the world; but it would only create an
eternal burning hatred. Germany has fulfilled the imposed disarmament
obligations laid down by the Inter-Allied Control Commission.
The following were the works of the destruction of the German military
power and its means which were certified to, by this commission.
A. Army
59 897 guns and barrels
130 558 machine guns
31 470 trench mortars and barrels
6007 000 rifles and carbines
243 957 machine gun barrels
28 001 gun carriages
4 390 trench mortar carriages
38750 000 projectiles
16550 000 hand and rifle grenades
60400 000 fuzes
491000 000 small arms ammunition
335 000 shells
23 515 cartridges and bullets
37 600 powder
79 500 empty shells
212 000 telephones
1 072 flamethrowers
31 armored trains
59 tanks
1 762 observation cars
8 982 wireless stations
1 240 Field bakeries
2 199 pontoons
981 pieces of equipment for soldiers and
8230 350 sets of equipment for soldiers
7 300 pistols and revolvers
180 machine gun sleighs
21 mobile workshops
12 AA gun carriers
11 caissons
64 000 steel helmets
174 000 gas masks
2 500 machines of former war industry
8 000 rifle barrels
B. Air
15 714 fighter planes and bombers
27 757 Airplane engines
C. Navy
26 battleships
4 coast guard vessels
4 destroyers
19 small destroyers
21 school and special ships
83 torpedo boats
315 U-Boats
Remarks to A and B
Further under the destruction duties; vehicles of all kinds, means of
gas attack and partly gas defense, gas and explosives, searchlights,
sighting mechanisms, range-finding and sound-ranging devices, optical
apparatus of all kinds, harnesses for horses, narrow gauge equipment,
field printing shops, field kitchens, workshops, slash and stabbing
weapons, steel helmets, ammunition transport material, normal and
special machines of the War industry as, buildings, blueprints thereof,
airplane and zeppelin hangars, etc.
Following this unprecedented historical fulfillment of a treaty, the
German people had the right to expect the redemption of the introduced
duties also from the other side.
Because:
1. Germany has disarmed.
2. In the peace treaty it was plainly required that Germany must be
disarmed in order to set precedent for general disarmament; this means,
it was said that only in Germany’s armament alone lies the basis for
the armament of other nations.
3. The German people were filled with such principles in its
governments and in its Parties which completely agreed with the
pacifistic-democratic ideals of the League of Nations and its founders.
While Germany however had fulfilled its obligations on one side of the
treaty, there remained the redeeming of the obligations on the other
side. That means: the high treaty-makers of the former victorious
states have unilaterally released themselves from the obligations of
the Versailles treaty!
Not enough that every disarmament, was in some way or another
comparable to the German destruction of arms, discontinued, no:
Not even a standstill in the armament was seen, on the contrary
the armament of a whole number of states became visible. What was
discovered during the War in the way of new destructive machinery
now was completed in a methodical-scientific way. In the field of
creating mighty tanks, fighters and bombers, uninterrupted and terrible
improvements took place. New large guns were constructed, new high
explosive, incendiary and gas bombs were developed.
In the meantime however, the world resounded again with war cries as if
there never had been a World War and never a Versailles Treaty. Germany
was an empty powerless space, among these highly armed War states,
which continually made available the most modern motorized equipment
[Kraefte] and had no defense against any menace or threat. The German
people recall the disaster and suffering from fifteen years of
economical distress, political and moral humiliation. It is therefore
easily understood when Germany began to ask loudly for the redeeming of
the promise of the disarmament of the other nations.
Because this is clear, the world would not tolerate a hundred year long
peace but it must be an unmeasurable blessing to her. But it would not
endure a hundred year long break between conqueror and conquered.
The feeling regarding the moral rectification and necessity of an
international disarmament was not only active in Germany but also
within many other nations. Out of the pursuance of these strengths
resulted attempts to try and direct an armament reduction by means
of conferences and thereby bring about a general international
assimilation on a lower level.
And so resulted the first proposition for an international armament
abrogation, of which we have the memory of the MacDonald Plan as being
significant.
Germany was prepared to accept this plan and to take it as foundation
of a final agreement.
It failed due to the rejection by other nations and was finally
abandoned. Since the German people and Reich under such circumstances
found no realization in the equality of rights solemnly guaranteed in
the December declaration of 1932, the new German government saw in
themselves, the guardians of the honor and the living rights of the
German people; they were not in the position to continue to take part
in such conferences or to belong to the League of Nations.
Even after the leaving of Geneva, the German Government was still
prepared not only to consider proposals by other nations but also to
make several practical proposals themselves. They undertook thereby
the conception, which was coined by other nations themselves, that the
creation of short services Armies are inappropriate for purposes of
aggression and therefore are to be recommended for a peaceful defense.
They were therefore prepared to convert the long-service Reichswehr
into a short service Army according to the wishes of other nations.
Their proposals of the winter 1933/34 were practical and easy to
accomplish. Their rejection as well as the final rejection of the
similar proposed Italian and English plan however led us to believe
that the inclination toward a further sensible fulfillment of the
Versailles disarmament provision no longer exists.
Under these circumstances, the German government was forced to take
every necessary measure which would guarantee the termination of
conditions, which are just as unworthy as menacing; of the helpless
defenselessness of a great people and Reich.
They started out from the same motivations as the very true expression
given by Minister Baldwin in his last speech:
“A country, which is not willing to seize the necessary precautionary
measures for its own protection will never have might in this world,
neither moral nor material might.”
The Government of the present day German Reich however, only wishes one
single moral and material might; it is the power to be able to protect
the peace for the Reich and with that, peace for all of Europe!
Therefore she did everything that was in her power and what could serve
toward the furtherance of the peace.
1. For a long period of time she has proposed to all her neighbor
nations, the signing of non-aggression pacts.
2. She has sought and found an agreeable arrangement with the eastern
neighbor nation, which, thanks to the great arbitrary understanding,
has for ever decontaminated the menacing atmosphere which existed when
they took over the power, and it will lead to a lasting understanding
and friendship between the two peoples.
3. She has finally given France the solemn security that Germany, after
the effectuated arrangement of the Saar question will not place or
raise any more territorial claims against France. She believes thereby
to have created, in a historically rare form the prerequisite for the
termination of a hundred year long conflict between two large nations
through a great political and essential sacrifice.
However, the German government must witness to its regret, that for
months a continually rising rearmament is taking place in the world.
She sees in the creation of a Soviet-Russian Army of 101 Divisions,
which means 960,000 men in present peacetime strength, an element which
could not be foreseen at the time of the composition of the Versailles
Treaty.
She sees further signs of rejecting the disarmament idea, proclamated
in its time, in the overdoing of similar measures. It is far from the
German Government to reproach any nation. However, she sees today that
through the present resolved introduction of the two-year military
service in France, the basic ideas of the creation of a short service
defense Army has been abandoned in favor of a long-service organization.
This, however, was one of the arguments used in the demands on Germany,
to surrender its Reichswehr.
* * * Under these circumstances, the German government feels that it
is impossible longer to postpone taking the necessary measures for the
security of the Reich, or even to hide them from the knowledge of the
world.
Therefore, if it now complies with the desire, expressed in the
speech of the English Minister Baldwin on November 28, 1934 for a
clarification of the German intentions, then this is done:
1. IN ORDER TO GIVE THE GERMAN PEOPLE THE CONVICTION AND THE OTHER
STATES THE KNOWLEDGE THAT THE MAINTAINING OF THE HONOR AND SECURITY OF
THE GERMAN REICH WILL, FROM NOW ON, AGAIN BE ENTRUSTED TO THE GERMAN
NATION’S OWN POWER.
2. But in order, by fixing the extent of the German measures, to
invalidate these assertions which wish to imply that the German people
are striving for a position of military hegemony in Europe.
What the German government desires, as the guardian of the honor
and interests of the German nation, is to guarantee the extent of
those means of power which are required not only for maintaining the
integrity of the German Reich, but also for the international respect
and esteem of Germany as a co-guarantor of the general peace.
For in this hour the German government renews, before the German people
and before the whole world, the assurance of its determination never
to trespass the limit of guarding German honor and the freedom of the
Reich, and especially of its determination to (wish to) form, in the
national German armament, not an instrument of military attack, but
rather exclusively one for defense, and thus for maintaining the peace.
In so doing, the German Reich Cabinet expresses the confident hope that
the German people, which thus regains its honor, may be permitted, with
independent equal right, to make its contribution to the pacification
of the world in a free and open cooperation with the other nations and
their governments.
In this spirit the German Reich Cabinet has today passed the following
law:
Law for the Organization of the Armed Forces of March 16, 1935.
The Reich Cabinet has passed the following law which is herewith
promulgated:
Section 1
Service in the Armed Forces is based upon compulsory military duty.
Section 2
In peace time, the German Army, including the police troops transferred
to it is organized into:
12 Corps and
16 Divisions.
Section 3
The Reich Minister of War is charged with the duty of submitting
immediately to the Reich Ministry, detailed laws on compulsory military
duty.
Berlin, March 16, 1935
The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor
ADOLF HITLER
The Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs
FREIHERR VON NEURATH
The Reich Minister of the Interior
FRICK
The Reich Minister of Finance
GRAF SCHWERIN VON KROSIGK
The Reich Minister of Economics
Acting: HJALMAR SCHACHT
President of the Board of Directors of the Reichsbank.
The Reich Minister of Labor
FRANZ SELDTE
The Reich Minister of Justice
DR. GUERTNER
The Reich Minister of Defense
VON BLOMBERG
The Reich Minister of Post and Traffic
FREIHERR VON TELTZ
The Reich Minister of Nutrition and Agriculture
R. WALTER DARRE
The Reich Minister for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda
DR. GOEBBELS
The Reich Minister for Air
HERMANN GOERING
The Reich Minister of Science Education and Popular Culture
RUST
The Reich Minister without Portfolio
R. HESS
The Reich Minister without Portfolio
KERRL
The Reich Minister without Portfolio
Dr. HANS FRANK
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1659-PS
1938 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 303
Second order concerning plebiscite and election for the greater German
Reichstag of 24 March 1938
On the basis of par. 4 of the Second Decree regarding the Reichstag
election law of 18 March 1938 (RGBl I, p. 258) the following is decreed
in supplement to pars. 8 and 32 of the First Decree of 22 March 1938
for the people’s vote and for the election to the Greater German
Reichstag:
Article 1
1. The ballot is printed as follows:
[Illustration:
PEOPLE’S VOTE AND THE GREATER GERMAN REICHSTAG BALLOT
Do you agree with the accomplishment, on 13 March 1938, of the
REUNITING OF AUSTRIA WITH THE GERMAN REICH and do you vote for the list
of our Fuehrer ADOLF HITLER?
YES NO
]
2. The ballot for the qualified voters with the exception of the
Austrian qualified voters (par 8 of the First Decree) consists of white
or yellow paper.
3. The ballot for the Austrian qualified voters (par. 32 section 1 of
the First Decree) consists of green paper.
Article 2
1. The ballot for soldiers of the former Austrian Army (par 32 section
2 of the First Decree) is printed as follows:
[Illustration:
PEOPLE’S VOTE ON THE 10 APRIL 1938 BALLOT
Do you agree, German Soldier, with the ratification on the 13 March
1938 of the
REUNITING OF AUSTRIA WITH THE GERMAN REICH?
YES NO ]
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1660-PS
1938 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 631
Decree for the registration for the active service in Austria in the
year 1938 of 16 June 1938
I. The registration for the active service in the army for the year
1938 in the country of Austria will be conducted during the time from
16 August until 10 September 1938.
II. To be called for registration:
1. All those subject to duty, born in the year 1917, without regard to
their physical fitness and regardless whether they were exempt from
induction in spring of the year 1938;
2. All those volunteers of other years of birth who were considered
“general service”;
3. All those subject to duty considered “general service” or “limited
service” at the time of induction of the class of 1915 and 1916 who
have registered with reserve commands and who have as yet not been
trained;
4. The volunteers who have reported, or want to report, in June 1938,
for induction into active service for the fall of 1938 (for the
Luftwaffe also for the spring of 1939), without regard whether or not
they have been physically examined.
III. Charged with this task are--
in the higher administrative echelons:
The Landeshauptmaenner (governors of provinces); in Vienna the
mayor,
in the district police echelons:
in the cities, the mayor, and the State police officer, as far as
they are on hand,
in Vienna the Chief of Police,
in the rural districts the district governors.
IV. This decree is based upon Article 37, Section 2 of the draft law
dated 21 May 1935 (Reichsgesetzbl. I, page 609) and the decree of the
Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor regarding the transfer (carrying over)
of the institutional law according to the draft law dated 22 May 1935
(Reichsgesetzblatt I, page 615) and the decree on the introduction
of the general draft in the country of Austria dated 15 June 1938
(Reichsgesetzblatt I, page 631).
Berlin, 16 June 1938
The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces
Keitel
The Reich Minister of the Interior
Frick
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1662-PS
1938 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 1580
Order eliminating Jews from German economic life of 12 November 1938
On the basis of the Decree of 18 October 1936 for the execution of the
Four Year Plan (RGBl I, p. 887), the following is ordered:
Article 1
1. From January 1, 1938, operation of retail shops, mail order houses,
independent exercise of handicrafts is forbidden to Jews. (Article 5 of
the First Decree to Reich citizenship law [Reichsbuergergesetz] of 14
Nov 1935--RGBl I, 1933).
2. Moreover it is forbidden to Jews from the same date to offer goods
or services in the markets of all kinds, fairs, or exhibitions or to
advertise such or accept orders therefor.
3. Jewish shops operated in violation of this order will be closed by
police. (Third Decree to Reich citizenship law of 14 June 1938-RGBl I,
627).
Article 2
1. No Jew can manage a firm according to the interpretation of the term
“manager” under the law for national labor of 20 Jan 1934. (RGBl I, 45).
2. If a Jew is a leading employee in a business concern he may be
dismissed with notice of six weeks. At expiration of this period all
claims resulting from the employee’s contract, especially claims of
compensation or pensions, become null.
Article 3
1. No Jew can be a member of a cooperative society.
2. Jewish members of cooperatives lose membership from 21 Dec 1938. No
notice is necessary.
Article 4
Competent Reich Ministers are empowered to issue rules required by this
decree. They may permit exceptions so far as this is necessary for
transfer of Jewish firms into non-Jewish hands or for liquidation of
Jewish concerns and in special cases in order to insure supplies.
Berlin, 12 November 1938
The Commissioner for the Four Year Plan
Goering
General Field Marshal
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1665-PS
1940 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 1270
Order concerning treatment of property of Nationals of the former
Polish State of 17 September 1940
On the basis of the Decree to Implement the Four Year Plan of 18
October 1936 (RGBl I, 887) in conjunction with the Decree for the
Introduction of the Four Year Plan in the Eastern Territories of 30
October 1939 (RGBl I, 2125) the following is decreed for the area of
the Greater German Reich, including annexed Eastern territories:
Article 1
1. Property of nationals of the former Polish State within the area
of the Greater German Reich, including annexed Eastern territories,
is subject to confiscation, administration by commissioner and
sequestration in accordance with the following regulations.
2. This does not apply to the property of persons who have gained
German citizenship in accordance with Article 6 of the edict of the
Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor concerning organization and administration
of Eastern territories, dated 8 October 1939 (RGBl I, 2042). The
competent authority (Article 12) may permit additional exceptions.
3. Nationals of the former Free City of Danzig who are of Polish
nationality are considered as nationals of the former Polish State.
Article 2
1. Confiscation will be applied in case of property belonging to:
_a._ Jews.
_b._ Persons who have fled or who have absented themselves for longer
than temporary period.
2. Confiscation may be applied:
_a._ If the property is needed for the public good, especially for
purposes of national defense or the strengthening of German folkdom.
_b._ If the owners or other persons entitled to it immigrated into the,
then, area of the German Reich after 1 October 1918.
3. Confiscation may be limited to individual articles of property.
4. As a rule the following articles are to be exempted from
confiscation:
_a._ Movable articles destined exclusively for personal use.
_b._ Cash, bank and savings bank deposits as well as stocks and bonds
up to a total value of one thousand marks.
Article 3
Properties are stationary and movable objects (with all accessories),
credits, shares, judgments, and interests of all sorts.
Article 4
1. With the sequestration the previous owners lose the rights of
disposal of the sequestered properties. The competence of the general
governor in accordance with the ordinance for public administration of
farm and forestry industries and territories in the annexed Eastern
areas of 12 Feb 1940 (RGBl I, 355) remains unaffected.
2. Whoever has sequestered property in his possession or custody, must
administer it until further notice. Changes or disposal of the property
or its profits are only to be permitted within the limits of regular
business. All measures which go beyond this, especially the disposal
of plots of land, must have the permission of the competent office
(Article 12).
Article 5
1. The commissarial administration can be ordered for property which is
subject to sequestration, insofar as ordinary administration demands it.
2. Orders by the commissarial administration serve as confiscation at
the same time.
Article 6
1. The commissarial administrator is appointed by the competent office
(Article 12). He will receive a written appointment. He can be recalled
at any time.
2. In the direction of businesses, he must use the same caution which
a regular businessman or administrator would and is responsible for
all the damages which result through breach of duty. He must report to
the competent office (Article 12) at all times all of the information
requested by it and insofar as nothing else is determined he still
must report it concerning his administrative activity monthly without
further request.
3. The commissarial administrator can be held to the fulfillment of his
obligations by the competent office--without prejudice to his criminal
responsibility--by means of an automatic fine of up to 10,000 RM.
Article 7
1. The commissarial administrator is empowered to take all judicial and
extrajudicial actions, which the administration of the property entails
within the limits of ordinary business.
2. The administrator needs a special permission of the competent office
(Article 12) prior to:
_a._ Selling or mortgaging lots.
_b._ Changing the subject or the legal form of an enterprise.
_c._ Doing legal business which results in the sale or winding-up of an
enterprise or of a management or the sale of an administrated stock of
goods or other property which is not divided.
_d._ Renting professional, agriculture and lumber enterprises and farm
and timber lots over 10 hectars.
_e._ Undertaking other legal business whose settlement is made
dependent upon previously established authority of the competent
office (Article 12) by means of public announcement in the German
Reichsanzeiger and the Prussian Staatsanzeiger.
3. Legal affairs which are undertaken without the authority required by
Article 2 are not valid.
Article 8
1. The administrator will receive a remuneration for his activity which
will be determined by the competent office.
2. The costs of the commissarial administration including the
remuneration will be borne by the concern, property, or portion of
property, administered.
Article 9
1. Sequestered property can be confiscated in favor of the Reich by
the competent office if the public weal, particularly the defense of
the Reich or the consolidation of the German nationality [Volkstums],
requires it.
2. Before confiscation the sequestered property is to be determined
according to more detailed directives of the competent office (Article
12).
The Reich is the security for the debts of the confiscated property up
to the amount of the sale value of the confiscated property. Judgments
against confiscated properties remain valid.
4. The disposal of confiscated property is granted the office which was
competent for the confiscation (Article 12). In the case of disposal
of agricultural property an accord will be reached between the Reich
Commissar for the strengthening of German nationality and the Reich
Minister for Food and Agriculture.
5. The regulation of the type and extent of compensation which will be
granted for property losses attendant upon the carrying out of this
decree remains withheld. For measures of the competent agency (Article
12), on the basis of Articles 16 and 17, no compensation will be
granted.
Article 10
1. A commissarial (provisional) administration can also be established
over the property of legal persons, societies, clubs and other
associations of individuals in which subjects of the former Polish
State in the year 1939 still either had a preponderant capital interest
or whose administration was decisively influenced by members of the
former Polish State.
2. During the existence of the commissarial administration the
authority of chief and of the other persons authorized for
representation or administration will be dormant; the same thing for
the powers of all other organs.
3. Only the shares and holdings of subjects of the former Polish State
are subject to confiscation in this case.
Article 11
1. The sequestration or the regulation of the commissarial
administration are upon request of the competent authority (Article
2) to be entered into the register of deeds or any other appropriate
public register. The entry of the name of the commissarial
administrator can also be demanded.
2. Insofar as the register of deeds or other appropriate public
register becomes incorrect as a result of measures on the basis of this
decree, it is upon request of the competent authority to be corrected.
Article 1, section 3 to 5 of the second decree for the execution and
completion of the law on the granting of compensation in case of
confiscation or transferral of property of 18 March 1938 (RGBl I, 317)
is to be applied appropriately.
Article 12
1. For measures and decisions on the basis of this decree the
commissioner for the four year plan--chief-trusteeship East--is
the competent authority; for agriculture including agricultural
side-enterprises, the Reich Commissar for the strengthening of German
nationality.
2. The competent authorities according to subparagraph (1) can delegate
the exercise of their powers entirely or partially to other agencies.
Complaints against their decisions will be directed to the competent
authority according to Sect (1). The complaint will have no delaying
effect. It is not permissible if more than one year has gone by since
the issuance of the disputed decision.
Article 13
If anybody opposes the sequestration or the ruling of the commissarial
administration with the assertion that he is a member of the German
people, then the proceedings are to be suspended. The competent
authority (Article 12) will entrust the decision concerning membership
in the German people to the local governor [Regierungspraesident].
The person concerned also has the right of requesting that his
nationality be determined. Complaint against the decision of the
Regierungspraesident to the Reich Minister of the Interior is
permissible. The decision on membership in the German people is
binding, upon the proceedings of the competent authority (Article 12)
on the basis of this decree.
Article 14
The regulations to be issued according to Article 2, 5 and 10 will
be effected by a written order which is to be made known to person
concerned. This personally making known may be substituted by a sign,
poster, or public proclamation.
Article 15
1. Disposal of property and property rights of subjects of the
former Polish State, who do not come under the regulations governing
exceptions of Article 1, Section 2, need the approval of the
competent authority (Article 12) to be valid. This is not true for the
disposition of claims upon interest and other continuous earnings.
2. The competent authority decides whether approval according to
Section 1 is necessary. The decision is binding upon courts and
administrative agencies. The competent authority (Article 12) must upon
demand issue a certificate that approval is not necessary.
Article 16
1. All sorts of compulsory sales of objects are by this decree
subject to sequestration may only be begun with the assent of the
competent authority (Article 12). If one of the competent authorities
according to Article 12 has assented, it has no influence upon further
proceedings, if it has wrongly asserted its competence.
2. If it is to be feared that the debtor will escape the compulsory
sale, or an immediate seizure is called for, for some other reason,
then upon order of the court authorizing the compulsory sale the
compulsory sale can be begun before issuance of the necessary approval,
according to Section 1. It should, in this case, be limited to the
measures permissible in the execution of an attachment and be continued
from this point only when the approval has been issued. Upon demand of
the competent authority (Article 12) the court authorizing a compulsory
sale must order the lifting of the temporary attachment measures.
Article 17
1. If in the incorporated Eastern territories bankruptcy proceedings
are opened on the property of a bankrupt, then the provisions of
Article 16 are valid accordingly, for the liquidation of the property
belonging to the estate of the bankrupt.
2. If the opening or discontinuance of bankruptcy proceedings in the
incorporated Eastern territories depends upon whether the value of
the bankrupt estate corresponds to the cost of the proceedings, then
objects which according to this decree are subject to confiscation,
shall only be regarded as belonging to the bankrupt estate, if the
competent authority (Article 12) has agreed to their liquidation in
bankruptcy proceedings.
Article 18
It can be publicly announced that property coming into consideration
for sequestration is to be registered. The announcement of registration
for agricultural property takes place in agreement with the Reich
Minister for Food and Agriculture.
Article 19
The competent authority (Article 12) can demand information of
everybody for the carrying out of its tasks. Administrative agencies
and courts must give it official help, especially they must question
witnesses and experts upon its demand.
Article 20
1. Whoever undertakes to deprive the agencies indicated in Article
12 or those empowered to dispose of the property by said agencies or
otherwise in any way undertakes to thwart, to evade, or to prejudice
the effect of the sequestration in order to create a profit for himself
or another, will be punished with imprisonment and fine or one of these
penalties.
2. In aggravated cases the punishment will be confinement to a
penitentiary. If the culprit acts out of insubordination against the
political new order or the case is otherwise especially aggravated the
sentence of death is to be given.
Article 21
1. Whoever intentionally or carelessly fails to fulfill or fulfills
incorrectly, or incompletely, an obligation to report or give
information incumbent upon him according to an executionary regulation
issued to implement this law or a regulation issued according to
Articles 18 and 19, will be punished with imprisonment and fine.
2. The criminal prosecution will be instituted only upon request of the
competent authority (Article 12).
Article 22
1. The following remain unprejudiced:
_a._ The regulation for the securing of the necessary establishments
for the fitting out of the Reich’s war harbor Gdynia of 21 December
1939 (RGBl I, 2475);
_b._ The decree on the public exploitation of agricultural and
sylvicultural enterprises and real estate in the incorporated Eastern
territories of 12 February 1940 (RGBl I, 355) with the provision that
upon the undertaking subject to public exploitation the provisions of
Articles 1, 2, 3, 4 Section 1, Articles 9, 11, 12 Section 1, Articles
14, 18, 19, 20, 21 and 23 of this decree will be applied;
_c._ The ordinance on the handling of enemy property of 15 Jan 1940
(RGBl I, 191) with the provision that property of the subjects of the
former Polish State, who have their residence or permanent domicile in
the territory of an enemy state, will be treated according to this
decree, insofar as it is located in the Greater German Reich including
the incorporated Eastern territories.
_d._ The decree on confiscation in the occupied former Polish
territories (except Eastern Upper Silesia) of 5 Oct 1939, P. 25.
_e._ The decree on the employment of Jewish property of 3 Dec 1938
(RGBl I, 1709) with following:
1. The sequestration according to Article 2 and the regulation of a
commissarial administration according to Articles 5 and 10 of this
decree do not take place in the case of property of Jews, which the
Jewish owners had already been ordered to sell on the basis of Articles
1 to 6 of the decree on the disposal of Jewish property at the time
this law came into effect. The proceeds of this sale can be confiscated.
2. The approval according to Article 15 of this decree is not necessary
insofar as a license is prescribed by Article 8 of decree on employment
of Jewish property;
_f._ The decree of the Reich protector in Bohemia and Moravia on Jewish
property of 21 June 1939 [Verordnungsblatt des Reichsprotektors in
Boehmen und Maehren p. 45] and the decree of the Reich protector in
Bohemia and Moravia on the removal of the Jews from the economy of the
protectorate of 26 Jan 1940 [Verordnungsblatt des Reichsprotektors in
Boehmen and Maehren P. 45] with the provision that the proceedings for
the removal of Jews will also be carried out in regard to the property
of subjects of the former Polish State according to these provisions,
in agreement with the chief-trusteeship East; for the sequestration and
confiscation the agencies named in Article 12 remain competent.
2. Furthermore all regulations conflicting with this one, issued since
28 August 1939 in the incorporated Eastern territories including
the territory of the former Free City of Danzig, especially such
regulations which grant the right to sequester, to install commissarial
administrators or trustees, or to confiscate, become invalid.
3. The measures and legal transactions of the commissariat
administrator undertaken with the approval of the competent agencies
are not subject to the necessity of being approved according to
the decree to assure the orderly development of the economy in the
incorporated Eastern territories of 31 Jan 1940 (RGBl I, 255). In the
case of property disposal an understanding will be established with
the competent Reichs governor or provincial governor or the highest
Reichs authority, which according to Article 3 Section 2 of the decree
of 31 Jan 1940 have withheld their consent. If in cases of especial
importance such an understanding cannot be established, then the
commissioner for the four year plan will make the decision.
4. Measures of the competent authorities (Article 12) which have been
taken before this decree became effective, are valid if they are in
accordance with the provisions of this decree or with the law as it
stood previously.
5. Insofar as sequestrations, confiscations, or the installation of
commissarial administrators have been carried out by anyone else
but the competent agencies (Article 12), their confirmation is to
be applied for in writing. If the confirmation of them is not then
forthcoming, the previously directed measures become null and void. The
same is true if a decision is not reached on the confirmation before
31 October 1940. The competent agencies are authorized to prolong this
period to a reasonable degree in individual cases.
6. The provisions of Section 5 are not valid for trustees, who at the
time this law came into effect were installed according to Articles
2 and 6 of the decree on the employment of Jewish property of 3 Dec
1938 (RGBl I, 1709) for the temporary carrying on, transferral, or
winding up of Jewish business undertakings or for the administration
or transferral of other property of Jews. The legal position of these
trustees remains unchanged.
Article 23
1. The commissioner for the four year plan will issue the necessary
legal regulations for the carrying out of this law--for agriculture
including subsidiary enterprises pertaining to agriculture--with
the agreement of Reich commissar for the strengthening of German
nationality and of the Reich Minister for Food and Agriculture.
2. The commissioner for the four year plan in agreement with the Reich
Minister of Finance and the Reich Minister for Economic Affairs can
decree by means of legal regulations a simplified settlement, diverging
from the provisions of the law as it stands, of the legal affairs of
those persons whose property is subject to confiscation according to
this decree.
3. The necessary administrative regulations for the carrying out
of this decree will be issued by the commissioner for the four
year plan--Chief Trusteeship East--in agreement with the competent
authorities.
Article 24
1. This decree becomes effective one week after its proclamation.
2. The commissioner for the four year plan will fix the time of its
becoming invalid.
Berlin, 17 September 1940
The chairman of the ministerial council
for the defense of the Reich and commissioner
for the four year plan
GOERING
Reichs Marshal
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1666-PS
1942 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 179
Decree of the Fuehrer concerning a plenipotentiary general for the
utilization of labor of 21 March 1942
In order to secure the manpower requisite for the war industries as
a whole, and particularly for armaments, it is necessary that the
utilization of all available manpower, including that of workers
recruited [angeworbenen] abroad and of prisoners of war, should
be subject to a uniform control, directed in a manner appropriate
to the requirements of war industry, and further that all still
incompletely utilized manpower in the Great German Reich, including
the Protectorate, and in the General Gouvernement and in the Occupied
Territories, should be mobilized.
Reichsstatthalter and Gauleiter Fritz Sauckel will carry out this task
within the framework of the Four Years Plan, as Plenipotentiary General
for the utilization of labor. In that capacity he will be directly
responsible to the Commissioner for the Four Years Plan.
Section III (wages) and Section V (utilization of labor) of the Reich
Labor Ministry, together with their subordinate authorities, will
be placed at the disposal of the Plenipotentiary General for the
accomplishment of his task.
Fuehrer-Headquarters, 21 March 1942
The Fuehrer
Adolf Hitler
The Reich Minister and Head of the Reich Chancellery
Dr. Lammers
The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces
Keitel
1942 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 180
Ordinance for the execution of the Fuehrer’s decree concerning a
Plenipotentiary General for Arbeitseinsatz of 27 March 1942
In pursuance of the Fuehrer’s Decree of 21 March 1942 (RGBl I, 179), I
decree as follows:
1. My manpower sections [Geschaeftsgruppen Arbeitseinsatz] are hereby
abolished. (Circular letter of 22 Oct 1936/St. M. Dev. 265). Their
duties (recruitment and allocation of manpower, regulations for labor
conditions [Arbeitsbedingungen]) are taken over by the Plenipotentiary
General for Arbeitseinsatz, who is directly under me.
2. The Plenipotentiary General for Arbeitseinsatz will be responsible
for regulating the conditions of labor (wage policy) employed in the
Reich Territory, having regard to the requirements of Arbeitseinsatz.
3. The Plenipotentiary General for Arbeitseinsatz is part of the Four
Year Plan. In cases where new legislation is required, or existing laws
require to be modified, he will submit appropriate proposals to me.
4. The Plenipotentiary General for Arbeitseinsatz will have at
his disposal for the performance of his task the right delegated
to me by the Fuehrer for issuing instructions to the higher Reich
authorities, their branches and the Party offices, and their associated
organisms and also to the Reich protector, the General-Governor, the
Commander-in-Chief, and heads of the civil administrations.
In the case of ordinances and instructions of fundamental importance
report is to be submitted to me, in advance.
Berlin, 27 March 1942
The Deputy for the Four Year Plan
Goering
Reich Marshal
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1669-PS
NATIONAL SOCIALIST GERMAN WORKERS PARTY
Deputy of the Fuehrer
H/J
Munich, Briennerstrasse 45
Tel: 54901 and 58344
Munich, 28 August 1933.
Mr. Dr. Albrecht Hanshofer
BERLIN
Society of Geography, Wilhelmstr, BERLIN
My dear Doctor:
Many thanks for both your letters of the 23 and 24 of this month. I
made all necessary arrangements concerning the Standartenfuehrers,
immediately.
I would like very much to speak to Haselblatt before his convention
starts. Probably I will be at Berlin around September 7. I don’t know
yet if I shall be able to attend the Convention myself.
Concerning the American, would you please tell him, that in one case
it is no longer the question of a “party” in the sense of the “custom”
practiced since Washington’s time, that we are striving for, but this
party is a section of the State itself. It is of utmost interest to me
to know, whether any American official representatives ever attended
meetings of the fascist party.
I reported the statements of the Polish Chief of Staff.
With hearty greetings
your
[Signature] Rudolf Hess.
Registered!
# # # # #
Berlin, August 1933.
EAST PRUSSIA
Dear Mr. Hess:
Today I have only two reports to pass on to you, having received them
from a generally well informed source.
Primarily: Assertion of the Polish Chief of staff: “Once the damned
civilians thwarted our East Prussian aim with their scruples &
hesitation. That will not happen again. Precaution has been taken that
these people are sent to a Concentration Camp if they should still dare
to obstruct us.”
Secondly: A very delicate matter. It is known to yourself, that
at some place in your organization, there are people, unable to
subordinate their personal initiative for the benefit of the common
good. I am informed that a personage very highly esteemed abroad,
but completely retired at home, H * * * h B * * * g has to fear for
her individual safety. The source of this insecurity, I was told is
S.A. Standartleader Schoeneberg. I don’t have to point out to you the
repercussions, abroad, which any personal accident would provoke. * * *
Could you take care of internal curbing.
With hearty Greetings
Always Your
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1674-PS
1938 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PAGE 1044, 17 Aug. 1938
The second decree for the execution of the law regarding the change of
the surnames and forenames of 17th August 1938.
On the basis of Article 13, of the law of 5 January 1938
(Reichsgesetzblatt I.S.9) concerning the change of the surnames and
given-names, the following is ordered:
Art. 1
1. Jews may be given only such given-names as are cited in the
directives issued by the Ministry of Interior concerning the
utilization of given-names.
2. Para. (1) is not applicable to Jews who are foreign citizens.
Art. 2
1. In so far as the Jews are still using some other given-names
different from those which are at their disposal according to Art.
1,--they are obliged to assume by the 1st January 1939, a second,
additional given-name as follows; for males, the given-name Israel and
for females the given-name Sara.
2. The person having to assume an additional forename according to para
(1) is obliged to give a written notification in this matter to the
registration office at which his birth, and marriage are registered.
The same notification is to be given to the proper police-official
in the registerer’s place of residence or customary habitat. The
notifications are to be reported within a month from the date requiring
him to assume an additional given-name.
3. In so far as the birth or marriage of the person who must register
has been verified by a German diplomatic representative of a Consul, or
has been verified in a German protectorate,--the notification, which
must be made, is to be forwarded to the Register-Office I, Berlin. If
the place of residence or customary habitat of the person registering
is abroad, the notification in question, mentioned in Para (2),
sentence (1) is to be forwarded to the competent German Consul instead
of to the competent police-official.
4. For people who are unable, or are partially unable to conduct
their own affairs, the obligation to register rests upon the legal
representative.
Art. 3
As far as is customary in juridical and business procedure to indicate
the given-names, the Jews are obliged always to indicate at least
one of their given-names. In so far as they are required to assume
an additional given-name as mentioned in Art. 2,--this additional
given-name is to be indicated also. The present directives regarding
the management of a business are not hereby altered.
Art. 4
1. Whoever deliberately disobeys the directives of Art. 3 is to be
punished by imprisonment of up to six months. Cases of negligent
disobedience will be punished by imprisonment of no more than one month.
2. Whoever deliberately or carelessly neglects to give the proper
notification according to Art. 2 is to be fined or punished by
imprisonment of no more than one month.
Berlin, 17th, August 1938.
Reichs Minister of the Interior:
Representative, Dr. Stuckart.
Reichs Minister of Justice:
Dr. Guertner.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1676-PS
Voelkischer Beobachter
Southern Germany Edition
28/29 May 1944
A Word on the enemy air-terror
by Reichsminister Dr. Goebbels
Nowadays, it is no longer disputed by anyone that the enemy air-terror
pursues almost exclusively the aim of breaking the morale of the German
civil population. The enemy wages war against the defenseless, against
women and children in particular, in order to compel the men of our
country to yield. This intention of his is proved on one hand by the
facts themselves and on the other hand by the abundance of existing
statements by enemy publicists. As far as the facts are concerned one
needs only to visit one of the often bombed towns in the Reich or in
the occupied territory in order to determine without doubt by one’s own
examination that our war potential is damaged by perhaps at the most
only 1% by enemy air-terror and the remaining 99% plainly falls upon
the civil sector.
A short time ago, the leading representatives of the French, and
Belgian Episcopate, who certainly cannot be suspected of acting
according to German orders, objected with flaming protest directed
to the international public against the enemy’s barbarous methods of
aerial warfare, which kills old people, women and children, as well as
destroys churches, venerable cultural monuments and thickly settled
civilian residential sections, without any military objectives being
apparent. To this we need to add nothing more.
Our enemies do not try to conceal their intentions in this matter. One
does not need to look far in British and American press in order to
find substantial proof of this. “Lay the great cities in ruins and you
will crush the will to fight”. Thus wrote the English air expert T. M.
Epaight in his book “Air power and the cities” in 1930. Nothing in this
tendency of the British aerial warfare has changed since then. “It is
not possible to draw a boundary-line between the civil population and
the combatants”. With this cowardly excuse the “Daily Mail” attempts to
justify publicly this rough and low method of the enemy aerial warfare.
Much more explicit becomes influential British naval officer who states
in the English military publication “The Army Quarterly”: “Does the
concept of non-combatants exist at all? A small child is neither in
peace nor in war a useful member of the national community. No one has
in reality the right to demand inviolability for himself even if he
can attempt to do so in the name of humanity. Germany must become more
desolate than the Sahara Desert”.
The well known London’s newspaper “News Chronicle” is not missing in
this choir of hatred. It adds “We favor that every living being in
Germany be wiped out. Man, woman, child, bird and insect. We would not
let even a blade of grass grow”. This causes the respected British
author H. G. Wells to name the following demand: “Treat the German
people like a troublesome native tribe”. The American publicists are
no less robust. One of their leading spokesmen Raymond Clapper writes
with evident pleasure: “Terror and brutality are the best sides of
aerial warfare!” One might object, perhaps, that not all influential
Americans and Englishmen think this way. Wrong! Even the Anglican High
Church declares in its official organ “Church of England” on the 28
of May 1943: “It is a perverse view of Christianity to suppose that
civilians must not be killed”. Even the Archbishop of York, Dr. Cysill
Barbett, blesses the barbaric methods of the Anglo-American aerial
terrorism in his pastoral letter of June 1943 with the words: “It is
only a small evil to bomb German civilians.”
We had so far desisted from making known to the German people the
meanest of the statements from which we have only presented a small
selection and which all together represent a simple demand for the
murder of women and children, because we were afraid that in view of
this cynicism it would take measures of self-defense and revenge itself
with the same measures upon the enemy pilots who bail out of shot down
enemy planes. In the meantime, however, circumstances have arisen which
prevent us from continuing to maintain this reserve in the future.
The Anglo-American terror flyers in the last few weeks, besides
indiscriminately bombarding the residential quarters of our cities have
taken to attacking the German civilian population openly, directly
and without even any superficial respect, for the international rules
of warfare, by strafing them and slaughtering them in cold blood. No
more excuses can be brought toward in this matter because the enemy
planes sweep low over villages, fields and highways, and direct their
machine-guns upon harmless groups of people who are minding their own
business. This has nothing more to do with war. This is naked murder.
There is no rule of international law which the enemy can call on in
this matter. The Anglo-American pilots place themselves through such
a criminal mode of warfare, outside the pale of every internationally
recognized rule of warfare. On last Sunday, for example, to take only
one of a thousand examples, in the rural countries of Saxony, groups of
playing children were attacked by strafing, and suffered considerable
casualties.
No one will be astonished by the fact that the population concerned
which, as is known in the whole world, can understand any soldierly
type of warfare has been seized with a terrible rage on account of
these cynical crimes. It is only possible with the aid of arms to
secure the lives of enemy pilots who were shot down during such
attacks, for they would otherwise be killed by the sorely tired
population. Who is right here? The murderers who after their cowardly
misdeeds await a humane treatment on the part of their victims, or the
victims who wish to defend themselves according to the principle: “An
eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth”? This question is not hard to
answer. In any case it would be demanding too much of us if it were
asked of us that we use German Soldiers for the defense of murderers of
children against the parents who seized with blind rage, having just
lost their most valuable treasure through the brutal cynicism of the
enemy, take measures of self-defense. If the English and Americans as
they themselves say, regard and treat us as troublesome native tribes,
then it is our business whether we stand for it. The German people is
known in the whole world for the fact that it gives to war what war
demands from it. But too much is too much and here the boundaries of
what can be borne have been far overstepped.
It seems to us--hardly possible and tolerable to use German police
and soldiers against the German people when it treats murderers of
children as they deserve. Even the arbitrary methods of warfare of the
Anglo-Americans must end somewhere. The pilots cannot say that they as
soldiers acted upon orders. It is not provided in any military law that
a soldier in the case of a despicable crime is exempt from punishment
because he passes the responsibility to his superior, especially if the
orders of the latter are in evident contradiction to all human morality
and every international usage of warfare. Our century has obliterated
to a great extent the boundaries between warfare and crime on the part
of the enemy. It would be demanding too much of us to expect that we
should silently accommodate ourselves as victims to this unlimited
barbarity.
We reach these conclusions in a completely objective manner. In these
questions our people think much more radically than its government.
It has always been our wish that the war should be conducted in a
chivalrous manner. The enemy, apparently, does not want this. The whole
world is a witness for that. If this revolting condition continues, it
will also be witness for the fact that we can find ways and means to
defend ourselves against these criminals. We owe this to our people
which decently and bravely defend its life and therefore has in no way
deserved to be declared fair game for the enemy killers.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1678-PS
DOCUMENTS OF GERMAN POLITICS, VOLUME 5, PAGES 372, 373 and 376
Statement of accounts of the Reich Organization Leader of the NSDAP,
Dr. Ley, at the 5th yearly session of the German Labor Front in
Nurnberg, on 11 September 1937.
In speaking of “Soldiers of Labor” I have to demand that such soldiers
of labor exist in reality. I have to demand that everybody march at
the same cadence and in the same spirit. The factory-community is
only then complete when every manager takes his place as an ordinary
work-crew member among his crew. We shall not rest or relax before this
is accomplished. Otherwise everything would be reduced to beautiful
phrases resulting only in beer sessions and distribution of cigarettes.
No, same cadence and stride, same pack and same marching, then no
outward distinction between the entrepreneur and the worker shall exist
anymore, and sometimes a worker might even look better from a racial
point of view than the entrepreneur. And if the latter was adequately
polished and drilled, he will lose his feeling of superiority and
“curse” exactly like the others. That is necessary, and with this I
come to another point.
My collaborators and myself found no rest. We too wanted to to have
laws and legal foundations, I was constantly pursued with that request.
I asked the Fuehrer myself: “My Fuehrer, can’t we too get a law?”
The Fuehrer refused. That’s why I say: He was of greatest help to us.
Had the Fuehrer given in at the time, we would be in bad shape now. The
Fuehrer said: “I think it’s wrong. For once I want you to make a law
through habit in Germany. For once I want to try if it isn’t possible
in Germany to set up an authority without having to issue laws and
decrees on the part of the State. It must be possible to create a great
institution and establishment, based only on a law through habit and it
must be possible to make this law through habit of a much greater force
than any other law and justice.”
Once I said to the Fuehrer: “My Fuehrer, actually I am standing with
one foot in jail, for today I am still the trustee of the comrades
“Leipart” and “Imbusch”, and should they some day ask me to return
their money, then it will be found that I have spent it, either by
building things, or otherwise. But they shall never again find their
property in the condition in which they handed it over to me. Therefore
I would have to be convicted.”
The Fuehrer laughed then and remarked that apparently I felt extremely
well in this condition.
It was very difficult for us all. Today we laugh about it. * * *
* * * * * * *
We have only 70,000,000 altogether. Therefore we must use everybody. We
have work for at least 300,000,000 and that figure is increasing from
year to year. We must have new space. We want to repeat that again and
again. We have told the world often enough. We are a people without
space and we shall never forget that factor in all our social measures.
We need space, and we must never give this up in all our measures. We
must never lose sight of that. That’s why we need a healthy people and
healthy men.
We succeeded--and this is about the most important accomplishment for
the German Labor Front--in eliminating the association-character of
the trade unions and the employer-associations, and for it we have
substituted the conception “Soldier of Labor” [Soldat der Arbeit].
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1680-PS
10 Years Security Police and SD--Die Deutsche Polizei,
1 February 1943.
When the Fuehrer assumed the direction of the fate of the German Reich
and people on 30 January 1933, he found in the domain of the police,
as in all other fields, a situation which bore all the signs of the
irresponsible incapability of the Weimar system. The concept of a
police force, together with the Marxist-Liberal tendency and their
characteristic practices were the main reasons for the insufficiently
organized and therefore in many respects helpless condition of the
police.
This was particularly obvious in that part of the police system to
which was assigned the task of the safekeeping of the community against
inner-political dangers from the beginning of all historical state
activity. The activities to which we are accustomed today under the
concept of “Security Police” was, under the “Weimar Interim State” in
its political police field, exclusively directed towards a prevention
of the unavoidable collapse of its system, especially against the
National Socialist movement, with the use of more or less brutal means
of power of the state, and was decisively handicapped in the domain
of criminal police by the organizational splintering as well as the
liberalistic sympathy towards crimes and criminals which existed at
that time.
The task of the New National Socialist Security Police, which became
apparent with the assumption of power in 1933, had to include as a
nucleus the creation of an organism with the view towards the vital
necessities of the people and without consideration of the individual
interest the safeguarding of the communities against all disturbances
and destructions. The prerequisite for its organization was the strict
coordination of the political and criminal police, which were split
through the federal state regulations and which alone could provide
the necessary striking power for the struggle against the enemies
of the nation and in the service of the commands of the leadership.
The foundation for this achievement of restoration were the National
Socialist views of the world, the occupation of important positions by
proved national socialistic fighters and the inner core of a large part
of the police officials which had remained unharmed in spite of all the
attempts to rouse them.
The fight against the political, as well as the individual criminal
which was the responsibility of the political departments of the police
administration and of the criminal police and which is now combined
under the term of “Security Police” took a continuously developing form
in the execution of its central goal, as well as in its content as in
its organization. With the knowledge that the police in the National
Socialistic State, of which it is a distinguished representative,
must not only be the best friend of the people but also, and just for
the same reason, the most pitiless adversary of all the enemies of
the nation, the preventive fight against criminals was added to the
activities of the security police which was previously mainly punitive
and executive. This constitutes a decisive innovation in the general
development of the police. The activities of the security police were
furthermore considerably supported by the communication service, and
partially made possible only by the development of the security service
of the Reichsfuehrer SS, which was created upon the assumption of power
which came into ever closer personal and organizational contact with
the security police in the course of years.
The general development of the police since 1933 was outwardly
characterized by:
The Reichs Reconstruction Law [Reichsneuaufbaugesetz] of 1934
(central directive law for the federal states in individual
domains).
The merger of the Reichs Ministry of the Interior and the Prussian
Ministry of Interior of 1934.
The Fuehrer decree concerning the creation of a Chief of the German
Police dated 17 June 1936.
The law about finance measures in the domain of the police of 1937,
the German Police official law of 1937.
Within the general development of the police since 1933, the following
regulations were of decisive importance for the security police and SD:
Decree of the Reichsfuehrer SS and the Chief of the German Police
in the Reichs Ministry of the Interior of 26 June 1936 (Transfer of
Direction of the Security Police, newly created from the political,
secret state and criminal police to the SS Gruppenfuehrer HEYDRICH
as chief of the Security Police.) Decree of the Reich and Prussian
Ministers of the Interior concerning appointment of inspectors of the
Security Police, dated 20 Sept 1936.
Decree of the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police of 27
Sept 1939, concerning the merger of the central bureaus of the security
police and the SD along with the
Decree of execution of the chief of the Security Police and the SD of
the same date concerning the creation of a Central Bureau of Reich
Security [RSHA].
The organizational development of the three branches, Secret State
Police [Gestapo], Criminal Police, and Security Service [SD] of the
Reichsfuehrer SS, which are now merged under the leadership of the
Chief of the Security Police and SD took place in its details, as
follows:
1. _The Secret State Police_ [_GESTAPO_]
The first step towards the creation of a Secret State Police
replacing the Political Police Forces of the various federal states
was undertaken in Prussia by the law concerning the establishment
of a Secret State Police, dated 26 April 1933. The same day a
circular decree was issued by the Prussian Ministers of the Interior
regulating the tasks and responsibilities of the Secret State Police
and establishing a State Police Bureau in each government district of
Prussia as a subordinate to the Secret State Police Bureau. The creator
and Chief of the Secret State Police in Prussia was Prime Minister
Hermann GOERING. The State Police Bureaus were separated from their
organizational connection with the District Government or the police
administrations of the State and appointed as independent authorities
of the Secret State Police, in the spring of 1934 by a circular decree
of the Prime Minister and the Chief of the Secret State Police.
Parallel to that development in Prussia, the Reichsfuehrer SS Heinrich
HIMMLER created in Bavaria, the Bavarian Political Police, and also
suggested and directed in the other federal states outside of Prussia
the establishment of Political Police. The unification of the Political
Police, of all the federal states, took place in the spring of 1934
when Hermann GOERING appointed Reichsfuehrer SS Heinrich HIMMLER, who
had meanwhile been nominated as Commander of the Political Police
Forces of all the federal states possible. The Prussian law about the
Secret State Police, dated 10 Feb 1936, then summed up the developments
hitherto and determined the position and responsibilities of the Secret
State Police in the executive regulations issued the same day.
A new decisive chapter of the development began with the appointment
of the Reichsfuehrer SS as Chief of the German Police by means of the
Decree of the Fuehrer mentioned above dated 17 June 1936, and the
nomination which followed of SS Gruppenfuehrer Maj Gen HEYDRICH, who up
to then, had been Chief of the Secret State Police Bureau and Chief of
the Central Security Bureau of the SS, as Chief of the Security Police
(Secret State Police and Criminal Police). The term “Secret State
Police” was decreed by the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German
Police on 28 August 1936 in the process of establishing uniformity
for all the political police forces of the federal states and their
organization adapted to the one existing in Prussia by the creation
of State Police Bureaus. The Chiefs of the State Police Bureaus
assumed the functions of the political executive with the current
“Oberpraesident” (later on also with the Reich Governor), that is the
president of the Government, according to the decree of the Reich and
Prussian Ministers of the Interior, dated 20 Sept 1936.
On the basis of these forms of organization and with the help of the
powers bound up with them, the fight against the open and hidden
political enemies of the National Socialist peoples State was taken up
by the Secret State Police after the assumption of power and is still
being tried on today. Its activity is not only limited to solving
political crimes already committed or to seizing their perpetrators,
but they are equally interested in the prevention of these crimes,
thus eliminating these dangers for the community at their very start.
Constant investigation and observation of the enemies of the State and
quick action in the case of recognition or after commitment of the act,
thus go hand in hand. The Secret State Police by carrying out these
tasks, contributed decisively to the fact that the National Socialist
construction work could be executed in the past ten years without any
serious attempts of interference by the political enemies of the nation.
2. _The Criminal Police_
The subordination of the Criminal Police of the Reich under the
Chief of the Security Police, as decreed on 26 June 1936 became the
fundamental basis for the uniform development throughout all Germany of
the Criminal Police, which had been organized differently in all the
federal states up to this time, namely for the establishment of the
Reich Criminal Police in its present form of organization. The circular
decree of 20 Sept 1936 stated the first fundamental regulations for
the reorganization of the Criminal Police of the State, separating
the Prussian State Criminal Police Bureau, in locality as well as
function, from the Police Presidency in Berlin and charging it with the
professional direction of the Criminal Police of all the German federal
states, State as well as communal. The Reich Central Bureau for the
struggle against the international and professional criminals as well
as against habitual instinctive criminals, which was attached to the
State Criminal Police Bureau, was particularly characterized in the
course of this process by its close relationship to the practices of
the Criminal Police.
The whole territory of the Reich was simultaneously divided into
Criminal Police Bureaus on the basis of criminal geographical
delineation of spheres of competence in place of the State Criminal
[Police] offices. The new spheres occasionally combined several
criminal police offices. Insofar as Criminal Police District Offices
are not affiliated to State Police Administrative Offices, local duties
falling within criminal police jurisdiction are to be taken care of by
the crime sections of these State Police Administrative Officers.
In the course of further organizational development, the title of
Reichskriminalpolizeiamt [Reich Criminal Police Bureau] was conferred
on the Prussian State Criminal Police Bureau through a decree of 16
July 1937. This bureau was directly subordinated to the Chief of
Security Police.
This newly created organizational system rendered possible the
successful activity of the German Criminal Police, which also became
increasingly more perfect in technical fields. From then on Criminal
Police did not limit itself to repressive activity, but paid much
attention to preventive combatting of crime on the basis of national
protective ideology. The correctness of planning and development
is demonstrated most clearly in the decline of criminality in the
subsequent period.
3. _The Security Service of the Reichsfuehrer SS (SD)_
Recognizing that accurate knowledge of the enemy, of his methods and
aims, is one of the most important bases of any successful struggle
the Reichsfuehrer SS created an intelligence service organization as
early as 1932 under the then SS-Standartenfuehrer (Colonel) Reinhard
HEYDRICH. From the beginning members of the SS were the full-time
agents of the SD, which had emerged from the SS.
After the seizure of power the leaders of the National-Socialist
movement felt the necessity for current objective information about
newsworthy events. This caused the NSDAP to issue an ordinance on 9
June 1934 which merged all information facilities then existing within
the Party organization with the SD, and declared the latter to be sole
Party information service. The original task of intelligence coverage
of the enemy was thereby expanded to general intelligence activity.
In the course of the development as a whole, an increasingly closer
cooperation of the SD with the offices of the Security Police resulted
as a matter of course. The successful combatting of all activity
hostile to the state by the Security Police can be traced back to
a considerable extent to the intelligence groundwork of the SD. In
addition the field of activity of the SD was progressively expanded,
because top Reich authorities delegated to the SD in a series of
agreements the task of informing these authorities about the effects of
official measures upon popular morale. These agreements also regulated
the details of cooperation between these top Reich authorities and the
SD. Today the exploration of the situation in all fields of life from
the information point of view is incumbent upon the Security Service
(SD) of the Reichsfuehrer SS, with special consideration of the morale
factors and repercussions among the population. The results of its
variegated and responsible activity transmit an objective, always
up-to-date picture of the situation to the leading authorities of Party
and State. In addition they form valuable hints for current planning of
the competent authorities.
The organizational structure within which the SD became active
during the first years of its existence and was headed by the Chief
of the Main Security Bureau of the SS, to whom in turn the regional
subdivisions were subordinate. The elimination of SD-Oberabschnitte in
September 1939 resulted in direct functional connection between the
SD-Abschnitte, as the regional subdivisions were now termed, and the
Main Security Bureau as central authority. The current close personal
and organizational connection between the SD and the Security Police
resulted from the Decree of the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of German
Police, dated 27 September 1939. This Decree amalgamated the central
authorities of the security police and of the SD, and vested it in the
newly-created Chief of Security Police and SD, and above him in the
Reich Main Security Bureau. Since that time the SD-(Leit)-Abschnitte
and their subordinate offices have been under the jurisdiction of the
Reich Main Security Bureau.
The above description of the history of the Secret State Police
[Gestapo], of the Criminal Police and of the Security Service [SD] of
the Reichsfuehrer SS only recounts the external stages of development.
It can express only incompletely the great degree of personal
initiative and unlimited National-Socialist prowess in work and
organization which was brought to bear by the authoritative leadership
personalities in building up the undertaking. However, the result
of this concentrated effort is such that in these decisive times an
apparatus was created on an entirely new basis which was from the
beginning a necessary and effective instrument in the hands of the
nation’s leadership and proved that it is capable of protecting the
national community against protracted interference with communal life.
It is obvious that these entire tasks could be handled only by men who
are deeply rooted in National Socialist ideology, and who are ready to
devote not only their total working capacity, but also their life, to
the comprehensive realization of the National Socialist idea in the
course of the fulfilment of their duties which is frequently dangerous.
Because of this, and according to the wish of the Reichsfuehrer SS
and of their late Chief, General Heydrich, it is the duty of the
Security Police and of the SD not only to form a perfectly working
administrative machinery, but in addition it is their duty to form
a battle community sworn to a common ideology and brotherhood. The
currents of strength generated by this battle community in fulfilling
its difficult task of continuous combatting of everything inimical to
the nation, a task which has to be accomplished in inglorious silence,
shape the National Socialist idea ideologically. These currents of
strength also shape the basic law of the SS, from the members of
which Security Police and SD are recruited in increasing measure.
Tangibly they shape the continuous work in thoroughly training the
individual. Ideological schooling, comradeship, professional education
and physical fitness are inculcated without cease; they take up a
prominent position side by side with the professional daily routine
proper, especially in the schools of the Security Service and the SD
established for these purposes.
Trained in such a manner, Security Police and SD could do justice even
to the great additional requirements, which the four year battle for
the living rights of the German people brought in its train. In all
battle areas, and in all occupied territories, the men of the Security
Police and of the SD stand side by side with the Armed Forces. In a
struggle full of sacrifice they devote all their strength to keep the
rear of the front free, and to help make secure German reconstruction
in occupied territory. In the offices of the home front, on the other
hand, the men employed make certain that the fight for life of the
German people is not impaired by criminal elements. Through increased
effort they equalize the additional tasks and the additional work,
which are necessitated by the war as such and especially by the reduced
number of personnel due to drafting of men for front-line duty. All
faithful to the words of the Reichsfuehrer SS, to do more than their
duty in time of war.
* * * * * * *
PARTIAL COPY OF DOCUMENT 1689-PS
CZECHOSLOVAKIA FIGHTS BACK
A Document of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Published by
American Council on Public Affairs
Washington, D. C., 1943
[Pages 110, 111, and 114]
On December 2, 1942, a special order issued by the “Protectorate”
Ministry of Agriculture excluded the Jews not only from buying
unrationed foods, but even from receiving them as a gift from any
private citizen. The same order has left it to the discretion of the
Ministry of Agriculture to exclude Jews entirely or partially from
obtaining rationed food, thus exposing the remnants of the Jewish
community to death by starvation.
One hour on five days a week has been allowed for shopping, this hour
being fixed at a time when after, first the Germans and then the
Czechs, have done their buying, the small stocks are mostly exhausted.
After the occupation of Poland, Hitler designated Lublin and its
immediate district as a reservation in which all Jews from the occupied
countries were to be concentrated. Some 2,000 Jews of Moravska Ostrava
were the first to be sent there. A year later, at the end of October
1941, 48,000 Czech Jews were already picked out for deportation. Men
between the ages of sixteen to fifty were sent to labor camps, while
their womenfolk and children were taken to special settlements in
Eastern Poland.
At the end of June, 1942, deportation to Poland began on a large scale.
The Gestapo was instructed to prepare by every Monday and Thursday
contingents of a thousand Jews each. Those to leave were given a day
or two’s notice. The Nazi records of the Jewish registration were out
of date and it often happened that the call-up cards were addressed to
persons who had died years ago, had left the country or had already
been deported. In such cases the daily quota of a thousand was made up
by people simply picked up from the streets or dragged from their beds
at night-time. The Gestapo took a delight in so selecting the deportees
that families were split, wives separated from their husbands, and
even small children from their mothers. Those left at home were never
allowed to bid farewell to their relatives or friends. But sometimes,
on early summer mornings, their Czech friends could watch those gloomy
processions of the outlawed marching to the railway station and passing
for the last time through the streets of Prague.
At the end of 1942, no Jewish life in Bohemia and Moravia was left. Out
of the 90,000 Czech Jews more than 72,000 have been deported.
Although the deportations went on, leaving at the end of August, 1942,
only some 20,000 Jews in Slovakia, most of them in ghettos the Nazis
were still not satisfied. At the end of November, 1942, a special
committee was set up to consider the final expulsion of the remainder
of the Jews. By then, out of the 95,000 Jews, 76,000 had already been
deported.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1696-PS
THE REICHSMINISTER OF THE INTERIOR
IV g 4178 /39-5100
Berlin, NW 40, Koenigsplatz 6, 16 November 1939
Telephone:
Dept. Z, I, II, V, VIII, 11 00 27
Dept II, IV, VI
(Unter den Linden 72); 12 00 34
Tel. Address: Reichsinnenminister.
To the Head of the Hospital (for Mental cases)
Kaufbeuren
or his Deputy in Kaufbeuren.
With regard to the necessity for a systematized economic plan for
Hospitals and Nursing Institutions, I request you to fill up the
attached Registration Forms immediately, in accordance with the
attached instructional leaflet, and to return them to me. If you
yourself are not a doctor the Registration Forms for the individual
patients are to be filled in by the superintending doctor. The filling
up of the questionnaires is, if possible, to be _done on a typewriter_.
In the column “Diagnosis” I request a statement as exact as possible,
also a short description of the condition if feasible.
In order to expedite the work, the registration forms for the
individual patients can be despatched here in several parts. The last
consignment must, however, in any case have arrived at this Ministry
_at the latest_ on 1 January 1940. I reserve for myself the right,
should occasion arise, to institute further official enquiries on the
spot through my representative.
p.p. (Sd.) DR. CONTI
Certified.
(Sd.) Illegible
Administrative Secretary.
# # # # #
_Registration Form 1_
_To be typewritten._
Current No. __________
Name of the institution: _______________________________________
at: ____________________________________________________________
Surname and Christian name of the patient: _______ at birth _______
Date of birth: _____ Place: ________ District: _________________
Last place of residence: ____________ District: __________________
Unmarried, married, widow,
widower, divorced: ________ Religion ________ Race[1] __________
Previous profession: ________ Nationality: __________ Army Service
when? 1914-18
or from 1.9.39
______________
War injury (even if no connection with
mental disorder) Yes/No __________________________________________
How does war injury show itself and in what
does it consist? _________________________________________________
Address of next of kin: ____________________________________________
Regular visit and by whom (Address): _______________________________
Guardian or nurse (Name, address): _________________________________
Responsible for payment: ___________________________________________
Since when in that Institution: ____________________________________
Whence and when handed over: ___________ Since when ill: __________
If has been in other Institutions, where and how long: _____________
Twin yes ___ Blood relations of unsound mind: ____________________
no
Diagnosis: _________________________________________________________
Clinical description (Previous history, course, condition; in any case
ample data regarding mental condition): ____________________________
Very restless? yes ________ Bedridden? yes _______________________
no no
Incurable bodily illness: yes (which) ___________________________
no
Schizophrenia: Fresh attack _______ Final Condition ____________
good recovery
Mental debility: weak _________ Imbecile ________ Idiot ________
Epilepsy: psychological alteration ___________ Average frequency
of the attacks _______
Therapeutics (Insulin, Cardiazol, Malaria, Permanent result: yes ___
Salvarsan etc. When?) _________________ no ____
Admitted by reason of para. 51, para. 42b StrGB etc ________________
through ________________
Crime: ___________________ Former punishable offences: _____________
Manner of employment (detailed description of work): _______________
Permanent } Yes ______________
} Employment, independent worker
Temporary } No ______________
Value of work (if possible compared with average performance of healthy
person) __________________________________________________________
This space to be left blank.
_________________ Place, Date ________
__________________________________________
Signature of the head doctor or his
representative (doctors who are not
psychiatrists and neurologists please state
same.)
FOOTNOTES:
[1] German or of similar blood (of German blood), Jew, Jewish mixed
breed Grades I or II, Negro (mixed breed).
# # # # #
PUBLIC UTILITY
AMBULANCE TRANSPORTATION G.m.b.H.
Dept. II/d, H/K
Berlin, W. 9. 12th. May, 1941
To the Director of the Hospital of the District association of
Swabia,
Kaufbeuren/Bavaria.
Potsdamer Platz 1.
Dear Director,
By order of the Reich Defence Commissioner I must remove mental
cases from your institution and from the Branch at Irrsee to another
institution. A total of 140 persons are to be transported, 70 on 4th
June and 70 on 5th June. I forward you herewith Transport Lists Nos.
8, 9, 10 and 11 in triplicate. The additional names on the lists are
intended for possible deficits (discharged meanwhile, died, etc.).
The marking of the patients is most suitably done by means of a strip
of adhesive tape, on which the name is written in ink-pencil, to be
pasted between the shoulder blades. At the same time the name is to be
put on an article of clothing.
The hospital reports and personal histories are to be prepared for the
transportation and to be handed to our Director of Transport, Herr
Kuepper, in the same way the personal possessions of the patients, as
well as money and articles of value.
I enclose property information cards and information cards as to the
defrayer of the expenses, which, accurately filled out, must be handed
in at the time of transportation. Money and articles of value, besides
being noted on the property information cards, must also be noted on
separate special lists (in duplicate). Transportation takes place:
On 4th June, 8.46 a.m. from Kaufbeuren--70 patients.
On 5th June, 8.46 a.m. from Kaufbeuren--70 patients.
Our director of transport, Herr Kuepper, will visit you the previous
day, in order to discuss further details with you.
I further request you to provide the patients with food (2-3 slices of
bread and butter each and some cans of coffee).
[Pencil note illegible]
Heil Hitler!
[signature illegible]
Public Utility Ambulance Transportation G.m.b.H.
# # # # #
PROVINCIAL ASSOCIATION FOR SOCIAL WELFARE SWABIA.
Address: Augsburg 1, P.O. Box Regierungspraesident
Tel No. 5842
Cashier’s Office: Principal Govt.
Cashier’s Office Augsburg.
Post Office check account:
Munich No. 1624
Enclosures:
Director: Dr. Faltlhauser, of the Hospital, Kaufbeuren.
Your reference: 2080. Your letter of 13.11.40. Our ref: (to be
given always) II-B-7-2.
Augsburg, 6.5.1941
Concerning the transfer of patients.
I have the honour to inform you that the female patients transferred
from your institution on 8.11.1940 to the institutions in Grafeneck,
Bernburg, Sonnenstein and Harthein all died in November of last year.
[signature illegible]
# # # # #
Copy
No. 5255 c 39
Ministry of State of the Interior.
Oberregierungsrat Gaum.
Munich, 24th November 1942
To the Director of the Hospital,
Kaufbeuren, Obermed. Rat
Dr. Faltlhauser.
To Head Physician Dr. W. Leinisch
Guenzburg.
Re letter of 13.11.1942.
Dear Doctor,
In your letter of 13.11.1942 you requested me to send suitable
epileptics for the carrying out of your research work. I had an
opportunity of discussing this with the Obermedizinalraeten Dr.
Faltlhauser and Dr. Pfannmueller. Both will willingly deliver you
suitable patients. For various reasons patients from the Institution
at Kaufbeuren are primarily to be chosen. If this institution has
no suitable material, I agree to the transfer of patients from
Eglfing-Haar to Guenzburg for your research work. I request you to get
into touch with Dr. Faltlhauser.
Heil Hitler!
(Sd.) GAUM.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1701-PS
Copies distributed to Gauleiter Dr. Wilhelm von Allwoerden [?]
11 Aug.
H
Berlin, 9 August 1943
The Reich Minister of the Interior
Pol. SV A I No 844/43
To the Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellory _in Berlin
W8_
For the information of the other Reich ministers.
_Subj_: Law on the treatment of enemies of the society.
In addition to my letter of 19 March 1942--
_Enclosures_: 55. --
After the draft of the law on the treatment of enemies of the society
has been completely rewritten, I am sending the enclosed new draft
with the consent of the Reich Minister of Justice, Dr. Thierack and ask
that the law be approved in a circulatory manner. The necessary number
of prints is attached.
The Chief Plenipotentiary for the Reich Administration has again
agreed on the importance of the law in war, considering the existing
directions for curbing the making of laws and the administrative
activity. Furthermore I refer to my letter of 19 March 1942 and to the
reasons attached to the draft.
/s/ Frick
# # # # #
The Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories
Berlin W 35, 22 Dec 1943
Tele--letter
To the Reich Minister of the Interior for the information of the
Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellory and the other Reich
Ministers.
_Subject_: Law on the Treatment of Enemies of Society.
To Pol. SVA 1 No. 844/43 of 9 August 1943
I have basic objections against the draft of the law. In Par 2, Dir. 4,
I assume that the police will inform the penal prosecuting authority
also of such cases in which it does not consider--for legal or actual
reasons--that a punishable act has been committed or can be proved,
especially if it wants to connect the behavior of the culprit with
consequences adverse to him. The penal prosecuting authority should
be able to determine also in dubious cases whether the possibility of
penal prosecution exists. I therefore suggest to formulate Par. 2, Dir.
4, of the law draft about as follows:
“If there is suspicion of a punishable act by enemies of society, the
police will inform the penal prosecuting authorities about it.”
Because, in the framework of the draft, the basic regulation of the
connections between penal justice and police has become mandatory,
an exact definition of the respective competence seems necessary to
me. In the expected executory decree it should hence be made clear,
as it was already provided in the draft of the executory decree (Par.
4) for the first draft of the law, that police actions because of the
same matter are not admissible anymore if a court has freed (a party)
because of proven innocence or lack of proofs, except for custody
measures in case of freeing for lack of proofs. Furthermore, it should
be determined that the police can not take other than custody measures
after the penal term of a person judged by a court because of the same
facts. Further, I think it necessary to have a fundamental clearing
of the question whether, and if so--to what degree police measures
are admissible after refusal of a decree of custody or other judicial
directions, regardless of the reason for refusal.
Finally, I mention for consideration if the words “the regime of the
time of the system” in Dir. 3 of the official document, taken from
the newspaper language, could not be replaced to advantage by another
expression.
I especially direct your attention to the printing mistake in the
last but two dir. of the reason, in which in the third line it should
probably read “protective surveillance” instead of “protective custody”.
Rosenberg
attested:
chancellery employee
Offic. Stamp
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1702-PS
Rec’d: 1025/44g
encl: 1 Aug. 44
Copy
SECRET
II 1C
Evacuation Report
of District Commissariat of Kasatin
[Illegible notes]
REPORTER: District Commissar STEUDEL, Kasatin.
Time of report: 8 November to 28 December 1943.
1. The military situation in November/December 1943.
Immediately following the capture of Kiev by the Soviets on 7 November,
the district town of Wassilkow as well as the important railroad
center Fastow, belonging to the district of Wassilkow, fell into enemy
hands, (8-9 November). The following day, the Soviets attempted to
advance farther along the rail line Fastow-Kasatin. They succeeded in
capturing with weak armored and infantry spearheads in one move, the
stations of Kozanka, Popilnva and Browki, situated along this line, and
to execute further sudden advances past the station of Czernorudka.
For this reason the district of Wtscheraische had to be evacuated on
15 November. I withdrew the Germans committed there to the district
of Rushin situated 20 kilometers to the South. The withdrawal was
effected according to plan and without friction, with all implements,
after all camps had been evacuated previously; the cattle--above
all the valuable breeds (Oxen and colt stables) led back. German
tractors and farm machines transported away and all businesses had
been crippled. (Fundamentally, the chief command of the 4th Armored
Army, in whose zone these battles took place, had ordered that in the
district West of the Dnjepr, in contrast to the ones to the East, no
destructions of farm goods or businesses should take place).
* * * * * * *
_The results of the hereby described military events_ between 8
November and 20 December were as follows:
In a conference, called by me, of the authoritative leaders of all
offices of the civilian sector on 8 November, I ordered the immediate
start of, and discussed in detail, measures for the most far-reaching
decentralization. At the same time, the leaders of all vital, above
all of the economic food industry, were informed to effect, in case of
an evacuation, the crippling of factories (by taking away important
and hard-to-replace machine parts, belts, etc.,) and to prepare this
already now. Up till then, however, all factories had to be kept
running at full capacity. It should be emphasized here, praisingly,
that all measures ordered by me in strictest accordance with the army
economic leader [A.W.F.] of the chief command of the 4th Armored
Army, were executed by the responsible parties and their staff in an
exemplary manner, and with the greatest conscientiousness. Although the
delivery of cars, for conceivable reasons, did meet with considerable
difficulties, we succeeded, due to the splendid cooperation of the
authoritative Reich German organizations of military and civil
government, in transporting to the West approximately 80% of the most
vital goods (grain, cattle, sugar, etc), or in making them available
for the armed forces for immediate use as provisions for the fighting
troops.
* * * * * * *
5. In the midst of the conditions, almost restored to normal, I
received _a call on_ _the eve of the 25th of December from the Army_
according to which _the Soviets_ with superior forces of tanks and
motorized troops, had exerted a strong renewed pressure on the line of
Kotscherowo-Brusilow-Fastow and along the street Kiev-Shitomir with the
main advance in a South West direction. Shortly afterwards, the long
distance calls, as per attached inclosure number 2, was put through
according to which the able-bodied male population in the ages between
15 and 65 as well as the cattle had to be led back in the direction
East of the line Kililowka-Berkitschew-Shitomir. The transporting of
the able-bodied population was charged to the military authorities by
the chief quartermaster of the army, while beginning with the morning
of 26 December. I discussed and ordered in detail, during an immediate
conference for the whole district the shipment of all the cattle.
This action started successfully on that day according to plan, while
the discussions over the seizure of the male population were not
yet concluded in the afternoon hours of the 26th of December and no
positive measures of any kind were taken.
# # # # #
Enclosure II
SECRET
Kdt. rueckw. A. Geb. 585
_Abt. Qu. Nr. 452/43 geh._
In the field 25 December 1943
To the District Commissar KASATIN
1. The able-bodied male population between 15 and 65 years of age and
the cattle are to be shipped back from the district East of the line
Belilowka-Berditschen-Shitomir (places excluded).
* * * * * * *
4. Destruction of farm goods and factories in all places must not take
place, only a crippling of factories for several weeks will be executed
by army economic leader (A.Wi.Fue.).
In charge
[signature illegible]
Lt. General
Distribution:
See original.
# # # # #
Enclosure III
Copy
SECRET
High Command of the 4th Armored Army
O. Qu/Qu 2 Nr. 1662/43/ secret
Army Headquarters,
26 December 1943
Re: Evacuation measures.
1. The city of Berditschew is to be evacuated of Reich Germans, German
[Volksdeutschen] agencies of the civil government, government of
the country, able-bodied population. The cattle is to be taken away.
Execution of evacuation measures is charged to the civil government.
* * * * * * *
4. No destructions are to take place as far as they are not expressly
ordered by the armored army. All factories are to be prepared for
crippling so that this can be accomplished in the shortest possible
time. The electricity and water plants are to be taken over by the
technical troops.
* * * * * * *
6. The same measures are to be prepared for Kasatin in such a way that
they can be started at once at the command of the armored army.
For the High Command of the Armored Army
The Chief of the General Staff
In charge
Original signed MUELLER
Colonel, General Staff
Correct:
[signature illegible]
Lt Colonel, General Staff.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1708-PS
National Socialistic Yearbook 1941
Edited by: Dr. Robert Ley
Published by: Central Publishing House of the N.S.D.A.P.
Franz Eher, successor Munich
The program of the NSDAP
The program is the political foundation of the NSDAP and accordingly
the primary political law of the State. It has been made brief and
clear intentionally.
All legal precepts must be applied in the spirit of the party program.
Since the taking over of control, the Fuehrer has succeeded in the
realization of essential portions of the Party program from the
fundamentals to the detail.
The Party Program of the NSDAP was proclaimed on the 24 February 1920
by Adolf Hitler at the first large Party gathering in Munich and
since that day has remained unaltered. Within the national socialist
philosophy is summarized in 25 points:
1. We demand the unification of all Germans in the Greater Germany on
the basis of the right of self-determination of peoples.
2. We demand equality of rights for the German people in respect to the
other nations; abrogation of the peace treaties of Versailles and St.
Germain.
3. We demand land and territory (colonies) for the sustenance of our
people, and colonization for our surplus population.
4. Only a member of the race can be a citizen. A member of the race can
only be one who is of German blood, without consideration of creed.
Consequently no Jew can be a member of the race.
5. Whoever has no citizenship is to be able to live in Germany only as
a guest, and must be under the authority of legislation for foreigners.
6. The right to determine matters concerning administration and law
belongs only to the citizen. Therefore we demand that every public
office, of any sort whatsoever, whether in the Reich, the county or
municipality, be filled only by citizens. We combat the corrupting
parliamentary economy, office-holding only according to party
inclinations without consideration of character or abilities.
7. We demand that the state be charged first with providing the
opportunity for a livelihood and way of life for the citizens. If it
is impossible to sustain the total population of the State, then the
members of foreign nations (non-citizens) are to be expelled from the
Reich.
8. Any further immigration of non-citizens is to be prevented. We
demand that all non-Germans, who have immigrated to Germany since the 2
August 1914, be forced immediately to leave the Reich.
9. All citizens must have equal rights and obligations.
10. The first obligation of every citizen must be to work both
spiritually and physically. The activity of individuals is not to
counteract the interests of the universality, but must have its result
within the framework of the whole for the benefit of all.
Consequently we demand:
11. Abolition of unearned (work and labour) incomes. Breaking of
rent-slavery.
12. In consideration of the monstrous sacrifice in property and blood
that each war demands of the people personal enrichment through a war
must be designated as a crime against the people. Therefore we demand
the total confiscation of all war profits.
13. We demand the nationalization of all (previous) associated
industries (trusts).
14. We demand a division of profits of all heavy industries.
15. We demand an expansion on a large scale of old age welfare.
16. We demand the creation of a healthy middle class and its
conservation, immediate communalization of the great warehouses and
their being leased at low cost to small firms, the utmost consideration
of all small firms in contracts with the State, county or municipality.
17. We demand a land reform suitable to our needs, provision of a law
for the free expropriation of land for the purposes of public utility,
abolition of taxes on land and prevention of all speculation in land.
18. We demand struggle without consideration against those whose
activity is injurious to the general interest. Common national
criminals, usurers, Schieber and so forth are to be punished with
death, without consideration of confession or race.
19. We demand substitution of a German common law in place of the Roman
Law serving a materialistic world-order.
20. The state is to be responsible for a fundamental reconstruction
of our whole national education program, to enable every capable
and industrious German to obtain higher education and subsequently
introduction into leading positions. The plans of instruction of
all educational institutions are to conform with the experiences of
practical life. The comprehension of the concept of the State must
be striven for by the school [Staatsbuergerkunde] as early as the
beginning of understanding. We demand the education at the expense of
the State of outstanding intellectually gifted children of poor parents
without consideration of position or profession.
21. The State is to care for the elevating national health by
protecting the mother and child, by outlawing child-labor, by the
encouragement of physical fitness, by means of the legal establishment
of a gymnastic and sport obligation, by the utmost support of all
organizations concerned with the physical instruction of the young.
22. We demand abolition of the mercenary troops and formation of a
national army.
23. We demand legal opposition to known lies and their promulgation
through the press. In order to enable the provision of a German press,
we demand, that: a. All writers and employees of the newspapers
appearing in the German language be members of the race: b. Non-German
newspapers be required to have the express permission of the State
to be published. They may not be printed in the German language: c.
Non-Germans are forbidden by law any financial interest in German
publications, or any influence on them, and as punishment for
violations the closing of such a publication as well as the immediate
expulsion from the Reich of the non-German concerned. Publications
which are counter to the general good are to be forbidden. We
demand legal prosecution of artistic and literary forms which exert
a destructive influence on our national life, and the closure of
organizations opposing the above made demands.
24. We demand freedom of religion for all religious denominations
within the state so long as they do not endanger its existence or
oppose the moral senses of the Germanic race. The Party as such
advocates the standpoint of a positive Christianity without binding
itself confessionally to any one denomination. It combats the
Jewish-materialistic spirit within and around us, and is convinced that
a lasting recovery of our nation can only succeed from within on the
framework: common utility precedes individual utility.
25. For the execution of all of this we demand the formation of a
strong central power in the Reich. Unlimited authority of the central
parliament over the whole Reich and its organizations in general. The
forming of state and profession chambers for the execution of the laws
made by the Reich within the various states of the confederation.
The leaders of the Party promise, if necessary by sacrificing their
own lives, to support by the execution of the points set forth above
without consideration.
Adolf Hitler proclaimed the following explanation for this program on
the 13 April 1928:
Explanation
Regarding the false interpretations of Point 17 of the program of
the NSDAP on the part of our opponents, the following definition is
necessary:
“Since the NSDAP stands on the platform of private ownership it happens
that the passage” gratuitous expropriation concerns only the creation
of legal opportunities to expropriate if necessary, land which has
been illegally acquired or is not administered from the viewpoint of
the national welfare. This is directed primarily against the Jewish
land-speculation companies.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1709-PS
[Report of Special Delegate for Art Seizures, July 1943]
[_Page 68 Par. 134_]
The collection Lubomierski in Lemberg contained among others 31
valuable hand drawings by Albrecht Duerer. An offer made in the spring
of 1940 by a special commissioner through the foreign office to the
Russian government, to exchange these drawings by Duerer for equally
valuable Russian works of arts and literary monument, was refused.
On the day of the capture of Lemberg, the special commissioner, Dr.
Muehlmann and the museum director Dr. Kudlich went there by order
of the Reichmarshal, to conduct a search for the hand drawings. The
investigation encountered considerable difficulties, because the
Russians had reorganized the system of museums in Lemberg and because
the collection Lubomierski did not exist any more.
In the course of further investigations Prof. Gebarowicz of the
Bawarowski-museum, who had publicized the drawings in the past, was
thoroughly interrogated also. Finally he explained that he kept the
drawings carefully hidden from the Russians in the Bawarowski-museum.
On demand, he also brought them out from concealment.
After thorough examination, the sequestration was announced, and a
regular receipt was issued.
The special commissioner has turned over these hand drawings in July
1941 to the Reichmarshal in person, who brought them to the Fuehrer
into the headquarters, where they still are. By specific order of the
Fuehrer, they remain temporarily in his possession.
The following single drawings are affected, which were entered in the
supplement of the catalogue (31 drawings on 23 cartons):
Carton I 1. Self portrait
2. 6 pillows
Carton II 3. The young steer
Carton III 4. Nude with mirror
5. Partial sketch of the same figure
Carton IV 6. Nude woman with headscarf in a niche on a sphere
Carton V 7. Nude man with lion
8. Nude man with mirror
9. Attached weak reprint of the same figure
Carton VI 10. Corner ornament with eagle
11. The holy family
Carton VII 12. Drapery study
13. Nude man lying down
Carton VIII 14. Oarsman
Carton IX 15. Horse
Carton X 16. Europa on the steer
Carton XI 17. Corpus Christi
Carton XII 18. Nude woman with a staff
Carton XIII 19. Sampson with the city gates of Gaza
Carton XIV 20. Mary and child
21. Childhead
Carton XV 22. Pictures of the emperors Charlemagne and
Sigismund
Carton XVI 23. The holy family in a hut
Carton XVII 24. Study for a Madonna and the head of an old man
25. Two geometric drawings
Carton XVIII 26. Mary with a child in an indicated renaissance hall
Carton XIX 27. Christ as king of the universe
Carton XX 28. Man’s head with a cap
Carton XXI 29. Lamentations over Christ
Carton XXII 30. Head of a deer
Carton XXIII 31. Study for an adoration, left kneeling Mary, right
Holy Joseph
[_Page 77, Par. 148_]
_Works of art for decorative purposes_
On the desire of the Governor General, a number of 2nd and 3rd class
art objects was made available to him for exhibition and decorative
purposes,--Reference Paragraph 141 and 142.--The architect Franz
Koettgen in Krakau was charged with the execution of this mission,
especially the furnishing of Castle Kressendorf and the castle in
Krakau. A list was made by the special commissioner, in which all
objects, put at the disposal of architect Koettgen, were exactly listed
in detail.
During the conference with the architect Koettgen, on 30 July 1942, the
latter promised, to continue the inventory, already started by him,
more rapidly, and to conclude by the end of 1942 at the latest. He
furthermore said he was willing, to provide the special commissioner
after the completion of the inventories with a directory of the
location of the individual objects. The completeness of the transferred
art objects and their careful storing can only be examined after the
completion of the inventories.
A copy of the above mentioned lists on the object, put at the disposal
of Koettgen is added to the report as enclosure Nr. 8.
[_Page 80_]
Of the objects, taken from the depot of the special commissioner in the
state library in Krakau as of 1 Aug 1942, the following were inspected:
I. In Berlin in the depot of the special Commissioner and in the safe
of the German Bank:
_Catalogue No._
East German Master 1430 “Picture of the Vesper” 4
German Master 16th century “Picture of a bearded man” 17
Master von Kappenberg “Mary with child” 27
Dirk Bouts “Annunciation of Mary” 35
Netherland Master “Lamentation over Christ” 42
Berckheyde “Small Houtpoort in Haarlem” 45
Breughel “Folksfestival” 47
Gerrit Dou “Rembrandt’s mother” 51
Pinturicchio “Madonna and child” 138
Raffael “Picture of a young man” 141
Venetian Master “Mary and child” 145
de Largilliere “Portrait of a lady” 158
Further two 2nd class pictures, namely “The lustful
old man” (unequal lovers), “Fugger’s Portrait”.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1721-PS
CONFIDENTIAL
Supreme SA Command
FO No 82/277-38 n.f.D. Ha/Hbl.
MUNICH, 29 November 1938
For Use of the Services Only
Distributor I
Subject: Measures against the Jews.
The Stabsleiter of the Fuehrer’s deputy, in Order No. 189/38 (not to be
made public), makes the following announcement:
“In connection with the actions against the Jews arising from the
public, valuable objects had to be safeguarded here and there by the
offices of the Party and its branches for the protection of German
public property. I order that such objects be turned over at once to
the nearest office of the Secret State Police, and receipts be given
therefor.”
“If, in connection with these actions, the offices of the Party and
their branches should become aware or have been aware of thefts,
which unfortunately may have occurred, it is to be reported at once
to the nearest Police Station. The same is to be done upon the
appearance of suspicious objects.”
“The offices of the police are to be aided to the fullest extent in
accomplishing their assignment.”
Chief of the Fuehrungshauptamt:
Signed: JUETTNER
Obergruppenfuehrer
Official
/s/ [Illegible]
Standartenfuehrer
STAMPED: SA Group Kurpfalz 1543
/s/ [Illegible]
30 November 1938
# # # # #
CONFIDENTIAL
SA der NSDAP
50th Brigade (Starkenburg)
Division F Reference No 4309
DARMSTADT, 2 Moosbergstrasse 11 November 1938
Tel. 7042 and 7043 Postal checking account: Frankfurt on
the Main 234-38 Bankaccount City Savings Bank 155
To: SA Group Electoral Palatinate [Kurpfalz] _Mannheim_
The following order reached me at 3 o’clock on 10 November 1938.
“On the order of the Gruppenfuehrer, all the Jewish synagogues within
the 50th Brigade are to be blown up or set on fire immediately.”
“Neighboring houses occupied by Aryans are not to be damaged. The
action is to be carried out in civilian clothes. Rioting and plundering
are to be prevented. Report of execution of orders to reach Brigade
Fuehrer or office by 8:30.”
I immediately alerted the Standartenfuehrer and gave them the most
exact instructions; the execution of the order began at once.
I hereby report that the following were destroyed in the area of:
Standarte 115
1. Synagogue at Darmstadt, Bleichstrasse destroyed by fire.
2. Synagogue at Darmstadt, Fuchsstrasse destroyed by fire.
3. Synagogue at Ober/Ramstadt interior and furnishings wrecked.
4. Synagogue at Graefenhausen interior and furnishings wrecked.
5. Synagogue at Griesheim interior and furnishings wrecked.
6. Synagogue at Pfungstadt interior and furnishings wrecked.
7. Synagogue at Eberstadt destroyed by fire.
Standarte 145
1. Synagogue at Bensheim destroyed by fire.
2. Synagogue at Lorsch in Hessen destroyed by fire.
3. Synagogue at Heppenheim destroyed by fire and blown up.
4. Synagogue at Birkenau destroyed by fire.
5. Prayer House Alsbach destroyed by fire.
6. Meeting room Alsbach destroyed by fire.
7. Synagogue at Rimbach furnishings completely destroyed.
Standarte 168
1. Synagogue in Seligenstadt destroyed by fire.
2. Synagogue in Offenbach destroyed by fire.
3. Synagogue in Klein-Krotzenburg destroyed by fire.
4. Synagogue in Steinheim on the Main destroyed by fire.
5. Synagogue in Muehlheim on the Main destroyed by fire.
6. Synagogue in Sprendlingen destroyed by fire.
7. Synagogue in Langen destroyed by fire.
8. Synagogue in Egelsbach destroyed by fire.
Standarte 186
1. Synagogue in Beerfelden blown up.
2. Synagogue in Michelstadt furnishings wrecked.
3. Synagogue in Koenig furnishings wrecked.
4. Synagogue in Hoechst i/Odenwald furnishings wrecked.
5. Synagogue in Gross-Umstadt furnishings wrecked.
6. Synagogue in Dieburg furnishings wrecked.
7. Synagogue in Babenhausen furnishings wrecked.
8. Synagogue in Gross-Bieberau destroyed by fire.
9. Synagogue in Fraenk. Crumbach furnishings destroyed.
10. Synagogue in Reichelsheim furnishings destroyed.
Standarte 221
1. Synagogue and Chapel in Gross Gerau destroyed by fire.
2. Synagogue in Ruesselheim torn down and furnishings destroyed.
3. Synagogue in Dornheim furnishings destroyed.
4. Synagogue in Wolfskehlen furnishings destroyed.
The Fuehrer of Brigade 50 (Starkenburg)
/s/ [Illegible]
Brigadefuehrer
Stamped: SA Group Electoral Palatinate (Kurpfalz)
11 Nov 1938
/s/ [Illegible]
# # # # #
CONFIDENTIAL
Notice!
8.35 Oberfuehrer Durein [?] for the area of Brigade 51 reports
completion of the matter of the Synagogues.
Everything has been carried out up to Roelsheim [?] near Germersheim.
10 Nov 38 (s) [Illegible]
# # # # #
CONFIDENTIAL
Note for Files
Telephone call by the Fuehrer of Brigade 50, Darmstadt.
Brigadefuehrer Lucke.
Brigadefuehrer Lucke reports at 9 o’clock on 10 November 1938:
The Jewish church at Darmstadt, the Synagogue at Darmstadt, and
the Synagogue at Eberstadt were destroyed by fire. The Synagogue
in Darmstadt destroyed and burned out. The Synagogue in Eberstadt
destroyed and burned out. The Synagogues in Griesheim, in Graefenhausen
and Oberramstadt destroyed. The Synagogue in Bensheim destroyed by
fire. The Synagogue in Lorsch near Bensheim destroyed by fire. The
Synagogue in Heppenheim blown up. The Synagogues in Rimbach and
Birkenau destroyed. The Prayer Hall at Alsbach a.d.B. destroyed.
Meeting-room in the Jewish cemetery in Haehnlein destroyed. The
Synagogue and Church in Gross-Gerau destroyed by fire. The Synagogue in
Ruesselsheim wrecked. In addition, the Synagogue and wooden church in
Dornheim were demolished. In Offenbach the big Church and the Synagogue
were destroyed by fire. Synagogues that may still exist will also be
found and destroyed.
Mannheim, 10 Nov 1938 /s/ LOHMANN
Sturmhauptfuehrer
Copied:
# # # # #
CONFIDENTIAL
Note for Files
Telephone call from Brigade 151, Saarbruecken, by Sturmhauptfuehrer
Rossel.
Sturmhauptfuehrer Rossel reports at 9.15 on the morning of 10 November
1938. Tonight the Synagogue in Saarbruecken was set on fire, and the
Synagogues in Dillingen, Merzig, Saarlautern, Saarwillingen and
Broddorf were also destroyed. Jews were taken into protective custody.
The fire departments are occupied with extinguishing the fires. In the
area of Standarte 174 all Synagogues were destroyed.
MANNHEIM, 10 November 1938
Copied:
/s/ ZIMMERMANN
Standartenfuehrer
# # # # #
CONFIDENTIAL
Note for Files
Telephone call from the Fuehrer of Standarte 250, Bruchsal,
Standartenfuehrer Ritter von Eberlein.
Standartenfuehrer Ritter von Eberlein reports at 9.00 on the morning
of 10 November 1938. In the early morning of 10 November 1938, between
the hours of 4.30 and 6.00 o’clock, the Synagogue at Bruchsal burned
down to the foundations. The crowd broke all shop windows of the Jewish
stores in the city; the alerted SA put guards before the Jewish stores
to prevent plundering. The Rabbi and several prominent Jews had to be
taken into protective custody for their own safety. This was done by
the Gestapo. The Synagogue at Philippsburg also burned down at the same
time. The infamous Rabbi Neuburger, who is known because of his foreign
connections was taken into protective custody by instigation of the
SA. During the night the Synagogues at Wiesloch, Walldorf and Malsch
were also destroyed. The male Jews had to be taken into protective
custody for their personal safety. In the area of Sturmbann III/250 the
Synagogues at Sinsheim, Neidenstein, Neckar-Bischofsheim, Hoffenheim,
Wollenberg and Ittlingen were also destroyed.
MANNHEIM, 10 November 1938
Copied:
/s/ ZIMMERMANN
Standartenfuehrer
# # # # #
CONFIDENTIAL
Note for Files
Standarte 17 reports by telephone call from Sturmbannfuehrer. Then at
10.13 o’clock in the morning of 10 November 1938: The Synagogues at
Ludwigshafen and Frankenthal were burned down completely this morning
between 7 and 8 o’clock. Several Jewish stores were demolished.
MANNHEIM, 10 November 1938
Copied:
/s/ [Illegible]
Standartenfuehrer
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1723-PS
DECREES, REGULATIONS, ANNOUNCEMENTS [The German publication entitled
“Verfuegungen, Anordnungen, Bekanntgaben”] Pp. 430-39.
_Security Police_
Cooperation of the Party offices with the Secret State Police [Gestapo].
In a summary of all the previously issued decrees on the cooperation
between the Party and the Gestapo I refer to the following and ordain:
1. To the Gestapo has been entrusted the mission by the Fuehrer to
watch over and to eliminate all enemies of the Party and the National
Socialist State as well as all disintegrating forces of all kinds
directed against both. The successful solution of this mission
forms one of the most essential prerequisites for the unhampered
and frictionless work of the Party. The Gestapo, in their extremely
difficult task, is to be granted support and assistance in every
possible way by the NSDAP. The supervision of the Party itself does not
come under the jurisdiction of the Gestapo.
I prohibit all offices of the Party, its organizations and associated
groups to conduct investigations and interrogations regarding
affairs which concern the Gestapo only. All occurrences of a
political-criminalistic nature are to be reported without prejudice
along Party channels and as ever brought to the knowledge of the
Gestapo immediately.
2. The secret state police must report automatically all occurrences
of a criminal nature, even if it includes Party Members, to the
responsible public prosecutor according to the laws of the National
Socialist State, in force for all nationals. In such cases, the State
police offices will notify, as before, the county and Gauleiters
concerned, of the reports made to the public prosecutor. Reports will
include reasons for the incidents. In the interest of the movement the
functionaries [Hoheitstrager] are obliged to suspend, if necessary,
the party members, after contacting the responsible Party Court;
the latter will hold a public hearing, to decide on the temporary
suspension.
_Invitation of the leaders of offices in the Security Police and the
Security Service to attend Party meetings._
In order to establish closer connections between all the offices of the
Party and their organizations and the office leader of the Security
Police and SD, the leader of the Party Chancellor asks that they should
be invited in the future to all large official meetings of the Party.
_The taking over of political offices by officials of the Gestapo_
The Secret State police has the mission to safeguard the unhampered
development of all forces active in the party and released by it in the
National Socialistic State.
Since it is still in a state of being organised and the available
officials and employees are very much in demand they are only to be
employed in order to take over positions in the Party in as much as it
is compatible with their official duties in the Secret State Police.
I, therefore, ask to check in every single case and in close harmony
with the department of the Secret State Police concerned, whose leader
welcomes the taking over of political functions by officials and
employees of the Secret State Police, whether the transfer of political
missions into the Party can be justified in the interest of the
official obligations of the Secret State Police.
_Presentation to the State Police upon request by Party offices_
The Chief of the Security Police and SD has issued the annexed decrees
of 29 March 1940 and 4 November 1940. It is ordered herewith that
departments of the Secret State Police will be obliged to execute the
presentation request when the same emanates from the Reichsleiters
or the Gauleiters. If the request for presentation originates from
subordinate departments of the party it will only be granted if
particular interests of the State Police seem to warrant a presentation.
In the future the county administration and local administrations are
to direct all requests through the district administration to the
responsible department of the Secret State police.
# # # # #
Berlin, 29 March 1940
The Chief of the Security Police and SD
I A 1 NR. 102/40-176
To all State police departments
By way of information to the Inspectors of the Security Police and SD.
Subject: Presentation to the State Police upon request by Party
offices.
Repeated requests by Party offices for presentation to the State Police
of Volksgenossen who did not heed the summons of the Party offices,
cause the following regulations to be decreed:
1. If the district administration makes the request the same is to be
granted as long as no important interests of the State Police interfere.
2. If a party office subordinate to the district administration
requests the presentation, the same has to be denied in as far as no
important interests of the State Police seem to warrant a presentation.
Signed: HEYDRICH
Verified: Schoenbrunn of the Chancellery
# # # # #
Berlin SW 11 4 November 1940
The Chief of the Security Police and SD
IB 1 NR 763/40-151
To All State Police Departments
By way of information to the Inspectors of the Security Police and SD
Subject: Presentation to State Police upon request of Party Offices
Reference: Decree of 29 March 1940 IA 1 NR 102/40-176
In supplement to my decree of 29 March 1940 I order that presentation
requests by Reichsleiters be granted in so far as important interests
of the State Police do not interfere.
Signed: HEYDRICH
# # # # #
_Protective Custody_
Protective custody must be viewed as the strongest measure in order to
impressively instruct the Volksgenossen, who maliciously neglect their
duties toward the community or endanger the security of the State,
that they have to conform themselves to the universal interests and to
adapt themselves to State discipline. Therefore it should only serve as
a means of combatting real enemies of the Reich, but should never be
used for the clarification or punishment of different or insignificant
offenses.
An excessive use of protective custody, as well as its infliction
without previous indisputable clarification of the state of affairs and
the question of guilt, is neither justified with regard to the future
of the one involved nor with respect to the reduction of its moral
effect.
Therefore it must be expected that protective custody is only to be
employed in really pressing and substantial cases.
I request that the county leaders be instructed orally to avoid any
written communications; special emphasis on secrecy.
_Protective Custody_ (_Regulations_)
Through the circular of the 25 January 1938, the Reich Minister of
the Interior has issued new regulations regarding the introduction of
protective custody. In the following, I announce the wording of this
decree for confidential information.
# # # # #
Berlin 25 Jan. 1938
The Reich Minister of the Interior
The following regulations regarding protective custody go into effect
on the 1 February 1938. At the same time, the following are rescinded:
a. My decree of 12 April 1934--I 3311 A/28.2 along with the supplement
of 26 April 1934 and 10 July 1934 (directed to governments of the
states and to the Reichstatthalters).
b. My decree of 12 April 1935--VI B 757A/3014 along with the
supplementary decree of 1 June 1935 VI B 11568/3014 (directed to the
governments of the states, Reichstatthalter, Prussian presidents of
government districts).
c. My decree of 17 June 1935--III P 3311/329 (directed to the state
government and the Reichstatthalter.)
d. The decree of office of Secret State Police of 3 July 1934--B Nr.
19582 II I D (directed to the presidents of the Prussian government
districts).
e. The decree of the Political Police Commander of the Lands of the 9
Sept 1935--B. Nr. 37840/35 II I D (directed to the Political police of
the states and the Prussian State Police offices).
Article 1 Admissibility
Protective custody can be decreed as a coercive measure of the
Secret State Police against persons who endanger the security of the
people and the state through their attitude, in order to counter all
aspirations of enemies of the people and state.
Protective Custody shall not be decreed for penal purposes or as a
substitute for punitive arrest. Punishable offenses have to be decided
finally by the courts.
Article 2 Competence
1. The Secret State Police exclusively is competent for the application
of protective custody.
2. Motions in behalf of the application of protective custody have
to be directed to the Secret State police through the State police
offices. Every motion has to be substantiated in detail; the statements
of the arrested person have to be considered in it. A copy of the
hearing of the person temporarily apprehended has to be forwarded
immediately.
3. Protective custody may only be inflicted if the accused has
previously had a hearing on offenses imputed to him.
Article 3 Temporary Arrest
1. The Secret State police bureau, the offices of the State police
director and of the State Police are authorized under the provisions of
par. 1 to order the temporary arrest of persons:
a. If it is feared that the freedom will be abused for activities
hostile to the state.
b. If danger of under-cover activities exists.
c. If there is suspicion of escape.
2. The accused has to be notified at the latest within 24 hours after
the arrest. He is to be heard on the grounds for the infliction of the
temporary arrest according to protocol.
3. A temporarily arrested person has to be released at the latest after
an elapse of 10 days from the day of apprehension if the Secret State
police bureau has in the meantime not decreed protective custody (5).
* * * * * * *
Article 6 Execution
The protective custody has to be executed generally in the State
Concentration Camps.
Article 7 Duration
1. Protective custody shall only be upheld as long as it serves its
purpose.
2. The Secret State police bureau authorizes release from protective
custody. For that reason the bureau investigates periodically but not
exceeding 3 months, whether the protective custody should be cancelled.
The release must have taken place, at the latest, on the third day
after the lifting of the protective custody.
Article 8 Foreigners
As a matter of principle deportation procedure has to be carried out
against foreigners who have been taken into protective custody unless
particular reasons interfere.
Article 9 Executory Regulations
The Chief of the Security Police issues the necessary regulations for
the execution.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1724-PS
Press conference on August 4, 1938 headed by Regional Leader
[Gauamtsleiter] Schoeller
Duration: 1 hour
[Page 1, par. 4]
The breaking up of the synagogue (information must still be secret).
On August 10, 1938 at 10 o’clock A. M. the breakup of the synagogues
will commence. Gauleiter Julius Streicher will personally set the crane
into motion with which the Jewish symbols (Star of David etc.) will be
torn down. This should be arranged in a big way. Closer details are
still unknown.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1725-PS
1935 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 502
Ordinance on Enforcement of the Law for Securing the Unity of Party and
State of 29 March 1935
By virtue of the law for securing the unity of Party and State of 1
December 1933 (RGBl I, 1016) I order:
ARTICLE 1
1. The NSDAP and the Hitler Youth Movement, Inc. are to be expunged
in the corporation register. The property of these corporations has
without liquidation become the property of the NSDAP as a corporation
of public law.
2. The land deeds and other public records are to be corrected free of
charge on request.
3. Until the decree of the statute of the NSDAP (Article 1, Section
2 of the Law for Securing the Unity of Party and State of 1 December
1933), the previous statute of the National Socialist German Workers’
Corporation, Inc., is applicable in this sense to the NSDAP as a
corporation of public law.
ARTICLE 2
The SA,
The SS,
The National Socialist Driver Corps [Kraftfahrkorps],
The Hitler Youth (including the Jungfolk, the League of German Girls
and Jungmaedel),
The National Socialist German Student League,
The National Socialist German Women’s Auxiliary [Frauenschaft], are
components of the party.
ARTICLE 3
The National Socialist League of German Physicians, Inc.,
The League of National Socialist German Jurists, Inc.,
The National Socialist Teachers’ League, Inc.,
The National Socialist People’s Welfare, Inc.,
The National Socialist War Veterans’ Administration, Inc.,
The Reich League of German Officials, Inc.,
The National Socialist League of German Technologists,
The German Labor Front (including the National Socialist foundation
“Kraft durch Freude”),
are the organizations affiliated to the NSDAP.
ARTICLE 4
1. The components of the NSDAP possess no legal character of their own
and no property of their own.
2. The NSDAP forms with its components as a corporation of public
law, a unit for the domain of the entire organization, with reference
to property rights. Therefore the entire corporation is exclusively
obligated and justified as to property rights.
3. The Reich Treasurer of the NSDAP is the Plenipotentiary of the
Fuehrer in all legal matters relating to property of the NSDAP. The
Plenipotentiary rights include the right to assign sub-powers of
attorney generally or for individual matters.
ARTICLE 5
1. The affiliated organizations can possess their own legal character.
2. The affiliated organizations are subject to the financial
supervision of the Reich Treasurer of the NSDAP.
3. The other legally determined supervisory rights are not touched by
the financial supervision of the Reich Treasurer of the NSDAP.
ARTICLE 6
All authorities have to assist the Reich Treasurer of the NSDAP and his
agent in the fulfillment of his duties and to conform with the requests
of the Reich Treasurer of the NSDAP, which go to them on the basis of
this order.
ARTICLE 7
1. The first enforcement order of 23 March 1934 (Voelkischer
Beobachter, Munich edition No. 86 of 27 March 1934 and Berlin edition
No. 87 of 28 March 1934) on the law for securing unity of party and
state dated 1 December 1933 is abrogated.
2. Likewise all previous orders and regulations contrary to the above
enforcement order on the law for securing unity of party and state of 1
December 1933 are abrogated.
ARTICLE 8
1. The Deputy of the Fuehrer issues terms for enforcement and
supplementing Articles 2 and 3 of this order. The Reich Treasurer of
the NSDAP issues the remaining terms for execution of this order.
2. This law takes effect on the day following its announcement.
Berlin, 29 March 1935
The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor
Adolf Hitler
The Deputy of the Fuehrer
R. Hess
Reich Minister without Portfolio
The Reich Minister of the Interior
Frick
COPY OF DOCUMENT 1726-PS
STATEMENT OF THE NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT IN VIEW OF THE PROSECUTION AND
PUNISHMENT OF THE GERMAN MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS
Enclosure “h” entitled: _Central Bureau for Statistics_
THE DEPORTATION OF NETHERLANDS WORKMEN TO GERMANY [Pages 1-3].
The enlistment of working labourers took quite a different course. Many
big and reasonably large business concerns, especially in the metal
industry, were visited by German commissions who appointed workmen
for deportation. This combing out of the concerns was called the
“Sauckel-action”, so named after its leader, who was charged with the
appointment of foreign workmen in Germany.
The employers had to cancel the contracts with the appointed workmen
temporarily, and the latter were forced to register at the labour
offices, which then took care of the deportation under supervision of
German “Fachberater”.
Workmen who refused (relatively few) were prosecuted by the
“Sicherheitsdienst” (SD). If captured by this service, they were mostly
lodged for some time in one of the infamous prisoners camps in the
Netherlands and eventually put to work in Germany.
In this prosecution the “Sicherheitsdienst” was supported by the German
Police Service, which was connected with the labour offices, and was
composed of members of the N.S.B. and the like.
At the end of April 1942 the deportation of working labourers started
on a grand scale. Consequently in the months of May and June the number
of deportees amounted to not less than 22,000, resp. 24,000 of which
many were metal workers.
After that the action slackened somewhat, but in October 1942 another
top was reached (2,600). After the big concerns, the smaller ones had,
in their turn, to give up their personnel. * * *
This changed in November 1944. The Germans then started a ruthless
campaign for manpower, passing by the labour offices. Without warning,
they lined off whole quarters of the towns, seized people in the
streets or in the houses and deported them.
In Rotterdam and Schiedam where these raids (razzia’s) took place on 10
and 11 November, the amount of people thus deported was estimated at
50,000 and 5,000 respectively.
In other places where the raids were held later, the numbers were much
lower, because one was forewarned by the events. The exact figures are
not known as they have never been published by the occupants.
The people thus seized were put to work partly in the Netherlands,
partly in Germany.
The events of the war then took such a turn that further deportations
did not take place. But still in the North and East of the country,
many men, up to 60 years, were seized and forced to build defence works
in the neighbourhood of their homes.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1741-PS
PART 3
S BLN NR 51 7 AUG 8 AUG 0800--
TO the Chairman of the German-French Economic Commission,
Ambassador HEMMEN,
Wiesbaden Hotel 4 Jahreszeiten.
[Rubber Stamp]
German Armistice Delegation for Economy
Wiesbaden 8 AUGUST 1940
NO. 30 Incl. 1.
NO. 70--
Enclosed, I forward to you a copy of the draft of the note on
occupation costs, which corresponds to the decisions made in the
meeting of the H.P.A. on 31 July, and which in the meantime has the
consent of the Chief of the OKW. I request to forward the note now.
By Order /S/ WIEHL.
# # # # #
NOTE: For the Chairman of French Delegation with the German Armistice
Commission General Huntziger
My General:
By order of my government, I have the honor to inform you of the
following:
1 According to Article 18 of the German French Armistice Agreement of
22 June 1940, the costs for the maintenance of the German occupational
troops on French soil are to be borne by the French government. To
carry out this term, an early settlement is necessary.
2 Considering the impossibility to calculate the costs accurately
at present, until further notice, daily installments of at least 20
million marks are necessary. These installments may be paid in French
francs, Reichcredit checks [Reichskassen Scheinen] or other values,
to be agreed on. The conversion of French francs has been fixed on
a currency ratio at 1:30, subject to a later different settlement.
The billeting of the German occupation troops on French soil is not
included in the settlement of installments. The billet owners will be
compensated for the billeting costs by the French government outside of
the settlement of installments.
3 The settlement is in force from the period beginning 25 June 1940.
The back payments are due with the settlement of installments. The
further amounts are to be paid every time for a period of ten days in
advance.
4 Certificates of requisition for material in kind, issued by the
German occupation, exclusive of billeting, as far as they have been
issued after the coming into force of the settlement of installments,
will be registered as payment for the cost of the occupation by the
French government. However, the certificates of requisition, which were
issued by the German occupational troops before the coming into force
of the settlement of installments, are to be redeemed by the French
government without deducting it from the costs of occupation. I request
my General to confirm to me the receipt of this note, and to notify
me about the measures which the French government has made about the
execution of the above settlement.
Permit me, My General, to express my utmost respect,
* * * * * * *
PART 6
Wiesbaden No. 29 17.9.40 2010 Secret
Teletype
Foreign Berlin
Secret
Del. No. 120.
In your teletype No. 171 of 12 September, concerning occupation
expenses, it is stated in number 2 that it is the wish of the Reich
Finance Ministry to inform the French delegation explicitly “that
the installments did not constitute a settlement by a lump sum, but
that they would have to be adapted to the actual necessities arising
from the current war situation and the current requirements of the
occupation troops”. I hesitate considerably, to communicate this
request to the French delegation for the following two reasons:
In my notes of 8 August 1940--Del. W. 280 of 15 August 1940--Del. W.
331--and of 20 August 1940--Del. W. 408, the idea of installments has
always been expressed clearly. The idea of a settlement by a lump
sum has never been discussed with the French. The French delegation
has therefore no reason, up to now, to assume that the installments
constituted a settlement by a lump sum. The instruction requested by
the Reich Finance Ministry would, on the contrary, only arouse the
idea of a settlement by a lump sum in the minds of the French, which I
consider as disastrous.
General von Stuelpnagel informed me more officially, that numerous
German Divisions have been transferred to the East from France. This
fact cannot remain unknown to the French permanently. He draw my
attention to that fact because he thought that this decrease of the
armed forces in France would certainly influence the amount of the
occupation expenses.
The transmission of the communication to the French delegation at
present in the wording “as necessitated by the current war situation
and the current requirements of the occupation troops” as desired by
the Reich Finance Ministry, contains the further danger, that the
French delegation would claim a reduction of the installments because
of the decrease in the number of troops.
I ask you for your decision.
Signed: HEMMEN
2015 NR 29 Received BO AUSW AMT (Foreign Office) Berlin.
# # # # #
PART 7
Wiesbaden 23 October 1940
Armistice Commission for Economic Affairs
The President of the French Delegation for Economic Affairs French
Delegation
To Monsieur Hemmen
Minister Plenipotentiary
President of the German Armistice
Delegation for Economic Affairs.
No. 6318/DE
[Rubber Stamp]
German Armistice Delegation for Economic Affairs Wiesbaden
24 October 1940
No. 1532
Enclosures
Sir:
By order of my government I have the honor to communicate the following
to you:
In a note dated the 12th of October, the German government answered
a note of the 26th of August in which the French government had made
a formal protest against the payments demanded from her to cover
the expenses of the German occupation troops in France. The German
government refuses all discussion, both on the distinction between
“occupation troops” and “operational troops”, and on the rate of
exchange between Reichsmarks and francs.
It further refuses or denies the French government the right to watch
and receive information about the way in which the sums paid for the
costs of occupation are used, as well as about the requisitioning of
lodgings and economic requisitions.
The French government profoundly regrets this reply. It considers, in
fact, that events have fully justified the position it took up.
After having recalled once more the essential distinction which it
makes between “occupation troops” and “operational troops”, the
French government pointed out to the government of the Reich the two
considerations which, in its opinion, make a fresh examination of the
problem necessary.
1. Facts have shown that the rate of exchange fixed for the conversion
of the Reichsmark into francs was too high. This rate of exchange
did not take into account the respective levels of prices in France
and Germany at the time when it was fixed. It anticipated a very
considerable rise in French prices, which the German authorities
considered inevitable. Actually this rise did not take place and the
buying power of the franc remains much higher, than that implied by the
maintenance of the present parity.
The French government is all the more surprised at its protest against
the rate of exchange between francs and Reichsmarks not having had any
results, as it had itself suggested, in case the rate were modified, a
formula allowing the pay and allowances received by the German troops
for their expenses in France to remain at the figures at present paid
in francs.
An immediate consequence of the rate of exchange of 20 francs to the
mark is that the sum demanded on account, for the maintenance of the
occupation troops, which is reckoned in Reichsmarks, is out of all
proportion to the real expenses of these troops. As a matter of fact,
the credit balance of the account opened by the Bank of France for
the German military administration is enough to cover the costs of
occupation for a long time to come.
2. It is obvious that the payments demanded by the government of the
Reich should be reduced in proportion to the number of German troops in
France. But it is clear that this number has diminished considerably
since the daily payment was fixed.
The French government is all the more justified in arguing from the
above facts, as it is faced by an extremely serious economic problem,
owing to a lack of raw materials and insufficient means of transport,
which have led to considerable unemployment. The result is that, if the
level of the costs of occupation fixed in August is persisted in, the
burden will become more and more difficult to bear as time goes on.
The French government therefore has to make a formal request for
a revision of the present daily payment. This reduction is amply
justified, both by the real needs of the occupation troops and by
France’s economic capacity. If it does not take place soon, the French
government will inevitably be unable to continue its payments.
The French government, anxious to carry out the Armistice Convention
which it signed, wanted to give the government of the Reich this loyal
explanation of the position it is forced to take up. It appeals to the
feeling of great comprehension of the German government and hopes that
this sincere explanation will induce the latter to grant the revision
requested in this note.
I am, sir,
/S/ Yves de Boisanger.
[Rubber Stamp]
THE PRESIDENT
French Armistice Delegation
For Economic Affairs.
# # # # #
PART 8
French Delegation for Economic Affairs
Wiesbaden, 18 March 1941
[Rubber Stamp]
German Armistice Delegation for Economic Affairs
18 March 1941
No. 5409
Enclosures.
No. 15447/DE
The President of the French Delegation for Economic Affairs, to
Monsieur Hemmen Minister Plenipotentiary
President of the German Armistice Delegation for Economic Affairs.
Sir:
I have the honor to communicate the following to you on the orders of
my government:
Since the fixation of the daily indemnity by Germany, the French
government has paid over 108 million as occupation costs.
The burden of this payment, aggravated as it is to this degree, can no
longer be borne by the economy of this country without serious danger.
There is a risk of its causing a disorganization of its social and
political structure from which German interests would be the first to
suffer.
The representatives of the German government have several times
manifested their intention of dealing considerately with France’s
domestic order and her attempts at recovery.
It is the purpose of safeguarding the economic forces necessary for
Franco-German collaboration that the government has the honor of
setting forth the motives and objects of its request for the revision
of the indemnity.
I. MOTIVES
1. _Monetary_
The total of the sums paid by France is so great that financing has to
be covered by repeated appeals to the Bank of France.
As a result, the monetary circulation is increasing at an exceptionally
dangerous rate.
In January 1939 it did not exceed 110 milliards. In January 1941 it
had already been doubled. At the present rate it will soon reach three
times its pre-war volume.
2. _Economic_
This enormous mass of buying power weighs down an impoverished country,
whose reserves have been exhausted by war and whose production is
cramped by the lines of demarcation. It can not be reabsorbed by taxes,
since budgetary recoveries, which already represent a very heavy
burden on the taxpayer, do not exceed 60 milliard francs. It can not
be absorbed by loans, since subscriptions to treasury bonds only just
cover the expenses of the French state.
The mass of currency thus exercises considerable pressure on prices, so
that it is difficult to prevent them rising.
3. _Psychological_
This is particularly the case owing to the fact that, all holders of
francs are showing an increasing propensity to fly from money. The
rise in the rate of interest on shares, hoarding by merchants and
individuals and rise in real estate prices reveal the progressive
depreciation of the national currency.
The fall of the franc was considerably accelerated when, the
State’s Fourth Convention with the Bank of France (20 January 1941)
became known. It is to be feared that the publication of the Fifth
Convention, dated the 20th of February, will be still more disastrous,
unless it is accompanied by the announcement of a revision of the
indemnity.
II. OBJECTS
1. _Reduction of the indemnity_
The indemnity was fixed at 400 million francs per diem, as the result
of a decision by the German Armistice Commission for Economic Affairs
on the 8th of August 1940, to meet the expenses of the occupation
troops.
But these troops have decreased in number since the armistice, and
one must reintroduce the distinction between operational troops and
occupation troops, the latter being the only ones who were to be
supported by France, according to the Armistice Convention.
Furthermore, the debits actually entered on the account of the Reich
Credit Bank [Reichskreditkasse] with the Bank of France have been used
to cover other needs than that of supporting German troops.
Finally, in spite of these non-military uses to which the indemnity
has been put, German expenses have not absorbed the credits which were
opened.
Thus it came about, that on the 12th of March 1941 the payments made by
France amounted to 108 milliards, while the Germans had only drawn up
to half this figure.
It would therefore only be fair, to reduce the daily payment of 400
millions by a very considerable fraction.
2. _Incorporation of all French obligations into the indemnity_
The present indemnity does not include all the obligations which France
has to meet.
The French State meets the expenses of lodging and billeting separately.
The fiscal exonerations which Germany recently decided her purchases
in France should enjoy, deprived the French Treasury of a considerable
income.
It would only be fair that the new payment should cover all the
obligations falling on France as a result of the occupation.
3. _Reduction of the rate of exchange of the mark_
The rate adopted for the mark, as a result of the decision of the 8th
August, is 20 francs to the Reichsmark, whereas the official parity
between the two currencies is 17 francs, and real parity, based on a
comparison of their buying power, is still lower than this figure.
This over-valuation of German currency does not have as its only effect
a considerable aggravation of the burden of tribute. It also exerts an
upward pressure on French prices which tend to adjust themselves to
German prices, on the basis of the excessive rate of exchange of the
mark.
The parity between the two currencies should therefore be brought back
to a level which stands in a closer relationship to economic realities.
4. _Alteration of the method of payment_
The habit of making payments in currency in settlement of the
requisitions supplied to the occupation authorities is the principal
cause of the exaggerated monetary circulation.
It is therefore essential that the needs of the German occupation
troops be met, in principle, only by requisitions in kind;
that the methods used in the Rhineland from 1919 onwards be taken as an
example and the French authorities be made responsible for obtaining
these requisitions and debiting the occupation account with the value
of the products and services provided in France;
that payments in currency be limited to a few purchases direct from
commerce and industry made by soldiers of the German army out of their
pay;
that payment for purchases in Germany for the maintenance of the
occupation troops in France be met by the Reichsmarks which the French
Compensation Office holds in Berlin. The cost of these supplies would
be debited to the account opened to follow the use of the daily
indemnity.
The French government strongly hopes, that the reasons for her
preoccupations will be understood. It urgently requests, that talks
be begun rapidly, so that the indemnity can be readjusted before
the currency has lost its value completely. It counts on the German
government agreeing to no new payments being made, until the necessary
negotiations have been completed, as the needs of the occupation troops
are covered for many months by the money at present credited to them in
the Bank of France.
I am, Sir, etc.
/S/ Yves de Boisanger.
[rubber stamp]
The President
French Armistice Delegation
for Economic Affairs.
* * * * * * *
PART 20
Paris 11 Sep 1941
C 3
Del. W. No. 9659 P
1. _Foreign BERLIN_
Del W. No. 443 of 11 Sep 1941
_Teletype Secret_
After extensive examination of the situation, I would like to suggest
urgently, in reference to our dilatory treatment of the occupation
costs, ordered by the telegram from there of 2 Aug 1941--No.
3863--and strictly complied with up to now, to make a new appeal to
the Reichsminister for Foreign Affairs, to authorize me to sign the
agreement over the reorganization reached with the French delegation,
according to my telegram of 22 July 1941, Del. W. No. 372, and to put
it into force.
In fact, it absolutely complies with Ambassador Abetz’s opinion,
forwarded there in his telegram of 15 Aug 1941, paragraph 1, that our
consent for a fundamental readiness to decrease the occupation costs
has been given to Admiral Darlan on 7 May 1941 for the concessions,
granted us in Syria. As it is reported to me, General Huntziger
has represented the opinion to De Boisanger, that there may be a
misapprehension or incomplete notification of German agencies, if now
the settlement of the occupation costs are brought up in connection
with the North African questions.
I further point out, that the present arbitrary de facto settlement
of the payment of 15 instead of 20 million RM daily, already extends
over 4 months, and that this represents for France the practically most
favorable situation, and probably pleases more than the new regulation
for 10 million RM credit plus 3 million RM transfer daily. It is
still more important, that with a further delay of the settlement of
occupation cost, a series of important questions, which are regulated
with the reorganization simultaneously, remain further unsolved _at the
same time_, and disadvantages for us come about from this:
1. The purchase of further French interests abroad is obligatory
in most cases because of war-economical reasons. However, the
reorganization, agreed to, cannot be taken up for that, as long as a
total solution is still uncompleted. The Reichsministry for Economy
reports that the negotiations are practically at a standstill at
present for this reason. Therefore, the disadvantage lies with us alone
in these subjects, while 60 million RM for the purchase of interests
with the coming into force of the reorganization.
2. The execution of armament deliveries from France always presents
to our armed forces authorities difficulties, which result from the
payment. An immediate coming into force of the transfer of goods would
directly result in favor of our war potential.
3. I can secure the final appointment of the German foreign trade
commissioner at the same time, for which especially the Four Years’
Plan and the military commander show a lively interest.
But the stoppage also has a disadvantageous effect on the other work
of the delegation. I am forced to approach the French government
every week with new demands, mostly war-economically important, among
them the construction of a German-French clay factory in France for
deliveries of additional 100,000 tons of clay per year, the renting of
several thousand trucks with French drivers, and the purchase of 15,000
French trucks, converted to wood gas for transports to Russia.
Everywhere the energetic cooperation of the French government and in
part serious pressure by the government on its own economic circles
are necessary for the execution of these problems. Because of the
well-known tendency of the French government to hide themselves in
case of such economic desires behind the general political situation,
my efforts now ran against continually increasing difficulties. It
is therefore desired to reinstitute the previous status as soon as
possible, and to keep the field of endeavor of my delegation free and
independent of the prevailing political constellations, as much as
possible.
For these reasons, I recommend, that the present uncertain situation
of the occupation cost question, which can only have a disadvantageous
effect on us ourselves, be ended soon, and that the new settlement be
ordered by us now.
[In ink] Ambassador Abetz has been informed of this telegram before it
was forwarded.
/s/ Hemmen
1735 No. 23 one received foreign office KR
* * * * * * *
PART 22
FOREIGN OFFICE Ambassador Ritter C.3
“Westfalen”, 14 October 1941
[STAMP] German Armistice Commission
Wiesbaden 18 October 1941
Nr. 10628
Dear Mr. Hemmen,
I have received your letter of 29 September 1941--Del. W. No. 10093 P.
The Reich Foreign Minister does not consider it appropriate to approach
the Fuehrer with the regulation of the occupation expenses at the
present.
With friendly greetings
Heil Hitler
Yours
signed: Nitter
To The Ambassador Hemmen German Embassy Paris
# # # # #
PART 23
Paris, 4th November 1941
Place du Palais-Royal
French Delegation to the German Armistice Delegation for Economic
Affairs
German Armistice Delegation f. Economic Affairs
Wiesbaden 5 November 1941 No. 11116 Enclosures
The President of the French Delegation for Economic Affairs,
To Monsieur Hemmen Minister Plenipotentiary President of the German
Armistice Delegation for Economic Affairs
Sir,
In execution of the decisions taken by the German government with
regard to the payment of the costs of occupation, the French government
has, since August 1940 made periodic payments which, on the 31st
October 1941, totalled 183,200,000 francs. It was also obliged
to defray certain expenses (particularly the lodging of troops)
directly--expenses which amounted at this same time, to nearly 8
milliards and to cover the deficit in the Franco-German clearing
account, which is, at the moment, in the neighborhood of 11 milliard
francs.
The French government protested several times against the size of this
imposition, drawing the attention of the German Government to the grave
dangers it entails, both from the financial and from the economic point
of view.
Its fears on this point are unfortunately being shown to be better
founded every day.
The expenses resulting to the French Treasury from the occupation alone
are as high as the expenses of the State itself. The sums paid towards
the costs of occupation are also often used to a large extent to defray
expenses which have nothing to do with the maintenance of troops.
It is clear that such burdens are disappropriate to the present
resources of France and that they can be covered only by treasury
expedients.
The national revenue is diminishing continually. If the efforts made in
the field of agriculture result in an increase in the productivity of
the soil, industrial activity slows down. An increase in taxation would
produce a hardly noticeable result, and one must, on the contrary,
expect the product of these taxes to diminish more or less rapidly. One
is therefore forced to borrow at short call, either from the Bank of
France or from individuals and credit establishments, up to 70% of the
needs. In this way the public debt and the advances from the fiduciary
swell at an alarming speed, whatever the effects may be of the measures
taken to manipulate certain elements of this debt and to make it less
onerous (conversion, consolidation, reduction of rates of interest).
The mass of means of payment created to deal with the expenses
resulting from the occupation, seriously imperils economic equilibrium.
Inflation takes place in spite of the efforts of the government to
limit its volume and its consequences.
The prices of foodstuffs of daily use and of industrial products are
maintained by rationing and taxation, but nevertheless tend more and
more irresistibly to rise, and each day it is harder to prevent too
rapid a rise in the cost of goods and property.
The increasing abundance of money available is shown both by the
increased circulation of bank notes and by the increase in stocks held
in private and public institutions.
The monetary circulation, which was about 160 milliard francs in June
1940, has today reached the figure of 250 milliards, in other words,
it has increased by over 56%. During the same period bank deposits
increased by about 50%.
The smallness of the quantity of goods offered is at the same
time accentuated by supply difficulties and by the extent of the
requisitions carried out in the occupied zone.
This development is leading to a catastrophy like that suffered by
Germany 20 years ago.
When the French government signed the Armistice, it firmly intended
reestablishing the economic situation. All its efforts since then have
aimed particularly at keeping the monetary situation under control, in
spite of difficulties of all kinds and, particularly, in spite of the
enormous costs of occupation.
The French government is resolved to persevere in this path, but it
cannot do so usefully if the payments imposed by the German government
continue to render all its efforts useless in advance. It wants to warn
it once more.
I am, Sir, etc.
sgd. Yves de Boisanger.
[rubber stamp] The President French Armistice Delegation for Economic
Affairs
* * * * * * *
PART 27
_Telegram (Secret Ch V)_
Berlin, 19 February 1942, 1343 o’clock
Wako Paris
Nr. 50 of 19 Feb. Citissime.
Matter to be kept under lock C
Att: Mr. Hemmen
German Armistice Delegation for Economics
Wiesbaden 20 February 1942 No. 1309 Enclosures
[Initials]
In answer to report of 3 and 11 February No. 736 and No. 189 of 16
February and telegram of the 18th No. 43.
1. Reich Foreign Minister has ordered on 16 February that you orally
transmit to the Governor de Boisanger that the German Government
considers the letter of Finance Minister Bouthillier to the Reich
Minister of Finances only as a personal statement, not as an official
communication of the French Government. In case the French government
wishes to make a statement concerning the question of occupation costs
this should be directed by the authorized French chief of negotiations
to the authorized German chief of negotiations. In connection with this
communication you are to warn Mr. de Boisanger regarding the end of Mr.
Bouthillier’s letter emphatically against an arbitrary discontinuation
of the payments for occupation costs by the French Government and to
point out to him that such a discontinuation would create a serious
situation and result in corresponding German counter measures.
2. The Reich Minister of Finance has on 17 February declared that he
approves these steps and that he is not going to answer the letter.
However, he has suggested an internal discussion of the question of
occupation costs to which the Reich Foreign Minister also agreed
regarding the report of the OKW on the actual daily expenditures.
The discussion will take place soon in agreement with the competent
department and your reports mentioned in the beginning will also be
discussed.
3. Reich Foreign Minister, by the way, has issued for all your
negotiations the general directive, considered at an earlier date,
that you are to break off negotiations and depart for Berlin in case
the French assume an attitude which is not becoming to them as the
conquered ones.
Wiehl.
* * * * * * *
PART 29
French delegation to the German armistice delegation for economic
affairs
Ref.: P 276/DE
Paris, 4 March 1942
Place du Palais-Royal
From: The president of the French delegation to the German armistice
delegation for economic affairs.
To: Monsieur Hemmen, Minister Plenipotentiary, president of the
German armistice delegation for economic affairs.
Sir,
I have the honour to inform you of the following by order of my
government.
Ever since August 1940 the French government has continuously drawn the
attention of the German Government to the extremely grave consequence
which must necessarily accrue to French economics and finance from
payments towards the costs of the occupation.
The French delegation to the German armistice delegation for economic
affairs has time and again made personal and written representations on
this point; the question has also been taken up regularly by members of
the French government and their representatives every time they had a
chance to discuss Franco-German problems with the German authorities;
lastly, the French finance minister considered it his duty, in view of
the seriousness of the situation, to make a direct appeal to the German
finance minister.
The French government declared, as soon as it was informed of the
German Government’s demands, that it only agreed under duress to make
payments out of proportion to the obligations accruing to it out of
the armistice agreement; it has protested against the German refusal
to differentiate between occupation and operational troops and against
the rate of exchange imposed between the franc and the mark, which
enabled the German army, by reason of the very low level of French
prices, to effect enormous requisitions in the occupied territory.
Finally, it has proved again and again that the daily payments of 20
million Reichsmarks exceeded the total requirements of occupation and
operational troops, since the sums placed at the disposal of the German
authorities were never sent in their entirety, although they were even
used otherwise than for the expenses of the German army in France
(purchases of goods by the Reich, purchases of stocks and shares, etc.).
These representations remained without effect, and those protests
were never accepted. Only one series of discussions was opened in May
1941; it continued for over three months and had no other result than
the reduction of the daily payments to 15 million Reichsmark and an
admission by the German government that this amount could very well be
reduced a lot more. Even these concessions were made dependent by the
Germans on extremely heavy compensations in the form of transfers which
the French Government only accepted for a limited period and in order
to facilitate an agreement.
More than seven months have gone by and this question is still
outstanding. It is now impossible to put off a decision any longer,
since the effects on French economics and finance of the payments
exacted under occupation costs are now fully visible.
On February 28th, in other words after 20 months of occupation France
will have paid 219,200,000,000 francs and another 9,000,000,000 odd
under the heading of military accommodation costs. Payments for the
year 1942 based on present facts and exclusive of accommodation costs
will reach 110,000,000,000, which is considerably more than the total
fiscal receipts of the French state.
# # # # #
PART 30
Dir. Ha Pol Nr. Buero RAM with the request for further transmission.
Berlin, 10 March 1942
Notes Concerning occupational cost regulation
With the approval of the Reich minister for Foreign Affairs all the
departments took up again the question concerning the occupational
costs.
According to the opinion of all the ministries expressed unanimously,
negotiations with France concerning the occupational costs have become
necessary, because a suspension or diminution of the payments on the
part of the French was to be feared on one hand (Bouthillier-letter)
and because the OKW on the other hand protested again with
determination against the, in July 1941, proposed reduction of the
installments to 10 million RM’s per day because of its current needs in
France.
After careful deliberation of the question, all departments, the Armed
Forces included, took the point of view that the reduction to 10
billion RM’s should not be conceded to the French as a final settlement
on the occasion of new negotiations, but that they should be granted a
breathing spell of about 6 months, from 1 April 1942--1 October 1942,
which should exclude any further discussion of that question until that
date. This is insofar of tactical importance as in that manner the old
amount of the installments of 15 to 20 million RM’s is being maintained
and thereby the important concession of a reduction to 10 million RM as
a political concession is left open.
It has been agreed upon, that:
1. A current transfer from the existing credit amounting to 2 million
RM per day in merchandize and 1 million RM in securities (stocks) and
participation must be insisted upon for the meeting of the so-called
external occupation costs.
2. The French Government should see to it that the expenditures for the
occupational costs figure in the budget in a lawful manner.
3. A general regulation of the absolutely necessary tax-, wage- and
price-reform and other measures for the prevention of the danger of an
inflation must be demanded simultaneously.
The decision proved indisputably that we had no real efficacious
counter-measures at our disposal in the case of an arbitrary suspension
or diminution of the occupational costs by France. To make ourselves
paid by sequestering the bank-note reserve of the Bank of France or
by sequestering French State- or private property would only be of
temporary efficacy, not to mention the political effect of such a
measure of force. This would direct itself very soon against the proper
German interest, because the present efficacious French cooperation in
the execution of great armament orders and the distribution of orders
would suffer strongly by it.
Considering these viewpoints, I ask for the authority to instruct
the German Armistice delegation for economy in Paris to conduct the
negotiations with the French delegation in that sense.
Hereby submitted to the Foreign Minister of the Reich
through the State secretary.
signed: Wiehl
* * * * * * *
PART 32
Draft/KA
Final Copy
SR/17 Oct 1942
Paris, 16 October 1942
Del. W. No. 347 secret RS
1) To the Foreign office Berlin
(in ink) written in eight copies 3 copies of which to Berlin:
1 FRH v. Mahs
1 Int Ley (2)
1 Ambassador-Paris
1 Capt. Brandt
1 Qva
To the decree of 18 September this year--Ha Pol Frie 839/secret and
in connection with the report of 24 August this year--Del.
W. No. 307 secret RS
_Subject_: Occupation costs in France
2 information copies
I. In addition to the suggestions of the German armistice delegation
for economy in its above-mentioned report and for the preparation of
the execution of the decision of the HPA of the 7 September 1942 in the
question of occupation costs, the following suggestions are made:
If one starts out, that because of political and financial reasons
the French government does not find itself ready for the continuous
advance of the occupation cost account above the daily installment of
15 million RM for the purpose of retention of a minimum amount of the
account, because it will mean an increase of the cost of occupation,
then it will depend during the coming negotiation with the French
government upon getting its agreement to the suggestion of the German
armistice delegation for economy, to settle the expenditures, unrelated
to the occupation, which have been paid thus (or from occupation cost
funds, via the clearing, to retain the occupation cost funds for their
proper purpose).
1. In connection with this suggestion, it must be attempted to solve
two questions:
a. One single transfer of a larger amount via clearing to the
occupation cost to equalize at least partly the expenditures, unrelated
to occupation costs, already paid in the first half year of 1942 from
occupation cost funds;
b. Continuous monthly transfer via clearing of funds from Germany,
which are necessary for the settlement of expenditures, unrelated to
occupation costs.
At first it will depend upon making it clear to the French that we
are forced to make a difference between expenditures for occupational
purposes, and expenditures, unrelated to occupation costs. It is yet
to be considered in detail, which instances are to be mentioned to the
French as examples of expenditures, unrelated to the occupation costs.
Without doubt, these will include in the past the funds out of which
the compensations were paid for the requisitioned horses, and in the
future the expenditures for food and fodder deliveries consigned for
Germany. However, there are strong doubts about mentioning the black
market purchases here also. At the end, the only thing to do will
be to justify the distribution to the French by generally military
reasons, which cannot be described in detail. Of course, such a basis
for negotiations makes the accomplishment of the new German demands for
the transfer via clearing of the continuously necessary funds of 150
million RM monthly more difficult, because the French will recognize
that therewith additional purchases of goods outside the contingencies
agreed to are to be paid.
Since the costs of the occupation have increased greatly especially
since the beginning of the year, there is a definite reason to demand
from the French that they also agree for the past to the settlement of
at least a part of the expenditures, unrelated to occupation costs,
in such a form that an amount as big as possible, is paid in via
clearing and transferred by France to the occupation cost account. In
that manner, it could be accomplished that the occupation cost account
will again be replenished by this amount. In the first half year of
1942, 280 million RM have been spent for the purchase of horses, and
600 million RM for the purchase of the Raw Material Trading Co. Ltd.
(Roges). Of course, it will not be possible to get from France the
consent for the transfer of an amount of that size.
In case of the one single payment as well as in case of the future
continuous monthly payments for expenditures, unrelated to the
occupation costs, the French authorities will neither be informed about
the distribution of the accounts, the latter of which are to be paid as
lump sum payments at the end of each month, nor about the purpose.
It is a prerequisite for the settlement, that the procurement of funds
in Reichsmarks is secured in the past as well as in the future.
* * * * * * *
3. This type of settlement of the question of occupation costs secures
the procurement of French funds in a simple practical form, and fits
into the frame of the German-French financial transaction. Naturally,
it amounts to a further considerable financial burden on French
economy; but it does not appear in the form of an increase of the
occupation costs.
The idea to balance this internal account at the final settlement of
the occupations at the conclusion of the peace can be combined at the
same time with the special internal bookkeeping of these expenditures,
unrelated to the occupation costs, separate from other clearing
transfers.
II. The fact that in the meeting of the HPA it was not finally given
up to increase the amount of francs of the installments by change of
the exchange rate, causes the German armistice delegation once more
conclusively to take a standpoint to this question.
* * * * * * *
However, a new evaluation of the Franc by 50% does not lie in the
German interest. The present economical situation of France can no
longer be compared with the one of 1940, where the interior purchasing
power of the Franc was about in the ratio of 1 RM=10 Francs.
* * * * * * *
The account has dropped since 1 July 1942 until 15 October 1942 from
2,476 billion RM to 1,532 RM.
* * * * * * *
/s/ Hemmen
# # # # #
PART 33
Received: 28 October 1942 at 9:40 o’clock from: A. A. Bln by: Buehler
Initials
Incoming stamp:
German Armistice Delegation for Economics
Wiesbaden 28 October 1942 no. 353 g. Rs. Enclosures
From Foreign Office, Berlin
To German Armistice-Delegation for Economics
Paris
Citissime!
Telegram (secret code) No. 307 of 27 October.
Matter to be kept under lock C.
1. For your information: Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs has
ordered, as there might arise political objections against increased
demands from France, more exact explanation how in detail the increase
of daily expenditures for occupation has been brought about, in
particular, who is responsible for the fact that from the account of
occupation costs demands have been satisfied which do not represent
actual occupation costs. OKW, Department of Wehrmacht Budget and
Administration, declare themselves not to be in a position to explain
more fully the use of occupation cost amounts and expenditures
unrelated to occupation costs.
II. Therefore I ask you to contact the bookkeeper of occupation cost
account, get the necessary documents and vouchers and wire back.
What matters is to get a survey of amount and purpose of the issue
of green checks to the various authorities entitled to make demands
[Bedarfstraeger] since the beginning of this year which should easily
appear from the books of the issuing office. Greatest speed is demanded
as these documents are needed for another submission to Reich Foreign
Minister.
/s/ Wiehl
decoded: Buehler
Pencil notes:
1. How large is the part administered by _v. Lenz_? How large is the
part administered by Berlin? Who gives to Roges. To whom else does
Berlin give allotments.
2. How far does Lenz know for that purposes the amounts are used which
he allots to branches of the Wehrmacht, etc.
3. What are green checks?
# # # # #
PART 34
OKW Berlin, 6 November 1942
2 f 32 Beih. 1A WV (XVI)
3145/42 secret
SECRET
To the Foreign Office
Subject: Occupation costs France
Reference: a. Note of the DWFW Del. W. 347 g of 16 Oct 42
b. Meeting of committee for trade policy of 22 Oct. 42 and
30 Oct 42
The Chief Intendant with the military Commander in France has
reported that in the past deliveries have been made amounting to a
total of 90,000,000 RM monthly which could have been paid by way of
the German-French clearing system, because the procured goods were
exported from France. The following figures have been obtained from
the present monthly average of the year 1942 but they can only serve
as a conjecture because the elimination of those goods which were not
procured for the requirements of the units of the German Wehrmacht
stationed in France is very difficult on basis of the available
documents. The following items are involved:
1. Food supply and forage ca. 11 mill. RM
2. Spirits, wine and champagne ” 4 ” ”
3. Red wine for troops ” 0.6 ” ”
4. Canteen goods of all kinds ” 1 ” ”
5. Billeting utensils ” 16 ” ”
6. Tools for vehicles ” 3 ” ”
7. Procurements of ordnance staffs ” 0.4 ” ”
8. Procurements of air force ” 23.5 ” ”
9. Procurements of horses ” 15 ” ”
10. Purchases by Wehrmacht procurement
office ” 4 ” ”
11. Procurements by the departments
North and Pas de Calais ” 5.3 ” ”
12. War risk premiums ” 2.5 ” ”
13. Navy ” 5 ” ”
-----------------
ca. 91 ” ”
These procurements have been transacted at the prices resulting from
the general increase of prices in France. As the procurements were
made for service branches outside of France, payment by way of the
German-French clearing system is permissible as a matter of principle.
Funds of occupation costs have been claimed so far, because the
final customer of the goods in most cases is not known at the time
of procurement. The payment and final entry into the books of these
expenditures is the duty of the procurement office in France.
The amount of 150 mill. RM provided so far for carrying out the flat
clearing process [Pauschalclearingverfahren] with France can be reached
only by including the purchases made by the Roges “Raw Material Trading
Company Ltd.” [Rohstoffhandelsgesellschaft m k H] on the black market.
Objections have been made hereto, because resale of the goods bought
on the black market [“S-Markt”] is practicable only with subsidies to
reduce the prices granted by the Reich Minister of Finances, and it
is irresponsible to incur a commercial debt in the amount of these
subsidies given by the Reich Minister of Finance, in order to procure
goods which bring a considerably lower price than that expended.
Payment of the procurements on the black market should be possible,
however, at least to the amounts _actually_ obtained by the Roges
through resale. The amount of 150 mill. RM would almost be reached
if the Roges were required to transfer by way of the German-French
clearing the proceeds obtained by resale of the goods with exception of
the Reich subsidies for price reduction.
If this settlement should not be practicable carrying out of the flat
clearing process could be restricted to the amount of 90 mill. RM per
month. In this case, the French Government in accordance with the
suggestion of the Reich Minister of Finances of 27 October 1942 should
be obliged to provide in form of occupation costs the surplus amount
missing from the 150 mill. RM.
The excess consumption of occupation cost funds in 1942, as already
thoroughly pointed out in the last meetings of the Committee for Trade
Policy, is primarily due to the decrease in purchasing power of the
franc, and it is to be assumed that this decrease compared with 1940
is at least one third. In addition, payments to a considerable extent
had to be made from the occupation cost funds which were not allotted
to meet the demands of those units of the German Wehrmacht stationed
in France. On 15 January the B account of occupation costs was
approximately _3 bill. RM._ The reason for the decrease appears from
the following compilation:
a for procurement of goods exported from
France during the period of 1 Jan.-31 Oct
1942 an estimated 10 × 90 mill. RM 900 mill. RM
b to Roges Raw Material Trading Company
Ltd. for purchases on black market 700 ” ”
c for procurement of foreign bills by the Navy
(the purchase of foreign bills with French
francs was necessary to buy and repair merchant
ships in Spanish harbors. These merchant
ships are to serve for supplying Rommel’s
Panzer army in Africa) 40 ” ”
d Reimbursement to Foreign Office (account
Syria) 4 ” ”
e Allotments in favor of families of French
workers working in Germany 1.5 ” ”
f Special commissioner Rumania 1.3 ” ”
g Costs of building completions for directors
of French powder factories 0.2 ” ”
---------------
1647 ” ”
Therefrom it appears that the decrease of reserves of occupation cost
funds amounting to 3000 mill. RM on 15 January 1942 is primarily
due to expenditures for purposes unrelated to the occupation. Also
in the above compilation are not included the bills issued by the
Reichskreditkasse imported into France. Of these probably a not
immaterial part has been imported by troop units transferred to
France, but to carry out procurement of goods destined for export
from France. Consequently, it may be assumed that the requirements
of the Wehrmacht units stationed in France up to now could have been
approximately satisfied from the installments of 450 mill. RM made
available every month by the French Government. It is further pointed
out that a considerable part of the above-listed expenditures unrelated
to occupation, in particular the expenditures for purchases on the
black market (S-Markt) and for French food deliveries not destined for
the occupation troops proper, have not been caused by the OKW.
The Chief of the OKW
b. Dr. Kersten
Del. W. 7479
# # # # #
PART 35
Received 4 December 1942
at 16 - - o’clock
from AA Berlin
by Mk.
[Rubber Stamp]
German Armistice Delegation for Economy
Wiesbaden 4 December 1942
No. 399 top secret
Telegram from Foreign Office, Berlin to German Armistice Delegation
for Economy Paris
Citissime
Telegram (Secret, coded, Verf) No. 352 of 4 Dec.
Secret
Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs has ordered the submission of a vote
with reasons, _whether_ the _French potential can bear_ the increase
of occupation cost payments, demanded by us. One must if possible gain
clarification before a decision, whether for instance as result of
black market purchasing actions, a development would be started, which
would lead to Greek conditions.
Request _by return_ that _documents and standpoint, necessary_ for
vote, is wired, if _necessary_ in connection with _military commander_
and _Embassy_.
/s/ Wiehl.
decoded: Buehler
# # # # #
PART 36
Dir. Ha Pol 379 Berlin, 8 December 1942
Note re French occupation costs
Following the note dated 27 November--Dir. Ha Pol 371
According to instructions, I submit in the annex a note of delegate
Hemmen about the financial capacity of the French to pay the increased
expenditure rates of the occupation as well as about the dangers
threatening French finances arising from the payments of occupation
costs and about the methods to meet these dangers. Delegate Hemmen
comes to following conclusion.
1. The increased payments of 25 million RM daily (yearly 182 billion
francs) are bearable and by no means dangerous for the French finances.
The yearly French national income amounted to 432 billion francs for
1942. The daily per capita war expenses are at present in Germany 2.90
RM and thus 6 times as high as in France with 0.40 RM.
2. The danger point for the French finances lies in the fact that
the French government has done nothing until now to counteract the
threatening inflation which is due to the war expenditures, so that
a price increase of 50-60 per cent and a devaluation of the franc of
about one third took place.
3. Therefore it is necessary to raise simultaneously with the demand
for increased occupation costs the demand for effective French
financial, monetary and price regulations and to secure their strictest
execution under German guidance and control.
This result on the whole corresponds to the decisions of the HPA
which were laid down in my former note. As suggested there, it can be
demanded from the French to increase the daily part-payments from 15
to 25 million RM; however, as it has been also suggested there, it
is to be insisted that the measures which are needed against further
price increase should be carried out without delay and in an absolutely
effective way. The investigations which were conducted by the OKW and
by the Reich Ministry for Finance come to the same conclusion.
In doing so, it is not sufficient to leave this to the French
government alone, but we ourselves have to intercede. The nomination of
a special commissioner with similar tasks as in Greece will at present
not be necessary and not even feasible in France, for the simple reason
that it would be unwise to entirely unburden the French government
of its own responsibilities to maintain the order of economics and
finances. But it seems necessary to persuade the French government to
accept a collaboration with one or more German advisors in order to
introduce and carry out the necessary measures. This function could
be assigned to the delegate Hemmen and to his delegation in such a
manner that the negotiations they have conducted until now would be
changed into a collaboration with the corresponding French governmental
agencies. The necessity for this could be presented to the French
government with the double motivation that, as an occupying power, our
interest is not only in that further inflation should be prevented
in France and that we can demand this in our capacity as receiver
of the occupation costs on the basis of the armistice contract, but
that we also have the same interests on account of the far-reaching
interweaving of the French and German industries which was achieved
through mutual free negotiations.
Furthermore, the German side has to do its share that nothing should
happen in the further course which would enhance the inflationary
tendencies in France. I have agreed with State Secretary Koerner that
the Foreign Office and the Four Years’ Plan should most closely follow
further development in this respect and intervene as soon as necessary.
State Secretary Koerner has told me that the Reich Marshal announced
his decision to curb and, if necessary, to stop the black market action
if it should become apparent that it has undesirable consequences in
this respect. Also, further liaison will be maintained by the Foreign
Office with the OKW which has already taken provisions to reduce the
military expenditures to the absolutely necessary minimum in order to
observe permanently this point of view.
In this way both on French as well as on German sides everything will
be done to prevent the possible dangers of the payment of increased
occupation costs.
Herewith submitted via the State Secretary to the Reich Foreign
Minister with the request to approve the planned procedure.
signed Wiehl
Copies to:
Buero Reich Foreign Ministry
St. S
U. St. S. Pol
Dir. Ha Pol
Dg. Ha Pol
Delegate Hemmen
Ha Pol Frie
Ha Pol II a
* * * * * * *
PART 41
12th February 1943
The Head of the Government
[Rubber stamp]
German Armistice Delegation f. Economic Affairs
Wiesbaden, 13 January 1943
No. Del. W. 165
enclosures:
To his Excellency, Monsieur Hemmen, Minister Plenipotentiary German
Armistice Delegation for Economic Affairs
Sir,
On the 15th December 1942 the German government asked me through you
to increase the payments towards the costs of occupation by 10 million
RM (200 million French francs), which would bring the daily total of
payments to 25 million RM, as against 15 millions, or 500 million
French francs as against 300 millions.
During our conversation of the same day, the 15th December, at the
German Embassy, I pointed out to you:
on one hand that these payments exceeded France’s ability to pay;
that they would oblige the French government to cover this increase
by advances from the Bank of France, and would in consequence risk
compromising the French currency irretrievably;
on the other hand that the French payments exceeded the concept of
occupation costs and really constituted a French contribution to the
common defence of Europe;
that, wishing to collaborate and to render effective aid to the German
war-effort under existing circumstances, I accepted these extra
payments.
In formulating your request for an increase, you declared that close
cooperation should be instituted between our two countries, with the
purpose of seeking and applying common measures intended to ensure
the stability of the French currency and of French economy. You
mentioned, on this subject, that the German government would appoint
a plenipotentiary to the French government, whose mission would be to
advise the French government.
I declared myself ready to cooperate closely in the financial field as
in all others, but I formally rejected the appointment of a financial
adviser, as this would undermine the authority of the French government
and risk ruining the confidence of investors.
It is in fact necessary to point out that the daily payments which are
the object of your request of the 15th December for an increase, do not
represent the total of the financial burdens on my country. Besides
these payments, France bears the lodging and billeting expenses of the
German troops in the occupied zone, as well as the advances made for
the functioning of the Franco-German clearing agreement.
I had also pointed out to you, in our conversation of the 15th
December, that a demand from the Italian Government could be expected.
Since then, although the Franco-Italian Armistice Convention does not
put part of the costs of maintenance of the Italian occupation troops
on France, the Italian government has requested advances.
Finally, I consider that the daily payments should, from the day that
they are raised to 25 million RM, i.e., 500 million French francs,
include all obligations falling on France as a result both of the
occupation and of the Clearing agreement, and should take into account
any advances which may eventually be granted to the Italian government.
It has not been possible to hold any conversations since December; I
consider that negotiations on these various points are essential and
should be pursued without delay.
While waiting for these negotiations to end up the necessary agreement,
I inform you that I accept from now, under the conditions I have just
described, a provisional increase in the daily payments as from January
1943, to 25 million RM, i.e., 500 million French francs.
The French government will immediately take steps to meet, on this
basis, the new payments which have been demanded from it, and
particularly to make up the difference in the payment made on the 11th
January 1943 at the old rate.
I am, sir, etc.
[signature illegible]
* * * * * * *
H. Hartlieb I propose a note 2/Nov
Received 2 November 1943 at 1630 o’clock from AA Berlin by Kn.
[Rubber Stamp]
German Armistice Delegation For Economy
Wiesbaden, 2 November 1943
No. 4492
Inclo.
From S Berlin, Foreign Office No. 52 Nov 1617 Etat
To Delegation Hemmen Paris
No. 196=Secret Letter
Reference: _written Decree HA POL FRIE 808 of 28 and 836 of 30
October [penciled note: not yet received] and 838 of 2 November._
All departments concerned attach the _greatest importance_ to the
continued payment of the French occupation cost payment, previously
paid to Italy, because of the condition of the occupation cost and of
the increased demand, which has been caused by the occupation of the
Southern French area, which was up to now reserved for the Italian
armed forces. I therefore request, to demand from the French government
the transfer of all payments promised to Italy, to the Reich. If the
French government should raise any legal objections then I request to
point out without going into legal questions that the German Reich
has taken over the protection of the areas occupied by Italy up to
now. If necessary, certain concessions can be made, according to the
suggestion by the Four Years’ Plan, to which the Reich Minister of
Finance has also agreed, in the question of the additional payment of
2.8 billion Francs for the previous additional demands of the Italians
in the connection with war and occupation damages. The Reich Minister
of Finance requests to point out to the French government also that its
representatives themselves, during the negotiations of the delegate
of the Reich cabinet (Reichsregierung) for economic and Financial
questions, always have entered the Italian occupation costs as debit
items. Request report on the acceptance of your demarche.
Dumont * * *
No. 6 of 2 November 1943 1630 Rec’d Wako Paris Ka † †
* * * * * * *
PART 44
Paris 23 June 1944
_Minister of Finance_
_Minister’s Office_
[rubber stamp]
German Armistice Delegation f. Economic Affairs.
Wiesbaden, 23 June 1944
No. 2126
Enclosures
[rubber stamp]
Minister’s office
Ministry of National Economy
and Finance
Sir,
I have the honour to confirm the conclusions reached in our talk of the
21st June.
The payments towards the costs of occupation, which have till now been
made every 10 days and in advance, will provisionally, to fit in with
present circumstances, be made monthly and in advance, on the 21st of
each month.
On the 25th of June next a settlement will be made, which will cover
the monthly period from the 21st June to the 20th July, taking into
account the payment made on the 21st June. From the 21st July, monthly
payments will be made in advance at the rate previously agreed.
These new regulations for the payments were adopted owing to the
exceptional circumstances which justify the request you addressed to
me in the note of the 19th June. They impose new burdens on the French
Treasury at a time when, as you know, the monetary situation fills me
with the liveliest apprehension.
I therefore count on the system of making the payments every 10 days
being reintroduced as soon as possible.
I am, sir, etc.
[signature illegible]
Monsieur Hemmen Minister Plenipotentiary
President of the German Armistice Delegation for Economic Affairs
* * * * * * *
PART 46
Konzept/Ss _No. 2318_
Paris, 11 July 1944
1. To the Foreign Office Berlin Teletype-C7-(only from to in secret
cipher)
[In handwriting] “Citissime”
No. 87 of 11 July 1944
after cabled order of 8 July No. 71.
I ask for the consent of the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs to
enter negotiations with the French government on the following basis:
1. The OKW demands an increase of the French occupation cost payments
from 25 million RM a day or 750 million RM a month plus 50 million RM
for Italian occupational costs to 33.3 million RM a day or 1 billion RM
per month and proposed to the Foreign Office to instruct my delegation
to enter negotiations with the French Government to that effect. The
RFM (Reich Finance Ministry) and the Four Year Plan agreed to that
demand.
The expenditures for occupational cost have since the beginning of
the year constantly exceeded the income because of the increasing
preparations on the Atlantic coast, made necessary by the war. Those
excess expenditures were covered by using the remaining credits on
the account of occupational costs and by a payment of one month of
occupational costs in advance which we demanded a short time ago.
These expenses increased to an even larger extent during the last few
months, especially since the beginning of the invasion. While they
still amounted to 900 million RM in May, they increased to 950 million
RM in June and will reach 1100 millions in July. All reserves which
were available up to now will be exhausted by the middle of August at
the latest. New means for the conduct of war in France must therefore
be procured until then according to the demand of the OKW.
2. The income of the French Government from Tax-Sources, and mainly the
raising of money through loans and short term bills of exchange has on
the other side decreased considerably since the extensive paralyzation
of the economic life, the industries and the transportation system in
France. The French Government consequently has been forced for the last
few months to use the _advances of money_ of the Bank of France at an
ever-increasing rate. Those advances increased from _about 10 billions_
of F. Frs. to 18 billions of F. Frs. _in May_ and _25 billions_ F.
Frs. in June. The newly demanded payments will also have to be raised
through the use of the bank-note credit, that means, through the
printing of bank notes.
The French Government can on the other hand hardly be surprised,
considering the actual circumstances, if we approach them with the
demand for increased payments.
We know from confidential sources that Laval and Finance Minister
Cathala already expect such a demand.
3. Considering, however, the political necessities and the already
mentioned difficult financial situation of France, and in appreciation
of the fact that the French Government has kept its financial
obligations for 4 years without interruption, I propose the following:
1. to designate the new increase of payments which has now become
necessary, as _temporary_ and to leave open the possibility of our
readiness to reopen negotiations for an eventual re-diminution, as soon
as the military situation in France permits.
2. _Not_ to designate that new demand as an increase of the
occupational costs in the spirit of the Armistice treaty, because
that demand, which was explicitly motivated by the OKW, as to cover
the increased expenses for our conduct of war in France, could
only with difficulty be reconciled with the obligation to pay the
“_cost for the maintenance of our occupation troops_”, as based on
the Armistice-treaty. I recommend rather to present it _as special
contribution of the French Government and the French people_ for the
repelling of Bolshevism (original version reads: “repelling of the
Anglo-Saxon invasion of Europe” but it has been changed in pencil to
read as above) and the defense of Europe. Such a formulation lies in
the political line of Laval and his repeated declarations. This does
not change the fact, that those payments, like the previous increase,
will also be made through the account of occupational costs and will
thus continue to be treated as such.
3. In order to provide _also an exterior character_ to that idea, I
propose to negotiate about a single additional effort of _1 billion
RM_ to be paid in _monthly installments_ of 200 million RM each. At
the expiration of 4 months a further contribution by France could
eventually be negotiated again, according to the then prevailing
military situation.
With the consent of the embassy.
signed: Hemmen.
# # # # #
PART 47
Copy as concept/Ss
German Armistice Delegation for Economics
Paris, 31 July 1944
1. Note for the President of the French Delegation to the German
Armistice Delegation for Economics, Governor de Boisanger.
Mr. President!
Following a special order of the Reich Cabinet, I have the honor to
communicate the following to you:
According to Article 18 of the Armistice treaty the French Government
has to defray the expenses for the support of the German occupation
troops on French soil.
The daily occupation expenditures for the Wehrmacht in France are at
present more than 35 million RM. Since 11 November 1942 the French
Government has paid daily installments of 25 million RM to the
occupation costs. Due to the deficit thus resulting every month the
last reserves from the occupation cost account have been used up in the
meantime as you repeatedly had occasion to notice for yourself. By my
exchange of notes with Minister Cathala on the future monthly advance
payments of occupation costs of 19 and 23 June 1944 the necessarily
resulting insolvencies could be overcome, however, the existing deficit
could not be removed. I therefore request the French Government now to
increase the installments of occupation costs effective on 1 August of
this year to 35 million RM daily.
In accordance with the said exchange of notes of 19 and 23 June
1944--No. 2076--the installments are to be paid monthly in advance on
the 21st of the preceding month. The additional amount of 200 million
RM for the period of 1 to 20 August has therefore become due and is to
be paid before 15 August 1944.
I request you, Mr. Governor, to acknowledge receipt of this note and
to inform me of the orders given by the French Government in order to
carry out the above demand of the Reich Cabinet.
Please accept, Mr. President, the expression of my deepest respect.
s. Hemmen
President
* * * * * * *
PART 49
_By special route via Altkirch_
Belfort, 20 August 1944 No. 2739 IV
_Teletype_
Foreign
_Berlin_
No. 111 of 20 August 1944
In connection with No. 107 of 11 August.
As I reported on 12 August the 8 billion-rate promised by President
Laval for 12 August has finally been paid on time after considerable
difficulties had been overcome (compare my report of 16 August). There
was an unmistakable tendency to put off this payment until after the
approaching bank-holidays to the 16th in the hope that by that time
the development of the military situation would prevent the payment
(American tanks had already been reported in Chartres).
In addition to the increase of occupation cost payments I negotiated
since 7 August upon suggestion of our military agencies with the
Governor of the Bank of France, de Boisanger, about transport for
safeguarding of the large reserves in bills in Paris (60 billion F.
frs.) and Clermont Ferrand (80 billion F. frs.) to eastern France.
Readiness of the Bank of France to do so was undoubtedly present, the
existing transport facilities and the requisite military protection
however extremely slight. A first transport of 25 billion from
Paris to Nancy was scheduled for 12 August; simultaneously also the
installment of 8 billion due on the 12th was to be sent off because
there would be no other transport opportunity for it. This transport
was carried out. For a second transport of 25 billion the military
could no more make available any trucks. Railroads are also out.
Therefore, the German Bank commissioner tried to transfer 10 billion F.
frs. on 2 trucks of the Bank of France in another transport about the
completion of which there is no report yet.
Still greater were the difficulties of transport and protection for the
transfer of 80 billion reserves in bills from Clermont-Ferrand to Dijon
and Lyon, because there direct transport is being obstructed by Maquis
and transport therefore had to be directed via Paris.
Ten billion of these did arrive. Further transports are improbable in
view of the development in the meantime.
* * * * * * *
However, on the morning of the following day, 17 August, I again
negotiated orally with Minister Cathala and Governor de Boisanger
about our demand for increase of occupation costs. Cathala at this
opportunity declared as per order of President Laval that the French
government now definitely refuses the demanded increase for reasons
already stated. I stated that therewith I had to consider our
negotiations as definitely frustrated and therefore reserve subsequent
decisions to my government. As I had learned in the meantime that the
convention in the Bank of France necessary for the installment of 8
billion due on 21 August had not yet been applied for, i.e., that on
the due date new difficulties for the payment had to be expected, I
expressed the definite expectation of the Reich Cabinet that order to
pay the balance will be issued on time by the Ministry of Finances,
Cathala thereupon declared that the French Government for a period
of more than 4 years always fulfilled its obligations promptly. As
long as he functioned as Minister of Finances he always considered it
his special duty to fulfill the obligations contracted by the French
Government; he would act the same way now in case he should still be
in office on the 21 August. By saying so he distinctly alluded to
the pending plans for a change of government and the present serious
situation of President Laval.
* * * * * * *
[Note: The original shows numerous corrections in ink. Translation
followed the corrected version.]
* * * * * * *
PART 51
Copy In the field 7 September 1944
The Military Commander in France
To Distribution
The French government has not yet paid the 2nd September installment
of the occupation costs which were due 21 August. For the securing of
the French for the armed forces, stationed on French soil, I order the
following.
The administrative headquarters [Feldkommandanturen; FK] mentioned in
the distribution, will confiscate at once half of the cash amounts of
francs at the branch of the Bank of France, located at their official
station, and will cause the removal under military guard to the
following Reichskreditkassen: Belfort, Colmar, Muehausen, Strassburg,
Saargemund, and Saarlautern. According to the situation of end of
July, the following cash amounts were with the branches of the Bank of
France: Belfort 698 million francs, Besancon 642, Epinal 853, Luneville
93, Nancy 1,411, Nevers 1,016, Saint Die 181, Vesoul 227.
Furthermore, 2 billion francs in thousand-franc notes are in the vault
of the Bank of France in Nancy or Epinal, which were brought via
transport in the middle of August from Paris to Nancy. Those 2 billion
francs are also to be confiscated and to be removed.
/s/ Kitzinger
General of the Air Force
_Distribution_
(in pencil)
FK Belfort 698
Besancon 642
Epinal 853
Luneville 93
Nancy 1,411
Nevers 1,016
Saint Die 181
Vesoul 227
-----
6,131 : 2 = 3 billion francs
+ 2 billion francs
---------------------
5 billion francs were to be confiscated
Order was forwarded by telephone
* * * * * * *
PART 53
German Armistice Delegation for Economics
Wiesbaden 16 November 1944
No. 2971 Enclosures
Berlin C 111,
7 November 1944
Chief Administration of the Reichskreditkassen
Journal No. 10906/44 Re: Your letter of 12 October 1944 No. II 2846
The French moneys in the amount of frs. 2,931,000,000 deposited with us
by the military commander in France have been accounted for by us with
the Bank of France, Belfort branch, as per our letter of 25 October
1944, photocopy of which is enclosed.
Chief Administration of the Reichskreditkassen
[initials illegible]
To the
German Armistice
delegation for Economics
(12 b) _Salzburg_
Hotel Osterreichischerhof
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1742-PS
The Reichmarshal of the Greater German Reich.
V.P. 18727/6/3
_Distribution_:
Berlin, October 26, 1942
W8 No. 3, Leipziger Street
OKW W.F.St.
OKW Wi Amt,
OKH Gen.St.d.H.
OKW Gen. Qu.
Chef d. Gen.St.d. Luftw.
Reichsfuehrer SS, Ostmin.
Reichsernaehrungsmin.
Chef wi Srab Ost
Gen. Bev. f. d. Arb. Eins.,
Org. Todt,
Reischsarbeitsdienst, Chefgr. Ernaehrung.
Simultaneously with the intensified combating of gang activities,
[Bandentaetigkeit] ordered by the Fuehrer, and with the cleaning up
of the Hinterland in particular that behind the Army Group Middle, I
request that the following aspects are taken into consideration and
that the deductions drawn therefrom are put into practice.
1. During combating of the underground and the combing through of the
areas contaminated by them, all the available _cattle stock_ there,
must simultaneously be driven off to safe areas. _Food supplies_ are
to be evacuated and protected similarly, so that they will no more be
accessible to the bands.
2. All masculine and feminine labour which can be considered for some
kind of employment, must be seized by force and transported to the
plenipotentiary Chief of the Labour Exchange who will employ them in
the safe areas of the hinterland or at home. The accommodation of the
children in the hinterland camps is to be regulated separately.
3. In the execution of the directives outlined under pars 1 and 2,
no regard is to be paid to whether the agricultural or any other
production in these areas will suffer or succumb owing to these
measures. Since up to now these band infested areas have nothing to
show in the way of production anyway, but were directly or indirectly
useful to the bands.
I request all authorities concerned, in as far as it is necessary, in
mutual agreement, to effect the requisites within their spheres of
competence, in order to act according to the directives outlined by me.
About the detailed delimitation of areas an Agreement must be reached
between the various head groups of agriculture of the Economy Offices
[Wirtschaftsdienststellen].
(signed) Goering
attested:
Schwimpe
Registrar of the Ministry.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1743-PS
[Page 1] Economic Operations Staff East
TOP SECRET
Note: Up to mobilization day these instructions are to be treated as
“Top secret”, as of mobilization day open for “Restricted”.
_Guiding Principles for the Economic operations in the newly occupied
Eastern territories_
(Green portfolio)
Section I Assignments and organization of the Economy
Berlin, June 1941 Printed at the Armed Forces High Command
_Introductory remark._ [page 3]
The “green portfolio”, Section I, serves the military leadership and
the Economic offices for orientation in the Economic assignments in
the Eastern territories to be newly occupied. It contains instructions
concerning the supplying of the troops from that land and provides the
guiding principles for the troops to assist the Economy.
The instructions and guiding principles contained in the “green
portfolio” correspond to the military orders issued by the armed forces
high command and the branches of the armed forces.
The Major Economic Assignments
The following executions are first of all intended for orientation
during the course of operations. But they contain simultaneously the
guiding principles, which serve for the duration of the occupation
as a fundamental principle. The Economic arrangements necessary in
the further progress of the occupation will be released as soon as
the great political aim is publicized, which will be determined in
connection with the necessary improvement of the German war Economy.
I. In accordance with the commands given by the Fuehrer, all measures
are to be taken which are necessary, to bring about the immediate and
highest possible exploitation of the occupied territories in favor of
Germany. On the contrary all measures are to be refrained or to be held
back that could be harmful to this goal.
II. The Exploitation of the territories to be newly occupied must be
executed first of all in the realm of food and mineral oil economy.
To gain for Germany as much food stuff and mineral oil as possible is
the main goal of this action. Aside of that order raw materials are
to be transported from the occupied territories for the German War
Economy, insofar as it is technically possible and with a view towards
the production to be maintained outside. As far as kind and amount of
the factory production to be maintained the occupied territory, to be
reconstructed or newly ordered is concerned, this likewise is also in
the very first line to be decided according to the needs, provided by
the exploitation of the agriculture and the mineral oil Economy for the
German War Economy.
For the Economic leadership in the occupied territories the main points
are to be clearly outlined in accordance with this. This is valid with
regards to the main aim as well as for the individual assignments
and those that serve to aid their execution. From that it can be
further concluded, that these assignments, that cannot agree with the
given basic direction toward the goal, respectively those that may
make their retention difficult, must be left out of consideration,
no matter if their individual compilation does appear desirable.
The conception would be totally off the track, if it would come to
the point to uniformly pursue the idea in the occupied territories,
that it can be directly restored to order and reconstructed with the
greatest expediency. The treatment of the individual districts of
the country will have to be on the contrary, entirely varied. Only
those territories must be economically promoted and urgently kept in
order in which considerable food and mineral oils can be rendered
accessible for us. In other sections of the country, which cannot feed
themselves--therefore in big sections of north and middle Russia--the
economic operations must be limited to the available supplies.
Which mobilization factories are to be maintained or reconstructed, is
reserved for later decision.
III. The individual fields consist of the following [Page 4]:
a. Food and agriculture:
1. The main assignment to be accomplished as soon as possible, is the
uninterrupted supply of the German troops, in order thereby to relieve
the supply situation in Europe and to ease the burden on the means of
transport. The entire need of oats for the armed forces is to be taken
care of from middle Russia, the main section for the growth of oats,
insofar as it cannot be obtained from other occupied territories. In
South-Russia it is to be achieved to feed barley and corn instead of
oats.
2. The main weight in procuring of food stuff for the domestic economy
has to be placed on grain and oil fruits. The surplus of the crop
that can be obtained and stocks in the southern territories are to
be secured by all means, the proper handling of the harvest is to be
watched, the removal into agricultural deficient Middle and North
Russia has to be stopped ruthlessly, insofar as exceptions are not
ordered or made necessary in order to feed the troops.
b. The main weight as far as industrial raw materials are concerned,
is to be placed on mineral oil. Under these measures, which do not
serve the food management, all tasks connected with the production and
shipment of mineral oil, will have first priority, by all means. For
the execution of the decrees in the mineral oil field, especially to be
issued for the Caucasus, the Continental Oil Company will be appointed.
* * *
c. The industries which provide for the functioning in the German
interest, of agricultural production in surplus territories, the
production of mineral oil and raw material production, are to be put
into operation immediately.
d. In order to tackle the transportation problem in the German
interest, particular attention is to be paid to
1. Street buildings in South territories and the thoroughfares,
2. The extension of the railroad tracks, especially the building of
two track lines in the most important traffic districts,
3. The improvement of canals, unloading facilities in the inland
waterways, especially in the North and South traffic,
4. Rebuilding of harbor facilities. * * *
Organisation of the Economy [Page 5]
A. General.
The Reichsmarschall has formed the “Wirtschaftsfuehrungsstab Ost”
which is under his immediate jurisdiction and which will be run by
Staatssekretaer Koerner, as his representative, for the uniform
management of the Economy administration in the zone of operations
and in administration districts, to be established later. For the
representation of the military interests, for the preparation and for
the duration of the military operations, the Chief of the War Economy
and Armament Office, General of the Infantry Thomas, has the authority
which he exercises as a Member of the Wirtschaftsfuehrungsstabes Ost.
The directives of the Reichsmarschall include all phases of the Economy
incl. food and agriculture. They will be carried out by the subordinate
economy agencies (see B).
The orders of the “Wirtschaftsfuehrungsstabes Ost” will be transmitted
by the Chief of the Wi Rue office to the advanced “Wirtschaftsstab Ost”
in the occupied territory which will be located during the operations
in the vicinity of the OKH/Gen Qu.
B. Organization of the Economy in the zone of operations.
The subordinate Economy agencies of the “Wirtschaftsstab Ost” are,
as far as they are active in the zone of operation, assigned to the
Command agencies of the Army and militarily under their jurisdiction,
namely:
a. In the rear area of the army:
One each economy inspection team with the Commanders of the army rear
area,
One each of several economy Commands with the security divisions,
One group IV Wi each with the field administration headquarters.
b. in the Army zone:
One each group IV Wi [V.O. Wi Rue Office] with the AOK’s [Army high
commands]
One each group IV Wi with the field administration headquarters, who
have advanced into the Army zone and who are under the jurisdiction
of the AOK’s, also in case of need, economy commands advanced into
the Army zone militarily under the jurisdiction of the AOK’s. * * *
C. Organization of the Economy for the political Administration
districts.
Regulation will follow later by the Reichsmarschall.
The execution of the economic detailed tasks [Page 9].
1. Within the food economy, the procurement of grain and oil containing
plants is the foremost task. All measures for this will be taken with
a view of long duration (bringing in of the harvest, safe storage,
preparation and cultivation of the fields for autumn, to make available
manpower and machines, the seed, fertilizer, throttling of the
consumption of the domestic population. As much use as possible, is to
be made of the setting up of simple community kitchens.)
The supplying of the troops from the land [Page 14].
As far as the troops have to be supplied from the land, attention is
called to the following:
I. Food, Clothes, housing needs and consumer goods.
* * * * * * *
2. The food, housing, consumer goods and Clothes found in the zone of
combat and in the rear areas, are in the first place at the disposal of
IVa in order to satisfy the immediate needs of the troops (notice par.
3).
3. In order to facilitate the possibility of transfer of food stocks
at a later date, the required supplies for the immediate needs of the
troops, are if possible not to be taken from stocks which are in a
general favorable locality for the shipment to Germany. (At railroad
stations and waterways, in harbor, especially baltic harbor, the border
states, in the vicinity of the German borders.)
4. All food, housing, consumer goods and Clothes stocks which have not
been taken over in the zone of combat and the Army rear areas by IVa
and its agencies for the immediate use of the troops, will be put at
the disposal of IV Wi, who thereby will be responsible for the care and
Transfer to the economy agencies next in line.
5. In the Army rear area the economy agencies who are taking over the
preliminary work done by IV Wi will be charged with reconnaissance,
security and care of the food, housing, consumer goods and Clothes
stocks. The assignment to the troops will be made through the Wi
agencies to the permanent local food supply agencies, who will
determine the requirements of all troops of the different branches
and report them to the local competent economy agencies. These will
regulate the supply demands. * * *
II. Fuel and tires.
a. The troops will resort to the stocks found by them.
Only in an emergency can be used:
a. stocks of the gas, water, electricity and mine facilities
b. gasoline and lubricants for farm and vital Industries
c. stocks of the motor tractor stations.
* * * * * * *
War-Booty, Services for pay, Army booty, prize [Page 19].
I. General.
1. Although according to the Hague Convention the entire movable
property of the enemy country can be taken away without compensation,
however for the time being only the movable property of the enemy
army shall be treated as booty. Other movable property of the state
may however be used by the troops in case of need, it is however to
be treated as private property and to be paid for in case of use or
acquisition.
2. The payment is to be made in case of values up to 1000 RM in
Reichskassennotes, amounts exceeding 1000 RM by issuance of receipts.
Receipts may be issued by every agency in the rank of battalion or
higher, unless exceptions have to be made due to a situation of the
fighting or in case different directives have not been given by the OKH.
3. When taking over property for which there is no owner a receipt will
be given to the Senior member of the community or a report will be made
to the field administration headquarters.
4. With the establishment of the Field administration headquarters
[Feldkommandanturen] and the permanent local economy agencies, the
latter will be charged, in connection with the military agencies, with
the procurement and making available the requirements of the troops
from the Economy. In urgent cases the troops may even then secure their
immediate needs independently. If possible, the local competent Field
administration headquarters will be notified in such a case.
Raw materials, Management of goods [Page 23].
An exact regulated production and distribution of goods by
interpolation of special merchandise pools will be out of question
as far as the new territories to be occupied are concerned, with the
exception perhaps of the Baltic states.
* * * * * * *
C. All raw materials, processed and half processed goods, useful to us
will be withdrawn from the market. This will be initiated by IV Wi’s
and the economy agencies through suitable measures such as appeals and
orders, through decrees for confiscation or through military guard or
both.
Money and Credit system [Page 24].
* * * * * * *
2. Gold reserves and foreign currency are to be secured. Further action
will be taken by the Economy command upon notification.
* * * * * * *
5. Reichskreditkassen will be established as soon as possible.
They are personally and in fact under the jurisdiction of the
Chief administration of the Reichskreditkassen in Berlin. The
Reichskreditkassen are charged with the regulation of the Money and
Credit system. They will discharge their duties with Reichskreditkassen
notes which will be issued in 50, 20, 5, 2, 1 and 0.50 RM
denominations. The Reichskreditkassen notes are legal tender along with
the currency of the country. The ratio of the Reichsmark in relation
to the currency of the Country will be fixed through decrees by the
authorities in charge.
The Reichskreditkassen notes serve as well the purpose to keep the
economy of the occupied country intact, as far as this is important
for us in the interest of peace and order, as well as to satisfy and
balance the money requirements of the German troops. The first will
be achieved by granting credits to industrial and other enterprises
also to financial institutions or also to state and district
administrations, if the granting of credits is in the German interest
(compare 3).
The financial institutions of the occupied countries are also to be
induced to open accounts with the Reichskreditkassen.
The Army has been ordered to pay its troops, after they cross the
border, only with Reichskreditkassen notes or with the currency of the
country and to use German change only in the smallest denominations
of 10, 5, 2 and 1 Reichspfenning if the foreign change is not
available. The money in the hands of the soldiers at the time of the
invasion, in the amount of more than 0.50 RM, has to be exchanged
into Reichskreditkassen notes at the nearest Reichskreditkasse by the
Finance office of the troops.
6. The Army has the order to see to it that the soldiers on their
part pay in the occupied territory only with Reichskreditkassen notes
or in the currency of the foreign country at the established rate of
exchange. A decree will be issued in due time to the effect that in the
occupied territory along with the currency of the foreign country, the
Reichsmark in the form of Reichskreditkassen notes will also be a legal
tender and what the rate of exchange will be.
7. The maintenance of the rate of exchange of the Reichskreditkassen
notes is especially important. The way of their acceptance by
the population is therefore carefully to be observed. Should any
difficulties arise of the kind that the population refuses to accept
Reichskreditkassen notes at all or only to another than the fixed rate
of exchange, so if necessary it must be counteracted by punishment. The
Economy agencies will report about such incidents.
To the maintenance of the rate of exchange pertains also that in case
of subscription to forced loans and also when selling merchandise
to the population not only the currency of the foreign country is
demanded, but also Reichskreditkassen notes will be accepted at the
rate of exchange by us.
* * * * * * *
9. The Reichskreditkassen will work in closest cooperation with
the Economy agencies. They have, notwithstanding the fact that
they are under the jurisdiction of the Chief administration of the
Reichskreditkassen, to bring in line their measures with the intentions
of the Economy inspector with regard to the Money and Credit system.
Foreign Trade and Exchange [Page 25].
1. General.
With regard to the question of Trade and Exchange between the occupied
territories and third countries is to be taken into account, that all
surplus of goods are in principle destined for German consumption. So
far as removal is not possible, the goods will be, for the time being,
stocked and secured, and be held ready for later removal. Therefore
trade between the occupied territories and third countries is for the
time being, fundamentally not possible. Directives for carrying on
trade at a later date, with third countries in the interest of Germany,
will be given as soon as the situation is clearer.
* * * * * * *
Price Control [Page 26].
A decree or announcement of a most simple character will prohibit
the raise of prices and other compensations (also wages) and make it
a punishable offense. This is only a temporary solution. A change
of prices which are subject to political conditions will have to be
considered.
For agricultural products, the following rates are fixed, which may not
be exceeded in the occupied territories.
The IV Wi and the economy agencies will take care of their publication.
Food purchases for the troops as well are to be made at the established
prices only.
1. Field products, prices for 1 dz:
Wheat 140 Ruble
Rye 120 ”
100% Grain 145 ”
Barley 110 ”
Oats 120 ”
Corn 100 ”
Peas 160 ”
Millet 100 ”
Buckwheat 130 ”
Potatoes 50 ”
Hay 30 ”
Straw 15 ”
2. Processed Products, prices for 1 dz:
80% Wheat flour 200 Ruble
85% Rye flour 155 ”
Sugar 400 ”
3. Animals (living)
Cattle (for each dz.) 500 Ruble
Hogs (for each dz.) 600 ”
Calves (for each dz.) 250 ”
Sheep (for each dz.) 200 ”
4. Dairy products
Milk (each 1.) 1 Ruble
Butter (each kg.) 44 ”
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1746-PS
Conference between Field Marshal List and Representatives of the
Bulgarian General Staff
(Agreement between Germany, Bulgaria and Rumania for attacking Greece
and eventually Turkey). dated February 8, 1941
[_Page 1, Line 5-14:_]
_Minutes_ of questions discussed between the representatives of the
Royal Bulgarian General Staff and the German Supreme Command--General
Field Marshal List--in connection with the possible movement of German
troops through Bulgaria and their commitment against Greece and
possibly against Turkey, if she should involve herself in the war.
[_Page 1, Line 19--Page 2, Line 24:_]
1. During the operation of the German troops against Greece or Turkey,
the Bulgarian army will not be committed in an offensive way against
the two mentioned countries, according to an agreement between the two
governments. It will be reinforced, in order to safeguard the new order
on the Balkan.
2. Up to the arrival of German troops on the Bulgarian South and
Southeast border, the Bulgarian army will alone defend its territory
with its own troops for the beginning, with about the following
deployment:
at least 6 Bulgarian divisions on the Bulgarian-Turkish border
sufficient forces for the protection of the border, on the Greek
border,
reinforced border protection on the Yugoslavian border
Later on, the Bulgarian army is also responsible for adequate
protection along those fronts where German forces will not become
offensive.
The mobilization and the deployment of these forces may start
immediately in a camouflaged way. However, in order that these measures
will have the desired effect, the deliveries to Bulgaria must be
fulfilled immediately by Germany (enclosure I).
The German supreme command will do everything in its power, so that its
troops will appear on the Bulgarian-Turkish and Bulgarian-Greek border
in sufficient numbers in the shortest time.
For this purpose, from the beginning a sufficient amount of German
forces--mainly armored and motorized divisions--will be moved in the
shortest time behind the Bulgarian border protection troops. This move
will start with the deployment of the two armored divisions which
already are in the Dobrudscha as well as with the armored and motorized
divisions which are in Walachia. The other forces provided for the
operations, that means more infantry and armored divisions, will follow
behind, depending on weather, road, and bridge situation.
[_Page 3, Line 3-12:_]
3. The Bulgarian and the German general staff will take all measures in
order to camouflage the preparation of the operations and to assure in
this way the most favorable conditions for the execution of the German
operations as planned.
The representatives of the two general staffs consider it to be
suitable to inform their governments that it will be good to take
the necessity of secrecy and surprise into consideration, when the
three-power treaty is signed by Bulgaria in order to assure the success
of the military operations.
[_Page 3, Line 13--Page 4, Line 27:_]
4. In order to protect Bulgaria from any possible enemy before and
after the beginning of the operations, the German supreme command will
take the following measures:
a. _Against Turkey_: From the beginning, sufficient German forces,
mainly armored divisions, will be thrown against the Turkish border
behind the Bulgarian defensive front. At the same time, the German air
force will stand ready for active defense.
If Turkey should attack Bulgaria, while the German operations against
Greece are being carried out, the Bulgarian army will defend itself,
supported by sufficient German forces. The German supreme command will
take all necessary measures immediately, in order to beat and throw
back the Turkish army with German troops, so that an extended defense
by Bulgarian troops will be avoided on the Turkish front.
The same also goes for Greece, if the Greeks should attack Bulgaria
during the German operations against Turkey.
b. _Against Greece_: Motorized advance units shall thrust immediately
against the Greek-Bulgarian border as fast as possible, in order to
stand there as support for the protection of the Bulgarian border.
c. _Against Yugoslavia_: If Yugoslavia should attack, the columns of
the German infantry divisions would take over the protection against
the West, at first, which are deployed on the right flank to the rear.
Other German forces would get at Yugoslavia from another side, too. It
is assumed in this case, that a reinforced Bulgarian border protection
exists also along the Bulgarian-Yugoslav border.
d. _Against Russia_: Sufficient German forces are ready on the German
Eastern border, to be used for any purpose. Moreover, German instructor
troops are available in Rumania, in addition to the Rumanian army.
e. _Against landing attempts_: The German troops are in a position
to take a hand at any time in the defense against a possible landing
on the Black Sea coast, in cooperation with the air force. Besides,
the supreme command of the army List will make its suggestions at the
competent German navy office, in order to strengthen the protection of
the two ports Varna and Burgas, according to the already known wishes
of the Bulgarian supreme command.
The Bulgarian army will also do its part to guarantee the protection of
the two ports by providing forces there.
[_Page 4, Line 32--Page 5, Line 27:_]
6. The supply of the German troops on their march through Bulgaria and
during their operations against Greece or Turkey will be provided from
their own German stocks. However, in order to relieve the railroad and
transportation system, especially with regard to feeding facilities,
assistance from the Bulgarian side is necessary. This assistance will
only be within the limits of the so-called “Contingents” [Kontingent].
The details about the installation of the necessary dumps, about
purchases, payment of work, etc., as well as export and import control,
will be regulated by a special commission.
[Remark in pencil] (L IV Is taken care of)
7. It will be necessary to use the Bulgarian national installations
(railroad, postal system, etc.), for the purposes of the German armed
forces, as far as it will be bearable for the Bulgarian economy. The
details about it will be regulated by the special commissions which
are already in Sofia. It is presumed that especially the railroad
net and the rolling stock will be placed at the disposal of the
German army for its requirements. For that purpose it is necessary
that the Bulgarian railroad receives an extra allowance of about 100
locomotives, 1500 freight cars and 30 km rail material, in order to
satisfy all requirements of the Bulgarian army, the Bulgarian economy
and the German army. Operation and management of the Bulgarian national
railroad, postal and telegraphic service are to remain in Bulgarian
hands. Transportation required by the German army will be organized
by the Bulgarian general staff. The details about the service of
the railroads, postal and telegraphic systems will be discussed and
regulated by a special commission.
[_Page 6, Line 6-11:_]
10. The activity of the counter intelligence service [Abwehr Dienst]
of the German and Bulgarian general staffs is already regulated by a
special commission.
11. The question of command function in Bulgaria could not yet be
finally settled. The German high command will come back to this
question in the near future.
[_Page 6, Line 15-26:_]
13. Questions which might come up later will be taken care of by
further conferences.
14. The conditions laid down above, as far as political questions are
concerned, will be in effect only after the approval by the German
supreme command of the armed forces. Nevertheless, the preparations
for the execution of the operations will be made with all energy,
regardless of the above fact.
In order to enable the Bulgarians to carry out in time the last
preparations for the deployment, it is necessary that the Bulgarian
general staff should be informed of the crossing of the border by the
Germans 10 days ahead of time.
Finis
PART II Conference of Hitler and the German High Command _on the
situation in Yugoslavia. Dated March 27, 1941_
[_Page 1--Page 4, Line 13:_]
W F St
Berlin, March 27, 1941
Top Secret
1st copy W F St
_2nd copy L_
3rd copy W Kr G
Only for general officers
To be transmitted by officers only.
_Discussion about the situation in Yugoslavia_
[stamp] [several pencil
marks and initials]
OKW/W F St Dept L (I M I) 29 March 1941
No 44391/41 top secret
Present:
Fuehrer
Reich Marshal
Chief OKW
Chief W F St
Major General Bodenschatz
Colonel Schmundt
Commander von Puttkamer
Lieutenant-Colonel Scherff
Major von Below
Major Christian
Later on the following persons were added:
Supreme commander of the army (Ob.d.H.)
Chief of the General staff of the army (Chef Gen St d H)
Colonel Hensinger
Lieutenant-Colonel Sieverth
Reich Foreign Minister
Ambassador Hewel
Brigadier General (Gen.Maj.) von Waldan
Colonel Schmidt
Brigadier General (Gen.Maj.) von Rintelen.
_The Fuehrer_ describes Yugoslavia’s situation after the coup
d’etat. Statement that Yugoslavia was an uncertain factor in
regard to the coming Marita-action and even more in regard to the
Barbarossa-undertaking later on. Serbs and Slovenes were never
pro-German. These governments never sit securely in the saddle, because
of the nationality problem and the officers caste (Kamarilla), which
is always inclined to start a coup d’etat. In the present time, the
country had only one strong man, namely Stojodinowitsch, and Regent
Prince Paul had him thrown over, to his own disadvantage.
The present moment is for political and military reasons favorable for
us to ascertain the actual situation in the country and the country’s
attitude toward us, for if the overthrow of the government would have
happened during the Barbarossa-action, the consequences for us probably
would have been considerably more serious.
The Fuehrer is determined, without waiting for possible loyalty
declarations of the new government, to make all preparations in order
to destroy Yugoslavia militarily and as a national unit. No diplomatic
inquiries will be made nor ultimatums presented. Assurances of the
Yugoslav government which cannot be trusted any how in the future will
be taken note of. The attack will start as soon as the means and troops
suitable for it are ready.
It is important that actions will be taken as fast as possible. An
attempt will be made to let the bordering states participate in a
suitable way. An actual military support against Yugoslavia is to be
requested of Italy, Hungary, and in certain respects of Bulgaria too.
Rumania’s main task is the protection against Russia. The Hungarian and
the Bulgarian ambassador have already been notified. During the day, a
message will still be addressed to the Duce.
Politically, it is especially important that the blow against
Yugoslavia is carried out with unmerciful harshness and that the
military destruction is done in a lightning like undertaking. In this
way, Turkey would become sufficiently frightened and the campaign
against Greece later on would be influenced in a favorable way. It can
be assumed that the Croats will come to our side when we attack. A
corresponding political treatment (autonomy later on) will be assured
to them. The war against Yugoslavia should be very popular in Italy,
Hungary, and Bulgaria, as territorial acquisitions are to be promised
to these states; the Adria coast for Italy, the Banat for Hungary, and
Macedonia for Bulgaria.
This plan assumes that we speed up the schedule of all preparations
and use such strong forces that the Yugoslav collapse will take place
within the shortest time.
_In this connection, the beginning of the Barbarossa-operation will
have to be postponed up to 4 weeks._
The military operations are to be carried out in the following way:
1. Begin the operation Marita as early as possible with the limited aim
to capture Greek-Thracia and the basin of Saoloniki and to win the high
terrain of Edessa; for that purpose march [Ausholen] across Yugoslav
territory.
2. Push from neighborhood South of Sofia in direction Skoplje in order
to relieve the flank of the Italian front in Albania.
3. Push with stronger forces from the area around Sofia in direction
towards Nis, then towards Belgrad, in cooperation with
4. Stronger German forces penetrating from the area around Graz and
Klagenfurt in direction South-East with the aim to destroy the Yugoslav
army.
[_Page 5, Line 3-9_:]
5. The main task of the airforce is to start as early as possible with
the destruction of the Yugoslavian airforce ground installations and to
destroy the capital Belgrade in attacks by waves; besides the air force
has to support the advance of the army.
For this purpose, it is possible to make use of the Hungarian ground
installations.
[_Page 6, Line 7-12_]
_The Fuehrer_ orders the immediate starting of all preparations. He
expects the plans of the different parts of the armed forces during the
evening of March 27th. General von Pintelen is ordered to receive the
message and verbal orders from the Fuehrer during the night of March 27.
[illegible pencil initial]
* * * * * * *
PART V
Subject: Tentative plan for the coordination of the German and Italian
operations against Yugoslavia. Dated: March 28, 1941
The Chief of the operational staff of
the Armed Forces of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces.
Berlin, March 28, 1941
[in pencil] Handed over to Gen. von Rintelen on March 28, 1941 at 4 P.
M.
Only for general officers
To be transmitted by officers only
KW/W F St [Stamp] [several pencil marks]
Tentative Plan for the coordination of the German and Italian
operations against Yugoslavia.
1. In the event that the political development requires an armed
intervention against Yugoslavia, it is the German intention to attack
Yugoslavia in a concentric way as soon as possible, to destroy her
armed forces, and to dissolve her national territory.
2. For this purpose, the following units are being formed:
a. One assault group South of Sofia for the advance in direction
Skoplje and South, in order to occupy the Southern part of Yugoslavia
as basis for the combined attack against Greece and to remove the
danger for the rear of the Italian front in Albania.
b. One assault group which will be deployed around Graz and under
certain circumstances also in the Southwest Hungary, in order to
penetrate into Yugoslavia later in the direction Belgrad and Westward.
c. Probably an Hungarian attack group reinforced by German forces which
will be committed in the general direction towards the Danube on both
sides of Belgrad.
3. If the weather situation permits, the operation against Greece will
start on April 2nd or 3rd. In this operation, the right flank will
move across Yugoslavian territory. In the beginning, its aim will be
limited to the occupation of the basis of Saloniki and the high terrain
of Edessa.
4. Therefore, the following tasks result for the participation of the
Italian armed forces:
a. Flank protection for the German attack group Graz by advancing
towards the line Split-Yajele, with forces as strong as possible.
b. Shifting to the defense on the Greek-Albanian front and deployment
of an attack group, in order to join with the German forces committed
around Skoplje and South.
c. Elimination of the Yugoslav naval forces.
d. Later on, resumption of the attacks against the Greek front in
Albania.
For the inner-political integration of the Yugoslav national territory
it is especially desirable to favor the Croat independence movements
in every respect and to treat the Croats as friends of the Axis. It
will therefore be opportune to avoid any air attacks against Croat
territory, as long as it is not a question of commitment against enemy
troops fighting there.
5. The following chronological schedule of the German operations may be
expected:
a. Attack against Greece: April 2nd-3rd
b. Attack from the area South of Sofia on April 3rd or April 4th
c. Attack from the area around Graz and East of it: April 12th.
[illegible initial]
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1751-PS
SECRET
SS Main Office Economy Administration [SS Wirtschafts-Verwaltungs
Hauptamt]
Department Chief [Amtsgruppenchef]
Concentration Camps Dramenburg, 12 May 1944
DI/Az,:14 h 2/Na/s-
Geheim Tgb-Nr. 605/44
Re: assignment of prisoners for experimental purposes
To the Camp Commanders of Concentration camps Da, Sah, Bu, Mau, Flo,
Neu, Au.I III, br-Ro, Natz, Stu, Rav, Herz, Aufenth, Camp Bergen,
Belsen
Group leader D Riga, one copy each for KL Riga, Kauen, Vaivara
SS Wirtschafter Ost, Krakau with one copy each for KL Lublin,
Warschau and Plaszow.
There is cause to call attention to the fact that in every case
permission for assignment has to be requested here _before_ assignment
of prisoners is made for experimental purposes.
To be included in this request are number, kind of custody, and in
case of aryan prisoners, exact personal data, file number in the Main
Reich’s Security Office and reason for detainment in the concentration
camp.
Herewith, I explicitly forbid assignment of prisoners for experimental
purposes without permission.
[signature illegible] (Waffen)
SS Lt Gen and Lt Gen of the SS
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1752-PS
SECRET
_Preparations already made for the International Congress_
Reichsleader Alfred Rosenberg received the order from the Fuehrer to
stage an anti-Jewish congress. The date for this congress was fixed for
11.7. after a discussion, and after the corresponding preparations had
been made.
The following preparations for the congress have been undertaken:
1. In Germany.
2. abroad.
1. _Preparations in Germany._
a. The financing of the congress has been taken on by the Reich
Treasury of Chief, Schwarz. Further, after the Fuehrer had decided on
Cracow as the site of the congress, Reich Minister and General Governor
Frank has taken over all the costs that arise within his General
Government.
b. _The site of the meeting._
All negotiations concerning billeting, feeding and welfare of the
guests, the lecture rooms etc. have been readily settled with the
offices of the General governor. (Instead of Cracow, a place that is
safe from air raids, for instance Zakopane, can be selected at any
time.)
c. The program of lectures has been discussed with the appropriate
offices,
1. Foreign Office
2. Propaganda Ministry
3. Head Office for internal security
and has met with general approval. The Reich Foreign Minister as well
as Reich Minister Dr. Goebbels have given their assent to the program.
d. German speakers and lecturers have been visualized, among others
three German Ministers. The promise of these three gentlemen to attend
seems certain. Some lectures are already on hand.
The final preparations, those for the cultural extra items on the
programme, have been taken in hand. (See the letter from Reichsleader
Rosenberg to Reichsleader Bormann concerning the appearance of the
Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra, with Furtwaengler as conductor.)
Even the formation of international organisations for investigating and
combatting Jewry, which have been provided for in connection with the
congress, have been brought about, and scientific presidents of the
organisations have been earmarked. Some individual personalities have
already been approached. Amongst others we already have the promise of
Geheimrat Professor Dr. Eugen Fischer to be president of the European
organisation for the “racial-biological questions of Jewry”.
e. The following have been entered as honorary members:
Reich Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop
Reich Minister of the Interior and Reichsleader of the SS Heinrich
Himmler
Reich Minister Dr. Goebbels
Reich Minister and Governor Dr. Frank
2. _Preparations abroad_
The Foreign Office has accepted the task of contacting the prominent
European people, with the exception of a few of the occupied
territories in Europe, via its representatives abroad.
The German representatives abroad have received several official
instructions, according to which they are
a. to propose delegates to be invited,
b. nominate lecturers,
c. approach the representatives of governments with a view to their
participating at the congress.
In the course of these instructions being carried out, the
following have promised their participation, or membership of the
congress-committee and membership of the honorary committee:
Italy: Minister for National Enlightenment Mezzasoma (honorary
committee)
The former Minister of State Preziosi (congress-committee and
congress lecturer)
France: Minister for Education Abel Bonnard (Honorary committee)
Secretary of State Paul Marion (congress-committee)
Hungary: Minister for the Interior von Jarossh (honorary committee
and congress lecturer)
Holland: The leader of the NSB, Mussert (Personally invited by
Reichsleader Rosenberg during the latter’s stay in Holland)
Arabia: The Grand Mufti of Jerusalem (honorary committee and congress
lecturer)
Iraq: Prime Minister Gailani (honorary committee)
Norway: At the present moment a representative of Reichsleader
Rosenberg has arrived here, in order personally to convey
an invitation to Prime Minister Quisling to attend the
congress.
Contacts have also been established with countless other countries. For
the time being the promises to attend of the prominent representatives
are not yet at hand. On the other hand promises have been received from
delegates from Sweden, Roumania, Slovakia and illegal delegates from
Switzerland, Spain and Portugal. Further the office of General in the
SS Berger has undertaken to invite renowned leaders of the Germanic
volunteers in the SS to take part in the congress. Amongst others,
Britons and Americans are visualised in this connection, who are also
willing to speak.
The occupied eastern territory is included via the Ministry for the
East. A number of promises to attend have been received from renowned
personalities in this territory. Lectures have already been received
from foreign speakers, amongst others from the former Minister of State
Preziosi.
3. Reason for the importance of the Congress at the present time. The
reports from outside Germany and the anti-German allied propaganda try
to make believe beyond all doubt that the whole war is being kindled by
the other side more and more as a crusade, because the German nation
plans to destroy the “Jewish People”.
The Soviet Union: We refer to the pro-semitic Molotov-congress in
Moscow.
U.S.A.: We refer to permanent session of the Jewish Congress.
The _last new_ beginning 6. 5. 1944.
England: We refer to the English failure to pay attention to their own
White Paper regarding Palestine problem.
At the same time, we point out the slowly rising anti-Semitic feeling
in the countries of our opponents. It seems necessary that the feeling
caused by enemy propaganda that National Socialism is retreating on all
fronts, be refuted by this great anti-Jewish Congress.
The invasion army is not fighting against the barbarian Germany of
annihilation of Jews but it is fighting for world Jewry!
What kind of propaganda is being duly turned out on the German side?
To give up this plan or to postpone this International Congress _to an
indefinite date_, after half of Europe has already been won for this
plan would support or strengthen the propaganda conducted against us.
It must be borne in mind that not a German authority but an
international assembly is responsible for the Congress and issues
invitations to it.
The preparations for the Congress have so far progressed with the
greatest possibilities of disguise.
An arrangement, which has been made on general lines, mentions only an
International historic and scientific congress taking place in a Town
in the East of the Reich.
Berlin, 15th June 1944.
Hg/We
/s/ Hans Hagemeyer,
Head of the Department.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1757-PS
_REPORT OF GOERING’S COMMISSION_
for the investigation of the Aryanisations carried out in the Gau of
Franconia between 9.11.38 and 9.2.39 and the irregularities connected
therewith which have been established
[P.9] k. By an order of the Reich Chancellor of the Exchequer of
the 2nd September 1938, No. 57/38, issued with the agreement of the
Fuehrer’s deputy, all party offices, including organisations and
attached formations, are forbidden to accept administrative dues,
donations, gifts, bequests or material payments of any other kind
for the participation of the party in economic tasks, including the
transfer of Jewish firms to persons of German race, nor are they
allowed to make the fulfillment of such tasks dependent on the payment
of contributions, etc. The order was addressed to all Gau treasurers
and reached the Gauleaders as well, among others.
[P.12] From the course of events one can only assume that the Reich
Chancellor of the Exchequer’s order of the 2nd September 1938 No. 57/38
about the ban on financial payments for the cooperation of the Party
in Aryanisation and other economic tasks was considered in Franconia
to be superseded, and that they thought themselves entitled to obtain
considerable sums of money for the Gau of Franconia in connection with
Aryanisation.
[P.13] l. Following upon the November demonstrations, the deputy
Gauleader, Holz, took up the Jewish questions. His * * * reasons can be
given here in detail on the basis of his statement of the 25th March
1939:
“_The 9th and 10th November 1938._ In the night of the 9/10 November
and on the 10th November 1938 events took place throughout Germany
_which I considered to be the signal for a completely different
treatment of the Jewish question in Germany_. Synagogues and Jewish
schools were burnt down and Jewish property was smashed both in shops
and in private houses. Besides this, a large number of particular
Jews were taken to concentration camps by the police. Towards midday
we discussed these events in the Gauleiter’s house. All of us were of
the opinion _that we now faced a completely new state of affairs on
the Jewish question_. By the great action against the Jews, carried
out in the night and morning of the 10th November, _all guiding
principles and all laws on this subject had been made illusory_. We
were of the opinion (particularly myself) that we should now act on our
own initiative in this respect. I proposed to the Gauleiter that, in
view of the great existing lack of houses, the best thing would be to
put the Jews into a kind of _internment camp_. Then the houses would
become free in a twinkling and the housing shortage would be relieved,
at least in part. Besides that, we would have the Jews under control
and supervision. I added “The same thing happened to our prisoners of
war and war internees.” The Gauleiter said that this suggestion was,
for the time being, impossible to carry out. Thereupon I made a new
proposal to him: I said to him _that I considered it unthinkable that,
after the Jews had had their property smashed they should continue to
be able to own houses and land_. I proposed that these houses and this
land ought to be taken away from them, and declared myself ready to
carry through such an action. I declared that by the Aryanisation of
Jewish land and houses _a large sum could accrue to the Gau out of the
proceeds_. I named some millions of marks. I stated that in my opinion,
this Aryanisation could be carried out as legally as the Aryanisation
of shops. The Gauleiter’s answer was something to this effect: “_If you
think you can carry this out, do so. The sum gained will then be used
to build a Gau school._” The very same afternoon I began to organize
the Aryanization of land. I stated here as in my memorandum, too, _that
I considered this Aryanisation of Jewish land as a logical continuation
of the events of the 9th and 10th November_. I was of the opinion that
I was doing a service to the Party by trying to bring it money. I was
further of the opinion _that the transfer of the land and houses from
Jewish to German hands was a National-Socialist action_.”
[P.16] Holz appointed commissioners for Nurnberg and Furth to carry out
the Aryanisation of Jewish landed property * * *
[P.18] 2. The Aryanisation was accomplished by the alienation of
properties, the surrender of claims, especially mortgage claims, and
reductions in buying price.
The payment allowed the Jews was basically 10% of the nominal value
or nominal sum of the claim. As a justification for these low prices,
Holz claimed at the Berlin meeting of the 6th February 1939 that the
Jews had mostly bought their property during the inflation period for a
tenth of its value. As has been shown by investigating a large number
of individual cases selected at random, this claim is not true.
[P.70] Favoritism shown to third parties and irregularities during the
Aryanization of properties.
[P.72] _Schoeller case._ c. Gauamtsleiter Fritz Schoeller bought
_Grimmstrasse 3, Nurnberg_ by a contract of the 15th November 1938.
The house has a nominal value of RM 43,300 and an exchange value of
RM 50,000. The buying price was fixed at RM 5,000. Holz admitted
(statement of the 27th March 1939) that he was in agreement with
the buying of the property. He based his agreement on the fact that
Schoeller was an old and deserving party member and deserved particular
consideration owing to his family circumstances.
Report of German Commission to Goering on Streicher. [Extract from Part
II]
[P. 139] On the other hand, the minority of the shares of the
Mars-Werke, Nurnberg, with a face value of Reichsmark 112,500, were
acquired through publishing house manager Fink for the Gauleiter
according to the latter’s instructions at the instigation of the
deceased SA Brigadier General Koenig. These shares were in the
possession of the Jewish banking house Kohn, the proprietor of which
was at that time in protective custody. Verlagsdirektor Fink, as agent
for the Gauleiter, acquired the parcel of Mars-Werke shares from this
Jew at 5 per cent of the face value, i.e., the sum of Reichsmark 5,600.
In the presence of Fink, Koenig informed the Gauleiter in detail of
the completed transaction. The Gauleiter gave his complete assent and,
in addition, gave the order to transfer the parcel of shares from the
account of the banking firm Kohn to the account of Fink at the Dresdner
Bank. He further ordered that his name should not be mentioned at all
in connection with the transaction.
By order of the Gauleiter, Fink withdrew Reichsmark 5,600 from a
Stuermer account, and later, also acting for the Gauleiter, he bought
the remainder of the shares of the Mars-Dresdner Bank, at 60 per cent
for the Gauleiter with Stuermer funds.
After Fink learned of the investigating commission he discussed the
matter with Gauleiter Streicher. Streicher told Fink that he would keep
the shares, because they had no connection with the Aryanization of
estates, and if the purchase of the Mars shares should be contested he
would simply pay over the required sum to the Reich.
After the investigating commission had started to work Gauleiter
Streicher sent for Fink and told him the following: “The police have
found out about the Mars shares. We will simply say that the shares
were not bought for me but for the Fraenkische Tageszeitung!!” [P. 145]
Thanks to the efforts of the district economic adviser and president
of the chamber of commerce Strobl, it was possible to persuade the
Hungarian consul Pfaller to buy the estate of the Gauleiter on Lake
Constance without ever having seen it, for a price of Reichsmark
240,000. It is noteworthy that the Gauleiter and people close to him
had a very bad opinion of Consul Pfaller, but after the purchase of
the estate the Gauleiter sent him a picture. In order to avoid the
Gauleiter’s appearing personally as the seller, a sham contract was
made with publisher Willmy, so that the latter would appear to the
outside world as the seller of the estate.
[P. 152] Gauleiter Streicher likes to beat people with a riding whip,
but only if he is in the company of several persons assisting him.
Usually the beatings are carried out with sadistic brutality.
The best known case is that of Steinruck, whom he beat bloodily in
the prison cell, together with deputy Gauleiter Holz and SA Brigadier
General Koenig. After returning from this scene to the “Deutscher
Hof” he said: “Now I am relieved. I needed that again!” Later he also
stated several times that he needed another Steinruck case in order to
“relieve” [erloesen] himself.
In August 1938 he beat editor Burker at the district house, together
with district office leader Schoeller and his adjutant Koenig.
On 2 December 1938 he asked to have three youthful criminals (15 to 17
years old) who had been arrested for robbery brought to the room of the
director of the criminal police office in Nurnberg-Fuerth. Streicher,
who was accompanied by his son Lothar, had the youths brought in singly
and questioned them about their sex life and in particular, through
clear and detailed questioning, he laid stress on determining whether
and since when they masturbated. One of the youths did not know the
word, whereupon Streicher gave him a vivid description. The last one of
these three boys he beat with his riding whip, with blows on the head
and the rest of the body.
[P. 151] From 1934 to 1938 Gauleiter Streicher employed the Jew Jonas
Wolk as contributor to the Stuermer. Wolk wrote for the Stuermer under
the pseudonym of “Fritz Brandt”. In addition, Wolk did spy work for
the Gauleiter abroad. From February 1937 to August 1938 the Stuermer
paid the Jew Wolk a fee of Reichsmark 8,262.39. Wolk was previously
convicted six times, among other things with loss of civic rights.
It is especially significant that Streicher had the Jew Wolk paid
by the Fraenkische Tageszeitung from 1934 to 1937. The Fraenkische
Tageszeitung paid Wolk the sum of Reichmark 9,623.65.
[P. 160] According to the statement of the district treasurer
[Gauschatzmeister], his financial adviser, and several other persons,
Streicher is regarded as extremely brutal. The statements made by
Verlagsdirektor Fink are especially significant. He declared that he
was convinced that the Gauleiter would have him bumped off one of these
days, as soon as he found out that Fink had told the truth to the
investigating commission.
[P. 161] According to reports of reliable witnesses, Gauleiter
Streicher is in the habit of pointing out on the most varied occasions
that he alone gives orders in the district of Franconia. For instance,
at a meeting in the Collosseum in Nurnberg in 1935 he said that nobody
could remove him from office. In a meeting at Herkules Hall, where
he described how he had beaten Prof. Steinruck, he emphasized that
he would not let himself be beaten by anybody, _not even by an Adolf
Hitler_.
[P. 166] For, this also must be stated here, in Franconia the Gau acts
first and then orders the absolutely powerless authorities to approve.
[P. 172] In general it is to be said that Koenig was regarded as the
evil spirit in Franconia. In an unheard-of-manner he tyrannized the Gau
leader, the authorities and the population, and he knew how to make
the influence of his power felt everywhere. Koenig’s word carried the
weight of that of the Gauleiter.
[P. 174] In favor of Strobl [pencil note: Director of the AEG,
Gau economic adviser, and president of the Chamber of Industry
and Commerce] it must be said that he, in contrast to almost all
other defendants, immediately told the truth on all points in his
interrogations. It is primarily thanks to him that clearness was
quickly reached in many cases which could be verified.
As an excuse for his incorrect acts Strobl states that he like all
other persons in the Gau of Franconia was to such an extent under the
pressure of Gauleiter Streicher and his adjutant Koenig that he would
never have dared to do anything against the orders of the two men
mentioned.
[P. 179] By the law of April 1938 it is decreed that all applications
for Aryanization shall be submitted to the competent Gauleiter. From
that time on Strobl submitted the applications, which he had up to
that time handled by himself, to the adjutant of the Gauleiter, SA
Brigadier General Koenig for approval. He makes the excuse that it had
been the practice in Franconia for the adjutant to take care of almost
all matters as agent for and deputy of the Gauleiter. Every order of
Brigadier General Koenig was equivalent to an order of the Gauleiter.
COPY OF DOCUMENT 1759-PS
United Mexican States }
Mexico, Federal District }
Embassy of the United } ss
States of America }
}
Mexico City, D. F. }
} ss
Mexico }
Raymond H. Geist, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
I came to Berlin in December, 1929, as Consul and continued in that
capacity, exercising my official functions until the end of 1939. In
1938 I was appointed First Secretary of the Embassy and continued in
that office discharging at the same time my duties as consul. During
the entire period of ten years my work was of such character that
I frequently came into contact with many officials of the German
Government. After the Nazis came to power in 1933, these contacts
increased owing to the much more frequent occasions on which it was
necessary to intervene with German officials in order to protect the
rights of American citizens and their properties. During this period I
not only had many official contacts but also friends and acquaintances,
both in Berlin and elsewhere in Germany. My work permitted and
occasionally required travel in Germany. It was my custom to make
bicycle trips, as well as excursions by automobile to various points
particularly in the environs of Berlin, often to the extent of fifty
miles. Although I do not have the first-hand information with regard
to developments under the National Socialists for all of Germany that
I have regarding the neighborhood of Berlin, I saw enough during my
excursions, and was told enough by friends and acquaintances to know
that the activities hereafter described in and around Berlin were being
substantially duplicated all over Germany.
There were indeed few military establishments in the neighborhood of
Berlin in 1929 and until 1933 there were the Casernas at Potsdam and
the military establishment at Doeberitz. After the Nazis came to power,
military establishments of all sorts grew up with enormous rapidity.
Before the end of 1933, during my frequent excursions, I discovered
outside of Berlin on nearly every road leaving from the city new large
military establishments, including training fields, airports, barracks,
proving grounds, anti-aircraft stations and the like. For these
establishments most of the ground was broken during the year 1933;
there were probably fifty within the immediate vicinity of Berlin.
Most of these establishments were being openly prepared, nevertheless
they were under guard. It was apparent with respect to others that an
attempt was made to preserve secrecy. I recall in particular that the
large anti-aircraft station near my house in the Gruenwald was built
under secrecy, likewise a munitions dump burrowed in the hills of
Wildpark near Potsdam was also built under secrecy. Being disguised as
a German and speaking the language, I was able on my bicycle trips to
penetrate certain of these establishments where at various times I saw
military exercises, including the use of tanks, in various maneuvers.
I recall from my travels beyond Berlin and the information and reports
which I had from friends and acquaintances that the same feverish
preparations were in progress throughout the length and breadth of
Germany, in fact, all establishments which could serve a military
purpose were converted to military uses.
I also saw the preparations being made for building up the new army. I
visited the camps of the compulsory labor service, the _Arbeitsdienst_,
which was well under way by the end of 1933, with camps established
all over Germany. Though this was ostensibly a labor service, it was
essentially military in character, as is well known. I saw the men
working on reclamation projects and was informed that they worked two
hours in the morning and two hours in the afternoon, the balance of
the time being spent in military tactics and in instruction in Nazi
ideology. So that when conscription went into effect in 1935 through
the medium of these camps, it was possible for the Germans to put a
trained army of at least 3,500,000 men, which formed the nucleus of the
future army of aggression.
Particularly through the years 1933 and 1934 the hordes of storm
troopers SA were much in evidence practicing military exercises.
They were being converted into a military organization. I frequently
encountered the storm troopers deployed in fields and in forests
engaged in military technical exercises. This was all the part of a
general plan to prepare Germany’s manpower for war.
I witnessed, too, scores of times, the training of the Hitler Youth,
which included boys from 14 to 17, who dressed in their uniforms, were
likewise generally in evidence wherever I chose to travel. I frequently
saw them in the woods near Berlin, deployed in ravines, in fields,
woods and hillsides staging mock attacks, employing the technique of
actual maneuvers. Frequently they were under the direction of uniformed
leaders and at times under officers of the Reichswehr. This type of
training of the youth extended everywhere in Germany. Frequently my
route of travel had to be changed in order not to find myself in the
midst of some maneuvers which required the use of roads or paths along
which I was riding. It was not considered wise to get too close to
these operations, particularly if they were on an extensive scale.
The _Deutsche Jungvolk_ (boys from the ages of 6 to 14) was also the
vehicle for military training. They were also in evidence throughout
the country. I frequently met them marching. I saw them engaged in
military exercises in the school yards during the school recesses,
particularly throwing hand grenades usually under expert adult
leadership. Often I have seen these children in large numbers engaged
in what were obviously military maneuvers, and under the direction of
adult uniformed officers.
I had occasion, at times, to witness the organizations which were
created for the girls that were part of the Hitler Youth and were
also incorporated in the so-called _Arbeitsdienst_, usually located
somewhere near the camps for men. The resultant illegitimate children
were a definite planned result of the program; they were part of the
manpower and the army for the next generation. The shame and the grief
of parents over this program fostered and urged by the Nazis although
it existed, was seldom openly expressed on account of dangers to which
the parents might expose themselves.
So far as the youth were concerned, the entire program was carried
on with lavish propaganda and enough benefits to the participants to
make it extremely popular. The Nazis provided the youth with special
trains, special trucks, special bathing beaches, food and other
privileges. At the same time, the semi-hysteria which was maintained
about the whole National Socialist program made it impossible for
parents or anyone else to speak against it even if they had wished to
do so. The German people were well acquainted with the goings on in
concentration camps and it was well known that the fate of anyone too
actively opposed to any part of the Nazi program was liable to be one
of great suffering. Indeed, before the Hitler regime was many months
old almost every family in Germany had had first-hand accounts of the
brutalities inflicted in the concentration camps from someone either in
the relationship or in the circle of friends who had served a sentence
there; consequently the fear of such camps was a very effective brake
on any possible opposition.
In addition to what I saw during these many years with my own eyes
regarding the preparation and the building of a huge armed force,
I received reliable information from trustworthy sources as to its
scope and strength. One of my close friends in Berlin was one George
Graffenstein, who lived at 34 Altenauerstrasse, just across the street
from me. He was a German, formerly a member of Meile Printing Company
of Chicago and a man strongly opposed to the Nazis. He had been an
officer in the German army in the First World War; therefore he knew
a large number of the officers of Reichswehr. Occasionally he gave in
his house beer-evenings which a number of Reichswehr officers attended,
including certain generals. To these parties I was occasionally
invited. One of these generals was General Goettke, who was the head
of the artillery on the General Staff and a very close friend of
Graffenstein. In addition, Graffenstein’s nephew was on the General
Staff and was at the same time the liaison between the Reichswehr
and the S.A. Late in 1934, George Graffenstein told me that from the
information which he had received from his friends, the armament
program was already so complete, so far advanced, so gigantic and
all-inclusive, that there was no doubt of Germany’s winning the war
on sheer weight of arms alone. That same information was given to me
directly by certain of the high officers of the Reichswehr, whom I met
at Graffenstein’s house.
By the middle of 1934 it had become obvious that the rearmament
program, though in its beginning, was being planned on a vast scale so
that it could not possibly be considered as defensive armament but only
as a weapon for offensive war. This was, however, not a conclusion of
my own; but it was openly stated as such to me. Graffenstein told me in
1934, during the conversations to which I have already referred, that
the purpose of the program was an aggressive war. He told me that he
had been so informed by General Goettke in particular. This statement
was borne out by other persons who were in the know in Germany at
that time. I confirmed his statements by my own conversations with the
generals who gathered in his house. They intimated to me, not only that
Germany was embarked upon an inevitable program toward war but even
gave me indications of the general plan, namely, the drive to the East
and the attack upon Russia, after Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Austria
had been eliminated. This was as early as 1934, and I had many similar
conversations along the same line at Graffenstein’s house during the
following years.
Similar information was constantly being confirmed from other sources
at later dates. For instance, in December 1938, I had a conversation
with General Franz Halder, who was then Chief of Staff, at the house
of Dr. Etscheit, a prominent Berlin lawyer. Halder stated to me: “You
must take into account the National Socialist program in the East.
If you, the Western powers, oppose our program in the East, we shall
have to go to war with you.” During this conversation he made it
clear to me that the program of the Nazis for expansion in the East
was unalterably fixed and decided upon. It included the attack on
Poland, the annexation of Austria, territorial expansion in Yugoslavia,
Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Russia, particularly in the Ukraine. The
latter provinces would have to be German. When I replied to Halder
that I was positive the Western powers would never tolerate any such
aggressive program and that inevitably it would not only mean war with
England and France but with the United States as well Halder replied:
“That is a pity.”
The same information as to the aggressive intention of the Nazis was
given to me by a friend, Count von Bismarck, formerly Counselor of the
German Embassy in London. He was violently anti-Nazi. In Germany, where
I knew him, he held no official position, deriving his income from
his estates in East Prussia; but he was a man with wide contacts in
officialdom, particularly in the Foreign Office. He said that the Nazis
were headed for war, for huge aggressive adventures, that conquest of
the East was a major part of the vast plan and that conquest of the
West would only follow, when complete victory in the East solidified
Germany’s strength and resources in those quarters. He made this
statement to me in 1936 and we discussed it often in 1937 and 1938. He
was extremely disturbed, not over the aggressive plans of the Nazis,
but over their manner of converting Germany into a slave State, which
he repudiated entirely. He considered that the course of the Nazis
militarily could not be hindered and furthermore, no country was
preparing to stop them.
I also had the same information from another reliable source. After
Hitler came to power in 1933, General von Hammerstein withdrew from
public life. He had been head of the Reichswehr under Chancellor
Bruening. Although he was then retired, he knew and associated
intimately with the Generals of the German Army, as he was among them
_primus inter pares_. He told me of the German program for aggressive
war during a long conversation which we had during a musical recital
in 1938 at Dr. Paul Kempner’s home. The army, he said, was at a
highly mechanized strength, extremely mobile and ready for anything.
He was sure, in view of the preparations and the excellent character
of the German equipment that the German Army was then an instrument
of invincible striking power. He stated categorically that it was a
superb instrument which had been formed to wage war and that it would
not be much longer delayed. He did not know the plans and details but
he confirmed the information that I had from all sources, that Germany
intended to strike in the East and that the war in the West depended on
whether or not the Western powers would endeavor to intervene when the
German war machine started moving.
Of these aggressive designs I learned also from other sources. A
personal friend, Dr. Hans Henniger, a veterinarian in Berlin, was an
intimate friend of an officer by the name of Schlessicher (I believe
that is the correct spelling), who was the responsible purveyor to the
German Army, therefore a high member of the Quartermaster Corps. I
do not remember his exact title. Dr. Henniger received from this man
information constantly with regard to the preparations being made by
the Germans in 1939. A month before March 15, 1939, I was informed of
the plans for marching into Prague on that date and that large stocks
of food and other equipment were being accumulated near the border of
Czechoslovakia. On March 15, 1939, the German Army rolled into Prague.
I also had a good deal of personal experience with and first-hand
knowledge of the internal policies from 1935 to 1939. Indeed, from the
very outset of the regime, I had intimate and continuous contact with
various officers of the German Government in the course of my duties as
an American official protecting American citizens or protesting against
their mistreatment. The acts of violence against American citizens were
numerous, particularly during the early years of 1933 and 1934. In
addition, I was constantly receiving information as regards other Nazi
tactics and the nature and number of victims from a variety of sources;
the victims themselves on many occasions, both American and German,
told me their experiences and appealed for help; relatives and friends
of victims, both those who came back and those who did not; the foreign
newspaper correspondents and, to a very considerable degree, I received
information from the Gestapo itself.
For a period I dealt directly with Herr Heinrich Himmler, then
subsequently with Herr Reinhard Heydrich and often with Dr. Werner Best.
My vigorous relations with the Gestapo began in March, 1933. In fact
I knew the organization of the secret police and dealt with that
organization before the Nazis came to power. It was then the Politische
Abteilung des Politizeipraesident, i.e., the political division of
the Politizeipraesidium, which was charged with supervisory and
preventive functions with regard to political matters, then chiefly
investigating the terror of Communists. It was located in Berlin at
the Politizeipraesidium. On March 6, 1933, it was moved from the
Politizeipraesidium to No. 8 Prinzalbrechtstrasse and became the
famous Gestapo [Geheimstaatpolizei], its first chief was Rudolf Diels,
who was succeeded by Heinrich Himmler, in May, 1934. I knew well not
only Diels but also Himmler, his second in command, Reinhard Heydrich
and his administrative officer, Dr. Werner Best. The organization at
No. 8 was huge with over 1,000 persons employed there. Besides, as
rapidly as administrative measures permitted, Gestapo headquarters
were established throughout Germany, not only in the cities but in
provincial places to such an extent that the smallest hamlet and
village fell under direct Gestapo supervision. At the beginning of
the Hitler regime, the only organization which had meeting places
throughout the country was the S.A. (storm troopers). Until the Gestapo
could be organized on a national scale the thousands of local S.A.
meeting places became the “arrest points.” There were at least fifty
of these in Berlin. Communists, Jews, and other known enemies of the
Nazi party were taken to these points and, if they were enemies of
sufficient importance, they were immediately transferred to the Gestapo
headquarters. During 1933 and 1934, when the Gestapo became universally
organized, the S.A. were gradually eliminated as arresting agents
and the S.S. [Schutzstaffe] were incorporated as administrative and
executive officials into the Gestapo. By the end of 1934, the S.A. had
been fairly well eliminated and the S.S., the members of which wore
elegant black suits and were therefore called Elite Guards, became
almost identical as functionaries with the Gestapo.
Immediately in 1933, the concentration camps, as soon as they were
established, were put under the immediate charge of the Gestapo and
they remained exclusively a Gestapo institution. Only “political”
prisoners were held in the concentration camps. Ordinary criminals
remained the responsibility of the regular police authorities and the
established courts. On being sentenced, they were confined in the
regular prisons. These confinements were always the result of duly
carried out legal procedure. Incarceration in concentration camps was
carried out without any legal procedure, neither indictment nor trial.
Prisoners were, occasionally, released from the concentration camps
and turned over to the prosecuting attorney for prosecution before
the legal courts of justice. A prisoner accused of high treason, for
example, whose offense might carry a death sentence, would be released
to the prosecuting attorney for trial in the people’s court. All
felonies were tried by the regular courts.
As I have stated, my frequent contacts with this entire Gestapo
organization began with the first wave of terrorist acts in the week of
March 6-13, 1933. That wave was accompanied by universal mob violence.
Since 1925, one of the cries of the Nazi party had been “Jude Verrecke”
(Death to the Jews) and when the Nazi party won the elections in March,
1933, on the morning of the sixth, the accumulated passion blew off in
wholesale attacks on the Communists, Jews, and those who were suspected
of being either. Mobs of S.A. men roamed the streets, beating up,
looting, and even killing persons.
No American citizen, so far as I am aware, was killed, but a number of
them were assaulted and injured and appealed to the Consulate General
for aid and protection. For example, Nathaniel Wolff, an American
citizen, who resided in Rochester, New York, made an affidavit which
stated:
This morning, March 6, at 5 o’clock, there came into my room five or
six Nazis with drawn revolvers. They abused me, called me a dirty
Russian Jew and started going through my belongings. They asked me
what remarks I had made. I replied that I had made none that I knew
of and that I am not interested in politics. One of them shouted “Do
you call throwing bombs not being interested in politics?” Another
asked at the same time, “Are you the Wolff who lived in the Pension
Stephanie?” Having left the Stephanie on account of difficulties
with the Portier regarding the price of the room and his behavior, I
whistled very softly, intimating that I understood the source of the
denunciation. Thereupon one of the Nazis remarked: “Du Scheiss Jude,
warum pfeiffst du?” and hit me in the jaw. They said that they would
take me to the police station, whereupon I answered, “The quicker,
the better, because my conscience is absolutely clear.” One of them
said, “Do you call throwing bombs having a clear conscience?” The
intruders were not accompanied by an officer, nor did they carry
“Hilfspolizei” armbands. They took me in an automobile to an address
in the Knewbeck Strasse beyond the Kant Strasse (I believe No. 67 or
76, Gartenhaus left, I think three or four flights up the stairs).
I was conducted to a bare room in which the shutters were closed
and the windows boarded, evidently to prevent sounds from getting
out, where, after my possessions were taken away including my keys,
I was left with two guards who spent the time abusing the Jews. At
five minutes before seven, the group who had arrested me returned
with two or three members including one who was apparently a leader,
when I was again abused, that is, they gave me to understand that
they imagined I was implicated in communistic activities. I remarked
that I should like to send a telegram to my cousin, Alan Steyne at
the Hamburg American Consulate, and asked if I had the right to
do so, whereupon the leader replied: “As a foreigner you have no
right, and especially not as a Jew.” One of the men then proceeded
to bind my hands and feet as closely and as painfully as possible. I
still bear the marks of the bruises on my wrists. I was questioned
about various English and French letters which had been found in
my room and taken along with them and then I was left about half
an hour alone because they evidently discussed my fate. After some
time one of the group returned and advised me that every one had a
right to his own political opinions as long as no attempt was made
to mix into politics. He remarked that nothing was to be gained by
brutality, undid the rope and freed my hands and feet and gave me
a cup of coffee and said, “Probably the thing isn’t so bad because
women chatter a great deal” and that I was denounced by a girl. After
a few minutes he elaborated the statement that the girl, Paula, of
the Pension, had denounced me as having the intention of throwing
bombs at the Nazi parade. I expressed my astonishment and told him
the facts of the case. He appeared to laugh it off and asked me if
I would be willing to sign a paper on the condition that they would
release me. I said “yes.” They then said I would have to go to the
police to have my signature attested to and one of the men who had
come in, in the meanwhile, went out to draft the paper I was to sign.
He returned with the paper which read: (1) “I am a Jew,” (2) “I will
leave tonight for Paris,” (3) “I promise never again to set my foot
on German soil.” “I attest that no physical violence was done to me
and that none of my property was stolen.” This paper I signed. They
told me to put on my coat and come to the police. Instead of taking
me to the police station they took me to Charlottenburg towards the
Gruenwald. When I asked to which police station they were taking me,
they replied “You’ll get there soon enough.” When we were near the
Heer Strasse they pretended that the automobile was broken down and
informed me that I would have to walk through the woods to get to the
police station. We proceeded into the woods where three members drew
their pistols and the other two brought straps out of their pockets
and informed me that they were going to teach me a lesson and made as
if they were about to tie me to a tree. They said that they intended
to beat the life out of me and “You can walk back afterwards.” I
replied that I hoped I would be able to walk. This was probably about
eight o’clock and we were entirely alone as nobody had followed us.
I took off my coat myself and remarked “If one can’t help oneself,
one may as well make the best of it.” One of them threw my coat
to the ground and said “Get ready” and after making a threatening
gesture, said “You can go home now!” pointing to the wrong direction,
whereupon they walked rapidly to the automobile and disappeared
yelling after me, “Keep your mouth shut.” I was also threatened that
if they ever caught me in Germany again, they would know how to get
me out of the way. * * *
Another American, Herman I. Roseman, made an affidavit which stated:
Yesterday, March 10, 1933, in the afternoon at about 4:30, I came
out of “KDW” with my fiancee, Fraulein Else Schwarzlose, residing in
Wilmersdorf, Kaiser-Allee 172, and proceeded to walk along Tauentzien
Strasse. A man in S. A. uniform stepped on my toe purposely,
obviously offended me and said “Pardon.” I said “bitte,” and walked
ahead. He followed me and kicked me saying: “Na und?” A policeman saw
this and walked ahead, paying no attention to attacks made on me.
Then I took my passport out of my pocket, showed it to the second
policeman, and said that I was an American citizen, but he walked
ahead, obviously not able to afford me protection, or at least being
unwilling. The S.A. man continued to attack me, struck me in the
face, wounded me over the eye, and continued to do me bodily harm.
During this attack, all the time my walking along, we reached another
policeman, and I applied to him, showing my passport and said: “I am
an American and am entitled to protection.” He shrugged his shoulder
and said “What can I do?” By this time the S.A. man had obviously
inflicted enough attack upon me and walked away.
Upon my appeal the policeman brought my fiancee and me to the station
house at 13 Bayreuther Strasse. My fiancee and I reported to the
officer in charge. He heard the story and said that he was sorry, but
that there was nothing to do. My face was bleeding. The policeman
said that he had had orders not to interfere in any affair in which
an S.A. man took part. I then asked him what I could do to protect
myself. He said that there was nothing to do but to wait until the
situation was better. He added that the police were absolutely
powerless, and were under the direction of the S.A., and that there
were S.A. [Sturm-Abteilung] in the police itself. Thereupon I
departed * * *
Another American, Mrs. Jean Klauber, made an affidavit which stated:
That on the night of Friday, March 10, 1933, she and her husband
had retired for the night when they were awakened by a prolonged
ringing of their apartment bell. They heard pounding upon the street
door and a demand for immediate entry, and a concurrent threat to
break the door down. The street door was opened by the janitor’s
wife, and a party of four or five men entered and went at once to
the apartment of the deponent where they again rang and pounded on
the door. Mr. Klauber asked who was there, and was answered--“The
police.” He opened the door and a party of four or five men in brown
uniforms, one wearing a dark overcoat and carrying a rifle, pushed
in, jostling Mr. and Mrs. Klauber aside. One asked Mrs. Klauber where
the telephone was and she indicated the room where it was to be
found, and started to go there. Thereupon, she was knocked down by
one of them. They went on to the bedroom where Mr. and Mrs. Klauber
followed them, and there they demanded their passports. Mr. Klauber
went to the wardrobe to get his, and was stopped, being asked by the
intruders whether he was carrying any weapons. Being clothed only
in pajamas, his denial was accompanied by a gesture indicating his
garb. He then turned to the wardrobe, opened it, and reached for one
of his four suits hanging there in where he thought the passport
was, and was immediately attacked from behind by all but one of the
intruders, who beat him severely with police clubs, the one with
the overcoat and rifle standing by. Remarks were shouted such as
“Look. Four suits, while for fourteen years we have been starving.”
Mrs. Klauber tried to inquire the reason for their actions, and was
answered--“Jews. We hate you. For fourteen years we have been waiting
for this, and tonight we’ll hang many of you.”
When the intruders stopped beating Mr. Klauber he was unconscious,
and they demanded the passports again of Mrs. Klauber. Mrs. Klauber
found her American passport and her German passport (required by
local authorities as the wife of a German citizen, and issued by the
Police at Munich after her arrival here), and the intruders took both
in spite of Mrs. Klauber’s protests that she was American. She then
searched for her husband’s passport, laid hold of his pocket-book,
and in her excitement offered it to them. Though full of money they
refused it, and again demanded the passport. Mrs. Klauber then found
it and handed it over.
Then the intruders returned to the unconscious Mr. Klauber, saying
“He hasn’t had enough yet,” and beat him further. Then they left,
saying “We are not yet finished,” and just as they departed, one of
them said to Mrs. Klauber “Why did you marry a Jew? I hate them” and
struck her on the jaw with his police club * * *
I personally can verify that the police had been instructed not
to interfere; that is that there was official sanction for these
activities. Affidavits taken from numerous victims attest this fact.
I had become acquainted with the two police officers stationed at
the corner of Bellevuestrasse and Tiergartenstrasse near where the
Consulate General was located; these officers told me that they and
all the other police officers had received definite instructions not to
interfere with the S.A., the S.S. or the Hitler Youth.
For the Germans who were taken into custody by the Gestapo, chiefly
Communists at that time, there was, from my experience and from the
information that I had from all sources, a regular pattern of brutality
and terror. Upon arrest, the victims would be systematically subjected
to indignities and brutalities such as beatings, kicking, pushing
downstairs, deprivation of food and all comforts, and threats of much
worse. After the victims had been imprisoned--usually in cellars, since
both the headquarters at No. 8 Albrechtstrasse and the S.A. meeting
places usually had them--they would be beaten with various degrees
of severity. If the Gestapo believed that the victim--particularly
Communist leaders--had information as to other alleged accomplices they
would give systematic beatings, usually when stripped and tied on a
table. This would go on often for many days until they had extracted
the information they wanted or killed the victim.
Based on all of the reports which I had from many sources, my judgment
is that the victims were numbered in the hundreds of thousands all
over Germany. Many of them were ultimately released. I can state with
certainty that the contemporaneous accounts in foreign newspapers, such
as the London Times and the American newspapers which I have seen, are
accurate.
The second wave of terror was not so systematic nor so concentrated as
to point of time. It was directed chiefly against the Jews, and was
chiefly the result of the ruthless and occasionally violent enforcement
of numerous decrees and orders, such as the Nurnberg Decrees. After
the initial outbreak in March, 1933, and all through that year and the
next, the Jews still in Germany had, in many cases, come to believe
that things might become a little better and that they could live in
some sort of peaceable relationship with the Nazis, even though they
were reduced to the status of second or third class citizens. In 1935,
however, the pressure on them began to increase and they began to be
excluded completely from certain civil activities. The terrorism was
continued all the time to some degree; but the enforcement of the new
decrees in 1935 was characterized by such brutality and ruthlessness
that it warrants special attention. Inadvertent violators were dealt
with, for example, with great severity.
The 1938 wave of terror was a very pronounced and definite one. Again
the object was the Jews, particularly the wealthy ones. The ostensible
occasion was the murder of the German diplomat, von Rieth, by a
French Jew, but the violence was in no sense spontaneous. Dr. Best,
the Administrative Officer of the Gestapo, told me that the terror
had been decided upon and ordered by Hitler himself, and that he, Dr.
Best, could, therefore, do nothing about it. Actually that statement
corroborated what everyone knew. Innumerable persons with whom I talked
and who witnessed the violence told me that at all of the synagogues,
which had been set on fire by the Nazis, the fire departments were
always present, but never acted except to prevent the fires from
spreading to neighboring non-Jewish properties. Nor did the police
interfere with any of these acts of vandalism and incendiarism.
I personally did not see any of the violence nor the burning of
the synagogues while the acts were being perpetrated, as the mobs
throughout Germany commenced to work at midnight on November 8, 1938,
and carried through their activities during the early morning hours of
November 9. At that time I was on my way to the Wartburg Castle, and on
the day of November 9 I saw the burned synagogues and the looted and
smashed shops in Eisennach, and later in Berlin. I also know that at
this time many of the wealthy Jews, who had previously escaped attack,
were arrested, among whom were relatives of American citizens. Pursuant
to requests from the United States, some of which were transmitted
through the Department of State, I personally intervened with the
Gestapo through Dr. Best, and secured the return of nearly twenty
victims from the Saxonhausen Concentration Camp. Among these victims
were Fritz Warburg and Eugene Garbaty. I think that many, perhaps most
of these people, were released in the space of ten days or two weeks
with the warning that if they remained in Germany they would have
cause to regret it. In all cases the victims were subjected to rough
treatment. Those who returned from the concentration camp and whom I
saw in my office had their hair closely clipped, a common outward sign
that they had been at Saxonhausen.
The Gestapo authorities with whom I spoke on my frequent, and often
daily visits to the Gestapo headquarters did not hesitate to state
that they regarded Communists in particular as subversive and as an
element dangerous to the State, and that it was necessary to wipe
them out. Diehls, the first chief of the Gestapo, in particular, whom
I saw nearly every day of the March wave of terror in 1933, made no
attempt to conceal the systematic character of the roundups of what he
called “subversive persons”; though he did attempt to justify it to
me as necessary to the safety of the State. While denying that any
violence against American citizens was contemplated, he admitted that
it was being undertaken against Germans. Terroristic tactics, however,
in all their various forms, were so completely and thoroughly the
actuating policy, that it would have been wholly redundant to discuss
it. They and I both understood that it was the mainspring of all
Gestapo activity--indeed of all Nazi activity--and that it was beyond
discussion.
On one occasion I received a clear and definite admission of the Nazi
terroristic policy with respect to many of their victims. In 1938 I
was making strenuous efforts to free a young man from a concentration
camp. He had been arrested in March, 1933, for aiding certain of his
comrades to escape Germany, and had been sentenced by regular courts
to a sentence of 2½ years. When he was released from the Brandenburg
Prison at the end of that time, he was taken into custody by the
Gestapo and sent to Dachau, the notorious concentration camp, and from
there to Buchenwald. I had tried over a long period of time to secure
his release by appeals personally to Himmler, Heydrich and Best, and
had failed. In 1938, however, I was told by Ministerialraet Krohne, in
the Ministry of Justice, that if I could reach Gruppenfuehrer Eiche of
the Todtenkopfverbaende (Death’s Head Regiments) I might be successful.
Eiche was then the head of all German concentration camps. After having
first been told officially by the Gestapo that no such person existed,
I was finally able by a ruse to secure his telephone number whereupon,
through the recommendation of Krohne, I was able to make an appointment
with Eiche at the Saxonhausen Concentration Camp near Berlin. He told
me that with respect to Communists and any other persons who were
suspected of holding views contrary to the Nazi conception of the
State, such persons were “Asociale”, that is, impossible of social
assimilation and, therefore, they must be physically eliminated from
society or destined to perpetual confinement. Thaelman, the leader of
the Communists in the Reichstag, was, as is well known, kept during the
Hitler regime in perpetual confinement. His ultimate fate has never
been revealed.
On another occasion I was given considerable information by a high
official of the Gestapo as to the policy of the Nazis with respect to
the Jews. I had had a considerable contact with the head of the Jewish
section of the Gestapo, known as the “Judische Abteilung der Gestapo”,
one Dr. Hasselbacher, in connection with making arrangements for
official representatives of the American Joint Distribution Committee
to visit certain Jewish centers throughout Germany, for which
visits, of course, the permission of the Gestapo was necessary. These
negotiations brought me frequently in touch with Dr. Hasselbacher,
whom I came to know very well. He told me that Germany will be made
“Judenrein”, that is, clean of Jews. He said that all the Jews who
failed to leave Germany would be exterminated. That statement was
made in 1938 before the extermination camps were established, but the
statement of Hasselbacher clearly indicated the eventual emergence
of extermination camps in accordance with the general Nazi plan; for
certainly the Jews were unable to leave Germany, even if they had been
permitted to do so by the Nazis, as no world-wide arrangement had been
made to receive them in other countries.
I had a great deal of experience with the systematic measures which
were taken to confiscate property of non-Nazis, particularly Jews.
Force of circumstance and a settled governmental policy made this
campaign a more gradual one. Drastic and sudden action would have led
to the alienation of a great deal of ready assets owned by the Jews
and would have tended to destroy the economic value of Jewish-owned
property. It would also have resulted in the physical destruction or
hiding by Jews of things of value, as indeed did happen to a great
extent. Consequently, the Nazis permitted many Jews, particularly those
of wealth and position, to remain unmolested for many years, giving the
Jews the faithless and false assurance that they were exempted from the
general repressive program for various reasons. For example, I knew
well the leading German cigarette manufacturer, Eugene Garbaty. Until
September, 1938, he was in complete control of his fortune. During that
month, however, he was compelled to sell his factory, worth between
seven million and ten million marks for the sum of one million marks.
In October, 1938, his country estate near Dresden, valued probably over
two million marks, was simply confiscated with no payment at all. It
was to be used, as the authorities stated, for a welfare center for
German Youth. After his experience in the Pogrom of November 8, 1938,
Garbaty applied for a passport and received one only after paying a
bribe of 500,000 marks to the corrupt Count Heldorf, Chief of Police
in Berlin, and enough other fines to equal the million marks that he
had received for his factory. He left Germany with nothing, except
that earlier, by bribing the customs officials with approximately
250,000 marks, he had been able to get valuable art treasures out of
Germany. Garbaty is now a citizen of the United States and is living in
Connecticut.
Another instance of the same nature occurred with respect to my
landlord, Mr. Franz Rinkel, who told me the entire story of his
persecution at the hands of the Nazis. He had a fine house at No. 2
Bruckenalle in Berlin, in which I lived. Rinkel was one of the victims
sent to Saxonhausen and whom, after the space of a week, I was able
to rescue. One Dr. Lilienthal, a fanatical Nazi lawyer practicing in
Berlin, coveted Rinkel’s house. The general system of expropriating
the property of the Jews was illustrated in this particular case.
My landlord was approached by Dr. Lilienthal and told the price the
latter desired to pay, a mere fraction of the value of the estate.
He was given a few days to make up his mind to sell at that price.
He sold because he knew that if he did not, he would be accused of
some trumped-up crime and taken away to the concentration camp. Dr.
Lilienthal took possession of Rinkel’s house. I know that on many
occasions where it was thought necessary to increase the pressure, the
prospective purchaser or his agent would be accompanied by a uniformed
S.A. or S.S. man. I know because I lived in the immediate neighborhood
and know the individuals concerned, that Baron von Neurath, one time
Foreign Minister of Germany, got his house from a Jew in this manner.
Indeed, he was my next door neighbor in Dahlem. Von Neurath’s house was
worth approximately 250,000 dollars. I know too that Alfred Rosenburg,
who lived in the same street with me, purloined a house from a Jew in
similar fashion. There were, of course, innumerable instances in which
Nazis used their positions in the Party to void debts and the like.
An illustration of this were the cases of the persons who came to the
Consulate in Berlin and informed us of the circumstances. For example,
Max Schussler, an American citizen, made an affidavit which states:
* * * I own several apartment houses in Berlin, one situated at
Ring Strasse 11, Berlin-Steglitz. On the property at Ring Strasse
11 resides a tenant by the name of Hans Zink, who owns and operates
a restaurant in those premises. He has been in arrears in his rent
for about a year. Since the first of February of this year, that
is, since the new Government came into power, he has refused to
pay his rent. I gave instructions to the Sheriff to have him put
out. Yesterday two uniformed men came to my office and spoke to my
secretary and said that if I do not recall the order to the Sheriff
to have Zink evicted, something will happen to me. I did not see
these men. My secretary received them. She stated they wore black
trousers and brown shirts. She referred them to my attorney, Felix
Szkolny, Charlottenstrasse 17, Berlin S.W. 68. They went to the
attorney, but he refused to give the order. They came to my office
again and said to my secretary that if I did not give the order in
writing and hand it over to a certain address within an hour’s
time, something would happen. I then called the police station at
Alexandrinenstrasse 134, Revier No. 113, and a police officer came to
my office and accompanied me to a taxi, when I went home.
About a week before, it may be noted, Zink had come to my office and
insisted on my rescinding the order of eviction, and said, “I care
nothing about law; we are now in power, remember that. Do anything
you please, I am not going out of the office until you cancel the
order”. I called the police, and an officer came. Zink said, “I do
not care what you say”. After about ten minutes the officer put him
out.
At two o’clock Tuesday morning, March 7, I was awakened and faced by
two men with pistols, who had come into the house. They were allowed
to enter by the janitress, as they claimed to be “Hilfspolizei”, and
also by my maid. These two men were accompanied by two others in
civilian clothes, the former wearing the brown National Socialist
uniforms. They said, “Here, dress yourselves, quick too”. My wife
asked them to turn about while she dressed, but they refused. She
was compelled to remove her night gown at the point of a revolver
and stand naked before the intruders. When she protested they said,
“Don’t be theatrical”. My wife then wanted to telephone, but they
said, “No, sit down. Do not touch the telephone”, while they kept
their pistols pointed at us all the time. I sat down. One of them
said, “Have you got a fountain pen? You sign that”. I had to sign
the order to the Sheriff cancelling the order of eviction, and had
to sign another letter to the tenant Zink, stating that the order
of eviction was called off. I hesitated to sign and they drew their
revolvers on me, and my wife in terror fell to her knees, and then
I signed. I asked if they had credentials, and they pointed to the
“Hakenkreuz” on their sleeves and said that was their credentials.
They then said, “If you recall that order tomorrow, you will be
dead”. After I signed, they left * * *
Actually, all Nazis used their positions in the Party as a means
of enriching themselves. I have already spoken of the bribe to the
customs officials and the Foreign Office officials, which Mr. Garbaty
was compelled to pay. Another instance of the venality of the Nazi
officials was illustrated in the case of Mendelssohn Bartholdy, who
owned a house near me and whom I knew well. He was told by Count
Heldorf, Chief of Police in Berlin, through his stooge, one Herr
Schmidt, that his passport would cost him 250,000 marks. Bartholdy told
me the facts and asked me if he should pay. Knowing the Nazi practices
and the danger which he ran as a Jew in Germany, I advised him to pay.
He did, got his passport and visa, and left Germany. This happened in
November, 1938.
I was informed by a personal friend, a Jewish banker in Berlin, Herr
Kempner, whom I believed to be qualified to make an accurate estimate,
that the total confiscations from Jews in Germany was between seven and
eight billion marks.
I had less experience with the manner in which the Nazis operated in
industrial firms. However, from the accounts of numerous American
businessmen with manufacturing plants in Germany, accounts which agreed
with the information which I had with respect to similar activities
in German factories, I know that the Nazis used their Party position
to obtain authority and power. Many American businessmen told me
that they had serious troubles operating their factories because
the Nazi officials in the establishment, usually recruited from the
workmen, attempted to take over the management themselves, and engaged
consistently and ruthlessly in acts of persecution against non-Nazi
workmen. Many German firms were actually dominated by fanatical Nazis,
usually persons who had had no previous position of importance, such
as janitors, timekeepers and the like. Their position in the Nazi
hierarchy gave them importance in the enterprise out of all proportion
to their standing and position.
[Signed] Raymond H. Geist
Subscribed and sworn to before me William L. Brewster Vice Consul of
the United States of America, duly commissioned and qualified, in
Mexico, D. F., Mexico, this 28th day of August 1945.
[Signed] William L. Brewster
Vice Consul of the United States of America
Service No. 6684
Tariff No. 38
No fee prescribed.
COPY OF DOCUMENT 1760--PS
United Mexican States }
Mexico Federal District }
Embassy of the United } SS
States of America }
George S. Messersmith, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
During the period 1930 to the late spring of 1934, I was Consul General
of the United States of America in Berlin. During that period and
particularly during the years 1933 and until my departure for Austria
in the late spring of 1934, the nature of my work brought me into
frequent contact with German Government officials. As background for
this statement it is pertinent to state that this contact with German
Government officials in the highest categories was necessary by me as
Consul General, and some of my principal associates, because of the
circumstances of the period.
In the period immediately preceding the coming into power of the
National Socialists it was necessary for me and some of my principal
associates in the Consulate General to have contact with high
officials of the German Government because of unsettled state of
affairs in Germany due to the uncertain political situation; this
involved difficulties for American firms of various kinds which made
the intervention of the Consulate General in the line of its regular
duty necessary. In addition to this contact with the officials of the
Government, as a matter of further duty I had contact with individuals
in all parties in Germany in order to keep myself and therefore our
Government currently informed with regard to developments in the
political picture in Germany. During that period, and before the
National Socialists came into power, I therefore had contact of an
informed character with persons in the National Socialist Party for
the purpose of securing information as to their aims and objectives,
but that contact was, before the access to power of that party, with
secondary rather than with the first ranking members thereof.
Immediately after the access to power of the National Socialist
Government in the beginning of 1933, all sorts of steps of an arbitrary
character were taken by the new Government and by its various agencies
and dependencies which affected the rights of American citizens and
property and in the carrying through of my official duty as Consul
General I had the primary responsibility for the protection of American
citizens and property. In consequence of this responsibility I had to
see frequently almost all of the high ranking members of the German
Government with the exception of Hitler and a very large number of
officials below the rank of Minister. The nature of my duties was such
that a considerable portion of my days had to be spent in visits on
such officials to discuss the protection of American interests and
property. Some of these secondary officials I had known before the
Party came to power, for information purposes.
It is difficult to explain adequately in a statement of this kind the
circumstances under which these officials of the Nazi German Government
frequently took occasion to talk to me most frankly about matters of
general Nazi policy and to discuss frankly and freely the aims and
purposes of the Nazi regime. Frequently our conversations were long
and difficult because of the matters which I had to present and on
which I had to take the firmest stand. Not infrequently at the end of
such official conversations they spoke freely and without any reserve
with regard to the aims of the regime.
It is the more important to bring this out in this preliminary section
of my statement because I did not at any time conceal from any of these
Nazi officials my complete lack of sympathy with the course they were
pursuing nor did I hesitate to say to them what I considered was the
danger of the course which they were pursuing not only for Germany but
for Europe and the rest of the world. Their freedom of expression to me
was all the more interesting in view of the fact that I never hesitated
to assert in the strongest possible way the rights of the United States
and of its citizens when they were violated. It requires a knowledge
of the circumstances of the time, of the character and psychology of
these high Nazis and secondary Nazi officials to be able to appreciate
that the fact that I was forthright in my views and did not hesitate
to express them and particularly that we stood out so strongly for
the rights of our country and our citizens that led them to respect
me and my associates and to reveal to me more than they very probably
revealed to other foreign representatives. Whatever the reasons may
have been, however, the Nazi Government officials, almost without
exception from the highest to the lowest with whom I had contact, were
on most occasions amazingly frank in their conversation and without any
concealment of their aims.
* * * * * * *
[Omitted is a part of this affidavit in which Mr. Messersmith lists the
names, and states his impressions of, the following:
1. Hermann Goering
2. General Milch
3. Hjalmar Schacht
4. Hans Frank
5. Wilhelm Frick
6. Count Schwerin von Krosigk
7. Joseph Goebbels
8. Richard Walther Darre
9. Robert Ley
10. Hans Heinrich Lammers
11. Otto Meissner
12. Franz von Papen
13. Walther Funk
14. General Wilhelm Keitel
15. Admiral Eric von Raeder
16. Admiral Karl Doenitz
17. Dr. Bohle
18. Dr. Stuckert
19. Dr. Krupp von Bohlen
20. Dr. Davidson]
In the late spring or early summer of 1934, I cannot recall the exact
date, I left my post as Consul General at Berlin to go to Vienna
where I remained until the late spring of 1937. During my stay in
Austria, I had intimate official and personal contact with the highest
officials of the Austrian Government as well as with many of the
secondary and lower ranking officials. I had this intimate contact
with these officials of the Austrian Government from the very outset
due, undoubtedly, to the fact that when I came to Austria it was
already well known that I was an outspoken opponent of all that the
Nazi Government and leaders stood for. In consequence, even though
I was the Minister of a country which was considered in Austria as
having no immediate concern in Austria’s foreign relations, I received
much information from the many Austrian officials on developments in
Austro-German relations and in their relations with other countries
in Europe. Among those whom I saw frequently and from whom I obtained
information were the following:
President Miklas
Chancellor Dollfuss
Chancellor Schuschnigg
Foreign Minister Berger-Waldenegg
Police President and Minister of Security, Hofrat Skubl.
In addition, I should add that there were both in Berlin and in Vienna
a corps of correspondents, many of whom were of outstanding ability and
with whom I was in frequent contact.
Finally, I should say that during my stay in Austria I made fairly
frequent trips to Berlin and on many of these saw and talked with
the same persons whom I had known during my residence there as
Consul-General. Thus I maintained my German sources of information as
well as acquiring new Austrian ones.
I feel fully qualified, therefore, to speak with authority on the
matters which follow in this statement. The specific conversations and
events which I recite are, of course, specific facts which I set forth
here as facts. As to many of them, I have refreshed my recollection as
details from contemporaneous reports and letters which I wrote during
this period. The opinions which I offer are, I believe, fully warranted
by the sum total of information which I received from all sources.
From the very beginnings of the Nazi Government, I was told by both
high and secondary Government officials in Germany that incorporation
of Austria into Germany was a political and economic necessity and that
this incorporation was going to be accomplished “by whatever means
were necessary”. Although I cannot assign definite times and places,
I am sure that at various times and places every one of the German
officials whom I have listed earlier in this statement told me this
with the exception of Schacht, von Krosigk and Krupp von Bohlen. I
can assert that it was fully understood by everyone in Germany who had
any knowledge whatever of what was going on that Hitler and the Nazi
Government were irrevocably committed to this end and the only doubt
which ever existed in conversations or statements to me was “how” and
“when”.
At the beginnings of the Nazi regime in 1933, Germany was, of course,
far too weak to permit any open threats of force against any country,
such as the threat which the Nazis made in 1938. Instead it was the
avowed and declared policy of the Nazi Government to accomplish the
same results which they later accomplished through force through the
methods which had proved so successful for them in Germany--obtain a
foothold in the cabinet, particularly in the Ministry of the Interior
which controlled the police, and then quickly eliminate the opposition
elements. During my stay in Austria I was told on any number of
occasions by Chancellor Dollfuss, Chancellor Schuschnigg, President
Miklas and other high officials of the Austrian Government that the
German Government kept up constant and unceasing pressure upon the
Austrian Government to agree to the inclusion of a number of Ministers
with Nazi orientation. The English and French Ministers in Vienna with
whom I was in constant and close contact confirmed this information
through statements which they made to me of conversations which they
had with high Austrian officials.
In order to compel the Austrian Government to accept their terms the
Nazis resorted to almost every conceivable measure, including economic
pressure, propaganda, and most important of all, terroristic acts.
My information concerning these terroristic outrages came partly
from official communiques of the Austrian Government, partly from
responsible news sources, and to a very considerable extent from Skubl,
the Police President and later Minister of Public Security, whom I
saw frequently and knew well. The Austrian secret police under the
direction of Skubl, it should be noted, was one of the most efficient
in all of Europe.
The outrages were an almost constant occurrence, but there were
three distinct periods during which they rose to a peak. During the
first two of these periods--in mid-1933, and in early 1934--I was
still in Berlin. However, during that period I was told by high Nazi
officials in conversation with them that these waves of terror were
being instigated and directed by them. I found no concealment in my
conversations with high Nazi officials of the fact that they were
responsible for these activities in Austria. These admissions were
entirely consistent with the Nazi thesis that terror is necessary and
must be used to impose the will of the Party not only in Germany but
in other countries. I recall specifically that General Milch was one
of those who spoke frankly that these outrages in Austria were being
directed by the Nazi Party and expressed his concern with respect
thereto and his disagreement with this definite policy of the Party.
During the wave of terroristic acts in May and June 1934, I had already
assumed my duties as American Minister in Vienna. The bomb outrages
during this period were directed primarily at railways, tourist
centers, and the Catholic Church, which latter, in the eyes of the
Nazis, were one of the strongest organizations opposing them. I recall,
however, that these outrages diminished markedly for a few days during
the meeting of Hitler and Mussolini in Venice in mid-June 1934. At that
time Mussolini was strongly supporting the Austrian Government and was
strongly and deeply interested in maintaining Austrian independence
and sovereignty and in keeping down Nazi influence and activity in
Austria. At that time also Hitler could not afford an open break with
Mussolini and undoubtedly agreed to the short cessation of these bomb
outrages on the insistence of Mussolini because he, Hitler, wished to
achieve as favorable an atmosphere for the meeting between him and
Mussolini as possible. The cessation of the bomb outrages during the
Hitler-Mussolini conversations was considered by me and by the Austrian
authorities and by all observers at that time as an open admission on
the part of Hitler and the German Government that the outrages were
systematically and completely instigated and controlled from Germany.
While I cannot recall at this time the details of the terroristic
acts, they were fully reported in the Legation despatches of the
period. These reports were based upon intimate and frequent contact
with high Austrian officials and many of the details I received from
the then head of the Austrian Police, Dr. Skubl. While there was no
doubt whatever that these outrages had been conducted and directed by
Germany, there was ample evidence as to the origin of the outrages from
the fact that fragments of the bombs collected by the Austrian police
showed that they were of German manufacture and had been introduced
from Germany into Austria. While I do not recall having seen any of
these bomb fragments myself, I recall specifically having been told
by high Austrian authorities that they had seen them and that there
was no doubt as to the origin of the bombs. A further proof that these
outrages were directed from Germany, although in most cases the bombs
were actually planted by Austrian Nazis, is found in the fact that the
records of the Vienna Police and Courts at the time will show that when
some of these Nazis were arrested they declared proudly that they had
committed these acts.
At various times I or A. W. Kliefoth, Counselor of the Legation,
reported on these outrages because of their significance. Quotations
from some of these despatches are as follows:
Trunks containing inflammable material were placed in the
three leading railway stations of Vienna and timed to explode
simultaneously on the evening of May 6. The damage was very slight.
The police charged the Nazis with the Crime.
An official communique, dated May 10, announced that on the previous
evening a bomb was exploded near the Philadelphia Bridge in Vienna,
wounding two persons. The same evening a bomb was exploded in one of
the local beer gardens, at which a picnic of the Heimwehr was being
held, slightly wounding a woman.
Official despatch from Vienna dated May 15, 1934.
During the past week the continuation of the Nazi terrorist
activities in bombing public places and railway lines, with the
object of damaging the Austrian tourist trade, some of which
are described below, was the source of serious concern to the
authorities. This terrorism was carried out according to a well
organized plan, undoubtedly conducted by Nazi agents in Germany. The
explosives used by the Nazis during the past week, according to the
Foreign Office, were all manufactured in Germany and smuggled into
Austria.
In a communique dated May 24, the authorities also admitted a number
of other bomb outrages at Brannau, Bad Ischl and Dorf an der Pram.
While the damage to both life and property was small--no lives
were lost--the Government admitted its inability to cope with the
situation with the existing measures of security.
The authorities further confirmed officially, on May 25, a bomb
explosion on May 23 in the residence of the Archbishop of Salzburg,
which caused considerable damage. At Monag, near Salzburg, on May 23,
a bomb explosion wrecked a flower-kiosk, causing damages amounting
to 10,000 schillings. A nine year old child was severely injured in
Anleiten, near Ried.
Official Despatch from Vienna dated May 29, 1934.
The Nazi terrorist outrages continued during the past week in spite
of the Government’s notification regarding the application throughout
Austria of martial law for crimes of public violence. These crimes,
now punishable by death, include malicious acts against public order,
and damage to the railway, telegraph, telephone and wireless services
of the State.
The new development in the recent outrages was that many of the acts
were directed against the property of the Roman Catholic Church,
which in the eyes of the Nazis was the strongest organization
opposing the Nazi regime.
In addition to the attempted bombing of the Archbishop’s palace in
Salzburg, a few days previously, a bomb was exploded on May 20 in an
annex to the Archbishop’s palace in Feldkirch, which caused minor
damages. The police charged Nazis with the outrages and arrested a
number of suspects. During the night of May 27, a bomb explosion
broke windows in the churches and vicarages of St. Paul in Carinthia.
In Linz, on May 26, a bomb exploded before the entrance of one of the
schools, breaking 44 windows. The school was empty at the time the
outrage was committed. During the same night, an attempt was made to
blow up the electric works at Brannau, causing a temporary suspension
of the electric service.
Other outrages, not reported by the press, included an attempt to
blow up one of the bridges over the Danube in Vienna on May 30, a
bomb explosion in one of the popular cafes, and numerous bombings of
telephone and newspaper kiosks.
Official Despatch from Vienna dated June 4, 1934.
The National Socialist terrorism in Austria, which started slowly
and cautiously several weeks ago, culminated in a heavy and rather
serious outbreak on June 8 to June 11, threatening not only the
peace and security of the country, but the foreign tourist trade, an
exceedingly important item in Austria’s economic life. The attempts
to wreck the railway lines near Vienna and in other parts of Austria,
as well as terrorist outrages in the principal tourist centers,
occupied the attention of the Government above all other matters.
After a number of important cabinet sessions, new measures were
adopted to counteract the terrorism, and the matter was also the
subject of diplomatic conversations between Austria and Germany.
Official Despatch from Vienna dated June 13, 1934.
The outrages in Austria during the week ending June 23, while almost
as numerous as in the week preceding, were less violent in character.
The attacks were directed, as heretofore, against the quarters of
anti-Nazi associations and persons, public utilities, but less
against the railway communications. Additional stores of explosive
materials were uncovered in Vienna and elsewhere.
* * * * * * *
A recent terrorist explosion in the Vienna School of Agronomy caused
damages amounting to about 40,000 schillings. As a result of the Nazi
outrages, the school has been closed for one week.
In an attempted bomb attack on the post office in Bregenz, the
capital of the Province of Vorarlberg, the police seized a supply
of explosives bearing labels of “Sprengstoffwerke Kloster Lechfeld,
G.m.b.H.”, “Dynamit A.G. Hamburg, Alfred Nobel & Co.”, and “Fabrik
Wurzendorf”, explosive factories domiciled in Germany.
Official Despatch from Vienna dated June 25, 1934.
During the week ending June 30 there were less terrorist outrages of
major importance, but the number of small outrages, bomb explosions,
attacks on electric, water, and railway establishments had not
decreased. The principal attacks were directed against Catholic
institutions, ex-National Socialists, and the city of Salzburg. The
purpose in the latter case was to frighten foreign tourists away from
the Summer Music Festivals at Salzburg.
A bomb which exploded in the Roman Catholic vicarage in Kapfenberg,
in the Province of Styria, on June 24, resulted in the death of the
Chaplain, Reverend Franz Eibel. Several other persons were slightly
injured. The death was one of terrorism, although there were several
cases of attacks. Likewise there were attacks on other Church
institutions in different parts of the country.
A series of outrages were reported on June 28 from Salzburg and
adjoining tourist centers. Bombs were exploded in the market place
and elsewhere, and attempts were made to blow up the electric and
railway communications. The outrages were particularly directed at
Salzburg at this time in view of the forthcoming Summer Festivals,
which ordinarily attract thousands of non-German tourists. Similar
attacks were made the same day in the Provinces of Vorarlberg and
Tyrol.
Official Despatch from Vienna dated July 3, 1934.
A series of lesser outrages were reported from all parts of Austria
on Sunday, July 15. A large amount of explosives were stolen from
a shop in Gloggnitz; the director of the institution was fined 600
schillings and sentenced to two weeks imprisonment for negligence in
guarding the supplies. In Unterkirchen, on July 17, a bomb explosion
damaged the local vicarage and the electric works. On July 18 a bomb
explosion in Innsbruck injured one person, whereas in St. Kathrein
a house was damaged. In Vienna on July 18 a public telephone was
damaged, and set on fire. The perpetrator, a National Socialist, was
immediately apprehended by the Police. At Edlach, a summer resort
about 100 kilometers from Vienna, an attempt was made to bomb the
railway. A similar attempt was made in a Tyrolian mountain railway
station.
Official Despatch from Vienna dated July 26, 1934.
In addition to these outrages, the Nazis attempted to bring pressure
upon Austria by means of the “Austrian Legion”. This organization, a
para-military force of several thousand men, was stationed near the
Austrian border in Germany as a constant and direct threat of violent
action against Austria. It was without any question sanctioned by the
Nazi Government of Germany as it could otherwise not have existed,
and it was armed by them. It was made up of Austrian Nazis who had
fled from Austria after committing various crimes in Austria and by
Austrians in Germany who were attracted by the idle life and pay given
by the German authorities.
After the July Putsch, in August 1934, in Vienna I was told by the
British Military Attaché in Vienna of a conversation which he had
had with the German Military Attaché in Vienna, General Muff. It
may be observed here that to my knowledge General Muff was a rather
influential person in Germany and one who played a preponderant role in
the German Legation in Vienna. General Muff told the British Military
Attaché that he had just been in Germany and had spent three days with
Hitler at Berchtesgaden, during which time he had several conversations
with Hitler. He said then--in August 1934--that the Austrian Legion had
not yet been dissolved and that Hitler had talked at length with him
about the Legion. General Muff did not deem it worth while to conceal
to the British Military Attaché the fact that the Austrian Legion had
been armed and that the Nazis had armed it. I saw General Muff later
myself and received the same impression as to these facts although he
was not as frank and direct in his statements with me as he had been
with the British Military Attaché.
The events of the Putsch of July 25, 1934, are too well known for me
to repeat them in this statement. I need say here only that there can
be no doubt that the Putsch was ordered and organized by the Nazi
officials from Germany through their organization in Austria made up
of German Nazis and Austrian Nazis. Dr. Rieth, the German Minister in
Vienna, was fully familiar with all that was going to happen and that
was being planned. The German Legation was located directly across the
street from the British Legation and the Austrian secret police kept
close watch on the persons who entered the German Legation. The British
had their own secret service in Vienna at the time and they also kept
a discreet surveillance over people entering the German Legation.
I was told by both British and Austrian officials that a number of
the men who were later found guilty by the Austrian Courts of having
been implicated in the Putsch had frequented the German Legation. In
addition, I personally followed very closely the activities of Dr.
Rieth and I never doubted on the basis of all my information that Dr.
Rieth was in close touch and constant touch with the Nazi agents in
Austria; these agents being both German and Austrian. Dr. Rieth could
not have been unfamiliar with the Putsch and the details in connection
therewith. I recall, too, very definitely from my conversations with
the highest officials of the Austrian Government after the Putsch,
their informing me that Dr. Rieth had been in touch with von Rintelen,
who it had been planned by the Nazis was to succeed Chancellor Dollfuss
had the Putsch been successful.
It may be that Dr. Rieth was himself not personally sympathetic with
the plans for the Putsch but there is no question that he was fully
familiar with all these plans and must have given his assent thereto
and connived therein.
As this Putsch was so important and was a definite attempt to overthrow
the Austrian Government and resulted in the murder of the Chancellor
of Austria, I took occasion to verify at the time for myself various
other items of evidence indicating that the Putsch was not only made
with the knowledge of the German Government but engineered by it. I
found and verified that almost a month before the Putsch, Goebbels told
Signor Cerruti, the Italian Ambassador in Berlin, that there would be a
Nazi Government in Vienna in a month. On the evening before the Putsch,
a pamphlet appeared in the streets of Berlin from which it appeared
that the Nazi Government had full knowledge of what was planned the
next day in Vienna. An attempt was made by the German authorities in
Berlin to suppress this pamphlet and this effort was partly successful
but copies of it were available at the time and I recall an officer
of our Embassy in Berlin, whose name I cannot specifically recall at
this time, informing me that he had seen a copy thereof. Articles also
appeared in some of the German papers of July 25, indicating that they
had information as to the time that the Putsch was to take place. I
will not go into detail as to the character of the evidence but there
is no question from the historical record and the facts as known to me
from direct knowledge at the time that the Putsch was engineered and
directed by the German Government from Berlin and Munich.
For two years following the failure of the July 25 Putsch, the Nazis
remained relatively quiet in Austria. Very few terroristic acts
occurred during the remainder of 1934 and as I recall in 1935 and
most of 1936; this inactivity was in accordance with directives from
Berlin as direct evidence to that effect, which came to my knowledge
at that time, proved. Early in January, the Austrian Foreign Minister,
Berger-Waldenegg, furnished me a document which I considered accurate
in all respects and which stated:
“The German Minister here, von Papen, on the occasion of his last
visit to Berlin, was received three times by Chancellor Hitler for
fairly long conversations, and he also took this opportunity to call
on Schacht and von Neurath. In these conversations the following
instructions were given to him:
“During the next two years nothing can be undertaken which will
give Germany external political difficulties. On this ground,
everything must be avoided which could awaken the appearance of
Germany interfering in the internal affairs of Austria. Chancellor
Hitler will, therefore, also for this reason not endeavor to
intervene in the present prevailing difficult crisis in the National
Socialist Party in Austria, although he is convinced that order
could be brought into the Party at once through a word from him.
This word, however, he will, for foreign political reasons, give
all the less, as he is convinced that the for him desirable ends
may be reached also in another way. Naturally, Chancellor Hitler
declared to the German Minister here, this does not indicate any
disinterestedness in the idea of Austria’s independence. Also, before
everything, Germany cannot for the present withdraw Party members
in Austria, and must, therefore, in spite of the very real exchange
difficulties, make every effort to bring help to the persecuted
National Socialist sufferers in Austria. As a result, Minister of
Commerce Schacht finally gave the authorization that from then on
200,000 marks a month were to be set aside for this end (support of
National Socialists in Austria). The control and the supervision of
this monthly sum was to be entrusted to Engineer Reinthaler, who,
through the fact that he alone had control over the money, would
have a definite influence on the Party followers. In this way it
would be possible to end most quickly and most easily the prevailing
difficulties and division in the Austrian National Socialist Party.
“The hope was also expressed to Herr von Papen that the recently
authorized foundation of German ‘Ortsgruppen’ of the National
Socialist Party in Austria (made up of German citizens in Austria)
would be so arranged as not to give the appearance that Germany is
planning to interfere in Austrian internal affairs.
“He was also informed that an effort would be made through the
easing of the Auslandesperre, particularly with reference to the
more westerly Austrian Alps sections, so that to the German-Austrian
Alpenverein (Alps Association) a particular role was to be given. The
easing of the Auslandesperre was naturally only to be accorded to
those who obligated themselves to visit the more westerly Austrian
Alps sections and to go to fixed towns and live in specified hotels
or inns.”
This policy of the Nazis was dictated solely by considerations of
expediency. The basic aim of achieving Anschluss remained wholly
unchanged. The brutal murder of Dollfuss, the Austrian Chancellor, and
the unquestioned direct attack on Austrian sovereignty through the
Putsch, directed by the German Government from Germany, had so shocked
public opinion in Austria and in Europe that the Nazis could not afford
for the time being to take open action.
That the policy of Anschluss remained wholly unchanged was confirmed to
me by Franz von Papen when he arrived in Vienna as German Minister. It
will be recalled that he accepted this assignment as German Minister
even though he knew that he had been marked for execution in the St.
Bartholomew’s massacre on June 30, 1934. When, in accordance with
protocol, he paid me a visit shortly after his arrival in Vienna,
I determined that during this call there would be no reference to
anything of importance and I limited the conversation strictly to
platitudes which I was able to do as he was calling on me in my office.
I deemed it expedient to delay my return call for several weeks in
order to make it clear to von Papen that I had no sympathy with and
on the other hand was familiar with the objectives of his mission
in Austria. When I did call on von Papen in the German Legation, he
greeted me with “Now you are in my legation and I can control the
conversation”. In the baldest and most cynical manner he then proceeded
to tell me that all of Southeastern Europe, to the borders of Turkey,
was Germany’s natural hinterland, and that he had been charged with
the mission of facilitating German economic and political control over
all this region for Germany. He blandly and directly said that getting
control of Austria was to be the first step. He definitely stated that
he was in Austria to undermine and weaken the Austrian Government and
from Vienna to work towards the weakening of the Governments in the
other states to the South and South East. He said that he intended to
use his reputation as a good Catholic to gain influence with certain
Austrians, such as Cardinal Innitzer, towards that end. He said that
he was telling me this because the German Government was bound on this
objective of getting this control of Southeastern Europe and there was
nothing which could stop it and that our own policy and that of France
and England was not realistic.
The circumstances were such, as I was calling on him in the German
Legation, that I had to listen to what he had to say and of course I
was prepared to hear what he had to say although I already knew what
his instructions were. I was nevertheless shocked to have him speak so
baldly to me and when he finished I got up and told him how shocked
I was to hear the accredited representative of a supposedly friendly
state to Austria admit that he was proposing to engage in activities
to undermine and destroy that Government to which he was accredited.
He merely smiled and said, of course this conversation was between
us and that he would, of course, not be talking to others so clearly
about his objectives. I have gone into this detail with regard to this
conversation as it is characteristic of the absolute frankness and
directness with which high Nazi officials spoke of their objectives.
Nazi activities, forced underground in this period, were by no means
neglected. The Party was greatly weakened for a time as a result of
the energetic measures taken against the Putsch and as a result of the
public indignation. Reorganization work was soon begun. In October
1934 the Austrian Foreign Minister, Berger-Waldenegg, furnished me
the following memorandum, which he told me had been supplied to the
Austrian Government by a person who participated in the meeting under
reference.
“A meeting of the chiefs of the Austrian National Socialist Party
was held on the 29th and 30th of September, 1934, at Bad Aibling in
Bavaria.
“The meeting occupied itself principally with the reorganization
of the Austrian National Socialist Party and particularly with the
measures to be taken to this end in the Tirol.
“Measures were decided upon as to the means to be used to create
better contact between the party leadership and its members as well
as with respect to new propaganda measures.
“One principal point on the agenda had reference to the preparatory
measures to be taken for taking over the power in Austria. It
was decided to give to all of the Party Headquarters in Austria
instructions preparatory to new Terroristic acts. The necessary
material, however, is nevertheless until new instructions are issued
not to be transported from the German border into Austria, but shall
be kept assembled at appropriate places on the German side of the
entire Austro-German frontier.
“From a report received by the Party chiefs on the situation in
Vienna and upper Styria, it is established that agreements have been
concluded with the Communists and with the Socialists with respect to
a uniform and common procedure.
“The agents of the Party Direction in Germany have received orders in
every Austrian district to prepare lists of all those persons who are
known to actively support the present Government and who are prepared
closely to cooperate with it.
“When the next action against the Government takes place these
persons are to be proceeded against just as brutally as against all
those other persons, without distinction of party, who are known to
be adversaries of National Socialism.
“In a report of the Party leaders for Austria the following
principles have been emphasized:
“A. The taking over of the power in Austria remains the principal
duty of the Austrian National Socialist Party. Austria has for the
German Reich a much greater significance and value than the Saar. The
Austrian problem is the problem. All combat methods are consecrated
by the end which they are to serve.
“B. We must on every occasion which presents itself appear to be
disposed to negotiate, but arm at the same time for the struggle. The
new phase of the struggle will be particularly serious and there will
be this time two centers of the terror, one along the German frontier
and the other along the Yugoslav frontier.”
The Austrian Legion was kept in readiness in Germany. Although it
was taken back some miles further from the Austrian frontier, it
remained undissolved in spite of the engagement which had been taken
to dissolve it. The Austrian Government received positive information
to this effect from time to time which it passed on to me and I had
direct information to the same effect from reliable persons coming from
Germany to Vienna who actually saw the Legion.
On the surface, however, German activities consisted principally of
efforts to win the support of prominent and influential men through
insidious efforts of all kinds, including the use of the German
Diplomatic Mission in Vienna and its facilities and personnel. Von
Papen as German Minister entertained frequently and on a lavish scale.
He approached almost every member of the Austrian Cabinet, telling
them, as several of them later informed me, that Germany was bound to
prevail in the long run and that they should join the winning side if
they wished to enjoy positions of power and influence under German
control. Of course, openly and outwardly he gave solemn assurance that
Germany would respect Austrian independence and that all that she
wished to do was to get rid of elements in the Austrian Government like
the Chancellor, Schuschnigg and Starhemberg as head of the Heimwehr and
others, and replace them by a few “nationally-minded” Austrians, which
of course meant Nazis. The whole basic effort of von Papen was to bring
about Anschluss.
In early 1935, the Austrian Foreign Minister, Berger-Waldenegg,
informed me that in the course of a conversation with von Papen, the
latter had remarked “Yes, you have your French and English friends
now and you can have your independence a little longer”. The Foreign
Minister, of course, told me this remark in German but the foregoing
is an accurate translation. The Foreign Minister told me that he had
replied to von Papen “I am glad to have from your own lips your own
opinion which agrees with what your chief has just said in the Saar
and which you have taken such pains to deny.” Von Papen appeared to
be terribly upset when he realized just what he had said and tried
to cover his statements, but according to Berger-Waldenegg, kept
constantly getting into deeper water.
Von Papen undoubtedly achieved some successes, particularly with
men like Glaise-Horstenau and others who had long favored the
“Grossdeutschtum” idea, but who nevertheless had been greatly disturbed
by the fate of the Catholic Church. Without conscience or scruple,
von Papen exploited his reputation and that of his wife as ardent and
devout Catholics to overcome the fears of these Austrians in this
respect.
Developments in the fall of 1935 and the spring of 1936 gave Germany
an opportunity to take more positive steps in the direction of the
Nazification of Austria. Italy, which had given Austria assurance
of support of the most definite character against external German
aggression, and on one occasion by mobilizing her forces, had
undoubtedly stopped German aggressive action which had been planned
against Austria, embarked on her Abyssinian adventure. This and the
reoccupation of the Rhineland in 1936 completely upset the balance in
Europe. The French and the British Minister informed me that as early
as August 1935, they had informed their Governments, on the basis of
conversations with the Austrian Foreign Minister, that if there was
to be any Danubian Pact, it would have to come into being rapidly for
the Austrian Government would be forced to negotiate with Germany even
though it would have no confidence that any such agreement arrived at
would be respected.
The result of all these forces was the Austro-German accord of July 11,
1936, the public text is as follows:
“Convinced that they are thereby rendering a valuable contribution
toward the peaceful development of Europe, and believing that they
are thereby doing the best service to the various common interests
of the two German States, the Government of the German Reich and the
Government of the Austrian Federal State have decided to restore
normal and friendly mutual relations.
“It is therefore declared:
“1. In the sense of the statement made by the Fuehrer and Reich
Chancellor on May 21, 1935 the German Government recognizes the full
sovereignty of the Federal State of Austria.[2]
FOOTNOTES:
[2] On May 1935, in a speech in the Reichstag, Hitler had stated
with respect to Austria (I quote from _Documents on International
Affairs_, Vol. I, 1935, published by the _Royal Institute of National
Affairs_, (London, 1936) p. 171):
“Germany neither intends nor wishes to interfere in the internal
affairs of Austria, to annex Austria, or to conclude an
”_Anschluss_“. The German people and the German Government have,
however, the very comprehensible desire, arising out of a simple
feeling of solidarity due to a common national descent--namely,
that the right to self-determination should be guaranteed, not only
for foreign nations but to the German people everywhere. I myself
believe that no regime which does not rest on public consent and is
not supported by the people can continue permanently.”
“2. Each of these two Governments shall regard the internal political
conditions of the other country, including the question of Austrian
National-Socialism, as a domestic concern of that country, upon which
it will exert neither direct nor indirect influence.
“3. The Austrian Federal State Government’s general policy and its
policy toward Germany in particular shall be constantly guided by the
Principle that Austria recognizes herself to be a German State. The
Rome Protocol of 1934, together with its additional clauses of 1936,
and the relations of Austria to Italy and Hungary, as partners in the
said protocols are not hereby affected.
“Recognizing that the relaxation of tension desired by both parties
can be brought about only if in addition certain preliminary
conditions are established by the Governments of both countries,
the Reich Government and the Austrian Federal Government shall in
a series of detailed measures create these required preliminary
conditions.”
Even more important than the terms of the agreement published in the
official communique, was the contemporaneous informal understanding,
the most important provisions of which were, that Austria would (1)
appoint a number of individuals enjoying the Chancellor’s confidence
but friendly to Germany to positions in the Cabinet; (2) would devise
means to give the “national opposition” a role in the political life
of Austria and within the framework of the Patriotic Front, and (3)
would amnesty all Nazis save those convicted of the most serious
offenses. This amnesty was duly announced by the Austrian Government
and thousands of Nazis were released, and the first penetration of the
_Deutsche Nationaler_ into the Austrian Government was accomplished
by the appointment of Dr. Guido Schmidt as Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs, and of Dr. Edmund Glaise-Horstenau as Minister without
portfolio.
The significance of these arrangements can best be explained by quoting
from an official dispatch which I wrote in October 1934 when concern
was being expressed with regard to conversations which Chancellor
Schuschnigg was reported as having with the “moderate Nazis”,
Reinthaller and Riehl. I then reported as follows:
“It is obvious, however, that in view of certain well known facts,
these conversations will be followed with interest. A major
consideration which will not be disregarded is the fact that
Chancellor Hitler himself has always been in favor of indirect rather
than direct action in bringing Austria into the German picture. It
is his belief that the way to be followed is to get representatives
of the National Socialist Party into the penetration. It is an
indication of political astuteness, for it is quite certain, in the
opinion of many objective observers, that if once a militant, even
though small, National Socialist minority gets representation in the
Cabinet, it will be the forerunner of absorption. To explain why
this is so is rather difficult, as it requires a full appreciation
of many factors at play in Germany and in Austria. Briefly, however,
it may be epitomized in the terroristic policy which is one of the
primary principles of National Socialism. Even before July 25,
when the National Socialist Party was legally prohibited, it was
very difficult to get proper police and judicial action against
National Socialists who committed terroristic acts or who were
plotting against the Government. This inaction came, not through
sympathy with the movement or through lack of definite knowledge
of overt acts, but through fear--through fear of reprisals when
a National Socialist regime might come, and that if it did come,
those who had proceeded, even though in the line of duty, against
National Socialists, would be dealt with with the barbarity and
intolerance with which National Socialism has treated its opponents
in Germany. The determined attitude of the Government after July
25, strengthened the administration of justice and of the security
forces, and this changed attitude came about as a result not only
of the feeling within the country that National Socialism would not
come now, but also as a result of the action of the powers in support
of the independence of Austria. Should the conversations which the
Government is having with the National Socialist groups reawaken
this fear, or should there be any weakening of the attitude of the
Government towards National Socialist be admitted even to indirect
or subordinate participation in the Government, it would undoubtedly
bring back this fear in an even more acute form and bring into what
element of weakness.
“The fact that these conversations are taking place need, therefore,
not be considered as being intrinsically a disturbing factor in the
internal and external situation of Austria, but should these National
Socialist elements in the Government, there is reason for the gravest
concern, not only so far as the internal situation in Austria is
concerned, but this might become the focal point of disturbance
without the country * * *”
The sequel of the agreement was the only one which could have been
expected in view of all the facts and previous recorded happenings.
Active Nazi operations in Austria were resumed under the leadership of
a certain Captain Leopold, who it was known definitely was in frequent
touch with Hitler. The Nazi program was now to form an organization
through which the Nazi could carry on their operations openly and
with legal sanction in Austria. There were formed in Austria several
organizations which had a legal basis but which were simply a device
by which the Nazis in Austria could organize, and later seek inclusion
as a unit in the Patriotic Front. The most important of these was the
_Ostmarkischer Verein_, the sponsor of which was the Minister of the
Interior Glaise-Horstenau. Through the influence of Glaise-Horstenau
and the pro-Nazi Neustadter-Sturmer, this organization was declared
legal by the Courts. I made specific mention of the foregoing because
it shows the degree to which the situation in Austria had disintegrated
as a result of the underground and open Nazi activities directed from
Germany.
Even more open recognition of the Nazis was demanded. In January 1937,
Captain Leopold submitted a memorandum of Nazi demands, which, though
not formally received, were known to and considered by the Austrian
Cabinet.
The Leopold memorandum is as follows:
For the Internal Pacification of Austria.
* * * * * * *
[In Mr. Messersmith’s affidavit there appears at this point the body
of Captain Leopold’s lengthy memorandum. It includes Captain Leopold’s
statement of the existing situation in Austria. It includes the
following demands: (1) An amnesty for all punishments or privations
suffered for National Socialist or National activity or sympathy;
(2) equal treatment for National Socialists, including freedom of
political activity and cultural activity; abolition of laws and
sanctions used by the Government against Nazi activity. The memorandum
advocates cooperation on the basis of political principles including: A
broadening of the Patriotic Front; changes in the Cabinet; an alliance
with the Reich; common racial stock as a political aim, and the
application of anti-Semitic measures; an early plebiscite on Anschluss.]
Later, a petition circulated by Leopold was submitted to the Austrian
Government, demanding authorization to form a “nationalistic party”,
which was to be incorporated as a group in the Political Front. It was
a Party which its sponsorship plainly marked as openly Nazi. Pressure
for the acceptance of these demands was exercised by staging frequent
demonstrations and circulating propaganda, all of which was financed
in and from Germany. Even as soon after July 11 as July 29, 1936,
when the Olympic Torch was carried through the streets of Vienna,
there were violent Nazi disorders. From then on, and until Austrian
sovereignty was destroyed, there were constant arrests and trials of
persons accused of distributing illegal literature or staging illegal
demonstrations, accompanied by numerous press comments of more or less
violence.
The Austrian Government sought to counteract this pressure in some way
by allowing activity in favor of a restoration of the Hapsburgs. On his
visit to Vienna in late February 1937, von Neurath took occasion to
register Germany’s emphatic opposition to any such move. I remember von
Neurath’s visit very clearly. I had known him well and was on friendly
terms with him while I was stationed in Berlin. At that time and after
the Nazi came into power, he told both Ambassador Dodd and me that he
had remained as Foreign Minister when the Nazi came into power in order
that he might exercise “a restraining influence” and render service to
his country. This may have been the initial motive of von Neurath but
he rapidly became one of the most complete and in some ways effective
instruments of the Nazis. If he was not in accord with what they did,
he was a perfect instrument in helping to carry it through.
Although I had known him well in Berlin and had on occasions been in
his house in small gatherings, when he came to Vienna in 1937, there
were a number of ceremonies and receptions given by the Austrian
Government to which the Diplomatic Corps was invited. When he met me
at these meetings he treated me with great coolness and even disdain,
knowing my complete lack of sympathy with the program to which he
had committed himself, and this manner of treating me with disdain
and open disregard was probably his way of protecting himself and
his own feelings of shame. Shortly after the visit of von Neurath,
Chancellor Schuschnigg in my conversations with him told me that in his
conversations with von Neurath, during the visit, von Neurath had been
just as bad as if Habicht or Frauenfeld had been talking when they had
discussed the German demands for the inclusion of Nazis in the Austrian
Cabinet.
About the same time, Schuschnigg made some concessions to ease the
pressure from the Nazis. In February, he appointed a so-called
“Committee of Seven”, consisting among others of Dr. Jury and a man
named Tavs, to discuss “nationalistic ambitions” with him. In June,
following the visit of Glaise-Horstenau and General Kraus and Leopold
to Hitler in Berlin, and the increased Nazi activities following,
Schuschnigg appointed Seyss-Inquart and Dr. Pembauer to devise a means
whereby the “Nationalists” could be incorporated into the Patriotic
Front.
Dr. Seyss-Inquart himself was a prominent Vienna Lawyer, who had
long been an intimate personal friend of Chancellor Schuschnigg. The
Chancellor himself told me on various occasions that Dr. Seyss-Inquart
had frequently attempted to convince him that the admission of the
Nazi into the Austrian Cabinet would be for the best interest of
Austria, in that it would relieve the pressure on Austria by Germany,
and that he (Seyss-Inquart) at all times professed a sincere desire to
maintain the independence of Austria. I had little personal contact
with Seyss-Inquart but I knew from various sources absolutely reliable
that while Seyss-Inquart was making these protestations to the
Chancellor with whom he had had this intimate friendship, and which
the Chancellor repaid by his confidence, Seyss-Inquart was in fact
completely insincere. He was known at the time, and I had knowledge
of this, to be in frequent contact with many high officials of the
German Government and that he had had contact with Hitler himself. My
information on this point was obtained not only from sources in Austria
but also from acquaintances in Germany. There is only one thing which
can be said in favor of Seyss-Inquart at the time and that is that he
perhaps did believe the German protestations made to him that Austria’s
independence would be respected. It is difficult, however, to conceive
that a man who was known to have the legal ability and intelligence
of Seyss-Inquart could have been completely taken in by these
protestations. The probabilities are that at least from the outset he
used his friendship with Chancellor Schuschnigg in order to help to
destroy the independence of his country in order to make a place for
himself.
I left Vienna on July 11, 1937, in order to assume the post of
Assistant Secretary of State in Washington. I, therefore, left Vienna
before the final tragedy occurred. The final outcome, however, was
then already foreseeable. From the tenor of the Italian Minister’s
conversations with me it was clear that Italy would not or could not
any longer defend Austria militarily against German aggression. It was
also clear that Austria could not resist the German pressures alone.
Although France had given very definite assurances as to her interest
in maintaining Austria’s independence and England had expressed her
interest therein, the Austrian Government was less and less able to be
assured of real support. When the Austrian government could no longer
expect the full military support of Italy, it knew that its fate was
sealed. Hitler was, therefore, free to work his will in Austria. The
only question remaining was when he would do it and when he considered
it opportune. The work of disintegration, set forth in this statement,
had had its effect. Early in 1938, apparently satisfied that England
and France would not move and knowing that Italy could not and would
not oppose him, Hitler struck the final blow at Austria’s independence,
bringing to a climax what must be recorded in history as one of the
most insidious, dastardly, unjustified and altogether effective series
of measures to undermine and bring about the end of a sovereign state,
during the course of which machinations and operations the Nazi
Government nevertheless consistently openly proclaimed its friendliness
towards Austria and its intentions of maintaining its respect for its
sovereignty and independence.
[Signed] G. Messersmith
Subscribed and sworn to before me, William L. Brewster, a Vice Consul
of the United States of America, duly commissioned and qualified, in
Mexico, D.F., Mexico, this 28th day of August 1945.
[Signed] William L. Brewster
Vice Consul of the United States of America
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1765-PS
The commissioner for the four year plan
Plenipotentiary for special missions
Berlin W8, Behrenstr. 43, 15 Jan 43
SECRET
To
1. His excellency, the Reich marshal of the Greater German
Reich--commissioner for the four-year plan--
_a._ Attention the secretary of state Koerner or his representative
_b._ Attention the ministerial dirigent Dr. Gramsch or his
representative
_c._ Attention ministerial councillor Dr. Kadgien or his
representative
_d._ Attention ministerial councillor Legler, or his representative
2. the commissioner for the four-year-plan- central planning-Attention
state councillor Schieber or his representative.
3. The high command of the armed forces
_a._ Office of economics--attention General Thomas or his
representative
_b._ Special staff HWK, attention Admiral Groos, or his representative
_c._ Office of foreign intelligence, attention Admiral Canaris, or
his representative
_d._ Army Administration Office, attention General Osterkamp, or his
representative
_e._ Armed forces budget dept., attention Ministerial dirigent Dr.
Tischbein, or his representative
_f._ Armed forces administrative dept., attention Intendant General
Dr. Biehler, or his representative.
4. The High Command of the army--Quartermaster General, attention Maj.
Gen. Wagner or his representative.
5. The Reich minister for Aviation and supreme commander of the
Airforce, attention Field Marshal Milch, or his representative
_b._ Administrative office of the airforce, attention General Crosrav
or his representative
_c._ Dept. GI--attention chief engineer Sellschopp, or his
representative
6. The high command of the navy, attention Admiral-General Witzell, or
his representative.
7. The Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police
_a._ SS Main office of economic administration, attention SS
brigadier General Loerner, or his representative.
_b._ SS-Office for raw materials--SS-Colonel Kloth, or his
representative.
8. The Foreign Office
_a._ Attention Ministerial Director Wiehl, or his representative
_b._ Attention VLR. Bisse, or his representative
_c._ Attention Minister Hemmen, or his representative
9. The Ammunition Ministry
_a._ Attention Reichsminister Speer, or his representative
_b._ Attention Commercial Attaché Ruckenbrod, or his representative
10. Reich Minister for Nutrition
_a._ Attention Secretary of State Backe, or his representative
_b._ Attention Ministerial Director Dr. Moritz, or his representative
11. Reich Minister of Finance
_a._ Attention Reichsminister Count Schwerin-Krosigk, or his
representative
_b._ Attention Ministerial Councillor von Knorre, or his
representative
_c._ Attention Government Councillor Nitschke, or his representative
12. The Reichsminister of Economy
_a._ Attention the secretary of State Dr. Landfried, or his
representative
_b._ Attention to the under secretary of state von Jagwitz, or his
representative
_c._ Attention for the President Kehrl, or his representative
_d._ Attention to the Ministerial Councillor Dr. Drexl, or his
representative
_e._ Attention of the Chief Councillor of government Dr. Goetze, or
his representative
13. The Main Office for Reich Security [RSHA]
_a._ Attention SS-Brigadier General Ohlendorf, or his representative
_b._ Attention SS-Colonel Schellenberg, or his representative
14. The Reich Commissioner for price control
_a._ Attention Minister Fischboeck, or his representative
_b._ Attention Government councillor Dr. Wurst, or his representative
15. The Auditor-Generals Office of the German Reich
_a._ Attention Ministerial Councillor Kuesel-Glogau, or his
representative
_b._ Attention Office Councillor Rueger, or his representative
16. The Military Commander in France
_a._ Attention KVCh Dr. Michel, or his representative
_b._ Attention KVACh Frhr. v. Mahs, or his representative
_c._ Attention OKVR Bolck, or his representative
_d._ Attention Intendant of General Staff Lenz, or his representative
17. The Military Commander in Belgium and Northern France
_a._ Attention KV Chief Reeder, or his representative
_b._ Attention Ministerial dirigent Dr. Schlumprecht, or his
representative
_c._ Intendant in charge, Intendant of General Staff Fritsch, or his
representative
18. Commissar of the Reich for the occupied Dutch Territories
_a._ Reichscommissar Dr. Seyss-Inquart, or his representative
_b._ Dept. of industrial economy, attention Chief Councillor of
government Dr. Heinemann, or his representative
_c._ Dept. of the four-year plan, attention Mr. Pluemer, or his
representative
19. Commander of the Armed Forces in the Netherlands
_a._ General Christiansen, or his representative
_b._ Intendant in charge, intendant of General Staff Dr. Geyer, or
his representative
20. The Plenipotentiary General for Economy in Serbia, Consul General
Neuhausen, or his representative
21. The Supervisory Office in Paris, attention Lt. Col. Koch, or his
representative, two copies
22. The Supervisory Office in Belgium, attention Lt. Col. V. Parish, or
his representative, two copies
23. The Supervisory Office in Lille, attention Major Woehlke, or his
representative, two copies
24. The Supervisory Office Netherlands, attention SS-Major Hanke, or
his representative, two copies
25. The Supervisory Office Belgrade, attention Major Werner, or his
representative, two copies
26. The Roges trading Company Ltd., attention Director Kraney, or his
representative
Enclosed I send copy of my second report of findings with the request
for acknowledgement.
Heil Hitler
signed: J. Veltjens
Col AC
certified:
Hillmann
office employee
The commissioner for the four-year plan
plenipotentiary for special missions
SECRET
2. Report of findings of the plenipotentiary for special missions
A. _Obtaining of war important goods on the black market in the
occupied western territories_ and in Serbia.
I. The black market up to the issue of the order to the
plenipotentiary for special missions.
II. Development of the black market since the 1 July 1942.
1. General
2. The organization created by the plenipotentiary for special
missions.
3. Scope of the previous purchases (per 30 Nov. 1942).
III. The further development
B. Obtaining of harbor installations and machines from shut down plants.
I. Harbor installations
II. Machines
C. Christmas action.
D. Miscellaneous.
# # # # #
A. _Providing of war important goods on the black market in the
occupied western territories and in Serbia._
I. The black market up to the issue of the order to the plenipotentiary
for special missions.
The beginning of a black market in the occupied territories can already
be ascertained in the time before the German troops entered. It started
however, on a large scale after the German occupation and as matters
were, the occupation authorities could not prevent this.--The following
reasons have necessarily led to its rise:
1. The scarcity of goods in consequence of the exploitation and
rationing as a result of hoarding as an escape into material values
(particularly in metals) and as a result of removal for the purpose of
sabotaging the German Military power.
2. The impossibility of enforcing price limits completely and
consequently a constant enlargement of the divergence of price between
raw materials and finished products on one hand and between goods and
wages on the other.
3. The impossibility of controlling the prices on the German
model because of the lack of personnel in the German supervisory
organizations.
4. The lack of effective support of the counter-measures by the
individual administrative state authorities, primarily in France.
5. The inefficient criminal justice of the individual state criminal
authorities.
6. The lack of discipline in the civilian population.
This development was accelerated--particularly since the year 1942--by
the attitude of numerous offices of the armed forces and other German
organizations. The raw materials and finished products needed by these
offices could often not be placed at disposal on the desired scale
by the home land within the framework of existing priority measures.
Consequently it became often actually the practice simply to use
the way of supply through the black market. The activity of German
agencies on the black market gradually reached an extent which led to
increasingly more unbearable conditions; it was daily routine for the
black marketeers to offer their goods simultaneously to several offices
for sale and that that office which offered the best price received the
merchandise so that the individual German formations in this manner not
only snatched the merchandise away from one another, but also, inflated
the prices.
Finally the black market dealings took a course which gave impetus to
the most serious fears with respect to market- and currency policy.
The military commanders in France, Belgium and northern France and
the Reichscommissar for the occupied territories of the Netherlands
therefore took measures during the course of the year 1941 to bring
this development to a halt. However, in this respect the lever was
not--at any rate not primarily--inserted at the price side because this
promised only little success in the face of the internal conditions
prevailing in the occupied territories; just as little could a
stricter control of prices be considered at that time. The central
occupation authorities rather began to do business themselves on the
black market, with the aim of slowly gaining control of it and then to
kill it gradually. These actions can be viewed as the predecessors of
the organization of the Bfs, (Plenipotentiary for special missions)
here also the purchased goods were distributed centrally and because
the winding up was also executed through the Roges (in France) or
through the AWG (in Belgium) and the Bfs in Holland in conjunction
with the department “four year plan” of the Reich commissioner on the
one hand and the departments of the Reich on the other. The purchase
was at times made through a single purchasing agency. However, such a
procedure had to be denied the desired success as long as it was not
possible to hold off all the other offices from activity on the black
market; it would have been a prerequisite for this, that all central
authorities in the Reich had instructed the departments subordinated to
them accordingly, but this was only done in part.
Finally, in June 1942 the plenipotentiary for special missions [Bfs] in
agreement with all central authorities was ordered to take charge of
the seizure and central control of the black markets. With that, the
prerequisite for an effective beginning regarding the problem of the
black market and with it the struggle against it existed for the first
time.
II. Development of the black market since 1 July 1942.
1. General.
The plenipotentiary for special missions has from the beginning on
viewed the purpose of the mission given to him less in presenting the
highest possible figures of purchases; the final aim was set rather to
combat the black market that is, to bring it to an end.
The starting point had to be however, that as long as in the occupied
territories an essential part of the goods existing or produced at all,
disappears by reason of inefficient control or various other reasons
in the black market, in the interest of supplying the German war
economy with the most important raw materials and finished products, as
textiles and PX rations, seizure of these goods could not be avoided.
One fact is overlooked again and again: that the black market is not
a phenomenon evoked through the activity of the plenipotentiary for
special missions or other departments, but--as is shown under I--has
developed inevitably from the economic situation of the market and will
exist and have to be exploited in the German interest as long as no
way has been found to break it up completely or at least check it to
the extent that the amount of goods caught through it are meaningless
within the framework of the total supply. However, the figures given
later on in detail show that for the time being there cannot be any
question about it.
But the figures given later on show also that the purchases made on the
black market could contribute essentially to the covering of many gaps
in the supply of the German war economy without impairing the quota of
deliveries in the occupied territories. Therefore the purchases can
already for this reason not be refrained from as long as it has not
been established that the goods can be secured in another way. The
objection that these goods could have been secured anyhow within the
frame work of the normal supply--and then much cheaper,--is incorrect.
A typical example is the result of the last negotiations with France
regarding leathergoods: Upon the desire of the Reichsminister of
economics, the chief plenipotentiary for special missions had agreed to
stopping the purchases on the leather and hide market, if the French
who had complained about the German buying activity on the black
market, would oblige themselves to deliver additionally in 1943 the
same amount which had been bought in 1942 on the black market; the
French declared that they did not feel in a position to do this. The
objection mentioned is overlooking the fact that merchandise which had
once been withdrawn from production or had been produced illegally,
will never again become “white”. What is done cannot be undone, the
black market is in existence and would also exist without any doubt
if not a single German department would work in this field. The black
market receives new impulse again and again and that on the one hand
from the supply side, and
1. from the large hidden stocks still in existence,
2. from the illegal production which is taking place continuously
(this subject will have to be investigated later on more in
detail),
3. in France--at any rate up to date--through continuous supply from
the unoccupied territory;
on the other hand, at the always increasing scarcity of goods every
item finds a buyer, either from the civilian population or industry,
or through purchase on the part of the Italians, Swiss, Spaniards;
yes, numerous purchases could even be ascertained--in particular
in unoccupied France--by the English or--evidently through British
instigation--from neutral sources, as for instance the Portuguese which
do not serve any other purpose than that of depriving Germany of the
merchandise.
The consequence of such sudden cessation of purchases through the
organization of the plenipotentiary for special missions would
therefore only be that a so far not inconsiderable source of raw
materials and war important finished products dries up without
achieving on this account the end of the black market. Besides, it has
to be doubted with good reason that it would be possible to keep up the
prohibition of purchases which was issued to the German departments
in the occupied territories, if the delivery by the organization of
the plenipotentiary for special missions would suddenly cease. This
applies particularly for the cases of the so-called immediate-need
[Sofort-Bedarf]. The conception that the black market will come to an
end if no more is bought on the part of the Germans, is incorrect.
[Marginal notation in handwriting is inserted here: “Yes, our work
has to begin _here_; with it we hit then the French black market
primarily”.]
The central purchasing organization of the plenipotentiary for special
missions for instance does not buy agricultural products (only some
particularly reasonable items in price have been bought, which however
are not at all worth mentioning within the framework of the total
supply) and nevertheless the black market is the most significant just
on this sector.
It has been explained that further activity on the black market at the
scale up to date will in the long run not be bearable any more for the
budget of the Reich. However, in this respect it has to be pointed
out that the greatest part of the purchases--that is the ones made in
France--have been financed from the French costs of occupation. Of RM
1,107,792,819----the total amount of purchases, RM 929,100,000 have
been financed from French occupational funds. Therefore a debit to the
budget of the Reich did not arise to this extent.
The claim that the black market or the activity of German departments
on the black market would bring about an increasing decline of the
currency in the occupied territories, cannot be recognized as the
truth. The decline of the currency which has in part actually occurred
already, is not a consequence of the black market, but on the contrary,
the inflationary tendencies accompanying the increasing scarcity of
goods have evoked the rise of the black market.
At this place it will not be necessary to elaborate on the advantages
of a centralized obtaining of the purchases on the black market; only
two points of view shall be emphasized:
1. While in the time before the commissioning of the plenipotentiary
for special missions, the prices on the black markets rose always
further,--for the most part a consequence of the mutual competition of
the individual German buyers--it has since been possible, to stabilize
the prices of most goods, and this in spite of the fact that the
_general_ level of prices in the occupied territories has risen further.
2. While until the commissioning of the plenipotentiary for special
missions, the individual German departments received and used the goods
purchased by themselves uncontrolled, without regard to the degree of
necessity, the distribution now takes place within the scope of total
planning by the Reich according to the degree of _urgency_.
In summarizing, it has to be said that in the face of the supply
situation of the Reich, it cannot be refrained from skimming the black
market now as before as long as there are still concealed stocks of war
important goods. With regard to this higher interest all other points
of view have to remain in the background.
2. The organization created by the plenipotentiary for special missions.
In his report at the end of August 1942, the plenipotentiary for
special missions has presented in detail the organization created
by him for the getting hold of and centralized control of the black
market. Therefore here a short review only shall be given.
The general control and supervision of the purchasing activity is the
task of the supervising offices newly created for this purpose.
They are:
_a._ the supervising office France with its seat in Paris
_b._ the supervising office Belgium and Northern France with its seat
in Brussels
_c._ the supervising office Belgium and Northern France, Lille
branch, with its seat in Lille
_d._ the supervising office Netherlands with its seat in the Hague
_e._ the supervising department Serbia with its seat in Belgrade.
Principle and directives for the execution are on the one hand
“the instructions for the winding up of stocks of merchandise of
uncertain origin” issued by the plenipotentiary for special missions
in agreement with the military commanders of the Reich commissar for
the occupied Dutch territories and on the other hand the contracts
concluded by the Roges raw material trading company Ltd. with the
purchasing organizations. The purchases themselves are made by a
restricted number of authorized purchasing organizations, of which
there are in France 11, in Belgium 6, in the Netherlands 6 and in
Serbia 3. Thereby the total purchasing activity is subordinated to the
central supervision of the plenipotentiary for special missions. Each
purchasing organization is only authorized for a quite definite kind
of goods. The engagement of a number of purchasing organizations which
will on first sight appear comparatively high was necessary, because
the black marketeers by experience want to sell for the most part only
to certain departments, with which they have cooperated before and
because they refuse to cooperate with other buyers whom they did not
know previously; it had to be taken care, however, that none of the
existing sources dried up. Participation has been prohibited to all
other departments by corresponding orders of the central authorities in
the Reich and the military commanders of the Reich commissioner.
The financing of purchases and the transportation of the goods will
be taken care of by the Reich-owned Roges Ltd.; the goods are then
distributed according to the urgency of the individual consumers in
agreement with the instructions of the centralized planning or the
departments charged by the centralized planning. It is the additional
task of the Roges Ltd., to level the purchasing prices down to the
German internal price; lower prices, however, will not be granted for
deliveries to the armed forces, authorized and--in case of investment
goods--to big plants. The adherence to the directives is guaranteed
by the fact that the purchasing organizations at each offer may only
then perform the transaction, if the supervising department has given
its permission through an expert. The experts for their part will make
their decision on the basis of the price and quality limits given by
the plenipotentiary for special missions or the Reich departments.
3. Scope of the previously made purchases (up to 30/11/1942).
_a._ Since the beginning of the action (that is since purchases have
been directly centralized by the military commander or the Reich
commissar with centralized distribution of goods in the Reich).
Up till now since the beginning of the action purchases have been made
in the total amount of RM 1,107,792,818.64, of which
in France RM 929,100,000.00
in Belgium RM 103,881,929.00
in Holland RM 73,685,162.64
in Serbia RM 1,125,727.00
Payment takes place in France from the funds for occupation, in the
other countries through clearing.
In the following is a statement of the quantities involved:
1. _Metals_:
66,202 tons to the value of RM 273,078,287.00 of which there are
_a._ non-ferrous metals 58,742 tons, in particular copper and copper
containing material (34,000 tons), lead and lead alloys (14,500
tons), furthermore (in the succession of their quantity) zinc,
aluminum, tin, nickel, magnesium, antimony, manganese ore;
_b._ material containing iron (tools, junk, etc.) 7,460 tons.
2. _Textiles_:
To the total value of RM 439,040,000.00, of which there are 22,672,000
pieces of linen, suits (particularly workers’ clothing), overcoats,
etc., 5,488,000 kg yarn and miscellaneous, 40,642,000 m cloth and
ribbons, 10,072,000 pairs of gloves, suspenders, etc.
3. _Leather, skins, and hides_:
To the total value of RM 120,754,000.00, of which there are 5,053,000
kg raw hides, 3,390,000 square feet of finished leather, 1,783,000
pieces of hides, chamois, etc., 801,000 pairs of shoes, and 694,000 kg
leather for soles and other shoe soling articles.
Furthermore was bought:
industrial oils and fats (1,330 tons)
food oils and fats (346 tons)
wool
household articles
PS goods including paper articles
wines and alcoholic drinks
equipment for engineers
sanitary necessities
sacks
The factors leading to excessive raising of prices of essential goods
are at the present time the following:
-----------+--------+---------+-------------
| | | The
| France | Belgium | Netherlands
-----------+--------+---------+-------------
Metals | 9 | 9 | 5-6½
Textiles | 4 | 6½ | 5
Hides | 6½ | 6 | 4
Leather | 6½ | 6 | 6
-----------+--------+---------+-------------
Since beginning of the action the following items were bought in
_France_--against payment from occupation funds:
Metals RM 248,000,000.00
Textiles RM 340,000,000.00
Hides, skins, leather RM 112,000,000.00
Wool RM 3,000,000.00
Oils & fats (for industrial and food purposes) RM 12,000,000.00
Household goods RM 46,600,000.00
PK goods RM 33,000,000.00
Wines and alcoholic drinks RM 50,000,000.00
Sacks RM 10,500,000.00
Paper and packing material RM 5,000,000.00
Food and pleasure items RM 33,000,000.00
Chemical products RM 8,000,000.00
Sanitary necessities RM 12,000,000.00
Miscellaneous RM 16,000,000.00
-------------------
TOTAL SUM RM 929,100,000.00
Since beginning of the action the following items were bought in
_Belgium_--against payment by clearing:
Metals RM 13,784,000.00
Textiles RM 43,755,000.00
Leather, skins & hides RM 4,030,880.00
Wool RM 2,179,720.00
Industrial oils & fats
Chemical products
Food-oils & fats RM 3,815,159.00
Household goods RM 2,512,912.00
Furniture RM 418,035.00
Paper & packing material RM 5,561,268.00
Food & pleasure items RM 3,393,955.00
Engineer equipment RM 7,500,000.00
Miscellaneous RM 16,931,000.00
--------------------
TOTAL SUM RM 103,881,929.00
Since beginning of the action the following items were bought in the
_Netherlands_--against payment through normal bank transactions:
Non-ferrous metals RM 6,706,744.00
Textiles RM 55,285,568.00
Wool RM 753,878.00
Leather, hides & skins RM 4,723,130.00
Wooden barrels RM 254,982.00
Furniture RM 272,990.00
Food-and pleasure items RM 590,859.00
Chemical-and cosmetic articles RM 152,191.00
Various iron-and steel goods RM 3,792,166.00
Rags RM 543,416.00
Motor oil RM 52,284.00
Raw diamonds RM 25,064.00
Miscellaneous RM 531,890.00
--------------------
TOTAL SUM RM 73,685,162.00
In Serbia was bought against payment through clearing:
Non-Ferrous metals in the amount of RM 1,125,727.00
The action began here only in the month of November. Up to date the
goods charged to the receivers amounted to a total of RM 86,084,910.06.
The reasons why, at a total delivery of RM 1,107,792,819.00 no larger
quantities could be completely wound up, are various (aggravation of
the winding up through the procedure in fixing the prices, difficulties
in transportation, lack of personnel). The Plenipotentiary for special
missions has instigated measures, in order to accelerate the wind-up in
the future.
_b._ Since the beginning of the activity by the plenipotentiary for
special missions, on the 1/7/1942, the following was bought (up to
30/11/1942):
Altogether for RM 840,382,893.00
of which
metals RM 174,982,697.00
textiles RM 318,013,354.00
leather, skins and hides RM 82,265,070.00
The figures mentioned above comprise roughly about the same period of
time (1/7/-30/11, i.e., five months) as the purchasing action of the
military commander or the Reichs Commissar before commissioning of the
plenipotentiary for special missions (in France 6 months, in Belgium 2
months, in the Netherlands 7 months); the figures are however several
times higher (RM 840,382,893.00--in contrast to RM 267,409,926.00).
This proves more than anything else that and to what degree, the
concentration of purchases on the black market through the organization
of the plenipotentiary for special missions and the placing of the
purchased goods at the disposal of the total planning of the Reich
succeeded.
III. The further development.
There is not any doubt that the black market as such from the viewpoint
of political economy is extremely undesirable and that therefore
everything has to be attempted to bring it to an end. In this respect
it is also necessary that the German purchasing activity be stopped
as soon as possible. But on the other hand, as has already been
explained above in detail, the delivery of war important raw materials
and finished products cannot be refrained from. The plenipotentiary
for special missions has therefore made his own suggestions to the
departments involved to the effect the purchasing activity be abandoned
by degrees if the black market is suppressed by corresponding measures;
in this respect it must be certain however, that the quantities of
goods which flowed up to date to the black market will now go into
the “white” production and into normal trade. Naturally, however,
repressive measures have to precede this; only then can the gradual
abandoning of the purchasing activity take place in order to impair the
total influx of goods as little as possible.
In examining the measures to be taken for the fight against it, a
distinction must be made between the sources, from which the black
market is fed. First, there are the concealed stores established for
most varied reasons whose sale will bring a one time flow of goods.
Second, the black market is fed by continuous illegal production. It is
certain that with continued duration of the war the second mentioned
source will gain more and more in importance; therefore special
attention has to be paid to it.
The illegal production has its cause--aside from the general lure
of higher prices--in the fact that the price divergence between raw
materials and finished products has partly become so great that it
cannot be bridged any more within the framework of normal production
without endangering the solvency of the enterprise. Often the
capacity of the enterprise is exploited only incompletely so that the
entrepreneur, even if it is only in order to avoid a shut-down, turns
to procurement of raw materials illegally in order to produce beyond
his quota, that is, illegally. Previously the purchases in unoccupied
France which were sent on special routes into the occupied territory,
formed a third and considerable source. It remains to be seen, whether
it is now possible to supervise production in the up to now unoccupied
part of France on a stricter basis so that, here also, the fight
against the black market can be initiated.
According to the conception prevailing here, the following measures for
the removal of the black market would have to be effected:
1. Enlargement of the price supervision.--As an increase in personnel
of the German departments entrusted with the supervision does not
or only at a restricted scale seem possible, the administrative
authorities of the individual state have to be constrained to show more
activity.
2. The enactment of severer penalties for violations against measures
of economic management taken in accordance with the German example
because only then can the lack of discipline in the civilian population
resulting from their individualistic and liberalistic attitude be
removed. A supervision of the verdicts of the penal authorities of the
individual states seems to be recommendable.
3. The announcement of awards for reporting violations against measures
of economic management amounting to a not too small percentage of the
value of the objects confiscated on the basis of the report.
4. Engagement of spies and agents provocateurs.
Besides for the prevention of illegal production:
5. Shut down of all plants which are not manufacturing for war purposes.
6. Stricter shut-downs or merger of plants whose capacity is exploited
immediately only.
7. Stronger supervision of the production in factories.
8. Stricter scrutiny in the allotment of raw materials for the
distribution of orders.
9. A price policy which gives to the enterprises sufficient prices and
guarantees them the existence.
In order to create for the purchasing organizations of the
plenipotentiary for special missions the basis for purchasing activity
on the black market in the face of the administrative authorities of
the individual state in the occupied territories, the plenipotentiary
for special missions has in Belgium and in the Netherlands effected
a “decree on the clarification of unexplained goods” or a “general
decree”. Hereby the supervising departments and their purchasing
organizations were given simultaneously the possibility of approaching
through purchases of goods the source of error in management and
control. In accordance with it a suggestion was made by the
plenipotentiary for special missions also to Ambassador Hemmen for
France, which will result in the issue of such a decree for France also
in cooperation with the military commander.
Most important and promising of success for the beginning appears the
measure outlined in 2 whereby the initial effort should be made toward
commerce and there again first toward retail business. As soon as a
number of draconic penalties has occurred, the retail dealers will in
their own interest refrain from buying excessively priced merchandise
from the wholesalers and manufacturers. The latter face then only the
organization of the plenipotentiary for special missions; then it
could be started by degrees to let the illegal producers crack up.
The plenipotentiary for special missions has in this respect already
performed certain preliminary work by directing part of the purchasing
organizations to try to approach the manufacturers by eliminating of
the black market traders.
The repressive measures mentioned above--particularly under 1 and
2--have to be performed in close cooperation with the individual state
authorities; it is recommendable that as soon as possible proper
measures be taken on the part of the German occupation authorities. The
measures have to be accompanied by purposeful propaganda of press and
radio (branding the black market as a crime against one’s own people);
in order to build psychologically foundation for the strict measures
with the population and to rouse it to cooperation.
Further, French and Belgium government--and economic circles--among
others also the French chief of government--have lately found it
necessary to complain about the organized German purchasing activity.
In the face of such representations--aside from various other
arguments--it should be pointed out that also on the part of Germany
the greatest interest exists in the disappearance of the black market,
but its existence is, in the main, the fault of the government
authorities themselves, through their incapability in the supervision
of prices and their laxity in penal prosecution, whereby, lack of
discipline is bred within their own population.
B. Providing of fort installations and machines from shut-down plants.
I. Harbor installations.
A large amount of harbor equipment exists in the occupied western
territories, which at the present time is not or is insufficiently
used. On the other hand, in the eastern territories as well as partly
in the Reich there exists an urgent need for such harbor installations.
The plenipotentiary for special missions has therefore received the
directive to seize these idle potentialities, in agreement with the
departments involved. The determination of the objects to be shipped
is up to the Reich commissar for navigation or those needing the
goods after confiscation by the responsible navy departments, the
plenipotentiary for special missions effects the financial settlement
and puts the objects for installation at the disposal of those needing
them. So far installations of that kind could already be provided for
Oslo and for Hamburg; further transactions are in the process of being
executed.
II. Machines.
Another task of the plenipotentiary for special missions is the
seizure of machines from closed down plants. It is certain that large
potentialities, particularly in machine-tools which are badly needed
at home for the armament productions, are at the present time still
idle. In agreement with the plenipotentiary for special missions,
the military commander and the plenipotentiary for the production of
machines a so-called “arbitration offices for machines” is anticipated
in Belgium and the Netherlands. One of the main difficulties in this
field lies in the overcoming of the resistance of both the owner of the
plants involved and the individual state authorities in the occupied
territories. Here the occupational authorities will have to employ all
their initiative in order to break this resistance.
C. Christmas-Action.
At the end of August 1942 the plenipotentiary for special missions
received a further special task, i.e. the providing of Christmas
presents for the German people. Initially the action was calculated to
amount to RM 300,000,000 (internal price). This task was undertaken
immediately with all possible vigor, though it could be foreseen
that providing and transportation of such quantities of goods in the
comparatively short time available until Christmas could hardly be
achieved; as the providing should if possible take place in the normal
way--by payment through clearing also in France--and _not_ on the black
market, an organization had first to be created in order to master this
task.
Actually it was possible to provide goods to the value of approximately
RM 244,000,000 (purchase price) up to the 20 December 1942. But on
account of the difficulties of transportation occurring in conjunction
with the political events in France as well as the procedure necessary
for fixing the prices and other reasons, it was impossible to bring all
of these goods to Germany and to make them available for sale on time.
2,306 box-cars with 11,138,229 kg and further by ship 6,335 bales of
goods with over 100,000 kg arrived in Germany. In the first place they
comprise cosmetics, toys and in general gift-articles. Distribution
was primarily made in the bomb-damaged regions as well as in the
big cities Berlin, Vienna, Hamburg, Breslau, Koenigsberg and in the
industrial region of Waldenburg and Upper Silesia. A conclusive report
in the Christmas-action will be presented in the course of the month of
February. If an identical action should be contemplated in the year of
1943 on the basis of experiences made it would have to be started in
the course of the month of March.
D. Miscellaneous.
Recently a report has been made to the commissioner for the four-year
plan on the other fields of activity of the plenipotentiary for special
missions insofar as the providing of additional shipping space for war
important purposes is concerned.
A report on the special imports by way of blockade running is
anticipated.
On the orders issued recently
_a._ in the field of the so-called “commodity-arbitrage”
_b._ the economic use made of enemy property,
a report shall be rendered at opportune time.
Signed: J. Veltjens
Colonel of the Air-Force.
Berlin, 15 Jan. 1943
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1770-PS
1933 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 161
Law concerning Factory Representative Councils and Economic
Organizations of 4 April 1933
The Reich Cabinet has decided the following law which is hereby made
public:
Chapter I
_Factory Representative Councils_
Article 1
1. The Highest Authority of the Federal State can postpone the
elections for the Legal Factory Representative Council for the Federal
State, parts of the Federal State or for individual enterprises until
30 September of this year at the latest for reasons of public safety
and order.
2. The Factory Representative Council existing up to date remains
in office in the case of postponement of the elections. Filling of
vacancies in Factory Representative Councils caused by dismissal of
members is only necessary if the number of its members has fallen below
half of the legal number of members or if they number less than three.
The new members of the Factory Representative Council required for its
minimum strength will be nominated from the eligible workers by the
highest authority of the Federal State or the authority appointed by it.
Article 2
The highest authority of the Federal State can cancel the membership
of members who have been appointed contrary to the spirit of State and
economy [die in Staats- oder Wirtschaftsfeindlichem Sinne eingestellt
sind.] It can appoint new members for the Factory Representative
Councils from the eligible workers to replace the eliminated members.
Article 3
The aforementioned regulations will be applied accordingly to the
“United Factory Councils”, created according to Article 50 of the
Factory Council Law and to the “Special Representations” formed
according to Articles 61 and 62. Article 93 of the Factory Council Law
will not be applicable in the case of disputes concerning the execution
of the above-mentioned regulations.
Article 4
The competent highest Reich authorities will be appointed to exercise
the powers for the highest authority of the Federal State contained in
Chapter I, in the case of the administrations and enterprises of the
Reich, including the German Railroad Company and the Reichsbank.
Article 5
The regulations contained in Article 1, para. 2 and Article 2, 2nd
sentence are also applicable to measures taken before the effectiveness
of this law.
Chapter II
_Dismissal of Workers_
The right to oppose dismissal of a worker contained in Article 84
of the Factory Council Law is not applicable if the dismissed is
suspected of an unfriendly attitude towards the State. The worker can
appeal within a week to the authority declared competent according to
Chapter I, Article 2. That authority decides, after hearing all those
concerned, whether the suspicions are justified or not. The dismissal
is cancelled if its findings are negative.
Chapter III
_Representation of Economic Organizations within the Miners Insurance_
Article 1
Article 184, Article 157, sentences 2 and 3 and Article 180, part 3 of
the Reich Mining Law are hereby revoked.
Article 2
The Reich Labor Minister can charge members of the insurance or mine
supervision authorities, as commissioners with the tasks of the
instances which are in office at the time; the commissioners are under
the authority of the Reich Labor Minister.
Chapter IV
_Legal Representation before the Labor Court_
The following part 3 is added to Article 11 of the Labor Court Law:
The Reich Labor Minister can, in agreement with the Reich Economy
Minister and the Reich Minister of Justice, put other organizations on
the same level for legal representation as the organizations named in
parts 1 and 2.
Chapter V
_Directives of Execution_
The Reich Labor Minister has the power to issue legal decrees and
general administrative directives in order to insure the execution of
the Regulations of this Law; he is authorized to change regulations of
the Reich Mining Law in order to adapt them to the decrees of Chapter
III of this Law.
Berlin, 4 April 1933
The Reich Chancellor
Adolf Hitler
The Reich Labor Minister
Franz Seldte
The Reich Minister of the Interior
Frick
For the Reich Minister of Justice
The Reich Minister of Finance
Count Schwerin von Krosigk
The Reich Minister of Economy
Hugenberg
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1773-PS
THE LAW OF THE GENERAL GOVERNMENT
[Das Recht des Generalgouvernements] Krakau, 1941
_E 8. Impounding of Valuables_
E 800. Decree on the Sequestration of Property of the Former Polish
State in the General Gouvernement.--15 November 1939
On the basis of Article 5, section 1 of the decree of the Fuehrer
and Reich Chancellor governing the administration of occupied Polish
territory dated 12 October 1939 (RGBl I, page 2077), I issue the
following order:
Article 1--1. All movable and stationary property of the former
Polish State with accessories, including all demands, participation,
rights and other interests inside the General Gouvernement, will be
sequestered for the purpose of securing all manner of public valuables.
2. The seizure, administration, and utilization of the sequestered
property is the duty of the department “Trusteeship for the General
Gouvernement” in the office of the Governor General.
Article 2--The director of the department “Trusteeship for the General
Gouvernement” will in agreement with the director of the finance
department in the office of the Governor General issue the regulations
required to execute this decree, in particular on the duty to make a
declaration of the wealth belonging to the former Polish State as well
as the treatment of rights of third persons on the wealth of the former
Polish State and of claims against this wealth.
Article 3--This regulation will be effective on the day of its
publication.
The Governor General for the Occupied
Polish Territories
FRANK
# # # # #
E 810. Decree on the Right of Ownership of Wealth of the former
Polish Territories.--24 September 1940
On the basis of Article 5, section 1 of the decree of the Fuehrer and
chancellor of the Reich of 12 Oct 1939 (RGBl I, page 2077), I issue the
following order:
Article 1--The property sequestered on the basis of Article 1, section
1 of the decree on the confiscation of the wealth of the former Polish
State within the General Gouvernement of 15 Nov 39 (Verordnungsblatt
GGP, page 37) will be transferred to the ownership of the General
Gouvernement. A legal right of the General Gouvernement will not be
established by this transaction.
Article 2--1. Rights of third persons in the property mentioned in
Article 1 expire insofar as they existed before 20 November 1939.
2. It will be determined later on whether and to what extent an
indemnification can be granted to persons, especially to rightful
foreign claimants, for legal losses suffered through the action.
Article 3--The seizure and administration of the property mentioned in
Article 1 will be executed until further notice on the basis of the
regulation on the confiscation of the wealth of the former Polish State
within the General Gouvernement of 15 November 1939 (Verordnungsblatt,
GGP, page 37) and of the first executionary decree issued on 16 March
1940 (Verordnungsblatt GGP II, page 175).
Article 4--The director of the department “Trusteeship for the General
Gouvernement” in agreement with the director of the finance department
in the office of the governor general will be in charge of the property
mentioned in Article 1.
Article 5--This regulation will be effective on the day of its
publication.
The Governor General
FRANK
# # # # #
E 845. Decree on the Confiscation of Art Objects in the General
Gouvernement.--16 December 1939
On the basis of Article 5, section 1 of the decree of the Fuehrer and
Chancellor of the Reich on the administration of the occupied Polish
territories of 12 Oct 1939 (RGBl I, page 2077), I order the following:
Article 1--All art objects in public possession in the General
Gouvernement will be confiscated for the fulfillment of public tasks
of common interest insofar as it has not already been seized under the
decree on the confiscation of the wealth of the former Polish State in
the General Gouvernement of 15 November 1939 (Verordnungsblatt GGP,
page 37).
Article 2--With the exception of art collections and art objects which
were the property of the former Polish State, art objects will be
considered as owned by the public:
1. private art collections which have been taken under protection by
the special commissioner for the seizure and safekeeping of the art and
cultural treasures.
2. all ecclesiastical art property with the exception of those objects
required for the daily performance of liturgic actions.
Article 3--1. In order to determine whether art objects are public
property in the sense of this regulation, every private and
ecclesiastical art possession has to be registered with exact data on
the kind, nature and number of pieces.
2. Everyone who possessed or at the present time is in possession of or
else is entitled to dispose of such objects of art since 15 March 39,
is obliged to register the same.
3. Everyone is obliged to make upon request truthful and appropriate
statements.
Article 4--The special commissioner appointed by me for the seizure and
safekeeping of the art and cultural treasures will determine in cases
of doubt what art collections and art objects in detail will have to
be regarded on the basis of Article 2 of this regulation as public art
property. He also will decide on the eventual necessary exceptions.
Article 5--1. He will be punished with imprisonment
1. Who undertakes to conceal, sell or remove objects of art from the
General Gouvernement.
2. Who refuses or else gives incorrect or incomplete information
required from him on the basis of this decree.
2. The special court is competent for the trial.
Article 6--The special commissioner appointed for the seizure
and safekeeping of the art and cultural treasures will issue the
regulations necessary for the execution of this decree.
Article 7--This regulation will be put into effect immediately.
The Governor General for the Occupied
Polish Territories
FRANK
# # # # #
E 846. First Enforcement Regulation for the Order of 16 December 1939
on the Confiscation of Art Objects in the General Gouvernement.
In order to execute the decree on the confiscation of art objects in
the General Gouvernement of 16 December 1939 (Verordnungsblatt GGP,
page 209), I order the following:
Article 1--The registration decree in Article 3, section 1 of the
regulation must be carried out by 15 February 1940 with the office of
the special commissioner for the seizure and safekeeping of the art and
cultural objects, Cracow, Bergakademie.
Article 2--1. Objects of artistic, cultural-historical and historical
value which originate from the time before 1850, have to be registered.
2. The registration includes the following:
_a._ paintings
_b._ sculpture
_c._ products of handicraft (for instance antique furniture, china
ware, glass, golden and silver objects, Gobelins, rugs,
embroideries, lace-work, paramente, etc.)
_d._ drawings, engravings, woodcuts, etc.
_e._ rare manuscripts, musical manuscripts, autographs,
book-paintings, miniatures, prints, covers, etc.
_f._ weapons, armors, etc.
_g._ coins, medals, seals, etc.
3. Regarding the art objects mentioned in section 2, detailed
information has to be given, if possible, on the master, the time
of production, the contents of the representation, measurements and
material (for instance, wood, canvas, bronze, etc.)
Article 3--The special commissioner will send in writing his decision
in doubtful cases or in the eventual necessary exceptions as provided
for in Article 4 of the decree. The decision will be final.
Article 4--Scientific experts will be entrusted with the execution of
the decree.
The Governor General for the Occupied
Polish Territories
By order:
Dr. MUEHLMANN
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1774-PS
ORGANIZATIONAL LAWS OF THE GREATER GERMAN REICH
“Verfassungsrecht des Grossdeutschen Reiches” by Ernst Rudolf Huber.
FUEHRER, AND REICH-CABINET [REICH REGIERUNG, Page 223]
_a._ The Structure of the Reich-Cabinet
The political direction of the Reich is the task of the Fuehrer. The
Fuehrer selects, in all fields of political developments the goals
which should be attained, determines the methods to be used and makes
all fundamental decisions when necessary. The authority of the Fuehrer
[Fuehrergewalt] is the “Political Authority” in the new Reich. The
term “Leadership” expresses better the mobilization of the collective
political force of the people towards the achievement of the common
goal, than the term “Government” which has been used heretofore for
the highest authority of the State. The Fuehrer has the only final
power to decide in all matters concerning movement [party], people,
and Reich. He possesses and bears the historical responsibility to his
people. Even in instances, where the law assigns certain tasks to the
“Reichsregierung”, it is the Fuehrer who is responsible for the final
decision.
The Fuehrer avails himself, however, in his decisions of the counsel
and the constructive cooperation of his collaborators, especially the
Reich-Cabinet, which combines the Subordinate-Fuehrers [Unterfuehrer]
of the various departments of the State. The legal position of the
Reich-Minister was originally laid down by the Reich-Minister Law
of March 27 1930 (RGBl I 96). In its place Section XIII of the
German Civil Servant Law is now applicable, with the exception of
the regulations concerning the official salaries, service quarters,
moving--and travel expenses, where the old law remains valid. The
Reich-Ministers are appointed by the Fuehrer and maintain a public
service relationship towards him and the Reich. They take a special
oath before the Fuehrer when they assume their functions. They
cannot belong to any economic enterprise as chairmen or members
of administrative or supervisory councils while they hold office
(“economic incompatibility”). The Reich-Ministers can be dismissed
from their offices at any time by the Fuehrer. No disciplinary action
against them will be taken. Special treatment of the Reich-Ministers is
based on the fact that they are not “Civil Servants”. Civil Servants
are only the members of the Bureaus which are sub- and coordinated
to the hierarchic administrative structure, but not those who occupy
immediate state-directing positions to whom the Reich-Ministers belong
according to the present constitutional law.
The Fuehrer and Reich-Chancellor is at the top of the Reich-Cabinet. He
hands down the directives for the over-all operation of the Government
and the basic principles for the various departments. A number of
Bureaus are subordinated to him for direct counsel and assistance, as
follows:
1. The Reich-Chancellery (Chief: Reich-Minister, Dr. Lammers)
2. The Supreme-Command of the Armed Forces (Chief: Generaloberst (Gen.)
Keitel)
3. The Presidential Chancellery (Chief: State Minister Dr. Meissner)
4. The Privy Cabinet Council (President: Reich-Minister Frh. von
Neurath)
The Reich-Cabinet [Reich Regierung] comprises furthermore the
department ministries proper. It is constituted in the following manner
according to the official order of rank laid down in the year 1939:
1. The Deputy Commander for the Fuehrer (Reich-Minister Hess)
2. The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (Generaloberst (Gen.) Keitel)
3. General Field-Marshal Goering (Deputy for the 4 Year Plan)
4. Foreign Office (v. Ribbentrop)
5. Reich-Minister of the Interior (Dr. Frick)
6. Reich-Minister for Enlightenment of the People and Propaganda (Dr.
Goebbels)
7. Reich Air-Minister (Gen. Field-Marshal Goering)
8. Reich Finance Minister (v. Schwerin-Krosigk)
9. Reich-Minister of Justice (Dr. Guertner)
10. Reich-Minister of Economy (Funk)
11. Reich-Minister for Food and Agriculture (Darre)
12. Reich-Minister of Labor (Seldte)
13. Reich-Minister for Science, Education and National Culture (Dr.
Rust)
14. Reich-Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs (Kerrl)
15. Reich-Minister of Transportation (Dr. Dorpmueller)
16. Reich Postal Minister (Ohnesorge)
17. Reich-Minister Frank (Legal Affairs Reich-Fuehrer)
18. Reich-Minister Schacht
19. Reich-Minister Seyss-Inquart
20. Reich Forest-Office (Gen. Field-Marshal Goering)
The Commanders-in-Chief of the Army (Generaloberst (Gen.) v.
Brauchitsch) and of the Navy (Great-Admiral Raeder) have also the rank
of Ministers. Furthermore, the following participate regularly in the
sessions of the Government, whenever matters of their department are
being discussed:
1. The Prussian Finance Minister, Dr. Popitz.
2. The Reich-Fuehrer SS and the Chief of the German Police, Himmler.
3. The Reich Labor Leader in the Reich-Ministry of the Interior, Hierl.
4. The Chief of the Organization in Foreign Countries in the Foreign
Office, Bohle. In addition, the following Supreme Reich-Bureaus are
immediately subordinate to the Fuehrer:
1. Court of Accounts of the German Reich (State-Minister, retired,
Mueller).
2. Inspector General for the German Road System (Dr. Todt).
3. Reich Office for Area Control [Raumordnung] (Kerrl).
4. Youth-Fuehrer of the German Reich (v. Schirach).
Furthermore, the following are immediately subordinate to the Fuehrer:
1. The German Reich-Bank (President Reich-Minister Funk).
2. Inspector General of Constructions for the Reich Capital (Professor
Speer).
3. Counsellor General of Constructions for the Capital of the (party)
movement (Professor Giesler).
4. Reich Construction Counsellor for the town of Linz on the Danube.
The directors of these Reich Bureaus act as direct advisers and
collaborators of the Fuehrer in their department without being members
of the Reich-Government by authority of their office.
A privy cabinet council, to advise the Fuehrer in the basic problems
of foreign policy, has been created by the decree of 4 February 1938
(RGBl I, 112). This privy cabinet council is under the direction of
Reich-Minister v. Neurath, and includes the Foreign Minister, the
Air Minister, the Deputy Commander for the Fuehrer, the Propaganda
Minister, the Chief of the Reich-Chancellery, the Commanders-in-Chief
of the Army and Navy and the Chief of the Supreme Command of the
Armed Forces. The privy cabinet council constitutes a select staff of
collaborators of the Fuehrer which consist exclusively of members of
the Government of the Reich; thus, it represents a select committee of
the Reich Government for the deliberation on foreign affairs.
The law on the Supreme Leader of the State makes provision for
the nomination of a Deputy Commander for the Fuehrer and also a
Vice-Chancellor. Up to July 1934, von Papen, then Reich Minister, was
Vice-Chancellor. Since then, no such nomination has been promulgated.
The Deputy for the 4 Year Plan has a sort of representation in all
matters concerning the 4 Year Plan, “all competent instances of party
and state” being combined in his person, and he has been given the
power to “issue directives to all authorities, including the highest
Reich-Authorities and all offices of the party, its subdivisions
and its affiliated associations”. The deputy for the 4 Year Plan is
therefore within the limits of his authority superior to the other
Reich Ministers, particularly to the economic and military departments.
But he is not only superior to the offices of the State but also to
those of the party. He is (with the exception of the Fuehrer) the only
central authority which by virtue of an office (and not by virtue
of a personal union of a party and State office) can issue binding
directives to the offices of the party and the State. Considering the
tremendous importance of the 4 Year Plan, this position of the deputy
is an important means for securing unity between party and State.
This same object is furthermore pursued by the Office of the Deputy
Commander for the Fuehrer. While the Deputy for the 4 Year Plan
constitutes an authority of the State with the power to issue
directives to the party, the Deputy Commander for the Fuehrer
represents a party instance with authority to cooperate in State
affairs to a large extent. The “Ministry Hess”, with its Liaison-Staff
is charged to assert the influence of the party in the legislation and
administration of the State. All projects of politically important laws
have to be submitted to the Deputy Commander for the Fuehrer for his
preliminary examination. He naturally has the power to propose laws
from his side. His influence on the administration affects particularly
the selection of personnel. All appointments to be made by the Fuehrer
have to be examined first by the Deputy Commander for the Fuehrer.
Besides these individual powers, it is the duty of the Deputy Commander
for the Fuehrer to assert the will of the (party) movement in the
organization of the State, to settle difficulties which develop, to
investigate complaints, and thus to guarantee unity of party and State.
Unity of party and Reich-Cabinet is furthermore secured by the numerous
personal unions i.e. association of Central State Offices with
corresponding party offices. Such personal unions exist in the cases
of the Food Minister and the Propaganda Minister, the Chief of the
German Police and the Reich Labor Leader, the Chief of the Organization
in the foreign countries, and the Reich Youth Fuehrer. Furthermore,
the majority of the Reich-Ministries is occupied by leading old party
members. Finally, all Reich Ministers have been accepted by the party
on 30 January 1937 and have been decorated with golden party insignia.
_b._ The Reich-Cabinet as the bearer of responsible collaboration.
The relationship between the Fuehrer and the Reich-Cabinet differs
from the Weimar colleague-like system as well as from Bismarck’s
Chancellor System. The great political principles are determined by
the Fuehrer; the will of the government is not expressed by vote, as
under the colleague-like system; doubts and differences of opinion
are also settled by the Fuehrer (in contrast to the provisions of
Section 57 of the Weimar Constitution). The Reich-Ministers who act as
advisers to the Fuehrer owe him loyalty and obedience in accordance
with the oath they have to take by virtue of the law of 16 October
1934. The Fuehrer is therefore not “primus inter pares” (first among
equal ones), as it was featured in the colleague-like system, but he
is absolutely superior to the other Reich-Ministers. But, if therefore
the principle of authority prevails within the Reich-Cabinet it is not
permitted in this case in the least to become a formal bureaucratic
mechanism like the one that characterized the Chancellor System of
Bismarck. In the latter, the collaborators of the Reich-Chancellor,
the State-Secretaries, were not independent and responsible chiefs of
their departments, but they were the subordinates of the Chancellor and
administered in his name and by his orders the various Reich-Offices,
at the top of which stood the Chancellor. Even the law of 17 March
1878 concerning deputies did not change that state of affairs to any
extent. Such a bureaucratic system does not permit the collaborators
to develop a sense of enjoying responsible action and power of
resolution and prevents genuine deliberation, the prerequisite of
which is independence of the advisor. This is characteristic of an
administrative state, where everything depends on the authoritarian
technical functioning of the State apparatus. In the Reich of the
Fuehrer the decisive factors are that the collaborators are subordinate
leaders, that they are therefore possessed themselves with the desire
for creative leadership and responsibility.
The Fuehrer does not avail himself of the Reich-Ministers as
subordinate executive organs. The Reich-Cabinet is not a technical
apparatus. It is therefore inadmissible to consider the Reich-Ministers
as mere “Chiefs of Reich Offices” who preside over bureaucratic
institutions, rather Reich-Ministers in particular must become genuine
sub-leaders if the entire Reich is to be imbued with the spirit of
the Fuehrer system. In the Reich Cabinet, the Fuehrer procures for
himself the independent and responsible collaborators who do not only
technically direct the various offices but who are also capable to
act in a constructive and creative manner, within the scope of their
assignments. The Reich-Ministers are therefore not only advisors but
at the same time responsible creative assistants of the Fuehrer, who
administer their offices independently under the direction of the
Fuehrer. The prerequisite for the Fuehrer Principle which has been
realized in the Reich-Cabinet, is independent cooperation based on
confidence and responsibility, of the Fuehrer’s closest followers.
Thus, the Fuehrer Principle presents far higher requirements than the
bureaucratic absolutism and its not too different Chancellor System of
Bismarck.
In view of this structure of the Reich-Cabinet it is only natural
that the counter-signature, prescribed in Section 50 of the
Weimar Constitution for all decrees and regulations issued by the
Reich-President, becomes unnecessary for the decisions of the Fuehrer.
They do not require the counter-signature of the Minister of the
respective department. Compulsory counter-signature was an institution
of the constitutional and parliamentary system. The Minister who
counter-signed the orders of the Chief of State assumed thereby
responsibility before parliament. The counter-signature was thus
inseparably connected with the parliamentary responsibility of the
Ministers; it lost its political foundation with the revolutionary
elimination of parliamentarianism of any form. However, also in the New
Reich during the period of Reich President Hindenburg’s administration,
counter-signature of presidential acts by the Reich-Chancellor was
maintained. Of course, the counter-signing Reich-Chancellor or
Reich-Minister did not assume any more the “responsibility before
the Reichstag”, as was the case within the limits of the Weimar
parliamentary system. The counter-signature was used in this case
rather as a suitable technical form for safeguarding the unified
direction of the State as long as a dual Chief of State existed.
This technical reason for maintaining the counter-signature was
rendered unnecessary with the assumption of the presidential powers
by the Fuehrer. Today, it is not necessary any more according to
constitutional law. The decrees of the Fuehrer have legal force,
even if they are not counter-signed by a Reich-Minister. Such was
particularly the order of execution of the 4 Year Plan of 18 October
1936 (RGBl I, 887) which in fact contains a law issued by the Fuehrer
alone without any counter-signature.
As a rule, the decrees of the Fuehrer, are on the other hand, even
today co-signed by the Minister of the department concerned. Authorized
to co-sign are the Reich-Ministers, within the limits of their
departments. Furthermore the Chiefs of the Presidential-Chancellery
and of the Reich-Chancellery for their departments (Decree of 22
November 1934, not published), and also the State-Secretaries of a
Reich-Minister who is temporarily unavailable (Decree of 20 March
1935, RMinBl. 423). The decrees concerning the party are co-signed
by the Deputy Commander of the Fuehrer, decrees concerning the range
of problems of the 4 Year Plan by the Deputy of the 4 Year Plan and
the military decrees by the Chief of the Supreme Command of the
Armed Forces. The Chiefs of the Supreme Reich-Bureaus who are not
Reich-Ministers are not authorized to co-sign.
Co-signature is being regularly maintained for two reasons. For
once, the co-signature brings out the fact that the Minister of the
department is more than a mere technical auxiliary tool of the Fuehrer,
that he performs rather independent and objective work which requires
of course the approval of the Fuehrer but which is nevertheless the
Minister’s own work and performance. Thus, the co-signature gives
prominence to the fact that the Minister is an independent collaborator
and not only an executive instrument. Also, the co-signature is
therefore documentary proof--and this is the second reason--for the
responsibility of the Minister of the department, naturally not
before the Parliament but before the Fuehrer himself. By co-signing
the Minister accepts the responsibility before the Fuehrer that the
decree is practical, has been carefully considered and thoroughly
worked out. Such a responsibility of the Minister before the Chief of
the State could not exist under the radical parliamentary Republic.
The independence of the Minister from the Chief of State and his
responsibility before the Parliament would have been weakened in that
way. Under the old constitutional system, on the other hand, (as well
as under the presidential system formed after the constitutional
system) this responsibility of the counter-signing Minister also
before the Chief of State was in existence. This type of “Minister
responsibility” is indispensable under the Fuehrer Constitution. In
view of the number and the importance of affairs, it is self-evident
that the Fuehrer needs the advice, the suggestions, and the proposals
of his collaborators; political leadership is impossible without
reliable collaborators. The Ministers are responsible to the Fuehrer
by their oath for competent and reliable counsel and preparation of
his decisions. This responsibility of the Ministers of the various
departments finds its public expression by their counter-signature.
This counter-signature is not necessary, nevertheless. The Fuehrer can
do without it and issue all decrees and decisions which have full legal
effect by his own accord.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1775-PS
The OKW is asking the Fuehrer’s decision, concerning the following
proposals:
Orders will be given immediately, after the detailed numbers and
letters have been released by the Leader, for accomplishment.
1. To take no real preparatory measures in the Army or Luftwaffe. No
troop movements or redeployments.
2. Spread false, but quite credible news, which may lead to the
conclusion of military preparations against Austria,
_a._ through V-men [V-Maenner] in Austria,
_b._ through our customs personnel at the frontier,
_c._ through traveling agents.
3. Such news could be:
_a._ Furloughs are supposed to have been barred in the Sector of the
VII A.K.
_b._ Rolling stock is being assembled in Munich, Augsburg, and
Regensburg.
_c._ Major General Muff, the Military Attaché in Vienna has been
called for a conference to Berlin. (As a matter of fact, this is
the case).
_d._ The Police Stations located at the frontier of Austria, have
called up reinforcements.
_e._ Custom officials report about the imminent maneuvers of the
Mountain Brigade in the region of Freilassing, Reichenhall and
Berchtesgaden.
4. Order a very active make-believe-wireless exchange in Wehrkreis VII
and between Berlin and Munich.
5. Real maneuvers, training flights, and winter maneuvers of the
Mountain Troops near the frontier.
6. Admiral Canaris has to be ready beginning on February 14th in the
Service Command Headquarters in order to carry out measures given by
order of the Chief of the OKW.
7. An answer is requested to Lt General Keitel through the
Reich-Chancery.
Signed--Keitel.
14.2 7:30 Captain Eberhardt gives the information by phone,
that the Fuehrer has given his approval in all points.
Answer came only around 2 at night through Reich-Chancellery.
9:00 Telephone message transmitted to Admiral Canaris in
Munich.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1778-PS
THE POISONOUS MUSHROOM [Der Giftpilz]
A Stuermer book for young and old Fables by Ernst Hiemer
Pictures by Fips
Published by Der Stuermer--Nurnberg copyright 1938
* * * * * * *
[P.6] “It is almost noon,” he said, “now we want to summarize what we
have learned in this lesson. What did we discuss?”
All children raise their hands. The teacher calls on Karl Scholz, a
little boy on the first bench. “We talked about how to recognize a Jew.”
“Good! Now tell us about it!”
Little Karl takes the pointer, goes to the black board and points to
the sketches.
“One usually recognizes a Jew by his nose. The Jewish nose is crooked
at the end. It looks like the figure 6. Therefore it is called the
“Jewish Six”. Many non-Jews have crooked noses, too. But their noses
are bent, not at the end but further up. Such a nose is called a hook
nose or eagle’s beak. It has nothing to do with a Jewish nose.”
“Right!” says the teacher. “But the Jew is recognized not only by his
nose...” The boy continues. The Jew is also recognized by his lips. His
lips are usually thick. Often the lower lip hangs down. That is called
“sloppy”. And the Jew is also recognized by his eyes. His eyelids are
usually thicker and more fleshy than ours. The look of the Jew is
lurking and sharp.
[P.9] Then the teacher goes to the desk and turns over the black board,
on its back is a verse. The children recite it in chorus:
From a Jew’s countenance--the evil devil talks to us,
The devil, who in every land--is known as evil plague.
If we shall be free of the Jew--and again will be happy and glad,
Then the youth must struggle with us--to subdue the Jew devil.
[P.32] Inge sits in the reception room of the Jew doctor. She has to
wait a long time. She looks through the journals which are on the
table. But she is much too nervous to read even a few sentences.
Again and again she remembers the talk with her mother. And again
and again her mind reflects on the warnings of her leader of the BDM
[League of German Girls]: “A German must not consult a Jew doctor! And
particularly not a German girl! Many a girl that went to a Jew doctor
to be cured, found disease and disgrace!”
When Inge had entered the waiting room, she experienced an
extraordinary incident. From the doctor’s consulting room she could
hear the sound of crying. She heard the voice of a young girl: “Doctor,
doctor leave me alone!”
Then she heard the scornful laughing of a man. And then all of a sudden
it became absolutely silent. Inge had listened breathlessly.
“What may be the meaning of all this?” she asked herself and her heart
was pounding. And again she thought of the warning of her leader in the
BDM.
Inge was already waiting for an hour. Again she takes the journals
in an endeavor to read. Then the door opens. Inge looks up. The Jew
appears. She screams. In terror she drops the paper. Frightened she
jumps up. Her eyes stare into the face of the Jewish doctor. And this
face is the face of the devil. In the middle of this devil’s face is
a huge crooked nose. Behind the spectacles two criminal eyes. And the
thick lips are grinning. A grinning that expresses: “Now I got you at
last, you little German girl!”
And then the Jew approaches her. His fleshy fingers stretch out after
her. But now Inge has her wits. Before the Jew can grab hold of her,
she hits the fat face of the Jew doctor with her hand. Then one jump
to the door. Breathlessly Inge runs down the stairs. Breathlessly she
escapes the Jew house.
[P.61]
The pimpf [Hitler boy between 10-14] so far has not said anything.
Suddenly he stops. Then he grasps his two friends by the arm and pulls
them away. They stop in front of a bill-board. They read a large
poster. It says Julius Streicher makes an address in the People’s Hall
about “The Jews are our misfortune”.
“That is where we go!” shouts Konrad, “I wanted to hear him speak for a
long time.” “I have heard him once before at a meeting two years ago,”
says Erich. “Do tell us all about it!” the two pimpfs beg.
The Hitler youth recounts:
“The meeting was overcrowded. Many thousands of people attended.
To begin with, Streicher talked of his experiences in the years of
struggle, and of the tremendous achievements of the Hitler Reich. Then
he began to talk about the Jewish question. All he said was so clear
and simple that even we boys could follow it. Again and again he told
about examples taken from life. At one time he talked most amusingly
and cracked jokes, making all of us laugh. Then again he became most
serious, and it was so quiet in the hall that one could hear a needle
drop. He talked of the Jews and their horrible crimes. He talked of the
serious danger which Judaism is for the whole world.
“Without a solution of the Jewish question there will be no salvation
of mankind.”
That is what he shouted to us. All of us could understand him. And
when, at the end, he shouted the “Sieg-Heil” for the Fuehrer, we all
acclaimed him with tremendous enthusiasm. For two hours Streicher spoke
at that occasion. To us it appeared to have been but a few minutes.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1780-PS
Excerpts from General Jodl’s Handwritten Diary, February 1937-August
1939.
_1937_
_4 February_:
Decisive conference about the scarcity of raw materials by the
Commissioner of four-year plan.
Only 50% of steel and iron available, therefore rationing necessary.
Full allotment only for export. Armed forces and constructions for
four-year plan must be cut down by about 40%. Therefore, requests for
money have to be converted into requirements for raw materials. Three
branches of the Armed Forces and L. for R.V. special resources must
make up a priority sequence. Until further notice no more orders to be
placed with industry so they will have a chance to fill the many orders
previously placed with them.
The sentence “Money is an unimportant factor” has come true, even in
another sense. The main part is the raw materials.
Bad harvest and [illegible], especially bread grain [Brotgetreide],
demand considerable use of foreign currency for the feeding of the
people.
_31 March_:
Report to the Minister about the maneuvers of the Armed Forces. The
Field Marshal emphasized the necessity to bring some influence to bear
(on the maneuvers) in so far as a special Armed Forces problem has to
be dealt with daily. These exercises are to be designated as “Armed
Forces Maneuvers” (army, etc.). After two years, a two front war i.e.,
two maneuvers, should be presented.
_5 November_:
Hitler develops his ideas of future development, intentions, and
conduct of policy to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, the
Army, the Navy and the Air Force.
There is a divergence in the recording of his ideas as made by the
Chief of the Armed Forces Office (War Department) [des Chef WA (R Kr.
Min)] and by the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force (Directive to the
Chief of the General Staff of Air Force). (No minutes were kept).
Intention of L to put ideas on paper and transmit them to the Services
(C-in-C Air Force); furthermore, to incorporate them into mobilization
instructions.
_1938_
_11 February_:
In the evening and on 12 February General K., with General v. Reichenau
and Sperrle, at the Obersalzberg. Schuschnigg together with G. Schmidt
are again being put under heaviest political and military pressure. At
2300 hours Schuschnigg signs protocol.
_13 February_:
In the afternoon General K. asks Admiral C. and myself to come to his
apartment. He tells us that the Fuehrer’s order is to the effect that
military pressure by shamming military action should be kept up until
the 15th. Proposals for these deceptive maneuvers are drafted and
submitted to the Fuehrer by telephone for approval.
_14 February_:
At 2:40 o’clock the agreement of the Fuehrer arrives. Canaris went
to Munich to the Counter-Intelligence office VII and initiates the
different measures.
The effect is quick and strong. In Austria the impression is created
that Germany is undertaking serious military preparations.
_15 February_:
In the evening an official communique about the positive results of the
conference at the Obersalzberg is issued.
_16 February_:
Changes in the Austrian government and general political amnesty.
_22 February_:
At 1300 hours General K. sees the Fuehrer in order to inform him about
the planned advances [Vorstoesse].
_3 March_:
The Austrian question is becoming critical. 100 officers shall be
dispatched there. The Fuehrer wants to see them personally. They
should not see to it that the Austrian Armed Forces will fight better
against us, but rather that they do not fight at all.
_10 March_:
By surprise and without consulting his ministers, Schuschnigg ordered a
plebiscite for Sunday, 13 March, which would bring strong majority for
the Legitimists in the absence of plan or preparation.
Fuehrer is determined not to tolerate it. The same night, March 9 to
10, he calls for Goering. General v. Reichenau is called back from
Cairo Olympic Committee. General v. Schebert is ordered to come, as
well as Minister Glaise-Horstenau, who is with the District leader
[Gauleiter] Burckel in the Palatinate. General Keitel communicates the
facts at 1:45. He drives to the Reichskanzlei at 10 o’clock. I follow
at 10:15, according to the wish of General v. Viebahn, to give him the
old draft.
“Prepare case Otto.”
1300 hours: General K informs Chief of Operational Staff (and) Admiral
Canaris. Ribbentrop is being detained in London. Neurath takes over the
Foreign Office.
Fuehrer wants to transmit ultimatum to the Austrian Cabinet. A personal
letter is dispatched to Mussolini and the reasons are developed which
force the Fuehrer to take action.
1830 hours: Mobilization order is given to the Command of the 8th Army
(Corps Area 3), 7th and 13th Army Corps; without reserve Army.
Air puts 300 JU-52 in readiness for dropping of propaganda pamphlets.
In addition, one Pursuit Squadron [Jagdgruppe], 3 bomber groups
[Kampfgeschwader] and two companies as airborne troops with transport
planes are held ready at civilian airports [Friedensflugplatze] in
Bavaria.
Subordinated to the Army are: one commander of the Air Force, 2F, 3H
Squadrons, courier squadron, 1 heavy AA Bn., Regt. General Goering.
_11 March_:
Instruction No. 1 of the Fuehrer is given on 11 March at 2:00 without
signature; at 1300 hours with his signature.
The Army is joined by the SS Military Units (V. T.) by regiments,
40,000 men of the police and the Totenkopf Unit Upper-Bavaria as second
wave.
1700 hours: The Navy has ordered all ships back home.
1800 hours: Schuschnigg has resigned; Seyss-Inquart is chancellor. SA
and SS perform duty in uniform. Own movements have commenced. Frontier
will not be crossed at the moment. Air Force plans large scale
propaganda flights for tomorrow. The police force will be needed in any
case and will be mixed with the troops.
1835 hours: Department L. has been informed. Colonel Winkler and
Oberfuehrer Petri have also been informed. The Air Force has its doubts
if it should initiate the movements that have not yet started.
Decision: yes.
2030 hours: Briefing received from Major General Viebahn that the
situation has changed once more. The occupation will take place.
_Later undated entry._
After annexation of Austria, the Fuehrer mentions that there is no
hurry to solve the Czech question because Austria has to be digested
first. Nevertheless, preparations for Case Green will have to be
carried out energetically; they will have to be newly prepared on the
basis of the changed strategic position because of the annexation of
Austria. State of preparations (see memorandum L I a of 19 April)
reported to the Fuehrer on 21 April.
The intention of the Fuehrer not to touch the Czech problem as yet is
changed because of the Czech strategic troop concentration of 21 May,
which occurs without any German threat and without the slightest cause
for it.
Because of Germany’s self-restraint, its consequences lead to a loss
of prestige of the Fuehrer, which he is not willing to take once more.
Therefore, the new order is issued for “green” on 30 May.
_22 May_:
Fundamental conference between the Fuehrer and K. Henlein (see
enclosure).
_23 May_:
Major Schmundt reports ideas of the Fuehrer. Further conferences, which
gradually reveal the exact intentions of the Fuehrer, take place with
the Chief of the Armed Forces High Command (OKW) on 28 May, 3 and 9
June, see enclosures. (War Diary L)
_30 May_:
The Fuehrer signs directive Green, where he states his final decision
to destroy Czechoslovakia soon and thereby initiates military
preparation all along the line. The previous intentions of the
Army must be changed considerably in the direction of an immediate
break-through into Czechoslovakia right on D-Day [X-Tag], combined with
aerial penetration by the Air Force. Further details are derived from
directive for strategic concentration of the army. The whole contrast
becomes acute once more between the Fuehrer’s intuition that we must do
it this year and the opinion of the army that we cannot do it as yet,
as most certainly the Western Powers will interfere and we are not as
yet equal to them.
_10 August_:
The Army chiefs and the chiefs of the Air Force groups, Lt. Col.
Jeschonnek and myself are ordered to the Berghof. After dinner the
Fuehrer makes a speech lasting for almost three hours, in which he
develops his political thoughts. The subsequent attempts to draw the
Fuehrer’s attention to the defects of our preparation, which are
undertaken by a few generals of the Army, are rather unfortunate. This
applies especially to the remark of General Wietersheim, in which to
top it off he claims to quote from General Adams [die er noch dazu dem
General Adams in den Mund legt] that the western fortifications can
only be held for three weeks. The Fuehrer becomes very indignant and
flames up, bursting into the remark that in such a case the whole Army
would not be good for anything. “I assure you, General, the position
will not only be held for three weeks, but for three years.” The cause
of this despondent opinion, which unfortunately enough is held very
widely within the Army General Staff, is based on various reasons.
First of all, it (the General Staff) is restrained by old memories;
political considerations play a part as well, instead of obeying and
executing its military mission. That is certainly done with traditional
devotion, but the vigor of the soul is lacking because in the end they
do not believe in the genius of the Fuehrer. And one does perhaps
compare him with Charles XII. And since water flows downhill, this
defeatism may not only possibly cause immense political damage, for
the opposition between the Generals’ opinion and that of the Fuehrer
is common talk, but may also constitute a danger for the morale of the
troops. But I have no doubt that [?] the Fuehrer will be able to boost
the morale of the people in an unexpected way when the right moment
comes.
_21-26 August_:
Visit to Germany of the Hungarian Regent [Reichsverweser]. Accompanied
by the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Honved
Minister v. Raatz [?].
They arrive with the idea that in the course of a great war, after a
few years, and with the help of German troops, the old state of Hungary
can be reestablished. They leave with the understanding that we have
neither demands from, nor claims against them, but that Germany will
not stand for a second provocation by Czechoslovakia, even if it should
be tomorrow. If they want to participate at that moment, it is up to
them.
Germany, however, will never play the role of arbitrator between them
and Poland. The Hungarians agree; but they believe that, when the issue
arises, a period of 48 hours would be indispensable to them to find out
Yugoslavia’s attitude.
_6 September_:
Chief of General Staff, General of Artillery Halder, has a conference
with the Hungarian Chief of General Staff Fischer.
Before that he is briefed by me on the political attitude of the
Fuehrer--especially his order not to give any hint on the exact moment.
The same with OQI, General v. Stuelpnagel.
_8 September_:
General Stuelpnagel OQI asks for written assurance that the Army High
Command will be informed five days in advance if the plan is to take
place. I agree and add that the over-all meteorological situation can
be estimated to some extent only for two days in advance, and that
therefore, the plans may be changed up to this moment. (D-day-2) [X-2
Tage].
General Stuelpnagel mentions that for the first time he wonders whether
the previous basis of the plan is not being abandoned. It presupposed
that the Western Powers would not interfere decisively. It gradually
seems as if the Fuehrer would stick to his decision even though he may
no longer be of this opinion. It must be added that Hungary is at least
moody and Italy reserved.
I must admit that I am worrying too, when comparing the change of
opinion about political and military potentialities, according to
directives of 24 June, 5 Nov 37, 7 Dec 37, 30 May 38, with the last
statements.
In spite of that one must be aware of the fact that the other nations
will do everything they can to apply pressure to us. We must pass
this test of nerves, but because only very few people know the art of
withstanding this pressure successfully, the only possible solution is
to inform only a very small circle of officers of news that causes us
anxiety, and not to have it circulated through anterooms as heretofore.
1800 hours to 2100 hours: Conference with Chief of Army High Command
and Chief of General Staff of the Air Force (present were Jeschonnek,
Kammhuber, Sternburg and myself).
We agree about the promulgation of the D-day order [X-Befehl] (X-1, 4
o’clock) and preannouncement to the Air Force (D-Day-1, 7 o’clock).
The “Y time” has yet to be examined; some formations have an approach
flight of one hour.
_10 September_:
General Halder back from Nurnberg. He reports that the Fuehrer signed
decree subordinating the Reich Labor Service to the Army High Command,
as of 15 September. Furthermore it was decided that the 13th and 2nd
motorized divisions would join the Reichenau Army and their place would
be taken by two other divisions [3 words illegible].
_11 September_:
In the afternoon conference with Secretary of State Jahnke from the
Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda on imminent common
tasks.
The joint preparations for refutation [Wiederlegung] of our own
violations of international law, and the exploitation of its violations
by the enemy, were considered particularly important.
_15 September_:
In the morning conference with Chief of Army High Command and Chief of
General Staffs of Army and Air Forces; the question was discussed what
could be done if the Fuehrer insists on advancement of the date, due to
the rapid development of the situation.
_16 September_:
General Keitel returns from the Berghof at 1700 hours. He graphically
describes the results of the conference between Chamberlain and the
Fuehrer. The next conference will take place on the 21st or the 22nd in
Godesberg.
With consent of the Fuehrer, the order is given in the evening by the
Armed Forces High Command to the Army High Command and to the Ministry
of Finance, to line up the V.G.A.D. along the Czech border.
In the same way, an order is issued to the railways to have the empty
rolling stock kept in readiness clandestinely for the strategic
concentrations of the Army, so that it can be transported starting 28
September.
_17 September_:
Contrary to the previous intention to transfer all Sudeten Germans with
previous military training to the Replacement Army, the Fuehrer issues
order to unite them into a Sudeten German Free Corps. The Armed Forces
High Command puts Lt. Col. Koechling (reporter on youth questions) at
the disposal of Konrad Henlein as advisor to Henlein.
_19 September_:
Order is given to the Army High Command to take care of the Sudeten
German Free Corps.
_20 September_:
England and France have handed over their demands in Prague, the
contents of which are still unknown. The activities of the Free Corps
start assuming such an extent that they may bring about, and already
have brought about, consequences harmful to the plans of the Army.
(Transferring rather strong units of the Czech Army to the proximity of
border). By checking with Lt. Col. Koechling, I attempt to lead these
activities into normal channels.
Toward the evening the Fuehrer also takes a hand and gives permission
to act only with groups up to 12 men each, after the approval of the
Corps HQ.
_21 September_:
The motorized reinforcements by the L. take effect.
1130 hours: Telephone call from the Adjutant of the Fuehrer, Captain
Engel, (it is submitted during the conference with the Chiefs by
Captain Eberhardt). “The Fuehrer has received news five minutes ago
that Prague is said to have accepted unconditionally.”
1245 hours: Department heads are informed and directive is given to
continue preparation for “Green”, but nevertheless to get ready with
everything necessary for a peaceful penetration. Orders to the Ic and
Ib of Navy High Command and Chief of General Staff of the Air Force;
General Stumpf to be informed.
_22 September_:
1920 hours: Ia reports about a telephone call from Godesberg by General
von Stuelpnagel on behalf of Keitel. Subject: a) Date cannot yet be
ascertained (D-Day); continue preparations according to plan. In case
“Green” occurs, it will not be before 30 September. If it occurs
sooner, it will probably be improvised.
_25 September_:
By order of the Fuehrer, two Death Head [Totenkopf] SS battalions have
moved into the panhandle territory near Asch [Acher Zipfel] to the rear
of the Free Corps.
_26 September_:
Chief of the Armed Forces High Command, acting through the Army High
Command, has stopped the intended approach march of the advance units
to the Czech border, because it is not yet necessary and because the
Fuehrer does not intend to march in before the 30th in any case. Order
to approach towards the Czech frontier need be given on the 27th only.
In the evening of the 26th, fixed radio stations of Breslau, Dresden
and Vienna are put at the disposal of the Reich. Ministry for Popular
Enlightenment and Propaganda for interference with possible Czech
propaganda transmissions.
Question by department “Foreign Countries” whether Czechs are to be
allowed to leave and cross Germany. Decision from Chief of the Armed
Forces High Command: yes.
1515 hours: The Chief of the Armed Forces High Command informs General
Stumpf about the result of the Godesberg conversations and about the
Fuehrer’s opinion. In no case will X day be before the 30th.
It is important that we do not permit ourselves to be drawn into
military engagements because of false reports, before Prague replied.
A question of Stumpf about Y hour results in the reply that on account
of the weather situation, a simultaneous intervention of the Air Force
and Army cannot be expected. The Army needs the dawn, the Air Force can
only start later on account of frequent fogs.
The Fuehrer has to make a decision for the commanders in chief who is
to have priority.
The opinion of Stumpf is also that the attack of the Army has to
proceed. The Fuehrer has not made any decision as yet about commitment
against Prague.
2000 hours: The Fuehrer addresses the people and the world in an
important speech at the Sportspalast.
_27 September_:
1320 hours: The Fuehrer consents to the first wave of attack being
advanced to a line from where they can arrive in the assembly area by
30 September.
_28 September_:
Stapf (?) reports about a conference with Goering where the latter
states that a Great War can hardly be avoided any longer. It may last 7
years, and we will win it.
1700 hours: Tension relaxes. The Fuehrer has decided on a conference
with Chamberlain, the Duce, and Daladier in Munich.
_29 September_:
The pact of Munich is signed. Czechoslovakia as a power is out. Four
zones as set forth will be occupied between the 2nd and 7th of October.
The remaining part of mainly German character will be occupied by the
10th of October. The genius of the Fuehrer and his determination not
to shun even a World War have again won the victory without the use of
force. The hope remains that the incredulous, the weak and the doubtful
people have been converted and will remain that way.
_1939_
_23 August_:
Received order from Armed Forces High Command to proceed to Berlin and
take over position of Chief of Armed Forces Executive Office. (WFA).
1100 hours-1330 hours: Discussions with Chief of Armed Forces High
Command. X day has been announced for 26 August. Y time has been
announced for 0430 hours.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1786-PS
WAR DIARY OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES OPERATIONS STAFF
WF. St. KTB (1) 1943
14 Mar. 1943
The treatment of captured partisans has been laid down in the combat
directive for the combatting of partisans in the East [Kampfanweisung
fuer die Bandenbekaempfung] of 27.11.42 (cf. 27.11/11/1) and Hitler’s
order [Fuehrerbefehl] of 16.12 (cf. 16.12/1). On the basis of the
foregoing the Reichsfuehrer SS ordered on the 30.12 that persons
suspected of being partisans or their assistants, who are not to be
executed, are to be transferred to concentration camps in Germany.
This order, which corresponds to the terms of reference already
decreed, differs from an order already given on the 30.10.42 by the
Commander in Chief [Oberbefehlshaber] of the 18th Army, which calls for
the shooting without discrimination of all members of partisan groups
and which is covered by the subsequent orders of the 15.11 and 16.12
only on their strictest interpretation. The Reichsfuehrer SS therefore
sent to the Armed Forces Operations Staff [Wehrmachtfuehrungstab]
on the 21.1 a letter of the Chef der S.P. and S.D. in which it is
requested that, in the area of the 18th Army also, partisan helpers and
persons suspected of such activity, should be dealt with in accordance
with the terms of reference of 30.12.
The Armed Forces Operations Staff handed the matter over on the 25.1
to the Army General Staff [Generalstab des Heeres] competent for the
combatting of partisans, and thereby conforming with the ruling given
by the Reichsfuehrer SS. This decision was confirmed by the Chief
of the High Command of the Armed Forces [Chef des Oberkommandos der
Wehrmacht].
Since the ruling of the combat directive, figs. 85, 86 & 104, provides
for work in Germany as a punitive measure for partisan helpers and
suspects and has proved to be disadvantageous for the enlistment
of voluntary workers, the General Plenipotentiary for Labour
[Generalbevollmaechtigter fuer den Arbeitseinsatz], has requested that
no threat of forced labour in Germany as a punitive measure should be
made, or that at least, suspects should be described as such to the
labour authorities for the purpose of supervision.
The General Quartermaster together with the Economic Staff (East)
[Wirtschaftsstab Ost] has proposed that the deportees should be sent
either to prison camps or to “training centers in their own area”, and
that deportation to Germany should take place only when the deportees
are on probation and in less serious cases.
In view of the Armed Forces Operations Staff this proposal does not
take sufficient account of the severity required and leads to a
comparison with the treatment meted out to the “peaceful population”
which has been called upon to work. He recommends therefore
transportation to concentration camps in Germany which have already
been introduced by the Reichsfuehrer SS for his sphere and which he
is prepared to introduce for the Armed Forces [Wehrmacht] in the case
of an extension to the province of the latter. The High Command of
the Armed Forces [Oberkommando der Wehrmacht] therefore orders that
partisan helpers and suspects who are not to be executed should be
handed over to the competent Higher SS and Police Leader and orders
that the difference between “punitive work” and “work in Germany” is to
be made clear to the population.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1796-PS
7 April 1941
W Kr Gesch.
Copy
3 Copies, 3rd Copy
Major of the General Staff Deyhle
Berlin, 18 October 1940
2 Copies, 2nd Copy
Notes to the War Diary
1st. End of March 1939:
The Fuehrer decides to make military preparations for the gradual,
seemingly unavoidable conflict with _Poland_, in such manner that these
can be executed in late summer 1939. Thereby the Fuehrer hopes only to
have to wage war on one front (“Fall Weiss”).
2nd. The following months: _Minutes under the Fuehrer’s influence_:
_a._ Attack by the forces from East Prussia;--OKH will first of all
deploy the forces from South West Part of East Prussia in order to
eliminate the Corridor as soon as possible. The Fuehrer considers
attack further East more suitable in order to reach a decisive solution
at the very beginning (causing the Vistula line to fall, thereby
preventing the Poles from making a new stand behind the Vistula).
_b._ Forming of 14 divisions. Fourth wave (Welle) to consist of E units.
_c._ All preparations to be camouflaged as defensive measures.
_Basis_ for 1st and 2nd:
_a._ Directive for “Fall Weiss” OKW/L of April 1939.
_b._ “Chronological table” for Weiss OKW/L of July 1939.
_c._ Correspondence OKW/L with sections of the Armed Forces.
_d._ Beginning of the War diary L.
3rd. August 1939:
_In spite of the English guarantee to Poland_, and thereby a war on 2
fronts becoming almost unavoidable, the Fuehrer decides to settle the
account with Poland after having prevented encirclement by means of _an
agreement with Russia_.
4th. September 1939: _Polish Campaign mainly under the Influence of
the Fuehrer_:
_a._ “Great Pincers” (strongly motorized forces to attack the Eastern
part of East Prussia towards South behind Vistula, moreover motorized
forces to push forward in plenty of time across lower Vistula towards
East Prussia).
_b._ Capture of Warsaw. Must be carried out _before_ the Russians reach
the Vistula.
_c._ Reinforcement of the Western Front. Extension northwards to the
Belgian/Dutch border, in order to incite the French/British Army to
march into Holland and Belgium; in addition to this also hasten the
construction of the Northern part of the West Wall.
5th. End of September 1939:
_Decision of the Fuehrer_, to attack _in the West_ and this as soon
as possible since the French/British Army is not yet ready. Intention
of attacking through Belgium and Holland (at least southern part) is
certain from the start. From the very beginning it is the Fuehrer’s
idea not to repeat the Schlieffen-plan but to attack in approximately
a west-north western direction through Belgium and Luxembourg under
strong protection of the Southern flank, and to gain the Channel coast.
After conclusion of the Eastern campaign the restrictions hitherto
existing in regard to warfare in the West are progressively being
lifted. They served the purpose, while the Eastern campaign was in
Progress, of not inciting the enemy in the West to greater action, by
German measures.
6th. October 1939:
Attack to begin at the earliest about 10 Nov. OKH is of the opinion
that the preparations of the Army will not be absolutely complete by
this time. Frequently the opinion is advocated--by no means shared by
the Fuehrer--that an attack in the West is unnecessary, the war could
perhaps be won for us satisfactorily if we were to wait a little.
Fuehrer is determined to attack in November only if the _weather_ will
permit operations by the mass of the Luftwaffe since only then can one
of our most important trumps become effective.
How situation would turn out if _France/England_ march into
_Belgium/Holland_, is constantly the concern of the Fuehrer. Immediate
attack of the German Western Army [Sofortfall] must be prepared for
this event.
7th. End of October 1939: _Influence of the Fuehrer_:
_a._ Employment of _motorized_ forces in direction Sedan is suggested
by the Fuehrer. Preparations are under way for moving Army group B and
concentrating them at A after, in accordance with previous deployment
of troops, main concentration had been at Army Group B.
_b._ Re-occupation of Holland, it has been decided that Holland is not
to be occupied for the time being, rapid occupation in case of English
landing should however be possible at any time.
_c._ Question of using parachute and airborne troops is being taken up
by the Fuehrer.
8th. Beginning of November 1939: Mainly under _Influence of the
Fuehrer_:
_a._ Permanent reinforcement of the southern mot. group, which is to
advance against Sedan.
_b._ Reinforcement of the Western Army to the utmost capacity.
The weather conditions prevent the execution of the attack in the West.
9th. 23 November 1939: _Speech by the Fuehrer_ to the Generals and
Admirals.
10th. End of November 1939: _Influence of the Fuehrer_ above all
_a._ Holland is to be occupied immediately.
_b._ Shifting of the main concentration of Army Group B to A appears to
have even better prospects.
_c._ Deployment of 7th FL. Div. (Deliberation of further possibilities).
_d._ Important to maintain element of surprise, therefore motorized
units which are still all located at home will be moved up to the Rhine
in order not to betray to the enemy the imminent beginning of the
attack, by the moving up to the front.
_e._ Capture of the bridges at Maastricht and of the Fort Eben Emael,
since destruction of the bridges would render impossible the fast
advance of the sixth Army.
First directive for _warfare against England_ (no. 9) is issued.
Purpose: concentration of all combat weapons for important targets.
At a conference in the map-room of the OKW (Supreme Command of the
Armed Forces) in the Reich Chancellery, the Fuehrer expresses anew his
opinion that _the attack planned in the West_ will lead to the greatest
victory in world history.
11th. December 1939:
In spite of the _severe winter_ the Fuehrer as always still continues
to consider it desirable to carry out the _attack in the West_ as soon
as possible and not to delay it until spring. Reasons:
_a._ England/France must not be allowed under any circumstances to
steal a march on us by occupying Belgium and Holland since then--on
account of the danger to the Ruhrbasin--the war could hardly be won.
_b._ Time is not on our side but on the enemy’s (see notes of Major
Deyhle).
The Fuehrer is carefully watching the Russo-Finnish war (on account of
the possibility of the Western powers joining in to the advantage of
Finland).
12th. Beginning of January 1940:
The introductory movements in _preparation for the big attack_ are
ordered anew by the Fuehrer, soon however checked again on account of
the weather condition, although most important operational basis fall
into Belgian hands and thereby there is a possibility of our intentions
becoming known.
For the deployment of the 7th FL. Division a new possibility becomes
more and more probable: Capture of the “Fortress Holland”.
13th. Middle of January 1940:
During the past weeks probable _dates_ for our attack in the West _have
become known_ in Belgium and Holland. The reason can not be determined,
the main fault lies possibly in the long waiting time just before the
attack (issue of order 7 days beforehand).
In order better to maintain the _surprise_ element beyond the time of
attack, the Fuehrer orders therefore a _change in the alert procedure_.
The idea that the decisive point of the attack will have to be reached
by breaking through Southern Belgium (thus the total attack to be
concentrated on the left) is being worked out by the Fuehrer in even
greater detail.
The occupation of the whole of Holland is ordered. For this also the
7th FL. Division is to be employed. Extensive deceptive measures are
ordered. The “Sofortfall” remains in effect.
The Fuehrer _makes up his mind_ to utilize the Danish and _Norwegian
space_ for the German warfare.
The Fuehrer considers what possibilities exist for forming new units.
The setting up of the division’s 7th and 8th wave is then ordered. * * *
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1799-PS
War Diary; Armed Forces Operations Staff (L/K.T.B. WFSt, Volume 6A, 1
Aug. 1940-26 Mar. 1941)
ANNEX 1
Report to the Fuehrer on 5 December 1940
The Chief of the General Staff of the Army then reports about the
planned operation in the East. He expanded at first on the geographic
fundamentals. The main war industrial centers are in the Ukraine, in
Moscow and in Leningrad.
* * * * * * *
The Fuehrer declares that he is agreed with the discussed operational
plans and adds following: The most important goal is to prevent that
the Russians should withdraw on a closed front. The eastward advance
should be combined until the Russian air force will be unable to attack
the territory of the German Reich and, on the other hand, the German
air force will be enabled to conduct raids to destroy Russian war
industrial territories. In this way we should be able to achieve the
annihilation of the Russian army and to prevent its regeneration.
The first commitment of the forces should take place in such a way to
make the annihilation of strong enemy units possible.
* * * * * * *
It is essential that the Russians should not take up positions in the
rear again. The number of 130-140 Divisions as planned for the entire
operation is sufficient.
1 August 1940-March 26, 1941
PARTIAL COPY OF DOCUMENT 1800-PS
PRELIMINARY REPORT ON GERMANY’S CRIMES AGAINST NORWAY
[Prepared by the Royal Norwegian Government.]
[Page 17]
Other Violations.
In different places in Norway the Germans appeared in Norwegian
uniforms during battles. This was the case in the district of Bergen
according to a Communique of the 14th of April, 1940, during the
struggles in Valdres and in Narvik. Reports have been received that at
one place the Germans even put on women’s clothes, in order to reach a
favourable position.
Where the Germans passed, the civilians found their homes in an
indescribable condition after the battle, even if the Germans had not
set fire to the houses. The so-called German “informal requisitions”
which actually meant plundering and destruction, were later compensated
for to the extent of about 9 million kroner in all, partly by Norwegian
authorities and partly by German authorities, that is, by money drawn
out of the Bank of Norway [Norges Bank] by the Germans.
On 25th April, 1940, Ulvik in Hardanger was reduced to ruins, as a
reprisal measure, as the Germans claimed that civilians there had
fired on German troops. Damage was done to more than 400 buildings and
chattels amounting to a total of 2.3 million kroner. [Page 26]
B. CRIMES AGAINST NORWEGIAN PROPERTY
a. Wanton ravaging and destruction.
4. As a result of the advance of the Russian troops and the retreat
of the German Army in Finnmark, October-November 1944, the Germans
practised the “scorched earth” policy for the first time in Norway.
Orders were issued that the civilian population was to evacuate and
that all houses, transport and stores were to be destroyed. As a result
of this about 30,000 houses were damaged, apart from 12,000 items of
damage to chattels, amounting to a total of about 176 million kroner
(Appendices 31 and 32).
[Page 62]
Appendix 31.
TO THE POPULATION:
The evacuation of a part of North Norway has been rendered a military
necessity as a result of the treachery of a Finnish Government clique.
This evacuation necessitates the removal of the civilian population,
as the enemy has proved that, in those territories occupied by him,
he ruthlessly and brutally forces the civilian population to give him
active assistance in achieving his aims.
This means that no shelter or means of existence of any kind can
be left to the Bolshevisk enemy in the fighting zone. All such
installations as housing accommodation, transport facilities and food
stocks must be destroyed or removed.
The population in these districts will therefore be deprived of the
basis for their existence so that in order to be able to survive they
must evacuate to those Norwegian territories which are still protected
by the German Wehrmacht.
For this reason, the German occupation authorities have declared
themselves prepared to support, by all means at their disposal, the
civil evacuation which the Norwegian authorities are carrying out.
In the interests of the people themselves all means by which they can
effect their own evacuation are to be used to the greatest possible
extent.
It is above all essential for a successful evacuation that all fishing
smacks and other craft which are available in this area shall be fully
employed. Owners of craft who try to evade evacuation must be prepared
for severe counter-measures such as the shooting and sinking of craft
and crew.
He who does not comply with these unequivocal instructions exposes
himself and his family to possible death in the arctic winter without
house or food.
(signed) Terboven.
Reichskommissar for the Occupied Norwegian Territories.
(signed) Rendulic.
Colonel-General
Commander-in-Chief 20th Army.
Proclamation by Terboven and General Rendulic on the evacuation
of Finnmark.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1807-PS
[EXTRACT FROM JODL’S DIARY.]
16.6.42.
The operational staff of the Navy [Skl], applied on the 29th May,
for permission to attack the Brazilian sea and air forces. The Skl
considers that a sudden blow against the Brazilian naval and merchant
ships is expedient at this juncture (_a_) because defence measures are
still incomplete (_b_) because there is the possibility of achieving
surprise and (_c_) because Brazil is to all intents and purposes
fighting Germany at sea.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1808-PS
Address by the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, Col. Gen.
Jodl to the Officers and Officials of the Armed Forces Operations
Staff. July 24, 1944: 19:30 hours, page 4.
Those making the attempt may have thought also that the men around
Hitler were climbers and servile characters. But how did matters
really stand? I, for example, was drawn in, even though I knew the
movement before 1933 but little and could do nothing for it for the
very reason that I was a soldier. Rather, I was against any relaxing of
the discipline, bound as I was by my oath to the Reich President. Of
course, my aims were, by and large, the aims of the movement, since my
thinking was always nationalistic, social, and anti-Catholic, and since
loyalty and obedience were the bases of life for me. And thus this
train of thought is also disposed of.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1809-PS
General Jodl’s Diary (Armed Forces Operational Staff) from 1 February
to 26 May 1940
_1 February 1940_:
The Fuehrer requests that Major Kieritz be sent from here in good time
with special mission.
Col. Schmundt and Capt. Deyhle are back from the West.
Conclusion:
1. Morale and discipline--excellent
2. Tactical mobility is impossible because of the weather. One cannot
withdraw more than 15 km. Army Group B, on the contrary, deems
weather excellent to overcome floods.
3. In all divisions, formerly committed in the East, the automotive
position is very bad. Up to 40% are missing--each of these 40
divisions should be provided with up to 100 vehicles.
1700 hours General Jeschonnek.
1. Attitude of parachute units. In front of the Hague, they have to
be strong enough to break in even forcibly. The 7th division
intends to drop units near the town.
2. Political mission contrasts to some extent with violent action
against the Dutch air force.
3. Walcheren Ioland will have to be occupied as soon as possible.
4. Immediate use requires some arrangements.
To be eliminated:
Commitment of K against Eben Emael
against bridge C
“Fieselor Stork” airplane in front of Army Group A.
The ground Forces already will take up position at dusk, if
possible.
7th Fl. Division is to be in readiness, but will not take up
position without further orders.
5. Question about general intentions? Time.
6. Is it not possible to tackle H alone; that would already be a
tremendous improvement in conducting aerial warfare.
7. The Air Force wants permission to attack every kind of commercial
shipping in the 30-mile zone as well as everything anywhere making
use of arms: French vessels, cargo boats.
_2 February_:
Fuehrer is furious about presentation by Ordnance Bureau which needed
8 days to demonstrate to him--not by actual constructing but only
theoretically--that the Czech 4.7-cm anti-tank gun is not usable with
armored car 3.
Fuehrer decides as to Jeschonnek’s questions of 1 February:
_a._ one has to employ in the Hague [d.H.] forces of such strength that
they will be able to take over command there. In order to achieve that,
a landing can be made in the center of the Hague.
Unlimited use of arms against airfields and anti-aircraft guns is
authorized.
Relative to an attack against all ships, found between the English East
Coast and the English mine fields, as desired by air, the Foreign
Office is still to be consulted and Admiral Schuster, Chief Air Force,
1700 hours, states in that matter that he does not want any exception.
Italian and Japanese ships to be considered, which were sailing to
Newcastle, until a short time ago.
Important, that, though we signed an agreement about submarine warfare,
we never signed one about manner of air warfare.
Reported to the Fuehrer on 3 February
The Spanish have supplied a German submarine and convoyed a merchant
ship from Bilbao to Santander.
Opinions of the newspapers: Spain is not ungrateful. Photos of Church
Services, does Fuehrer agree with them?
The Foreign Office wants that within the 30 mile zone the Air Force
shall _not_ attack--
_a._ Japanese and Italian ships.
_b._ Danish Maltesian cross ships.
_c._ All passenger boats which do not fire.
_3 February_:
General Gerke: Railroads are unable to accomplish big tasks. No
reaction to our transports. It seems possible that he got news about
the reliefs. Opportune to keep movement going. Proposal to prepare
again an A-movement to deceive the enemy. Empty rolling stock for 6
divisions available, organization transports are rolling. Will head of
transportation service be able to release state of readiness, so that
he can gather empty rolling stock during 4 days.
To consult Fuehrer. _The chief of Transportation Corps West requires
one week’s time (225 trains)._ 70 trains are at the disposal of the
armies.
315 trains are needed for second echelon. An order will be issued on
this matter on D-day.
Afterwards remain 3rd, 4th, and 5th echelon.
Total 660 trains, including 80 for tanks and 70 for armies (among them
10,000 army cars).
Altogether 60 fewer trains ready than before.
_Air raid protection._
_Ammunition train has no special protection. If machine gun car is
added, the enemy flier will be aware of the fact, that this is an
important train._ The wave before the trains should attack the enemy
plane with best results. Ammunition trains often remain for weeks,
personnel for its protection become demoralized.
Ammunition trains, regulating stations and storage areas to be spread
out and protected. Assembly stations are enlarged to assembly areas.
Maintenance units are kept in readiness in the most endangered areas
between the Rhine and the line Kassel-Hanover.
Ruhr area has 15 different ways to give way.
_Rumania_ wants to get supply of rail track material (from Poland.)
_1340_ locomotives and _40000_ cars will be manufactured by the end of
1940 or maybe beginning of 1941. Stock _23000_ locomotives, 8000 of
which are heavy freight train locomotives for Armed Forces transports.
This will only replace the loss.
_4 February_:
Will the Court-Martial be re-activated?
Bodenschatz: Army Group C should not get out of hand [Keinen zauber
machen] on minus-1 day.
Fuehrer gives his agreement that 225 trains in position of readiness
may be used for other purposes by the chief of transportation corps
until 12 February.
Proposal to the Fuehrer about continuation of aerial warfare within the
30 mile zone. Fuehrer agrees with proposal and talks with the Minister
for Foreign Affairs in the afternoon.
_5 February_:
Special staff “Weser Exercise” meets and is welcomed by Chief of Armed
Forces High Command, gets instructions.
Representative of Air Force is still missing.
_6 February_:
Consumption of gasoline is not reduced. Stocks further diminished by
30000 tons.
Deception even of Armed Forces High Command.
Office Reinicke and Thomas, that is to say Chief of Armed Forces High
Command,
W Pr that is to say Chief of Armed Forces Operational Office.
Fuehrer leaves in the evening.
15:30 hours conference with General Jeschonnek, Col. v. Waldau and Col.
Warlimont.
Air Force submits following questions:
Does X time remain unchanged? Yes. Deceptive action intolerable for
Army Group C on A-1 day. Navy is not interested in Walcheren. Does not
see any danger from the English side. New idea: carry out actions H and
Weser Exercise only and guarantee Belgium’s neutrality for the duration
of the war.
Discussed once more affair Risberg with Chief of Armed Forces High
Command.
_8 February_:
Chief of Transportation Corps reports: Reich Railroads now admit that
they cannot handle any additional burden at this moment. They are not
ready for war. Although they hardly got any military requests, they
cannot supply the domestic economy right now.
It is only a question of engines, now, there are enough cars available
everywhere.
Transportation: 80% railroad.
18% water transport.
2% road transport.
Transportation by water has to be brought to double of current capacity.
Radio receivers can be transformed into transmitters without particular
difficulties.
Paris probably only by Gen. F.... [Fermont?], rue de Louvre.
_9 February_:
Chief of Armed Forces High Command received by Field Marshal Goering at
10 o’clock. Newspaper correspondents from the Protectorate may be sent
to the West Wall (Fuehrer gave permission on 10 February).
_10 February_:
The difficult situation in Transportation is presented by me in written
form to the Chief of the Armed Forces High Command.
13:00 hours: Conference of Fuehrer with General Halder. Before that,
inspection of 4.7 tank destroyer on tank I, chassis satisfying
[befriedigt].
Field Marshal has explained, that he is able to start at night anyhow.
Flying into the area of ... from the sea.
During the World War, we have dropped 28,000 tons. Thus, the Air Forces
does not want to anticipate, but prefers start at night. Planes shall
not fly over Luettich and Eben Emael in order to avoid any alarm there.
113,000 trucks driving in the W * * *
45,000 of them are suited for Armed Forces.
We are able to produce 4000 trucks.
Fuehrer states, all the iron has been taken away from Todt, even that
put aside by him (he wanted to build 3000 additional ones).
_For the first time, the problems of transportation, motor vehicles and
gasoline have been reported to the Fuehrer more impressively._
Fuehrer agrees that the 225 trains for the first wave of Army High
Command reserves may still be used further on by the Chief of the
Transportation Corps.
_11 February_:
First report from France about our troop movements and reinforcements
in the west, which were terminated on 1 February already.
_12 February_:
Fuehrer has a cold. No report.
_13 February_:
The Army requested survey about the strength of the armies and
reserves, divided into batteries, battalions and tanks [Btn. Btlen u.
Kampfwagen], induces the Fuehrer again to open the question of the
center of gravity.
He says: Most of the armed tanks [Geschuetzkampfwagen] have been
directed to areas of secondary importance. Armored Divisions at 4th
Army can do little in barricaded and fortified area.
They will be stopped at the latest on the Maas river and must be
withdrawn. The 16th or 12th Army will then miss them. One should lead
them together in direction of Sedan. The enemy does not expect our main
assault there. The documents of fliers, who landed, have convinced them
[the enemy] still further in their opinion that our intention is only
to take possession of the Dutch and Belgian channel coast.
A great number of tanks with 8th Tank Division does not seem necessary,
a mechanized division in 3 or 4 parts with tanks assigned, should
suffice. (It may be that this is a wish of the SSV division.)
I hand over to the Fuehrer a summarized report, from which the great
possibility for formation of a center of gravity south of the line
Luettich-Namur becomes obvious (at least 5 times the strength of the
forces committed north of that line). I bring to his attention that
the thrust against Sedan is a tactical secret path, where one can be
surprised by the God of War. If the French attack from the south flank,
we must veer to the south.
Fuehrer still thinks it possible, that the enemy will not engage the
battle at all. Anyhow he will do it automatically. After half a day the
news from Holland and Belgium may be so threatening already that he
will decide to stand still.
I don’t believe it.
At 17:30 hours Col. v. Greifenberg and Lt. Col. Heusniger are summoned
to discuss these questions.
The Fuehrer disapproves of the wearing of regular army uniforms by
persons who are not members of the army or the Fuehrer’s headquarters.
Recommends taking care of motor vehicles and fuel. Higher speeds result
in doubled tire consumption.
Chief of Armed Forces High Command has a cold and will remain at home
in the afternoon.
Have learned from Admiral Canaris that the echelon Reivel is to be put
to use against the Caucasus with bulk from Bulgaria. The Air Force must
explain with whom this false idea originated.
Inquiries made to the Chief of the Operational Division: whether there
is a sufficient quantity of cloth for flags on hand? Change of position
of the Army High Commands.
Proper designation of own troops:
(_a_) Front line: white.
(_b_) In line of company CPs: swastika flag.
(_c_) Rear echelons: yellow rectangle.
Communicated Fuehrer’s ideas to Col. Warlimont, von Greifenberg and
to Lt. Col. Heusniger, at 17:30 hours. Instructions requested how we
should proceed in future.
_14 February_:
Ziegenberg plant cannot be completed before June due to technical
difficulties. Emergency installation can be made ready for operation by
the middle of March, but in that case the Air Force must be in Nauheim
or on the train.
_Colonel Schmundt_ must make a report on the distribution of personnel
to WNV.
Copper advance from Wifo stocks now to WNV, later back to Wifo.
Political action against the increase in frontier road-blocks [?] in
Luxemburg.
_Dr. Dorpmueller telegraphed to the chief of the Transportation Corps_:
The condition of the Reich Railroads requires that all nonessential
transportation of the Armed Forces be postponed until warmer weather
sets in.
_15 February_:
The Fuehrer approves my article on the Finnish-Russian conflict. Is
to be published in the Voelkischer-Beobachter. Backlog congestion of
railroads increased by 200 trains.
Certainty that nothing will happen to W.
Instructions to the 18th Army.
_16 February_:
Corps on left flank of 16th and not 6th Army.
Landing at the Hague....
Capture Fort Hendrik.
10 divisions of the 8th wave [must receive 3 batteries].
No off-standard types of vehicles must be permitted to be used at the
front, as long as standard army models are still being used in industry.
_To the Chief of the Luftwaffe_ [taken care of].
Air raid protection....
Speakers for troops, danger if commanders order the speeches themselves.
Chief of the Armed Forces High Command.
WNV training of 300 to 400 men
land postal clerks at Verst. [?]
Not yet
from the Chief of the Air Force at present
_6 new German consuls appointed in Scandinavia._
_C. has given orders for large-scale preparations for offensive._
Fortress [Fest] drill of “Grafemvoeln”.
Special security by counterintelligence coordination of press.
Brief reports in the provincial newspapers for enemy intelligence
service. Request authorization to land at Myden with a load of
machines. Alternative preparations at C. should work in the same
direction. Pr. Battleship “Repulse” in dock. Complete flop of this
news report. Altmark in Bergen, British submarines expected. Burgedeyk
submarine 48 Schulz unsuccessful [?] submarines.
Chief of Armed Forces High Command.
Press Conference at Foreign Office.
Chief of the Navy High Command wishes to talk the Halifax problem over
once more and then speak to the Fuehrer. Now applications of mines
only. Chief of Navy, High Command will take this matter up again with
the Fuehrer. L. ask what with report of General Staff Officers.
_17 February_:
Incident with tankship “Altmark”, 6 dead, 4 seriously injured. 1700
hours: Newly promoted Commanding Generals and General Rommel at
Fuehrer’s table for dinner. (Geyr, Manstein, Schmidt, Reinhardt,
Glumne). Complaints that guns in armored cars IV only * * * have not to
2000 m. After dinner Manstein reports his ideas about the operations
of Army Group A. He says, the decisive blow will not fall west of the
Maas, but it must be overcome between Sedan-Charleville. If the enemy
crosses the river, we are able to beat him and cross the River Maas
together with him. In the south therefore, we must have strong armor or
none at all. What is in the rear cannot reach the battlefield in time.
_18 February_:
On the basis of my discussion with Greifenberg on 13 February Chief
of the Armed Forces High Command and General Halder reported to the
Fuehrer the following intention:
1. To shift the demarcation line between Army Group A and B in line
Luettich-Namur.
2. To employ stronger armored forces in front of the 12th and 16th
army, weakening by the measure Army Group B (1st and 5th armored) and
ground forces reserved (9th armored division).
3. Intention to go to the front any way with a very small staff one
night preceding A Day.
Fuehrer approves all three suggestions but insists that in distributing
the heavy tanks III, III t and IV due consideration should be given to
the tasks to be expected. That is to say not such a large number of
heavy tanks as it is the case now with the 8th Armored and 6th Armored
Division.
_19.II_
Fuehrer displeased with behavior of Graf Spee crew on the Altmark. No
resistance, no British losses.
Fuehrer presses energetically, preparations for the Weser Exercise
Equip steamships. Put units in readiness. Will talk to staff.
In order to speed up preparations I advise to appoint one of newly
promoted commanding generals with his staff as leader.
Fuehrer approves.
Chief of Army reports about problems of organization.
_20 February_:
Discussion and consideration how case “Weser Exercise” is to be carried
through. Equipment is to be taken on board ships ahead of the troops.
Designation of units depends on equipment on hand.
1500 hours discussion concerning that matter through Chief of Armed
Forces High Command with General Fromm. Intention, to take two
divisions with technical equipment as second wave.
_21 February_:
Fuehrer talks to General von Falkenhorst and charges him with
preparation of the Weser Exercise. Falkenhorst accepts gladly.
Instructions to each of the 3 branches of the armed forces.
Proposal from Fromm to use only units with German material. Therefore
7th Fl. Div., 22nd Division, one regiment of the 1st mountain division.
Two divisions of the 7th wave, motorized brigade (rifle brigade. 11
with armored car 1).
Fuehrer wishes that western connections of the “Spicherer Hoehen” be
advanced and fortified with pillboxes.
Colonel v. Greifenberg transmits.
_22 February_:
Fuehrer expresses his intention to go to Munich for Sunday.
At the beginning of operations he does not want to go to Ziegenberg but
to the Eagle’s Nest [Felsen].
Colonel Juppe ordered:
_a._ to have a drawing made of the chain of command.
_b._ to consider, in what way the communications can be technically
improved at the Eagle’s Nest and vicinity.
Commander Junge informed about proposed points in his report by the
Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. Important 3 points:
_a._ Submarines into the Mediterranean.
_b._ Esthonian submarines.
_c._ Discordance Navy-Airforce about the moment for the beginning of
mine laying. Air force beginning 1 May with 3000, Navy with
Heinckel 115 now, already 1845 hours Chief of the Armed Forces
High Command informed.
_Noon._ Todt reports to the Fuehrer concerning extension of railroad
gauges [?] [Schienenhoehen]. Fuehrer approves that extension will be
built according to schedule.
_23 February_:
Navy High Command reports that during last night 2 destroyers were sunk
by our own planes [Leberecht Maas and ...]. Navy High Command stresses
that this is the consequence of uncoordinated conduct of sea warfare,
regardless whether it is conducted under, on or above the sea. One
takes pains not to get excited; what would happen if there should be
heavy losses. Fuehrer is furious. He is right. He says: “I would not
say anything if the whole Navy were sunk in battle with the enemy, but
it is inexcusable if that happens on account of lack of coordination.”
Gasoline reserve for motor vehicles.
_24 February_:
Clear up, whether Navy is authorized to start already now with mine
laying. Who will ask Duce, whether our own submarines have to enter the
Mediterranean?
Engel informs about inquiry results Todt and Schmundt. The latter calls
long distance from Munich. Fuehrer has ordered completion of Eagle’s
Nest for Armed Forces Operational Staff and Air Force. [Zug] (air group
[?]) Heinrich will have to stay east of the Rhine.
Army High Command as strongly as possible in forests. Officer from the
General Staff and an officer from Intelligence Service are to go to
Eagle’s Nest 26 February. There to reconnoiter together with Todt.
1430 hours. Orally transmitted to Chief of Operational Department and
to Lieutenant Colonel Heusinger the matter. Chief of the High Command
is informed. Staff Falkenhorst arrives in Berlin and starts to function
XXIst Corps.
_25.II._
Disturbing reports from Turkey. Communication apparently cut off.
Chief of Armed Forces High Command inform General Halder about
Fuehrer’s intention to have an Operational Staff of the Army High
Command near the Eagle’s Nest also.
_26.II._
Fuehrer raises the question, whether it is better to undertake the
Weser Exercise before or after case “Yellow”.
Chief of the Air Force charged with examining this problem. Fuehrer
decides that Navy will have to wait with starting of mine laying by
means of planes, until situation will permit large-scale employment of
air force [transmitted to Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force].
Talked with Chief of Air Force and Chief of Staff about work on and
about housing of Air Force near Eagle’s Nest at the beginning. Air
Force to Rodert or Muenstereifel or train nearby.
_27 February_:
60 Tons of leaflets shall be dropped down in the near future. Fuehrer
approves the schedule but will not issue proclamation to Armed Forces
from here on A Day.
_28 February_:
I make the following proposition to the Chief of the Armed Forces
High Command and after that to Fuehrer: Case “Yellow” and Weser
Exercise have to be prepared in such a manner that they will become
quite independent from another regarding time and strength. Fuehrer
completely agrees with that proposition if there is any possibility for
it.
1500 hours, staff Falkenhorst reports about preparations made so far.
In this connection I explain to him the new basis of preparations.
Proposition for employment of forces
N 4 airborne companies
2 Mountain divisions
D 1 corps headquarters
22 infantry divisions less
2 division, 7th wave pol. division
1 div. 3rd wave regional defense unit.
It has yet to be decided, whether reinforcement 11th rifle brigade
is to be directed first to group D and then to group N or to group N
immediately.
Proposition as regards combat planes too high.
_29 February_:
1500 hours, Report of staff Falkenhorst with Kranke, Buschenhagen,
Dnaus very satisfactory to Fuehrer. He approves the suggestions.
Fuehrer wishes also to have a strong group at Copenhagen and detailed
elaboration in which way the individual coastal batteries are to be
overpowered. Commander-in-Chief of Air Forces is instructed to make out
immediately the order for Army, Navy, and Air Force, and Chief “WZ”
order concerning increasing of the staff.
According to my proposal outfit transport ships immediately and with
them bring horses over here from East Prussia.
1300 hours, Order to Juppe to speed up construction of Eagle’s Nest, 11
March according to interim solution (operational staff of the Commander
in Chief of the Armed Forces in hunting lodge and at the same time
permanent solution). (Army High Command with operational department and
parts of O.A.IV.)
The same evening order concerning personal requirements of the staff
and requisition to the branches of the armed forces.
_1 March_:
Fury at Army High Command because transfers. Consultation with Chief
of Armed Forces High Command. After my discussion with Jeschonnek
scaling-down of requisitions.
_2 March_:
Agreement with Army. Field Marshal rages and gets unfriendly towards
Chief of Armed Forces High Command, goes to see Fuehrer at 1300 hours.
During the afternoon new requisitions are put forward which are
somewhat reduced after consulting with Army and Air Force.
1100 hours: Assistant Secretary of State Welles with the Fuehrer. The
appointment of a new Minister for Ordnance is to be expected because
Fuehrer is dissatisfied with production of equipment and munition.
Letter from the Chief of the Armed Forces High Command to the Field
Marshal.
_3 March_:
Fuehrer expresses his opinion about the necessity of prompt and strong
action in Norway very sharply. No delay by branches of Armed Forces.
Rapid acceleration is necessary.
Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force is against any proposition to
subordinate Air Force units to XXI Corps.
Fuehrer decides to undertake Weser Exercise before case “Yellow”, with
several days interval.
_4 March_:
Discussion with General Jeschonnek. All units of the Air Force are
subordinated to X Fl. K. This receives its order through High Command
of the Air Forces, upon demand of the Staff of XXIst Corps.
Fuehrer orders that the Air Force shall provide the anti-aircraft
battalion for the Weser exercise South.
3rd mountain division to be in Berlin already on March 6th.
_1000 hours_: Chief of the Air Force is informed.
_1300 hours_: Chief WNV is charged with securing communications from
Falkenhorst to us. The former has to go to Luebeck to the X Fl. K.
_1500 hours_: Chief WNV is instructed to set up * * * platoon company
only after X-day. After that time, use expedients and send some men
with the tactical troops.
_1700 hours_: General Bodenschatz complains about exclusion of the
Field Marshal from Weser exercise. He said that 110 officers of the Air
Force had been consulted in advance. Such subordination is intolerable.
Mad at General K
I certify this error.
Chief of the Armed Forces High Command is informed that General
Rundstedt is supposed to feel sick. Intend to talk about it with
Commander-in-Chief of the Army. If it is true, v.R. would have to be
replaced by List in good time.
Himmler or Canaris are to provide personnel who are familiar with the
Hague. These to Wenninger and are grabbed there by Kiertz.
Proclamations:
_a._ faked ones,
_b._ proclamations that everything is going well.
Student wants separate proclamations for Holland.
_5 March: 1500 hours_:
Big conference with the 3 Supreme Commanders about Weser exercise.
Field Marshal vents his spleen, because he was not consulted
beforehand. He dominates the discussion and tries to prove that all
previous preparations are good for nothing.
_Result_:
_a._ Stronger forces to Narvik,
_b._ Navy shall leave warships in the ports (Hipper or Luetzow in
Trondheim),
_c._ Christian and may be excluded, for the beginning,
_d._ 6 divisions should be calculated for Norway,
_e._ To get a foothold immediately in Copenhagen, too.
After this, the following make a report: General von Kesselring,
Student, Sp * * * Richthofen, Captain Koch, 1st lieutenant Witzig
about the case “Festung” [fortress] and actions by glider-borne troops
against the bridges of Vroenhofen and Veldvezelt, furthermore against
Fort Eben-Emael. Accusations are made that Army Group B is supposed to
have said that it would take 3-4 days until forces of the army could
attack the fort.
_6 March_:
_7 March_:
Falkenhorst with Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force. The preparations
have now materialized. The Fuehrer signs a directive containing all
changes subsequent to the conference of March 5th. Nothing is to be
changed any more now.
_8 March_:
Fuehrer wishes to have issued special orders for the Weser exercise in
another form. They are to be divided into military orders which have
to be made known to the tactical troops and into general instructions
concerning actions of the Plenipotentiary of the Reich.
Fuehrer is outraged about report of the Field Marshal that the Army
does not care for occupation of the area in front of the left wing of
the Army led by Busch by airborne troops dropped from “Stork” planes,
because divisions can get there only after several days. I object that
it will naturally be better to employ these troops there, where armored
divisions will arrive faster.
_9 March_:
Fuehrer is outraged when he learns that Prince Oskar is commanding
officer of a regiment. Schmidt was just about to suggest that he should
be given command of a division, but he managed not to mention it.
Buschenhagen reports to me about the preparations for W and submits the
schedule.
Fuehrer does not appear at table.
In the evening of March 8th, I again bring seriousness of the gasoline
situation to the attention of the Chief of the Armed Forces High
Command. Nothing efficacious has been done to improve the situation.
Industry regularly uses up 80,000 tons a month.
There is pressing need for the appointment of a Deputy-General for Fuel
Economy (General von Schell).
_10 March_:
Fuehrer makes his wonderful speech in the arsenal on the occasion of
Memorial day.
The news about the Finnish-Russian negotiations are very favorable,
from a political point of view.
The French press rages about it because they consider it necessary to
cut Germany off from the Swedish ore. In a military way, the situation
is disturbing for us, because, if peace should be concluded soon, the
motivation for the prepared action of the group Falkenhorst will be
difficult.
_11 March_:
Fuehrer has objections against the iron cross in gold (color effect
black-gold), as it means abandoning tradition. Rather create a new
decoration.
On the other hand, he agrees with the Oak-Leaves for the Knight’s
Cross. The Chief of the Armed Forces High Command presents a list of
the tanks at hand in the armed forces.
Fuehrer wants a basic ruling that only such people should be appointed
in the Armed Forces and in Civil Service who have no relatives abroad.
The danger is too great that they will get into conflict with their own
conscience. The schedule (for the Weser exercises) is presented to the
Fuehrer. Also the special orders which the Fuehrer takes along.
_12 March_:
Fuehrer is very much satisfied with Ribbentrop’s conference in Rome.
Duce remains steadfast, wants to talk with Fuehrer personally next
week on the Brenner. Conclusion of peace between Finland and Russia
deprives England, but us, too, of any political basis to occupy Norway.
The preparations are ready to the extent that March 20th could be
W-day. However, unfavorable ice conditions compel postponement by 1-2
days.
_13 March_:
Fuehrer does not yet give order for “W”. He is still looking for some
justification.
_14 March_:
English keep vigil in the North-Sea with 15-16 submarines; the reason
is doubtful, either to prevent a German action. Fuehrer has not yet
decided, how to justify the Weser exercise. Wrong news report in the
American newspapers.
Commander-in-Chief of the Navy is in doubt, whether it is still
important to play at preventive war [?] in Norway. The question is,
if it wouldn’t be better to carry out case “Yellow” before the Weser
exercise.
The danger in that case is that the English will immediately get a
foothold in Narvik, because we would have started with neutrality
violation.
At noon, Colin Rosz visits the Fuehrer. Interesting explanations about
Japan-China and Russia.
_15 March_:
Fuehrer wants the following material for the conference with the Duce
on March 18th:
1. Large-scale map of the distribution of our own forces (207
divisions).
2. Maps about the distribution of enemy and neutral forces. France,
England, Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, Norway, Denmark, Sweden,
Hungary.
3. Terminal map of the Finnish-Russian conflict.
4. Strength of our own Air Force.
_1330 hours_: Lunch with Army Group A and with Chief of the General
Staff.
_1500 hours_: Reports of Army Group Commander and Army Commanders,
including Group Kleist; very satisfactory.
_16 March_:
Worries that the English will proceed against Norway, as overhead radio
messages indicate. As the English have retired 7 submarines, such an
action does not seem probable any longer.
Army Group B reports about its evaluation of the situation and its
intentions.
Detailed preparations are done very well. Displeasure about
disconnection of the 4th army. Mutual assistance is eliminated.
Lack of reinforcements, if the 6th army should be successful, after
all. 6th army shifts its center of gravity to 4th Corps, and also draws
3 armored divisions of the 2nd echelon there. 10th and 9th Corps have
no anti-aircraft protection.
Jeschonnek transmits that Army Bush needs another 25 “stork” planes.
_17 March_:
Fuehrer leaves at noon for conference with Duce on the Brenner.
News of the successful raid of the Air Force against Scapa Flow.
Fuehrer is in high spirits.
_18 March_:
Nothing important. Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force (Chef L) is
informed about the report of the commanders in the West.
_19 March_:
Fuehrer returns from the conference with the Duce beaming with joy
and very much satisfied. Complete harmony, Duce is resolute; but he
cannot fight a long war. Duce is highly impressed and agrees with the
opinion of the Fuehrer’s that the decision against France is being
made. Whatever happens at the periphery in the meantime is unimportant.
At the end, Duce told Ciano: “My decision is made. Did you hear,
Fuehrer?” Balkan should and must remain quiet. Complete understanding
for Fuehrer’s cooperation with Stalin.
Fuehrer deeply moved by enthusiasm of the Tyrolian’s England song [“We
will sail against England...”--translator’s note].
Chief of Armed Forces High Command very much depressed because of
Todt’s appointment. I try to persuade him not to insist on the
“agreement”. It is much better, to separate the tasks clearly. The
quests of the Armed Forces are laid down by the Fuehrer and transmitted
to Dr. Todt by the Armed Forces High Command. Dr. Todt has full powers
to fulfill these requests.
_20 March_:
During the night, the English attack Sylt and Hoermann [?]. No success.
At noon, the Fuehrer signs an order which appoints Todt as Minister for
Ordnance.
Wedel is instructed by the Chief of the Armed Forces High Command to
celebrate the 40th anniversary of service by the Commander-in-Chief
of the Army in a modest way only. The achievements of individual
personalities can be appreciated only during or after the war.
In the evening, annihilating blow against an English convoy; 42000 tons
of big boats (10-12000 tons) have been sunk.
_21 March_:
Objections of Group 21 [Grp. XXI] about the long interval between
taking up readiness positions at 05,30 hours and finishing of the
diplomatic action. Fuehrer rejects any earlier negotiations, because
otherwise calls for help will be offered, it has to be broken
ruthlessly. The political plenipotentiaries will have to strongly
emphasize the military measures taken, and will even have to exaggerate
them.
_22 March_:
Reported to Fuehrer, how we want to proceed at the proposed discussions
with the Italian General Staff. First, inquiry by attaché in Rome, how
they believe they can take some burden off us. Only then to proceed to
possibility of an operation across the Upper Rhine. Discussion with
General Staff only once our cards are on the table.
American newspaper correspondents inspect the small damage on Sylt.
_24-25 March_:
Fuehrer at Obersalzberg.
No special events.
The English start to molest our merchantmen in the Danish and Norwegian
territorial waters, or even fire at them.
_26 March_:
The Fuehrer is back.
Discussion about deadlines for operations.
Fuehrer sticks to it: first Weser exercise, dark nights necessary for
it. Thus about 4-5 days later. Commander-in-Chief of the Navy reports,
urges to start laying mines with planes, as 1270 mines will already be
at hand by end of April. Fuehrer wants to think it over some more.
_27 March_:
Our own submarine stranded near Lindesnaes, one submarine and boat 37
come to help. Are to ask for permission to stay in Norwegian waters, if
necessary, 2300 PM. Discussion of the Fuehrer with Commander-in-Chief
of the Army and of Army Group C. First and Seventh army.
Fuehrer explains his intentions with the Italians about to strike.
Operational aim plateau Langres.
Deceptive actions of First Army in case “Yellow” agreed to. Attacks
proposed in case of 95th, 93rd, 75th, 268th, 215th, and 246th
divisions. These have favorable effects, but deceptive measures of the
7th army will not take place, because of the preparation of case Brown
(Ital.).
_28 March_:
Duce attaches importance to General Staff talks, Graziani intends to
send General Roatta to B. in April. The Norwegians are interning U
21 seemingly because of awkward statements by the commander, who did
not claim engine trouble but mistaken navigation. But it may also be
a mistake made in translation. Individual naval officers seem to be
lukewarm concerning the Weser exercise and need stimulus. The three
chiefs von Falkenhorst are also pondering matters, which are none of
their business. Kranke sees more disadvantages than advantages.
In the evening, the Fuehrer steps into the map room and explains
sharply that he will not be content with the Navy again quitting the
Norwegian ports right away. Narvik, Trondheim, and Oslo will have to
remain occupied by naval forces. Bad impression on ground forces.
_29 March_:
Talk with Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, 1200 hours. Wants decision
about commitment of air mines.
Fuehrer talks to him alone about retaining of ships. Admiral of the
Fleet [Grossadmiral] rejects Narvik, but wants to examine, if Trondheim
cannot be set up as a base immediately.
Commander-in-Chief of the Navy draws attention to the fact that they
want fuel from him, because the army will run out of it by the end of
May. This is the consequence of the wrong arrangements with Shell and
not to buy in Mexico, like the Navy did it.
3 PM: Commander-in-Chief of the Force with the Fuehrer.
_30 March_:
U-21 not set free yet by the Norwegians. Negotiations under way.
Fuehrer thinks about activation of another 10-12 new divisions. Where
are the mortars committed?
L II ordered to present an outline of personnel and materiel, from
which it could be determined, if and when new activations are possible.
_31 March_:
Nothing of importance.
_1 April_:
German fighters shoot 7 enemy fighters down. 1300 hours: Falkenhorst
again gives general report about Weser exercise. 1300 hours: Breakfast,
then discussion with all commanding officers primarily concerned.
Fuehrer has a very good impression about thoroughness of preparations.
_2 April_:
1530 hours: Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, Commander-in-Chief of
the Navy, and General von Falkenhorst with the Fuehrer. All confirm end
of the preparations. Fuehrer orders carrying out of the Weser exercise
for April 9th.
Protests of the commanding officer of the Air Force that some warships
leave ports again right away. Fuehrer, too, disapproves of that, but
does not want to intervene too much in an exclusive concern of naval
warfare.
Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force agrees to plan to start aerial
torpedo war [LM-Krieg] now.
Fuehrer wants that Luetzow shall be used for the transport of troops to
Trondheim, in spite of tasks later on.
Find out, if it is not possible to land debarkation troops by fishing
boat, in order to capture the bridge strong point of Vordingborg.
_3 April_:
Movements of the first 3 ships of the leading echelon [Ausfuhrstaffel]
started at 0200 hours. Lt. Commdr. Junge reports at 1600 hours that the
3 ships have instructions how to act against Norwegians. I immediately
instruct Councillor of Legation Hewel in order to inform the Foreign
Minister what the situation is, in case one of the ships of the leading
echelon should be examined by Norwegians. The Chief of the Armed Forces
High Command also informs the Fuehrer at 1815 hours about it.
1830 hours Reich Foreign Minister informed by Fuehrer. Chief of Armed
Forces High Command asked to join discussion.
_4 April_:
Slight alarm, as some news from Norway indicates increased
preparedness. Sweden has asked what preparations for troops shipments
in Stettin are supposed to mean (boats under Reich Naval Ensign)
[Reichsdienstflagge].
Fuehrer drafts the proclamations. Piepenbrock, Chief of
Counter-Intelligence service 1, returns with good results of the talk
with Quisling from Copenhagen.
News that 2 armored coastal vessels [Kuestenpanzer] are in Narvik and
that 2 submarines are expected.
_5 April_:
Weser exercise runs according to plan. Some alarm report from the
source of a Belgian agent [V-Mann] appears unworthy of belief. The
Chief of the Armed Forces High Command instructs General von Rintelen
at 1930 hours.
_6 April_:
Weser exercise runs according to plan. The high-pressure weather area
over the Northern North-Sea, which was predicted yesterday, is not
taking place and that favors the action of the navy. Fuehrer puts great
emphasis on the fact that the families of all deserters will be checked
carefully. Navy records long English radio message, but is unable to
decipher it.
_1500 hours_: General Gerke reports that his movements according to
plan.
_1600 hours_: Talks in room of the Chief of the section for Foreign
Countries in presence of Chef L and Military Attaché in Rome with
General Marras.
_1700 hours_: Report that Luetzow is dropping out and can go to Oslo
only, because auxiliary engines did not take part. Fuehrer agrees to
this decision.
_7 April_:
No disquieting news. Hipper with destroyers seems to have been reported
by an English submarine on Sunday morning, April 7th.
Prince Axel of Denmark has the intention to visit Field Marshal Goering
on Monday.
_8 April_:
Day of highest tension. The English put 3 mine fields in the Norwegian
territorial waters and make that public.
Leading echelon is far off with several ships because of lack of pilots.
Only 1 ship near Narvik, everything else seems to be hardly beyond
Bergen.
Boat Rio de Janeiro is torpedoed; since horses and men in uniform are
landed, the impending project becomes known to the Norwegians.
Group Hipper gets into a battle with an English destroyer and
annihilates it.
_9 April_:
The surprise effect succeeds in Bergen, Trondheim, Narvik, and from the
air in Stavanger. Not at Christiansand and in Oslo.
Bluecher sinks after heroic fight. Commanding Admiral and Commander 103
(Kdr 103) of it, on deck up to the last moment, swim to land.
Luetzow has to take over lead and lower boats.
Heavy fighting for coastal fortifications. Fortress Christiansand
fought to surrender by planes and Karlsruhe.
_10 April_:
Chief of naval forces [Flottenchef] reports 2 turrets gone, only 25
miles.
First breaking through of British destroyers in Narvik.
The Koenigsberg destroyed by enemy dive bombers. Bornholm occupied.
_11 April_:
Luetzow on voyage home. Oslo hit by torpedo.
Norwegian warships are put into service.
Denmark does not belong any longer to jurisdiction of XXIst Corps.
Railroads Oslo-Bergen and Oslo-Drontheim destroyed.
_12 April_:
Still 6 destroyers left ready for use in Narvik, Freighter
[Treckdampfer] Jon Wellom in N., otherwise no ship of the leading
echelon. Bulk of the submarines ordered outside the ports occupied by
us.
Hundalen on the iron-ore railroad reached. Strong enemy air attack on
Bergen.
_13 April_:
* * * Mountain battery flown to lake near Narvik with Ju 52 planes.
Concentration of strong English naval forces near Harstadt in process.
Much booty in Oslo.
1650 hours naval battle in Narvik.
Battleships and Hipper arrived in home ports.
_14 April_:
Dietl is not being attacked, but is separated from Northern group.
Terrible excitement. All details are to be ordered from here.
Steamship Baerenfelsis sunk in the course of attack on Bergen.
Another 3 airforce anti-aircraft batteries on board ship torpedoed by
submarine.
Fuehrer wants that Dietl tries to fight his way through to the South. I
argue against this impossible idea.
_15 April_:
_16 April_:
Reproaches against the navy, especially because the battle was not
engaged by battleships and because she does not succeed in speeding up
the transports (Unjustified--I strongly argue against it).
_17 April_:
During the night from the 16th to 17th Staff Officer from Admiralty
arrives in Narvik and delivers written report by Dietl with call for
help from Stavanger, since English naval forces are firing there.
Air-Force notified. The Fuehrer again states in a temperamental way
that the Gr. Dietl will have to march South or will have to be picked
up. I advocate again in a very strong way that
_a._ a march South is impossible,
_b._ even a transport can evacuate only very small units, leads to
the loss of many planes and breaks the moral backbone of the
Dietl group.
They will continue to fight on the Swedish border for a long time. A
thing should be considered lost only when it is actually lost. 1200
hours: Field Marshal with Jeschonnek. Has to be regrouped. Draws combat
teams to Ralburg and transport groups back into Slesvig. 1530 hours:
Admiral of the Fleet [Grossadmiral] with Admiralty Staff Officer from
Narvik who reports verbally about his experiences in Narvik. Each piece
of bad news leads to the worst fears. Chief of Air-Force and of L IH
[Army Air-Forces?] presents an evaluation of the situation I fully
agree to. I present to the Fuehrer this and the proof that we do not
have enough long range planes to pick up troops from Narvik, anyhow.
Furthermore, an order which is delivered by courier and composed in our
sense.
To fight and tie down forces and not to give up.
Even a professor who knows Norway is fetched from Innsbruck and asked
whether mountain troops can get from Narvik to Fauske is impossible
judging from my mountain experience.
In the evening, the Fuehrer signs the order to Dietl which I had
prepared, to hold out as long as possible.
_18 April_:
Fuehrer is again calm. He gives orders to Captain von Sternburg in
a way conforming entirely with our point of view. It might even be
possible to change last night’s order even more towards a sense of
holding out and tying down forces.
The situation, too, looks better. The strong shipping losses of the
English give them something to think about.
Quiet day which does our somewhat strained nerves good.
Sternburg leaves by plane with additional verbal orders.
_1600 hours_: General Jeschonnek shares the opinion we should go to
Bardufoss. I refuse that. The troops cannot hold out.
Important is * * * of the forces on hand, most important the thorough
destruction of the railroad.
2. He expresses doubts whether the landing of the 22nd division
which takes several days still runs satisfactorily in view of the
preparations in Holland. I emphasize that we have to open for ourselves
at least the entry into the Southern front of the fortress Holland and
that we have to keep it open.
_19 April_:
Renewed crisis. Political action has failed. Envoy Braner is recalled;
since Norway is at war with us, the task of the Foreign Offices is
finished. According to the Fuehrer’s opinion, force has to be used.
Gauleiter Terboven is supposed to be put in charge.
Field Marshal works in the same direction; he criticizes that the
behavior against the civilian population is not energetic enough, that
it was possible to occupy the electrical plant, that not enough troops
are brought up by the navy. The Air-Force cannot do everything.
Chief of the Armed Forces High Command leaves room, leadership chaos is
again threatening, because even details are being overruled from above,
and all orderly work of the competent military leadership (Navy High
Command and Gr. XXI) is in vain.
In the evening, Terboven arrives; after supper, the Fuehrer instructs
him alone. It is doubtful, if it will be possible to limit him to the
activity of a Civilian Commissar [Zivilkommissar], as I suggest it; we
will have to talk to him personally.
_20 April_:
Fuehrer’s birthday. Chief of the Armed Forces High Command and the
Supreme Commanders congratulate. All the tempests have quieted down.
The movements to Oslo and Narvik make progress. No English landings.
Fuehrer has a discussion with the Field-Marshal, with Himmler,
Terboven, Reichsleiter Bormann.
Before that, the Chief of the Armed Forces High Command has told the
Fuehrer about all possible points of friction between an independent
head of the government and the Military Commander in Norway. It seems
that reports of the Air Force have induced the Fuehrer to form the
opinion that the Norwegians are already conducting guerilla warfare and
sabotage on a large scale. Already on the 19th, I contradicted such
an opinion. We must not lead the Norwegians to passive or even active
resistance, because that is precisely the aim of the English, after all.
_21 April_:
Reports about landings on a larger scale near Andalsnes and Namsos
become more tangible.
On the evening of April 20th, the General [Generaloberst] leads a long
fight in order to word the text of the order to Terboven in such a way
that the military necessities are taken into account.
Fuehrer would like to bring big vessel with personnel and materiel to
Trondheim.
Commander-in-Chief of the Navy considers that to be impossible,
especially now.
_22 April_:
Fuehrer is increasingly worried about the English landings and
the consequent impossibility to set up ground communications with
Trondheim. Without success, I compare the difficult situation of the
English, who have no usable port and no airdrome at their disposal.
The Field-Marshal somewhat quieter, in view of the good weather
forecasts for the Air Force today.
_23 April_:
The excitement grows, because the 163d and 196th divisions are making
small progress towards the North and new bridge demolitions are being
reported. Fuehrer orders that no more motorized units [11th rifle
brigade] are to be sent to _Stavanger_, but immediately 2 mountain
divisions instead. 3rd is to be brought up to full strength again. 4
ships of the Iller class, in addition a 5000t steamer, later 2 larger
East Asia boats are to be brought to Bergen convoyed by capital ships,
in order to make the troops there mobile and ready for battle.
Forces in Narvik to be reorganized right away, in order to make the 3d
mountain division again steadfast for battle.
No heavy artillery is to go to Norway for ground combat. The heavy
battalion of the 2nd mountain division remains in the West, those
of the 3d mountain and 69th division are at the disposal of the
Commander-in-Chief of the Army.
Fuehrer talks to Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force.
_a._ Anti-aircraft reinforcements for Stavanger.
_b._ Bombers for ground fighting in Oslo, Fighters for ground
fighting in Oslo.
In the evening Lieutenant-Colonel von Lossberg returns from Oslo. He
reports the favorable situation in a somewhat schoolmasterly way, but
does not know any details. He brings along an English battalion order.
_24 April_:
The situation looks much more favorable, a fast advance on the right
flank is to be expected with mechanized Battalion Goering.
Lieutenant-Colonel Boehme confirms that picture after his return from
the front. He brings collected orders of the captured English brigade
detachment along. Very great political success to be anticipated with
that.
_1130 hours_: Field-Marshal reports, especially the situation in
Trondheim. Lieutenant-Colonel Boehme, back from the battle field,
reports favorably, rapid progress. Fuehrer regrets the halting of the
11th rifle brigade. I refuse to send them again now.
_2300 hours_: Schmundt back, even more favorable news. Boehme brings
English orders for the entire project of Norway’s occupation by the
English. Complaint about lack of clear orders in the Air Force.
_25 April_:
Optimistic mood continues. Fuehrer very happy about Schmundt’s
report and about exact orientation. Talks adversely about Lossberg
to Bodenschatz; Lossberg’s somewhat braggard report has created
displeasure, although he did not know any details. Preparation of an
action on the basis of the orders found on captured Englishmen.
Order to Kraatzer W Pr and Counter Intelligence Bureau for foreign
countries [Amt Abwehr/Ausland].
Report by Sternberg about his task in Narvik.
Order by me to Chief L to give out a strong directive that nobody but
Armed Forces High Command will give orders to Gr. Narvik. All men there
are subordinated General Dietl exclusively.
The Belgian government resigned.
_26 April_:
Suggestion to the Fuehrer to omit naval transport to Bergen with
battleships and to bring these mobile parts of the 69th Division back
to Oslo. Italian ambassador Atolico is recalled, because he does not
take a clear pro-German attitude.
At 1500 hours the Commander-in-Chief of the navy reports.
Fuehrer drops request for transporting troops to Bergen convoyed by
heavy naval forces.
Commander-in-Chief of the Navy reports that everything which could be
possibly thought of has been done for the safeguarding of * * * the
Westwall will be extended * * * Sp * * * solidified.
Major Soltman reports about the interrogation of the Englishmen, and
delivers additional important documents, among them the secret chain of
command [Rangliste]. At noon, the first prisoners arrived in Berlin.
They are being interrogated in the Alexander Barracks and confirm the
authenticity of the orders. All material is handed over to the Foreign
Office.
Until 0330 in the Reich Chancellery, where Fuehrer formulates the
government statement together with Foreign Minister. It will be
published on the * * *
_27 April_:
Fuehrer voices intention to start with case “Yellow” between 1st and
7th May. I point out that the Air Force and the Transportation Chief
have to be initially notified 3 days ahead of time.
Motor column [Mot.Kol.] Fischer gets stuck 100 miles [Km?] south of
Drontheim in front of many destroyed bridges.
Group (Gr) XXI is crying for engineers and cross-Country motor
vehicles. They will have to get along with their own engineers. After
all, there are 19 engineer companies. Order to get all engineers up to
the front.
_28 April_:
Advance movement direction Drontheim is halting. Nevertheless the
English are retiring fast according to their communiques.
_29 April_:
Fuehrer decides: Air Force can commit another 2 groups (new) in Norway
on Tuesday and Wednesday, but must be ready for Yellow on Sunday.
Commander-in-Chief of the Navy commits heaviest flat * * * for the
safeguarding of * * * [?]
Emden still to be left in Baltic (O), Employ 2 East Asia steamboats for
Oslo-transport.
Falkenhorst wants his motorized and mountain battalion with engineer
platoon and battalion brought to Drontheim by air.
Commander-in-Chief of the Army has to be compelled first to set up the
missing regiment for the 3rd mountain division so rapidly than it can
roll immediately behind the 2nd mountain division.
Fuehrer is worried about Drontheim and is not quite to be dissuaded yet
from readying heavy artillery and also the 1st mountain division for
Norway.
_30 April_:
At 13.35 hours I am able to report to the Fuehrer that line of
communication on land between Oslo and Drontheim has been established.
Fuehrer is happy with joy. At noon, I have to sit next to him.
The special communique is released right away. It remains to be decided
now, whether to keep in readiness the 1st mountain division (no) and
heavy artillery (no). At 18.30 hours the report comes in that Dombaas
has been reached, too, and that the enemy is retiring. Opdal on the
railroad Drontheim-Dombaas has also been occupied. Fuehrer releases
order of the day to the soldiers in Norway.
_1 May_:
More big successes in Norway on land and in the air.
Fuehrer orders that starting Saturday, May 4th, everything must be in
readiness to start operations for case Yellow the following day, when
ordered.
_2 May_:
Victory report from Norway. Pursuit direction Andalsnes. The English
flee to the boats. Norwegians give up the Commander of Moeren-Romsdal,
Gen. Hang offers capitulation.
Field Marshall with Kesselring, Jeschonnek, Student, Sponek again
report about case “Festung” [fortress]. It will be carried out. Landing
on super-highway possible.
Difficulty is the strong echelonment in depth [Tiefenstaffelung] of the
bridge position near Moerdyk and north of it.
Air Force is to get order on the 3rd at noon, whether to guide in
[einweisen] or not to guide in, that whether means to use or not to use
parachutists and airborne units.
_3 May_:
After evaluation of weather, Fuehrer decides that X-day will not be
before Monday, 6 May.
Air Force notified by code word “Do not guide in.” [“Nicht einweisen”]
Field Marshal protests against draft of the comprehensive description
of operations in Norway, where Armed Forces High Command is mentioned
and where the name Pellengahr appears, but not Milch.
Fuehrer rejects request of the Air Force to set up a listening post
[Horchstelle] in the Caucasus.
Prepared White Book concerning unneutral actions of Holland and Belgium
does not seem to satisfy the Foreign Office completely. To my mind the
material is more than sufficient.
A new order goes out to group XXI, especially as several foreign news
reports say that Namsos, too, will be evacuated.
Dr. Todt transmits exact details.
_4 May_:
Reports about evacuation of Namsos by the English. Great successes of
the Air Force against the English fleet. Battleship, heavy cruiser and
destroyer, in addition to 12000 ton transport sunk.
Fuehrer himself wants to make comprehensive report about the campaign
in Norway. He is furious about it that people other than himself meddle
with this reporting. He stated that the Armed Forces High Command is
his staff. Fuehrer designates Tuesday, May 7th as X-day.
The flanks of Gr. Dietl are being pressed hard in Narvik. I am afraid
he remains too long in front.
_5 May_:
Field Marshal reports that an English 1500 ton submarine minelayer
was sighted on the Swedish coast. He makes an onslaught aimed at
subordinating all Naval Air units under the Commander-in-Chief of the
Air Force.
Fuehrer has finished justification [Begruendung] for case “Yellow”.
Wednesday, May 8th, is designated as A-day.
_6 May_:
Detailed orders for May 8th for A-day are issued, and for transmission
of the code words Augsburg and Danzig.
_7 May_:
Fuehrer railroad train was scheduled to leave Finkenkrug at 16.38 hours.
But weather remains uncertain and therefore, the order valid up to this
time is rescinded. Next decision May 8th until 1200 hours.
1100 hours: The Field Marshal with Bodenschatz and Jeschonnek at the
Fuehrer’s.
1500 hours: Admiral of the Fleet [Grossadmiral] Raeder.
Mine damage of the Gneisenau only very insignificant. One destroyer may
be recalled from Drontheim, as a second one is still ready for sailing.
Fuehrer very much agitated about new postponement, as there is danger
of treachery particularly in brown leaflets [in braunen Blaettern].
Talk of the Belgian Envoy to the Vatican to Brussels permits the
deduction that treason has been committed by a German personality who
left Berlin for Rome on April 29th.
Fuehrer again emphasizes that the greatest achievement of endurance
[Dauerleistung] is that of the foot-slogging combat-soldier.
_8 May_:
Alarming news from Holland, canceling of furloughs, evacuations,
road-blocks, other mobilization measures; according to reports of the
counterintelligence service the British have asked for permission to
march in but the Dutch have refused.
According to reports the measures of the Dutch are partly directed
against the coast and partly against us. It is not possible to obtain
a clear picture, whether the Dutch don’t work hand in hand with the
English or whether they actually want to defend their neutrality
against the first attacker. Evaluation of the weather shows slow
improvement of the whole situation, but development fog in the next
days still have to be taken into consideration.
Fuehrer does not want to wait any longer.
Field Marshal wants postponement until the 10th, at least.
Chief of the Armed Forces High Command presses for early action.
Fuehrer is very agitated; then he consents to postponement until May
10th, which is against his intuition, as he says. But not one day
longer. Departure of Envoy Kieritz, who was scheduled to leave at 12.57
hours is stopped at the last minute. Is not supposed to leave until May
9th.
In the evening, I arrange the different telegrams with him.
_9 May_:
Fuehrer decides to fall in on May 10th for sure. Departure with Fuehrer
train at 17.00 hours from Finkenkrug.
After report Jeschonnek that weather situation will be favourable on
the 10th, the code word Danzig is given at 2100 hours.
The same to Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force.
_10 May_:
Morning arrival in Emskirchen still during darkness. At 0530 hours in
the Eagle’s nest.
_11-13 May_:
The operations take a course favorable beyond expectation. The Dutch
offer desperate resistance. Bridges at Maastricht, and all bridges
north of it, are blown up. Only the railroad bridge at Gemrep falls
into our hands undamaged. Fort Eben Emael is taken and the bridges
in Mordeyk south of Dortrecht as well as the important ones over the
Albert Canal west of Maastricht are taken over by parachutists and
glider-borne personnel and are held by them. Airborne operation of the
Sponek Division is met by heaviest resistance and is badly mauled.
However, the different units hold out. On the R., the junction of the
9th armored division with them is effected. The citadel of Luettich is
being broken into.
_14 May_:
Order number 11 issued, which orders the concentration of all armored
and mechanized units in front of the 4th army.
Holland capitulates.
_16 May_:
Fuehrer insists very much on transfer of all armored and mechanized
units from Army Group B to A, and on speediest bringing up of strong
reserves behind the 4th and 12th army. OKH gives orders to pull these
units out from B and to add them via F ... to the fifteenth corps
as new Armored Group Hoeppner. According to report Reichau, there
are indications that the enemy is giving up the Dyle position or its
Southern part, at least. Therefore, Army High Command receives the
option to carry out the junction of Armored Group Hoeppner also in
front of Nanner, which the enemy seems to be evacuating.
Engle reports after visit at 4th army that that army has reached the
French-Belgian border near Beauchmont, after a heavy tank battle.
_1600-1830 hours_: Field Marshal Goering with the Fuehrer, talk with
Jeschonnek about forthcoming tasks of the Air Force and intentions
concerning Narvik, utilizing the new airdrome near * * *
_17 May_:
_18 May_:
Day of great tension. The commander-in-chief of the Army has not
carried out the intention of building up, as quickly as possible, a
new flanking position to the South. Instead of turning march to the
west. For this reason the 10th Armored Division and the 2nd and 29th
Motorized Divisions are still entrenched in the defensive flanking
positions.
The commander-in-chief of the Army and General Holdes are called
immediately and ordered to adopt the necessary measures immediately
(see note in the files).
Chief of the Armed Forces High Command is flying immediately by plane
to General Rundstedt at Bastogne.
I further give an order supplementing the previous directive. It veers
the 1st Mountain Division and the rear echelons of the 4th Army, to the
South and South-West for an attack.
_19 May_:
_20 May_:
Break-through becomes more and more clearly outlined. True, Army Group
“B”, respectively Chief are very vexed because their Armored Corps was
taken away from them, but it was the right thing to do. On the 20th, we
already have all armored and mechanized divisions, except the 9th one,
in the middle of the break-through wedge. While we were still afraid on
the 19th that the bulk of the French-English army might have escaped to
the South, it becomes increasingly evident on the 20th that more than
20 divisions are still north of the Somme.
Now everything depends on sealing off the Abbeville gap and the Army
Corps Kleist reaches it in the evening of the 28th. In the forenoon of
the 20th, at the Army High Commands conference, the Fuehrer declares
the new directive for continuation of operations against the French
Army.
1. Annihilation of the enemy north of the Somme and gaining of the sea
coast.
2. Sudden thrust forward between Oise and sea, until Seine river is
reached.
3. Principal Attack on both sides of Reims in south-westerly direction,
accompanied on the right flank east of Paris by heavy forces.
4. For secondary reasons penetration of the Maginot line by
lighter forces between St. Avold and Sarreguemines in direction of
Nancy-Luneville.
General von Stuelpnagel is ordered, not to follow up any more former
intention, to attack the Plateau of Langres with 20 Italian Divisions
crossing the Upper Rhine. The Italians rather should attack the French
Alpine Front and pin down French forces on the Upper Rhine. This they
can prepare already now, without having commenced hostilities.
Fuehrer is beside himself with joy. Talks in words of highest
appreciation of the German Army and its leadership. Is working on the
peace treaty, which shall express the tenor only: Return of territory
robbed over the past 400 years from the German people, and other values.
First negotiations in the forest of Compiegne like in 1918.
British can get a separate peace any time after restitution of the
colonies.
A special memorandum of the Chief of the Armed Forces High Command
containing the emotion-chocked words of the Fuehrer when receiving
the telephone report of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army about the
capture of Abbeville, is in the files.
_21 May_:
Commander in Chief of the Army together with Halder reports at 09.45
about situations and later intentions. The Commander-in-Chief of the
Army wants to operate by-passing Paris on the West with the entire
Armored and mechanized units under Reichman’s command, and in addition
to this to attack with he wants to attack the Upper Rhine with 18
divisions. This would change the intentions of the Fuehrer, expressed
by him on the 20th. Fuehrer declares his agreement for the time being.
* * * * * * *
In the afternoon the Fuehrer explains to Chief of the Armed Forces High
Command and to me, that he had changed his mind. He believes, that it
is wrong to employ all Armed and Mechanized Divisions West of Paris,
that it would be better to direct the main thrust, also with the bulk
of Armored Forces, to by-pass Paris in the east (transmitted by me to
Greifenberg in the evening).
Report of Commander-in-Chief of the Navy to Fuehrer at 1200 hours. In
the afternoon Field Marshal and Jeschonnek.
The Fuehrer is a little nervous in the evening about the fact, that
infantry divisions are not pushed forward fast enough. Possibly they
are being held back in order to obtain improvements of position of the
VIth and VIIth Corps. If possible, one must employ transport groups.
Fuehrer stays in map room until 0130 hours.
_22 May_:
Chief of the Armed Forces High Command decides after that to fly to
Army Group A in Charleville early on the 22nd. Brings back a report
much more pleasant than the situation map indicates. It becomes
apparent that Headquarters of 4th Army has ordered General Kluge to
commit the 1st Army Corps south of Sombre, so that it will be in front
rather than in the rear of the French border fortifications.
The Fuehrer approves at 1300 hours directive, submitted by me,
concerning sparing of human lives of the 10th Army by disengagement
from the Maginot line, cessation of unnecessary attacks, bringing up of
all Divisions and mobile GHQ troops to the rear of 4th Army.
Sharp pressure of Army Group B towards the West. The Fuehrer
furthermore approves commitment of an airborne Battalion already in
readiness and of 2 companies Mountain troops, with short training, in
Narvik.
Army High Command draws a very optimistic picture of the situation at
1700 hours and intends to continue at 1200 hours on left wing West of
Arras towards North.
But Jeschonnek reports at 1900 hours, that French tanks reached point
3 kilometer in front of Arras and were stopped only there by dive
bombers, pursuit planes and Anti Aircraft Artillery.
_24 May_:
The Fuehrer flies together with me and Schmundt to Army Group A to
Charleville.
He is very happy about the measures of the Army Group, which correspond
entirely with his ideas. He learns to his surprise that the Army High
Command, without informing the Fuehrer and the High Command of the
Armed Forces, has subordinated the 4th Army and a number of Divisions
to its rear, to Army Group B. Fuehrer is very much displeased and
thinks this regulation is a mistake not only in military respect but
also psychologically wrong. Commander-in-Chief of the Army is ordered
to report, and shifting of dividing-line is rescinded. New crisis
of confidence, especially since Field Marshal reports earlier that
an order of the Army High Command in no way pushes the Army Group B
onward, but even invites it to make available reserves that can be
spared.
For that reason a new order is issued in the evening (a) not to advance
beyond the line Sandez-St.Omer-Graveline towards the East. Besides that
each change regarding the Chain of command among the Armies is subject
to approval of the Fuehrer.
The Fuehrer signs Order #13 regarding continuation of operations.
He prohibits the proposed talk by General von Melsch in the Foreign
Office to foreign journalists about the war situation, if necessary
this shall be done by W PR [Armed Forces Propaganda?]
Very favorable report of the Commander in Chief of the Air Force and
the Commander in Chief of the Army about the situation.
It becomes obvious, that the surrounded enemy is no longer capable of
concerted action.
Situation in the East becomes threatening because of Russian
concentration of forces against Bessarabia.
_25 May_:
In the morning the Commander-in-Chief of the Army arrived and asks
permission armored mechanized division to push forward from the High
terrain Vimy-St.Omer-Graveline towards in the West into the level
terrain. Fuehrer is against it, leaves decision to Army Group A. They
decline for the time being because tank, shall rest a while, to be
ready for tasks in the South.
At noon, Commander of 22 Divisions (Parachute Divisions) Count Sponek,
reports about his experiences between the Hague and Rotterdam. He had
heavy losses, but accomplished the incredible.
Air Force reports great successes near Narvik.
The unlimited expansion plan of the SS causes general apprehension.
Lutz protests in a letter to the General [Generaloberst] against
mentioning of the Armed-SS [Waffen-SS] in Armed forces High Command
communiques. But this came from the Fuehrer in a proclamation to the
troops in the Dutch theater of operations. General Dietl has received
parachuted mountain troops in Narvik after a course of training lasting
only 10 days, no losses.
_26 May_:
In the morning the Fuehrer sends for Commander-in-Chief of the Army
and agrees because 18th and 6th army advance slowly and because,
resistance in the South in front of the 2nd Army Corps has stiffened,
that tank units and infantry divisions push forward in direction of
Tournai, Cassel and Dunkerque from the West, especially because the
enemy on their part do not advance against the mountain positions but
dig themselves in defensive positions and improve them. In conjunction
therewith the Commander-in-Chief of the Army reports about his
intentions for further conduct of the operations (All sketch). Of the
12 Divisions, committed for the first push northwest of Paris, 6 shall
join Army Group B (9th and 4th Army). First push possible around 31
May. 2nd push 6 to 8 days later (Main attack A and B), 3rd push at C
will be in readiness starting 15 June.
The problem Paris is to be considered, not only from a military, but
also from a political point of view.
* * * * * * *
If Paris is surrendered or if revolutionary features come to the fore,
then Paris must be occupied at once. If Paris is defended, we will
strongly disengage ourselves for the time being.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1814-PS
ORGANIZATION BOOK OF THE NSDAP
Editions of 1936, 1938 and 1940.
Editor, the Reich Organization Leader of the NSDAP (Dr. Robert Ley).
Published by the Central Publishing House of the NSDAP, Franz Eher
Successor, Munich. Pages 86-88.
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE NSDAP AND ITS AFFILIATED ASSOCIATIONS
The Party was created by the Fuehrer out of the realization that if
our people were to live and advance towards an era of prosperity they
had to be led according to an ideology suitable for our race. They
must have as supporters men above average, that means, men who surpass
others in self-control, discipline, efficiency, and greater judgment.
The party will therefore always constitute a minority, the order of the
National Socialist ideology which comprises the leading elements of our
people.
Therefore the party comprises only fighters, at all times prepared
to assume and to give everything for the furtherance of the National
Socialist ideology. Men and women whose primary and most sacred duty is
to serve the people.
The NSDAP as the leading element of the German people control the
entire public life, from an organizational point of view, as well as
from that of affiliates, the organizations of the State administration,
and so forth.
In the long run it will be impossible to let leaders retain responsible
offices if they have not been recognized by the Party.
Furthermore, the party shall create the prerequisites for a systematic
selection of potential “Fuehrers”.
The reconstruction of the National Socialist organizational structure
itself is demonstrated by the observation of the following principles:
The Fuehrer Principle.
The subordination and coordination within the structure of the entire
organization.
The regional unity.
The expression of the practical community thought.
I. FUEHRER PRINCIPLE [Fuehrerprinzip]
The Fuehrer Principle requires a pyramidal organization structure in
its details as well as in its entirety.
The Fuehrer is at the top.
He nominates the necessary leaders for the various spheres of work of
the Reich’s direction, the Party apparatus and the State administration.
Thus a clear picture of the tasks of the party is given.
The Party is the order of “Fuehrers”. It is furthermore responsible for
the spiritual-ideological National Socialist direction of the German
people. The right to organize people for their own sake emanates from
these reasons.
This also justifies the subordination to the party of the organizations
concerned with the welfare of the people, besides the inclusion of
people in the affiliates of the party, the SA, SS, NSKK, the Hitler
Youth, the NS Womanhood, the NS German Student Association and the NS
German “Dozentenbund” [University teachers association].
This is where the National Socialist Fuehrer structure becomes more
strongly apparent.
Every single affiliate is cared for by an office of the NSDAP.
The leadership of the individual affiliates is appointed by the Party.
The Reich Organization Leader [Reichsorganisationsleiter] of the NSDAP
is simultaneously leader of the DAF. The NSBO is the organization
bearer of the DAF.
The Leader of the Head-Office for Public Welfare also handles within
the “Personalunion” the National Socialist Welfare and the Winter
Relief.
The same applies to:
The Reich Justice Office [Reichsrechtsamt] for the NS
“Rechtswahrerbund”,
The head office for public health for the NS. German Medical
Association,
The head office for educators for the NS Teachers Association,
The head office for civil servants for the Reich Association of Civil
Servants,
The head office for war victims for the NS. War Victim Relief,
The head office for technology for the NS. Association of German
Technology.
The Racial Political Office handles the Reich Association of families
with many children, the NS Womanhood [Frauenschaft] and the “Deutches
Frauenwerk”.
The Reich Office for agrarian politics of the NSDAP remains furthermore
in closest touch with the “Reichnaehrstand” [Reich Nutrition Office]
which is anchored in the State. Direct handling and personal contact of
the leaders is also provided in this manner.
All attached affiliates, as well as the offices of the Party, have
their foundation, in the same manner as in the Reich direction, in the
sovereign territories, in the “Gaue” and furthermore in the districts
(Kreise) and if required in the local groups of the NSDAP. This applies
also to cells and blocks in the case of the NS Womanhood, the DAF,
and the NSV. The members of the attached affiliates will be included
in local administrations, respectively district sectors or district
comradeships which correspond geographically to local groups of the
Party.
II. FUEHRER PRINCIPLE. SUBORDINATION AND COORDINATION WITHIN THE TOTAL
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
The Fuehrer structure would be split, though, if all subdivisions,
including attached affiliates were completely independent in their
structure from the smallest unit up to the “Reichsfuehrung” and were
they to come only at the top directly under the Fuehrer.
Like a four-story building, if we consider the four Sovereign
territories [Reich, Gau, etc.] whose pillars and walls go up to the
roof without having supporting joists (wooden stays) or connections
on the various floors. Furthermore, it would not be reconcilable with
the Fuehrer principle, which assumes complete responsibility, to
assume that the Leader of a subdivision, as well as of an affiliated
organization, would be in the position to guarantee beyond a
professional and factual responsibility the political and ideological
attitude of _all_ the sub-leaders down to the smallest unit on the
basis of his Reich leadership. The total independence of individual
organizations would necessitate furthermore, the creation of an
organizational, personal and educational apparatus for each one of
them. This, in turn, would create eventually, in spite of the best will
of the responsible “Reichsleiters” [Reich Leaders], central offices and
office leaders in the Reich Leadership [Reichsfuehrung] of the party,
differences in the various organizations. Those differences would
later on of necessity take the shape of completely different systems
in regional, vertical, and personal respects, etc. within the National
Socialist regime.
The Subdivisions NS German Student Association, NS Womanhood
Association, NSD [Dozentenbund] and the affiliates and their leaders
come therefore under the authority of the competent sovereign leaders
of the NSDAP. At the same time their structure is professionally
effectuated from the bottom up and they are subordinated to their
immediately superior organization in the sovereign divisions of the
Party, from a disciplinary point of view, that is to say insofar as
organization, ideology, politics, supervision and personal questions
are concerned.
Thus a solid anchorage for all the organizations within the party
structure is provided and a firm connection with the sovereign leaders
of the NSDAP is created in accordance with the Fuehrer Principle.
[In the 1943 edition the text remains the same, but the topical
sentences “I. Fuehrer Principle” and “II. Fuehrer Principle.
Subordination and Coordination within the Total Organizational
Structure” are changed to “I. Construction of the Organization” and
“II. Subordination and Coordination within the Total Organizational
Structure”.]
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1815-PS
Berlin 12 May 1941
R.S.H.A.
IV B I
To all Staatspolizei-leit-stellen
_For information_:
The SD-Leit-Abschnitten
The Inspekteuren der Sipo/SD
Concerning: The Study and Treatment of Church Politics
The Chief of the R.S.H.A. has issued an order, which is to come into
immediate operation, in which the Sipo and SD Study and Treatment
of Church Politics, which has hitherto been divided between the
SD-Abschnitte and Stapostellen, shall now be taken over entirely by
the Stapostellen. (See the plan for the division of work issued by
the R.S.H.A. on 1.3.41. In addition to combatting opposition, the
Stapostellen thus take over the entire ‘Gegnernachrichtendienst’ in
this sphere.)
In order that the Stapostellen should be in a position to take
over this work, the Chief of the Sipo/SD has ordered that ‘Church
Specialists’ hitherto employed in the SD-Abschnitten, should be
temporarily transferred to the same posts at Stapostellen, and operate
the Nachrichtendienst (Intelligence Service in the Church Political
Sphere) there.
On the orders of the Chief of the R.S.H.A., and after reaching
agreement with the heads of Amts III, II, and I, these ‘Church
Specialists’ specified in the attached lists will thus be transferred
from the SD-Abschnitten to the Stapostellen, quoted. Further
instructions for transference or removal will be issued by Amt. I.
Those Stapostellen which are unable to obtain any SD-‘Specialists’ must
immediately train those of their specialists who appear most suitable
for Nachrichtendienst work.
The Chief of the R.S.H.A. has furthermore ordered that
‘Nachrichtendienst’ files concerning Church Political Opposition,
hitherto the property of the SD-Abschnitte should be handed over to
the Stapostellen. However, material concerning Confessional influence
on the lives of the people is to remain with the SD-Abschnitten. In
doubtful cases the Stapostellen are to be given an opportunity of
making copies or photostats of these reports.
Since it is essential that in this particular sphere the opposition
should be kept under constant observation, with no possibility
of loopholes, I am endeavoring to ensure that the change-over in
organization should take place immediately.
On I.VI.1941 all Stapostellen are to send in reports on the completion
of the actual change-over of organization, and, at the same time, draw
up a list of personnel, giving the names of those ‘Specialists’ who,
after the reorganization, are doing executive work in the Stapostellen,
and of those who are conducting the intelligence proper of the
Nachrichtendienst.
I then intend, at the end of June, to summon all these specialists to
a conference [Arbeitstagung] in Berlin, at which they will receive
important instructions for the carrying-out of their work.
Signed Mueller
Beglaubigt: Kanzleiangestellte
# # # # #
Berlin 14.8.1941
R.S.H.A.
IV B
To all Stapo-leit-stellen
_Information_: From the Inspectors of the Sipo/SD
_Concerning_: Conference of the Specialists in Church Affairs
[Kirchenbearbeiter] attached to the Stapostellen.
On 22d and 23d of September 1941 a Conference for Church Specialists
attached to Stapo-leit-stellen will take place in the Lecture-Hall of
the Stapoamt, Prinz-Albrechtstrasse 8, Berlin SW II. Date of arrival:
21.9.41. Uniform: Brownshirt and trousers worn with jackboots.
I leave it to the heads of the Stapo-leit-stellen as to whether they
send those officials responsible for the entire ‘Kirchenbearbeitung’
(Treatment and Study of Church Politics) to this conference, or
officials in charge of both the executive and intelligence branches
(SD-members). In each case those taking part in the conference must
have their names sent in before 10.9.1941, in order that accommodation
may be found for them. Billeting forms will be issued on arrival in
Berlin on the 21st at the Stapoamt Watchroom, Room I. Passes are to
be given up at the entrance of the lecture-hall at the opening of the
conference at 9 hrs.--22.9.41.
Heydrich
Beglaubigt: Kanzleiangestellte
# # # # #
Aachen, 8 October 1941
Report of Hammes on Conference dated 8 October 1941 at Aachen
_Notes on the Conference of Church Specialists attached to
Stapo-leit-stellen_
On the 22d and 23d September 1941 a Conference of Church Specialists
attached to Stapo-leit-stellen was held in the Lecture-Hall of the
R.S.H.A. in Berlin, in which 141 Specialists took part.
I. _On 22.9.1941_
1. The latest developments in the Church Political situation, and our
outstanding tasks at this moment--SS-Stubaf. Hartl.
2. Sipo measures for combating the Political Church and
Sects--Regierungsrat Rotu & Reg. Ass. Harnensbruch.
3. Nachrichtendienst tasks in the conflict with Political Catholicism
in the Reich--SS-Ostuf. Kunze.
4. Vatican world-politics, and our Nachrichtendienst
tasks--SS-Untersturmfuehrer Jakobs.
II. _On 23.9.1941_
5. Present conditions within the German Protestant
Church--SS-Obersturmfuehrer Stiller.
6. Treatment of the Sect problem, and the combating of
Sects--SS-Hauptscharfuehrer Ehrhardt.
7. World-Protestantism and the Oxford Movement--Nachrichtendienst work
evolving from these subjects--SS-Obersturmfuehrer Stiller.
8. The problem of the Church in the Eastern regions, and
Nachrichtendienst measures--SS-Untersturmfuehrer Wandesleben.
9. The present Nachrichtendienst problem of
Freemasonry--SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer Kolrep.
10. Summary of the most important points in the treatment of Church
Political opposition--SS-Sturmbannfuehrer Hartl.
In the absence of SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Heydrich, the Conference was
opened by SS-Brigadefuehrer Mueller, who, after a short speech of
welcome, and introduction handed over to the first lecturer. The most
important lectures--those under I, items 2 and 3, have been noted down
and filed.
The main aim and object of the conference has been to familiarize the
specialists as thoroughly as possible with their material, and, by
stimulating their interest, enable them to fulfill their duties to the
best of their ability.
Nothing of great moment came to light in the discussions. Finally
SS-Stub. Hartl, also deputizing for the absent Heydrich, summed up the
most important points in the treatment of Church Political affairs. He
summarized the culminating points as follows:
1. Avoidance of all sweeping measures and actions against the Church
and its establishments.
2. Suspension of measures taken against monasteries/convents, including
“camouflaged” measures of this type.
3. Action is still to be taken as before in individual cases, but the
R.S.H.A. is to be informed in each case. In particularly serious cases
the decision of the Fuehrer will be sought.
4. Above all it must be ensured that the Church does not win back any
lost ground. We must see to it that we retain any position won.
5. The greatest importance is to be attached to Church Political
activity. Any material that is of the slightest significance, or could
become of significance, is to be carefully examined. On the Fuehrer’s
instructions photostats are to be made of all documents seized, and
other material of this type, as in such cases duplicate copies are in
no way sufficient for the introduction of decisive measures.
The “Nachrichtennetz” is to be fostered with the greatest of care, and
enlarged through the recruitment of new V-Personen. Particular value is
attached to contacts between Church circles and “Staatsstellen.”
The lecturer closed with the following words:
Each one of you must go to work with your whole heart and a true
fanaticism. Should a mistake or two be made in the execution of this
work, this should in no way discourage you, since mistakes are made
everywhere. The main thing is that the enemy should be constantly
tackled with determination, will, and effective initiative.
Signed: HEINZE
Kriminal-Secretaer
Signed: HAMMES
Kriminal-Kommissar z. Pr.
# # # # #
Aachen, 26 September 1941
Report of Regierungsrat Roth’s speech before Conference dated 26
September 1941
_Sicherheitspolizei measures for combating Church Politics and Sects_
While describing the aim and methods of the Political Church in its
oppositional activities, the executive measures which, in accordance
with the Concordat, are at the disposal of the Stapo, were discussed.
a. Punishable offences and infringements of the law by members
of the Church are to be submitted to the Kripo for processing.
Nachrichtendienst evaluation, and the compiling of evidence for a final
breakdown is the responsibility of the Stapo.
b. It has been demonstrated that it is impracticable to deal with
political offences (malicious) under normal legal procedure. Owing to
the lack of political perception which still prevails among the legal
authorities, suspension of this procedure must be reckoned with. The
so-called “Agitator-Priests” must therefore be dealt with in future
by Stapo measures, and, if the occasion arises, be removed to a
Concentration Camp, if agreed upon by the RSHA.
c. Offences and crimes against the “Sammlungsgesetz” [Order to
contribute to Party Funds] and the “Flaggenerlass” [Order to beflag
Churches etc.,] come under normal procedure. [A penciled note states
that this is not always so, and that it depends on the case in
question.]
d. The necessary executive measures are to be decided upon according to
local conditions, the status of the person accused, and the seriousness
of the case--as follows:
1. Warnung (Warning)
2. Sicherungsgeld (Fine)
3. Redeverbot (Forbidden to preach)
4. Aufenthaltsverbot (Forbidden to remain in parish)
5. Betaetigungsverbot (Forbidden all activity as a Priest)
6. Kurzfristige Festnahme (Short-term arrest)
7. Schutzhaft (Protective custody)
The instructions for the application of individual measures are known.
The following points must be remembered:
_The Aufenthaltsverbot_ (Forbidden to remain in parish) is very much
feared by all the clergy. In one case a Vicar-General appealed to the
RSHA for the lifting of the ban, and begged that they would rather
place the priest under short-term arrest. The “Aufenthaltsverbot” is
to be enforced in any case where the continued stay of the priest in
his former parish is likely to bring about dissension and disquiet
among the population. It should be applied, for instance, in the event
of a priest returning from arrest, in order to prevent him from being
feted as a martyr. Care must be taken that the measure is only enforced
where really expedient (encumbering of another Stapostelle).
_Redeverbot_ (Forbidden to preach) is intended chiefly as a measure
against itinerant preachers, and will only be brought against
residential ones when they exceed their normal offices as priests, and
preach much injurious matter.
_Betaetigungsverbot_ (Forbidden all activities as a priest) has not yet
been applied, but is possible.
_Schutzhaft_ (Protective custody). As already stated, in accordance
with the Order issued by the RSHA on 24.8.36 the “Agitator Priest” is
to be taken into long-term imprisonment. The technical execution of
this lies in the hands of the Referat IV C 2, while it is IV B I’s
responsibility to present the charges.
Actions against societies are not at the moment possible as a
widespread State measure. However, in cases where the Society has
been involved in anti-state activity, or appears superfluous or
undesirable, local measures may be applied. Small funds/properties
may be liquidated. Funds may also be handed over to the NSV. In cases
of activities against the State the only method is confiscation of
funds. Proposals for “Declaration of Enmity to People and State” with
the object of confiscation of property, are principally to be directed
to the RSHA, which works nonexecutively, and directs the necessary
negotiations with the MdI.
_Monasteries/Convents._ It is not expected at the present that
they will be declared as hostile to the State. During the process
of “Dissolution” it should be remembered that the Law of 10.2.36
suffices as a legal basis for the disposal. It is not essential that
the Order of 28.2.33 should be quoted, and it will only be brought
up if the Stapo measures are to come under “legal justification”
(Betaetigungsverbot 4).
_Actions against Monasteries/Convents._ About 100 monasteries in the
Reich have been dissolved. Various incidents which may be traced back
to bad tactical procedure by Stapo officials, have led to disagreeable
consequences. Should the inmates of the monasteries put questions
to the appointed officials, those officials must refer them to the
Aktionsleiter [officer in charge of the proceedings].
Churches are to be seized at the same time, but, if possible, should
not be closed. As long as the confiscation is not absolute, any
action which interferes with property, or causes any alteration to it
should be avoided. The principle to be followed during the period of
“Sicherstellung” is that life should go on within the framework of an
ordered administration.
Further points made were:
Retreats, recreational organizations, etc., may now be forbidden on
grounds of industrial war-needs, whereas formerly only a worldly
activity could be given as a basis.
Youth camps, recreational camps are to be forbidden on principle.
Church organizations in the evening may be prevented on grounds of the
black-out regulations.
Processions, pilgrimages abroad are to be forbidden by reason of the
overburdened transport conditions. For local events too technical
traffic troubles and the danger of air attack may serve as grounds for
their prohibition (one Referent forbade a procession, on the grounds of
it wearing out shoe leather).
There are no new regulations regarding the despatch of Confessional
literature to the troops, and the restrictions on Confessional
publications.
Visas are always to be denied where the applicant cannot offer the
excuse that he will dedicate himself unreservedly to working for the
Fatherland while abroad. There are, however, possible exceptions. In
principle the intention still holds good, that no foreign priest should
enter the Reich, and that no German priest should travel abroad, above
all, not to the “Aufbaugebiet.”
In the meantime the Church Ministry has adopted the view of the
RSHA, in which it was decided that Polish civilian workers and
prisoners-of-war must definitely be separated at Services.
The RSHA requests that questions of policy should be submitted to
them, but that, on the other hand, they should not be bothered with
unnecessary inquiries. Above all, definite proposals on how to handle
the case in question should always be given, and not just requests for
direction or decision.
The immediate aim: The Church must not regain one inch of the ground it
has lost.
The ultimate aim. Destruction of the Confessional Churches to be
brought about by the collection of all material obtained through
Nachrichtendienst activities, which will, at a given time, be produced
as evidence for the charge of treasonable activities during the German
fight for existence.
Signed: HAMMES
Kriminal-Kommissar z.Pr.
# # # # #
SECRET
Excerpt from Note 16 concerning the Conference held by the Inspector in
Dusseldorf on 23.9.41. (Pp. 26, 27, 28.)
14. _Cooperation between Stapo/and SD in the sphere of Church Politics_
The study and treatment of the efforts of the Catholic Church in its
opposition to the present State is, from both a communication and
executive angle, the responsibility of the Stapo (‘Gegnerbekampfung’).
The treatment of the efforts of the Church, and their repercussions in
the sphere of ‘religious life’ is, however, the task of the SD.
From this it can be seen that a close cooperation in the future within
the sphere of the “Catholic Church” is especially necessary. It is the
duty of the Stapostellen to inform the SD-Abschnitte of any general
points to be observed during the course of ‘Gegnerbekampfung,’ in order
that the SD-Abschnitte can evaluate these facts from a religious angle.
The SD-Abschnitte are to inform the Stapostellen of any observations
which might be of assistance to them in their fight against the church
as an opponent of the State. Gegnerbekampfung and research in the
religious sphere must go hand in hand. The SD-Abschnitte must hand
over to the Stapostellen those V-Maenner who are working entirely,
or for the greater part, in ‘Gegnerbekampfung.’ However, if mutually
agreed upon, the SD-Abschnitte, who may still have a certain claim on
these V-Maenner by virtue of their work in the religious sphere, may
retain one or another of them to contribute work in this sphere. It
is desirable, however, that the appropriate official attached to the
Stapostelle should start taking over the direction of the V-Maenner by
stages as soon as possible.
The Inspector has asked for a general ruling from RSHA concerning the
direction of the ‘Kirchenreferat’ by the Stapo offices, and at the same
time expressed the opinion that it was not absolutely essential that
the responsibility of this should rest principally on the executive
officials. The RSHA has made a corresponding decision in which it
shall be left to the Stapoleiter in every individual case to choose
who should be entrusted with the general direction and control of the
‘Kirchenreferat.’ It is therefore up to the Stapo leader [leiter] to
decide, by the efficiency of his work, who is the more capable, and to
appoint him head of the Referat. (Order of the Chief of Sipo/SD 18.9.41
IV B.) The Inspector is to be informed as soon as possible of the
subsequent decision.
# # # # #
Berlin, 22 October 1941
Reichssicherheitshauptamt IV B 1--2744/41 g
_To all Stapostellen_
_For information to_:
a. The Fuehrers of all SD-(Leit) Abschnitte
b. To all Inspectors of the Sipo/SD
c. To the “Befehlshaber der Sipo/SD in Generalgouvernement KRAKAU”
d. To the “Kommandeure der Sipo/SD--KRAKAU, LUBLIN, RADOM, WARSCHAU.”
_Concerning_: Present Conditions within the Organization of the
Catholic Church.
_Enclosure_: 1 Report.
_Minute_
I am inclosing a report on the present position of the Organization of
the Catholic Church. This report is designed to serve as a basis for:
a. The education of the appropriate Specialist.
b. To aid “Nachrichtendienst” activity.
The following directions must be followed concerning Nachrichtendienst
activity:
1. If at all possible to verify that Bishops are using the papal
nunciate courier to deliver their report to Rome, and vice versa, we
should be informed.
2. It should be found out which priests, members of Holy Orders, and
Laymen are used by the Bishops to bring their reports to and from Rome.
Wherever possible, attempts should be made to intercept this method of
reporting through V-Maenner.
3. If possible, the reports submitted to Rome every 5 years should be
intercepted, especially when an opportunity arises in connection with
Stapo action.
4. Where tension is known to exist between Bishops, the Bishop and
Nuncio, or the Bishops and the “Instanzen” subordinate to them, this is
to be utilized for Nachrichten purposes.
5. Since there are at the moment 13 Arch- and Bishoprics vacant in
Greater Germany, efforts must be made to obtain the lists of Bishop
candidates.
6. If not already known, it must be found out with what particular
department the individual Bishops are concerned, under the aegis of
the Bishops Fulda Conference. Those Stapostellen in whose area there
is a Bishop entrusted with special duties--(The Bishop of Berlin with
Press work, the Bishop of Mainz with “Jugendseelsorge,” the Archbishop
of Freiburg with charity work, the Bishop of Passau with work
connected with the Church in the Eastern regions ... etc. ...) have
Nachrichtendienst tasks of especial Reich importance.
7. Points discussed during the Diocesan Synodes are to be obtained
wherever possible, and should be immediately submitted to IV B 1 at the
R.S.H.A.
8. The following directive is given for local Nachrichtendienst
activity--
a. In every case where a Sachbearbeiter attached to a Stapostelle has
an Archbishopric in his area, he must have a thorough knowledge of the
particular sphere of work in which the individual Referenten of the
appropriate Ordinarists are engaged.
b. The Episcopal Chancery is of particular importance within the
Episcopal Ordinariat. Similarly, and especially in the case of an
“Action,” the diocesan archives and the Episcopal secret archives are
of especial significance.
c. The Deans are of particular importance to Aussenstellen, since
they are described as the eyes and ears of the Bishop. Should the
opportunity arise, the yearly reports which they have to submit to the
Bishop, should be obtained and evaluated locally.
d. In order to ensure that the Nachrichtendienst organization is as
comprehensive as possible, an all-embracing Nachrichtennetz should be
spread among the more insignificant members of the clergy.
9. It must be discovered which of those members of Orders, and priests
of German origin are employed in important posts at the Vatican--other
than those named in the report; we must be immediately informed of this.
10. The Specialists of the individual Stapo(leit)stellen have to
extract the names of those Papal “Protonotare,” Chamberlains, Prelates,
and Chaplains who are officiating in their districts, and devote extra
attention to them in the course of their Nachrichtendienst duties.
Especial watch must be kept in order to discover to what extent they
are employed as “agents” to and from the Vatican.
11. Reports are also to be submitted on those theological students
destined for Papal Institutes, and Priests returning from such
institutes to Germany. Should the opportunity arise of placing someone
for Nachrichtendienst purposes in one of these institutes, in the guise
of a theological student, we should receive immediate notification.
Signed: Heydrich
Attested: KLANN [?]
Chancellery Clerk
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1816-PS
STENOGRAPHIC REPORT OF THE MEETING ON “THE JEWISH QUESTION” UNDER THE
CHAIRMANSHIP OF FIELD MARSHALL GOERING IN THE REICHS AIR FORCE
(12 November 1938--11 o’clock)
Part I
_Goering_: Gentlemen! Today’s meeting is of a decisive nature. I have
received a letter written on the Fuehrer’s orders by the Stabsleiter of
the Fuehrer’s deputy Bormann, requesting that the Jewish question be
now, once and for all, coordinated and solved one way or another. And
yesterday once again did the Fuehrer request by phone for me to take
coordinated action in the matter.
Since the problem is mainly an economic one, it is from the economic
angle that it shall have to be tackled. Naturally a number of legal
measures shall have to be taken which fall into the sphere of the
Minister for Justice and into that of the Minister of the Interior;
and certain propaganda measures shall be taken care of by the Minister
for Propaganda. The Minister for Finance and the Minister for Economic
Affairs shall take care of problems falling in their respective resorts.
In the meeting, in which we first talked about this question and came
to the decision to aryanize German economy, to take the Jew out of it,
and put him into our debit ledger, was one in which, to our shame, we
only made pretty plans, which were executed very slowly. We then had a
demonstration, right here in Berlin, we told the people that something
decisive would be done, but again nothing happened. We have had this
affair in Paris now, more demonstrations followed and this time
something decisive must be done!
Because, gentlemen, I have enough of these demonstrations! They don’t
harm the Jew but me, who is the last authority for coordinating the
German economy.
If today, a Jewish shop is destroyed, if goods are thrown into
the street, the insurance company will pay for the damages, which
the Jew does not even have; and furthermore goods of the consumer
goods belonging to the people, are destroyed. If in the future,
demonstrations which are necessary, occur, then, I pray, that they be
directed, so as not to hurt us.
Because it’s insane to clean out and burn a Jewish warehouse then have
a German insurance company make good the loss. And the goods which
I need desperately, whole bales of clothing and what-not, are being
burned; and I miss them everywhere.
I may as well burn the raw materials before they arrive. The people of
course, do not understand that; therefore we must make laws which will
show the people once and for all, that something is being done.
I should appreciate it very much if for once, our propaganda would make
it clear that it is unfortunately not the Jew who has to suffer in all
this, but the German insurance companies.
I am not going to tolerate a situation in which the insurance companies
are the ones who suffer. Under the authority invested in me, I shall
issue a decree, and I am, of course, requesting the support of the
competent Government agencies, so that everything shall be processed
through the right channels and the insurance companies will not be the
ones who suffer.
It may be, though, that these insurance companies may have insurance
in foreign countries. If that is the case, foreign bills of exchange
would be available which I would not want to lose. That shall have to
be checked. For that reason, I have asked Mr. Hilgard of the insurance
company, to attend, since he is best qualified to tell us to what
extent the insurance companies are protected against damage, by having
taken out insurance with other companies. I would not want to miss
this, under any circumstances.
I should not want to leave any doubt, gentlemen, as to the aim of
today’s meeting. We have not come together merely to talk again, but
to make decisions, and I implore the competent agencies to take all
measures for the elimination of the Jew from German economy and to
submit them to me, as far as it is necessary.
The fundamental idea in this program of elimination of the Jew from
German economy is first, the Jew being ejected from the Economy
transfers his property to the State. He will be compensated. The
compensation is to be listed in the debit ledger and shall bring a
certain percentage of interest. The Jew shall have to live out of this
interest. It is a foregone conclusion, that this aryanizing, if it
is to be done quickly, cannot be made in the Ministry for Economy in
Berlin. That way, we would never finish.
On the other hand, it is very necessary to have safety precautions so
that the lower echelons, Statthalter, and Gauleiter will not do things
unreasonably. One must issue correction directives, immediately.
The aryanizing of all the larger establishments, naturally, is to be my
lot--the Ministry for Economy will designate, which and how many there
are--it must not be done by a Statthalter or his lower echelons, since
these things reach into the export trade, and cause great problems,
which the Statthalter can neither observe, nor solve from his place.
It is my lot, so that the damage will not be greater than the profit,
which we are striving for.
It is obvious gentlemen, that the Jewish stores are for the people, and
not the stores. Therefore, we must begin here, according to the rules
previously laid down.
The Minister for Economic Affairs shall announce which stores he’ll
want to close altogether. These stores are excluded from aryanizing at
once. Their stocks are to be made available for sale in other stores;
what cannot be sold, shall be processed through the “Winterhilfe” or
taken care of otherwise. However, the sales values of these articles
shall always be considered, since the State is not to suffer but should
profit through this transformation. For the chain and department
stores--I speak now only of that, what can be seen, certain categories
have to be established, according to the importance of the various
branches.
The trustee of the State will estimate the value of the property and
decide what amount the Jew shall receive. Naturally, this amount is to
be set as low as possible. The representative of the State shall then
turn the establishment over to the “Aryan” proprietor, that is, the
property shall be sold according to its real value.
There begins the difficulties. It is easily understood that strong
attempts will be made to get all these stores to party-members and to
let them have some kind of compensations. I have witnessed terrible
things in the past; little chauffeurs of Gauleiters have profited so
much by these transactions that they have now about half a million.
You, gentlemen, know it. Is that correct?
(Assent)
Of course, things like that are impossible. I shall not hesitate to act
ruthlessly in any case where such a trick is played. If the individual
involved is prominent, I shall see the Fuehrer within two hours and
report to him.
We shall have to insist upon it, that the Aryan taking over the
establishment is of the branch and knows his job. Generally speaking
he is the one who must pay for the store with his own money. In other
words, an ordinary business transaction is to be sought--one merchant
selling, the other one buying a business. If there are party members
among the contenders, they are to be preferred, that is if they have
the same qualifications: first shall come the one who had the most
damage, and secondly, selection should be according to length of Party
membership.
Of course, there may be exceptions. There are party-members who, as
may be proven, lost their business concessions by action of the
Schuschnigg or Prague Government, and so went bankrupt. Such a man has
naturally first option on a store for sale, and he shall receive help
if he does not have the means to help himself. The trustee of the State
can justify this help, if he is more business like in the transfer.
This party-member should have the chance to buy the store for as cheap
a price as possible. In such a case the State will not receive the full
price, but only the amount the Jew received. Such a buyer may even
receive a loan besides, so that he will get off to a good start.
I wish to make it clear that such a proceeding shall only be legal
if the party-member has once owned such a store. For example, a
party-member was the owner of a stationery store, and Schuschnigg took
away the concession to operate it so that the man lost the store and
went bankrupt. Now, if a Jewish stationery store is being aryanized,
this party-member should get the store on conditions which he’ll be
able to fulfill. Such a case shall be the only exception though, in
all other cases the procedure shall be of a strictly businesslike
nature whereby the party-member, like I said before, shall have the
preference, if he has the same qualifications as any other candidate,
who is not a member of the party.
When selling for the actual value we shall find only about 60 Aryans
ready to take over 100 Jewish stores. I don’t think that we have a
German for every Jewish store. You must not forget that the Jew sees
his main activity in the field of trade, and that he owns 90% of it. I
doubt that we’d have a demand big enough. I even doubt that we’d have
enough people, particularly now since everybody has found his field of
work.
Therefore, I ask the Minister for Economy to go beyond what we think
ought to be done for the sake of the principle, in liquidating the
establishments. I ask him to go further, even though there won’t be any
candidates. That’ll be perfectly alright.
The transfer of stores and establishments shall have to be executed
by the lower echelons, not through Berlin but through the Gaue and
through the Reichstatthalterschaft. Therein shall be the seat of the
members of the Board of Trustees, even if it consists of a few people
only. The Statthalter and his people cannot do this job; the trustees
will have to tackle it. But the Statthalter shall be the authority
which supervises, according to the regulations given him, the trustees,
particularly in dealings such as the transfer to party-members.
Naturally, these establishments cannot disappear all at once but we’ll
have to start by Monday, in a manner that shall make it obvious that a
change has begun to materialize. Besides that, certain stores could be
closed which will make things here easier.
Another point! I have noticed that Aryans took over a Jewish store and
were then so clever to keep the name of the Jewish store as “formerly,”
or kept it altogether. That must not be; I cannot permit it. Because it
may happen--what has just happened--stores were looted because their
signboards bore Jewish names--because they had once been Jewish, but
had been “aryanized” a long time ago. Names of former Jewish firms
shall have to disappear completely, and the German shall have to come
forward with his or his firm’s name. I ask you to carry this out quite
definitely. That much then regarding aryanizing of stores and wholesale
establishments, particularly in regard to signboards and of all that is
obvious!
Of the consequences resulting from this for the Jew, I shall speak
later, because this is connected with other things.
Now for the factories. As for the smaller and medium ones, two things
shall have to be made clear.
1. Which factories do I not need at all--which are the ones where
productions could be suspended? Could they not be put to another use?
If not, the factories will be razed immediately.
2. In case the factory should be needed, it will be turned over to
Aryans in the same manner as the stores. All these measures have to
be taken quickly, since Aryan employees are concerned everywhere. I’d
like to say right now that Aryan employees shall have to be given
employment immediately after the Jewish factory is closed. Considering
the amount of labor we need these days, it should be a trifle to keep
these people, even in their own branches. As I have just said; if the
factory is necessary, it will be aryanized. If there is no need for
it, it being abandoned shall be part of the procedure of transforming
establishments not essential, for our national welfare into one that
is essential for it--a procedure that shall take place within the next
few weeks. For it, I shall still need very much space and very many
factories.
If such a factory is to be transformed or razed, the first thing
to be done is check the equipment. The questions arising will be:
Where can this equipment be used? Could it be used after the place
is transformed? Where else might it be needed badly? Where could the
machinery be set up again? It follows that aryanizing factories will be
an even more difficult task than the aryanizing of stores.
Take now the larger factories which are run solely by a Jewish owner,
without control by a Board of Directors; or take corporations where the
Jews might be in the Supervisory Council or Board of Directors. There
the solution is very simple: the factory can be compensated in the same
manner as in the sale of stores and factories; that is, at a rate which
we shall determine, and the trustee shall take over the Jew’s interest
as well as his shares, which he in turn may sell or transfer to the
State, which will then dispose of them. So, if I have a big factory,
which belonged to a Jew or a Jewish corporation, and the Jew leaves,
perhaps with his sons who were employed there, the factory will still
continue to operate. Maybe a director will have to be appointed because
the Jew has run the factory himself. But otherwise, particularly if the
maintenance of the establishment is very essential everything will run
smoothly.
Everything is very simple. I now have his shares. I may give them to
some Aryan or to another group or I may keep them. The State takes them
over and offers them at the stock market, if they are acceptable there
and if it so desires, or it makes use of them in some other way.
Now, I shall talk of the very big establishments, those in which the
Jew is in the Board of Directors, in which he holds shares etc., and
so is either the owner or one of the coowners; in any case in which he
is greatly interested. There too, things are comparatively simple; he
delivers all of his shares which shall be bought at a price fixed by
the trustee. So the Jew gets into the account book. The shares shall
be handled like I’ve just explained. These cases cannot be taken care
of by the Gaue and Reichsstatthalter, but only by us here on top;
because we are the only ones to decide where these factories are to be
transferred to, how they may be affiliated with other establishments
or to what an extent the State shall keep them or hand them over to
another establishment belonging to the State. All this can only be
decided here. Of course, the Gauleiter and Statthalter will be glad to
get hold of the shares, and they’ll make great promises to beautify our
capital cities, etc. I know it all! It won’t go! We must agree on a
clear action that shall be profitable to the Reich.
The same procedure shall be applied where the Jew has a share in, or
owns property of German economy. I am not competent enough to tell
off hand in what forms that might be the case, and to what an extent
he’ll have to lose it. Anyway, the Jew must be evicted pretty fast from
German economy.
Now, the foreign Jews. There we’ll have to make distinctions between
the Jews who have always been foreigners--and who shall have to be
treated according to the laws we arranged with their respective
countries. But regarding those Jews who were Germans, have always lived
in Germany and have acquired foreign citizenship during the last year,
only because they wanted to play safe. I ask you not to give them any
consideration. We’ll finish with these. Or have you any misgivings?
We shall try to induce them through slight, and then through stronger
pressure, and through clever maneuvering--to let themselves be pushed
out voluntarily.
_Woermann_: I’d like the Foreign Office to be included, since a
generally valid decision could hardly be made.
_Goering_: We cannot consult you in every case, but on the whole we
will.
_Woermann_: Anyway, I’d like to make known the claim of the Foreign
Office to participate. One never knows what steps may become necessary.
_Goering_: Only for important cases! I do not like to take this
category under special consideration. I have learned only now to what
extent that has been done, particularly in Austria and Czechoslovakia.
If somebody was a Czech in Sudetenland, we do not have to consider
him at all, and the Foreign Office doesn’t have to be consulted
because that person now belongs to us. And in Austria and also in
Sudetenland, too many become all of a sudden Englishmen or Americans or
what-not--and generally speaking we cannot consider that a great deal.
[Part II is missing]
Part III
_Funk_: That is quite a decisive question for us: should the Jewish
stores be reopened?
_Goebbels_: If they will be reopened is another question. The question
is will they be restored? I have set the deadline for Monday.
_Goering_: You don’t have to ask whether they’ll be reopened. That is
up to us to decide.
_Goebbels: Number 2._ In almost all German cities synagogues are
burned. New, various possibilities exist to utilize the space where
the synagogues stood. Some cities want to build parks in their place,
others want to put up new buildings.
_Goering_: How many synagogues were actually burned?
_Heydrich_: Altogether there are 101 synagogues destroyed by fire; 76
synagogues demolished; and 7,500 stores ruined in the Reich.
_Goering_: What do you mean “destroyed by fire?”
_Heydrich_: Partly, they are razed, and partly gutted.
_Goebbels_: I am of the opinion that this is our chance to dissolve
the synagogues. All those not completely intact, shall be razed by the
Jews. The Jews shall pay for it. There in Berlin, the Jews are ready
to do that. The synagogues which burned in Berlin are being leveled by
the Jews themselves. We shall build parking lots in their places or new
buildings. That ought to be the criterion for the whole country, the
Jews shall have to remove the damaged or burned synagogues, and shall
have to provide us with ready free space.
_Number 3_: I deem it necessary to issue a decree forbidding the Jews
to enter German theaters, moving houses, and circuses. I have already
issued such a decree under the authority of the law of the chamber for
culture. Considering the present situation of the theaters, I believe
we can afford that. Our theaters are overcrowded, we have hardly any
room. I am of the opinion that it is not possible to have Jews sitting
next to Germans in movies and theaters. One might consider, later on,
to let the Jews have one or two movie houses here in Berlin, where they
may see Jewish movies. But in German theaters they have no business
anymore.
Furthermore, I advocate that the Jews be eliminated from all positions
in public life in which they may prove to be provocative. It is still
possible today that a Jew shares a compartment in a sleeping car
with a German. Therefore, we need a decree by the Reich Ministry for
Communications stating that separate compartments for Jews shall be
available; in case where compartments are filled up, Jews cannot claim
a seat. They shall be given a separate compartment only after all
Germans have secured seats. They shall not mix with Germans, and if
there is no more room, they shall have to stand in the corridor.
_Goering_: In that case, I think it would make more sense to give them
separate compartments.
_Goebbels_: Not if the train is overcrowded!
_Goering_: Just a moment. There’ll be only one Jewish coach. If that is
filled up, the other Jews will have to stay at home.
_Goebbels_: Suppose, though, there won’t be many Jews going on the
express train to Munich, suppose there would be two Jews in the train
and the other compartments would be overcrowded. These two Jews would
then have a compartment all to themselves. Therefore, Jews may claim a
seat only after all Germans have secured a seat.
_Goering_: I’d give the Jews one coach or one compartment. And should a
case like you mention arise and the train be overcrowded, believe me,
we won’t need a law. We’ll kick him out and he’ll have to sit all alone
in the toilet all the way!
_Goebbels_: I don’t agree. I don’t believe in this. There ought to be a
law. Furthermore, there ought to be a decree barring Jews from German
beaches and resorts. Last summer * * *
_Goering_: Particularly here in the Admiralspalast very disgusting
things have happened lately.
_Goebbels_: Also at the Wannsee beach. A law which definitely forbids
the Jews to visit German resorts!
_Goering_: We could give them their own.
_Goebbels_: It would have to be considered whether we’d give them
their own or whether we should turn a few German resorts over to them,
but not the finest and best, so we cannot say the Jews go there for
recreation.
It’ll also have to be considered if it might not become necessary to
forbid the Jews to enter the German forests. In the Grunewald, whole
herds of them are running around. It is a constant provocation and
we are having incidents all the time. The behavior of the Jews is so
inciting and provocative that brawls are a daily routine.
_Goering_: We shall give the Jews a certain part of the forest, and the
Alpers shall take care of it that various animals that look damned much
like Jews,--the Elk has such a crooked nose,--get there also and become
acclimated.
_Goebbels_: I think this behavior is provocative. Furthermore, Jews
should not be allowed to sit around in German parks. I am thinking
of the whispering campaign on the part of Jewish women in the public
gardens at Fehrbelliner Platz. They go and sit with German mothers and
their children and begin to gossip and incite.
_Goebbels_: I see in this a particularly grave danger. I think it
is imperative to give the Jews certain public parks, not the best
ones--and tell them: “You may sit on these benches” these benches
shall be marked “For Jews only.” Besides that they have no business
in German parks. Furthermore, Jewish children are still allowed in
German schools. That’s impossible. It is out of the question that any
boy should sit beside a Jewish boy in a German gymnasium and receive
lessons in German history. Jews ought to be eliminated completely from
German schools; they may take care of their own education in their own
communities.
_Goering_: I suggest that Mr. Hilgard from the insurance company be
called in; he is waiting outside. As soon as he’ll be finished with his
report, he may go, and we can continue to talk. At the time Gustloff
died, a compensation for the damage Germany had suffered, was prepared.
But I believe that at present we should not work it through raised
taxes but with a contribution paid only once. That serves my purpose,
better.
(Hilgard appears)
Mr. Hilgard, the following is our case. Because of the justified anger
of the people against the Jew, the Reich has suffered a certain amount
of damage. Windows were broken, goods were damaged and people hurt,
synagogues burned, etc. I suppose that the Jews, many of them are also
insured against damage committed by public disorder, etc.
(Hilgard: “Yes”)
If that is so, the following situation arises; the people, in their
justified anger, meant to harm the Jew; but it is the German insurance
companies that will compensate the Jew for damage. This situation is
simple enough; I’d only have to issue a decree to that effect that
damage, resulting from these risks, shall not have to be paid by the
insurance companies. But the question that interests me primarily, and
because of which I have asked you to come here, is this one: In case of
reinsurance policies in foreign countries, I should not like to lose
these, and that is why I’d like to discuss with you ways and means by
which profit from reinsurance, possibly in foreign currency will go to
the German economy, instead of the Jew. I’d like to hear from you, and
that is the first question I want to ask: In your opinion, are the Jews
insured against such damage to a large extent?
_Hilgard_: Permit me to answer right away. We are concerned with three
kinds of insurances. Not with the insurance against damage resulting
from revolt or from risks. But with the ordinary fire insurance, the
ordinary glass insurance, and the ordinary insurance against theft.
The people, because of their contracts, who have a right to claim
compensation are partly Jews, partly Aryans. As for the fire insurance,
they are practically all Jewish, I suppose. As for the department
stores, the victim is identical with the Jew, the owner and that
applies more to the synagogues, except for neighbors to whose places
the fire may have spread. Although the damage done to the latter’s
property seems to be rather slight, according to the inquiries I made
late last night.
As for the glass insurance which plays a very important part in this,
the situation is completely different. The majority of the victims,
mostly the owners of the buildings are Aryans. The Jew has usually
rented the store, a procedure which you may observe all over, for
example on Kurfuerstendamm.
_Goering_: That is what we’ve said.
_Goebbels_: In these cases, the Jew will have to pay.
_Goering_: It doesn’t make sense, we have no raw materials. It is all
glass imported from foreign countries and has to be paid for in foreign
currency! One could go nuts.
_Hilgard_: May I draw your attention to the following facts: the
glass for the shop windows is not being manufactured by the Bohemian,
but by the Belgian glass industry. In my estimation, the approximate
money-value to which these damages amount is $6,000,000--that includes
the broken glass, glass which we shall have to replace, mainly to
Aryans because they have the insurance policies. Of course I have to
reserve final judgment in all this, Your Excellency, because I have had
only one day to make my inquiries. Even counting on about half of the
$6,000,000 being spent in transacting the business-specialists from the
industry itself are more confident in this matter than I am, we might
well have to import glass for approximately $3,000,000. Incidentally,
the amount of the damage equals about half a whole year’s production
of the Belgian glass industry. We believe that half a year will be
necessary for the manufacturers to deliver the glass.
_Goering_: The people will have to be enlightened on this.
_Goebbels_: We cannot do this right now.
_Goering_: This cannot continue! We won’t be able to last with all
this. Impossible! Go on then! You suggest that the Aryan is the one who
suffers the damage; is that right?
_Hilgard_: Yes, to a large extent, as far as the glass insurance goes.
_Goering_: Which would have to replace the glass.
_Hilgard_: Yes. Of course there are cases in which the Aryan, the owner
of the store is identical with the owner of the building. That is so
with all department stores. In the case of the department store Israel,
the owner is the Jew.
_Goering_: And now the third category.
_Hilgard_: Under this fall the victims of thievery.
_Goering_: I have to ask you a question. When all kinds of goods were
taken from the stores and burned in the streets, would that also be
thievery?
_Hilgard_: I don’t think so.
_Goering_: Could that be termed as “Riot”?
_Hilgard_: That is just the question which we are unable to decide
at this moment. Is it ordinary theft if entry into a dwelling or a
container of any kind is forced and something is taken away?
_Goering_: That is a case of “Riot.”
_Hilgard_: Riot does not mean much since we have very little insurance
against damage caused by riots--these were discarded by us long ago.
_Goering_: But this here is “Rioting.” That is the legal term. There
was no theft, and no individual broke into any place. But a mob rushes
in and knocks everything to pieces, or “Public Disturbances.”
_Hilgard_: Public disturbance. It is no riot.
_Goering_: Are they insured against damages caused by public
disturbances?
_Hilgard_: No, no more. May I show this by an example. The most
remarkable of these cases is the case Margraf Unter Den Linden. The
Jewelry store of Margraf, is insured with us through a so-called
combined policy. That covers practically any damage that may occur.
This damage was reported to us as amounting to $1,700,000 because the
store was completely stripped.
_Goering_: Daluege and Heydrich, you’ll have to get me this jewelry
through raids, staged on a tremendous scale!
_Daluege_: The order has already been given. The people are being
controlled all the time. According to reports, 150 were arrested by
yesterday afternoon.
_Goering_: These things will otherwise be hidden. If somebody comes
to a store with jewels and claims that he has bought them, they’ll be
confiscated at once. He has stolen them or traded them in all right.
_Heydrich_: Besides that, looting was going on in the Reich in more
than 800 cases, contrary to what we supposed; but we have already
several hundred people who were plundering, and we are trying to get
the loot back.
_Goering_: And the jewels?
_Heydrich_: That is very difficult to say. They were partly thrown
into the street and picked up there. Similar things happened with
furriers, for example, in Friedrichstrasse, district C, there the
crowd was naturally rushing to pick up minks, skunks, etc. It’ll
be very difficult to recover that. Even children have filled their
pockets, just for fun. It is suggested that the Hitler Youth is not
to be employed and to participate in such actions without the Party’s
consent. Such things are very easily destroyed.
_Daluege_: The Party should issue an order to the effect that the
police will immediately receive a report in case the neighbor’s wife,
(everybody knows his neighbor) has a fur coat altered or in case
somebody appears wearing new rings or bracelets. We’d like the Party to
support us here.
_Hilgard_: These damages are not covered by the policy, I believe. May
I say a word in general about our liabilities and a “Petidum” of the
Versicherungswirkschaft report. We’d like to make it our point, Mr.
General Field Marshall, that we shall not be hindered in fulfilling the
obligations for which our contracts call.
_Goering_: But I have to. That is important for me.
_Hilgard_: If I may give reasons for this request, I’d like to say
that it simply has to do with the fact that we carry out, to a large
extent, quite a number of international transactions. We have a very
good international basis for our business transactions, and in the
interest of the equilibrium of the Foreign exchange in Germany, we have
to make sure that the confidence in the German insurance shall not be
ruined. If we now refuse to honor clear-cut obligations, imposed upon
us through lawful contract, it would be a black spot on the shield of
honor of the German insurance.
_Goering_: It wouldn’t the minute I issue a decree--a law sanctioned by
the State.
_Hilgard_: I was leading up to that.
_Heydrich_: The insurance may be granted, but as soon as it is to be
paid, it’ll be confiscated. That way we’ll have saved face.
_Hilgard_: I am inclined to agree with what General Heydrich has just
said. First of all, use the mechanism of the insurance company to check
on the damage, to regulate it and even pay, but give the insurance
company the chance to * * *
_Goering_: One moment! You’ll have to pay in any case because it is
the Germans who suffered the damage. But there’ll be a lawful order
forbidding you to make any direct payments to the Jews. You shall also
have to make payment for the damage the Jews have suffered, but not to
the Jews, but to the Minister of Finance.
(Hilgard: Aha!)
What he does with the money is his business.
_Schmer_: Your Excellency, I should like to make a proposal. A certain
rate should be fixed, say 15% or maybe a little higher, of all the
registered wealth, I understand one billion is to be confiscated so
that all Jews shall pay equally, and from the money raised this way,
the insurance companies shall be refunded.
_Goering_: No. I don’t even dream of refunding the insurance companies
the money. The companies are liable. No, the money belongs to the
State. That’s quite clear. That would indeed be a present for the
insurance companies. You make a wonderful Petidum there. You’ll fulfill
your obligations, you may count on that.
_Kerl_: It seems that in one respect, we’ll have to arrange this
somewhat differently. As far as the glass insurance goes, the fact of
the matter is that the owners of the buildings will definitely have to
be paid for the damage, as stipulated. The majority of these companies,
with the exception of one Joint Stock Company in Cologne, are all very
small reciprocity companies [Gegenseitsvereine]. They won’t be able to
make up for the damage. We’ll have to find out how far they are covered
by reinsurance which I cannot tell at the moment.
_Hilgard_: In this connection, the reinsurance plays a relatively
small role, except for the large fire-insurance policies taken out by
department stores. There is not reinsurance in the glass insurances,
for the simple reason that, under normal conditions glass insurance is
one of our best branches in the insurance business; and therefore does
not need reinsurance. I have to add, though, that the amount of this
damage is approximately twice as high as the amount of damage for an
average year. It makes all our calculations wrong and completely wipes
out our chance for profit.
(Interrupted by Kerl)
No, sir, that is the way it is. The whole premium of the German glass
insurance amounts to $14,000,000, if I am not wrong. Under normal
conditions it amounted to 4 or 5 million. The glass insurance is our
greatest asset. So far, the greatest profits were made in it. But now,
the amount of this damage is alone twice as high as the amount for
one ordinary year. With the various special glass insurances, it is
altogether different.
_Goering_: One moment! 4 to 5 millions normally. Twice as much would be
about 10 million. You suggested 14 million. There are still 4 million
left.
_Hilgard_: We’ll also have to pay for the expenses. No, it is a very
great catastrophe for us. Let me point out that the damage in the whole
of Germany, in my estimation, shall amount to approximately 25 million
mark. I wanted to be careful.
_Heydrich_: We estimate that the damage to property, to furniture and
to consumer-goods amounts to several hundred million; although that
includes the damage the Reich shall suffer from loss of taxes--sales
taxes, taxes on property, and on income. I assume that the Minister for
Finance too, has been informed of all this.
_V. Krosigk_: I have no idea about the extent.
_Heydrich_: 7,500 destroyed stores in the Reich.
_Daluege_: One more question ought to be cleared up. Most of the goods
in the stores were not the property of the owner but were kept on the
books of other firms, which had delivered them. Then there are the
unpaid for deliveries by other firms, which definitely are not all
Jewish but Aryan, those goods that were delivered on the basis of
commission.
_Hilgard_: We’ll have to pay for them, too.
_Goering_: I wished you had killed 200 Jews, and not destroyed such
values.
_Heydrich_: There were 35 killed.
_Kerl_: I think we could do the following: Jews we don’t pay anyhow.
As for Aryans, payment shall have to be made. The insurance company
may contact us through the “Reichsgruppe” and we shall investigate
each case. I am thinking of the small reciprocity companies; it
should be easy to find out whether they are capable of paying or not.
In their cases, the amounts involved are not too large. We may find
an arrangement for this later on; I am thinking of one in which the
insurance companies arrange for recompensation exclusively to Aryan,
and once they know the results of their inquiries, contact us. We shall
then find a way out for these small companies. Of course only in cases
where it is absolutely necessary.
_Funk_: That is not necessary. I’d like to refer to what I’ve said
before about the decree. That seems to be the easiest solution.
_Goering_: We cannot do that. These people make a point of their
ability to pay.
_Funk_: If the Jews pay for it, the insurance companies don’t have to
pay.
_Goering_: Right, well, gentlemen, this is all very clear. We’ll stick
to it. At this moment every insurance company, except Mr. Hilgard
who is here, counts on having to pay for the damage. They want to
pay too, and I understand this very well. They’ll have to want that,
so they cannot be reproached for not being secure enough to pay. The
glass insurance, and a point was made of that, has brought the highest
profits so far. That means they’d have enough surplus money, and if
they haven’t divided it all up in dividends, they’ll have savings
enough for the compensation. Such an insurance company will have to be
in a position to pay for a damage of 10, 12, 15 million, that is three
times the amount paid in the normal year. If they are unable to do
that, then we’ll have to wonder whether we should let small companies
live at all. It would be insane to keep insurance companies which would
be unable to pay for such a damage. To permit an insurance company like
that to exist would simply mean to cheat the people. I suggest now the
following. The damage shall be determined in each case. And for the
time being, the insurance companies shall have to honor their contract
in every respect and shall have to pay.
[Part IV is missing]
Part V
_Goering_: Now for the damage the Jew has had. At Margraf’s the jewels
disappeared, etc. Well, they are gone, and he won’t get them refunded.
He is the one who has to suffer the damage. As far as the jewels may
be returned again by the police, they belong to the State. Now for the
consumer foods which were thrown into the street, stolen, or burned.
There too, the Jew will be the one who has the damage.
As for the goods that were kept on the basis of commissions, the Jew
shall have to make good for the damage.
_Goebbels_: That doesn’t have to be put in the decree, though. This
decree is quite sufficient the way it is.
_Hilgard_: I wonder to what an extent insurance companies in foreign
countries might be involved in this.
_Goering_: Well, they’ll have to pay. And we’ll confiscate that.
_Hilgard_: As for this merchandise sold on the basis of commissions, I
can imagine that the American supplier of fur coats, shipping them from
England or from America would in many cases insure it with English or
American insurance companies!
_Goering_: Then they’ll pay him for the damage. The question merely is
the following: do you think there are reinsurances for all this damage
in foreign countries?
_Hilgard_: Very few, amounting to very little.
_Goering_: Of course, the Aryan cannot report any damage because he
hasn’t had any. The Jew will make good.
The Jew shall have to report the damage. He’ll get the refund from
the insurance company but the refund will be confiscated. After it’s
all said and done, there will remain some profit for the insurance
companies since they can’t have to make good for all the damage. Mr.
Hilgard, you may enjoy yourself.
_Hilgard_: I have no reason for that--the fact that we won’t have to
pay for all the damage is called profit!
_Goering_: Just a moment! If you are compelled under the law to pay
5 million and all of a sudden there appears an angel in my somewhat
corpulent form before you, and tells you: you may keep 1 million--why,
cannot that be called making a profit? I should actually split with
you, or whatever you’d call it. I can see it, looking at you. Your
whole body grins. You made a big profit.
(Remark: Let’s initiate a tax for damages, resulting from public
disturbance, to be paid by the insurance companies)
_Hilgard_: For me it goes without saying that the honorable German
merchant cannot be the one who suffers. I have discussed this matter
with the enterprises and I have spoken for it that the Aryan must not
be the one who has the damage. But it is decidedly he who has it,
because all the insurance companies, not one insurance company, are the
ones that shall have to pay higher rates and at the same time shall
receive lower dividends. Therefore, all the insurance companies are
the losers. That is so, and that’ll remain so, and nobody can tell me
differently.
_Goering_: Then why don’t you take care of it that a few windows
less are being smashed! You belong to the people too! Send your
representatives out. Let them instruct the people. If there should be
any more questions speak to Mr. Lange.
(Reichsgruppenleiter Hilgard leaves the meeting)
Gentlemen, let us continue.
_Woermann_: I think that the foreign Jews are left out completely in
Article 1. They are covered only by Article 2. But they should also be
taken care of in Article 1. Otherwise they can be dealt with only if
they are insured, and not if they are not insured.
_Goering_: Well, they’ll have to insure themselves--or what else do you
mean?
_Woermann_: As for insurance, the foreign Jews are, to my
understanding, mentioned only in Article 2 and 3, and not in Article 1.
If I remember correctly, you were going to say in Article
1: “Jews inside the country.” Well, we’ll have plenty of complaints
then.
_Goering_: Pardon me. According to Article 2, they’ll receive their
compensation.
(Woermann: If they are insured!)
The number of those who are not insured is negligible.
_Heydrich_: I’d like to say one more thing of primary importance. In
the decree we should not mention the confiscation. We can do that
easily.
_Goering_: No, you cannot do that tacitly. A clear legal procedure will
have to be employed there. But that is not what Mr. Woermann means, he
is talking about these foreign Jews who are not insured. As far as they
are insured, they are covered. This here concerns those who are not
insured. That may be the case here and there.
_Woermann_: We shall then have plenty of complaints.
_Goering_: I’d like to avoid paying too much attention to the foreign
Jews.
_Woermann_: But if Article 2 contains that provision, Article 1 may as
well have it. The first draft by the Minister for Justice covered it
all very nicely.
_Guertner_: Now, if I don’t misunderstand, Mr. Woermann, he is
primarily concerned with the obligation for restoration which shall
be valid generally while only Jews who have German citizenship are
mentioned regarding the insurance.
I’d like to know whether there are any objections against compelling
also the foreign Jews to restore the damage, and to inform him that he
shall not be paid the money from the insurance.
_Goering_: He is quite able to do that.
_Woermann_: Even if he is not insured?
_Guertner_: Oh!
_Goering_: There should hardly be such instances. Let’s take a chance
on it.
_Stuckart_: If he is not insured, he’ll have to have the damage
restored anyway. How can he then make claims against anybody?
_Goering_: He cannot.
_Woermann_: He can file claims against the State.
_Stuckart_: According to which law? Damage caused by riots? We won’t
recognize riots.
_Goering_: Perfectly right.
_Woermann_: Generally speaking, may I say: regarding foreign Jews, the
reservation that the contract is to be taken into consideration was
made only for the organization. That is valid for all branches which we
have discussed today, and also for the expropriation.
_Goering_: Like the Fuehrer says, we’ll have to find a way to talk this
over with the countries which also do something against their Jews.
That every dirty Polish Jew has a legal position here and we have to
stand him--that ought to cease. The Fuehrer was not very happy about
the agreement that was made with the Poles. He thinks we should take a
few chances and just tell the Poles: all right, we are not going to do
that; let’s talk over what we may be able to accomplish together; you
are doing something against your own Jews in Poland; but the minute the
Itzig has left Poland, he should suddenly be treated like a Pole! I’d
like to disregard these stories from foreign countries a little.
_Woermann_: It ought to be considered whether or not, the U S might
take measures against German property. This question cannot be handled
equally for all countries. I have to make a formal and general
reservation.
_Goering_: I have always said and I’d like to repeat it that our
steamship companies and German companies in general should finally
catch on and liquidate their investments in the U S, sell them, etc.
That country of scoundrels does not do business with us according to
any legal rules. Once before they stole everything from us, that is why
I don’t understand how we could do it again, just for some temporary
profit. It is dangerous. You can do it with a regular country but not
with one that cares for the Right as little as the U S. The other day I
had the American ambassador with me, we talked about the zeppelin and
I told him: “We don’t need any helium, I fly without helium but the
prerequisite will have to be that this ship will be flying to civilized
countries where the Right prevails. It goes without saying that one
cannot fly to such gangster-states.” He had a rather silly look on
his face. One ought to tell these Americans. But you are right, Mr.
Woermann, it ought to be considered.
_Woermann_: In other words, the foreign office is granted the right to
be consulted.
_Goering_: Granted, but I’d like to avoid mentioning the foreign Jews
as long as we can help it. We’d rather have the foreign office take
part in these cases where that question becomes acute, so that some
compromise can be reached.
_Woermann_: Generally, and in particular cases.
_Funk_: The decisive question is: Are the Jewish stores to be reopened
or not?
_Goering_: That depends on how big a turn-over these Jewish stores
have. If it is big, it is an indication that the German people are
compelled to buy there, in spite of its being a Jewish store, because a
need exists. If we’d close all Jewish stores which are not open right
now, altogether before Christmas, we’d be in a nice mess.
_Fischboeck_: Your Excellency, in this matter we have already a very
complete plan for Austria. There are 12,000 Jewish artisan and 5,000
Jewish retail shops in Vienna. Before the National Revolution, we had
already a definite plan for tradesmen, regarding this total of 17,000
stores. Of the shops of the 12,000 artisans, about 10,000 were to be
closed definitely and 2,000 were to be kept open. 4,000 of the 5,000
retail stores should be closed and 1,000 should be kept open, that is,
were to be aryanized. According to this plan, between 3,000 and 3,500
of the total of 17,000 stores would be kept open, all others closed.
This was decided following investigations in every single branch and
according to local needs, in agreement with all competent authorities,
and is ready for publication as soon as we shall receive the law which
we requested in September; this law shall empower us to withdraw
licenses from artisans, quite independently from the Jewish question.
_Goering_: I shall have this decree issued today.
_Fischboeck_: It was granted us in connection with the economic plan
for Austria. I believe the only reason why it was not yet published
was that negotiations between the Reich Ministry for Economic Affairs
and the National Food Corporation were going on. A basic agreement had
already been reached. We’ll be able to close these 10,000 stores as a
matter of mere routine as soon as the decree will be issued. As for the
actual execution of the matter, somebody will have to take care of the
merchandise in these stores. Until last week we had intended to more or
less leave it up to the Jews themselves to liquidate the warehouses.
We cannot do that anymore. We intend to create a central agency which
shall take care of the merchandise to be used. Generally, the best
procedure might be to turn the merchandise over to the particular
branch which in turn shall divide it up among the Aryan stores. These,
in turn, shall resell it on the basis of commissions or for a fixed
price.
If this is carried out as planned, it’ll concern only the approximately
3,000 remaining stores which shall be aryanized, according to the
investigations made in the various branches. Actual buyers for about
half of these stores are waiting: their contracts have been checked
and are ready to be approved. If many of these cases were not approved
sooner, it is only because the decision on the planning had not yet
been made. As for the remaining 15,000 stores, negotiations have
also gone rather far in many cases. We think that a deadline should
be set, say until the end of the year. If, by the end of the year,
definite buyers for the stores designated for Aryans, cannot be found,
it’ll have to be examined once more whether the stores should not be
liquidated. In most cases that will be possible; an artisan’s shop is
of a rather individual character. As for retail stores, it would never
be urgent enough, so as to say that the economic worth was too big. The
very few stores which would still remain and found to be necessary but
for which no buyer was available, could be taken over by trustees. This
way, I believe that fewer than 100 stores would be left, and by the end
of the year we would have liquidated all the Jewish-owned businesses
which so far have been obvious as such in the eyes of the public.
_Goering_: That would be excellent.
_Fischboeck_: Out of 17,000 stores 12,000 or 14,000 would be shut down
and the remainder aryanized or handed over to the bureau of trustees
which is operated by the State.
_Goering_: I have to say that this proposal is grand. This way, the
whole affair would be wound up in Vienna, one of the Jewish capitals,
so to speak, by Christmas or by the end of the year.
_Funk_: We can do the same thing over here. I have prepared a law
elaborating that, effective 1 January 1939, Jews shall be prohibited
to operate retail stores and wholesale establishments as well as
independent artisan shops. They shall be further prohibited from
keeping employees or offer any ready products on the market. Wherever a
Jewish shop is operated, the police shall shut it down. From 1 January
1939, a Jew can no longer be employed as an enterpriser as stipulated
in the law for the Organization of National Labor from 20 January 1934.
If a Jew holds a leading position in an establishment without being
the enterpriser, his contract may be declared void within 6 weeks by
the enterpriser. With the expiration of the contract all claims of the
employee, including all claims to maintenance, become obliterated.
That is always very disagreeable and a great danger. A Jew cannot be a
member of a corporation; Jewish members of corporations shall have to
be retired by 31 December 1938. A special authorization is unnecessary.
The competent Ministers of the Reich are being authorized to issue the
provision necessary for the execution of this law.
_Goering_: I believe that we can agree with this law.
(Remark: Yes)
Of course there remain a few things to be straightened out even after
1 January. We shall be able to handle them with these general methods
which we shall have to employ for handling all other Jewish property.
As for the Jewish stores, we may proceed vigorously; we believe that by
Christmas enough buyers shall be found to take over the stores which
from now on shall be entirely under pressure. Also the merchandise may
be taken the way you have proposed it. To me, all this seems to be
prepared in an excellent manner.
_Funk_: In every single store everything is there.
_Schmer_: Everything is there, except that we have no control, anymore,
over this business with the trustees. I personally am of the opinion
that we don’t need it at all; so far we have managed quite well with
the aryanization. For those few stores that are to be kept open, we
shall easily find buyers. All other rooms shall be rented without much
ado. There is a great need for this right here in Berlin.
_Goering_: But my dear friend, that way the Jew will receive the full
amount.
_Schmer_: He will receive the amount that is far below the value, and
the aryanizing shall have to be authorized, as before.
_Goering_: The Jew will receive the amount which won’t be put into the
account book.
_Schmer_: No. We can arrange that later. He cannot swallow the money.
The amount is fixed, and under the law the Jew is compelled to
report every change in his financial status, so that it can easily
be controlled. He won’t run away; we’ll keep it in the Reich. The
only thing you’d have to do is to issue a decree, or to transfer the
provisions of Article 7 on to the Ministry for Economic Affairs in
order to confiscate the Jewish property. He cannot run away from us.
_Goering_: Mr. Schmer, could not the following be done: Somebody will
become aryanized and get 300,000 marks into his hands. He runs into the
next-best jewelry store around the corner and buys one piece of jewelry
after another, and on the same day disappears across the border.
_Schmer_: In that case, we’ll have to report this change in his
property.
_Goering_: But if he wants to scram!
_Fischboeck_: The OK on the aryanizing is not being given the minute
the price for the purchase is being paid. We do that the following way.
The aryanizing is being authorized only under the condition that the
price for the purchase is to be paid in installments lasting over a
long period of time, in case the buyer is unable to pay; or, in case
payment is being made, that the amount is to be put in the bank of a
frozen account.
_Goering_: We could do the same thing here.
_Schmer_: In the provisions for the execution of the law we may
stipulate that from a certain level on, payment shall have to be made
in bonds of the Reich or something similar. That would have to be a
decree made by the authorities which OK the aryanizing.
_Daluege_: The number of Jewish stores is unknown. Until yesterday,
7,500 were reported to us and the number does not increase.
_Fischboeck_: Because of what has happened the day before yesterday in
Vienna, 5,000 were shut down there. There were 40,000 altogether.
_Schmer_: Shall the arrangement made in Austria remain?
_Goering_: Nothing will be changed there.
_Fischboeck_: Everything can be shut down at any time.
_Heydrich_: I know that a very high limit has been set for registering,
3,000 I believe.
_Fischboeck_: More than 5,000.
_Goering_: Is that the same in the Reich?
_Fischboeck_: Yes, in the Reich too. In this connection, I’d like to
make a few more remarks. What we are very much concerned with, is the
situation regarding the Jewish apartment houses which contribute a
large percentage of Jewish wealth. Surprisingly enough, the Jewish
national wealth in Austria is reported to amount to 320 million marks
only; the value of the apartment houses alone amounts to 500 million.
We should appreciate it very much if the regulation which makes it
possible to requisition Jewish property would be made to be valid also
for the apartment buildings; thus we would be enabled to have these
houses administered by a board of trustees and to give the Jews the
right to have a claim on the debit ledger of the Reich. That could
also be an occasion to cash the contribution, which might be deducted
this way in advance. The administration of these blocks of apartment
buildings wouldn’t be a problem at all. The only thing we’d need for
it would be managers, and there’d be plenty of them. We’d like to
requisition the apartment buildings and also any bonds that way. This
question of the bonds has been left open so far. In Austria, a very
large part of Jewish wealth, 266 billion Reichsmarks, is invested in
bonds of all kinds, in shares or simply in bonds bringing a fixed rate
of interest. In my opinion, a danger for the market does not exist
because the Ministry for Economic Affairs would have control over
these bonds. We’ll pay by handling out claims, on the debit-ledger of
the Reich. Therefore, the finances of the Reich won’t be affected,
the Minister for Finance shall only pay 3% for the claims on the
debit-ledger of the Reich. He in turn receives internal loans, that
means saves money. And if the bonds are not being sold, one might keep
them 30 years until those claims on the debit-ledger of the Reich shall
be expired.
_Funk_: Why should Jews not be allowed to keep bonds?
_Goering_: Because that way he would actually be given a share.
_Funk_: That is entirely new.
_Goering_: No. I said very clearly before; bonds and shares.
_Funk_: Shares yes, but not internal loans.
_Fischboeck_: It is certainly better to pay the Jew 3% instead of 4%.
We’d have no possibility to control Jewish wealth the minute we’d let
him have shares.
_Goering_: Gentlemen, no arguments. It is out of the question that he’d
keep the shares. He’ll have to turn them in.
_Fischboeck_: In that case I’d like you to arrange this by calling
the shares in so that the stock market won’t be ruined. That can very
easily be done. They’ll be turned in. Administering the shares is
also much simpler. The trustee turns the shares over to the depot and
receives claims on the debit-ledger of the Reich in their place. With
this, the whole affair is settled. The only question is whether you
want to recall the shares or not.
_Funk_: This way, the Reich will become possessor of half a billion
shares.
_Goering_: Yes, yes.
_Goebbels_: He’ll be able to get rid of them according to its needs.
_Fischboeck_: But it is a business based on profits.
_V. Krosigk_: I am wondering, first whether it will bring us profits. I
grant you that, though. But secondly, an entirely new point of view has
to be entered here. I can very well see the point in what the Minister,
Mr. Fischboeck, says. As for the values that otherwise bring fixed
rates of interest, it is an entirely new idea to expropriate the Jew
also in this, though the intention had been to refrain his status as
the owner of the shares.
_Fischboeck_: The reason why this is so very important is that our
whole action shall remain without success as long as the Jews shall be
in the possession of values, which they may realize quickly and employ
for any other undertaking.
_Goering_: That’s it. We want to prevent the Jews from again secretly
manipulating against us.
_Fischboeck_: For example, if we don’t want the Jews to possess jewelry
we can prevent them from having it by allowing them to possess only
Internal Loan bonds, that means that they could acquire the jewelry
only by paying with bonds.
_Goering_: Nobody would pay them claims on the debit-ledger.
_Fischboeck_: They are not transferable.
_Goering_: Only if authorized.
_Heydrich_: Is it not possible to issue an order forbidding the Jew to
invest his money in certain values, such as art treasures?
_Goering_: The arrangement with the registration in the debit-ledger
is much simpler. Claims on the debit-ledger are not transferable. He
cannot do anything with them, and he cannot do much with those 3½%.
_Heydrich_: But we’ll also have to find an arrangement for confiscation
of valuable objects in Jewish possession.
_Goering_: What he has now in his possession, that’ll come.
_Schmer_: Article 7 of the decree states that the use of Jewish wealth
in German economy shall be regulated through the Four Year Plan.
_Goering_: I think Fischboeck’s proposal is very good. We should give
it the form of a draft now, find the apartment buildings, the shares,
etc.
_Fischboeck_: I should also like to have a decision made on the
following question. In Austria, individuals, not institutions, owe the
Jews 184 billion Reichsmarks. This way the Jews certainly have invested
money in a way we don’t like. That is money which they have loaned
out to other Jews, oftener enough to an Aryan. This way, a dependency
of the Aryan artisan from the Jewish creditor is created which we do
not want. Now the question arises, and I would answer yes. Should
trustees not be created to administer these debts and then pay with
claims on the debit-ledger, according to demand coming in. The goal of
this procedure would be to make the debtor independent from the Jewish
creditor, to insert Aryan trusteeship and pay the Jew, as far as his
demands could actually be met. Therefore it does not have to be paid.
So we should have to insert trusteeship in this case also, but the
difference to that in the case of the bonds would be that we won’t
simply pay but leave the decision for payment up to the trusteeship.
_Funk_: If word of this debate should reach the public, we’d have a run
on the capital market tomorrow.
_Fischboeck_: That’s why we have postponed these ideas all the time. We
have examples for it that the Jews have sold, head over heel, bonds of
internal loans, shares and everything they had.
_Goering_: I could stop that with a single decree, ordering the
immediate stoppage of traffic of Jewish capital. He is punishable who
buys from Jews, and his purchase shall be confiscated. I would not do
it any other way.
[Part VI is missing]
Part VII
_Frick_: The Ministry of the Interior shall have to take part in it.
_Goering_: I have said so before.
(Shout by Goebbels)
* * * that is a misunderstanding. That is now the committee which is
elaborating on nothing but on this problem which is being tackled. How
are the shares, how are the claims on the debit-ledger to be handled?
Therefore, I shouldn’t like to have anybody else in the Committee, in
order to keep it as small as possible.
_Buerkel_: Is the plan for the aryanizing to be discussed also?
_Goering_: Mr. Fischboeck shall bring that up. This place is the crux
of the matter. I hope you have listened properly so that you know
exactly what is to be valid for the Sudetengau! Of course, I too am of
the opinion that these economic measures ought to be strengthened by a
number of Police-action-Propaganda-measures and cultural displays so
that everything shall be fixed now and the Jewry will be slapped this
week right and left.
_Heydrich_: In spite of the elimination of the Jew from the economic
life, the main problem, namely to kick the Jew out of Germany, remains.
May I make a few proposals to that effect?
Following a suggestion by the Commissioner of the Reich, we have
set up a center for the Emigration of Jews in Vienna, and that way
we have eliminated 50,000 Jews from Austria while from the Reich
only 19,000 Jews were eliminated during the same period of time; we
were so successful because of the cooperation on the part of the
competent Ministry for Economic Affairs and of the foreign charitable
organizations.
_Goering_: The main thing is, you cooperated with the local leaders of
the “Green Frontier.”
_Heydrich_: That amounted to a very small number, your excellency.
Illegal * * *
_Goering_: This story has gone through the whole world press. During
the first night the Jews were expulsed into Czechoslovakia. The
next morning, the Czechs grabbed them and pushed them into Hungary.
From Hungary, they were returned to Germany and from there into
Czechoslovakia. They traveled around and around that way. They landed
finally on an old Barge in the Danube. There they lived, and wherever
they tried to go ashore, they were barred.
_Heydrich_: That was the report. There weren’t even 100 Jews.
_Goering_: For practically two weeks, a number of Jews left every
midnight. That was in the Burgenland.
_Heydrich_: At least 45,000 Jews were made to leave the country by
legal measures.
_Goering_: How was that possible?
_Heydrich_: Through the Jewish Kulturgemeinde, we extracted a certain
amount of money from the rich Jews who wanted to emigrate. By paying
this amount, and an additional sum in foreign currency, they made it
possible for a number of poor Jews to leave. The problem was not to
make the rich Jew leave but to get rid of the Jewish mob.
_Goering_: But children, did you ever think this through? It doesn’t
help us to extract hundreds of thousands from the Jewish mob. Have you
ever thought of it that this procedure may cost us so much foreign
currency that in the end we won’t be able to hold out.
_Heydrich_: Only what the Jew has had in foreign currency.
(Goering: agreed)
This way. May I propose that we set up a similar procedure for the
Reich, with the cooperation of the competent government agencies, and
that we then find a solution for the Reich, based on our experiences,
after having corrected the mistakes, the General Field Marshall has so
rightly pointed out to us.
(Goering: agreed)
As another means of getting the Jews out, measures for Emigration ought
to be taken in the rest of the Reich for the next 8 to 10 years. The
highest number of Jews we can possibly get out during one year is 8,000
to 10,000. Therefore, a great number of Jews will remain. Because of
the aryanizing and other restrictions, Jewry will become unemployed.
The remaining Jews gradually become proletarians. Therefore, I shall
have to take steps; to isolate the Jew so he won’t enter into the
German normal routine of life. On the other hand, I shall have to
restrict the Jew to a small circle of consumers, but I shall have
to permit certain activities within professions; lawyers, doctors,
barbers, etc. This question shall also have to be examined.
As for the isolation, I’d like to make a few proposals regarding police
measures which are important also because of their psychological effect
on public opinion. For example, who is Jewish according to the Nurnberg
laws shall have to wear a certain insignia. That is a possibility which
shall facilitate many other things. I don’t see any danger of excuses,
and it shall make our relationship with the foreign Jew easier.
_Goering_: A uniform?
_Heydrich_: An insignia. This way we could also put an end to it that
the foreign Jews who don’t look different from ours, are being molested.
_Goering_: But, my dear Heydrich, you won’t be able to avoid the
creation of ghettos on a very large scale, in all the cities. They
shall have to be created.
_Heydrich_: As for the question of ghettos, I’d like to make my
position clear right away. From the point of view of the police, I
don’t think a ghetto in the form of completely segregated districts
where only Jews would live, can be put up. We could not control a
ghetto where the Jews congregate amidst the whole Jewish people. It
would remain the permanent hideout for criminals and also for epidemics
and the like. We don’t want to let the Jew live in the same house with
the German population; but today the German population, their blocks or
houses, force the Jew to behave himself. The control of the Jew through
the watchful eye of the whole population is better than having him by
the thousands in a district where I cannot properly establish a control
over his daily life through uniformed agents.
_Goering_: We’d only have to forbid long-distance calls.
_Heydrich_: Still I could not completely stop the Jews from
communicating out of their districts.
_Goering_: And in towns all of their own?
_Heydrich_: If I could put them into towns entirely their own, yes. But
then these towns would be such a heaven for criminals of all sorts that
they would be a terrific danger. I’d take different steps. I’d restrict
the movement of the Jews and would say; in Munich, the governmental
district and the district
* * *
_Goering_: Wait a minute! I don’t care so much for it that the Jews
don’t appear in spots where I don’t want them. My point is this one:
if one Jew won’t have any more work, he’ll have to live modestly. He
won’t be able to go far on his 3½%--to restaurants, etc. He’ll have to
work more. That’ll bring about a concentration of Jewry which may even
facilitate control. You will know that in a particular house only Jews
are living. We shall also have concentrated Jewish butchers, barbers,
grocers, etc., in certain streets. The question is of course whether we
want to go on tolerating that. If not, the Jew shall have to buy from
the Aryan.
_Heydrich_: No, I’d say that for the necessities in daily life, the
German won’t serve the Jew anymore.
_Goering_: One moment. You cannot let him starve. But there’ll be the
following difficulty. If you say that the Jews will be able to have
so and so many retail stores, then they’ll again be in business, and
they’ll continually have to sell for the wholesaler.
_Schmer_: In a small town that wouldn’t work at all.
_Goering_: It could only be worked out if you’d reserve in advance
whole districts or whole towns for the Jews. Otherwise, you’ll have to
have only Germans do business, and the Jew shall have to buy from them.
You cannot set up a Jewish barbershop. The Jew will have to buy food
and stockings.
_Heydrich_: We’ll have to decide whether we want that or not.
_Goering_: I’d like to make a decision on that right now. We cannot
make another subdivision here. We cannot argue: so and so many stores
will remain for the Jew because then again no control will be possible
since these stores in turn would have to work with wholesale stores.
I’d say, all stores should be Aryan stores, and the Jew may buy there.
One may go one step further and say that these and these stores
will probably be frequented mostly by Jews. You may set up certain
barbershops operated by Jews. You may make concessions in order to
channel certain professions into certain streets for certain tasks. But
not stores.
_Heydrich_: What about the ghetto? Would the Jew have to go to an Aryan
district to buy?
_Goering_: No. I’d say that enough German storekeepers would love to
dwell in the ghetto if they could do some business there. I wouldn’t
alter the principle that the Jew shall have no more say in German
economy.
_Heydrich_: I shouldn’t like to comment on that. Now a few things which
are important also from a psychological angle.
_Goering_: Once we’d have a ghetto, we’d find out what stores ought to
be in there, and we’d be able to say: you, the Jew so and so, together
with so and so, shall take care of the delivery of goods. And a German
wholesale firm will be ordered to deliver the goods for this Jewish
store. This store would then not be a retail shop but a cooperative
store, a cooperative one for Jews.
_Heydrich_: All these measures would eventually lead to the institution
of the ghetto. I’d say one shouldn’t want to build a ghetto. But these
measures, if carried through as outlined here, shall automatically
drive the Jews into a ghetto.
_Funk_: The Jews will have to move quite close together. What are
3 million? Everyone will have to stand up for the next fellow. The
individual alone will starve.
_Goering_: Now, as to what Minister Goebbels has said before, namely
compulsory renting. Now, the Jewish tenants will be together.
_Heydrich_: As an additional measure, I’d propose to withdraw from
the Jews all personal papers such as permits and driver’s licenses.
No Jew should be allowed to own a car, neither should he be permitted
to drive because that way he’d endanger German life. By not being
permitted to live in certain districts, he should be furthermore
restricted to move about so freely. I’d say the Royal Square in Munich,
the Reichsweihestatte, is not to be entered any more within a certain
radius by Jews. The same would go for establishments of culture, border
fences, military installations. Furthermore, like Minister Dr. Goebbels
has said before, exclusion of the Jews from public theaters, movie
houses, etc. As for cultural activities, I’d like to say this: cultural
activities in holiday resorts may be considered an additional feature,
not absolutely necessary for the individual. Many German Volksgenossen
are unable to improve their health through a stay at a resort town. I
don’t see why the Jew should go to these places at all.
_Goering_: To health spas, no.
_Heydrich_: Well, then I’d like to propose the same thing for
hospitals. A Jew shall not lie in a hospital together with Aryan
Volkgenossen.
_Goering_: We’ll have to manage that gradually.
_Heydrich_: The same applies to public conveyances.
_Goering_: Are there no Jewish Sanatoriums and Jewish hospitals?
(Remarks--Yes!)
We’ll have to finagle all this. These things will have to be
straightened out one right after another.
_Heydrich_: I only meant to secure your approval in principle so that
we may start out on all this.
_Goering_: One more question, gentlemen: What would you think the
situation would be if I’d announce today that Jewry should have to
contribute this 1 billion as a punishment?
_Buerckel_: The Viennese would agree to this whole-heartedly.
_Goebbels_: I wonder if the Jews would have a chance to pull out of
this, and to put something on the side.
_Brinkmann_: They’d be subject to punishment.
_V. Krosigk_: Mr. Fischboeck, one question: Could this authorization be
ordered without their closing out their securities?
_Funk_: They are all registered. They’ll also have to register the
money.
_V. Krosigk_: But for the time being they may dispose of it.
_Goering_: It won’t help them to cash them all. They can’t get rid of
the money.
_Funk_: They’ll be the ones to have the damage if they sell their
stocks and bonds.
_Fischboeck_: There is a certain danger, but I don’t think it is very
great. But only then, when all the other measures shall definitely be
carried out during next week.
_V. Krosigk_: They have to be taken during the next week at the latest.
_Goering_: I would make that a condition.
_Fischboeck_: Maybe it is good that we put ourselves under pressure
this way.
_Goering_: I shall close the wording this way; that German Jewry shall,
as punishment for their abominable crimes etc., etc., have to make a
contribution of 1 billion. That’ll work. The pigs won’t commit another
murder. Incidentally, I’d like to say again that I would not like to be
a Jew in Germany.
_V. Krosigk_: Therefore, I’d like to emphasize what Mr. Heydrich has
said in the beginning; that we’ll have to try everything possible, by
way of additional exports, to shove the Jews into foreign countries.
The decisive factor is that we don’t want the society-proletariat here.
They’ll always be a terrific liability for us.
(Frick: “and a danger!”)
I don’t imagine the prospect of the ghetto is very nice. The idea of
the ghetto is not a very agreeable one. Therefore, the goal must be,
like Heydrich said, to move out whatever we can!
_Goering_: The second point is this. If, in the near future, the German
Reich should come into conflict with foreign powers, it goes without
saying that we in Germany should first of all let it come to a showdown
with the Jews. Besides that, the Fuehrer shall now make an attempt with
those foreign powers which have brought the Jewish question up, in
order to solve the Madagascar project. He has explained it all to me
on 9 November. There is no other way. He’ll tell the other countries.
“What are you talking about the Jew for?--Take him!” Another proposal
may be made. The Jews, gotten rid of may buy territory for their
“coreligionists” in North America, Canada, or elsewhere.
I wish to summarize: The Minister of Economic Affairs shall direct the
committee and he shall in one form or another, take all steps necessary
within the next few days.
_Blerning_: I fear that during the next few days, beginning Monday,
the Jews will start to sell bonds on internal loans for hundreds of
thousands, in order to provide themselves with means. Since we control
the course of the internal loan in order to sell more bonds, the
Reich-Treasury, Loan-Committee or the Reich Minister for Finance should
have to back this internal loan.
_Goering_: In what way could the Jew bring his bonds on the market?
(Remark: “Sell them”)
To whom?
(Remark: “on the stock market--he orders a bank to do it.”)
Well, I’ll prohibit selling internal loan bonds for three days.
_Blerning_: That could be done only through a decree.
_Goering_: I can’t see any advantage for the Jew. He won’t know himself
how and he’ll have to pay. On the contrary, I believe he won’t move.
_Goebbels_: For the time being he is small and ugly and stays at home.
_Goering_: I don’t think it would be logical. Otherwise we’ll have to
do it. The reason why I want this decree in a hurry is that for the
time being we have peace but who can guarantee that there won’t be new
trouble by Saturday or Sunday. Once and for all I want to eliminate
individual acts. The Reich has taken the affairs in its own hand. The
Jew can only sell. He can’t do a thing. He’ll have to pay. At this
moment, the individual Jew won’t think of throwing anything on the
market. There’ll be some chatter first, and then they will begin to run
to us. They’ll look for those great Aryans with whom, they’ll think
they may have some luck, the so-called various mailboxes of the Reich
with whom they can lodge their protests. These people will run my door
in. All that takes some time, and by then we’ll be ready.
_Daluege_: May we issue the order for confiscating the cars?
_Goering_: Also the Ministry of the Interior and the Police will have
to think over, what measures will have to be taken. I thank you.
[Conference closed at 2.40 PM]
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1817-PS
ORGANIZATION BOOK OF THE NSDAP, 1936 EDITION
The Reich Organization Leader of the NSDAP, published by the Central
Publishing House of the NSDAP, Franz Eher Successor, Munich. Page 211.
BUREAU FOR FACTORY TROOPS [AMT WERKSCHAREN]
I. _TASK_:
The factory troops in the National Socialist Community “Strength
through Joy” [NS--Gemeinschaft “Kraft durch Freude”] carry out the
following tasks:
1. To help and come to the rescue, in their capacity as a young factory
guard, whenever there is a question of bringing the German working man
strength through joy.
2. Shaping of factory celebrations and festivals in order to permeate
the factories with National Socialist ideology and philosophy, with
special regard to the creation of a new ritual.
3. To be an ideological shock squad [Weltanschaulicher Stosstrupp]
within the factory.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1818-PS
ORGANIZATION BOOK OF THE NSDAP, 1940 EDITION
The Reich Organization Leader of the NSDAP [Dr. Robert Ley] published
by the Central Publishing House of the NSDAP, Franz Eher Successor,
Munich. Pages 195-196b.
BUREAU FOR FACTORY TROOPS AND TRAINING
The Bureau of Factory Troops and Training [Werkschar und Schulung]
is simultaneously a Bureau under the jurisdiction of the Reich
Organization Leader of the NSDAP--Main Training Bureau.
* * * * * * *
The education and training of the Bureau of Factory Troops and Training
has in mind the totality of the tasks of the NSDAP and of the German
labor front. It comprises political shaping of the will, and conveying
trade knowledge, and includes the whole labor policy on an ideological
basis, character education, and creation of a soldierly attitude
[Soldatisch-haltungsmaessige Ausrichtung].
It is the aim of the German labor front training to enable the factory
troops and the German labor front functionaries to lead the workers of
the German people, and thereby to render real the National Socialist
community of factory, accomplishment and people.
* * * * * * *
THE FACTORY TROOPS OF THE GERMAN LABOR FRONT IN THE FACTORY
Regulations for its building:
The Factory Troop as an organization exists only in the factory. It is
the nucleus of the factory community.
The Factory Troops Leader:
The confirmed factory chairman [Betriebsobmann] of the German Labor
Front leads, under the same title, the Factory Troops of the factory.
For training and commitment of the shock squad [Stosstrupp] the factory
chairman deputizes a shock squad leader [Stosstruppfuehrer].
Membership in the Factory Troops:
Membership in the Factory Troops is voluntary and it presupposes
readiness to fight for a National Socialist conception of work and for
a German worker’s community.
* * * * * * *
TASK OF THE FACTORY TROOPS
Under the leadership of the factory chairman, it is the task of the
Factory Troops to guarantee, under all circumstances and by all means,
the political security and readiness of the factory to commit itself.
Not through words and speeches alone, but primarily through their
example, the Factory Troops shall convince the community of their
fellow-workers of the justice of the National Socialist will, and
educate them to utmost effort, to highest accomplishments, and to most
extreme devotion.
It must remain the aim of the Factory Troops to fuse the factory into
a closely-meshed, single-willed community capable of the highest
accomplishments for the people and the Reich. Commitment:
Directives and regulations for physical coordination, commitment
and utilization of the Factory Troops are issued by the Reich
Organizational Leader, or on his behalf by the head of the Central
bureau, or the German Labor Front chairmen of district [Gau] county
[Kreis] and locality [Ort], so far as it is not a question of Factory
Troops tasks falling within the professional sphere of activity of the
factory.
The competent regional chairmen (district, county and locality) are
solely responsible for the over-all commitment of the Factory Troops.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1822-PS
[Item 1]
1. Letter of the Fuehrer with wording of 25 August 1939 transmitted to
me by telephone from the Reich Labor Ministry.
2. Telegram No. 370 of 25 August 1939 concerning transmittal of
Fuehrer’s letter to Duce.
3. Second letter of Fuehrer to Duce, dated 25 August 1939 transmitted
by telephone by the Reich Labor Ministry to the Ambassador.
4. Tel. No. 371 of 25 August 1939 concerning transmission of second
letter of Fuehrer.
5. Note of Envoy von Plessen concerning telephone call from Berlin,
dealing with alleged contradiction between telegram 370 and a letter
transmitted by Ambassador Attolico in Berlin.
6. Note of 26 August 1939 on same subject.
7. Letter of Duce to Fuehrer of 26 August, transmitted at 1210 hours by
telephone in Berlin by Count Ciano to Attolico.
# # # # #
[Item 2]
Rome, August 25, 1939.
Embassy Courier (Btsch./Kr.)
Telegram in code (Secret Ch. V.)
(Valid)
Foreign Affairs
_Berlin_
Citissime
No. 370 of 25 August Top Secret
To: The Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Subject: Today’s Telephonic Instructions.
V. 1. Encoding: Fink/Grade/Haupmann.
2. Dispatched: Krueger/Limberg/Zimmerm.
3. To me dispatched in sections (last one at 11 p. m.)
[Illegible notations]
I have personally handed on to the Duce in the Palazzo Venezia at 1520
o’clock in the presence of Ciano the contents of today’s letter of
the Fuehrer conveyed here by telephone. The Duce, who was possessed
of great calmness, at first, read the letter through entirely, and
then went over it, with me sentence for sentence, at which time,
he translated the sentences into Italian for Ciano, who is not
conversant with German, and, in fact, as I was able to convince myself,
completely, correctly, and true to the meanings.
Among this comments upon the individual themes, I shall single out the
following:
He was entirely satisfied with the non-aggression pact with Moscow.
He, himself, already in the Spring had offered such a suggestion to
Field Marshal Goering, pointing out, indeed, at this juncture, the need
of adopting a moderate attitude, since our two nations, who for ten
years on account of ideological reasons have been oriented for a fight
against Moscow, must have the time needed for a readjustment. In spite
of the suggestion made at that time, he, himself, is and remains an
implacable anticommunist.
(Here I interrupted with the view that the German position against
communism self-evidently remains entirely unchanged and that in regard
to this fact Moscow has never been left in doubt.)
The comment in the letter concerning the attitude of the Japanese
Cabinet he regarded as being correct. The fault lies with the Japanese
Ministry of the Navy, which is opposed to adopting an unambiguous
position against England.
The reaction he also expects the pact with Moscow to have upon Rumania
appeared to be of most lively interest to him. Consideration for
Bessarabia would paralyze Rumania’s freedom of movement in favor of
Poland in the case of conflict. Thus Rumania would be left to the
Hungarians.
With an approving nod of the head he agreed that Turkey would now have
to revise its attitude.
He described the worsening of German-Polish relations as so acute that
an armed conflict can no longer be avoided. The moment to consider
possibilities of preventing the conflict has now passed, because
the Polish mentality--supported by England’s attitude--is no longer
responsive to reasonable suggestions, no matter from which side they
might come. Otherwise he might have imagined that the Poles would have
sought, for example, immediate reapproachment with Germany, if they
correctly appreciated the danger threatening their existence; and, to
prove clearly their willingness to negotiate, they would first of all
have given Danzig to Hitler, without reservations and without any talks
on negotiations. Then one might have considered the removal of further
reasons for discord--he cited the Polish Corridor and Silesia--by means
of direct German-Polish talks; in his opinion that would have been
possible. Finally, a general conference might have followed in order
to solve the other big controversial questions--points of differences
between Italy and France, German colonies, distribution of raw
materials, armament questions. This would have assured European peace
for 15-20 years, as is desired by all. Such considerations, however,
are outdated by the precipitous course of events. He had now adjusted
himself to the fact that the outbreak of a general conflagration is
not only unavoidable but immediately imminent. The question of the
exact date interested him most, and he wanted to know whether I could
tell him more about that. I answered the question by pointing out the
corresponding places in the letter. He seemed to realize that nothing
more could be said at the moment by anybody. But he emphasized that
he attached much value, for obvious reasons, to the fact that he
should be informed as fast as possible. But in view of the speed of
the developments he understood the difficulties of such notification.
Finally, he stated again that he would have preferred open conflict
2 to 3 years hence and gave his reasons. And he believed the reasons
also applied to us, especially in view of the condition of our fleet.
However, developments are now forcing us in another direction. In any
case, he expressly emphasized, he is with us, unconditionally and with
everything.
At the end of the talk he made comments about the prospects of an armed
German-Polish conflict which should be decided in our favor by our army
in a very short time.
Ciano, who led me out after I took leave of the Duce, summarized
his impressions of the situation by saying that any discussion over
possibilities to keep the peace was outdistanced by the course of
events. No longer the word “peace,” but “victory” would govern his
action.
Mackensen
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1823-PS
Telegram in Cipher (Good)
Sent Berlin 27 Aug 1939 00-32 hours
Rec Rome same day 02-25
Rec Embassy 27 Aug 1939 03-40
Deciphering Nr. 403 of 26 Aug 1939
[illegible pencil mark] For Chief of Agency personally. Sealed
matter. Decipher personally. Strictly secret. To Ambassador v.
Mackensen personally.
The Reich Minister requests that the following reply of the Fuehrer be
forwarded to the Duce immediately.
Duce!
I have received the information concerning your final attitude. I
respect the motives and influences determining your resolution. Perhaps
it will nevertheless be for the best. Of course, in my opinion,
this will be true only if the world does not receive any inkling of
the intended attitude of Italy, at least not till actual fighting
starts. For this reason I beg you heartily to support my struggle
psychologically in your press and any other means. I also beg of you,
Duce, if it is possible for you to force at least England and France to
immobilize certain parts of their strength, by demonstrative military
actions, or to keep them in any case, in a state of uncertainty. But
the most important thing is this, Duce: should, as mentioned, the big
war start, the situation in the East will be solved, before the two
Western powers can achieve any success. This winter or at the latest by
spring I intend to deploy in the West forces at least equal to those of
France and England. The blockade will be of little effect, especially
under the altered circumstances in the East and as a result of my
autarchic preparations. Its danger during the progress of war will not
increase but decrease. Now I have a big favor to ask you, Duce. You and
your people could help me most in this hard struggle by supporting me
with Italian manpower, manpower for industrial as well as agricultural
purposes. Should you later on in the course of developments be forced
or be in a position to intervene, the intensified autarchic basis of
the Reich would be of the utmost importance to you. In reiterating my
entreaty for the granting of this special favor, I wish to thank you
for all the efforts you have made in our common cause.
Adolf Hitler
End of Letter: Schmidt.
# # # # #
COPY
Letter of the Fuehrer transmitted telegraphically to his Excellency
Ambassador v. Mackensen, received at 3:40 o’clock, 27 August 1939, for
immediate delivery to Il Duce.
DUCE!
[Text of message the same as above].
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1828-PS
Extract from Memorandum Handed to German Foreign Office by Count
Magistrati, forwarded by von Weizacker to Ambassador von Mackensen in
Rome 7 August 1939.
2. * * * Above all it must be most _clearly_ and _unmistakably_ stated
that when the Fuehrer decides that the opportune time to start a war
has come, Italy is ready to agree a _hundred percent_. If Germany has
to mobilize, Italy will also do so _at the same time_, since it intends
to meet its obligations fully and with all its forces. As said already
before, this should be _clearly_ understood. * * *
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1831-PS
BTSCH/KR
NOTE
On behalf of the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs, VLR Kordt calls
at 11:15 with the information that two telegrams, numbered 439 and 440
are on the way to me. The Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs requests
that I should get in touch with the postal authorities to have these
telegrams delivered to me with the greatest possible speed. They
contained the text of two letters by the Fuehrer to the Duce, but I
was to keep this information to myself. I was to hand these to the
Duce personally as quickly as possible. When I asked when were the
telegrams sent off and how long they were which I had to know in order
to estimate for when to make an appointment with the Duce, Mr. Kordt
stated that until then only No. 439 had been sent off at 10:30, whereas
No. 440 was still being in the process of coding. One of the telegrams
was about half a page long, the other, two. I told Mr. Kordt that I
would take the necessary steps, but that I had to point out already now
that one should not entertain any false hopes as to the time that would
elapse.
At 11:50 the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs calls me up from the
Reich Chancellery personally and requests me to have the Fuehrer’s
two letters to the Duce received immediately by telephone, as their
transmission by telegraph would presumably take too long and then
to deliver the letters to the Duce with greatest speed. Then the
telephonic transmission of the text of the two telegrams followed
immediately.
Immediately afterwards VLR Kordt called me and told me that he had just
transmitted to us the Fuehrer’s two letters to the Duce by telephone.
Referring to our previous telephone conversation he asked me to take
the further steps. I answered that meanwhile the Minister for Foreign
Affairs has called me personally and that I had already received
the text of the letters over the telephone through another line. We
ascertained together that thus the text of these letters has arrived
here over three routes.
At 12:15, I informed the office RM by telephone that the Duce would
receive me at 1 o’clock.
After the audience with the Duce, I informed by telephone the Office RM
at 1:50 about the delivery of the letters, adding that a telegram about
my conversation with the Duce would be sent immediately.
ROME, 1 September 1939
(Signed) Mackensen
# # # # #
Coded Telegram (Copy)
From Berlin: 3 September 1939, 2:50 hours
Arr. Rome: 3 September 1939, 3:00 hours.
Arr. Embassy: 3 September 1939, 6:30 hours
DECODING
No. 450 dated 2 September 1939.
For High Officials or their representatives in person.
Top Secret. To be decoded in person.
Top Secret.
For the Chief of the Mission for personal and confidential
information.
The Italian Ambassador handed to the State Secretary at the Duce’s
order following copy for the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor and for The
Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs:
Italy sends the information, leaving, of course, every decision to the
Fuehrer, that it still has a chance to call a conference with France,
England and Poland on following basis: 1. Armistice which would leave
the Army Corps where they are at present. 2. Calling the conference
within 2-3 days. 3. Solution of the Polish-German controversy which
would be certainly favorable for Germany as matters stand today.
This idea which originated from the Duce has its foremost exponent in
France.
Danzig is already German and Germany is holding already securities
which guarantee most of her demands. Besides, Germany has had already
its “moral satisfaction.” If it would accept the plan for a conference,
it will achieve all her aims and at the same time prevent a war which
already today has the aspect of being universal and of extremely long
duration.
Duce does not insist on it, but he lays particular emphasis that above
should be brought to the immediate attention of von Ribbentrop and of
the Fuehrer.
End of Copy
The answer to the Italian Ambassador was promised by 3 September.
Woermann
# # # # #
Telegram Heading in Italian
773 S Berlin AW1/2 977 630/626 3/9 2051 Etat--459
For the Ambassador
I request that the following message from the Fuehrer be forwarded to
the Duce personally:
Duce
I first want to thank you for your last attempt at a mediation. I would
have been ready to accept, but only under condition, that there would
be a possibility to give me certain guarantees that the conference
would be successful. Because, for the last two days the German troops
are engaged in an extraordinarily rapid advance in Poland. It would
have been impossible to devaluate the bloody sacrifices made thereby
by diplomatic intrigues. Nevertheless, I believe that a way could have
been found, if England would not have been determined to wage war
under all circumstances. I have not given in to the English, because,
Duce, I do not believe that peace could have been maintained for more
than ½ year or 1 year. Under these circumstances, I thought that, in
spite of everything, the present moment was better for resistance. At
present, the superiority of the German armed forces in Poland is too
overwhelming in all fields that the Polish Army will collapse in a very
short time. I doubt whether this fast success could be achieved in one
or two years. England and France would have armed their allies to
such an extent that the crushing technical superiority of the German
armed forces could not have become so apparent anymore. I am aware,
Duce, that the fight which I enter, is one for life and death. My own
fate does not play any role in it at all. But I am also aware that one
cannot avoid such a struggle permanently and that one has to choose
after cold deliberation the moment for resistance in such a way that
the probability of the success is guaranteed and I believe in this
success, Duce, with the firmness of a vouch. Recently you have given
me the kind assurance that you think you will be able to help me in a
few fields. I acknowledge this in advance with sincere thanks. But I
believe also--even if we march now over different roads--that fate will
finally join us. If the National Socialistic Germany were destroyed by
the Western democracies, the Fascist Italy would also have to face a
grave future. I was personally always aware of this community of the
future of our two governments and I know that you, Duce, think the same
way. To the situation in Poland, I would like to make the brief remark
that we lay aside, of course, all unimportant things, that we do not
waste any man in unimportant tasks, but direct all on acts in the light
of great operational considerations. The Northern Polish Army which is
the Corridor, has already been completely encircled by our action. It
will be either wiped out or will surrender. Otherwise, all operations
proceed according to plan. The daily achievements of the troops are far
beyond all expectations. The superiority of our air force is complete,
although scarcely one third of it is in Poland. In the West I will
be on the defensive. France can here sacrifice its blood first. Then
the moment will come when we can confront the enemy also there with
the full power of the nation. Accept my thanks, Duce, for all your
assistance which you have given to me in the past and I ask you not to
deny it to me in the future.
(Signed) Adolf Hitler
End of message. Cable report is requested
Ribbentrop
# # # # #
Rome, 4 September 1939
Foreign Berlin
No. 418 of 4 September 1939
Telegram, secret code procedure (good)
CITISSIME to telegram No. 495 of 3rd of this month and in connection
with telegram No. 414 of 3 September.
TOP SECRET
Duce remarked during the presentation of the Fuehrer’s message, which
took place in Ciano’s presence at 0940, that he would forward his view
point by letter. He explained somewhat as follows, during the ensuing
conversation of a half an hour: they never had considered in the
least to let himself be used in an action of arbitration, which had
as prerequisite the withdrawal of German troops. No man on earth can
seriously consider the thought as worthy of discussion, to make such
an offer to troops, which, furthermore, are advancing successfully.
He refused such ideas with actual indignation, also he would not
consider the “symbolic withdrawal” suggested by Paris. In view of the
strong appeal by France to make one last attempt, he had forwarded the
suggestion under the self-evidence supposition, that the remaining of
the army corps, where it should be a prerequisite. In this case, if we
had considered the agreement of the Fuehrer to the suggestion possible,
he would perhaps even have advised it. However, England, which is
guilty for the entire development of the German-Polish conflict, did
apparently not want to let it come to a compromise. He seemed to know,
that the Polish Ambassador in London still exercised in the last
minutes a decisive influence on the position at the British Cabinet.
The declaration by England, which brought about the stage of war, and
which France followed up the last, only hesitantly, is absolutely
“diotic,” brought about by people who apparently have never even
studied a map. For what form should such a war take? It can only be
waged on water, on land or in the air. Breaking out of the Maginot Line
on land, over-running of the West Wall would be a hopeless undertaking,
which will hardly be attempted by the French. Even if our fleet is
modest, in any case the Navy cannot undertake anything decisive. The
air force would attempt to drop a few bombs, maybe it would destroy
this and that installation, but even that has nothing to do with the
decision, especially if we limit ourselves in the air as well to the
defensive. In brief, the declaration of war is an absolutely absurd
undertaking, because the only thing actually left would be the war of
attrition and that would also be harmful to the one who declares it.
If the Fuehrer’s message says that the Fuehrer and the Duce “would
now go separate ways”, he is of an entirely different opinion. On
the contrary, the most complete agreement in respect to methods and
goal prevails, and especially militarily, he has done everything to
the last, what the Fuehrer desired of him, and he continues his
preparation most intensively. In Lybya, the critical month for him is
September, after which even there, he will be armed for a successful
defense. Already today, he ties down 400,000 men of the opponent by
his measures on the Alpine frontier and in Africa. He will send to
the Fuehrer, via the military attaché (who is invited this evening to
the home of Gen. Pariani) all the details of his military measures
with appropriate carbo-graphic material, which he also showed me and
explained most thoroughly. I can leave the reporting on this to the
military attaché. I only wish to emphasize the Duce’s remark, that the
mobilization measures did not only pass without any friction, but also
that the spirit of those conscripted and of their families, thanks to
the generous subsidy allotted to them, is excellent.
At the end, the Duce repeated his assurance of every assistance desired
by us, particularly, in the question of workers and (on a suggestion of
mine) by the press.
Duce was in a confidential mood.
/s/ MACKENSEN.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1832-PS
The Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs called me on the telephone at
2200 hours from the Reich Chancellery and reported as follows:
According to authentic information, the rumors spreading in Rome,
by way of the Italian embassy in Berlin, that a relaxation of the
situation is to be noted and that conferences are being held. We wanted
to state on the contrary, that just the opposite is true and that
the situation is getting more serious from hour to hour. “The Armies
are marching”. It would be good if I would see to it that the rumor
mentioned above should not be believed by the Duce and Ciano.
Rome, 27 August 1939.
to the notice of: Mackensen
1. B. R. [initialed]
2. Military attaché [initialed]
3. Naval attaché [initialed]
4. Air attaché [initialed]
5. to be returned to me.
Rome, 27 August 1939.
[initialed]
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1834-PS
FOREIGN OFFICE
RAM NO. 56/R
Berlin, 2 March 1941
STRICTLY SECRET
Personal
In the inclosure is forwarded, for strictly confidential and purely
personal information, an extract of a report on my conference with the
new Japanese Ambassador Oshima in Fuschl on 23 February 1941. These
statements are of fundamental significance for orientation on the
general political situation facing Germany in early Spring 1941.
Signed: Ribbentrop
To: The German Embassy in
Ankara
Madrid
Moscow
Rome (_Quir._)
Rome (Vat.)
The German Legation in
Athens
Belgrade
Bern
Budapest
Bukarest
Helsinki
Lisbon
Pressburg (Bratislava)
Sofia
Stockholm
one each
# # # # #
65215
Enclosure
To RAM No. 56/R
STRICTLY SECRET
Extract from the report of the conference of the Reich Foreign Minister
with Ambassador Oshima in Fuschl on 13 February 1941
After particularly cordial mutual greetings, the RAM (Reich Foreign
Minister) declared that Ambassador Oshima had been proved right in
the policy he had pursued regarding Germany in the face of the many
doubters in Japan. By Germany’s victory in the west these policies had
been fully vindicated. He (the RAM) regretted that the alliance between
Germany and Japan, for which he had been working with the Ambassador
for many years already, had come into being only after various detours,
but public opinion in Japan had not been ripe for it earlier. The main
thing was, however, that they are together now.
Expanding upon the general political situation the Reich Foreign
Minister declared: The Fuehrer had always looked for an understanding
with England and he (RAM) had himself been sent to England as an
ambassador in his time to undertake a last attempt in this direction.
A certain possibility had existed in the person of King Edward, even
though it had been doubtful from the beginning whether the king would
prevail. He (the RAM) had been more than skeptical already at his
arrival in London, and had considered the chances for an understanding
as 100 to 1. Thus the war-inciter clique in England had then won the
upper hand. When he (the RAM) left England, _war was unavoidable_. Then
when it came to war the Fuehrer decided on a _treaty with Russia_--a
necessity for _avoiding a two-front war_. Perhaps this moment was
difficult for Japan. The treaty was, however, in the interest of Japan,
for the Japanese empire was interested in as rapid a German victory
as possible, which was assured by the treaty with Russia. Furthermore
he (the RAM) had made it clear to Stalin as well as to the public
that the treaty between the Reich and Russia in no way affected the
German-Japanese relationship. Now the _German-Japanese alliance_ has
been concluded. Ambassador Oshima is the man who gets credit for it
from the Japanese side. After conclusion of the alliance the question
of its further _development_ now stands in the foreground. How is the
situation in this respect?
* * * * * * *
As for the war against _England_, we had poor weather for our bombers
during the Fall and Winter to be sure, but in spite of this, heavy
damage has been done which has had a strongly retarding effect on
English war production, etc. The bombings would continue in increasing
measure so that we hope to destroy very much more than America was able
to replace. We now had air supremacy over the whole continent. The time
when we should win air supremacy over England would depend on further
developments.
At sea the commitment of U-boat weapon had thus far been comparatively
slight; after the end of March the commitment of the U-boat weapon
would multiply in a short time. Then with the combination Air
Force-U-Boat weapon we would deal terrible blows to England. The loss
of tonnage already was making considerable difficulties for the
English food supply. Meat and fats were already scarce. It was now a
matter of reducing imports by sinking to a definite level below the
absolute minimum for English existence. Thereby England’s situation
would take catastrophic shape overnight. The landing in England is
prepared; its execution, however, depends on various factors, above all
on weather conditions.
Concerning _America_, the Reich Foreign Minister went on, it must be
noted that Roosevelt is the most bitter enemy of Germany and Japan. As
far as he was concerned he would like to enter the war. However we have
an interest in keeping America out of the war. Should America enter
the war in spite of this it could not wage the war militarily at all.
The vast spaces of the oceans lying between us and America made this
impossible. In East Asia, America would hardly dare to send its fleet
beyond Hawaii, as it would then be threatened with destruction by the
Japanese fleet. In the Atlantic Ocean there is a lack of commitment
possibilities with the exception of England. Landing in Europe is
impossible, and Africa also is too far removed. Supply points for the
fleet and land troops are lacking. This points to the creation of
American air bases in England for practical purposes. But in an air war
we are located in a strategically advantageous position with respect to
England. We could bomb England concentrically from the broad basis of
the European coast while England had to spread out in fanlike fashion
in its attacks on Europe and must thereby split up its forces. In an
air duel--Europe vs. England--Germany would always be superior. We
believed, however, that it should be possible to keep America out of
the war by skillfully coordinated politics of the allied powers.
The Fuehrer would beat England wherever he would encounter her.
Besides our strength is not only equal, but superior to a combined
English-American air force at any time. The number of pilots at our
disposal was unlimited. The same was true for our airplane production
capacity. As far as quality is concerned ours was always superior to
the English (to say nothing about the American) and we were on the way
even to enlarge this lead. By order of the Fuehrer the anti-aircraft
defense too would be greatly reinforced. Since the army had been
supplied far beyond its requirements, and enormous reserves had been
piled up (the ammunitions plants have been slowed down because of the
immense stock of material), production would now be concentrated on
submarines, airplanes and anti-aircraft guns.
Every eventuality had been provided for; the war has been won today
militarily, economically and politically. We had the desire to end the
war quickly and to force England to sue for peace soon. The Fuehrer
was vigorous and healthy, fully convinced of victory and determined
to bring the war to a quick and victorious end. To this end the
cooperation with Japan was of importance. However, Japan, in its own
interest, should come in as soon as possible. This would destroy
England’s key position in the Far East. Japan, on the other hand, would
thus secure its position in the Far East, a position which it could
acquire only through war. There were three reasons for quick action:
1. Intervention by Japan would mean a decisive blow against the center
of the British Empire (threat to India, cruiser-warfare, etc.). The
effect upon the morale of the British people would be very serious and
this would contribute toward a quick ending of the war.
2. A surprising intervention by Japan was bound to keep America out
of the war. America, which at present is not armed as yet and would
hesitate greatly to expose her Navy to any risks West of Hawaii, could
do this even less so in such a case. If Japan would otherwise respect
the American interests, there would not even be the possibility for
Roosevelt to use the argument of lost prestige to make war plausible
to the Americans. It was very unlikely that America would declare war
if it then would have to stand by helplessly while Japan takes the
Philippines without America being able to do anything about it.
3. In view of the coming new world order it seems to be in the
interest of Japan also, to secure for herself already during the war
the position she wants to hold in the Far East at the time of a peace
treaty. Ambassador Oshima agreed with me entirely and said that he
would do everything to carry through this policy.
The Reich Foreign Minister mentioned further that, if America should
declare war because of Japan’s entry into the war, this would mean that
America had had the intention to enter the war sooner or later anyway.
Even though it would be preferable to avoid this, the entry into the
war would, as explained above, be by no means decisive and would not
endanger the final victory of the countries of the Three-Power Pact.
The Foreign Minister further expressed his belief that a temporary lift
of the British morale caused by America’s entry into the war would be
cancelled by Japan’s entry into the war. If, however, contrary to all
expectations, the Americans should be careless enough to send their
Navy in spite of all, beyond Hawaii and to the Far East, this would
represent the biggest chance for the countries of the Three-Power
Pact to bring the war rapidly to an end. He, the Foreign Minister,
is convinced that the Japanese fleet would then do a complete job.
Ambassador Oshima replied to this, that, unfortunately he does not
think the Americans would do it, but he is convinced of a victory of
his fleet in Japanese waters.
The Minister for Foreign Affairs further explained that closest
cooperation was required for the common waging of the war, particularly
as far as intelligence service and press were concerned. The
cooperation with the Italians is already exemplary; the same is true
for the cooperation with Rumania, Hungary and Slovakia. The press,
radio, etc. of these countries were already so synchronized with each
other that they form one single weapon. The same kind of close contact
must be established with Japan. The Ambassador welcomed this and
intends to set up a program with our men determining how our Japanese
propaganda can be most effectively intensified in all fields.
Ambassador Oshima explained that when the Three-Power Pact was
concluded, various opinions were still present in Japan. It was then
that the Emperor intervened with an edict. It must be stated, however,
that, impressed by the German victory in the West, the Japanese people
are now entirely for the Three-Power Pact.
Ambassador Oshima remarked further that in Japan, under the
influence of the events, the hard feelings against America had risen
considerably. The Reich Foreign Minister referred to the recent
statement of Nomura, the Japanese Ambassador in the U.S.A., concerning
Japan’s attitude in case of America’s entry into the war, and mentioned
that he considered it appropriate to talk plain language with the
U.S.A. Ambassador Oshima remarked hereto that the Japanese Ministry of
Foreign Affairs had given instructions to that effect. The Minister for
Foreign Affairs pointed out that particularly in view of the desire
to keep America out of the war, plain language must be used. Only if
the U. S. realized that they were confronting firm determination,
would they hold back. The people in the U. S. did not like National
Socialism. However, they were not willing to sacrifice their sons and
therefore were against an entry into the war. The American people felt
instinctively that they were drawn into the war for no reason, by
Roosevelt and the Jewish wire-pullers. Therefore, our politics with
the U. S. should be plain and firm, but, of course, not aggressive. In
the U. S. they must realize that Germany, Italy and Japan had no hard
feelings for the American people, but that should the U.S.A. have any
aggressive desires, they would confront an iron front of determined
people, a front, at that, which includes practically the whole world.
One would therefore have to work in close cooperation against the
attempts of misrepresentation by the British propaganda. As far as
speeches and addresses of a principle nature are concerned it would be
necessary to keep up a continuous exchange of ideas. In this connection
the Minister for Foreign Affairs referred to a recent remark by
Matsuoka concerning Japanese willingness to act as mediator for peace
negotiations. This remark had been extensively exploited by the enemy
propaganda.
The Reich Foreign Minister continued by saying that it was Japan’s
friendship which had enabled Germany to arm after the Anti-Comintern
Pact was concluded. On the other hand, Japan had been able to penetrate
deeply into the English sphere of interest in China. Germany’s victory
on the continent has brought now, after the conclusion of the Three
Power Pact, great advantages for Japan. France, as a power, was
eliminated in the Far East (Indochina). England too was considerably
weakened, Japan had been able to close in steadily on Singapore. Thus,
Germany had already contributed enormously to the shaping of the future
fate of the two nations. Due to our geographical situation we should
have to carry the main burden of the final battle in the future, too.
If an unwanted conflict with Russia should arise we should have to
carry the main burden also in this case. If Germany should ever weaken,
Japan would find itself confronted by a world-coalition within a short
time. We were all in the same boat. The fate of both nations was being
determined now for centuries to come. The same was true for Italy. The
interests of the three countries would never intersect. A defeat of
Germany would also mean the end of the Japanese imperialistic idea.
Ambassador Oshima definitely agreed with these statements and
emphasized the fact that Japan was determined to keep its imperial
position. The Reich Foreign Minister then discussed the great problems
which would arise after the war for the parties of the Three Power
Pact from the shaping of a new order in Europe and East Asia. The
problems arising then would require a bold solution. Thereby no
overcentralization should take place, but a solution should be found
on a basis of parity, particularly in the economic realm. In regard
to this the Reich Foreign Minister advanced the principle that a
free exchange of trade should take place between the two spheres of
interest on a liberal basis. The European-African hemisphere under the
leadership of Germany and Italy, and the East-Asian sphere of interest
under the leadership of Japan. As he conceived it, for example, Japan
would conduct trade and make trade agreements directly with the
independent states in the European hemisphere, as heretofore, while
Germany and Italy would trade directly and make trade agreements with
the independent countries within the Japanese orbit of power, such
as China, Thailand, Indochina, etc. Furthermore, as between the two
economic spheres, each should fundamentally grant the other preferences
with regard to third parties. The Ambassador expressed agreement with
this thought.
The Reich Foreign Minister then touched upon the question, explicitly
pointed out as theoretical, that the contracting powers might be
required, on the basis of new affronts by the U.S.A., to break off
diplomatic relations. Germany and Italy were fundamentally determined
on this; after signing of the Three-Power Pact we should proceed if
the occasion arises, but also jointly in this matter. Such a lesson
should open the eyes of the people in the U.S.A. to the situation
and under certain conditions bring about a swing toward isolation in
public opinion. Naturally a situation had to be chosen in which America
found herself entirely in the wrong. The common step of the signatory
powers should be exploited correspondingly in propaganda. The question,
however, was in no way acute at the time.
* * * * * * *
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1835-PS
Urgent. To Ambassador:
Fuehrer and RAM request you immediately to transmit the following
letter by Fuehrer to Duce.
Report execution.
Berlin, 28.3.41. 0,5 -
Duce, events force me to give you, Duce, by this quickest means, my
estimation of the situation and the consequences which may result from
it.
1. From the beginning, I have regarded Yugoslavia as a dangerous factor
in the controversy with Greece. Considered from the purely military
point of view, German intervention in the war in Thrace would not be at
all justified, as long as the attitude of Yugoslavia remains ambiguous
and she could threaten the left flank of the advancing columns, on our
enormous front.
2. For this reason, I’ve done everything and honestly have endeavored
to bring Yugoslavia into our community bound together by mutual
interests. Unfortunately these endeavors did not meet with success,
or they were begun too late to produce any definite result. Today’s
reports leave no doubt as to the imminent turn in the foreign policy of
Yugoslavia.
3. I don’t consider this situation as being catastrophic but
nevertheless a difficult one, and we, on our part, must avoid any
mistake if we do not want, in the end, to endanger our whole position.
4. Therefore, I have already arranged for all necessary measures in
order to meet a critical development with necessary military means.
The change in the deployment of our troops has been ordered also in
Bulgaria. Now I would cordially request you, Duce, not to undertake
any further operations in Albania in the course of the next few days.
I consider it necessary that you should cover and screen the most
important passes from Yugoslavia into Albania with all available force.
These measures should not be considered as designed for a long period
of time but as auxiliary measures designed to prevent for at least
fourteen days to three weeks a crisis arising.
I also consider it necessary, Duce, that you should reinforce your
forces on the Italian-Yugoslav front with all available means and with
utmost speed.
5. I also consider it necessary, Duce, that everything which we do and
order be shrouded in absolute secrecy and that only personalities who
necessarily must be notified, know anything about them. These measures
will completely lose their value should they become known.
6. Today I called in the Bulgarian and the Hungarian ministers and
outlined to them my thoughts on the situation and, with view to
military developments, to arouse their interest by explaining to both
of them, the negative and positive effects which would arise for
them in this case. Since without the aid of Hungary and Bulgaria,
operations, Duce, cannot develop with the swiftness which might be
necessary under the circumstances.
If possibly in the course of tomorrow, I will inform you, Duce, more
thoroughly about all this.
7. Therefore, General von Rintelen will report to you, Duce, tomorrow
if the weather is suitable for flying and will tell you the military
dispositions which are being prepared, and which we shall carry out.
Duce, should secrecy be observed as to these measures, then in case
action on our part should become necessary, I have no doubt that we
will both achieve a success no less than the success in Norway a year
ago. This is my unshaken conviction.
Accept my heartfelt and friendly greetings. Yours.
(Signed) Adolf Hitler
End of letter, Bureau of Minister.
With the directive that Ambassador Mackensen transmit this letter
tonight to Duce.
Howel 27.3.41 2400
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1842-PS
Notes on the discussion of the Reich Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop
with the Duce in the presence of Count Ciano as well as the ambassadors
von Mackensen and Alfieri, in Rome on the 19th September 1940.
* * * * * * *
All the same, Germany had won air superiority, and was bombing England,
and particularly London, by day and by night, whilst the British
were at most sending a few planes over Germany at night, in order to
drop bombs there at random. During the day no British plane dared to
fly over German territory. Germany, however, was carrying out strong
reprisal attacks by day as well as by night. On one occasion the German
Luftwaffe had been ready for a large scale attack as early as August.
But this attack had to be called off because of bad weather. A really
large scale attack had not taken place since, because the Fuehrer
wanted to accept the responsibility for this only when it was certain,
that such an attack would mean the beginning of England’s destruction.
Although Germany had merely carried out reprisal bombings from the air,
their results for England had already been extraordinarily serious.
With a continuation of these attacks London would be in ruins within a
short time. The British armament factories had been seriously affected,
and important ports, such as Portland, had been entirely crippled.
Moreover, all aerodromes from the South Coast to London had been made
unusable.
* * * * * * *
With regard to Greece and Yugoslavia, the Foreign Minister stressed,
that it was exclusively a question of Italian interests, the settling
of which was a matter for Italy alone, and in which Italy could be
certain of Germany’s sympathetic assistance. But it seemed to us to
be better not to touch on these problems for the time being, but to
concentrate on the destruction of England with all our forces instead.
Where Germany was concerned, she was interested in the northern German
districts (Norway etc.), and this was acknowledged by the Duce.
* * * * * * *
The Reich Foreign Minister further announced a statement by the Fuehrer
regarding the military part of the Spanish problem, i.e., the conquest
of Gibraltar. The Spaniards wanted to conquer Gibraltar by themselves.
But so as to prevent any failure, Germany would provide Spain with
special troops equipped with special weapons, and a few squadrons of
planes. The Fuehrer had carefully examined the Gibraltar problem from
the military point of view, and had come to the conclusion, that the
conquest of the rock was absolutely possible, but only then, if the
Spaniards were to be given assistance.
The Reich Foreign Minister then showed the Duce the German map
regarding the Spanish territorial demands, and this was duly noted by
the Italian gentlemen. A question which was put to the Duce by the
Reich Foreign Minister, showed, that the Spanish ambitions did not
clash with Italy’s in any way. In this connection the Reich Foreign
Minister announced Serrano Suner’s intention, also to make a visit to
Rome.
On his return to Berlin, he (the Reich Foreign Minister) intended to
sign a secret protocol with Serrano Suner, dealing with Spain’s entry
into the war, as well as the supplying of Spain with the aforementioned
materials, recognizing the Spanish ambitions, and providing an attack
against Gibraltar as a declaration of war. The protocol would also
state, that Spain’s entry into the war would be left to the judgment
of that country. It had been verbally provided, that Spain would come
into the war as soon as Franco had completed his preparations, and
particularly after the German special weapons and troops as well as
planes had arrived at their destinations in Spain.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1850-PS
_Filing reference_ 11 C-2 [in ink]
_Subject_: Negotiation between Obergruppenfuehrer Krueger, Oberst
Karmann, Oberst Lorenz, in the Chambers of the Reich Board of
Trustees on 8 July 1933.
Oberst Karmann stated that the Armed Forces had so far maintained no
contact whatsoever with the ex-service men. The only contact which
the ex-service men have, is the vote of their maintenance at the
Reich Ministry of Labor. Oberst Karmann intends to establish an
Ex-service men’s Association for which membership of the SA is laid
down as a condition. Ex-service men wait for about 3 years from the
time their active service ends until they obtain a Civil Service
post. Roughly estimated, they number about 20,000 men. In addition,
approximately 8,000 non-commissioned officers and men are released
yearly. The demand for these ex-service men is so great that, for
example, Oberst Karmann has difficulty in obtaining personnel for his
establishment. Oberst Karmann, however, wishes to send ex-service men
compulsorily to the S.A., as soon as this is required by the Chief
of Training. As a rule, the ex-service men go where they receive the
best pay. Furthermore, Oberst Karmann explained his ideas on the
recruitment of non-commissioned officers of the reserve. Forestry
and customs officials should, for example, do several years military
service with the Reichswehr. A similar provision should be made for
officials of other categories. The settling of the question regarding
the disadvantages of ex-service men in the SA, compared to those
in the Labor Service has been postponed until a later date. Oberst
Karmann mentioned that ex-service men, who were not appointed to good,
regularly paid positions in the S.A. would, when they claimed their
right to maintenance, be at a great practical disadvantage as regards
their financial circumstances by reason of their S.A. service. He would
see that there was official compensation for this.
Berlin, 8 July 1933.
131 Fl [ink]
C002167
# # # # #
Confidential 5 July 33
filing reference [in ink] [ink]
_Discussion with Oberst v. Vietinghoff, Chief of Armed Forces Division,
on Wednesday the 5th July 33._
1. _Leadership of Reich Youth_ [Reichsjugendfuehrung]. The question
of the powers of the Head of the Reich Youth in connection with
pre-military training.
I state that, by a decision of the Fuehrer, the spheres of duty of the
Head of the Reich Youth, the Reich Commissar for Sport and the Chief of
Training are sharply defined. I sent a draft to Munich to that effect.
2. _Students._ A discussion is taking place today between Oberst v.
Vietinghoff and Gerullis regarding the question of military sports for
students. Oberst v. Vietinghoff is of the opinion that these matters
also should be placed under the control of the Chief of Training.
I mentioned my preliminary negotiations with Herr Schwab, formerly with
the General Armed Forces Office [AWA-Allgemeines Wehrmachtsamt] who, as
liaison official on the Staff, was arranging this matter of military
sports for students on the right lines.
Oberst v. Vietinghoff believes that the Prussian Ministry of Education
and Public Worship, will make certain difficulties and would very much
like to take a service-officer into the ministry as technical advisor.
He suggested Hauptmann von Bernuth for this purpose.
3. I then gave an extensive outline of Bernuth’s duties; he was working
out the guiding principles for the training of men and the leaders
for the military camps and schools for leaders in accordance with the
wishes of the Reich Minister for Defense [Reichswehrministerium] with
regard to pre-military training, in addition, however, he should make
the technical preparations for weapon-training. Oberst v. Vietinghoff
declared himself in agreement.
Hauptmann v. Bernuth is being given a long-term appointment to my
staff. 002168 131 F2 [ink]
4. _Labor Service._ Military sports in Labor service camps are
suspended for considerations of foreign policy. Dr. Stellbrecht has
been to Oberst v. Vietinghoff to inform him that the Labor Service is
being organized on the wrong lines.
5. _The Office for Defence Policy_ [Wehrpolitisches Amt]. My answer to
Oberst v. Vietinghoff’s question was that of the “Wehrpolitisches Amt”
must not interfere with my sphere of duties and that I considered it
advisable to dissolve it.
Oberst v. Vietinghoff is of the opinion that the “Wehrpolitisches Amt”
has become superfluous and that all questions relating to military
sports should again be decided by the Chief of Training.
6. _The budget._ I drew Oberst von Vietinghoff’s attention to the fact
that the budget question must find its solution through the S.A., that
it was not advisable for the Reich Ministry for Defence to put the care
for the budget on behalf of the Chief of Training, for that might cause
difficulties. I drew attention to Oberst v. Reichenau’s suggestion and
how it would work out.
Oberst v. Reichenau recommends that the budget adviser to the Chief
of Training should contact Major Osterkamp, the expert of the Reich
Ministry for Defense, who is very experienced in these matters. It
would then be easier to get the budget passed by the Reich Ministry for
Finance.
I declared myself ready to examine the budget, in conjunction with
the Reich Ministry for Defense, as soon as it was decided upon.
Furthermore, the Fuehrer’s demand in Reichenhall that I should train
250,000 SA men and leaders within a year so that they would be at the
disposal of the Reichswehr in case of emergency, is the basis on which
I shall act.
In accordance with this demand of Hitler’s I should have to examine
the possibilities of instructional training and draw up my budget
accordingly. Deductions from the budget made by the Reich Ministry
would not be allowed.
7. The _Reich Trusteeship_. Oberst v. Vietinghoff asked when I was
taking over the Trusteeship of the Reich, to which I answered that I
had had a talk with Neuville today and that he had requested me in the
course of this discussion to go with him the next morning to Minister
Seldte to obtain information regarding the winding-up of affairs.
Oberst v. Vietinghoff considers this step superfluous, and only
calculated to cause further delay. I assured him that I was of the same
opinion.
8. _Branch Leaders_ [Zweigstellenleiter]. I referred to my order to
the main groups; it is to be left to them to employ Branch Leaders as
Training Inspectors as they are required. If they were not needed, the
former Branch Leaders would have to leave their posts.
Berlin, 5 July 1933.
131 F4 C002170
# # # # #
SECRET
Filing Reference 11 C-3 [Ink] Bauen
Discussion with Reich Defense Minister v. Blomberg on 15 July, 0930
hours.
1. My note of 13.7 to General v. Blomberg showed both parties that, in
fact, there had been a misunderstanding in the way the budget question
was viewed. General v. Blomberg had not been informed that Oberst v.
Reichenau had tried to have the budget for the Chief of Training of the
S.A. introduced by the Reich Ministry for Defense.
The Fuehrer’s statement of 12.7 regarding the basic regulations for
pre-military fitness training for youth, which had been shown to him
today, had cleared all doubts.
At the last discussion he had merely intended to grant to the Chief of
Training from his own special Fund for Training purposes, money which
might possibly be refused by the Reich Minister for Finance. He had
only wished to offer his services for this purpose, and today agreed
with me that the Reich Ministry of the Interior should decide upon the
budget for the Chief of Training and put the case before the cabinet.
2. With a view to a practical solution of the budget problems he
suggests that a discussion should take place between the Chiefs at the
beginning of August, in which the Ministers Frick, Schwerin-Krosigk,
and v. Blomberg should take part; he recommended also that I should
first have a word with State Secretary Reinhard in the Reich Ministry
for Finance to smooth the way.
3. General v. Blomberg had me explain to him the forms of training in
the military camps and requested that the very necessary camouflage
measures be taken.
4. Relationship of the higher S. A.--Fuehrerkorps to the Reich Ministry
for Defense. Berlin, 15.7.33.
C002171.
# # # # #
Ki/Eg Berlin, 1 Sept. 1933.
Filing Reference
Subject: Enrollment in the SA of members of the Reichswehr who are
due for release.
for the archives [in ink]
Discussion (1.9. 1933/0936 hours) between _Oberst Hinria_ and Hauptmann
von Wolf (general section and Armed Forces Section of Reich Ministry of
Defense) on the one hand and Stabsfuehrer Waehmann and Adjutant Kiefer
on the other.
_Oberst Hinria_ expressed the wishes of the members of the Reichswehr.
The latter wish, on entering the SA after their demobilization to
receive a rank corresponding to their last appointment. They consider
it inadvisable that, _for example_ a non-commissioned officer on
entering the SA should have, as his superior in rank, a man who was
formerly under him.
As opposed to this, Stabsfuehrer Waehmann holds that this idea is
contrary to the spirit and the service instructions of the SA, for it
is a demand which is particularly stressed in the SA that one should
place oneself voluntarily under the orders of another.
With regard to the Unions [Treubuende] the commonly held opinion is
voiced that their main purpose was to prevent the members of the
Reichswehr due for release from going over to the left. After the
assumption of power, since this danger was averted, this purpose will
no longer be held good in future. Nevertheless, Oberst Hinria advocates
their continued existence, for the reasons stated below.
_Suggestions for a temporary solution_: In future the Reichswehr will
presumably only be recruited from members of the S.A. Thus the men
being demobilized, will automatically return to the S.A. Therefore, the
solution for this period is simple.
Filing reference [in ink] 131 Gi [in ink]
# # # # #
SECRET
Filing reference
11 C-5 [in ink]
_Discussion with State Secretary Reinhard, Reich Ministry for Finance
on the morning of 18.7_
1. I reported to State Secretary Reinhard on the whole question of the
budget for the new sphere of duties assigned to Chief of Training; I
also asked that the further payment of the budget funds granted by the
Reich Ministry for Finance and belonging to the Reich Trusteeship,
since dissolved, should be cleared up for the current financial year.
2. Preliminary examination of the supplementary budget drafted by me
for the financial year 33/34 and an additional demand of approximately
25 millions.
State Secretary Reinhard considers it very difficult under the
circumstances to carry through the supplementary budget for the current
financial year. He was informed that the Reich Ministry for Finance
wishes to dispose of the funds granted from the Reich Trusteeship,
but on the other hand considers it necessary that the discussion of
Chiefs mentioned by General v. Blomberg should take place between the
Ministries. Taking the long view, State Secretary Reinhard believes
that the estimated budget could still be approved if the unemployment
problem were solved in the autumn. This is in his opinion a preliminary
condition.
In addition, however, Finance Minister Krosigk had the matter of
the budget in his own hands, for he [Reinhard] has to solve all the
problems relating to unemployment.
Berlin, 18 July 1933.
[illegible initials] R. [ink]
131 E (1) [in ink]
# # # # #
SECRET
11 C-4 [in ink] Bauen
Filing Reference
_Discussion with Ministerial Director Gerullis, Prussian Ministry for
Public Worship and Instruction, on 17 and 18.7.33_
1. Gerullis is fundamentally of the opinion that all military sports in
the colleges and universities should be in the hands of the Chief of
Training. He declared himself to be in agreement with my suggestion to
take onto my staff as liaison officer a Student Leader who is still to
be nominated, (Schwab or Krueger) and who, according to my suggestion,
is to be responsible for all training in military sports.
In addition it is necessary for carrying this out further, that the
S.A. Leaders etc., at present appointed as instructors in military
sport in the Colleges and universities, should once again be summoned
to a special course in order to do their training on the new lines.
Gerullis suggests Councillor Ministerialrat Haupt, present at today’s
discussion, as representative for Prussia. [3 illegible words in ink
and illegible initials follow]
2. From 1 October, five officers of the General Staff are to be
appointed for 3 years to the Universities of Koenigsberg, Breslau,
Berlin, Cologne, and Frankfurt-on-Main to teach military tactics, leave
of absence being granted for that period.
(Regulars, 5 senior Staff officers for this) [marginal note in pencil]
They will give lectures on military tactics in those universities.
On 1 September these gentlemen will be brought to Berlin and will
make contact with the Chief of Training. Questions regarding Military
Training are to be cleared up with me by these gentlemen. This ruling
is the joint decision as mentioned by Oberstleutnant Weissenberger, who
also took part in the discussion of the Reich Ministry for Defense and
the Prussian Ministry for Public Worship and Education.
3. With regard to the former soldiers of the Reichswehr _now_ united
in the Unions it was said: The SA has no interest in incorporating the
Unions, for all elements who do not believe firmly in the principles of
the new idealogy, are unwanted. (There is also no power of authority
over these unions). _The troop commanders should, however, be
guaranteed authoritative influence over the unions in their commands._
They should then see to it that:
1. All those who have hitherto been members of the Unions, who are
suitable by reason of their ideology, are incorporated into the S.A.
2. That the members of the Reichswehr due for release in the future
continue to join the unions which are under the supervision of the
Commanders, but are without exception incorporated into the SA. The
necessary foundations for this enrollment are to be laid immediately
upon entry into the Reichswehr and also constantly during military
service.
Oberst Hinria has also set up for future use the following organization
and order of service:
1. SA with preparation for the Reichswehr.
2. Period of service with the Reichswehr.
3. Re-entry into SA after release.
4. Transfer to the S.A. Reserve [SA--Handwehr] after the age of 45.
(Expansion of the Kyffhaeuser Union to form the SA Reserve.)
[illegible pencilled initials]
131 G 2 [in ink]
# # # # #
Personal [in pencil]
Ch 25/4/33 [in ink] [Illegible initials]
11C- 7 [in ink]
5 September 1933.
To the Chief of Naval Command for the attention of Konteradmiral Dr.
N. C. Gross.
_Berlin W. 10_
Koenigin Augustastrasse 38-42.
K/Kl.
Sir:
I am very much obliged for the dates of the Fleet Maneuvers sent to me
at the request of the Chief of Naval Staff [Chf der Marineleitung].
On the 17th inst. I shall go on board in Pillan punctually at 1200 and
will take the liberty of reporting in good time when and where, I shall
be arriving in Pillan, for before that I shall probably be on a duty
visit in East Prussia.
I take this opportunity of expressing a personal wish.
The Chief of Staff, Oberstleutnant Roehm, informed me that he will
also be present at the Fleet Maneuvers. I should be very grateful if
I could go on board the same cruiser, for I think that particularly
with regard to the whole question of the training of Naval-SA units, my
presence might be of value. Since the problems relating to this are my
responsibility, it would be a great advantage to me, if the opportunity
were offered me, to discuss the question and all its complications with
the Chief of Staff. In Nurnberg I took the opportunity of discussing
the matter with Korvettenkapitaen Kieseritzky, who is assigned to
my staff. Korvettenkapitaen Kieseritzky believes, however, that it
is unlikely that my request will be fulfilled on account of the
distribution already on hand.
For this reason, Sir, I am again applying directly to you.
Perhaps Korvettenkapitaen Kieseritzky could inform me briefly whether
my request can be granted.
Your very faithfully,
Heil Hitler
K. [Krueger]
Obergruppenfuehrer.
C--2177 131 D2 (in ink)
# # # # #
_For filing_ 11C-8
received 31.10.33 Initials [ink]
SECRET
Filing reference
1. The speech delivered by the Fuehrer to the SA leaders on the evening
of Tuesday the 17.10, has induced me to bring up for decision by the
Chief of Staff, the question, as to whether it is right that the SA
training in the Army of the Reich should be continued. In the clearly
expressed declaration of the Fuehrer there might be lost a suggestion
of apprehension, if we trained the SA in the Reichswehr; informers and
spies might have the opportunity of passing information regarding that
training to our foreign political opponents.
The Chief of Staff intends to decide this question before the
Gruppenfuehrer at the Gruppenfuehrer discussion on 23.10, while I am
commissioned to discuss the decision intended at the Reich Ministry
for Defense. If the Reich Minister for Defense assumes complete
responsibility for the resulting consequences, the Chief of Staff
agrees to the training of the SA in the army.
I informed Hauptmann von Dernuth on 18.10 of this wish of the Chief of
Staff, with the request that he would inform Oberst von Reichenau to
that effect, and obtain the decision of the Reich Minister for Defense.
On 19.10, 1100 hours, Oberst von Reichenau asked me to attend a
discussion during which this question was approached again. Oberst
von Reichenau drew attention to the fact that, to reject the training
of the SA in the Army of the Reich, by this decision of the Chief of
Staff, would mean that the training by special courses would also be
a thing of the past and also the entire training in frontier-guard
duties would be rendered impossible. I replied that, with regard to
the questions of frontier protection, no conversation had taken place
between the Chief of Staff and myself. This point would therefore need
special consideration.
# # # # #
C002177/1 P.T.O.
Filing reference [in ink]
The Chief of Staff is placing the decision with the Reich Minister for
Defense, who, for his part, bears the responsibility for the training
of the SA in the Army of the Reich.
The clearly-expressed speech of the Fuehrer on 17.10 caused the Chief
of Staff to clear up the question of responsibility in such a way as to
leave no room for doubt; for this reason it was absolutely necessary
that the Reich Minister for Defense should make inquiries of the
Chancellor.
If the Reich Minister for Defense assumed full and complete
responsibility for the training in the Army of the Reich, the Chief of
Staff saw no reason to cease training the SA in the Army.
II. Oberst von Reichenau showed me the letter written by
Obergruppenfuehrer von Jagow to the Reich Minister for Defense by
way of reply to the complaint made by the Reich Minister for Defense
regarding Obergruppenfuehrer von Jagow.
Since it was possible to misinterpret the wording of von Jagow’s
letter, I repeated to Oberst von Reichenau the remarks I had made to
Jagow, which the Reich Minister for Defense made in my presence. It
appeared that Obergruppenfuehrer von Jagow had had the opportunity
on the occasion of his visit to Berlin on 17.10, to speak to
Korvettenkapitaen von Langsdorff at the Reich Defense Ministry on the
suspension of weapon training in the SA camps. A remark made by Jagow
on this subject, which was quite unimportant and only reached Minister
von Blomberg in the course of a report, was the reason for Minister von
Blomberg’s complaint regarding Obergruppenfuehrer von Jagow.
Oberst von Reichenau remarked that there had been a misunderstanding
on the part of the Reich Minister for Defense and, after examining
the facts, he was of the opinion that the complaint made by the Reich
Minister for Defense about Obergruppenfuehrer von Jagow, which was
reported by word of mouth to Obergruppenfuehrer Krueger had been
unnecessary.
C002178/1
Reich Minister for Defense von Blomberg would now feel induced to write
to Jagow.
III. Discussion regarding the appointment of personnel to the Reich
Ministry for Defense.
IV. Discussion about the case of von Reichenau, von Obernity, and
Gruppenfuehrer Franken. It so happened that, through Hauptmann
Fenchtlinger, Nurnberg, a conversation between himself and
Gruppenfuehrer von Obernity has come to the knowledge of the ministry.
Oberst von Reichenau is very anxious that this misunderstanding should
be removed. He will therefore write a personal letter to Gruppenfuehrer
von Obernity.
Berlin, 19 October 1933.
/s/ Ringen.
C002179/1
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1851-PS
THE NEW GERMANY SPEAKS HERE
Book 11, Reichsfuehrer SS HEINRICH HIMMLER.
The Security Squadron as an Anti-Bolshevist Battle Organization. 1936.
Central Publishing House of the NSDAP., Franz Eher, Succ. Munich
OBEDIENCE.
* * * * * * *
[Page 23, line 31 to page 24, line 27]
The fourth directive and virtue, which applies to us, is that of
obedience; of obedience, which arises unconditionally through
the highest spontaneity, through the service to our ideology
[Weltanschauung], which is ready to make every necessary sacrifice of
pride, superficial honors and of everything, which is dear and valuable
to us; of obedience, not hesitating once, but following every order,
which is given by the Fuehrer, or has lawfully been given by one of
the superiors; the virtue of obedience, which keeps silent even during
the time of the political fight, when the will of freedom believes
to have to rise indignantly, which, with wide-awake senses and with
strict attention toward the enemy, does not raise a finger, which also
obeys unconditionally, and goes over to the attack, even if it should
believe, in its heart, that it cannot conquer.
We are so honest, that we do not claim about ourselves, that all these
laws are understood by the very last man, and in their last deepest
sense. But we believe to be able to claim, that now for six years, the
SS has generally assembled according to these directives, was organized
and lives according to them. We know, that year for year, we will
accept more of these virtues, and that they will more and more become
the natural property of every SS man. We are convinced, when fate
determines sooner or later, that as the first generation of the SS, we
are no more, then we can hand down these virtues as a full heritage, as
the best tradition to those, who are SS men after us.
* * * * * * *
[Page 28, line 17 to page 29, line 9]
BLOOD and SOIL
I, as Reichsfuehrer SS, who am myself a peasant according to ancestry,
blood and being, would like to state this second fact in front of
you, German peasants: The idea of blood, advocated by the SS from
the beginning would be condemned, if it were not tied eternally
with the conviction about the value and holiness of the soil. From
the beginning, the Race and Settlement Main Office [Rasse- und
Siedlungs-Hauptamt], has incorporated the term “Blood and Soil” in its
name, although with different words, but in the same meaning. I can
assure you, that it is not a coincidence, that the Reich Leader of
Peasants [Reichsbauernfuehrer des Deutschen Reiches] has belonged to
the SS as a leader for years, and that he, as a SS Lt. Gen. is Chief of
its Race and Settlement Main Office, as much as it is no coincidence,
that I am a peasant, and belong to the Reich Council of Peasants
[Reichsbauernrat]. Peasants and SS men both do not belong to those
kind of men, who speak superfluously many kind and friendly words. But
let it be said here clearly and plainly, as it was until now, so it
should be according to our will in the future. Wherever Adolf Hitler’s
peasants stand, they shall always have the SS at their side as their
most faithful friend, just as we know, that wherever Adolf Hitler’s
SS stands, it will have at its side the German peasant as its best
friend and comrade. That is how it is today, and that is how it will be
forever.
[Page 29]
I know that there are some people in Germany who become sick when they
see these black coats; we understand the reason for this and do not
expect that we shall be loved by too many. All those who love Germany
close at heart will and shall respect us; those who shall fear us, in
any way or at any time, must have a bad conscience toward the Fuehrer
and the nation. For these persons we have established an organization
called Security Service, and likewise, we the SS, place the men for the
service in the Secret State Police. We shall unremittingly fulfill our
task, the guaranty of the security of Germany from the interior, just
as the Wehrmacht guarantees the safety of the honor, the greatness, and
the peace of the Reich from the exterior. We shall take care that never
again in Germany, the heart of Europe, will the Jewish-Bolshevistic
revolution of sub-humans be able to be kindled either from within or
through emissaries from without. Without pity we shall be a merciless
sword of justice for all those forces whose existence and activity we
know on the day of the slightest attempt, may it be today, may it be in
decades or may it be in centuries.
* * * * * * *
[Page 31]
Every one of us knows, that he does not stand alone, but that this
tremendous force of two hundred thousand men, who are bound together by
oath, gives him unmeasurable strength, and he knows as well, that he,
as a representative of the black corps, must do honor to this community
by his best performance at his place. Thus we assemble and march
according to unalterable laws as a national socialist, soldierly order
of distinctly Nordic men, and as a sworn community, of its clans, on
our way into a far future, and we wish and believe, that we do not only
want to be the descendants who fought it out better, but above that the
ancestors of later generations, necessary for the eternal life of the
German, Germanic people.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1852-PS
“THE GERMAN POLICE” by Dr. Werner Best, Pp. 14-20 1940 edition.
_III. LAW._ The conception and formation of “police” law, which governs
the duties and activities of the “police” in detail, is based on the
conception of the law and its formation in general.
1. Law. a. The personal-human (individual-human) conception of law.
For the personal-human (individual-human) conception, “law” is only
that law laid down by those who are concerned with the validity of
the law or those commissioned by them, in accordance with the rules
of the fundamental law--the “constitution”--or a legal decree based
on law, whereas the administrative decree which governs the actions
of the authorities is not regarded as law. Every action which is not
based upon the law and does not come within its framework, is wrong and
illegal, insofar as it concerns individual men, because their agreement
to such action cannot be stated or supposed.
b. The people’s conception of “Law”.
According to the people’s conception, law is every rule which fulfills
the unity of the people’s “organs”--organizations and individuals--and
which is sanctioned or approved by the leaders. There is, therefore, no
difference between stronger and weaker “rules”, between “constitutional
Law” and “common law”, between “law”, “orders” and “decrees”, between
“public” and “private” law. The will of the leaders, in whatever form
it is expressed whether through law, order, decree, single order or
collective order, regulation of an organization or regulation of
competence, etc., administers law and alters all theretofore valid law.
2. “Police” law. There is no written “Police” law of the German Reich,
which rules the duties and activities of the Police (actual “Police”
law).
The only government ruling, in which the “police duties” are mentioned,
without any more detailed specification, is in the Fuehrer’s and Reich
Chancellor’s decree concerning the appointment of the Chief of the
German Police and Reich Ministry of the Interior, dated 17th June 1936
(Reichsgesetzblatt I, p. 487):
For the unification of the police duties in the Reich, a chief of
German Police of the Reichs Ministry of the Interior is appointed
who will be commissioned with the leadership and organization of
all police matters in the administrative sphere of the Imperial and
Prussian Ministry of the Interior.
The contents of the “police duties”, which in this are specifically
recognized by the leader as special State duties, must be gathered from
the written and unwritten “law”, through which the action of the police
is at present determined.
a. The written “police” law.
Written “police” law, which governs the duties and activities of the
“police” exists at present only as common law of the individual German
states. As an example, the Prussian Police Administration Law of
1.6.1931 (Prussian Law Manual, p. 77) is referred to.
The extent to which this written law can still be regarded as valid,
evolves upon two points of view, insofar as differences of common law
definitions can be established, firstly, to exercise duties uniformly
in the German Reich, different rules in different districts cannot be
recognized; secondly, in differences of common law, the laws drawn
up by the national socialist regime take precedence over the laws of
earlier times which are still valid.
The most important national socialist ruling on duties for a part of
the “police” is contained in the Prussian Law of 10.2.1936 (Prussian
Law Manual, p. 21) about the Secret State Police. Clause 1 of this law
reads:
The Secret State Police has the task of investigating and combatting
all activity dangerous to the state within the whole territory
of the state, of collecting and evaluating the results of the
investigations, of giving information to the government of the state,
of keeping other authorities posted as to facts important for them,
and of supplying them with suggestions. The Chief of the Secret State
Police in agreement with the Minister of the Interior decides what
individual matters come within the sphere of the Secret State Police.
The sphere of competence of the organs of the ordinary administration
of justice remains unaffected.
Thus the “police” task for a branch of the “police” has been defined
according to the law of the land, in such a way that it conforms to the
task which forms the basis of the people’s conception of “police”: the
safeguarding of national order against disturbance and destruction.
The decree for the protection of people and state of 28.2.1933 (Reich
Law Publication I p. 83) is to be regarded not as “police” law, i.e.
as the direction of police duties and activity, but as the expression
of the changed conception of “state” after the national socialist
revolution, out of which arose the new conception of “police”.
Paragraph 1 of this decree reads:
The articles 114, 115, 117, 118, 123, 124 and 153 of the constitution
of the German Reich are annulled until further notice. Therefore
restrictions as regards personal freedom, the right of free
expression of opinion including freedom of the Press, the right of
forming unions and holding meetings, infringements on the secrecy
of letter, post, telegraph and telephone communications, orders for
house-searches and confiscation of property, as well as restrictions
on property, even beyond the limits already fixed by law, are
admissible.
By means of this legal statement it was formally made clear at the
very moment of the revolution, that individual decisions of the law
valid until then, even of constitutional law, are no longer to be
used, as they are incompatible with the new conception of “state”;
since that time countless other legal decisions of the past--even
those of constitutional law--have been regarded as being no longer
applicable without formal repeal or annulment, because they are no
longer compatible with the new constitution of the state. The decree
of 28.2.1933 for the protection of people and state was not a “legal
foundation”, i.e. a statement of their duties and their activity,
but only the confirmation of the fact that the duties which they had
already begun to undertake were in accordance with the will of the
highest governing body to set things right.
Both the second clause of the law of 18.3.1938 (Reich Law Publication
I p. 262) dealing with the reunification of Austria and the German
Reich and the third clause of the decree of the Fuehrer and Reich
Chancellor of 22.10.1938 (Reich Law Publication I p. 1453) dealing with
the administration of the Sudeten-German territories, served as the
desired formal clarification, in the territories newly acquired by the
Reich, that the restrictive legal decisions of the past must not stand
in the way of the fulfilling by the “police” of their duties in Reich
territory. The first paragraph of both these clauses is practically
identical and reads:
The Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police in the Reich
Ministry of the Interior can take the necessary measures for the
maintenance of security and order (in the decree of 22.10.1938:
administrative measures) even beyond the legal limits otherwise laid
down for this purpose.
b. The unwritten “Police” law.
Not only the legal regulations drawn up by the national socialist
regime, but also the whole activity of the German police since the year
1933 sanctioned by the highest governing body of the Reich--and partly
on its sole instructions--as well as the rearrangement of the “police”
regulations, show that the duty of the “police” is conceived by the
government in the sense represented here, and that any other conception
of the duty of the “police” can no longer be valid.
Thus all legal definitions which are at odds with this must be
considered as altered in the sense of this new conception, without
formal cancellation or alteration of the individual earlier laws. For
the making of laws as a result of popular “voices” working together,
of actively operating organizations and of “actively” or “passively”
cooperating individuals, for the fulfilling of a definite task--here
the task of the “police”--must not be contradictory in itself, or
only because an individual law drawn up at an earlier date has not
been formally altered, and to which laws at variance with the will of
the government remain tied. At an early date this conception became
evident in the administration of justice of individual German High
Administrative Courts. The High Administrative Court of Saxony has
already explained in a decision of 18.1.1935 (published in the Reich
Administrative Publication of 1935, p. 117 ff.):
According to it (the national socialist conception of state and law),
law is not the sum total of the single regulations expressly laid
down by the legislator. Legislation is rather only the expression of
the ideas of right which are rooted in the people. Not legislation
but these ideas of law (“conceptions of right”), according to which
laws are formed in steady development, represent “law” * * * In this
sense, “law” as common law, i.e. as the orderly way in which the
people lives as a community, is recognized as taking precedence over
the statutes themselves.
This means that the orderly or regular way in which the people
fulfills the “police” task through its “voices”--organizations and
individuals--is “police” law, which takes precedence over statutory
law, insofar as this does not reproduce the contents of the “police”
law which is valid at the time but which belongs to an earlier date and
has meanwhile been altered.
The unwritten “police” law, i.e. law which is not laid down in
statutory form, by means of which all “police” action is determined,
does not however consist of mere “ideas of law” which are “rooted
in the people”, but of many sorts of regulations which in different
forms--law, order, decree, single command, general command,
organizational and competence regulations, etc.--were laid down by the
highest governing body of the Reich or with its sanction. The “police”
never acts in a lawless or illegal manner so long as it acts according
to the rules laid down by its superiors--up to the highest governing
body. The High Administrative Court of Hamburg rightly states in its
judgment of 19.11.1937 (published in the Juristischen Wochenschrift
1937, p. 3335 f.):
According to its nature, the police must only deal with what the
government wants to know is being dealt with.
What the “government” wants to know is being “dealt with” by the police
is the essence of “police” law, and is that which guides and restricts
the actions of the police. As long as the “police” carries out the will
of the government, it is acting legally; should it overstep the will of
the government, then it is no longer a matter of “police” action, but
it is a case of a breach of duty by a member of the police.
Whether the will of the government lays down the “right” rules, i.e.
those possible and necessary for police action--thus the “police”
law suitable for and beneficial to the people--is no longer a
question of law, but a question of fate. For actual misuse of the
“right-to-put-right” on the part of a people’s government, whether it
consist of harmful severity or of harmful weakness, will be punished
more surely before history by fate itself with misfortune and overthrow
and ruin, because of the violation of the “laws of life”, than by a
State Court of Justice.
[Pages 38-39]:
As the intelligence service of the German National Socialist Labor
Party, the Security Service has first of all the task of investigating
and keeping a watch over all forces, events and facts which are of
importance for the domination of the National Socialist idea and
movement in German territory. With this task follows that duty laid
down by the Reich Minister of the Interior--the duty of supporting the
Security Police--which is fulfilled, so far as it goes, under State
orders. In support of the task of the Security Police in securing the
ranks of the German people against interference and destruction of any
kind, the Security Service has to watch over every sphere of life of
the German people with regard to the activities of inimical forces and
the result of state and political measures, and to inform continually
the competent State authorities and offices about the facts which have
come to light. Finally, it has to investigate politically and explore
fundamentally the activities and connections of the great ideological
arch-enemy of National Socialism and the German people, in order
thereby to render possible a purposeful and effective fight against it.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1855-PS
ORGANIZATION BOOK OF NSDAP, Page 418.
Bravery is valued by the SS man as the highest virtue of men in a
struggle for his ideology.
He openly and unrelentingly fights the most dangerous enemies of the
State: Jews, Free Masons, Jesuits, and political clergymen.
However, by his example, he recruits and convinces the weak and
inconstant, who have not been able to bring themselves to the National
Socialistic ideology.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1856-PS
HERMANN GOERING, SPEECHES AND ESSAYS.
Edited by Dr. Erich Gritzbach, Third Edition. Published by Central
Publishing House of the NSDAP Franz Eher Successor, Muenchen. (1939)
* * * * * * *
Excerpt from speech entitled: “We Bear the Responsibility”, delivered
at an NSDAP demonstration on 3 March 1933, at Frankfurt am Main [page
27]:
Fellow Germans, my measures will not be crippled by any judicial
thinking. My measures will not be crippled by any bureaucracy. Here
I don’t have to give Justice, my mission is only to destroy and
exterminate, nothing more! This struggle, fellow Germans, will be
a struggle against chaos and such a struggle I shall not conduct
with the power of any police. A bourgeoise state might have done
that. Certainly, I shall use the power of the state and the police
to the utmost my dear Communists, so that you won’t draw any false
conclusions but the struggle to the death, in which my fist will
grasp your necks, I shall lead with those down there,--those are the
brown shirts.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1857-PS
_VOELKISCHER BEOBACHTER_, 26 July 1934 p.I.
The Fuehrer elevates the SS to a standing of an Independent
Organization.
Munich, 25 July
The Reich Press Office announces the following order of the Fuehrer:
In consideration of the very meritorious service of the SS, especially
in connection with the events of 30 June 1934, I elevate it to
the standing of an independent organization within the NSDAP. The
Reichsfuehrer SS, like the Chief of Staff, is therefore directly
subordinate to the highest SS fuehrer. The Chief of Staff and the
Reichsfuehrer SS are both invested with the party rank of Reichsleiter.
Munich, 20 July 1934.
/s/ Adolf Hitler.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1861-PS
1934 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 45
Law Regulating National Labor of 20 January 1934
The Government of the Reich has decided to enact the following law
which is hereby made public:
_SECTION I_
The Leader of the enterprise and the board of employee representatives.
_Paragraph 1_
The entrepreneur works in the factory as leader of the enterprise
together with the employees and the workers who constitute his
followers for the furtherance of the aims of the enterprise and for the
common benefit of people and state.
_Paragraph 2_
1. The leader of the enterprise makes the decisions for the employees
and laborers in all matters concerning the enterprise, as far as they
are regulated by this law.
2. He is responsible for the well-being of the employees and laborers.
The employees and laborers owe him faithfulness according to the
principles of the factory community.
_Paragraph 3_
1. In the case of legal persons and personal groups the legal
representatives will be the leaders of the enterprises.
2. The entrepreneur or in the case of legal persons or personal groups,
the legal representatives can appoint a person who participates in the
management of the enterprise in a responsible capacity as their deputy.
This must be done if they do not direct the enterprise themselves. In
matters of lesser importance they can also appoint another person.
3. Should the court of honor legally deprive the leader of the
enterprise of his qualifications to be a leader, then a new
entrepreneur must be appointed.
_Paragraph 4_
1. Administrations are also considered as enterprises in the sense of
this law.
2. Subordinate enterprises and parts of the enterprise which are
connected with the main enterprise through common direction will only
be considered as independent enterprises if they are situated far away
from the main enterprise.
3. The regulations of this law, with the exception of paragraphs 32
and 33, do not apply to Ships, Inland navigation and Air-transport and
their crews.
_Paragraph 5_
1. Representatives recruited from the employees and laborers act in an
advisory capacity to the leader of an enterprise with, in the rule,
at least 20 employees. They constitute with the leader and under his
direction the board of representatives of the enterprise.
2. To the employees and laborers in the sense of the regulations
concerning the board of representatives belong also the persons who
do piece work at home, who work mainly for the same enterprise either
alone or with their families.
_Paragraph 6_
1. It is the duty of the board of representatives to increase the
mutual confidence within the enterprise-community.
2. It is the task of the board of representatives to discuss
all measures concerning the improvement of the output, the form
and execution of the general labor conditions, especially the
enterprise regulations, the execution and the improvement of
enterprise-protection, the strengthening of the ties between the
members of the enterprise among themselves and toward the enterprise
as well as the welfare of all the members of the community.
It is furthermore their task to liquidate all quarrels within
the enterprise-community. They must also be heard prior to the
determination of punishment for violation of the plant-rules.
3. The board of representatives can charge certain representatives with
the execution of certain of its tasks.
_Paragraph 7_
(1) The number of representatives is as follows:
in enterprises with 20- 49 employees 2
in enterprises with 50- 99 employees 3
in enterprises with 100-199 employees 4
in enterprises with 200-399 employees 5
(2) These numbers are increased by one representative for each
300 supplementary employees until they reach the maximum of ten
representatives.
(3) An equal number of deputies shall be designated.
(4) Employees, workers and those who do piece work at home are to be
considered in the choice of trustees.
The Chancellor of the Reich
Adolf Hitler
The Reich Minister of Labor
Franz Seldte
The Reich Minister of Economic Affairs
Dr. Schmitt
The Reich Minister of Justice
Dr. Guertner
The Reich Minister of Finance
Graf Schwerin von Krosigk
The Reich Minister of Interior
Frick
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1862-PS
1936 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 887
Ordinance for the Execution of the Four Year Plan of 18 October 1936.
The realization of the new Four Year Plan--announced by me at the Party
Congress of Honor--requires homogeneous leadership of all forces in the
German nation and the strict coordination of all competent authorities
in Party and State.
The execution of the Four Year Plan, I intrust to Minister-President
General Goering.
Minister-President General Goering shall take all steps necessary for
the execution of the task put before him; he is authorized to issue
decrees of ordinances and general administrative directives. He is
empowered to receive reports from all governmental agencies, including
the highest agencies of the Reich and from all Party offices, their
departments and attached organizations--and issue orders to them.
Berchtesgaden, 18 Oct 36
The Fuehrer and Chancellor of the Reich
Adolf Hitler
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1866-PS
Record of the conversation between the Reich Foreign Minister and the
Duce in the Palazzo Venezia on the 13th May 1941, in the presence of
Count Ciano.
To begin with the Reich Foreign Minister conveyed the Fuehrer’s
greetings to the Duce.
He would shortly propose to the Duce a date for the planned meeting,
which he would like to take place as soon as possible. As the place for
the meeting he would probably prefer the Brenner. At the present moment
he was, as the Duce well understood, still busy with the Hess affair
and with a few military matters, but could be at his disposal after
that for a meeting.
The Duce replied that he would agree with all the Fuehrer’s proposals
concerning the place and date of this meeting. That he was prepared
to go to Germany, to meet him at the Brenner, or to arrange for the
conversation to take place anywhere else in Italy.
The Reich Foreign Minister then said that the Fuehrer had sent him
to the Duce, in order to inform him about the Hess affair and the
conversation with Admiral Darlan about the Hess affair. He remarked
that the Fuehrer had been completely taken aback by Hess’ action, and
that it had been the action of a lunatic.
Hess had been suffering for a long time from a bilious complaint and
had fallen into the hands of magnetists and nature cure doctors who
allowed his state of health to become worse.
All these matters were being investigated at the moment as well as the
responsibility of the aides-de-camp who had known about Hess’ forbidden
flights. Hess had for weeks carried out secret practice flights in a
M.E. 110. Naturally he had acted only from idealistic motives. His
being unfaithful to the Fuehrer was utterly out of the question. His
conduct had to be explained by a kind of mysticism and a state of mind
caused by his illness.
The Reich Minister went on to say that Hess was undoubtedly convinced
that England was facing imminent defeat, but that the English could not
take the step of drawing the necessary conclusions.
Being sympathetically inclined towards England Hess had conceived the
crazy idea of using Great Britain’s Fascist circles to persuade the
British to give in. He had explained all this in a long and confused
letter to the Fuehrer. When this letter reached the Fuehrer, Hess was
already in England. It was hoped in Germany that he would perhaps
have an accident on the way, but he was now really in England and had
tried to contact the former Marquis of Clydesdale, the present Duke
of Hamilton. Hess quite wrongly considered him as a great friend of
Germany and had flown to the neighbourhood of his castle in Scotland.
He had thus carried out his plan at the risk of his life. The Fuehrer
who was naturally and personally deeply stricken by these events,
took up a very severe attitude under the circumstances, demoted Hess
immediately and stated that he would have Hess shot immediately if he
returned to Germany. The investigation of the event was continuing, but
it was quite clear that Hess had not acted out of lack of faithfulness
towards the Fuehrer.
The Duce replied that he was also of the opinion that Hess was no
traitor. From the political point of view he did not consider the
results of his action serious. He was wondering what Hess intended to
say in England. It was said that his first words after being found were
to the effect that he had always had a great sympathy for England.
Without failing to see that the psychological results of Hess’ flight
were not slight, one could nevertheless say that the prosecution of the
war and public opinion in the Axis countries remained untouched by it.
In 3 or 4 days the whole affair would gradually subside. The question
arose as to whether anyone in Germany knew about Hess’ attitude to
England, and whether Hess had perhaps wanted to save England.
The Reich Foreign Minister remarked here that in Germany Hess had had
supporters mainly among the * * * [illegible] party members, but that
now every German was wondering how it was possible that Hess could have
done such a thing. The Fuehrer would want first to see in what way
enemy propaganda would make use of this affair. Considering England’s
morale and its situation, Churchill could naturally not use Hess’ peace
idea as propaganda material; this would immediately cause trouble
among his own people. The British would probably rather direct their
propaganda tactics towards making out that they regarded the whole
event as a sign of discord and internal division and as an outcome of
an allegedly difficult position of the Reich, and would also maintain
that Germany would now no doubt have to make peace soon. If it should
be necessary, the Fuehrer would carry out an energetic counter-attack
against this propaganda and would, if necessary, summon the Reichstag,
in order to clarify the whole situation there.
The Duce repeated his unworried view of the affair and remarked that to
him also it seemed best that the whole truth should be told about the
whole affair.
Going on to the matter of the talks with Admiral Darlan, the Reich
Foreign Minister explained to the Duce that two subjects especially had
been discussed:
1. the assistance which France could give in Syria for the support of
Iraq, and
2. the facilities she could provide for German-Italian supplies to
North Africa.
Darlan had agreed to deliver to Iraq certain quantities of arms and
war materials out of the stocks stored in Syria under Italian control.
Part of these arms would, no doubt, already be on their way to Iraq.
Ambassador Rahn and a French official had flown to Syria and had
submitted a directive of the Vichy Government to the local Government
Commissioner, General Deuz, according to which he was to provide all
the deliveries and other facilities recommended by the two delegates.
Darlan had, furthermore, put landing places for German aircraft and
stocks of petrol at their disposal.
At the same time, Ambassador von Papen had been recalled to Germany and
been instructed, as he, the Reich Foreign Minister, could inform the
Duce confidentially, to endeavour to obtain from the Turks permission
for the secret passage of arms for Iraq through Turkish territory.
According to the impression he left, Darlan would certainly do all that
was possible to help the Axis. Although, of course, one could not
look into his heart, he yet definitely appeared to be an enemy of the
English.
Should a large-scale transport of arms reach Iraq it would be possible
to move airborne troops into the regions, who could then advance
against the British with the material found there and who could, under
certain circumstances, attack Egypt from the East from Iraq.
The Duce stated his point of view on the Iraq question:
1. One must definitely help Iraq, as a new front against the British
would be created in this way and the indignation, not only of the
Arabs, but also of the great number of Moslems would be aroused.
Already the Grand Mufti had summoned the Arabs of the world to a
holy war against England. In answer to an interpellation by the
German Foreign Minister, the Duce declared that he ascribed a certain
importance to these events in any case.
2. It would be necessary to get possession of Crete and Cyprus (the
“anteroom” of Syria). If one could then obtain, from the French,
permission to land troops and planes in Syria, the Axis powers help
to Iraq could be very substantial. The Italians had already prepared
five planes, which would proceed to Baghdad via Rhodes, in order to
transport their 400 machine-guns, as well as 20 anti-tank guns. In
addition, 12 fighter planes were ready for action.
Should the passage of arms through Turkey prove impossible, one would
have to march against England from Syria. The great advantage here lay
in the 100 km stretch of desert which had to be overcome in the event
of an attack on Egypt from Syria, as compared with the 500 km stretch
of desert in the case of an attack on Egypt from the West.
In answer to an interpolation by the Reich Foreign Minister as to how
long Iraq would be able to hold out against the British, the Duce
replied that the Head of the Iraq Government had declared that he could
hold his own against the British, provided only he received some war
material. If, however, he received no aid, opposition would, in the
Duce’s opinion, be overcome by the British in 3 or 4 weeks. He was also
wondering whether the de Gaullist movement in Syria would not perhaps
put difficulties in the way of French assistance. The Reich Foreign
Minister replied to that that Darlan appeared convinced that he could
carry out the business in Syria as planned.
With regard to Tunis, the Reich Foreign Minister, reported on the
purchase of lorries and the recent concession that these lorries could
be sent to Tripolitania with freight. Darlan had agreed to place an
Algerian harbour, Baume, at their disposal for the unloading of the
materials transported by sea, (as these things could be carried out
more easily in Algeria than in Tunis). The Reich Foreign Minister also
mentioned, in this connection, that Darlan had told him that he would
like it, for personal reasons, if lorries were sold to Germany only.
Should Italy wish to obtain such vehicles from the French, he proposed
that the sale should first take place to Germany, and that the trucks
should then be given by the Reich to Italy. The Duce and Count Ciano
agreed to this procedure.
In reply to the Duce’s question as to what Germany had conceded to
France in exchange for these concessions, the Reich Foreign Minister
pointed to the lowering of the occupation costs from 20 to 15 millions
which, although it had not yet been definitely fixed, was expected,
as well as to certain facilities with the regard to the Line of
Demarcation. Further the rearming of some torpedo boats.
The Fuehrer had laid down as a principle that France could be granted
facilities to the extent to which she on her part made the war against
England for the Axis easier.
The Reich Foreign Minister answered the Duce’s question as to whether
concessions had been made regarding French prisoners of war in the
negative and mentioned that the Fuehrer had first of all reminded
Darlan of how the German prisoners of war had only been released in the
year 1920, when the World War had already been over a long time.
The Reich Foreign Minister further pointed out that he had suggested to
Darlan that if France should now grant facilities for the continuation
of the war against England, such an attitude would be taken into
account when the peace was signed. Furthermore he had stressed to
Darlan the necessity that France choose now, and place herself
unambiguously on the side of the Axis. Germany had certain wishes
concerning naval bases in Morocco for the maintenance of her submarines
and surface vessels. If France agreed to that, she (Germany) would
allow her some destroyers to arm, as she had long requested to do.
Beyond this, Germany did not, for one moment, anticipate assistance
from France on a larger scale, just as she did not expect the possible
assistance of the French Fleet against England.
It had been made clear to Darlan that in future the Axis powers would
be the decisive centre of power in Europe and that France would have to
toe the line in this respect.
It was also pointed out that France must, of course, count on having
to make concessions in the Mediterranean in the peace treaty; the
Italian demands were indeed known to them. She might, however, receive
compensation for the concessions elsewhere, e.g. in Africa, at the
expense of England.
In a private tete-a-tete conversation, Darlan declared to the Reich
Foreign Minister that he wished to assist the Axis powers against
England under all circumstances, after the Reich Foreign Minister had
analysed to him the three possibilities which offered themselves to
France, namely, that France could either work against Germany, in which
event she would be destroyed, or she could adopt a waiting attitude,
which, however, would also be to her detriment. Finally she could give
clear evidence of her will to cooperate with the Axis, and would then
receive an honourable position amongst the peoples of Europe.
The Duce replied that there were two camps in France, those who
wanted to wait, and those who were in favour of collaboration. When
the Yugoslav campaign began, people in France had hoped that it would
end unfavourably for the Axis. The opinion of French politicians was
beginning to waver. Typical of the trend of public opinion was the
fact, that in those days the monument of King Alexander of Yugoslavia
in France had been decked with flowers by the population. But when the
French saw how quickly Germany was victorious in the Balkans, they
immediately turned round towards collaboration again. In Vichy the
majority belonged to the camp that wanted to await events. Count Ciano
here added that the only difference between Vichy and Paris was that
in Paris people were saying: “Let us hope the British win,” whilst
in Vichy people were saying, “Let us hope those British swine win”.
To this the Reich Foreign Minister added, that of course chauvinists
continued to exist in France and would have to be weeded out according
to a plan yet to be laid down. In his opinion Pétain was an old fox,
whose memory deserted him just at the moments when it best suited him.
A few days before, and in connection with the invitation to Admiral
Darlan to come to the Berghof [Hitler’s residence in Berchtesgaden], he
had written a letter to the Fuehrer, which factually contained nothing
of importance, but which nevertheless indicated that in France people
were gradually becoming more and more certain that the war was finally
lost. It was the Fuehrer’s opinion that final victory against England
must under all circumstances be achieved. For this purpose he wanted to
obtain from France a maximum of facilities, without in any way binding
himself. The French questions would be dealt with on this basis, and it
would now have to be seen how far Darlan was prepared to go along this
road. But, as already stated, France would only be granted concessions
in proportion to facilities for the battle against England. When the
French would participate on a large scale in the battle against England
was still undecided.
To this the Duce remarked that France could give many small, but very
important bases to the Axis. In this connection he stressed the fact
that France always drew closer to the Axis when the Axis gained a
victory. But as soon as things were not making any proper headway, she
made eyes at England and the United States. The latter, particularly,
would have to be watched closely in this connection. The Reich Foreign
Minister agreed with this and remarked that if France was to attach
herself in any way to the Axis organization, this fact would make a
deep impression on the United States.
The Duce agreed with this conception, and referred in this connection
to the policy, expressed by the Fuehrer, of the unity of all Europe
against England. Russia and Spain were alone absent from this united
front. Serrano Suner had actually stated that Spain would march after
this year’s harvest. But this seemed to him to be extremely doubtful.
To this the Reich Foreign Minister remarked that at the beginning of
this year Franco had unfortunately left the Axis completely in the
lurch. This he had to note with regret again and again. If he had
cooperated at that time, Gibraltar would today not be in the hands of
the British, and the Spanish people would probably have far more to eat
than now, when alms from England and America could not save them either.
The Duce returned to his remark concerning the united front of Europe
against England and the two countries, Spain and Russia, that were
absent from it, with the remark that, to him, it seemed that it would
be advantageous if a policy of collaboration with Russia could be
carried out. He asked the Reich Foreign Minister whether Germany
excluded such a possibility, i.e. collaboration with Russia. The Reich
Foreign Minister replied that Germany had treaties with Russia, and
that the relations between the two countries were in other respects
correct. He personally did not believe that Stalin would undertake
anything against Germany. But should he do so, or should he carry out
a policy that was intolerable to Germany, then he would be destroyed
within 3 months.--The Duce agreed to this.--The Fuehrer would certainly
not look for any quarrel, but he had nevertheless taken precautions
for all eventualities. He had in no way come to any decision, but as a
result of certain occurrences and want of clearness on the part of the
Russians, he had become suspicious. Thus, for example, the Russians
had strengthened their forces along their western Frontier, which of
course caused Germany to reinforce her troops too, but only after the
Russians started it.
But Russia would never be a problem that could have any influence on
the final victory against England. She would never be able to interfere
with Germany, for Germany had such a large number of troops available
that she could easily deal with any eventuality.
The Duce then enquired whether Germany was not receiving deliveries
of raw materials from Russia, whereupon the Reich Foreign minister
mentioned the figures 1 million tons of oil and 1½ million tons of
corn, and added that these deliveries were coming in relatively well.
During the further course of the conversation, the subject of Japan,
and in particular the Japanese-American exchange of opinions, was
touched upon. In this connection the Reich Foreign Minister stressed
the fact that the principle that Japan shared a common destiny with
Germany and Italy had been so clearly understood by the Japanese that
he (the Reich Foreign Minister), did not think Japan would pursue a
policy which would not in the end align itself once more with the
policy pursued by Germany and Italy. In this connection the Reich
Foreign Minister referred to Matsuoka’s remarks that he was forced into
frequent manoeuvres for reasons of home politics, and that on occasion
he might be forced to do things that would not be easily understood in
Germany. At any rate he (the Reich Foreign Minister) trusted Matsuoka,
although of course he could not know what was going on inside his
heart. It was unfavourable that the discussions with Roosevelt were
being conducted via Admiral Nomura, for at heart Nomura inclined rather
towards the Anglo-Saxons. Matsuoka had, for the time being, made the
following further enquiries:
1. Whether the United States were willing to enter into an undertaking
not to enter into the European conflict, and
2. What was the attitude of the United States on the problem of the
Philippines.
If against all expectations, Japanese policy should follow a course
which does not correspond with the spirit of the Tripartite agreement,
great opposition would certainly arise all over Japan and Ambassador
Oshima would probably become the soul of such a real revolution. But
these affairs should be handled carefully, and we should avoid creating
unnecessary difficulties for Matsuoka.
The whole affair shows that Roosevelt is beginning to get alarmed,
probably because he is gradually realizing that, in case of warlike
complications, he can accomplish nothing, because of America’s bad
armament position, and therefore wishes to keep his back free.
The Duce remarked, in this connection, that it would without doubt be
favourable to Germany, and Italy if Matsuoka were in this manner to
prevent the United States entering the war. On the other hand, the
motive of his actions could, of course, also be Japan’s desire to keep
out of the war herself.
To that, the German Foreign Minister remarked that, if a forcing
hand were played and it were laid down that the American system of
protecting convoys meant war, the Americans would most probably
hesitate, because American rearmament was the biggest bluff in the
world’s history.
In this connection the Duce referred to the split which had appeared
in the United States and quoted speeches by Hoover and Lindbergh as
the most prominent opponents of Roosevelt’s policy. As against this,
the Jews and their propaganda were so strong that they had brought the
whole of America under their influence. But if in a country a War party
fights against a Peace party the War party usually wins, because war is
much nearer the soul of man than peace.
The German Foreign Minister replied that the same naturally went for
Japan as well, and that it was his conviction that sooner or later
Japan would enter the war on the side of the Axis to exploit the
opportunities offered. Anyhow he was absolutely certain that Japan
would meet her treaty obligations.
The Duce went on to speak about Turkey, which he called Germany’s and
Italy’s trump card. He asked the German Foreign Minister whether he
believed that Turkey would go with Germany and Italy.
The German Foreign Minister replied that Germany was in the act of
trying to influence Turkey in this sense. The preliminary conditions
were favourable, in so much as it was not in Turkey’s interests to let
great masses of English troops assemble in Iraq, so that Germany hoped
to be able to draw the Turks over to her side. A certain improvement in
the attitude of the Turkish press could already be noted.
Later on in the discussion the German Foreign Minister spoke about a
great intended propaganda drive in the British Empire, with the motto
that the Axis would support the liberation of all peoples oppressed by
the British. In this connection he mentioned the presence in Germany of
the Indian Nationalist leader--Bose--news which the Duce received with
surprise and great interest. The Duce agreed to this kind of propaganda.
In conclusion, the German Foreign Minister explained the plans
according to which he intended to employ Bose for Indian propaganda
and he emphasized that the development of any antagonism between Bose
and Ghandi should be avoided. Besides, Ghandi had written a very good
article against the British a short while before.
In conclusion, the Duce mentioned in this connection that Italy was
in contact with the Fakir of Ipi and was attempting by means of large
sums of money to get him, as well as the Grand Mufti, to carry on some
activity in the interests of the Axis. Even if these actions were
not very extensive, they would nevertheless create some unpleasant
difficulties for the English.
When parting, the possibility of having another discussion next morning
shortly before the return flight of the German Foreign Minister, was
left open.
This discussion took place in a very cordial spirit.
Fuschl, the 14th May 1941.
SCHMIDT.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1871-PS
Minutes of the conference between the Fuehrer and the Italian Minister
for Foreign Affairs, Count Ciano, in the presence of the Reich Foreign
Minister of Obersalzberg on 12 August 1939.
At the beginning of the conference the Fuehrer with the aid of maps
explained to Count Ciano the present situation of Germany from the
military standpoint. He emphasized particularly the strength of the
German fortifications in the west. There are three break-through points
in the west at which the French had in former times always attempted
to break through for geographical and strategic reasons, which have
now been protected with particular care, so that a break-through
seems impossible here as well. Moreover, fortifications have also
been built along the Luxemburg and Belgian borders up to the Dutch
border, so that a violation of Belgian neutrality would no longer give
France any military advantages, but would only involve the danger that
Belgium would join the German side in order to defend her neutrality
and under pressure from the Flemish part of the population. The only
remaining possibility of attack is therefore theoretically through the
Netherlands. But they too would, in the opinion of the Fuehrer, defend
their neutrality energetically because they would know that if they
should participate in a general conflict they would lose their East
Asiatic colonies, which are almost undefended, to Japan. Moreover, the
Netherlands are completely unsuitable as an assembly area for a large
army because of the numerous rivers and the possibility of flooding
large parts of the land which lies below sea level. In case of a breach
of Dutch neutrality Germany would of course move into the country
immediately and would have the possibility of reaching the Meuse in a
few hours because of its proximity to the German border. Besides, the
Rhine which is 1 to 1½ km wide in Holland offers natural protection
against attacks from this direction.
The third possibility of attacking Germany is a blockade by the British
Navy. But it must be kept in mind the ships used for the blockade would
be attacked from the air from Germany, since all of England is within
the radius of attack of the German air force, because of the long range
of the latest German bombers. There are no further possibilities of
attack on Germany. The Nordic countries would no doubt remain neutral
and are safe from air attack from any side, since there is hardly any
question of occupying such large areas as Norway and Sweden. In the
same way Switzerland would certainly defend her neutrality to the last
against any invader.
Germany has likewise built strong fortifications in the East. The
Fuehrer showed Count Ciano the various fortification systems of East
Prussia (Koenigsberg, Heilsberg triangle, border fortifications).
On the rest of the German frontier (Grenzmark, Silesia) strong
fortifications are also being built, which have been developed,
particularly on the Polish border opposite Berlin, into an impregnable
system of lines lying one behind the other. Of course the capital is
exposed to air attacks, since it lies only 150 km from the Polish
border, particularly since because of its size (28 km north to south
and 45 km east to west) the city could be bombed from a very great
altitude (8 to 9,000 meters) without the possibility of attacking
certain targets but with the certainty that the bombs would hit
somewhere within the city.
Proceeding to the military situation of the western powers and Poland
the Fuehrer again pointed out England’s vulnerability from the air.
Although some progress has been made in air craft production, the
anti-aircraft defense is still quite backward. It is known that England
decided on a certain type of anti-aircraft gun only last fall, and we
have enough experience on the basis of our own 7 years of rearmament
to know that mass production is possible only a long time after the
choice of a prototype, so that effective anti-aircraft defense can be
expected in England only after 1 to 2 years. Moreover, London and other
great cities and industrial centers have the same disadvantage which
characterizes Berlin’s position in regard to Polish air attacks: from
high altitude, out of range of the present English AA guns which are
left from the war, bombing can be carried out in absolute safety, which
would be successful in any case in the general target area.
At the present time England has no increase in sea power to record. The
first units of the ships under construction cannot be put in service
for some time. As for the land army, 60,000 men have been called up
since the introduction of compulsory military service. If England
keeps the necessary troops at home, she will be in a position to put
at the disposal of France only two infantry divisions and one armored
division. Furthermore she can transfer a few groups of bombers to
France but hardly any groups of fighters, since the German air fleet
would attack England immediately upon the outbreak of war, and the
English fighter planes would be urgently needed for the protection of
their own country.
In regard to France’s situation--the Fuehrer said that in a general
conflict after the expected conquest, within a short time, of Poland,
Germany would be in a position to assemble 100 divisions at the
Westwall, which would force France to assemble all available forces
from the colonies, from the Italian border, and elsewhere at the
Maginot line for the life and death struggle which would then begin.
Moreover, it is his opinion that the French cannot overrun the Italian
fortifications any more than the Westwall.
At this point Count Ciano showed signs of extreme doubt.
The Polish Army varies greatly in its value. Besides several crack
divisions there are a number of inferior units. Poland is very weak
in AA and anti-tank defense. At present France and England cannot
supply her. If, however, Poland is supported economically for a
considerable period of time by the West, she could acquire these
weapons, and Germany’s superiority would be reduced. The fanatics of
Warsaw and Cracow are opposed by the indifferent peasant population
of other districts. Besides, the composition of the population of
the Polish state must be considered: out of 34 million inhabitants
1½ million are German, about 4 million are Jews, and an estimated 9
million Ukrainians, so that there are considerably fewer real Poles
than the total population, and even these, as mentioned before, have
to be differently evaluated in regard to fighting power. Under these
circumstances, Poland would be conquered by Germany in a very short
time.
As Poland makes it clear by her whole attitude that in case of conflict
she will in any event be on the side of the enemies of Germany and
Italy, quick liquidation at this moment would only be of advantages for
the unavoidable conflict with the western democracies. If a hostile
Poland should remain on Germany’s Eastern frontier, not only the 11
East Prussian Divisions, but also further contingents would be tied up
in Pomerania and Silesia, which would not be the case in the event of
previous liquidation. Generally speaking, it would be best to liquidate
the pseudo-neutrals one after the other. This is fairly easily done, if
one Axis partner protects the rear of the other, who is just finishing
off one of the uncertain neutrals, and vice versa. Italy may consider
Yugoslavia such an uncertain neutral. At the visit of Prince Regent
Paul he (the Fuehrer) suggested, particularly in consideration of
Italy that Prince Paul clarify his political attitude toward the Axis
by a gesture. He had thought of a closer connection with the Axis and
Yugoslavia’s leaving the League of Nations. Prince Paul agreed to the
matter. Recently the Prince Regent was in London and sought reinsurance
from the western powers. The same thing was repeated that happened in
the case of Gafencu, who was also very reasonable during his visit
to Germany and who denied any interest in the aims of the western
democracies. Afterwards it was learned that he had later assumed a
contrary standpoint in England. Among the Balkan countries the Axis
can completely rely on Bulgaria, which is in a sense a natural ally
of Italy and Germany. That is why Germany has supported Bulgaria as
much as possible with supplies of weapons and will continue to do so.
Yugoslavia would stay neutral only as long as it would be dangerous to
take the side of the western democracies openly. At the moment when
there would be a turn to the worse for Germany and Italy, however,
Yugoslavia would join the other side openly, hoping thereby to give
matters a final turn to the disadvantage of the Axis. Rumania is afraid
of Hungary and is militarily very weak and internally corrupt. King
Carol would doubtless not give up his neutrality unless absolutely
necessary.
Hungary is friendly and Slovakia is under German influence and even has
German garrisons in some parts.
Returning to the question of Danzig, the Fuehrer explained to Count
Ciano that it is impossible to yield on this point. He has agreed
with Italy to withdraw the Germans from South Tyrol, but for that
very reason he must carefully avoid everything that could give the
impression that a precedent has been created by the withdrawal of
the Germans from South Tyrol, which could be applied to other
regions, too. Besides, his justification to the German people of the
withdrawal of these Germans from Italy is the German policy, which is
in general, directed toward the east and the north-east. The east and
the north-east--i.e., the Baltic countries--have always been Germany’s
uncontested sphere of interest, just as the Mediterranean is Italy’s
own sphere. Germany needs the grain and wood-producing countries of
these eastern regions for economic reasons as well. Danzig is not
only a case of material interests, however, although this city is the
biggest Baltic port. The turn-over amounts to 40% of the tonnage of
Hamburg.
Danzig, the Nordic Nurnberg, is an old German city, which awakens
sentimental feelings in every German, and just this psychological
element forces the Fuehrer to respect public opinion. To make the
situation easier to understand for an Italian, Count Ciano should
imagine that Trieste is in the hands of Yugoslavia and a strong Italian
minority on Yugoslavian territory is being treated with brutal force.
It can hardly be supposed that Italy would look on calmly for very long.
_Count Ciano_ replied to the Fuehrer’s explanations by first pointing
out the great surprise among the Italians at the absolutely unexpected
seriousness of the situation. Neither in the Milan conversations nor
in the talks on the occasion of his visit to Berlin was any indication
given by the Germans that the situation with regard to Poland was so
serious. On the contrary, the Reich foreign minister had declared that
in his opinion the question of Danzig will be settled in the course of
time. On the basis of this state of affairs, the Duce decided, true
to his conviction that a conflict with the western democracies is
unavoidable, to make his preparations for that eventuality and made
his plans for a certain period of time of 2 to 3 years. If a conflict
is unavoidable now, Italy would of course be on Germany’s side, as the
Duce re-emphasized just before Count Ciano’s departure, but for various
reasons, enumerated in detail, Italy would welcome a postponement of
the general conflict.
_Count Ciano_ then explained, with the aid of a map, the Italian
position at the outbreak of a general conflict. Italy believes, he
said, that a conflict with Poland would not be restricted to that
country, but would grow into a general European war.
_The Fuehrer_ remarked that opinions differ on that point. He
personally is firmly convinced that the western democracies will in the
end shy away from precipitating a general war.
_Count Ciano_ replied that he hoped the Fuehrer was right, but he did
not believe it. In any case, one should adapt one’s reflections to
the worst possibility, i.e., to general conflict. Since the Abyssinian
conflict Italy has actually been constantly living in a state of war
and therefore urgently needs a breathing spell. Count Ciano proved
with the aid of figures how great Italy’s material effort had been,
especially in the Spanish conflict. Italy’s stock of raw materials is
now exhausted. She needs time to restock her warehouses.
She must also transfer her war industries, all of which are in an
exposed location, to the south, in order to be better able to defend
them. In the same way the Italian artillery, particularly the AA
defense, is greatly in need of modernization. The long coast line and
other exposed points are not sufficiently defended.
The strength of the fleet is also extremely unfavorable. At the
moment Italy can put against the combined English and French 11 to
12 battleships only 2 of its own, while in a few years a total of 8
battleships will be available.
At this point the Fuehrer remarked that of course England and France
will have additional battleships of 35,000 and 40,000 tons.
_Count Ciano_ pointed out the long Italian coastline, which is hard to
defend and the numerous bases at the disposal of the English and French
fleets, giving particular attention to the Greek ports.
The Italian colonies are especially vulnerable at present. Lybya is
hard to attack from Egypt, it is true, while from Lybya there is the
possibility of advancing to Marsah Matru. The situation in regard to
Tunisia is quite different. The proportion of the Italian and French
Arab population is 1 to 20, while the strength of white troops is 1 to
5 to Italy’s disadvantage. Besides, the Italian fortifications on the
French frontier are quite inadequate. Only recently new armored bunkers
were delivered.
Though Abyssinia is almost pacified, with the exception of certain
regions along the border of the English territory, where the English
create difficulties among the population with their money and
propaganda, this pacification is only on the surface. It would be
sufficient, in a general conflict for a few English airplanes to drop
leaflets over Abyssinia, saying that the world had risen against Italy
and that the Negus would return, to make the revolt of the Abyssinians
flare up again. Besides, Abyssinia would be cut off completely from the
motherland in case of a conflict, and the fate of the 200,000 Italians
in Abyssinia would be very uncertain. In a few years there would be an
army of 4 to 500,000 men in Abyssinia, and if a conflict should break
out then it would be possible to attack the Sudan, Kenya, and French
Somaliland successfully.
The islands of the Dodecanese would be in difficulties because of the
attitude of Turkey. Of course Leros and Rhodes could defend themselves
for years.
Albania is a completely undeveloped country and would make an effective
base for operations against the Balkans only after several years.
First roads have to be built and the natural resources (iron, copper,
chromium, and petroleum) have to be exploited, and then one could
consider, as the Fuehrer had indicated, advancing successfully on
Saloniki and in other directions of the Balkans, as along the five
fingers of an outstretched hand.
Italy has plans of economic autarchy which cannot be realized for
several years and which would then put Italy in a position to withstand
even a prolonged war without difficulties. Another reason for the
Duce’s desire to postpone the conflict is the Italians abroad, who were
to be brought back to Italy according to plan. One million Italians
live in France, of whom about 700,000 are definitely lost for Italy.
The other 300,000, however, would be used by France as hostages in case
of a conflict, as could be seen from some measures taken by France in
September of last year.
Besides, the Duce personally attaches great importance to the orderly
execution of the world’s fair in 1942, for which Italy made big
preparations and from which she hopes for good results in the economic
field, especially as regards the inflow of foreign currency.
Besides these considerations, which are based on Italy’s position,
there are others of a general political nature which recommend
postponement of a general conflict. The Duce is convinced that the
encirclement system of the western democracies would doubtless work
at the present time. But after a certain length of time the points
of friction and the seeds of disunity would come to the fore among
the partners of the encirclement front, and the front would gradually
disintegrate.
Moreover, the Duce is convinced that the present enthusiasm in England
and France will not last very long. Soon, particularly in France, the
union sacree will once more be replaced by party discord, on condition
that the Axis keeps quiet for a time. At the present time it is only
due to the Axis that internal differences have been buried in the
respective countries.
Japan’s position would also be much stronger after the termination
of the China conflict, which is to be expected in two years, while
Roosevelt’s position in America would be seriously weakened after a
period of calm in the field of foreign politics, so that he could not
be elected president for a third time, which would certainly be the
case if a conflict should break out soon.
Spain, which has just acquired government friendly to the Axis (Serano
Suner, Beigbeder), needs peace after the civil war, but would stand at
the side of the Axis in 2 to 3 years as a power not to be neglected.
Thus, for example, within 2 years Spain would build 4 battleships of
35,000 tons each, the plans for which have just been taken to Spain by
an Italian General. The construction is to take place in El Ferrol.
For these reasons the Duce wishes strongly (le Duce insiste) that the
Axis powers should make a gesture which would emphasize anew the will
of peace of Italy and Germany. This could be done by the publication of
a communique which Count Ciano had given to the Reich foreign minister
on the previous day and which he now presented again in the following
English (and French version): * * *
Count Ciano said in connection with this tentative communique that
the Duce had at first contemplated a proposal for a conference, but
conscious of the Fuehrer’s misgivings, he now makes another suggestion
in a milder form and is very much interested in its acceptance.
_The Fuehrer_ declared concerning the conference plan that in future
meetings of the powers it will not be possible to exclude Russia. In
the German-Russian conversations the Russians made it plain, with
reference to Munich and other occasions from which they had been
excluded, that they would not tolerate this any more. Besides the 4
main powers, Poland and Spain would also have to be included in such a
conference, besides Russia. This means, however, that Italy, Germany,
and Spain would oppose England, France, Russia, and Poland, which
certainly is an unfavorable position.
_Count Ciano_ replied that the Duce is of the opinion that the one who
wins at a conference is the one who is ready to let the conference fail
if necessary and to accept war as a possible result. Moreover, the
Duce took the Fuehrer’s misgivings into consideration and modified his
proposal. He sees in an Italian and German peace gesture, as suggested
in this proposal, the advantage that the western powers, which are
internally not at all ready for war--but would surely start it at the
present moment, if they were, so to speak, forced to the wall by the
Axis and saw no other way out, according to the conviction of the Duce,
based on very reliable information from the democracies. [Translator’s
note: This sentence is incomplete--possibly something was omitted
in copying]. The suggested gesture of Germany and Italy represents a
face-saving way out for the western powers, which they will certainly
use, for there are wide circles which warn against war and which would
be backed up by a peace gesture. This means, however, that Poland,
which would doubtless be abandoned by the western powers, would be
isolated after a time and would have to agree to reasonable solutions
of the existing difficulties.
_The Fuehrer_ replied that there is no time to be lost in the solution
of the Polish problem. The further we get into fall the harder military
operations in the east of Europe will be. The air force could hardly be
employed at all after the middle of September in those regions because
of the weather conditions, while the motorized forces would also be
unusable because of the condition of the roads, which are rapidly
turned to mud by the rains which set in in the fall. From September to
May Poland is one big swamp and absolutely unsuitable for any military
operations. Thus Poland could simply occupy Danzig in October--and she
probably intends to do so--without Germany’s being able to do anything
against it; for it is out of the question to shell and destroy Danzig.
_Count Ciano_ asked by what time the question of Danzig will have
to be settled, in the Fuehrer’s opinion. _The Fuehrer_ replied that
this question will have to be settled one way or the other by the
end of August. The Fuehrer replied to Ciano’s question as to how
the Fuehrer imagined the solution, that Poland will have to give up
Danzig politically, whereby her economic interests will of course be
preserved, and that she will have to contribute by her general attitude
to a release of the tension. It is doubtful whether Poland will be
willing to do so; for hitherto she had rejected the German proposals.
The Fuehrer personally made these proposals to Beck on the occasion
of his visit to Obersalzberg. They were very favorable for Poland. In
exchange for the political return of Danzig to Germany, with complete
preservation of Polish economic interests and the establishment of
a connection between East Prussia and the Reich, Germany conceded a
border guarantee, a 25-year friendship pact, and Polish participation
in influence on Slovakia. At that time Beck acknowledged the proposal
with the remark that he wanted to examine it. The sharp refusal was
only the consequence of English intervention. Poland’s aims can,
moreover, be seen clearly in her press. All of East Prussia should be
occupied, they want to advance to Berlin, etc. In the long run it is
unbearable for a big power to tolerate such a hostile neighbor at a
distance of only 150 km from its capital. The Fuehrer is therefore
determined to use the opportunity of the next political provocation, in
the form of an ultimatum, brutal mistreatment of Germans, an attempt
to starve out Danzig, or something similar, to attack Poland within
48 hours and to solve the problem in this way. This would mean a
considerable strengthening of the Axis, just as an Italian liquidation
of Yugoslavia would mean a considerable increase of power for the Axis.
_Count Ciano_ asked when such an undertaking against Poland is to be
expected, since Italy must of course prepare for all eventualities. The
Fuehrer replied that under the prevailing circumstances an attack on
Poland is to be expected at any moment.
A telegram from Moscow and one from Tokyo were handed to the Fuehrer
during this exchange of opinions. The conference was interrupted for
a short time, and then Count Ciano was informed of the contents of
the Moscow telegram. The Russians agreed to the sending of a German
political mediator to Moscow. The Reich foreign minister added that the
Russians were completely informed about Germany’s intentions against
Poland. He himself had informed the Russian charge d’affaires, by order
of the Fuehrer.
_The Fuehrer_ remarked that in his opinion Russia would not be willing
to pull chestnuts out of the fire for the western powers. Stalin’s
position is endangered as much by a victorious Russian army as by a
defeated Russian army. Russia is, at the most, interested in enlarging
her access to the Baltic a little. Germany has no objection to that.
Besides, Russia would hardly take the part of Poland, whom she hates
from the bottom of her heart. The sending of the English-French
military mission to Moscow has only the purpose of averting the
catastrophic state of political negotiations.
After further discussion of the communique proposed by Count Ciano,
the Fuehrer said that he wanted to think over for a day, this proposal
as well as Count Ciano’s explanation of the general situation, and he
therefore suggested that the discussion be resumed the next day.
Salzburg 12 August 1939
signed Schmidt.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1874-PS
Notes on the Conference Between General Field Marshal GOERING and the
DUCE in the Presence of Count CIANO
15 April 1939
[_Page 4, par. 2_]
However, the heavy armament of Czechoslovakia shows, in any case, how
dangerous this country could have been, even after Munich, in the event
of a serious conflict. Because of Germany’s action the situation of
both axis countries was ameliorated, among other reasons because of the
economic possibilities which result from the transfer to Germany of the
great production capacity (armament potential) of Czechoslovakia. That
contributes toward a considerable strengthening of the axis against
the Western powers. Furthermore, Germany now need not keep ready a
single division for protection against that country in case of a bigger
conflict. This, too, is an advantage by which both axis countries will,
in the last analysis, benefit.
[_Page 5, par. 2_]
* * * the action taken by Germany in Czechoslovakia is to be viewed
as an advantage for the axis in case Poland should finally join the
enemies of the axis powers. Germany could then attack this country
from 2 flanks and would be within only 25 minutes flying distance from
the new Polish industrial center which had been moved further into
the interior of the country, nearer to the other Polish industrial
districts, because of its proximity to the border. Now by the turn of
events it is located again in the proximity of the border.
[_Page 6, par. 2_]
Furthermore the Fieldmarshal happened to talk about the date at
which Germany would be prepared best for a greater test of strength.
In this connection he pointed out that Germany at the moment was
comparatively weak on the sea because both the new battleships which
had been launched recently would be ready for commissioning only next
year and two additional battleships would be launched only next year.
In the airforce also, regrouping and adaptation of a new bomber type
“JU 88”, the production of which had yet to begin, was taking place.
This new German bomber had such a range that it would be possible to
attack not only England herself, but moreover that would push forward
into a western direction, in order to bomb the ships which come from
the Atlantic to England. Of course, Germany was ready for action, if
suddenly some conflict should come up. But if one was considering at
what period of time the armament situation was most favorable, both
the facts mentioned above--the insufficient armament at sea and the
reconversion of the airforce to the new type of bomber--should not be
disregarded. Besides in the fall already a monthly production of 280
planes of the “JU 88” and at the end of the year of 350 planes, could
be counted upon. On the basis of these calculations he came to the
conclusion that in 9 months or one year the situation for the axis,
from a military point of view, would be more favorable. On the other
hand it was true that the rearmament in England and France had not made
very much progress. In many cases, the factories for the production of
war material were only in a state of construction. England would most
likely not be able to show any results worth mentioning before 1942 for
her new beginning high pressure rearmament in the air.
Furthermore, the Fuehrer considered it almost out of the question
that England and France would not stand together. According to the
German point of view, both countries would in any conflict eventually
support each other to the utmost. Only if England should execute a
complete reversal of her policy, and the costs and risks of her present
political line should become too high, she would perhaps adapt herself
to confining her efforts to the preservation of the empire and give
the authoritarian countries a free hand for the securing of their
vital necessities. At the present time England had a weak government
which had yielded to the pressure of the leftist circles. England had
deviated from her old line in a way that it offers assistance only on
the basis of her own judgment of the situation in question from case
to case and she had, in completely turning away from her traditional
policy of giving support from time to time only on the basis of her own
judgment of the situation at the time, now obliged herself in advance
to render support, and that under conditions which could be determined
by the other partner. It was another question, of course, how England
could fulfill her guarantee obligation in fact. How was she going to
help Poland or Rumania, for instance? She did not have the possibility
of sending troops and could actually fulfill her obligations only by
setting ablaze a general war.
All in all, however, it had to be stressed, that the situation of the
axis was very strong and that it could defeat all possible opponents in
a general conflict.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1877-PS
Report RAM 19/41
REPORT ON THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE REICH MINISTER FOR FOREIGN
AFFAIRS [RAM] AND THE JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER MATSUOKA IN BERLIN ON
29 MARCH 1941.
The RAM resumed the preceding conversation with Matsuoka about the
latter’s impending talks with the Russians in Moscow, where they had
left off. He expressed the opinion, that it would probably be best,
in view of the whole situation, not to carry the discussions with the
Russians too far. He did not know how the situation would develop.
One thing, however, was certain, namely that Germany would strike
immediately, should Russia ever attack Japan. He was ready to give
Matsuoka this positive assurance, so that Japan could push forward
to the South on Singapore, without fear of possible complications
with Russia. The largest part of the German army was anyway on the
Eastern frontiers of the Reich, and fully prepared to open the attack
at any time. He (the RAM) however believed, that Russia would try to
avoid developments leading to war. Should Germany however enter into
a conflict with Russia, the USSR would be finished off within a few
months. In this case, Japan had of course even less reason to be afraid
than ever, if it wants to advance on Singapore. Consequently, it need
not refrain from such an undertaking because of possible fears of
Russia.
He could not know of course, just how things with Russia would develop.
It was uncertain, whether or not Stalin would intensify his present
unfriendly policy against Germany. He (the RAM) wanted to point out to
Matsuoka in any case, that a conflict with Russia was anyhow within
the realm of possibility. In any case, Matsuoka could not report to
the Japanese Emperor upon his return, that a conflict between Russia
and Germany was impossible. On the contrary, the situation was such,
that such a conflict, even if it were not probable, would have to be
considered possible. * * *
Next, the RAM turned again to the Singapore question. In view of the
fears, expressed by the Japanese, of possible attacks by submarines,
based on the Philippines and of the intervention of the British
Mediterranean and Home fleets, he had again discussed the situation
with General-Admiral Raeder. The latter had stated, that the British
Navy during this year would have its hands so full in the English home
waters and in the Mediterranean, that it would not be able to send even
a single ship to the Far East. General-Admiral Raeder had described the
U.S. submarines as so bad, that Japan need not bother about them at
all.
Matsuoka replied immediately, that the Japanese Navy had a very low
estimate of the threat from the British Navy; it also held the view,
that in case of a clash with the American Navy, it would be able to
smash the latter without trouble. However it was afraid, that the
Americans would not take up the battle with their fleet; thus the
conflict with the United States might perhaps be dragged out to five
years. This possibility caused considerable worry in Japan.
The RAM replied, that America could not do anything against Japan in
the case of the capture of Singapore. Perhaps for this reason alone,
Roosevelt would think twice before deciding on active measures against
Japan. For while on one hand he could not achieve anything against
Japan, on the other hand there was the probability of losing the
Philippines to Japan; for the American President, of course, this would
mean a considerable loss of prestige, and because of the inadequate
rearmament, he would have nothing with which to offset such a loss.
In this connection, Matsuoka pointed out, that he was doing everything
to reassure the English about Singapore. He acted as if Japan had
no intention at all regarding this key position of England in the
East. Therefore it might be possible, that his attitude toward the
British would appear to be friendly in words and in acts. However,
Germany should not be deceived by that. He assumed this attitude not
only in order to reassure the British, but also in order to fool the
pro-British and pro-American elements so long, until one day he would
suddenly open the attack on Singapore.
In this connection, Matsuoka stated, that his tactics were based on
the certain assumption, that the sudden attack against Singapore would
unite the entire Japanese nation with one blow. (“Nothing succeeds like
success,” the RAM remarked.) He followed here the example of the words
of a famous Japanese statesman, addressed to the Japanese Navy at the
outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war: “You open fire, then the nation
will be united”. The Japanese need to be shaken up to awaken. After
all, as an oriental, he believed in the fate, which would come, whether
you wanted it or not. * * *
Matsuoka then introduced the subject of German assistance in the blow
against Singapore, a subject which had been broached to him frequently,
and mentioned the proposal of a German written promise of assistance.
The RAM replied, that he had already discussed these questions with
Ambassador Oshima. He had asked him to procure maps of Singapore in
order that the Fuehrer--who probably must be considered the greatest
expert on military questions at the present time--could advise Japan on
the best method of attack against Singapore. German experts on aerial
warfare, too, would be at their disposal; they could draw up a report,
based on their European experiences, for the Japanese on the use of
dive-bombers from airfields in the vicinity against the British fleet
in Singapore. Thus the British fleet would be forced to disappear from
Singapore immediately.
Matsuoka remarked, that Japan was less concerned with the British
fleet, than with the capture of the fortifications.
The RAM replied, that here too, the Fuehrer had developed new methods
for the German attacks on strongly fortified positions, such as the
Maginot Line and Fort Eben Emael, which he could make available to the
Japanese.
Matsuoka replied in this connection, that some of the younger expert
Japanese naval officers, who were close friends of his, were of the
opinion, that the Japanese naval forces would need three months until
they could capture Singapore. As a cautious foreign minister, he had
doubled this estimate. He believed, he could stave off any danger which
threatened from America, for six months. If, however, the capture of
Singapore required still more time and if the operations would perhaps
even drag out for a year, the situation with America would become
extremely critical and he did not know as yet how to meet it.
If at all avoidable, he would not touch the Netherlands East Indies,
since he was afraid that in case of a Japanese attack on this area,
the oilfields would be set afire. They could be brought into operation
again only after 1 or 2 years.
The RAM added, that Japan would gain decisive influence over the
Netherlands East Indies simultaneously with the capture of Singapore. *
* *
Berlin, the 31st of March 1941.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1881-PS
Notes Fueh 20/41
NOTES
regarding the discussion between the FUEHRER and the Japanese Foreign
Minister MATSUOKA in the presence of the Reich Foreign Minister and of
the Minister of State MEISSNER in Berlin on the 4th of April 1941.
Matsuoka further mentioned, that he was induced to make those endeavors
for peace particularly in view of the personality of Cardinal Caspari.
Furthermore he had endeavored to convince the Pope, that the United
States and particularly the American President prolonged the war in
Europe and in China. It was not the question to determine, if America
or its President were right or wrong. They certainly had their definite
reasons for their policy. Notwithstanding the question of right or
wrong, one had to state the fact that they prolonged the war in Europe
and in China. In regard to China, he tried to convince the Pope that
Japan was not fighting the Chinese or China herself, but merely the
Bolshevism which threatened to spread in China and in the entire Far
East. It is regretful that America and England sided with Bolshevism.
The Fuehrer interrupted that both countries also sided in Spain with
Bolshevism.
Matsuoka then also expressed the request, that the Fuehrer should
instruct the proper authorities in Germany to meet as broad-mindedly as
possible the wishes of the Japanese Military Commission. Japan was in
need of German help particularly concerning the U-boat warfare, which
could be given by making available to them the latest experiences of
the war as well as the latest technical improvements and inventions.
Japan would do her utmost to avoid a war with the United States. In
case that country should decide to attack Singapore, the Japanese navy,
of course, had to be prepared for a fight with the United States,
because in that case America probably would side with Great Britain.
He (Matsuoka) personally believed, that the United States could be
restrained by diplomatic exertions from entering the war at the side of
Great Britain. The Army and Navy had, however, to count on the worst
situation, that is with war against America. They were of the opinion
that such a war would extend for five years or longer and would take
the form of guerilla warfare in the Pacific and would be fought out in
the South Sea. For this reason, the German experiences in her guerilla
warfare are of the greatest value to Japan. It was a question how such
a war would best be conducted and how all the technical improvements of
submarines, in all details such as periscopes and such like, could best
be exploited by Japan.
To sum up, Matsuoka requested that the Fuehrer should see to it that
the proper German authorities should place those developments and
inventions concerning navy and army which were needed by the Japanese
at their disposal.
The Fuehrer promised this and pointed out that Germany too considered
a conflict with the United States undesirable, but that it had already
made allowances for such a contingency. In Germany one was of the
opinion that America’s contributions depended upon the possibilities
of transportation, and that this again is conditioned by the available
tonnage. Germany’s war against tonnage, however, means a decisive
weakening not merely against England, but also against America. Germany
has made her preparations so that no American could land in Europe. She
would conduct a most energetic fight against America with her U-boats
and her Luftwaffe, and due to her superior experience, which would
still have to be acquired by the United States, she would be vastly
superior, and that quite apart from the fact that the German soldiers
naturally rank high above the American.
In the further course of the discussion the Fuehrer pointed out that
Germany on her part would immediately take the consequences, if Japan
would get involved with the United States. It did not matter with whom
the United States would first get involved if with Germany or with
Japan. They would always try to eliminate one country at a time, not
to come to an understanding with the other country subsequently, but
to liquidate this one just the same. Therefore, Germany would strike,
as already mentioned, without delay in case of a conflict between
Japan and America, because the strength of the tripartite powers lies
in their joint action, their weakness would be if they would let
themselves be beaten individually.
Matsuoka once more repeated his request, that the Fuehrer might give
the necessary instructions, in order that the proper German authorities
would place at the disposal of the Japanese the latest improvements and
inventions, which are of interest to them, because the Japanese navy
had to prepare immediately for a conflict with the United States.
As regards Japanese-American relationship, Matsuoka explained further
that he has always declared in his country, that sooner or later a war
with the United States would be unavoidable, if Japan continued to
drift along as at present. In his opinion this conflict would happen
rather sooner than later. His argument went on, why should Japan,
therefore, not decisively strike at the right moment and take the risk
upon herself of a fight against America? Just thus would she perhaps
avoid a war for generations, particularly if she gained predominance
in the South Seas. There are, to be sure, in Japan many who hesitate
to follow those trends of thought. Matsuoka was considered in those
circles a dangerous man with dangerous thoughts. He, however, stated
that, if Japan continued to walk along her present path, one day she
would have to fight anyway and that this would then be under less
favorable circumstances than at present.
The Fuehrer replied that he could well understand the situation of
Matsuoka, because he himself was in similar situations (the clearing of
the Rhineland, declaration of sovereignty of armed forces). He too was
of the opinion that he had to exploit favorable conditions and accept
the risk of an anyhow unavoidable fight at a time when he himself was
still young and full of vigor. How right he was in his attitude was
proven by events. Europe now was free. He would not hesitate a moment
to reply instantly to any widening of the war, be it by Russia, be it
by America. Providence favored those who will not let dangers come to
them, but who will bravely face them.
Matsuoka replied, that the United States or rather their ruling
politicians had recently still attempted a last maneuver towards
Japan, by declaring that America would not fight Japan on account
of China or the South Seas provided that Japan gave free passage
to the consignments of rubber and tin to America to their place of
destination. However, America would war against Japan the moment she
felt that Japan entered the war with the intention to assist in the
destruction of Great Britain. Such an argument naturally did not miss
its effect upon the Japanese, because of the education oriented on
English lines which many had received.
The Fuehrer commented on this, that this attitude of America did not
mean anything but that the United States had the hope that, as long as
the British World Empire existed, one day they could advance against
Japan together with Great Britain, whereas, in case of the collapse
of the World Empire, they would be totally isolated and could not do
anything against Japan.
The Reich Foreign Minister interjected that the Americans precisely
under all circumstances wanted to maintain the powerful position of
England in East Asia, but that, on the other hand, it is proved by this
attitude to what extent she fears a joint action of Japan and Germany.
Matsuoka continued that it seemed to him of importance to give to the
Fuehrer an absolutely clear picture of the real attitude inside Japan.
For this reason he also had to inform him regretfully of the fact
that he (Matsuoka) in his capacity as Japanese Minister for Foreign
Affairs could not utter in Japan itself a single word of all that
he had expounded before the Fuehrer and the Reich Foreign Minister
regarding his plans. This would cause him serious damage in political
and financial circles. Once before he had committed the mistake, before
he became Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, to tell a close
friend something about his intentions. It seems that the latter had
spread these things and thus brought about all sorts of rumors, which
he as Foreign Minister had to oppose energetically, though as a rule
he always tells the truth. Under these circumstances he also could not
indicate, how soon he could report on the questions discussed to the
Japanese Premier or to the Emperor. He would have to study exactly
and carefully in the first place the development in Japan, so as to
make his decision at a favorable moment, to make a clear breast of
his proper plans towards the Prince Konoye and the Emperor. Then the
decision would have to be made within a few days, because the plans
would otherwise be spoiled by talk.
Should he, Matsuoka, fail to carry out his intentions, that would be
proof that he is lacking in influence, in power of conviction, and in
tactical capabilities. However, should he succeed it would prove that
he had great influence in Japan. He himself felt confident that he
would succeed.
On his return, being questioned, he would indeed admit to the Emperor,
the Premier and the Ministers for the Navy and the Army, that Singapore
had been discussed; he would, however, state that it was only on a
hypothetical basis.
Besides this, Matsuoka made the express request not to cable in the
matter of Singapore because he had reason to fear that, by cabling,
something might leak out. If necessary he would send a courier.
The Fuehrer agreed and assured him, after all, that he could rest
entirely assured of German reticence.
Matsuoka replied he believed indeed in German reticence, but
unfortunately could not say the same of Japan.
The discussion was terminated after the exchange of some personal
parting words.
Berlin, the 4th of April 1941.
Signed: SCHMIDT
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1882-PS
Aufz RAM 21/41
Notes on the talk between the Reich Foreign Minister and the Japanese
Foreign Minister Matsuoka in Berlin on 5 April 1941.
[Pages 2 to 3]
Matsuoka then spoke of the general high morale in Germany referring
to the happy faces he had seen everywhere among the workers during
his recent visit to the Borsig Works. He expressed his regret that
developments in Japan had not as yet advanced as far as in Germany and
that in his country the intellectuals still exercised considerable
influence.
The Reich Foreign Minister replied that at best a nation which had
realized its every ambition could afford the luxury of intellectuals,
most of whom are parasites, anyway. A nation, however, which has to
fight for a place in the sun must give them up. The intellectuals
ruined France; in Germany they had already started their pernicious
activities when National Socialism put a stop to these doings; they
will surely be the cause of the downfall of Britain, which is to be
expected with certainty.
In answer to a remark by Matsuoka, that Japan was now awakening and,
according to the Japanese temperament, would take action quickly after
the previous lengthy deliberation, the Reich Foreign Minister replied
that it was necessary, of course, to accept a certain risk in this
connection, just as the Fuehrer had done so successfully with the
occupation of the Rhineland, with the proclamation of sovereignty of
armament, and with the designation from the League of Nations. * * *
[Pages 9 to 11]
The Reich Foreign Minister replied that the new German Reich would
actually be built up on the basis of the ancient traditions of the
Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, which in its time was the only
dominant power on the European Continent.
In conclusion, the Reich Foreign Minister once again summarized the
points he wanted Matsuoka to take back to Japan with him from his trip:
1. Germany had already won the war. With the end of this year the
world would realize this. Even England would have to concede it, if it
had not collapsed before then, and America would also have to resign
herself to this fact.
2. There were no conflicting interests between Japan and Germany. The
future of both countries could be regulated for the long run on the
basis that Japan should predominate in the Far East, Italy and Germany
in Europe and Africa.
3. Whatever might happen, Germany would win the war. But it would
hasten victory if Japan would enter the war. Such an entry into the war
was undoubtedly more in the interest of Japan than in that of Germany,
for it offered a unique opportunity which would hardly ever return, for
the fulfillment of the national objectives of Japan, a chance which
would make it possible for her to play a really leading role in East
Asia.
Matsuoka replied that he himself could only repeat that he had long
been of the opinion that every nation would be offered an opportunity
only once in a thousand years. Japan was confronting such an
opportunity, and she would have to assume the risk connected with it.
She would have to act decisively at the right moment in order to take
advantage of this unique opportunity.
Berlin, the 7th of April 1941
Sig. Schmidt
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1889-PS
_Account_ Concerning the conference of the Fuehrer with the Italian
Ambassador Attolico on August 31, 1939 at 1900 hours.
The Fuehrer handed the Italian Ambassador a copy of the German
proposals and a press notice, pointing out that because of the Polish
Government the proposals are now void. The mediation attempt of England
must, therefore, be considered as having failed.
Ambassador Attolico recalled that the Fuehrer on the occasion of a
mediation offer made a few days ago by Mussolini had declared that
England had just made a proposal and that one would wait for its
result. Since the Fuehrer had stated himself now, that the English
proposal must be considered as having failed, the question arises now
if the Duce on his part could not take over a mediation. He asks,
therefore, the Fuehrer if it were all right if the Duce would mediate
from now on.
The Fuehrer replied, one had to wait first of all for future
developments. He is not in the mood to be slapped in the face time
and again by Poland, and does not want to bring the Duce into an
uncomfortable position through acceptance of his mediation. He is
certain that because of the spiritual conception of the Poles, they
wouldn’t listen to the Duce either.
To the question of Attolico whether herewith everything is at an end,
the Fuehrer answered yes.
Herewith submitted to the Foreign Minister as per instructions. Berlin,
1 September 1939
(signed) Dr. Schmidt
Ambassador
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1893-PS
Organization Book of the NSDAP 1943 edition, Editor the Reich
Organization Leader of the NSDAP (Dr. Robert Ley), Published by the
Central Publishing House of the NSDAP, Franz Eher Successor, Munich.
[Page 6 e.]
3. Resignations.
* * * * * * *
Authorized to decree dismissal on the basis of a lawful decision of a
party court are:
(_a_) The Local Chapter Directors [Ortsgruppenleiter].
(_b_) The County Directors [Kreisleiter].
(_c_) The District Directors [Gauleiter].
(_d_) The Fuehrer.
[Page 7]
6. Duties of the Party Members.
The commandments of the National Socialists:
The Fuehrer is always right.
* * * * * * *
The program be your dogma:
It demands your utter devotion to the movement:
* * * * * * *
Right is, what serves the movement and thus Germany which means the
Nation.
* * * * * * *
[Page 13]
The aims of the Party are Only Ideological Ones.
It must be attempted to transfer all professional duties which, during
the reconstruction in connection with the rebuilding of the Reich, are
still being executed by the Party, to the affiliated organizations or,
if possible, to the State administration in due time. If necessary, and
if possible, directives to this effect will be issued by the competent
officers of the Reich Directorate [Reichsleitung].
The party as an instrument of ideological education, must grow to be
the Leader Corps [Fuehrerkorps] of the German nation.
This Leader Corps is responsible for the complete penetration of the
German Nation with the National Socialist spirit and to overcome the
dependence on the international influences in which the nation is still
partly rooted.
It will further be the duty of this Fuehrerkorps to see that the
professional and general duties within the affiliated organizations and
within the State administration will be handled according to National
Socialist directives.
[Page 14]
The Political Director [Der Politische Leiter].
The basis of the Party organization is the Fuehrer thought. The public
is unable to rule itself either directly or indirectly. The man best
suited for the job will be a Fuehrer. He will be carried by the
confidence of the people. All Political Directors stand as appointed
by the Fuehrer and are responsible to him. They possess full authority
towards the lower echelons. In choosing the Political Director the
main consideration will be to put the right man in the right place *
* * . In principle this is to be noted: Only a man who has absorbed
the school of subordinate functions within the Party has a claim to
the higher Fuehrer offices if he should be otherwise suited. We can
only use Fuehrers who have served from the ground up. Any Political
Director who does not conform to these principles is to be dismissed or
to be sent back to the lower offices, as Blockleiter, Zellenleiter, for
further training.
Each Political Director must be conscious always, as a Political
Fuehrer, that leadership does not only confer greater powers, but first
and foremost higher duties * * * .
[Page 15]
The Type of the Political Director.
All this shows the character of the Political Director. The Political
Director is not an office worker but the Political Deputy of the
Fuehrer * * * . With the Political Director we are building the
political leadership of the State * * * . The type of the Political
Director is not characterized by the office which he represents. There
is no such thing as a Political Director of the NSBO, etc., but there
is only the Political Director of the NSDAP.
[Page 16]
The Oath of the Political Director.
The Political Director is sworn in yearly. The oath is worded as
follows:
“I pledge eternal allegiance to Adolf Hitler. I pledge unconditioned
obedience to him and the Fuehrers appointed by him.”
The Political Director is inseparably tied to the ideology and the
organization of the NSDAP. His oath only ends with his death or with
his expulsion from the National Socialist community.
[Page 17]
The Protection of the Honor of the Political Director.
The leading personalities of State and Party are protected against
vicious attacks upon State and Party. (See Section 6).
This law primarily protects leading Party members from District
Directors on up.
Should, however, a situation exist which is liable to degrade the Party
and its institutions (for instance an allegation of embezzlement by a
Kreisleiter in which matter nothing was being done which would mean, in
other words, that bad conditions were tolerated) the prosecution may be
directed by authority of paragraph 1 of the law.
In case of attacks which are liable to degrade the Party and its
officers prosecution may be requested through the competent State
prosecutor after consultation with the proper law office of the Party.
[Page 19]
The Appointment of Political Directors.
1. The Fuehrer appoints the following Political Directors:
(_a_) Reichsleiter and all Political Directors to include the Directors
of the Women’s Leagues within the Reich Directorate [Reichsleitung].
(_b_) Gauleiters to include the Directors of an office of the Gau
Directorate, as well as the Directors of the Women’s League’s of the
Gau.
(_c_) Kreisleiters.
Their appointment will be published in the official paper
[Verordnungsblatt].
2. The Gauleiter appoints:
(_a_) The Political Directors and the Directors of the Women’s Leagues
within the Gau Directorate, and the Directors of the Main Offices up to
Associate Directors [Mitarbeiter].
(_b_) The Political Directors and the Directors of the Women’s Leagues
in the Kreis Directorate.
(_c_) The Local Chapter Directors [Ortsgruppenleiter].
3. The Kreisleiter appoints: The Political Directors and the Directors
of the Women’s Leagues of the Local Chapter [Ortsgruppen] to include
Block and Cell Directors and Block Helpers, as well as the Political
Directors in the factories (inasmuch as they are Party members). All
Political Directors and Directors of the Women’s Leagues will be issued
an identity card.
[Page 24]
All political directors irrespective of the local chapter, the county,
or the district in which they may be in office will wear a uniform
office suit.
All political directors irrespective in what party offices they execute
their duties, be it in the political directorate, the administration,
the party courts, the affiliated associations or in the factories, will
wear a uniform office suit.
[Page 49]
_MEETINGS OF MEMBERS AND PUBLIC MEETINGS_
The bearers of sovereignty of the party are responsible for the
membership meetings planned by all party offices and affiliated
associations. They will be approved:
1. By the local chapter director if they do not go beyond the local
chapter in their importance.
2. By the county directors if they do not go beyond the county in their
importance.
3. The district directors if they have a general political significance
for the district.
The meetings will be conducted along the lines laid down by the local
organization and propaganda offices.
[Page 50]
_CELL EVENINGS OF THE NSDAP_
1. Time of meetings:
Cell evenings of the NSDAP will be held once a month.
2. Conduct of the Cell Evenings:
The cell evenings of the Party will be conducted by the cell director
of the NSDAP. If no suitable cell director is on hand--either because
of his short time in office or insufficient indoctrination--the meeting
will be in the hands of the local Chapter Director of the NSDAP.
3. Participants:
(_a_) Participation at a cell evening is compulsory for:
All political directors of the cell:
Block leaders and block helpers, cell foremen and block foremen
living within the cell zone.
Factory cell and factory block foremen of the German Labor Front
[DAF] and their co-workers.
NSV cell and block managers:
Cell and block leaders of the Women’s League and the co-workers
of the NSV and NSF whose domicile is within the Cell Zone.
All Party members within the cell;
All members of organizations of the NSDAP. * * *
5. Program of the Cell Evenings. (During War Time):
Following are the rules for the program of a cell evening:
* * * * * * *
(_b_) Lecture (not over 30 minutes) based on the directives issued by
the Reich Directorate for Propaganda of the NSDAP.
[Page 50A-51]
_LEADER CONFERENCES--TIME OF MEETINGS_
1. Leader conferences in the local chapter zone.
(_a_) Local chapter directors and office chiefs, cell directors and
block directors possibly in the presence of cell and block foremen, as
well as cell and block managers and cell and block directors of the
Women’s League, as well as the local leaders of the organizations and
possibly the deputies of the Kreis offices (health, education, civil
servants, county policy, etc.).
Once a month.
(_b_) Cell directors with block directors and cell foremen, cell
managers and cell directors of the Women’s League.
Once a month.
(_c_) Block directors with block foremen, block managers, block leaders
of the Women’s League and block helpers.
Once a month.
(_d_) All officers of the local chapter are also to participate in:
1. The official formation within the region of the local chapter (may
be combined with leader conference (_a_)).
2. Official formations of the county.
Every three months.
3. The District Day. [Gautag].
One every three years.
4. The County Day. [Kreistag].
If coinciding with District Day, County Day will be cancelled.
Once a year.
(_e_) Participation in schooling:
1. Participants: The political directors, foremen, managers,
advisers, directors of the Women’s League, etc.
* * * * * * *
Once a month.
(_f_) Participation in education.
The political directors of the local chapter; in the evenings or
Sunday mornings, sport to be conducted concurrently. (For further
details see AVM).
Twice a month.
* * * * * * *
2. Leader conferences in the county [Kreis]:
(_a_) County director and his staff every 8 to 14 days.
(_b_) If possible the county director is to arrange for a week end
course of 1½ to 2 days duration. (Possibly at a county school
[Kreisschule], with the participation of the directors of the county
offices and local chapter directors.)
One every 3 months.
Purpose: To hear fundamental lectures, to gather socially in the
presence of the bearer of sovereignty, to get to know each other, to
overcome difficulties of personal and professional nature by a mutual
exchange of thought.
In counties having a large number of local chapters, these courses
can be divided. Participation in these conventions is compulsory and
official duties are not constituted an excuse under any circumstances.
* * * * * * *
(_d_) The bearers of sovereignty will meet at least once a month with
the leaders of the SA, SS, NSKK, HJ, as well as the RAD, and NSFK, in
so far as they are located within their sector for mutual orientation.
3. Leader conferences in the District:
(_a_) District leaders [Gauleiter] with his staff every 8 to 14 days.
(_b_) It is further absolutely necessary that the directors of the
GAU offices will meet with the county directors of their district
once every three months for a three day convention (possibly at a
district schooling castle) where they will have an opportunity to
overcome difficulties of personal and professional nature, apart from
hearing fundamental lectures, by social gatherings in the presence
of the bearer of the sovereignty, by getting to know each other and
by a mutual exchange of ideas. Participation in these conferences
is compulsory and duty would not constitute an excuse under any
circumstances.
(_c_) The arrangement of social meeting in the presence of leaders
of the organizations of RAD and NSFK of the respective zone of
sovereignty. In the course of these meetings differences of opinions
may be straightened out in discussions.
(_d_) The bearer of sovereignty will meet at least once a month with
the leaders of the SA, SS, NSKK, HJ, as well as the RAD and the NSFK
who are within the zone for the purpose of mutual orientation.
[Page 98]
Bearers of Sovereignty--[Hoheitstraeger].
Sectors of Sovereignty--[Hoheitsgebiete].
Among the Political Directors [Politische Leiter] the Bearers of
Sovereignty assume a special position. Contrary to the other Political
Directors who have departmental missions and serve as advisers to the
Bearers of Sovereignty, the Bearers of Sovereignty themselves are in
charge of a geographical sector known as the Sector of Sovereignty
[Hoheitsgebiete].
Bearers of Sovereignty are:
The Fuehrer.
The District Directors [Gauleiter].
The County Directors [Kreisleiter].
The Local Chapter Directors [Ortsgruppenleiter].
The Cell Directors [Zellenleiter].
The Block Directors [Blockleiter].
The Sectors of Sovereignty are:
The Reich.
The District.
The County.
The Local Chapter.
The Cell.
The Block.
Within their Sector of Sovereignty the Bearers of Sovereignty have
sovereign political rights. They represent the Party within their
Sector, internally and externally, and they are responsible for
the entire political situation within their Sector. The Bearers of
Sovereignty supervise all Party officers within their jurisdiction and
they are responsible for the maintenance of discipline within their
sector. On the other hand, the Directors of the Offices, etc., and
of the affiliated organizations are responsible to their respective
Bearers of Sovereignty as regards their specific missions apart from
their responsibility towards their departmental superiors. The Bearers
of Sovereignty are superior to all Political Directors, Managers,
etc., within their sector. As regards personal considerations Bearers
of Sovereignty, from a Local Chapter Director on up are endowed with
special rights. They may, within the provisions of their general
directives regarding personnel authorizations, appointments, leaves and
dismissal of Political Directors, execute the judgments of the Party
law courts which have jurisdiction within their Sector of Sovereignty.
The Bearers of Sovereignty of the Party are not to be administrative
officials for a certain sector but are to move in a continuous vital
contact with the Political Directors and the population within their
sector. The Bearers of Sovereignty are responsible for the proper and
good supervision of all members of the nation within their sector. The
supervision within a Local Chapter of the NSDAP should, if possible,
not be conducted through its business office but through the Blocks
and Cells and by the Directors of those units. Through the arrangement
of regular interview hours everyone should be given the opportunity to
contact his Bearer of Sovereignty.
* * * The Party intends to achieve a state of affairs in which the
individual German will find his way to the Party not only in cases of
emergency but where the Party, upon its own initiative, as desired by
the Fuehrer, will currently supervise and care for all members of the
nation.
[Page 70]
_POLITICAL LEADERS AND THE SA_
The political leaders conduct the practical political work and care for
the German nation.
The SA is the instrument of training and education through the Party.
The parallel organizations, SS and NSKK, are charged with maintaining
physical fitness and soldierly spirit within their organizations and
with the possibility of commitment as an inner political troop.
* * * * * * *
Smooth cooperation in the service of the Movement and the avoidance of
all petty jealousies is the absolute duty of both parties.
* * * * * * *
Mutual Leader Conferences.
To emphasize unity and to promote it, the following principles will
apply:
Hoheitstrager [bearers of sovereignty], gauleiters, kreisleiters, etc.,
will meet at least once a month with the leaders of the SA, SS, NSKK,
and HJ, as well as RAD and NSFK, as found within their zone for the
purpose of mutual orientation.
More than that, it is desirable to invite the SA leader to other
political Fuehrer talks and the political leader to the SA Fuehrer
talks.
* * * * * * *
[Page 71]
The Hoheitstrager is responsible for the entire political appearance of
the Movement within his zone. The SA leader of that zone is tied to the
directives of the Hoheitstrager in that respect.
Requisitioning the SA.
The Hoheitstrager is the ranking representative of the Party to include
all organizations within his zone. He may requisition the SA located
within his zone from the respective SA leader if they are needed for
the execution of a political mission. The Hoheitstrager will then
assign the mission to the SA.
* * * * * * *
Should the Hoheitstrager need more SA for the execution of a political
mission than is locally available, he then applies to the next higher
office of sovereignty which, in turn, requests the SA from the SA
office in his sector.
* * * * * * *
[Page 75]
_POLITICAL LEADERS AND THE SS_
The directives laid down with regard to the relationship to the SA are
similarly applicable to the SS.
* * * * * * *
_POLITICAL LEADERS AND THE NSKK_
The directives laid down with regard to the relationship to the SA are
similarly applicable to the NSKK.
[Page 76]
_POLITICAL LEADERS AND THE HJ_
The directives laid down with regard to the relationship to the SA are
similarly applicable to the HJ.
In appointing leaders of the HJ and the DJ, the office of the HJ must
procure the approval of the Hoheitstrager of his zone. This means that
the Hoheitstrager can prevent the appointment of leaders unsuited for
the leadership of youth. If his approval has not been procured, an
appointment may be cancelled if he so requests.
* * * * * * *
The political leader has the right to requisition the HJ, in the same
manner as the SA, for the execution of a political action.
* * * * * * *
[Page 76a]
_THE POLITICAL LEADERS AND THE NS AVIATION CORPS (NSFK)_
General Collaboration.
The ranking unit leader of the NSFK within the zone will be consulted
during the general leader conferences by the Hoheitstrager of the
NSDAP. Similarly, the Hoheitstrager or his deputy will be invited to
general leader conferences and other meetings of the NSFK.
* * * * * * *
[Page 76b]
_THE POLITICAL LEADER AND THE REICH LABOR SERVICE_
General Collaboration.
Although the Reich Labor Service is no longer an organization within
the NSDAP--on the basis of the Labor Duty Law of 26 June 1935--the
connection of this service with the Party is demonstrated by the
appointment of the Reich Labor Leader to be Reichsleiter of the NSDAP.
To emphasize this union, the leaders of the Reich Labor Service within
the zone will participate in the monthly leader conferences of the
Hoheitstrager. More than that, it is desirable that the Reich Labor
Leader will be invited to other political Fuehrer talks and, vice
versa, the political leader to meetings of the Reich Labor Service.
[Page 77]
_THE POLITICAL LEADER AND THE STATE_
To achieve unity of Party and State, the Chief of the Party Chancellery
has been given the powers of a Reich Minister. In fundamental
questions, the official channels of all Party offices and organizations
of the NSDAP with the ministries and other State authorities and, in
the opposite direction, of all State offices with organizations of the
Party go through the Party Chancellery. This method will assure unified
procedure of the Party towards the State.
The Chief of the Party Chancellery must be heard prior to the
appointment of any higher civil servant; he will indicate the judgment
of the Party towards the person of the proposed civil servant. To
make sure of agreement between the municipal administration and the
Party, the deputy of the NSDAP will have a decisive voice in the
appointment and dismissal of the mayor, the alderman, and the municipal
councillors, and furthermore, in the following decisions of the mayor:
1. The decree of principal directives.
2. The bestowal of honorary citizen rights and honorary titles.
The Chief of the Party Chancellery appoints the deputy of the NSDAP.
On the basis of his directives, the gauleiter appoints the deputies
as follows: for town and country districts, the kreisleiter. If
this official happens to be an employee of a municipality or of an
inspectorate, a gau inspector will be appointed. In special cases, the
gauleiter may appoint himself as deputy.
[Page 92]
Membership in Affiliated Organizations.
The tasks of the affiliated organizations are laid down by the chief
offices of the Party which have jurisdiction in the zone of those
organizations.
* * * * * * *
Only those organizations may claim to uphold the Fuehrer principle and
the form of National Socialist organization and thus be recognized
as promoting the continuation of State and people in the National
Socialist sense who have found, and will find in the future, structure,
supervision, and general character through the Party.
All others, living an existence of their own, are to be turned away as
outsiders and must either change or disappear from public life.
[Page 99]
_BLOCK OF THE NSDAP_
A. BLOCKLEITER
1. Regional Sector.
The household: The household is the basic community upon which the
block and cell system is built. The household is the organizational
focal point of all the Germans united in an apartment and including
roomers, domestic help, etc.
* * * * * * *
The block of the NSDAP consists of 40 to 60 households (if possible no
more than 50).
* * * * * * *
2. Personnel Questions.
_a._ The blockleiter is Hoheitstrager of the NSDAP.
* * * * * * *
_c._ Subordination: Within the local chapter the blockleiter is
subordinate to the cell leader in disciplinary matters.
_d._ Appointment: The blockleiter will be appointed by the
Ortsgruppenleiter (local chapter director).
* * * * * * *
3. Tasks and Jurisdiction.
The blockleiter has jurisdiction over all matters within his zone
relating to the Movement, and he is fully responsible to the cell
leader.
* * * * * * *
[Page 101]
It is his duty to find people disseminating damaging rumors and to
report them to the Ortsgruppe so that they may be reported to the
respective State authorities.
The blockleiter must not only be preacher and defender of the National
Socialist ideology towards the members of nation and Party entrusted
to his political care, but he must also strive to achieve practical
collaboration of the Party members within his block zone and he must
make those of special talents and ability known to the Hoheitstrager.
[Page 102]
The blockleiter shall continuously remind the Party members of their
particular duties towards the people and the State.
* * * * * * *
Furthermore, the blockleiter completes a list (card file) about the
households.
* * * * * * *
[Page 103]
It is the blockleiter’s aim to achieve to the greatest extent possible
that the sons and daughters of families within his zone become members
of the various formations of the HJ, SA, SS, NSKK, as well as the
corresponding affiliated organizations of the Party, and the German
Labor Front, that they visit the National Socialist meetings, rallies,
celebrations, etc. In short, the blockleiter must be an untiring
activist and propagandist of the Movement.
* * * * * * *
In principle, the blockleiter will settle his official business
verbally, and he will receive messages verbally and pass them on in
the same way. Correspondence will only be used in cases of absolute
necessity and practicability.
[Page 104]
5. Attitude Towards Members of the Nation.
* * * * * * *
_a._ The blockleiter conducts National Socialist propaganda from mouth
to mouth. He will eventually awaken the understanding of the eternally
dissatisfied as regards the frequently misunderstood or wrongly
interpreted measures and laws of the National Socialist government.
He is to encourage the members of the nation to ask questions and he
is to point out that they may go ahead and talk to him without having
to expect difficulties. He will admonish them, however, to exercise
discretion towards other members of the nation as regards loose talk.
It is not necessary for him to fall in with complaints and gripes about
possibly obvious shortcomings of any kind in order to demonstrate this
solidarity, but he must always be eager to think in a positive manner
and to influence those under his care by his attitude of confidence. *
* *
_b._ A condition to gain the confidence of all people is to maintain
absolute secrecy in all matters. * * *
[Page 110]
_THE CELL OF THE NSDAP_
A. CELL LEADER
1. Regional Sector.
The cell consists of four to eight blocks.
* * * * * * *
2. Personnel Questions.
_a._ The cell leader is the Hoheitstrager of the NSDAP immediately
superior to the block leader.
* * * * * * *
[Page 112]
3. Mission and Jurisdiction.
The missions of the cell leader correspond to the missions of the block
leader.
* * * * * * *
[Page 116]
_THE LOCAL CHAPTER [ORTSGRUPPE] OF THE NSDAP_
1. Regional Sector.
The zone of sovereignty includes one or more communities; if necessary,
towns may be subdivided into several zones of sovereignty.
* * * * * * *
[Page 119]
3. The Local Chapter Director.
I. Personnel Questions.
_a._ The Ortsgruppenleiter of the NSDAP in his capacity as
Hoheitstrager is endowed with special rights.
* * * * * * *
[Page 119a]
_c._ Place of Rank: The Ortsgruppenleiter is directly subordinate to
the respective (County Director) [Kreisleiter].
_d._ Appointment: The Ortsgruppenleiter is appointed by the Kreisleiter.
* * * * * * *
[Page 120]
II. Mission and Jurisdiction.
(1) General Responsibility.
Contrary to the time before the assumption of power, the actions of the
NSDAP are not limited to the care of its members but now include the
care of the entire German nation. This results in the following basic
conditions for the Ortsgruppenleiter and his office chiefs:
The Ortsgruppenleiter and his office chiefs must manage their Party
duties in addition to the fulfillment of their professional and family
duties.
Therefore, the proper conduct of Party tasks is only possible if the
tasks of the individual and, in particular, the honorary co-workers of
the Party are as limited as possible.
As Hoheitstrager, all expressions of the Party will emanate from him;
he is responsible for the political and ideological leadership and
organization within his zone of sovereignty.
The Ortsgruppenleiter carries the over-all responsibility for
the political results of all measures initiated by the offices,
organizations and affiliated associations of the Party. The Party
office directors (office chiefs, etc.) within the staff of the
Ortsgruppenleiter are the deputies of the Hoheitstrager in their
respective offices.
The Ortsgruppenleiter has the right to protest to the Kreisleiter
against any measures contrary to the interests of the Party with
regards to a unified political appearance in public.
* * * * * * *
[Page 121]
(2) Special Tasks and Duties.
* * * * * * *
_c._ Leader Conferences: The Ortsgruppenleiter has the duty to issue
directives in regular conferences.
* * * * * * *
[Page 130]
_THE KREISLEITUNG OF THE NSDAP_
[Page 131]
4. The County Director [Kreisleiter]
I. Personnel Questions.
_a._ Place of Rank: The Kreisleiter is directly subordinate to the
Gauleiter.
* * * * * * *
_c._ Appointment: The Kreisleiter is appointed by the Fuehrer upon
suggestion of the Gauleiter.
[Pages 132-133-134]
II. Mission and Jurisdiction of the Kreisleiter.
The Kreisleiter carries the over-all responsibility towards the
Gauleiter within his zone of sovereignty for the political and
ideological training and organization of the political leaders, the
Party members, as well as the population.
* * * * * * *
[Page 136]
_GAULEITUNG OF THE NSDAP_
The Gauleitung--Gauleiter and Gau staff--have the political leadership
of a designated sector of the Reich and there they perform creative
work.
1. Regional Sector.
The Gau represents the concentration of a number of Party counties
[Parteikreis].
* * * * * * *
4. The Gauleiter.
The Gauleiter is directly subordinate to the Fuehrer. He is appointed
by the Fuehrer.
The Gauleiter bears the over-all responsibility to the Fuehrer for
the sector of sovereignty entrusted to him. The rights, duties, and
jurisdiction of the Gauleiter result primarily from the mission
assigned by the Fuehrer and, apart from that, from detailed directives.
* * * * * * *
[Page 140b]
7 B. Functions.
(1) The edition of the official gazette of the Gauleitung.
* * * * * * *
(3) The central coordination office of the Gau directorate with
the State authorities (Reich deputies, police, Gestapo, etc.). The
arrangement of conferences between the Gauleiter and offices outside
the Party (State, economy, and others) inasmuch as several Gau
main offices or Gau offices are interested, in the presence of the
respective professional Gau office directors.
(4) The installation of the M Section into the Gau staff office and,
thus, the connection to the Armed Forces.
* * * * * * *
(7) Preparation of matters of pardon and commutation of sentence.
* * * * * * *
[Page 141a]
C. Structure.
To be able to handle all these tasks the staff office director of the
Gau is assigned the necessary number of co-workers. The above-mentioned
tasks of the staff office director of the Gau are combined in the
following main offices.
(1) Referee for questions of the Armed Forces (mobilization matters).
(2) Information and report matters.
(3) Pardon matters.
(4) Matters of interior conduct of business in as far as these are not
a concern of the Gau treasurer.
(5) Chancellery for personal-official concerns of the Gauleiter and the
Deputy Gauleiter.
(6) Law consultant of the Gau.
(7) Complaints and reception of visitors.
[Page 146]
_THE FUEHRER_
The recognition of the sociological mismanagement in pre-war Germany
which prevented the growth of a genuine people’s community, the
front line experiences of the World War filled with the spirit of
comradeship, and the disgust with the traitorous pacifist postwar
Germany, matured the Fuehrer’s decision to become a politician and to
give the German people a state form which would assume its justified
life interests for centuries.
To achieve this aim the Fuehrer created the National Socialist German
Workers’ Party. He filled it with his spirit and his will, and with it
he conquered the power of the State on 30 January 1933. The Fuehrer’s
will is supreme in the Party. As supreme bearer of sovereignty in the
Movement, he possesses the right of pardon in Party court matters.
By authority of the law about the Chief of State of the German Reich,
dated 1 August 1934, the office of the Reich President has been
combined with that of the Reich Chancellery. Consequently, the powers
heretofore possessed by the Reich President were transferred to the
Fuehrer, Adolf Hitler. Through this law, the conduct of Party and State
has been combined in one hand. By desire of the Fuehrer, a plebiscite
was conducted on this law on 19 August 1934. On this day, the German
people chose Adolf Hitler to be their sole leader. He is responsible
only to his own conscience and to the German nation.
To assist him, particularly in party-political questions, the Fuehrer
uses the _Party Chancellery_.
The Chief of the Party Chancellery, to guarantee closest collaboration
between the offices of the Party and the State authorities, has the
powers of a Reich Minister and is a member of the Reich Cabinet.
With the execution of tasks particular to the Party, the Fuehrer has
entrusted the _Reichsleiter_ within the Reich Directorate of the NSDAP.
[Pages 148-149]
_THE REICH DIRECTORATE OF THE NSDAP_
The NSDAP represents the political conception, the political
conscience, and the political will of the German nation. Political
conception, political conscience, and political will are embodied in
the person of the Fuehrer. Based on his directives and in accordance
with the program of the NSDAP, the organs of the Reich Directorate
directionally determine the political aims of the German people. It
is in the Reich Directorate where the strings of the organization of
the German people and the State meet. By endowment of the Chief of the
Party Chancellery with the powers of a Reich Minister, and by special
administrative directives, the penetration of the State apparatus with
the political will of the Party is guaranteed. It is the task of the
separate organs of the Reich Directorate to maintain as close a contact
as possible with the life of the nation through their sub-offices in
the Gaus. Observations at the front are to be collected and exploited
by the offices of the Reich Directorate.
The structure of the Reich Directorate is thus that the channel from
the lowest Party office upwards shows the most minute weaknesses and
changes in the mood of the people, and that the directives thereby
produced in the Reich Directorate will reach the outer command posts of
the Party quickly and clearly.
The Reich Directorate, then, sees to it that the reports of the
mood of the people will move from the lower to the higher echelons
uninterruptedly and quickly, and that the will of the Fuehrer will
reach the most distant branches quickly and accurately, even as in the
healthy organism of a tree, where the roots receive the food from the
soil and lead it into the leaves while the juices formed in the leaves
are being sent to the most distant roots. This coordination guarantees
an ever-renewed reception of power and an ever-strengthening anchorage
of the roots, and it permits the crown to spread further and further,
to reach higher and higher, and yet to withstand wind and weather.
Since the National Socialist Movement has originated from the people,
it is the most noble task of the Reich Directorate to watch that the
strong roots of the Party--namely its ties within the nation--will not
die off.
Another essential task of the Reich Directorate is to assure a good
selection of leaders. It is the duty of the Reich Directorate to see
that there is leadership in all phases of life, a leadership which
is firmly tied to National Socialist ideology and which promotes its
dissemination with all its energy.
Apart from the general great political tasks which are the
responsibility of the Reich Directorate, it will also see that the
Party is well organized in all its offices. For that purpose, the
Reich Organization Leader exercises a continuous supervision of the
organizations of the entire Party apparatus, and he prevents the birth
of a bureaucracy which would paralyze the striking power of the Party.
It is the supreme task of the Reich Organization Leader to preserve the
Party as a well-sharpened sword for the Fuehrer.
The inner organization of the Reich Directorate serves for the
execution of the above-named tasks. The number of its offices is so
arranged that there will be a representation of all phases of national
life within the Reich Directorate. The offices will have subordinate
organizations in the other zones of sovereignty as may become
necessary. The tasks, jurisdiction, etc., of the offices are further
defined in detail in the following chapters.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1903-PS
Decrees, Regulations, Announcements [Verfuegungen, Anordnungen,
Bekanntgaben], Vol. II. Edited by the Party-Chancellery. Published by:
Zentralverlag der NSDAP, Frz. Eher Nachf. GmbH., Muenchen. Page 510.
Decree of the Fuehrer on the execution of the decree concerning the
Deputy General for the mobilization of labor [Arbeitseinsatz].
In the following the Fuehrer’s decree on the extension of the authority
of the Deputy General for the Arbeitseinsatz is made public:
“Decree of the Fuehrer on the execution of the decree concerning the
Deputy General for the Arbeitsdienst of 30 September 1942.
I herewith authorize the Deputy General for the Arbeitseinsatz,
Reich-governor and district-leader [Gauleiter] Fritz Sauckel to
take all necessary measures for the enforcement of my decree
referring to a Deputy General for the Arbeitseinsatz of 21 March
1942 (Reichsgesetzblatt I, Page 179) according to his own judgment
in the Greater German Reich, in the Protectorate, and in the
Government General [Generalgouvernement] as well as in the occupied
territories, measures which will safeguard under all circumstances
the regulated deployment of labor [geordneter Arbeitseinsatz] for the
German war-economy. For this purpose he may appoint commissioners
[Beauftragte] to the bureaus of the military and civilian
administration. These are subordinated directly to Deputy General
for the Arbeitseinsatz, in order to carry out their tasks. They are
entitled to issue directives to the competent military and civilian
authorities in charge of the Arbeitseinsatz and of wage-policy.
More detailed directives will be issued by the Deputy General for the
Arbeitseinsatz.
Fuehrer-Headquarters 30 Sept 1942
The Fuehrer
Sign. Adolf Hitler
The Reichminister and Chief of the Reich-Chancery
Sign. Dr. Lammers
The chief of the German High Command
Sign. Keitel.”
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1913-PS
1943 REICHSARBEITSBLATT, PART I, PAGE 588
Agreement between the Plenipotentiary General for the Arbeitseinsatz
and the German Labor Front concerning the care of non-German workers
The Commissioner for the Four Year Plan
The Plenipotentiary General for the Arbeitseinsatz VIc 5783/291
Berlin, 20 Sept. 1943
To the presidents of the Gau employment offices and
to the Reich Trustees of Labor
as well as to the directors of the employment offices.
AGREEMENT
The following agreement has been concluded between the Plenipotentiary
General for the Arbeitseinsatz, Gauleiter and Reich Governor
[Reichstatthalter] Sauckel and the Reichsleiter of the German Labor
Front, Reichsorganisation leader Dr. Ley.
1. The German Labor Front, on the basis of decree Nr 4 of the
Plenipotentiary General for the Arbeitseinsatz of 7 May 1942--GBA
405/42 (Nr 2b) has the sole and exclusive mission of caring for all
foreign workers employed within the Reich. Excluded are the farm
workers employed in the Reich food administration.
2. The Reichsleiter of the German Labor Front, Reichsorganisationleiter
Dr. Ley, in collaboration with the Plenipotentiary General for
the Arbeitseinsatz, Gauleiter Sauckel, will establish a “central
inspection” for the continuous supervision of all measures concerning
the care of the foreign workers mentioned under 1. This will have the
designation:
“Central inspection for the care of foreign workers.”
The central inspection for the care of foreign workers exercises its
functions upon directives and in the name of the Plenipotentiary
General for the Arbeitseinsatz and of the Reichsleiter of the German
Labor Front. In order to avoid all duplication of work, it will be its
sole responsibility, to scrutinize all measures taken for the care of
foreign workers employed in the factories and camps, also to remove
immediately all defects discovered--as far as possible--on the spot and
to issue the necessary instructions for this.
The authority of the Plenipotentiary General for the Arbeitseinsatz
to empower the members of his staff and the presidents of the state
employment offices to get direct information on the conditions
regarding the employment of foreigners in the factories and camps, will
remain untouched.
3. The central inspection for the care of foreign workers will be
continuously in touch with the main office VI of the Plenipotentiary
General for the Arbeitseinsatz. It will instruct the office on the
general observations made and will make suggestions for changes, if
that should become necessary.
4. The offices of the administration of the Arbeitseinsatz will be
constantly informed by the “central inspection for the care of foreign
workers” of its observations, in particular immediately in each case in
which action of State organizations seems to be necessary.
This agreement becomes effective on the day of its signing.
Berlin, 2 June 1943
Dr. Robert LEY Fritz SAUCKEL
# # # # #
For the carrying out of this agreement I order the following:
1. The supervision of all welfare measures in the realm of the
employment of foreign workers is the sole responsibility of the
central inspection for the care of foreign workers. Complaints about
bad quarters, food, deficient provision of free time activities and
cultural and propagandistic care will in the future be directed by me
to the central inspection for investigation and elimination of possible
deficiencies. The labor offices and Gau labor offices must direct
complaints and protests coming to them to the locally competent office
of the German Labor Front.
The central inspection will inform the Plenipotentiary General for
Arbeitseinsatz regarding its decisions and the measures instituted by
it and their completion.
2. The employment of foreign workers, their identification,
equalization between the plants, transfers, supervision of practical
and vocationally correct employment in the plant, the promotion of
instructional measures to increase production, as well as drafting of
the labor-contract regulations, the carrying out of pay regulation
measures, and the supervision of the orderly paying of foreign
workers, remain as formerly the task of the competent offices of the
administration of the Arbeitseinsatz and Reich trusteeship.
3. The directives for the employment of eastern and western laborers
given in Va 5780.28/90 of 9 January and Va 5780/196 of 4 February 1943
remain in force with the provision that the labor offices and Gau labor
offices and the specialists employed with them for the inspection of
camps for eastern laborers need only undertake the tasks mentioned
under No. 2.
4. The close interrelationship of the tasks of the Arbeitseinsatz
and the care of foreign labor demands, independently of the measures
to be effected, for the execution of the above agreement, a constant
and close cooperation between the offices of the administration of
the Arbeitseinsatz and the offices of the German labor front. If, for
example, it is determined in the execution of Arbeitseinsatz measures,
that an insufficient labor performance on the part of foreign labor
results from absence of welfare work, then the competent agencies of
the German Labor Front are to be informed of this without delay so
that the latter may effect the correction of existing deficiencies.
On the other hand the offices of the German Labor Front will bring
to the attention of the competent agencies of the Arbeitseinsatz
administrative findings made in the course of their welfare work which
require an evaluation from the point of view of the Arbeitseinsatz.
For the adjustment of individual questions of cooperation between the
offices concerned and the erection of a permanent exchange of findings
the Gau labor offices will enter into negotiations with the appropriate
administration [Gauwaltungen] of the German Labor Front and will inform
the labor offices on the rulings effected for the districts.
By order
Dr BEISIEGEL
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1914-PS
Decrees, Regulations, Announcements [Verfuegungen, Anordnungen,
Bekanntgaben], 1st part, 1943 Edition--Editor: The Party Chancellery.
Published by the Central Publishing House of the NSDAP, Franz Eher,
successor, Muenchen. Pages 318-320.
# # # # #
AGREEMENT
The following agreement between the Reich Minister for the Occupied
Eastern Territories, Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg and the director
of the German Labor Front, Reichsorganisationsleiter Dr. R. Ley, was
reached today:
I. On the basis of the agreement reached on June 2, 1943, between
the Deputy General for the Arbeitseinsatz, Gauleiter Fritz Sauckel
and the leader of the German Arbeitsfront, Reich Organisationsleiter
Dr. R. Ley, concerning a “Central inspection for the care of foreign
laborers”, in order to avoid in the future duplication of work and
overlapping in plants and camps in which foreign workers are employed
or housed, special inspections of the plants and community camps
will be effected only by the central inspection. In order to secure
cooperation between the Reich Ministry for the occupied Eastern
territories and the Central Inspection, a liaison agency will be
created in the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories.
II. The Central Inspection for the care of foreign laborers is directed
to give upon request the liaison office of the Reich Minister for the
Occupied Eastern Territories, all information in questions related to
the care of foreigners.
III. If, in special cases, the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern
Territories considers that a committee should be dispatched in order
to inspect camps and plants, this will be done with the consent and
cooperation of a representative of the central inspection for the care
of foreign workers.
IV. However, the leader of the liaison agency will have at any time
access to the community camps and plants in which workers from the
Occupied Eastern Territories are housed or employed. Nevertheless, in
these cases too the central inspection will have to be given advance
notice of the intended inspections.
V. This agreement comes into force on the day of signing.
AGREEMENT
1. A liaison office of the Propaganda Ministry to the German Labor
Front is established in the office of the Arbeitseinsatz between the
Reichminister for Enlightenment and Propaganda, Dr. Goebbels and the
Director of the German Labor Front, Reichsorganisationsleiter Dr. Ley
as the result of the agreement reached on 2 June 1943, between the
Deputy General for the Arbeitseinsatz, Gauleiter Fritz Sauckel and the
Director of the German Labor Front, Dr. Ley about the establishment of
a “Central inspection for the care of foreign laborers”.
2. A similar agency will be created in the Gau administrations between
the Reich Propaganda Office and/or the Gau Propaganda Office and the
main section of the Arbeitseinsatz of the German Arbeitsfront.
3. The liaison agencies have to see that all the measures for
caretaking should be carried out in closest cooperation.
4. In order to secure this cooperation, it will be ascertained that
all reports, especially those of the central inspection, should be
currently maintained to liaison agents.
5. The liaison agents will be currently notified of the visits to camps
and plants effected by the German Arbeitsfront and by the delegates of
the Central Inspection; it will be at their discretion to take part in
these visits in person or by a representative. In special cases the
liaison agent or his representative can also visit camps and plants
after notifying the DAF.
6. This agreement comes into force on the day of signing.
# # # # #
Chief of Security Police and SD.
IV D--626/43 (ausl Arb.)
Berlin
June 21, 1943
Night Letter!
To the inspectors of the Security Police and of the SD.
Subject: Central inspection for the care of foreign laborers.
For the permanent control of all measures for the care of foreign
workers employed in the Reich--except in agriculture--the leader of the
DAF has created:
“Central Inspection for the care of foreign labor”, in
cooperation with the Deputy General for Arbeitseinsatz.
This Central inspection has the task of supervising all the measures
for the care of foreign labor in plants and camps, of correcting the
detected flaws right on the spot, as far as possible and to issue the
directives which are necessary for this purpose.
The leader of Central Inspection for the care of foreign labor is the
Hauptdienstleiter of the NSDAP.
Party member Otto Gohdes.
The erection and tasks of this central inspection will not interfere
with the measures for which the Security Police and SD are responsible.
The preventive tasks of the police which aims at an orderly treatment
and care of foreign laborers to avoid incidents undesirable from the
standpoint of the Security Police, will be considerably supported and
secured by the central inspection and its delegates. The delegates of
the central inspection for the care of foreign laborers are instructed
to carry out their activities in close cooperation with the agencies of
the Security Police and of the SD, particularly with the State Police
(directive) agencies. I request, therefore, that close cooperation be
afforded the delegates of the central inspection, that they be strongly
assisted and taken everywhere committed, even where the care of foreign
laborers does not forward the interests of the Security Police and the
SD.
Care of laborers of a German blood.
In order to do justice to the particular position of people of German
blood [Volksdeutschen], the DAF--Office of the Arbeitseinsatz--has
confidentially instructed its agencies to carry out the care of
Volksdeutschen in cooperation with the agencies of the Volksdeutschen
information office and to avoid that foreign liaison agencies should
take care of the Volksdeutschen workers. In the future, the DAF and the
State Labor Office will not submit to the foreign liaison agencies such
plants which employ only Volksdeutschen from the country in question.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1915-PS
1938 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 111
Decree concerning the leadership of the Armed Forces, 4 February 1938
From now on, I take over directly the command of the whole Armed Forces.
The former Armed Forces department in the Reichs War Ministry will come
directly under my command with all its tasks which it fulfilled under
the jurisdiction of the “supreme command of the Army” and my military
staff.
At the head of the staff of the supreme command of the Armed Forces
is the former Chief of the Armed Forces department as “Chief of the
supreme command of the Armed Forces”. He is equal in rank to a Reichs
Minister.
At the same time, the supreme command takes the responsibility for
the affairs of the Reichs Ministry of War, and by my order, the chief
of the supreme command of the Armed Forces exercises the authority
formerly belonging to the Reichs Minister.
It is the supreme command of the Armed Forces’ duty to carry out in
peace time in accordance with my instructions, the preparation of the
defense system of the Reich.
Berlin 4 February 1938
The Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor
Adolph Hitler
The Reichs Minister and Chief
of the Reichs Chancellery
Dr. Lammers
The Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces
Keitel
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1918-PS
HIMMLER’S ADDRESS TO OFFICERS OF THE SS-LEIBSTANDARTE “ADOLF HITLER” ON
THE “DAY OF METZ” (PRESENTATION OF HISTORICAL NAZI FLAG).
Now I would like to bring another matter to your attention. Very
frequently the member of the Waffen-SS thinks about the deportation
of this people here. These thoughts came to me today when watching
the very difficult work out there performed by the Security Police,
supported by your men, who help them a great deal. Exactly the same
thing happened in Poland in weather 40 degrees below zero, where we
had to haul away thousands, ten thousands, hundred thousands; where
we had to have the toughness--you should hear this but also forget it
again immediately--to shoot thousands of leading Poles, where we had to
have the toughness, otherwise it would have taken revenge on us later.
We also had to bring in, in this winter of 40 degrees below zero, ten
thousands of Germans, and had to take care of their needs--that the
women were warm; that, when they bore children, these children did
not experience want and destitution; where we had to take care of
their horses; where we had to take care of the baggage of these poor
Germans from Volkynia; all duties where the proud soldier says: “My
God, why do I have to do that, this ridiculous job here...!” Gentlemen,
it is much easier in many cases--and that I would like to tell you
this once, or would like to recall to you, you will gladly admit: in
many cases it is much easier to go into combat with a company than to
suppress an obstructive population of low cultural level in some area
with a company, or to carry out executions, or to haul away people, or
to evict crying and hysterical women, or to return our German racial
brethren across the border from Russia and to take care of them. I want
to tell you: In the entire Waffen-SS we must begin to view the other
great activity of the entire SS [Gesamt-SS] and entire police. We must
see to it that you consider the activity of the man in green uniform as
just as valuable as the activity you yourself are engaged in. You have
to consider the work of the SD man or of the man of the Security Police
as a vital part of our whole work just like the fact that you can carry
arms. You are the ones to be envied, because if you do something, if a
unit achieves fame, then one can talk of fame, and it can be decorated.
It is much more difficult in many other positions--and with that I do
not want to underestimate your achievements; I would be the last one
to do that--but, believe me, in many places it is much more difficult,
this silent work-compulsion, this silent activity, this standing
guard over our ideology, this necessity of remaining steadfast, this
necessity of not compromising is very much more difficult in places.
Now I want to tell you something else; I mentioned before that we
absolutely were in danger of suffocating within ourselves, within the
leadership corps [Fuehrerkorps]. There did not seem to be a way out.
Either we would have become senile or we had to kick the people out too
soon. Today, in the future, in time of peace, the possibility does not
exist that a man, or a leader, provided he is worth his salt, does not
perform valuable work in some position or that satisfactory work is not
assigned to him. Of course we will do it in such a way--let there be no
doubt about it--that we put the most capable ones into each position.
In other words, if there are four company commanders, the most capable
one will be promoted to battalion commander, the one who is best fitted
for that activity. The other three, or the other 2, will be utilized
in some activity which is just as valuable, but for which he is better
adapted. In general, everyone should understand that the course of the
past two years, which were pure war years with preparation for war,
are of course not completed, education for Political Officers will
become much more strongly emphasized. I would like to use this word
for once, Political Leader, Political Officer. A period will commence
where someone will be platoon leader in the Waffen SS for 3 or 4 years.
During that time he will attend this training course or that, and
already as a young leader he will come to know the sphere of activity
of all other branches in the SS, in courses lasting 6 to 8 weeks. From
the beginning it will then happen that mutual understanding sets in,
mutual esteem and the absolute conviction that the duties of the other
guy are very, very difficult, and are very, very valuable. On the
other hand, I will not allow any branch to grow where the leading men,
the members of the Fuehrercorps, are not at least reserve leaders of
the Armed SS and did not get at least far enough to be able to lead a
company as reserve leader. This way coherence will be achieved which
is necessary. I believe that you can get an idea from what I said to
the men today--and you as leaders can add to it by drawing your own
conclusions--what the entire SS will have to do in order to secure
our Reich, I mean in the first place with respect to ideology and
safeguarding of the race [Blut] by settlements and extending of our
Lebensraum, with respect to the work in colonies, and we shall have
garrisons far away in South-Africa, and we shall have garrisons in the
Arctic winter, as we have not in Kirkenes, that is up there on the
North cape we are also going to have a garrison of a few battalions,
we shall have garrisons on the Bug, and we shall now have garrisons in
the West, where certainly Metz will not be the most distant western
frontier. If we think the right way, some things will be of decisive
importance. You would be surprised if I wanted to carry out immediately
after the war when peace begins with an iron hand what I indicated
today in my class with the men, that we must win the peace and be hard
against ourselves. The first two years of peace will be decisive for
our future. After victory we must nowhere become megalomaniacs, we must
not relax in any respect but we must start an unheard-of education of
ourselves. It is necessary, that obedience be granite-like, or else it
would be impossible to have distant garrisons like Kirkenes which at
times cannot be reached even by modern means, or colonial garrisons, if
the officers there, the leader there, does not act strictly [eisern] in
accordance with his orders and would take any consequences rather than
disregard in any way an order, a basic order, given.
We shall have to do one thing: After the war we shall apply an
unheard-of discipline against ourselves as far as external values are
concerned they also are important. Whether it concerns our clothes
or anything else, because you see, it is a great plus and a great
danger at the same time, that what we are doing after the war, during
Adolf Hitler’s life, will live on for centuries to come, and if we
make a mistake, the mistake will live on for centuries, because silly
descendants will say: “Yes this is what they did in Adolf Hitler’s
time, consequently we must act likewise!” If we strike up a wrong
tune, this wrong tune will resound through centuries. And mistakes
unfortunately do grow in dimension the longer they are continued.
Therefore, it is necessary that we train ourselves in the future in an
unheard-of way. I believe it is not the right thing for us to do to
discuss these worries which I have with each one of you separately. The
one or the other among you who talks here and there like a fool and
believes he must talk wildly in the Cassino might say: “For Heaven’s
sake, those people up there don’t know, they have not the slightest
idea!” Our idea goes very far and I know exactly what is going on
within the troop, know exactly what they think and how they feel. You
must also consider the following: I cannot concentrate my mind solely
on--now, please don’t become conceited--the most splendid part of the
SS because it is the most positive part and because the trade you are
following is the most positive and most manly, I cannot do that, I must
always have the entire SS in my mind.
If I did not see this part, I would deny life to this most positive
and most manly part of our activity; i.e., the Armed SS. I would deny
your life. Because this armed SS will live only if the entire SS is
alive. If the entire corps is actually an order which lives according
to these laws and realizes that one part cannot exist without the
other--you are unimaginable without the general SS, and the latter is
not imaginable without you. The police is not imaginable without the
SS, nor are we imaginable without this executive branch of the state
which is in our hands. The Fuehrercorps is not imaginable without the
national-political institutions of education which we are building
up now, and vice versa we cannot fill up our ranks without contact
with the youth, we cannot exist without the business enterprises. A
field which probably is unknown to most of you because nothing has
ever been said about it. I want to tell you just a little bit of
it: The apartment-building program which is the prerequisite for a
healthy and social basis of the entire SS as well as of the entire
Fuehrercorps can be carried out only when I get the money for it from
somewhere; nobody is going to give me the money, it must be earned,
and it will be earned by forcing the scum of mankind, the prisoners,
the professional criminals to do positive work. The man, guarding
these prisoners, serves just as hard as the one on close-order drill.
The one who does this and stands near these utterly negative people
will learn within 3 to 4 months * * * and we shall see: In peacetime
I shall form guard-battalions and put them on duty for 3 months
only--to fight the inferior being [Untermenschentum], and this will
not be a boring guard duty, but if the officers handle it right, it
will be the best indoctrination on inferior beings and the inferior
races. This activity is necessary, as I said, 1. to eliminate these
negative people from the German people, 2. to exploit them once more
for the great folk community by having them break stones and bake
bricks so that the Fuehrer can again erect his grand buildings and 3.
to in turn invest the money, earned soberly this way, in houses, in
ground, in settlements so that our men can have houses in which to
raise large families and lots of children. This in turn is necessary
because we stand or die with this leading blood of Germany and if the
good blood is not reproduced we will not be able to rule the world.
Please understand: We would not be able to hold the great Germanic
Reich which is about to take shape. I am convinced, that we can hold
it, but we have to prepare for that. If we once had not enough sons
those who will come after us will have to become cowards. A nation
which has an average of 4 sons per family can venture a war: if 2 of
them die, 2 transplant the name. The leadership of a nation having
one son or two sons per family will have to be faint-hearted at any
decision on account of their own experience because they will have to
tell themselves: We cannot afford it. Look at France, which is the best
example. France had to accept from us a dictate. It could no longer
dictate to us because they could not continue. All the things which
sometimes seem strange to you because other things were more urgent
during the last 2 years, because I could not explain them sufficiently
to you, the leaders, because sometimes I did not explain them to you in
order not to make too public what was just starting life, so that the
tender nursling would not be pulled out by people who don’t like us. I
preferred that very often not even my own troops knew anything about
it and let the small nursling secretly grow into a small tree. Then
when it is big, nowadays everything is big, now the trees are not being
uprooted. Everything that seemed strange to you: “Why do we have to
contribute to the spring of life [Lebensborn]?” “Why do we have to join
the saving’s cooperative?” “Why do we have to do this and to do that?”
If anything like that turns up, I demand from you in future:
In the first place be SS men who have the creed that everything
being done is all right. One piece fits the other, even if you don’t
recognize it beforehand, even if it does not appear at first sight
that they fit each other. In the end, everything will be all right.
The ultimate aim for those 11 years during which I have been the
Reichsfuehrer SS has been invariably the same: To create an order
of good blood which is able to serve Germany. Which unfailingly and
without sparing itself can be made use of because the greatest losses
can do no harm to the vitality of this order, the vitality of these
men, because they will always be replaced. To create an order which
will spread the idea of nordic blood so far that we will attract all
nordic blood in the world, take away the blood from our adversaries,
absorb it so that never again, looking at it from the viewpoint of
grand policy, nordic blood in great quantities and to an extent worth
mentioning will fight against us. We must get it and the others cannot
have it. We never gave up the ideas and the aim conceived so many
years ago. Everything we did has taken us some distance further on the
way. Everything we are going to do will lead us further on the way. It
can only be carried out, if everyone of us looks beyond the things he
likes in his activity, his company, his regiment--and you are supposed
to love it you may be proud of it--looks beyond it towards the great
common goal, here the SS, and the SS also is only a means to an end,
always the Reich, the ideology, created by the Fuehrer, the Reich,
created by him, the Reich of all teutons.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1919-PS
Speech of the Reichsfuehrer-SS at the meeting of SS Major-Generals at
Posen October 4th, 1943
The 1941 attack
In 1941 the Fuehrer attacked Russia. That was, as we can well see now,
shortly,--perhaps 3 to 6 months--before Stalin prepared to embark on
his great penetration into Central and Western Europe. I can give a
picture of this first year in a few words. The attacking forces cut
their way through. The Russian Army was herded together in great
pockets, ground down, taken prisoner. At that time we did not value the
mass of humanity as we value it today, as raw material, as labour. What
after all, thinking in terms of generations, is not to be regretted,
but is now deplorable by reason of the loss of labour, is that the
prisoners died in tens and hundreds of thousands of exhaustion and
hunger [p. 3].
It is basically wrong for us to infuse all our inoffensive soul and
spirit, our good-nature, and our idealism into foreign peoples [p. 22].
This is true since the time of Herder who clearly wrote “Voices of
the Nations” [Stimmen der Voelker], in a state of drunkenness, thereby
bringing [p. 23] on us, who come after him, such immeasurable sorrow
and misery. This is true for instance, of the Czechs and the Slovenes
to whom we gave their consciousness of nationality. They were just not
capable of it themselves; we had to discover it for them.
One basic principle must be the absolute rule for the SS man: we must
be honest, decent, loyal, and comradely to members of our own blood
and to nobody else. What happens to a Russian, to a Czech does not
interest me in the slightest. What the nations can offer in the way
of good blood of our type, we will take, if necessary by kidnapping
their children and raising them here with us. Whether nations live
in prosperity or starve to death [verrecken--to die--used of cattle]
interests me only in so far as we need them as slaves for our Kultur;
otherwise, it is of no interest to me. Whether 10,000 Russian females
fall down from exhaustion while digging an anti-tank ditch interests
me only in so far as the anti-tank ditch for Germany is finished. We
shall never be rough and heartless when it is not necessary, that is
clear. We Germans, who [p. 24] are the only people in the world who
have a decent attitude towards animals, will also assume a decent
attitude towards these human animals. But it is a crime against our own
blood to worry about them and give them ideals, thus causing our sons
and grandsons to have a more difficult time with them. When somebody
comes to me and says, “I cannot dig the anti-tank ditch with women and
children, it is inhuman, for it would kill them,” then I have to say,
“You are a murderer of your own blood because if the anti-tank ditch is
not dug, German soldiers will die, and they are sons of German mothers.
They are our own blood.” That is what I want to instil into the SS
and what I believe have instilled into them as one of the most sacred
laws of the future. Our concern, our duty is our people and our blood.
It is for them that we must provide and plan, work and fight, nothing
else. We can be indifferent to everything else. I wish the SS to adopt
this attitude to the problem of all foreign, non-Germanic peoples,
especially Russians. All else is vain, fraud against our own nation and
an obstacle to the early winning of the war.
Foreigners in the Reich
We must also realize that we have 6 to 7 million foreigners in Germany.
Perhaps it is even 8 million now [p. 43]. We have prisoners in Germany.
They are none of them dangerous so long as we take severe measures
at the merest trifle. It is a mere nothing today to shoot 10 Poles,
compared with the fact that we might later have to shoot tens of
thousands in their place, and compared to the fact that the shooting
of these tens of thousands would then be carried out even at the cost
of German blood. Every little fire will immediately be stamped out
and quenched, and extinguished,--otherwise--as in the case of a real
fire--a political and psychological surface-fire may spring up among
the people.
The Communists in the Reich
I don’t believe the Communists could attempt any action, for their
leading elements, like most criminals, are in our concentration camps.
And here I must say this--that we shall be able to see after the war
what a blessing it was for Germany that, in spite of all the silly talk
about humanitarianism, we imprisoned all this criminal sub-stratum of
the German people in concentration camps: I’ll answer for that. If they
were going about free, we should be worse off. For then the sub-humans
would have [p. 44] their NCOs and Commanding Officers, then they would
have their councils of workers and military. As it is, however, they
are locked up, and are making shells or projectile cases or other
important things, and are very useful members of human society.
The SS in wartime
Now I come to our own development, to that of the SS in the past
months. Looking back on the whole war, this development was fantastic
[p. 51]. It took place at an absolutely terrific speed. Let us look
back a little to 1939. At that time we were a few regiments, guard
units [Wachverbaende] 8 to 9,000 strong,--that is, not even a division,
all in all 25 to 28,000 men at the outside. True, we were armed, but
really only got our artillery regiment as our heavy arm two months
before the war began. We will recapitulate which tasks, which duties,
and which assignments we have been given in the last 4½ years. But
first I would like to enumerate and make known once more some outward
changes.
Changes in Personnel
The following changes have taken place at the Main Offices:
Our comrade, SS Lieutenant General Kaltenbrunner has succeeded
our fallen friend Heydrich. Unfortunately he is ill today. He has
phlebitis, but it is, I am glad to say, not dangerous. That [p. 52] is
why he could not come.
Our old friend Daluege has such severe heart trouble that he has to
undergo courses of treatment and now has to retire from active service
for 1½ to 2 years.--I would like this evening to send our two friends,
Daluege especially, and Kaltenbrunner too, a teleprint or a telegram in
the name of all of us. As I have said, we may hope that Daluege will
have recovered in about two years, and can then return to the front and
get into harness.
SS Lieutenant General Wuennenberg is in charge as his deputy. He
has been in charge of the police division up till now, and was then
appointed to be Officer Commanding IVth SS armored corps. He is General
of the Waffen-SS and the police, and is in charge of the uniformed
regular police [ordnungspolizei] as their Head.
SS-Gruppenfuehrer Breithaupt has succeeded our old comrade and friend
Scharfe as Chief of the SS-court of justice.
SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Hofmann has made a change. He has given up the
Main office for race and settlement [Rasse--u. Siedlungshauptamt] and
has become Senior Executive SS and Police Officer [Hoehre SS--und
Polizeifuehrer] for the South-West.
SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Hildebrandt has left Oberabschnitt Weichsel, and
has become Chief of the Main Office for race and settlement [p. 53].
SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Schmidt has left the Head Office for Personnel at
his own request and has joined my personal staff for special duties. He
is succeeded by SS-Gruppenfuehrer von Herff.
One of my closest and most long-standing colleagues,
SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Wolff, has now, I am glad to say, recovered
completely from a severe illness which greatly endangered his
life--(it was an operation for removing stones from the kidney)--and
is now,--this is a new appointment--Supreme Executive SS and Police
Officer for the whole of occupied Italy. He therefore has charge of 25
to 30 million people. Under him he has SS-Gruppenfuehrer Globocnik as
Senior Executive SS and Police Officer for the coastal area. He too
could not come today.
Senior Executive SS and Police Officers have since been appointed as
follows: for Croatia--Kammerhofer, who on account of the Croatians is
not called Senior Executive SS and Police Officer, but Commissioner of
the Reichsfuehrer SS; for Serbia, Meyszner was appointed earlier, for
Greece--[p. 54] Stroob at the moment but--I would like to tell you this
now--I am transferring him from there to Schimana. Officials in Greece
will become Senior Executive SS and Police Officers, and thus not
command the Galician SS--Volunteer Division. SS-Gruppenfuehrer Pancke
is to become Senior Executive SS- and Police Officer for Denmark.
Chief of the Anti-partisan Units [Bandenkampf-Verbaende]
In the meantime I have also set up the department of Chief of the
anti-partisan units [p. 57]. Our comrade SS-Obergruppenfuehrer von dem
Bach is Chief of the anti-partisan units. I considered it necessary
for the Reichsfuehrer SS to be in authoritative command in all these
battles, for I am convinced that we are best in a position to take
action against this enemy struggle, which is a decidedly political one.
Except where the units which had been supplied and which we had formed
for this purpose were taken from us to fill in gaps at the front, we
have been very successful.
It is notable that, by setting up this department we have gained [p.
58] for the SS in turn a division, a corps, an army, and the next step,
which is the High Command of an army or even of a group--if you wish to
call it that.
Regular uniformed Police and the Sipo
Now to deal briefly with the tasks of the regular uniformed police and
the Sipo. They still cover the same field. I can see that great things
have been achieved. We have formed roughly 30 police regiments from
police reservists and former members of the police--police officials
as they used to be called. The average age in our police battalions is
not lower than that of the Security battalions of the Armed Forces.
Their achievements are beyond all praise. In addition, we have formed
Police Rifle Regiments by merging the police battalions of the “savage
peoples”. Thus we did not leave these police battalions untouched but
blended them in the ratio of about 1:3. That is why we have, at the
present moment of crisis, a far greater stability than could be seen
among the other units made up of natives or local inhabitants.
SS-industrial concerns
I now come to other individual great spheres of activity, of which it
is important for you all to know [p. 63]. We have huge armament works
in the concentration camps. This is the sphere of activity of our
friend SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Pohl. Every month we put in many millions
of hours of work for armaments. We tackle the most thankless tasks
and--I must give this its [p. 64] due--whether in the concentration
camps, in Pohl’s industrial works, or outside at the offices of the
Senior Executive SS and Police Officers or in the workshops of the
Head Office of SS administration, one thing is obvious: wherever we
are, we are SS-men. Where things are in a bad way, we act. I want
every subordinate trained to this end. We want to help, unhampered
by quibbles regarding authority, for we want to win the war. What
we are doing, we are doing for Germany. Whether it is a question of
building a road, if a tunnel is not going ahead somewhere, or if it
is an invention which for sheer red-tape does not come to fruition,
or anything else; where we can get to work, we get to work. What we
are doing in our armament works will be a remarkable and noteworthy
achievement, even if we can only assess it and prove it when the war is
ended.
The Clearing out of the Jews
I also want to talk to you, quite frankly, on a very grave matter.
Among ourselves it should be mentioned quite frankly, and yet we will
never speak of it publicly. Just as we did not hesitate on June 30th,
1934 to do the duty we were bidden, and stand comrades who had lapsed,
up against the wall and shoot them, so we have never spoken about it
and will never [p. 65] speak of it. It was that tact which is a matter
of course and which I am glad to say, is inherent in us, that made us
never discuss it among ourselves, never to speak of it. It appalled
everyone, and yet everyone was certain that he would do it the next
time if such orders are issued and if it is necessary.
I mean the clearing out of the Jews, the extermination of the Jewish
race. It’s one of those things it is easy to talk about--“The Jewish
race is being exterminated”, says one party member, “that’s quite
clear, it’s in our program--elimination of the Jews, and we’re doing
it, exterminating them.” And then they come, 80 million worthy Germans,
and each one has his decent Jew. Of course the others are vermin, but
this one is an A-1 Jew. Not one of all those who talk this way has
witnessed it, not one of them has been through it. Most of _you_ must
know what it means when 100 corpses are lying side by side, or 500 or
1000. To have stuck it out and at the same time--apart from exceptions
caused by human weakness--to have remained decent fellows, that is what
has made us hard. This is a page of glory in our history which has
never been written and is never to be [p. 66] written, for we know how
difficult we should have made it for ourselves, if--with the bombing
raids, the burdens and the deprivations of war--we still had Jews today
in every town as secret saboteurs, agitators and trouble-mongers. We
would now probably have reached the 1916/17 stage when the Jews were
still in the German national body.
We have taken from them what wealth they had. I have issued a strict
order, which SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Pohl has carried out, that this
wealth should, as a matter of course, be handed over to the Reich
without reserve. We have taken none of it for ourselves. Individual men
who have lapsed will be punished in accordance with an order I issued
at the beginning, which gave this warning: Whoever takes so much as
a mark of it, is a dead man. A number of SS men--there are not very
many of them--have fallen short, and they will die, without mercy. We
had the moral right, we had the duty to our people, to destroy this
people which wanted to destroy us. But we have not the right to enrich
ourselves with so much as a fur, a watch, a mark, or a cigarette or
anything else. Because we have exterminated a bacterium we do not want,
in the end, to be infected by the bacterium and die of it. I will not
see so much as a small area of sepsis appear here or gain a [p. 67]
hold. Wherever it may form, we will cauterize it. Altogether however,
we can say, that we have fulfilled this most difficult duty for the
love of our people. And our spirit, our soul, our character has not
suffered injury from it.
The bearing of the SS-man
If I make a statement for us all and in the presence of all of us of
all that we have done this year in the form of--I would almost say--a
statement of accounts, then there is one thing that I must not overlook
and pass over: the significance of the bearing of the SS-man.
The Principle of Selection
We are a product of the law of selection [p. 70]. We have made our
choice from a cross-section of our people. This people came into being
aeons ago, through generations and centuries, by the throw of the dice
of fate and of history. Alien peoples have swept over this people and
left their heritage behind them. Alien blood-streams have flowed into
this people, but it has, nevertheless in spite of terrible hardships
and terrible blows of fate, still had strength in the very essence of
its blood to win through. Thus this whole people is saturated with,
and held together by Nordic-Phalian-Germanic blood, so that after all
one could, and can, still speak of a German people. From this people,
of such varied hereditary tendencies, as it emerged from the collapse
after the years of the battle of liberation, we have now consciously
tried to select the Nordic-Germanic blood, for we could best expect
this section of our blood to contain the creative, heroic and
life-preserving qualities of our people. We have gone partly by outward
appearances, and for the rest have kept these outward appearances in
review by making constantly new demands, and by repeated tests both
physical and mental, both of the character and the soul. Again and
again we have sifted out and cast aside what was [p. 71] worthless,
what did not suit us. Just as long as we have strength to do this will
this organization remain healthy. The moment we forget the law which
is the foundation of our race, and the law of selection and austerity
towards ourselves, we shall have the germ of death in us, and will
perish just as every human organization, every blossom in this world
does some time perish. It must be our endeavour, our inner law, to
make this blossoming and fructifying last for our people as long as
possible, bringing as much prosperity as possible, and--don’t be
alarmed--if possible for thousands of years. That is why, whenever we
meet and whatever we do, we must be mindful of our principle: blood,
selection, and austerity. The law of nature is just this: What is
hard is good; what is vigourous is good; whatever wins through in the
battle of life, physically, purposefully and spiritually, that is what
is good--always taking the long view. Of [p. 72] course sometime--and
this has happened often in history--someone can get to the top by
deceit and cheating. That makes no difference to nature, to the fate of
the earth, to the fate of the world. Reality, that is, Nature, Fate,
removes the impostor after a time--time not reckoned in generations
of man but in historical periods. It must be our endeavour never to
deceive ourselves, but always to remain genuine, that is what we must
continually preach and instill into ourselves, and into every boy and
each one of our subordinates.
The SS after the war
One thing must be clear, one thing I would like to say to you today:
the moment the war is over, we will really begin to weld together
our organization, this organization which we have built up for 10
years, which we imbued and indoctrinated with the first most important
principles during the 10 years before the war. We must continue to do
this--we,--if I may say so, we older men--for twenty years full of
toil and work, so that a tradition 30, 35, 40 years, a generation, may
be created. Then this organization will march forward into the future
young and strong, revolutionary and efficient to fulfill the task of
giving the German people, the Germanic people the super-stratum of
society which will combine and hold together this Germanic people
and this Europe, and from which the brains which the people needs
for industry, farming, politics, and as soldiers, statesmen and
technicians, will emerge. In addition this super-stratum must be so
strong and vital that every generation can unreservedly sacrifice
two or three sons from every family on the battlefield, and that
nevertheless the continued flowing of the bloodstream is assured.
The Virtues of the SS-Man
I will speak now of the most important virtues which I began years ago
to preach and to impress on this organization, on this whole General-SS
[Allgemeine-SS]--for that is the basis of this organization--and which
are just now in the 5th year of war of such decisive significance and
importance.
1. Loyalty
We have, I am glad to say, not had a single case among our ranks so
far, of an SS-Man being disloyal. Let this one thing be our guiding
principle: If within the sphere of your knowledge there is ever
anyone who is disloyal to the Fuehrer or to the Reich, even if it
is only in thought, you must see to it that this man is thrown out
of the organization and we will see to it that he departs this life
[p. 74]. For everything,--I have said this one already and repeat
it today,--everything can be forgiven in this world, but one thing
cannot be forgiven among us Teutons: that is disloyalty. It would be
unforgivable and is unforgivable. Downfalls, like the downfall of
Badoglio in Italy must not and will not happen in Germany. The name
Badoglio will in future be the name for bad dogs, the name of abuse for
four-legged mongrel curs, just as in the olden days the name Thersites
was the name of abuse for traitors.--We can only say one thing and
preach it constantly: Let the German people show, by unparalleled and
wholehearted loyalty on the part of each one of its men and each one of
its women that is worthy of being permitted to live at the time of an
Adolf Hitler, and worthy of this leader having arisen for it, who has
dedicated his life full of care, full of responsibility, full of work,
to our German Teutonic people.
2. Obedience
Obedience is demanded and given in the soldier’s life morning, noon,
and night. And the little man always obeys or usually does. If he does
not, he is put in prison. The question of obedience in [p. 75] the case
of senior officials in the state, party and the army, and even here
and there in the SS, is more difficult. I would like here to state
something clearly and unequivocally: It is a matter of course that the
little man must obey. It is even more a matter of course that all the
senior leaders of the SS, that is, the whole corps of Gruppenfuehrer,
are a model of blind obedience. If anyone thinks that an order is based
on a misunderstanding on the part of the superior or on a false basis
it goes without saying that it is his duty and responsibility--that
is, the duty and responsibility of every one of you--to say so, and
also to state his reasons truthfully like a man if he is convinced
that they deprecate the order. But the moment the superior concerned
or the Reichfuehrer-SS--that applies to the Corps of Gruppenfuehrer
in most cases--or even the Fuehrer has made the decision and given
the order, it must be carried out, not only in word and letter, but
also in spirit. Whoever carries out the order must do so as a good
steward, as a true representative of the authority giving the command.
If you thought at first that this would be right and that that would
not be right or even wrong, then there are two alternatives. Thus if
a man thinks that he cannot be answerable for obeying an order, then
he should say quite honestly: [p. 76] I cannot be answerable for it. I
beg you to excuse me from it. Then the order will usually be: You must
still carry it out. Or you think: his nerve has gone he’s weak. Then
you can say: Good, retire on a pension. But orders must be sacred. If
the Generals obey, then the armies obey automatically. The more our
territory grows, the more does this sacredness of orders apply. It was
not all difficult to enforce an order in our little Germany. But to
enforce an order once we--and I am convinced of this--have garrisons
in the Urals,--that _is_ more difficult. Here it will not always be
possible to make sure that the order is carried out. Our controlling
authority may not, may never be,--as in Russia--the Commissar. The
only Commissar we have must be our own conscience, devotion to duty,
loyalty, obedience. If you lead the way with this example, gentlemen,
every subordinate will follow this example. But you will never be able
to demand obedience of your men if you do not give the same obedience
to authority over you, and give it blindly and without reserve.
3. Bravery
To bravery, I think we need least to exhort ourselves, for our leaders
and men are brave [p. 77].
4. Truthfulness
I now come to a fourth virtue, which is very rare in Germany, to
truthfulness. One of the greatest evils which has spread during the war
is the lack of truthfulness in messages, reports, and statements which
subordinate departments in civil life, in the state, the party and the
Services send in to the departments over them. The message, the report
is the basis of every decision. It is actually the fact that one can
now in many spheres assume in wartime that 95 out of 100 messages are
untrue or only half true or semi-correct [p. 80].
While on the subject of truthfulness I now come to another matter [p.
83]. It must so come about in war and in peace--in peace this will be
above all a training task--that we SS-men no longer conclude written
agreements, but that among us, as used to be the case formerly, the
giving of one’s word and the hand-shake signify the contract, and that
the hand-shake of one SS-man is--if necessary--certainly for 1 million
or more. It must so happen that the hand-shake or the promise of an
SS-man is more proverbially reliable than mortgage upon the greatest
value of anybody else’s. It must be so!
If we conclude agreements, we must keep them. If I make a contract
with an agent, even with a blackguard, I keep the contract. I take
my stand unreservedly on this point of view. If I announce in the
Generalgouvernement, that anyone who informs against a Jew who has
sought shelter and gone into hiding, shall have a third of the Jew’s
property, then it often happens that Secretary Huber or Second Lt.
(SA) Huber who--when he can--makes illegal trips, or does not hesitate
[p. 84] to order a new telephone or new pencils, who, that is, never
saves,--suddenly begins to save for the German Reich. He says for
instance: This Jew has 1200 RM. What, that means I would have to pay
out to the Pole who denounced him 4000 RM. No, I’ll save that for
Germany. The Pole shall only get 400 RM. So a little man goes and
breaks the promise of a whole organization. That sort of thing should
be impossible.
If we make a promise, it must be kept. If one Reichsfuehrer-SS pledges
to anyone support for his organization--as may very often be the case
now in the Balkans--this pledge must be kept. We must acquire such
a reputation for the keeping of contracts in the whole world, we in
the SS, that we thereby gain for Germany advantages of the greatest
value, namely faith through confidence. Many will come to us, who
will not approach official departments. The Balkans are always in a
state of confusion. That is a blessing. If they were united it would
be terrible. Things are chaotic in the Caucasus and in Russia. We can
only see to it--this is also a [p. 85] precept,--that the territories
we have occupied and the peoples we rule over never become united, that
they always remain disunited. For they would only be united against us.
If therefore we pledge our protection to a party [Splittergruppe] who
approaches us, it must be quite out of the question for any member of
the SS or the police, any member of the whole organization to go and
break the promise. This promise must be sacred.
Practical Tasks
In the way of practical duties for the Senior SS executive and [p.
103] Police Officers I see above all one task, which applies at
the same time to the Heads of the Main Offices as well. For me the
Senior SS Executive and Police Officer is the representative of the
Reichsfuehrer-SS in his area. It would be an evil day if the SS
and police fell out. It would be an evil day if the Main Offices,
performing their tasks well meaningly but mistakenly made themselves
independent by each having a downward chain of command. I really think
that the day of my overthrow would be the end of the SS. It must be,
and so come about, that this SS organization with all its branches--the
General-SS which is the common basis of all of them, the Waffen-SS, the
regular uniformed police [Ordnungspolizei], the SIPO, (with the whole
economic administration, schooling, ideological training, the whole
question of kindred), is, even under the tenth Reichsfuehrer-SS _one_
bloc, _one_ body, _one_ organization. Alas if we do not bring them
together. Alas if the individual main offices, the individual chiefs
had a false conception of their duty here, if they believed they were
doing a good thing, whereas in fact they were taking the first step
toward the end. We have come a long way on the road to amalgamation. In
the hard battles of this year the Waffen-SS has been welded together
in the bitterest hours from the most varied divisions and sections,
and from these it formed: body-guard units [Leibstandart], military
SS [Verfuegungstruppe], Death’s head units, and then the Germanic SS.
Now when our “Reich”, Death’s Head Cavalry Divisions and “Viking”
Divisions were there, everyone knew in these last weeks: “Viking” is at
my side, “Reich” is at my side, “Death’s Head” is at my side,--“Thank
God”, now nothing can happen to us.--The regular uniformed police and
Sipo, General-SS and Waffen-SS must now gradually amalgamate too, just
as this is and [p. 105] must be the case within the Waffen-SS. This
applies to matters concerning filling of posts, recruiting, schooling,
economic organization, and medical services. I am always doing
something towards this end, a bond is constantly being cast around
these sections of the whole to cause them to grow together. Alas, if
these bonds should ever be loosened,--then everything--you may be sure
of this--would sink back into its old insignificance in one generation,
and in a short space of time. It could then be said that that would be
no pity; if it wasn’t worth keeping alive, it should come to an end.
That is right. I would not hear of anything being kept, even if it is
my, our SS which is so dear to us, if it was not worth keeping alive.
Only I think that we could not be answerable for it to Germany, and
to Germania, for this Germanic Reich needs the SS organization. She
needs it at least for the next few centuries. Then, in a hundred, a
thousand, or two thousand years another form will surely be found. When
we are dead and gone, some remnant of us with a few of our fundamental
ideas will pull through and carry on. Out of this will grow something
new again, just as here and there we took over, and now bear, a torch
from the time of the Teutons, from the age of chivalry, from the
Vehmic organization, and from the [p. 106] Prussian army, in order to
light a great light from it. It will be just like that later on. I
believe that today we could not afford to let anything happen to this
SS. That is why I urge one thing on all of you, on you, my heads of
the main offices, my Senior Executive SS and Police Officers, and on
this whole corps of Gruppenfuehrers, the highest gradation in this
hierarchy of the SS organization: Always see the whole, always look at
the whole organization, never at your branch of it only, or only your
Oberabschnitt but always see the SS, and above it the Germanic Reich,
and above that our Fuehrer who has created and is still creating this
Reich.
The Future
When the war is won,--then, as I have already told you, our [p. 112]
work will start. We do not know when the war will end. It may be
sudden, or it may be long delayed. We shall see. But I say to you
_now_, if an armistice and peace comes suddenly, let no-one think that
he can then sleep the sleep of the just. Get all your Commanders,
Chiefs and SS-Fuehrers attuned to this; only then, gentlemen, shall
we be awake, for then, so many others will fall into this sleep. I am
going so to rouse the whole SS, and keep it so wide awake that we can
tackle reconstruction in Germany immediately. Then Germanic work will
be begun immediately in the General-SS, for then the harvest will be
ripe to be taken into the granary. We shall then call up age-groups
thereby law. We shall then immediately put all our Waffen-SS units
into excellent form, both as regards equipment and training. We shall
go on working in this first 6 months after the war, as though the
big offensive were starting on the next day. It will make all the
difference, [p. 113] if Germany has an operative reserve, an operative
backing, at the peace or armistice negotiations, of 20, 25 or 30
SS-divisions intact.
If the peace is a final one, we shall be able to tackle our great work
of the future. We shall colonize. We shall indoctrinate our boys
with the laws of the SS-organization. I consider it to be absolutely
necessary to the life of our peoples, that we should not only impart
the meaning of ancestry, grandchildren and future, but feel these to
be a part of our being. Without there being any talk about it, without
our needing to make use of rewards and similar material things, it
must be a matter of course that we have children. It must be a matter
of course that the most copious breeding should be from this racial
super-stratum of the Germanic people. In 20 to 30 years we must really
be able to present the whole of Europe with its leading class. If the
SS, together with the farmers,--we together with our friend Backe, then
run the colony in the East on a grand scale, without any restraint,
without any question about any kind of tradition but with nerve and
revolutionary impetus, we shall in 20 years push the national boundary
[Volkstumsgrenze] 500 kilometers Eastwards.
I requested of the Fuehrer today, that the SS--if we have fulfilled
our task and our duty by the end of the war--should have the privilege
of holding Germany’s most Easterly frontier as a defence frontier
[p. 114]. I believe this is the only privilege for which we have no
competitors. I believe not one person will dispute our claim to this
privilege. We shall be in a position there to exercise every young
age-group in the use of arms. We shall impose our laws on the East.
We will charge ahead and push our way forward little by little to the
Urals. I hope that our generation will successfully bring it about
that every age-group has fought in the East, and that every one of our
divisions spends a winter in the East every second or third year. Then
we shall never grow soft, then we shall never get SS members who only
come to us because it is distinguished or because the black coat will
naturally be very attractive in peacetime. Everyone will know that: “if
I join the SS, there is the possibility that I might be killed.” He
has contracted in writing that every second year he will not dance in
Berlin or attend the carnival in Munich, but that he will be posted to
the Eastern frontier in an ice-cold winter. Then we will have a healthy
elite for all time. Thus we will create the necessary conditions for
the whole Germanic people and [p. 115] the whole of Europe, controlled,
ordered and led by us, the Germanic people, to be able, in generations,
to stand the test in her battles of destiny against Asia, who will
certainly break out again. We do not know when that will be. Then, when
the mass of humanity of 1 to 1½ milliards lines up against us, the
Germanic people, numbering, I hope, 250 to 300 millions, and the other
European peoples, making a total of 600 to 700 millions--(and with
an outpost area stretching as far as the Urals, or, a hundred years,
beyond the Urals)--must stand the test in its vital struggle against
Asia. It would be an evil day if the Germanic people did not survive
it. It would be the end of beauty and “Kultur”, of the creative power
of this earth. That is the distant future. It is for that that we are
fighting, pledged to hand down the heritage of our ancestors.
We see into the distant future, because we know what it will be. That
is why we are doing our duty more fanatically than ever, more devoutly
than ever, more bravely, more obediently and more thoroughly than ever.
We want to be worthy of being permitted to be the first SS-men of the
Fuehrer, Adolf Hitler, in the long history of the Germanic people,
which stretches before us.
Now let us remember the Fuehrer, Adolf Hitler, who will create the
Germanic Reich and will lead us into the Germanic future [p. 116].
Our Fuehrer Adolf Hitler
Sieg Heil!
Sieg Heil!
Sieg Heil!
# # # # #
Speech of the Reichsfuehrer-SS Heinrich Himmler at Kharkow April 1943
My SS-Fuehrer,
It is perhaps very strange, that we should meet in a university of the
Russian State, here at Kharkow,--at this Kharkow, which has played so
great a part, and really will play a still bigger part in the history
of the war. Until last year it was of no very great significance. This
year it has become, like Stalingrad, but in the reverse sense, a city
of destiny in German war history, in German history. I have asked you,
the Commanding Officers of the three SS-Divisions, who took part in
this campaign from the Dnieper to Kharkow and carried out this campaign
practically alone and forced a decision, to come together here in
order, as has been the custom for many many years, as long as there
has been an SS, to meet each other again, and in order once more to
establish a few facts about the past and the future.
I would like, in a few words, to outline the whole position and
situation with regard to the war.
Today, Germany is on the borders of Europe everywhere. These European
frontiers stretch up as far as the North Cape, down the Norwegian
coast, through Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium and France and jump
over to Africa, continue to Tunis to form a bridgehead, run across as
far as the frontiers formed by the sea, then from Greece and Crete up
to the borders of the neutral states of Turkey and Bulgaria, to join
hands again here in the East. I would like to give it a name: it is the
great fortress of Europe.
It will undoubtedly happen, that the enemy will make the attempt,
today, tomorrow or the next day, at some time, to break into this
fortress of Europe at one point or another. That will undoubtedly be
the case. Possibly he will be able to force an entry for a shorter or
longer period at one point or another in places which we do not have
in our personal and responsible control, or which we are not defending
with our arms [p. 2]. One thing is certain: wherever the enemy lands,
if once we can get to grips with him on the Continent, where we are
not dependent on supplies from overseas, that ought to be, and will
be, all right with us. On the whole, however, it is here in the East
that the decision lies. The fortress of Europe with its frontiers must
be held and will be held too, as long as is necessary. The decision,
therefore, lies here in the East; here must the Russian enemy, this
people numbering two hundred million Russians, be destroyed on the
battle field and person by person, and made to bleed to death ...
It is my opinion--and here, I believe, I am speaking to men [p. 3] who
already understand this--that we must conduct the war and our campaign
on these lines:--how can we take the most men from the Russians--dead
or alive? We shall do it by killing them or taking them prisoner and
[p. 4] really putting them to work, by endeavoring to gain as much
control as possible over any territory we occupy, and by leaving
empty of people any territory we dispose of, any areas we make over
to the enemy. Either they must be deported and will be used as labour
in Germany for Germany, or they will just die in battle. To hand
people back again, giving the enemy workers once more and enabling
him to recruit again,--that I think, taking the broad view, would be
absolutely wrong. That could not be advocated * * *
On the other side, one thing goes on the same as ever, the U-boat
war, this dreadful stranglehold on the throat of the enemy. [p. 5] I
have good reason to be convinced that this stranglehold will never
be relaxed, but will tighten. I cannot help feeling that things are
beginning to go worse with England these last few months in matters
of supply. That by no means indicates that England will collapse
today, tomorrow or the next day, but it does mean that we will just be
approaching the time when one or other of our opponents, once Russia is
conquered and eliminated as a factor, will come to the conclusion that
it is not worth carrying on the war. The result--and I am convinced
of this, I believe it and I know it--the result, the end of this war,
regardless of however many months or even years it lasts, will be this:
that the Reich, the German Reich or the Germanic Reich of the German
nation, will with just title find confirmation of its evolution, that
we have an outlet and a way open to us in the East, and that then
centuries later, a politically Germany--a Germanic World Empire will
be formed. That will be the result, that will be the fruit of all the
many, many sacrifices, which have been made and which must still be
made.
We have,--I would say, as very consistent National Socialists, [p. 7]
taken the question of blood as our starting point. We were the first
really to solve the problem of blood by action, and in this connection,
by problem of blood, we of course do not mean anti-semitism.
Anti-semitism is exactly the same as delousing. Getting rid of lice is
not a question of ideology. It is a matter of cleanliness. In just the
same way, anti-semitism, for us, has not been a question of ideology,
but a matter of cleanliness, which now will soon have been dealt with.
We shall soon be deloused. We have only 20,000 lice left, and then
the matter is finished within the whole of Germany. But for us the
question of blood was a reminder of our own worth, a reminder of what
is actually the basis holding this German people together. Just as is
the case in the years between 1938 and 1943, in exactly the same way
as now, the same ill-founded reproaches were made then: well, if you
bring the Nordic man so much to the fore, you’re creating a new split,
a new class-distinction,--it’s a new class hatred. We’re overcoming
the social barriers, so I’ve been told by important party members, and
now you’re setting up racial ones. My reply to these people has always
been: If you want to look at things in a negative way, there is nothing
in the world which you cannot see in a negative way. From the negative
angle, of course, you can argue that way. I see it differently, for I
see it on this plane: What is the binding factor which holds the man
in East Prussia and the man in the Black Forest together, the man in
Schleswig-Holstein and in Hamburg and the man in Munich, in Graz, in
Pomerania, in Berlin [p. 8] and in the Rhineland? What is then the
factor or the element which contains all that is dear and precious and
valuable to us? It is in fact what we Germans call inherent Kultur, it
is this Germanic, this Nordic component of our blood.
In one operation those peoples must and will be incorporated in the
Germanic Reich which, at one time, were part of Germany, part of the
German Empire (the Roman Empire and the German nation) and belonged
to us up to 1806 or only till 1648,--that is Flanders, Wallonia, and
the Netherlands. They were a part of the Reich [p. 10]. Over and above
this, we must have the power to bring into the fold, and make a part of
our community in a second operation, those Germanic peoples and states
too, which have never been part and parcel of the German Reich,--I mean
Denmark and Norway, the Danish and Norwegian people.
I very soon formed a Germanic SS in the various countries. We very soon
got Germanic volunteers from them [p. 11]. It has not always been liked
and is still not liked today by many of the political leaders in these
countries. From the beginning, I have said to them, “You can do what
you like and leave what you like. I leave everything entirely to you,
but you may be sure, that an SS will be set up in your country, and
there is but one SS in Europe, and that is the Germanic SS, led by the
Reichsfuehrer-SS. You can resist, or you can offer no resistance, it’s
all the same to me. We shall do it in any case!” We have told them that
curtly and plainly and clearly from the beginning.
I have said to the SS-men from the beginning too: We do not expect
you to renounce your nation, or do anything which a proud and
self-respecting fellow who loves his nation cannot do. We do not expect
you to become German out of opportunism. But we do expect you to
subordinate your national ideal to the greater racial and historical
ideal, to the Germanic Reich.
In addition, one thing is quite obvious. All of us, who are members of
the Germanic peoples, can be happy and thankful that once in thousands
of years fate has given us, from among the Germanic peoples, such a
genius, a leader, our Fuehrer Adolf Hitler, and you should be happy to
be allowed to work with us.
Although I do not wish to discuss any individual official matters
here, I would still like to mention in a slightly official way, in my
capacity as a military man, what I said before about racial Germans. I
beg you never to commit the psychological error of speaking of Germans
who came from Roumania or Hungary or Croatia, as Croats, Roumanians
or Hungarians. I also beg you never to make the mistake of letting a
man who speaks [p. 12] German badly or cannot speak and read German,
sense this, or let him sense the thought: “You are a second-rate
German, for you can’t read or write German properly.” I beg you
rather, (and here too I am stating a very sober opinion), to think in
this case of these Germans in the whole of the Balkans, still more of
those overseas, in America, when one day we must fetch over here in
millions,--and we shall succeed in doing so--who have held out for
centuries. I am certainly of the opinion that if a mighty German Reich
with an incredible upward urge in its very being and a great German
Fuehrer had not now come into being at this time and in the last few
decades, it would have been the end of these Germans. A person with a
very strong character can personally rise above his surroundings for
years and perhaps for decades. A race, if it is in small groups, cannot
in the long run hold out against its surroundings. And we must never
forget this: these Germans do not usually live together in hundreds
of thousands, but a thousand here in a few villages, and two thousand
there, and 20 thousand at the most somewhere else. But they do not
live together in large numbers. So they are always encircled by a
foreign nation [Volkstum], and surrounded by its influence, but are
above all surrounded by the influence of the people of the country.
_They_ are not the people of the country, those are the others. They
are subjects of a state of foreign nationality, which, in any moment
of doubt, is their enemy, or at the very best, as, shall we say,
Roumania, a tolerably neutral and impartial observer. But on the whole
these Germans have lived, throughout the centuries of German weakness,
from the Thirty Years’ War up till now, in surroundings calculated not
to strengthen their consciousness of German race [Deutschtum] but to
destroy it.
There was something else besides this. If one of these Germans wanted
to get anywhere he could only do so by entering the state system of the
foreign people as an official or an officer. It is no mere chance--[p.
13]. I am not making spiteful assertions now but merely stating the
facts--that, for instance, among Hungarian generals there is such a
considerable percentage of men of German origin, who of course had,
in most cases, to alter their names if they wanted to get anywhere.
In many cases, if they did not do so, and remained obdurate about
it, they were subsequently removed from office. I quote here as an
example the present Chief of the Hungarian General Staff, General
Sombacke, who in his youth at the Austrian Military Academy still
had the thoroughly good German name of Knaus. May I remind you of
Feldmarschall or Feldmarschall-Lieutnant Raab, who as we all know, has
now retired. Both are of German descent, and one could name countless
hundreds of leading men in these South-Eastern States who are all of
German origin, had to become part of the alien nation, and were then
drained [eine Auslaugung bildeten] of their own most valuable national
characteristics.
If, then, we get sons of these racial Germans [Volksdeutschtum] who
have still survived there--(some are genuine volunteers, and others
come as a result of a levy, for we have organized the racial groups
from within the Reich through the SS, so that without possessing
political power we have in fact, morally such strength and power among
these people that we can compel a man, compel him morally, to serve
with us in Germany, due entirely to the power of the whole German
national community)--if we therefore get these men, you must not make
it difficult for them to enter our community by calling him by the
name which you judge he will not wish to hear. A Saxon from Siebenburg
will never let it be said that he is a Roumanian. It’s just against
that that he and his fathers have fought for 700 years. And a German
from Hungary will never let it be said that he is a Hungarian. If you
know how he has been thrashed by many a Hungarian gendarme, before
he came to us, how his mother was thrashed, and his parents driven
from hearth and home, you can imagine how bitter it is for him if he
now joins German service-men and they say: here comes a Hungarian. Or
you can imagine how bitter it is for him when he is reproached for
something which he cannot help. If we had not been to a German school
we should not be able to read and write German either. If we had been
forced, shall we say, to go to a Polish school, we should write Polish
too, although we profess to be Germans. And that is often the case
with these men. I must therefore expect of you understanding and human
sympathy in this matter, and must expect that the leaders, in addition
to their many other duties, will undertake to see that additional
German instruction in reading, speaking and writing, be given to these
men at every opportunity that is offered. I lay special emphasis on
this matter, because by negotiations, we have now managed to make an
arrangement enabling us in future to enlist even those Germans who up
to now have been serving in the Roumanian army. So we can expect a
great influx from the Germans of the South-East.
We know that these clashes with Asia and Jewry are necessary [p. 16]
for evolution. They give the cue [Auftakt] for the European Continent
to unite. These clashes are the only evolutionary possibility which
will enable us one day, now that Fate has given us the Fuehrer Adolf
Hitler, to create the Germanic Reich. They are the necessary condition,
for our race, and our blood to create for itself and put under
cultivation, in the years of peace, (during which we must live and work
austerely, frugally and like Spartans), that settlement area in which
new blood can breed, as in a botanical garden so to speak. Only by this
means can the Continent become a Germanic Continent, capable of daring
to embark, in one or [p. 17] two or three or five or ten generations,
on the conflict with this Continent of Asia which spews out hordes of
humanity. Perhaps we shall also have to hold in check other coloured
peoples who will soon be in their certain prime, and thus preserve
the world, which is the world of our blood, of our children and of
our grandchildren. Now it is just this world we like the best, the
Germanic world, the world of Nordic life. We know that this conflict
with the advancing pressure from Asia, with the 200 million Russians,
is necessary. And we shall win as sure as I am speaking here in the
University of Kharkow. We shall have to pass through many a valley,
many a narrow defile. Many will grow tired on the way. Of course they
will mostly be those who have no reason to do so. To put it vulgarly,
many will do something in their trousers. Many people will get shaky
at the knees. The only thing that matters is that we stand firm. This
is what is important for us as SS-men, for our province of duty and
our mission (it is a task additional to those of the whole German
Armed Forces and the whole German people): That is what I would like
to impress upon you, this is what I beg you, as Commanding Officers,
as Chiefs, and as leaders to teach the young men again and again in
their ideological instruction. That is what I demand and exact of
you,--that you really concern yourselves with the man, the young fellow
of 17 to 18 who comes to us, and with many who are in our ranks not as
volunteers but as conscripts. I ask you to look after them, and guide
them, and not let them go before they are really saturated with our
spirit and are fighting as the old guard fought before us--that is what
I request and demand of you.
We have only one task, to stand firm and carry on the racial struggle
without mercy. I will now say again something which I have already
today said to the men elsewhere: we will never let that excellent
weapon, the dread and terrible reputation which preceded us in the
battles [p. 18] for Kharkow fade, but will constantly add new meaning
to it. They can call us what they like in the world, the main thing is
that we are the eternally loyal, obedient, steadfast and unconquerable
fighting men of the Germanic people and of the Fuehrer, the SS of the
Germanic Reich.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1932-PS
SS Main Economic Administrative office
[SS-Wirtschafts-Verwaltungshauptamt]
Oranienburg 7 June 1943
Office group D, Concentrations Camps
D I/ 1 Az: 14 c 2 / Ot / S.--Secret diary No. 743/43
Subject: Treatment of prisoners who fall under the night and fog
decree. [NN-Erlass].
Reference: Reich Security Main Office [Reichs-Sicherheitshauptamt] IV
c 2 General No. 103/42 g - issued 5 May, 1943
Annexes: None
SECRET
To the Camp commanders of the Concentrations Camps
Dachau, Sachsenhausen, Buchenwald, Mauthausen, Flossenburg, Neumarkt,
Auschwitz, Gross-Rosen, Natzweiler, Stu., Ravensbruck, Herz., Riga,
Lublin and the Civilian Camp Bergen-Belsen.
[Da., Sah., Bu., Mau., Flo., Neu., Au., Gr.-Ro., Natz., Stu., Rav.,
Herz., Ri., Lub., und Zil Bergen-Belsen.]
I send the following decree of the Reich Security Main Office
[Reichssicherheitshauptamt] regarding treatment of Night and Fog [NN]
prisoners for acknowledgement and strictest observation.
The purpose of the NN decree is the elimination of all anti-German
forces in the occupied territories and their being brought into the
Reich.
The relatives and the population are to be kept in uncertainty about
the fate of these persons. In order to achieve this, the NN decree
further provides that prisoners of this kind should be placed under
prohibitions to write, to receive mail and parcels, to talk, or that
information should be given about them. In this regard it is irrelevant
whether it is the question of a NN-prisoner of the old or new type. By
NN-prisoners of the old type are understood those whom the military
courts have handed over to the disposing agencies for shipment to the
Reich, while the so-called New-Type NN-prisoners have been brought
directly by the arresting agencies of the Security-Police and of the SD
to the concentration camps (KL) in the Reich without the participation
of military courts.
The Agencies of the security police and of the SD in question are
instructed to submit to the Reich security Main Office and to the
concentration camp in charge questionnaires on all prisoners who
fall under the NN-decree. This questionnaire should contain detailed
personal data, data on racial origin, the reason for arrest, the former
place of custody and other incriminating elements. These questionnaires
are to be marked by a seal “Night and Fog” [Nacht und Nebel].
Upon the reports of the agencies of the Security Police and of the SD
a collective order for protective custody will be issued here with the
questionnaires attached and the agencies will be further instructed to
transfer the arrestees to a concentration camp.
Insofar as Germanic NN-prisoners are concerned, they will be
transferred from here to the concentration camp of Natzweiler
exclusively; in all other cases the NN-prisoners will be shipped to a
concentration camp depending on the location of the transferring agency
of the Security Police and of the SD with consideration of the echelon
division and of capacity of the concentration camp.
The camp commanders of concentration camps in which there are already
NN-prisoners have to order immediately that the prisoners should
be investigated according to racial points of view and that the
_Germanic_ NN-prisoners should be transferred to the concentration
camp of Natzweiler. Compliance with this order is to be reported on
individual questionnaires for each prisoner. The camp commander of the
concentration camp of Natzweiler has to take care that the NN-prisoners
are to be kept separated from the other prisoners.
In other respects the directives of the RSHA-Referat ND 4--which have
been sent together with the secret letter No. 551/42, dated 18 Aug.
1942, are referred to.
Furthermore it is pointed out again as has been ordered already in the
circular decree, issued 2 Feb. 1943, secret diary No. 111/43--that
death notices of NN-prisoners are to be submitted _exclusively_ to the
agency particular transferring agency of the Security Police and of the
SD, to the RSHA and to this agency, in order to exclude divulgence of
the place of custody of an NN-prisoner. Hereby the decrees regulating
the procedure in cases of death, particularly any notification of
the relatives are cancelled. The effects of deceased Night and Fog
prisoners are to be sent in their entirety to the transferring agency
in charge which will guard it until further notice.
The chief of the central office
[signature illegible]
SS Lt. Colonel
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1933-PS
Main Bureau for SS Economic Administration
Bureau Group Chief D--Concentration Camp-- DI/l/Az: 14 f 13/L/S
Secret order of the day--No. 612/43
_Subject_: Action 14 f 13 in the concentration camps.
_Reference_: Local directive DI/1/Az: 14 f 13/OT/S--Secret order of
the day No. 34/43 of S.1.43
STATE SECRET
To the Camp Commanders of the Concentration Camps
Da., Sah., Bu., Mau., Flo., Neu., Au., Gr.-Ro., Natz., Stu., Rav.,
Ri., Herz., Lubl., and Bergen-Belsen.
Copy to: Chief of Bureau D II, III in the house
The Reich Fuehrer-SS and Chief of German Police has decided, after
consultation, that in the future only mentally sick [geisteskranke]
prisoners may be selected for action 14 F 13 by the medical commissions
appointed for this purpose.
All other prisoners incapable of working (tubercular cases, bed-ridden
cripples, etc.) are to be basically excepted from this action.
Bedridden prisoners are to be drafted for suitable work which they can
perform in bed.
The order of the Reich Fuehrer SS is to be obeyed strictly in the
future.
Requests for fuel for this purpose therefore do not take place.
[signature illegible]
SS-Brigadefuehrer and Major General of the Waffen-SS
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1939-PS
A “Proclamation to Workers” addressed to employees and employers by Dr.
Robert Ley on 5 September 1939. Quoted from the chapter “The German
Worker Has Recognized * * *” pp. 14-17, of “Forge of the Sword”, a
collection in book form of speeches by, and articles about, Dr. Robert
Ley, published in 1942 by the Central Publishing House of the NSDAP,
Franz Eher Successor, Munich, with a foreword by Reichs Marshal Goering.
The German people in its over-all attitude is what the Fuehrer has
made of that people after the collapse. The poised and self-assured
attitude of the German people in the current world crisis contrasts so
enormously with the insecurity of the so-called democratic nations,
that each thinking human being must ask himself about the cause of this
state of affairs, which is so full of hope for us Germans.
The achievement of the Fuehrer in the entire political sphere is
a LARGE SCALE AND UNIQUE ACHIEVEMENT OF EDUCATION. The following
principles have been taught by the Fuehrer and are decisive for the
present strong attitude of Germany.
The Fuehrer has taught the German people that its existence and its
being is dependent upon the unqualified perception of all Germans that
the battle for life of the German people cannot be fought in limited
areas, but that this battle for life means wrestling and battling in
all spheres of life. It is the teaching of the totality for the battle
for life.
We National Socialists say: social policy and economy are one
and belong together. Progress and development are socialism. A
socialist can never be a pacifist; on the contrary, he must ALWAYS
STAND PREPARED AT THE HIGHEST PITCH OF MILITARY READINESS to attain
the socialist objective. Peace and war are not separate, mutually
exclusive conditions, but in each case they are only a different guise
[Erscheinungsform] for one and the same struggle of the people to
secure its living potentialities. We National Socialists do not hope
for gifts and miracles, but we recognize that every thing must be
fought and worked for honestly. We do not believe in chance, and we
leave nothing to arbitrariness either. To us Fight is Life, and to us
Life means Fight. We have no inclination to rest and restrict ourselves
to watching, but we know that Life would simply pass us by were we to
withhold ourselves from the Fight. We could never make up for what we
neglect today.
BECAUSE OF THAT THE FUEHRER HAS FURTHERMORE TAUGHT US THAT OUR GERMAN
PEOPLE MUST COMMIT ALL THE STRENGTH AND ENERGY IT POSSESSES TO FIGHT
THROUGH THE STRUGGLE OF LIFE AND DESTINY, SO AS TO ATTAIN VICTORY. We
National Socialists REJECT HALF MEASURES AND COMPROMISES. They never
lead to the goal, but lull people to sleep until they wake up one day
in horror and dread. COWARDS PERISH!
Because of that we National Socialists have mobilized all resources
and all our energies during the past seven years, so as to be equipped
for the supreme effort of battle. WE DO NOT THROW OURSELVES INTO
ADVENTURES, AND WE ARE NOT SO UNSCRUPULOUS AS TO LEAVE ANYTHING TO
ACCIDENT.
True,--when according to human judgment and according to the state of
our knowledge all preparations have been made, then we have never as
yet hesitated to venture the ultimate.
OBSERVE THE FUEHRER! Is he not the living model! His own career,
his leadership of the NSDAP, the seizure of power, the conduct of
the state, the regaining of Austria, the Sudeten area, Bohemia and
Moravia and finally the Memel territory,--all great events demonstrate
ever anew the fortunate fact that the Fuehrer prepares anything and
everything to the last detail. He calculates, ponders, elucidates,--he
acts. But when a decision has been arrived at, then there is no more
going back. He holds fast. He is tenacious.
Thus did the Fuehrer’s great successes come about, and thus new
successes will be added.
In conclusion the Fuehrer has taught a third principle: THE
PREREQUISITE for any battle and THE PREREQUISITE for the mobilization
of all our strength and energy is the _folk and fate community of
all Germans_. [Volks und Schicksalsgemeinschaft]. Even though our
professions may differ, even though our interests may clash, even
though the individuality of the various tribes and provinces may reveal
itself, one thing encompasses us, whether we are workers or soldiers:
THE RECOGNITION, THAT WE GERMANS BELONG TOGETHER IN AN INDISSOLUBLE
COMMUNITY OF FATE.
For example, what a splendid example was the building of the West Wall,
which revealed convincingly and unforgettably the cohesion of worker
and soldier!
THE COMMUNITY OF THE FACTORY IS NOT A MATTER OF PAPER VERBIAGE, BUT IT
IS AN UNEQUIVOCAL FACT.
The Great War 1914/1918 was not lost because the German soldier had
become a coward, but because dissension and discord tore the people
asunder.
Destiny will test us anew. This time we will demonstrate what the
National Socialist community can accomplish. This community is not a
matter of paper verbiage, it is not a phrase! The first precautionary
measure, the introduction of rationing certificates has proven how
seriously the National Socialist state believes in the total people’s
community.
Thus you, German man and German woman workers, will understand that
in this gigantic fight of Germany for justice and freedom, for living
space and bread, THERE IS NO PLACE WHATEVER FOR EVERYDAY QUARRELS. YOU,
working German, will learn to understand THAT THE LONG-RANGE PLANS OF
THE FUEHRER AUTOMATICALLY PRECLUDE ALL DISSENSION.
It will be impossible in future, too, to play the Home Front against
the Fighting Front and Fighting Front against the Home Front. Not a
front sector at some border is alone involved in battle, but the entire
German people. The worker at his drill press, the merchant at his
counter, the inventor in his laboratory, the soldier in the trenches,
they are all equally determined to fight for Germany’s freedom.
No one will be able to evade the question: “Do you believe in
Germany?”, and no one will want to evade that question. And the answer
to this question will resound audibly for the whole world: “Yes,
indeed, we believe in Germany because we believe in the work of the
Fuehrer.”
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1940-PS
VOELKISCHER BEOBACHTER, Southern German Edition (Publisher Franz Eher,
Successor), issue 136, of 11 May 1933, Page 1, column 5.
THE GERMAN LEADERS OF LABOR AN EDICT BY ADOLF HITLER
Berlin, 10 May
The Fuehrer Adolf Hitler has issued the following edict:
I appoint the Chief of Staff of the Political Organization [P.O.] of
the NSDAP, Dr. Robert Ley, as leader of the German Labor Front.
I appoint District Leader [Gauleiter] Forster Danzig, as leader of the
Employees’ Associations [Angestelltenverbaende].
I appoint the leader of the National Socialist Factory Cell
Organization [N.S.B.O.], Schuhmann, as leader of the Workers’
Associations [Arbeiterverbaende].
Berlin, 10 May
Adolf Hitler.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1942-PS
LEGAL REGULATIONS AND LEGAL PROBLEMS OF THE MOVEMENT
[Rechtseinrichtungen und Rechtsaufgaben der Bewegung] by Dr. Otto
Gauweiler (Munich 1939), page 20.
_a. Amendments in Reich Legislation_:
By an order of the Fuehrer, dated 25 July 1934, his Deputy, as well as
appointed reviewers, were given the power to take part in the editing
of bills dealing with all the departments of the Reich. On the basis
of this decree, the Deputy of the Fuehrer was to be invited to all
discussions of the department heads, to which he could also send his
representatives. Drafts of the laws had to be presented to the Deputy
of the Fuehrer in the form of reviewer’s drafts [Referentenentwuerfe]
and not as Cabinet bills. From a special order from the Fuehrer, 6
April 35, this privilege of participation in government affairs by
the Fuehrer’s Deputy was expanded to include all executive decisions
and orders insofar as they were published in the Reichsgesetzblatt.
The Deputy of the Fuehrer can on his own initiative introduce bills,
etc. regardless in what field; insofar as the good of the party is
concerned, he is the man in charge.
Thus, the direct influence of the movement on the legislation and the
executive branch was assured at a point where up to now the laws were
an internal affair of the individual ministries. From now on, technical
considerations or considerations of time cannot interfere with the
requests and plans of the party.
PARTIAL COPY OF DOCUMENT 1947-PS
From: Freiherr v. Fritsch.
To: Baronin Margot v. Schutzbar.
Achterberg, 11 Dec 38.
My dear Baroness:
Many thanks for your two letters. * * * It is really peculiar that so
many people should look to the future with increasing fears, in spite
of the Fuehrer’s indisputable successes during the past years. Herr
von Wiegand’s letter interested me very much and I am returning it
herewith. Unfortunately, I am afraid he is right when he speaks of the
profound hate which is directed to us by a large part of the world.
Soon after the war I came to the conclusion that we should have to be
victorious in three battles, if Germany were to become powerful again:
1. The battle against the working class--Hitler has won this.
2. Against the Catholic Church, perhaps better expressed against
Ultramontanism, and
3. Against the Jews.
We are in the midst of these battles and the one against the Jews is
the most difficult. I hope everyone realizes the intricacies of this
campaign.
* * * * * * *
(signed): FRITSCH
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1948-PS
The Reichsstatthalter in Vienna
I a Pol.--VIII--136/40 Vienna 7 November 1940
Subject: Compulsory Labor of Able-bodied Jews.
1. Notice:
On 5 November 1940 telephone conversation with Colonel
[Standartenfuehrer] Huber of the Gestapo. The Gestapo has received
directions from the Reich Security Main Office [RSHA], as to how
able-bodied Jews should be drafted for compulsory labor service.
Investigations are being made at present by the Gestapo, to find out
how many able-bodied Jews are still available in order to make plans
for the contemplated mass projects. It is assumed that there are not
many more Jews available. If some should still be available, however,
the Gestapo has no scruples to use the Jews even for the removal of the
destroyed synagogues.
SS Colonel Huber will report personally to the “Regierungspraesident”
in this matter.
I have reported to the “Regierungspraesident” accordingly. The matter
should further be kept in mind.
2. Presented anew: 25 November 1940
Presented anew: 20.12.40
[Initialed]
By order:
[Signed] Dr. Fischer.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1949-PS
State Administration of Reich Gau Vienna
Statistical Office for Reich Gau Ostmark
Zl. 3305/I 39
Vienna, 15 December 1939
1. Heldenplatz, Neue Burg
Tel. R 27-5-65
To the Reich Commissar for the Reunion of the Austrian Nation with
the German Reich
through channels via the Governor [Regierungspraesident] of Vienna
The Statistical Office for Reich Gau Ostmark has the honor to submit
herewith, in the enclosure, an initial compilation of early results
of this year’s census relative to the number and reduction in number
of Jews and part Jews in Reich Gau Ostmark, especially in the Vienna
districts, together with a brief commentary.
[Signature illegible]
1 file of the Statistical Office for the Reich Districts (Gaue) of the
Ostmark, together with a summary of 15 December 1939. Zl. 3305/I 39
# # # # #
_Jews and Part Jews in the Reich Districts [Gaue] of the Ostmark_
In the census of 17 May 1939, the question was put for the first time
whether one of an individual’s grandparents was full Jew by race.
The declarations were to be made by the people on the “Supplementary
Card for Data on Descent and Education” in full and to the best of
their ability; this supplementary card was to be given to the honorary
census taker in a sealed, opaque envelope, which was opened only
when the statistical count was made. No check has yet been made as
to the correctness of the information submitted. In the compiling
of the statistics, everyone who reported that three or four of his
grandparents were full Jews was counted as a full Jew himself,
everyone with two Jewish grandparents as a part Jew, Grade I, and
correspondingly everyone with only one Jewish grandparent as a part
Jew, Grade II. The resulting slight deviation from the pertinent legal
definitions of full Jew and part Jew was occasioned by formulation of
the question in the simplest possible way.
According to the initial results of this year’s census, there were
91,480 full Jews and 22,344 part Jews of Grades I and II in Vienna as
of 17 May 1939. In the remaining Reich Districts of the Ostmark there
were 3,073 full Jews and 4,241 part Jews. According to this, there were
altogether 121,138 Jews in the Ostmark, of whom 113,824, i.e. 94%,
lived in Vienna, 3% in Niederdonau, 1% in the Steiermark, and less than
1% in each of the remaining Gaus.
While 80% of all the Jews in Vienna were full Jews and only 14% were
part Jews, Grade I, and 6% part Jews, Grade II, in the other Reich Gaus
the part Jews predominated, totaling 58%, as against 42% who were full
Jews. Only in Niederdonau were the full Jews, with a total of almost
2,000, approximately as numerous as the part Jews.
These varying proportions of full Jews and part Jews are explained
primarily by the emigration of Jews following the political change
over. This emigration had reduced the number of _full Jews_ in the
Reich Gaus of the Ostmark, excluding Vienna and Niederdonau, to a small
remainder of 1,103 by the time of the census.
The extent of the emigration of full Jews can be estimated
approximately by comparison with the number of persons of Jewish faith
reported in the census of 1934. It must be remembered, however, that in
1934 the number of those of Jewish faith did not include all full Jews
and that, on the other hand, a small number of those of Jewish faith
were part Jews, Grades I and II.
With this reservation, it can be stated that the number of Jews in
the Ostmark (not including the annexed Sudeten-German regions) has
diminished from 191,528 Jews by faith to 94,384 full Jews. At the
same time the number of Jews in the Reich Districts (Gaus), excluding
Vienna, decreased by 13,000 i.e. approximately 82% to 3,000. In Vienna
alone, the decrease amounted to 84,000 persons, i.e. 48%.
The ratio of the sexes among full Jews has become so greatly dislocated
that there are 100 male full Jews to every 136 female full Jews in
Vienna, which can probably be ascribed to the earlier emigration of
the Jewish males. The ratio among the part Jews, comparatively few of
whom are thought to have emigrated, is 100:112, more nearly the average
surplus of women in the population of Vienna.
According to data furnished by the Central Office for Jewish
emigration, Vienna IV., about 100,000 Jews emigrated from the Ostmark
in the period between the change over [Umbruch] and the census. This
number is very close to the figure of 97,000 given above as the
reduction in Jews since the census of 1934. Some 26,000 persons of
Jewish faith emigrated from the Ostmark in the months succeeding the
census.
While the problem of full Jews is almost completely solved, therefore,
in the Reich Districts of the Ostmark, with the exception of Vienna,
from a numerical standpoint the problem of part Jews still plays a
relatively large role. For example, almost half of the approximately
1,000 Jews in Oberdonau are part Jews, Grade I, and more than one
quarter are part Jews, Grade II. Similar conditions prevail in the
remaining Reich Gaus, particularly in Salzburg, in Carinthia, and in
the Tyrol.
Nevertheless the problem of part Jews in the Ostmark is first and
foremost a problem for the Reich District of Vienna, where there are
86% of the part Jews Grade I and 80% of the part Jews Grade II. Gau
Niederdonau takes second place, with a large interval, but has only 6%
of the part Jews Grade I and 8% of the part Jews Grade II.
Out of all the part Jews in the Ostmark, 68% had two Jewish
grandparents and 32% had one Jewish grandparent. It is worth noting
that 70% of all Jews in Vienna were half-Jews, whereas less than 60%
were half-Jews in the remaining Gaus of the Ostmark.
At the present time the problem of part Jews in Vienna is still
numerically overshadowed by the large number of full Jews, of whom
there are estimated in round figures to be 70,000, since approximately
4,000 persons of Jewish faith have emigrated from the Ostmark every
month since the census--with the exception of September.
[Signature illegible]
15.12.39.
JEWS AND PART JEWS IN THE DISTRICT OF VIENNA
Preliminary Results of 1939 Census * JEWS
---------------------+--------------------------+--------------------------
| GRAND TOTAL | FULL JEWS
DISTRICTS +--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------
| total | male | female | total | male | female
---------------------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------
I. Innere Stadt | 6,825 | 3,001 | 3,824 | 5,947 | 2,596 | 3,351
II. Leopoldstadt | 33,889 | 14,483 | 19,406 | 31,564 | 13,370 | 18,194
III. Landstrasse | 7,623 | 3,290 | 4,333 | 5,890 | 2,530 | 3,360
IV. Wieden | 3,166 | 1,365 | 1,801 | 2,121 | 901 | 1,220
V. Margareten | 2,712 | 1,229 | 1,483 | 1,769 | 788 | 981
VI. Mariahilf | 4,634 | 2,016 | 2,618 | 3,826 | 1,653 | 2,173
VII. Neubau | 5,187 | 2,263 | 2,924 | 4,181 | 1,786 | 2,395
VIII. Josefstadt | 3,699 | 1,668 | 2,031 | 2,958 | 1,314 | 1,644
IX. Alsergrund | 12,784 | 5,179 | 7,525 | 11,281 | 4,527 | 6,754
X. Favoriten | 2,307 | 1,057 | 1,250 | 1,393 | 609 | 784
XI. Aimmering | 447 | 218 | 229 | 265 | 134 | 131
XII. Meidling | 1,986 | 900 | 1,086 | 1,045 | 444 | 601
XIII. Hietzing | 2,008 | 851 | 1,157 | 1,310 | 524 | 786
XIV. Penzing | 1,729 | 759 | 970 | 933 | 403 | 530
XV. Fanfhaus | 3,667 | 1,572 | 2,095 | 2,573 | 1,051 | 1,522
XVI. Ottakring | 3,123 | 1,440 | 1,683 | 1,874 | 831 | 1,043
XVII. Hernals | 1,690 | 760 | 930 | 934 | 394 | 540
XVIII. Wahlring | 3,246 | 1,411 | 1,835 | 2,155 | 922 | 1,233
XIX. Dobling | 2,961 | 1,325 | 1,636 | 2,030 | 845 | 1,185
XX. Brigittenau | 7,082 | 3,020 | 4,063 | 6,025 | 2,519 | 3,506
XXI. Floridsdorf | 1,391 | 671 | 720 | 524 | 224 | 300
XXII. Grossenzerdorf | 171 | 82 | 89 | 45 | 21 | 24
XXIII. Schwechat | 364 | 215 | 149 | 286 | 175 | 112
XXIV. Modling | 365 | 176 | 189 | 113 | 56 | 57
XXV. Liesing | 507 | 205 | 302 | 240 | 89 | 151
XXVI. Klosternauburg | 340 | 161 | 179 | 198 | 93 | 105
---------------------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------
Total |113,824 | 49,317 | 64,507 | 91,480 | 38,798 | 52,682
Table continued ...
---------------------+-------------------------+-------------------------
| PART JEWS, GRADE I | PART JEWS, GRADE II
DISTRICTS +--------+-------+--------+-------+--------+--------
| total | male | female | total | male | female
---------------------+--------+-------+--------+-------+--------+--------
I. Innere Stadt | 650 | 293 | 357 | 228 | 112 | 116
II. Leopoldstadt | 1,862 | 885 | 977 | 463 | 228 | 235
III. Landstrasse | 1,180 | 520 | 660 | 553 | 240 | 313
IV. Wieden | 698 | 31 | 388 | 348 | 154 | 193
V. Margareten | 632 | 293 | 339 | 311 | 148 | 163
VI. Mariahilf | 608 | 263 | 345 | 200 | 100 | 100
VII. Neubau | 740 | 356 | 384 | 266 | 121 | 145
VIII. Josefstadt | 534 | 256 | 278 | 207 | 98 | 109
IX. Alsergrund | 1,076 | 498 | 578 | 347 | 154 | 193
X. Favoriten | 609 | 292 | 317 | 305 | 156 | 149
XI. Aimmering | 127 | 57 | 70 | 55 | 27 | 28
XII. Meidling | 610 | 298 | 312 | 331 | 158 | 173
XIII. Hietzing | 457 | 210 | 247 | 241 | 117 | 124
XIV. Penzing | 506 | 230 | 278 | 290 | 126 | 164
XV. Fanfhaus | 758 | 368 | 390 | 336 | 153 | 383
XVI. Ottakring | 833 | 410 | 423 | 416 | 199 | 217
XVII. Hernals | 508 | 249 | 259 | 248 | 117 | 131
XVIII. Wahlring | 744 | 329 | 415 | 347 | 160 | 187
XIX. Dobling | 633 | 315 | 318 | 298 | 165 | 133
XX. Brigittenau | 754 | 339 | 415 | 304 | 162 | 142
XXI. Floridsdorf | 540 | 279 | 261 | 327 | 168 | 159
XXII. Grossenzerdorf | 69 | 35 | 34 | 57 | 26 | 31
XXIII. Schwechat | 44 | 23 | 21 | 34 | 18 | 16
XXIV. Modling | 146 | 67 | 79 | 106 | 53 | 53
XXV. Liesing | 185 | 80 | 105 | 82 | 36 | 46
XXVI. Klosternauburg | 88 | 41 | 47 | 54 | 27 | 27
---------------------+--------+-------+--------+-------+--------+--------
Total | 15,591 | 7,296 | 8,295 | 6,753 | 3,223 |3,530
Decrease of Jews in the Reich Districts [Gaue] of the Ostmark[3] (Based
on preliminary results of 1939 census)
-----------+----------+--------+-------------------+--------
| | | Numbers less |
| | | in 1939 than |
Reich | Jews by | Full | in 1934 |
Gau | religion |Jews by +--------+----------+ Jews
| as of | race, | | | by
| 22 Mar | as of | | |religion
| 1934 | 17 May |Absolute|In percent| 1934
| | 1939 | | |
-----------+----------+--------+--------+----------+--------
Vienna | 175,099 | 91,480 | 83,619 | 47.8 | 91.4
Niederdonau| 11,439 | 1,836 | 9,603 | 83.9 | 6.0
Oberdonau | 1,257 | 216 | 1,041 | 82.8 | 0.7
Steiermark | 2,818 | 563 | 2,255 | 80.0 | 1.5
Karnten | 273 | 60 | 213 | 78.0 | 0.1
Salzburg | 239 | 67 | 172 | 72.0 | 0.1
Tirol | 361 | 119 | 242 | 67.0 | 0.2
Vorarlbg. | 42 | 43 | 1 | ... | 0.0
-----------+----------+--------+--------+----------+--------
OSTMARK | 191,528 | 94,384 | 97,144 | 50.7 | 100.0
-----------+----------+--------+--------+----------+--------
Table continued ...
-----------+-------------------
|Local distribution
+-------------------
Reich | 1939
Gau +-------------------
| | Part Jews
+ Full +-----+------
| Jews |Grade|Grade
| | I | II
-----------+------+-----+------
Vienna | 96.9 | 86.8| 80.3
Niederdonau| 2.0 | 5.6| 7.1
Oberdonau | 0.2 | 2.4| 3.4
Steiermark | 0.6 | 2.9| 5.2
Karnten | 0.1 | 0.7| 1.5
Salzburg | 0.1 | 0.7| 1.0
Tirol | 0.1 | 0.8| 1.1
Vorarlbg. | 0.0 | 0.1| 0.4
-----------+------+-----+------
OSTMARK |100.0 |100.0|100.0
-----------+----- +-----+------
FOOTNOTES:
[3] Regional status as of Oct. 15, 1938, without the annexed
Sudeten-German districts.
# # # # #
Jews and Part Jews in the Reich Districts (Gaus) of the Ostmark
(Preliminary results of the census of 17 May 1939)
-----------+----------+--------+-----------------+-------------------
| | | These include | In percentages
| +--------+-----------------+-------+-----------
| | | Part Jews | |Part Jews
Reich | Jews and | +--------+--------+ Full +-----+-----
Gau |part Jews | Full | Grade | Grade | Jews |Grade|Grade
| together | Jews | I | II | | I | II
-----------+----------+--------+--------+--------+-------+-----+-----
Niederdonau| 3,737 | 1,970| 1,117| 650| 52.7| 29.9| 17.4
Oberdonau | 1,015 | 251| 468| 296| 24.7| 46.1| 29.2
Steiermark | 1,512 | 563| 508| 441| 37.2| 33.6| 29.2
Karnten | 313 | 60| 129| 124| 19.2| 41.2| 39.6
Salzburg | 273 | 67| 123| 83| 24.5| 45.1| 30.4
Tirol | 360 | 119| 147| 94| 33.1| 46.8| 26.1
Vorarlberg | 104 | 43| 23| 38| 41.4| 22.1| 36.5
-----------+----------+--------+--------+--------+-------+-----+-----
Total | 7,314 | 3,073| 2,515| 1,726| 42.0 | 34.4| 23.6
-----------+----------+--------+--------+--------+-------+-----+-----
Vienna | 113,824 | 91,480| 15,591| 6,753| 80.4 | 13.7| 5.9
Ostmark | 121,138 | 94,553| 18,106| 8,479| 78.1 | 14.9| 7.0
-----------+----------+--------+--------+--------+-------+-----+-----
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1950-PS
COPY
The Reichminister and Chief of the Reich Chancellory
_RK. 789 B secret_
Berlin, W8 3 Dec. 40
Voss Str. 6
SECRET
To the Reich Governor in Vienna Gauleiter von Schirach
VIENNA
Dear Mr. von Schirach,
As Reichleiter Bormann informs me, the Fuehrer has decided after
receipt of one of the reports made by you, that the 60,000 Jews, still
residing in the Reichsgau Vienna, will be deported most rapidly, that
is still during the war, to the General Gouvernement because of the
housing shortage prevalent in Vienna. I have informed the Governor
General in Cracow as well as the Reichsfuehrer-SS about this decision
of the Fuehrer, and I request you also to take cognizance of it.
HEIL HITLER!
Yours Obedient
/s/ Dr. LAMMERS.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1954-PS
Deposition of Field-Marshal Wilhelm Keitel
Investigating Officer: Dr. Bohuslav Ecer, Colonel of the Czechoslovak
Judge-Advocate’s Department.
Secretary: Elizabeth Radziejewska, WCB, USFET.
Present: Dr. Schwartz, L. of Judge-Advocate’s Department
Place: Ashcan--Time: 3rd August 1945, afternoon.
On being interrogated Keitel deposes:
I am Wilhelm Keitel, born 22 September 1882 at Helmscherode, district
of Gandersheim, Brunswick. Married to Liza, born Fontaine, I have 5
children. I have 3 sons, 30, 28, and 26 years old, the last one killed
in action in the East in 1941, and 2 daughters; one of them 35 years
old, married. The other one died at the age of 30. I saw my wife for
the last time in middle of April 1945.
_My functions._
On 4 February 1938 I was appointed Chief of the Supreme Command of
the Armed Forces by Adolf Hitler. Before I was appointed there was a
Reich-Minister for War, who was at the same time Supreme Commander of
the Armed Forces. It was von Blomberg. On 4 February 1938 Adolf Hitler
ordered a change. He abolished the functions of the Minister for War,
and himself took over the functions of Supreme Commander of the Armed
Forces.
At that time I became entrusted with certain functions of the Minister
for War, and that from case to case. The three Supreme Commanders of
the three formations of the Armed Forces--Air Force, Army, Navy--were
under direct orders of the Fuehrer, and contrary to Blomberg, I had no
command authority with respect to them. Therefore I was not entitled to
give orders independently, but only by order of Adolf Hitler and after
reporting to him. I had no authority of command, my role was really
that of a Chief of Staff. I was, however, able to submit proposals in
military matters to the Fuehrer in his capacity as Supreme Commander of
the Armed Forces on my own initiative, if the three Supreme Commanders
of the formations of the Armed Forces had not done so themselves; and
generally the Fuehrer asked for my opinion in military matters. The
decision was made by the Fuehrer alone.
On 1 September 1939 a Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich
was created under the chairmanship of Hermann Goering. I was a member
of this board only in so far as it dealt with military matters. I was
never made a member of the Reich Government and I never had seat or
vote in the Cabinet. For seat and vote in the Cabinet was never granted
to me.
_Relations to the Party._
In spring 1939 I was awarded the Golden Badge of Honor of the Party as
a decoration. I never applied formally for admission to the Party. The
Party considered me a member after the alteration of the law concerning
the Armed Forces as from autumn 1944, because I held the Golden Party
Badge; they asked me to pay a voluntary contribution to the Party.
To begin with I sent them 1000 marks at that time. Personally I was
a faithful follower of Adolf Hitler and my political conviction was
National-Socialist. But when the Fuehrer granted me his confidence, I
developed into National-Socialist under the influence of this personal
contact. Even today I am a convinced adherent of Adolf Hitler; this
does not exclude that I do not identify myself with some items of the
Party programme and of the Party policy.
_The German rearmament._
The German rearmament began approximately in the year 1935; at first to
a modest extent, after we had withdrawn from the League of Nations and
had reestablished the German sovereignty of arms.
Question: How much was the total expenditure for the German Armament up
to 1 September 1939?
Answer: For the Armed Forces about 30 and not more than 40,000,000,000.
Q. Do you know about the speech of Adolf Hitler, delivered at the
Sport Palace on 1 September 1939, in which he admitted to have spent
90,000,000,000 marks for German rearmament?
A. Yes. I know of his speech and also of the figure mentioned. I was
utterly surprised by this figure and I nearly fainted when I heard this
figure. As far as my knowledge went, this figure was exaggerated by
about two thirds.
Q. Was it the purpose of German rearmament to prepare for a war of
aggression?
A. Even during the years 1938 and 1939 none of us soldiers gave thought
to a war of aggression. I knew that we were not at all prepared for a
war of aggression, and even less for a world war.
Q. Did you ever advocate a German war of aggression in your official
capacity?
A. I was in favor of a war of aggression under certain conditions,
e.g. if by such a war of aggression a certainly impending attack of an
adversary was to be prevented.
Q. What were the reasons for the German attack on the Soviet Union?
A. Because we had sure knowledge of the preparations of the Soviet
Union for an attack and wished to prevent it.
Q. Did you know that some individuals in Germany, both military and
civilian, advocated a total war?
A. No.
Q. Did you yourself favor total war, i.e. a war disregarding
international law of warfare?
A. No.
Q. Was Germany prepared for a world war at the time of the Munich
crisis?
A. No, for at that time no preparations had been made on our side,
neither strategically nor operationally.
Q. Would Germany have begun the military attack if France and Gt.
Britain had not agreed to the Munich Treaty?
A. Hardly, in my opinion, because as I said before, we were not
prepared for a war at that time, especially if France had fulfilled her
obligation to help Czechoslovakia.
Q. Had Adolf Hitler made up his mind firmly to get his political aims,
even at the price of war of aggression waged by Germany or even of a
world war?
A. I do not know that, but I am firmly convinced that he did not want a
world war.
Q. Did you, in your capacity as Chief of the Supreme Command of the
Armed Forces, never sign an ordinance which might have implied a
violation of the International Law of Warfare?
A. Not that I know of.
The investigating officer submits at this instance an ordinance of the
Fuehrer concerning a General Trustee for the Employment of Labor to
Wilhelm Keitel, an ordinance dated 21 March 1941.
Q. Were you one of the signatories of this ordinance?
A. Yes.
Q. Were you aware of the fact that a rule of International Law is
violated by the employment of prisoners of war and the civilian
population of the occupied countries in the German armament industry?
A. No, as long as the ordinance is applied in accordance with
International Law. I am not responsible for further ordinances issued
later on the basis of this ordinance in order to carry it into effect.
I add, that the Fuehrer would have issued the ordinance also without my
counter-signature; or to put it better that he would not have made the
ordinance of 21 March 1942 dependent on my counter-signature.
_The Czechoslovakian Problem._
Q. Who conceived the idea to solve the problem of the Sudeten-Germans
by means of an occupation by German forces, and to solve the whole
problem of Czechoslovakia forcibly by means of an occupation of the
remainder of the Republic?
A. That was exclusively the idea of the Fuehrer, although possibly
political advisers cooperated; about this I know nothing, though.
Q. Was there a part-mobilization or were there movements of German
forces against Czechoslovakia during the second half of May 1938 with
the purpose of solving the Sudeten-German problem by the use of force?
A. No. The idea of military action was not yet discussed at that time,
so far as I know.
Q. Do you remember an order of Adolf Hitler’s of 28 May 1938, ordering
the preparation of military action against Czechoslovakia for the 2
October?
A. I do not remember such an order, although I should have known about
it.
The investigating officer now reads to Wilhelm Keitel the following
passage from the Reichstag speech of Adolf Hitler’s of 30 January 1939,
page 453 of the book “Dokumente der deutschen Politik” (Documents of
German Policy), vol. 7, part 2:
As Germany had not mobilized, let alone any intentions to attack
Czechoslovakia, the situation was bound--there is no doubt about
it--to lead to a grave loss of prestige of the Reich. This unbearable
provocation, made still worse by a really infamous prosecution and
terrorization of our Germans living there, has led me to the decision
to solve the Sudeten-German problem now finally and radically. On 28
May
(1) I ordered to prepare military interference against this state for
the 2 October.
(2) I ordered the enormous and speedy completion of our defensive
front in the West.
Keitel declares thereto:
Such orders may have been given, although from my memory I do not
know anything about it; for according to my memory the respective
preparatory measures were ordered only later, during the summer. I
believe, though, that the declarations of Hitler’s are correct, but I
do not know where they come from.
I stress the fact that Germany was not prepared for military action
against Czechoslovakia in May 1938. I know, it is true, that the
Fuehrer had made up his mind to solve the Sudeten-German problem in
any case and within a reasonable space of time.
Q. Was the danger of a Czechoslovakian mobilization discussed at the
time of the invasion of Austria by German forces?
A. I myself have drawn the attention of the Fuehrer to the fact that we
were not prepared and could not occupy Austria if Czechoslovakia would
mobilize. This indication was rejected by the Fuehrer.
Q. Do you know that at the time of the Austrian crisis Goering and
Neurath gave guarantees, both in their own names and that of the
Fuehrer, to Czechoslovakia that Germany felt bound by the Treaty of
Arbitration concluded with Czechoslovakia in 1925 and that Germany had
no intentions of attacking Czechoslovakia?
A. I do not know anything about such a guarantee.
_Munich._
I was present, I admit, in Berchtesgaden, Godesberg, and Munich when
Neville Chamberlain visited the Fuehrer. But I did not participate in
any of the discussions and was but passively present, ready for any
military information required.
Q. Did the Fuehrer consult you with regard to the military
possibilities of Germany before the meetings with Chamberlain?
A. No. He was well informed about the military possibilities proper,
and he knew that we were not at all prepared for war at the time of the
Munich crisis.
Q. Was then Adolf Hitler in favor of war at that time?
A. No, because Germany was not prepared for war, as I have to stress
again.
Q. What would have happened militarily, if Gt. Britain, France and
the Soviet Union had taken the side of Czechoslovakia, and if they
had declined the discussions with Germany and Italy, which led to the
Munich Treaty?
A. The military means of the German Reich were by no means sufficient
against such a constellation. An action at such a time would have been
madness.
Q. Was it the political purpose of the Munich Treaty to eliminate the
Soviet Union from the European affairs?
A. That is correct, for Czechoslovakia was considered to be a virtual
field of deployment of the Soviet Union which might have dangerous
consequences for military operations.
Q. Did the Armed Forces as a whole make their influence felt by means
of an official representative with regard to the designation of the
borderline in consequence of the so-called Munich Treaty?
A. I personally did not, neither did an officer of my Staff to my
knowledge; but it may be that a representative of the Army was given
the duty to point out strategical points of view, when the borderline
was discussed.
signed: Wilhelm KEITEL
Wilhelm Keitel has signed this protocol consisting of 9 (nine) pages,
on all copies and on every page in my presence.
signed: Guy A. Weill O-513470
Capt, AUS.
Signed Col. Dr. B. Ecer
Signed Lt. Dr. P. Schwarz
Signed Elisabeth Radziejewska.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1956-PS
Das Archiv, Vol. 22-24, Page 1342 January 1936.
Meaning and tasks of the Secret State Police.
In order to refute the malicious rumours spread abroad, the “Voelkische
Beobachter” (V.B. of 22.1.36) published an article on the origin,
meaning and tasks of the Secret State Police; extracts from this read
as follows:
The Secret State Police was created simultaneously in all German
Provinces after the National Socialist Revolution owing to cogent
political necessity. In Prussia its creator was Prime Minister Goering
who is still the Chief of the Secret State Police today. In Bavaria the
Bavarian Political Police was created by the Reichs Leader of the S.S.
Himmler, who at the same time directed the building of the political
police forces in the other provinces outside Prussia. The Political
Police Forces became uniformly coordinated when, in the spring of
1934, Prime Minister Goering appointed the Reichs Leader of the S.S.
as deputy Chief of the Prussian Secret State Police--cf. Si P.38 (Vol.
1). Thereby a unified leadership and a proportionate extension of the
Political Police Forces of all provinces was assured.
The Secret State Police is an official machinery on the lines of the
criminal police, whose special task is the prosecution of crimes and
offences against the State, above all the prosecution of high treason
and treason. The task of the Secret State Police is to detect these
crimes and offences, to ascertain the perpetrators and to bring them
to judicial punishment. The number of criminal proceedings continually
pending in the People’s Court on account of high treasonable actions
and of treason is the result of this work. The next most important
field of operations for the Secret State Police is the preventive
combatting of all dangers threatening the State and the leadership
of the State. As, since the National Socialist Revolution, all open
struggle and all open opposition to the State and to the leadership of
the State is forbidden, a State Police as a preventive instrument in
the struggle against all dangers threatening the State, is indissolubly
bound up with the National Socialist Leader State. The opponents
of National Socialism were not removed by the prohibition of their
organizations and their newspapers, but have withdrawn to other forms
of struggle against the State. Therefore, the National Socialist State
has to trace out, to watch over and to render harmless the underground
opponents fighting against it in illegal organizations, in camouflaged
associations, in the coalitions of well meaning fellow Germans and even
in the organizations of party and state before they have succeeded
in actually executing an action directed against the interest of the
state. This task of fighting with all means the secret enemies of the
state will be spared no Leader State, because powers hostile to the
state, from their foreign headquarters, always make use of some persons
in such a state and employ them in underground activity against the
state.
The preventive activity of the Secret State Police consists primarily
in the thorough observation of all enemies of the state in the Reichs
territory. As the Secret State Police can not carry out, in addition
to its primary executive tasks, this observation of the enemies of the
state, to the extent necessary, there steps alongside to supplement it
the Security Service of the Reichs Leader of the S.S., set up by the
Deputy Fuehrer as the political intelligence service of the movement,
which puts a large part of the forces of the movement mobilized by
it into the service of the security of the state. The Secret State
Police takes the necessary police preventive measures against the
enemies of the state on the basis of the results of the observation.
The most effective preventive measure is without doubt the withdrawal
of freedom, which is covered in the form of “protective custody”, if
it is to be feared that the free activity of the persons in question
might endanger the security of the state in any way. The employment
of protective custody is so organized by directions of the Reichs and
Prussian Minister of the Interior and by a special arrest examination
procedure of the Secret State Police, that--as far as the preventive
fight against the enemies of the state permits--copious guarantees
against a misuse of protective custody are provided. While protective
arrest of short duration is carried out in police and court prisons,
the concentration camps under the Secret State Police admit those taken
into protective custody, who have to be withdrawn from public life for
a longer time. The majority of the inmates of the concentration camps
is formed by those communist and other Marxist functionaries, who, by
previous experiences, would if free immediately resume their struggle
against the state. Further police preventive measures against efforts
hostile to the state consist in the dissolution of associations, in
the prohibition and dissolution of assemblies and congregations, in
the prohibition of publications of all kinds and so on. As the NSDAP
and its leaders are also provided with special protection by legal
regulations, the prosecution of crimes against these laws and the
protection of the party and its leaders are also incumbent upon the
Secret State Police.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1961-PS
1942 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 247
Decision of the Greater German Reichstag of 26 April 1942
At the proposal of the president of the Reichstag, on its session of
26 April 1942, the Greater German Reichstag has approved of the rights
which the Fuehrer has postulated in his speech, with the following
decision:
There can be no doubt, that in the present war, in which the German
people is faced with a struggle for its existence or annihilation,
the Fuehrer must have all the rights postulated by him which serve
to further or achieve victory. Therefore--without being bound
by existing legal regulations--in his capacity as leader of the
nation, Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, governmental chief
and supreme executive chief, as supreme justice and leader of the
party--the Fuehrer must be in a position to force with all means at
his disposal every German, if necessary, whether he be common soldier
or officer, low or high official or judge, leading or subordinate
official of the party, worker or employee--to fulfill his duties.
In case of violation of these duties, the Fuehrer is entitled after
conscientious examination, regardless of so-called well-deserved
rights, to mete out due punishment and to remove the offender from
his post, rank and position without introducing prescribed procedures.
At the order of the Fuehrer this decision is hereby made public.
Berlin, 26 April 1942
The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery
Dr Lammers
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1962-PS
1935 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PAGE 839
Law to change the Penal Code 28 June 1935
The Reich government has ratified the following law which is herewith
announced:
Article 1
Creation of Law by suitable application of the penal law.
The sect. 2 and 2a of the penal code contain the following wording:
sect. 2
Any person who commits an act which the law declares to be punishable
or which is deserving of penalty according to the fundamental
conceptions of the penal law and sound popular feeling, shall be
punished. If there is no penal law directly covering an act it shall
be punished under that law which most closely fits, in regards to
fundamental conception.
sect. 2a
The culpability of the act and the punishment are determined according
to the law which is in force at the time of the act.
Should a milder law be in force at the time of judgment than at the
time of the act, then the milder law can be applied; should the act
no longer be subjected to punishment at the time of judgment, then
punishment may not take place.
A law which is only valid for a designated time is also to be applied
upon the acts which have been committed during its validity even if it
has been rescinded.
Decisions on disciplinary measures of security and improvement are to
be made according to the law which is in force at the time of judgment.
Berlin 28 June 1935
The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor
ADOLF HITLER
The Reich Minister of Justice
DR. GUERTNER.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1964-PS
1942 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PAGE 535
Decree of the Fuehrer regarding special jurisdiction of Reich Minister
of Justice 20 Aug 1942.
A strong administration of Justice is necessary for the fulfillment
of the tasks of the great German Reich. Therefore, I commission and
empower the Reich Minister of Justice to establish a National Socialist
Administration of Justice and to take all necessary measures in
accordance with my directives and instructions made in agreement with
the Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery and the Leader of
the Party-Chancellery. He can hereby deviate from any existing law.
Fuehrer Supreme Headquarters 20 August 1942
The Fuehrer
ADOLF HITLER
Reich Minister and Chief of Reich Chancellery
Dr. Lammers
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1965-PS
EXTRACT FROM “DER STURMER”, 4 November 1943
“It is really the truth that the Jews ‘so to speak’ have disappeared
from Europe and that the Jewish ‘reservoir’ of the East, from which
the Jewish plague has for centuries beset the peoples of Europe, has
ceased to exist * * * However, the Fuehrer of the German people at the
beginning of the war prophesied what has now come to pass * * *”
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1969-PS
NOTE
To the file.
_Subject_: Ottilienheim Absberg.
Dr. Hefelmann, Berlin, informed me by telephone that the transfer of
the sick from the Ottilienheim was not carried out by the directive of
Berlin, but by the directive from the Bavarian State Ministry, Munich,
Regierungsrat Gaum.
Furthermore, he told me, that the bearer of sovereignty
[Hoheitstraeger] could not be included, since the regulation does not
call for that.
Nurnberg, 5 March 1941.
/s/ Sellmer
/t/ Sellmer
297/12
[_Seal_]
# # # # #
Gau Staff Office Sel/Pf. 5 March 1941
To the Kreisleiter Party Member Michael Gerstner
_Weissenburg/Bavaria_
Subject: Your letter of 24 Feb 1941
Alarm of the population of Absberg.
The Reich Office [Reichsstelle], Berlin, informs me that the transfer
of the sick from the Ottilienheim was not carried out by Berlin, but by
Munich. Therefore, I have now turned to Munich. In the meantime, I have
found from the Regierungspraesident that we also raised a complaint
against the ways and means of the treatment of the sick. I therefore
hope, that such cross mistakes will not occur in the future.
Heil Hitler
S 297/11
[Initial: Semmler]
Gaustabsamtsleiter
NB: The specialist [Sachbearbeiter] for Bavaria is Regierungsrat
Gaum in the Bavarian State Ministry in Munich. If possible we should
get in touch with him. Regierungsrat Gaum will see to it, that the
institutions will be cleared out as soon as possible.
# # # # #
Berlin, 31 Dec 1940 NW 7, Unter den Linden 72
Telephone: Local 120034
Long Distance 120037
Teletype: Local 517
Long Distance K 1517
Cable Address: Reichsinnenminister
[Rubber Stamp] Kreisleiter Informed
Reichministry of the Interior Ministerial Dr. Linden.
Iog 7633/40/5100.
It is requested, to mention this official designation and subject in
any further correspondence.
[Red pencil] S.6.I.41
To the Gaustabsamtsleiter, Heinrich Sellmer in Nurnberg, Gauleitung
My dear party member Sellmer!
I forward in the enclosure an incident, which deals with the affair
about which you have been informed by party member Blanicenburg from
the Fuehrer’s chancellery. As you can see in the application of Mrs.
Marie Kehr, the latter would like to have information whether it is
possible by a law of the Reich, to relieve people from their incurable
sufferings. I request that you investigate, whether Kehr is politically
reliable, especially whether she does not have church connections. In
case this should not be so, from my side, there are no misgivings, if
you give Kehr the desired information orally.
Heil Hitler!
/s/ Linden
In Ink
_Ortsgruppenleiter Party member Popp_ is of the opinion, that one can
inform Mrs. Kehr. She is calm and circumspect.
S 7 Jan 1941
297/21 2 DM
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1972-PS
SECRET
SS Fuehrungshauptamt [SS Main directorate office]
Kommandoamt of the Waffen SS
[Command Office]
Berlin--Wilmersdorf, 14 October 1941
Kaiserallee 188
Sect. Ia NR. 4116/41 geh.
_SUBJ_: Intermediate report on the civilian state of emergency.
_TO_: Reichsfuehrer SS
I deliver the following report regarding the commitment of the Waffen
SS in the Protectorate Bohemia and Moravia during the civilian state of
emergency:
In the mutual changes, all Battalions of the Waffen SS in the
Protectorate Bohemia and Moravia will be brought forth for shootings,
and relatively for the supervision of hangings.
Up until now there occurred:
_in Prague_:
99 shootings
21 hangings
_in Bruenn_:
54 shootings
17 hangings
----
Total 191 executions (including 16 Jews)
A complete report regarding other measures and on the conduct of the
officers, non-coms and men will be made following the termination of
the civilian state of emergency.
Signed: JUETTNER
SS Gruppenfuehrer [Maj. Gen.] and
Generalleutnant of the Waffen SS
Official stamp of Personal Staff of Reichsfuehrer SS
15 Oct 1941
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1991-PS
6th Report on activities and final report of the German Armistice
Delegation for Economy and of the Delegate of the Reich Government for
Economic and Financial Questions with the French Government for the
period from 1 July 1943 to 17 August 1944.
Salzburg. 15 December 1944.
No. 000101.
[Page 63, last paragraph].
During the four years of the occupation of France the Armistice
Delegation transferred approximately 121 Million Rmk. worth of
investments from French into German possession, among them shares of
war vital enterprises in third countries, in France and in Germany.
For details see the former activity reports of the Delegation. About
half of these transfers have been paid for by Germany with economic
compensations by delivery of French foreign bonds, which were acquired
in Holland or Belgium, whereas the balance was paid through Clearing
and from occupation costs. From the difference in the value of the
French foreign bonds, between the German purchasing price and the
French rate of purchase, there have been realized profits amounting to
Rmk. 7 Million which could be paid to the Reich.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1992-PS
Lecture by General [Obergebietsfuehrer]
Dr. Hellmuth Stellrecht:
“The Military Education of the German Youth”
From: National Political Course for the Armed Force, from 15-23
January 1937
[National-Politischer Lehrgang der Wehrmacht, vom 15.-23. January 1937]
Restricted for the Armed Forces
[Pages 163-166]
All of you know already the words: Pre-military training, youth’s
physical training or military education [Wehrerziehung].
The first term “pre-military training” means, that the young person
prior to his induction into the Army should acquire a certain amount
of knowledge; the second term “youth’s physical training” means
conditioning of the body to a certain degree of physical fitness will
be reached. However, we are choosing of the three terms the last one
which is “military education”. Because not only does it mean acquiring
a certain amount of knowledge and reaching a certain degree of
physical fitness, but what is more important, it will have a decisive
influence on the soldier.
One will ask: Why is it that there is such an endless debate going on
in Germany today about the term “military education”? Why are attempts
being made just at present to define clearly the term “military
education” to carry out what is recognized as correct? Is it done for
the sole purpose of trying to get the lead over foreign countries? Is
it because of reasoning that we did this, or does it go much deeper
than is noticeable on the surface?
Gentlemen, I believe that it was not only because of the reasoning of
individuals who inspired us that a change in our thinking unnoticeable
for many is taking place and becomes visible to all in its effects.
The term “military education” cannot be realized in a vacuum but it is
closely connected with the symbol of the German soldier. Just like this
symbol changes, the term “military education” also changes. Military
education of the youth makes sense only under certain historical
conditions. These in turn are closely connected with the ideology of
state and society current at the time.
* * * * * * *
The young Germany found herself again in a soldierly way of life.
The great historic development which lasted over hundred years had
finally reached its conclusion and consequently the German people had
gained new possibilities. Under Frederic the Great the military and
the bourgeoisie (middle class) as different estates [Staende] opposed
each other without understanding as hopeless strangers; the reforms,
the wars of independence brought about, had united again both terms.
However, they could not overcome the bourgeois way of life permanently.
Only within our time was this development concluded since life was
again molded into one unit. No more the citizen of the sovereign ruler
but each citizen of the New Reich is being born to bear arms. It is
not a “cursed obligation” which puts him under military law but his
own free will urges him to do it and makes him recognize the necessity
of military service not only for one or two years but for a life-time,
under a new unified system which begins in the earliest childhood and
ends only when he is also unable to do service at home for the well
being of all.
Considering all this, it goes without saying that we are talking about
the military education of the German youth and carrying it out. It is
just as clear before our eyes that Friederich Ludwig Jahn with all
his knowledge and the great effort put forward by him did not succeed
in carrying it out. But now the time is ripe because the newly gained
philosophy of life may be realized. It would only be self deception to
believe that this task could be solved from the top only. German youth
has been a movement since a generation.
This movement started long before the war as a first proof of its
coming great renovation protesting against the bourgeoise.
The Youth Movement before the war was not yet soldierly but it was hard
against itself and on long hiking tours it helped to lay the foundation
for a real great Germany. The volunteer-spirit of the great war would
be unthinkable without this youth movement--that volunteer-spirit which
is the prerequisite of military duty! Of course, those who only came
in order to fulfill their own duty did not spare themselves anything
either in the great war. They were no less brave than the volunteers.
The only difference was that the volunteer was willing to take
responsibility for his fate, injury and death, while the other one felt
more secure if the State and the Law were responsible for himself and
the family when the misfortune arose.
The voluntary service was contained in the free corps [Freikorps], in
the military organizations [Wehrverbaenden], in the organizations of
the NSDAP and in the Hitler Youth Movement.
The German youth has formed its own Reich within this youth-movement
in which it has the right and privilege of its own way of life. In a
decree issued by the Fuehrer on 1 December 1936, pertaining to the
Hitler Youth Movement this own Reich was approved by him. It might be
said that its own way of life gives its own character to German youth
but we are lucky in that the philosophy of life of National Socialism
has become the philosophy of life of youth and that there are no
political differences between the different generations of present
day Germany. Only the way of life of German youth has its individual
emphasis. This has hardly penetrated the older generations. The way
of life could also not be changed by an order from above because it
did not grow by order or by accident but through a movement that has
grown through the decades. We have to observe the fact that in the
youth organization and in other organizations different ways of life
confront each other. For instance, the way of life of the Army which
is based on the probably oldest tradition which we have. There is no
doubt that a boy who changes from one organization to another feels
that the different ways of life are different and that he tries to
decide for himself if one or the other is the right one. He probably
tries to compare youth hostel and barracks, comradeship leader
[Kameradschaftsfuehrer] and sergeant, an evening in a youth hostel
and military instruction, the comradely “thou” which bound him to all
leaders up to the Reichs Youth Leader and the pronounced separation
from his superior even the corporal, also, abstinence from nicotine and
alcohol and the sudden abolition of this abstinence.
It would, of course, be completely senseless for the individual to
start to investigate if this or that way seems right to him. It goes
without saying that an army which is to be trained for battle must be
handled entirely different from a unit of boys. I believe that there
is no organization in Germany which has gathered so much experience
through its century old tradition in leading men as the army. Only
at a later age one comes to see those things as a result of a deep
psychological knowledge which, as a private, as a young sergeant or
lieutenant, seemed obscure, or which one carried out without thinking,
as and how it has always been done.
It would be just as senseless to argue that the army, as the oldest
organization, should demand that the way of life in the youth
organization should be patterned after the army’s way and that this
should be done at once by a system of orders and regulations. That
would be completely wrong because the present youth movement is of a
natural growth which cannot suddenly be sent by coercion but needs a
certain amount of freedom to be able to grow further. And nothing would
be more harmful than to substitute a system of orders, which developed
under totally different conditions, for the free will of the present
young generation. The forty years of German youth history cannot
and shall not be erased because what has developed alive out of an
idealistic motive shall never be extinguished.
But, from a long range point of view, it is necessary that we do
not allow the life of a German boy who has to pass through all the
organizations, to go through as many breaking experiences as there are
organizations. On the contrary, it is necessary to give to his life
and his development actual stability. We do not only want to train our
boys and through the difference of the organizations give them the
opportunity to compare and to criticize but we want to lead them in
an unbroken line of development from boy to man, a development which
must be natural to them, which does not give them cause to investigate
why they have been dealt with in this or that manner. The political
education of the boy stops when he enters the service of the Armed
Forces.
We have to admit that the way of life in the youth organization is
different from that in the Armed Forces. But our time gives us an
opportunity to draw one line of development from the tenth year to
the time of discharge from the Armed Forces; that is the line of
development of military training and military education. Therefore,
it is in general of tremendous educational value and not only for the
training of a soldier. The boy should feel that he is part of a natural
course of events and react to it by feeling a constant uninhibited
enhancement of life.
The young scout grows into the armour-bearer of the nation. Thus
the natural course of events is again completed which has been
characteristic of every natural warriordom. It always let the boy
become a scout first, then gave him practice weapons and only then let
him earn the deathly weapon of the man.
All military training must thus be regarded a building of life without
friction, following only the laws of life and supported by the one as
well as the other organization and nothing to block it. Life itself
knows no abrupt fundamental changes from one day to another. One is
not a boy one day and a man the next one but every age period has
educational and formative significance, which needs to be recognized
and utilized.
In case these laws are observed one will, a few decades from now, be
incredulous before the achievements which will be made by development
of physical potentialities and by technical knowledge and also before
the high degree of ideological readiness which is inherent in the
German soldier. The recognition of the laws of development will and
must give us an incredible advantage over the achievements of other
nations, especially in the present which is carried along by the
impulse of national uprising. There is no question that even with
several years of military training another nation cannot ever make
up for that which was neglected in regard to development which we
recognized and utilized in time.
But that which will happen in the future in regard to this will not
only mean the training to be a German soldier but training to be a
German man, the decisive final finish of whom takes place in the
service of the Armed Forces. In addition, an extensive exchange of
experiences will come about on the broadest possible basis between the
Armed Forces in the Youth Organization on all things so decisive for
all future development in order to continue the one education in every
respect at the exact point where the other one stopped.
In regard to work with pure military education, this has already
been done in years of collaboration and very extensively. The
result has been put down in a book written by me which regulates
future military education up to the last detail of training
and which, on mutual consent, includes a preface by the Reichs
minister of war [Reichskriegsminister] and the Reichs Youth Leader
[Reichsjugendfuehrer].
The basic idea of this work is to present to the boy what fits into the
particular stage of his development. In doing this one quite naturally
avoids to bring up something beforehand that belongs into the future
training of the Armed Forces and does not fit the boy but only the
man. For that reason no boy is given a military weapon, simply because
it does not make sense from the point of view of development. But, on
the other hand, it makes sense to give him practice guns of smaller
caliber. Just as there are military exercises which fit only adult men
there are exercises which are better tackled at the age of a boy. Among
others, for instance, outdoor training.
The young man of twenty who has become estranged to nature in
the city--and two-thirds of the German population today live in
cities--will find it very difficult to reestablish contact. Everything
has become too foreign to him and he will never again be able to become
a bush or woods runner [Busch- und Waldlaeufer] whose best friends are
nature and terrain.
It is different for the boy. At the age of 12 to 16 or 17 a boy is
actually ideal for the terrain. It is exactly the age of wild west
romanticism when he thinks only in terms of secret paths, ambush and
surprise raids. If at that time nothing brings the boy into the terrain
if he only continues the dull way of going to school something ingrown
and crooked develops in him which can never again be straightened out.
The right time to put him into the terrain has been missed.
The same is true of the training of the senses. I am of the opinion
that to the training for seeing even the most insignificant things
in nature, for noticing the slightest change in the normal world
around us, a very systematic training of the ear should be added.
One has to learn again to distinguish from entire noise pictures the
single important sound which has something to say. One has to learn
direction hearing and distance hearing and one has to train the ear
to be constantly on the alert and immediately register the slightest
noise which shows danger. This kind of training belongs entirely to a
youthful age. If the right time has been missed it can hardly be made
up in later years.
The boy starts to learn while he plays and in more and more systematic
training becomes a young scout. He again acquires the incredible
agility of primitive men to find cover and camouflage in the terrain,
to use every indentation in the ground, every bit of vegetation to
close in, to cover long distances without any noise also at night and,
at the same time, to see everything, to hear everything and finally to
appear out of nowhere before the baffled enemy; thus growing into the
future battle technique through his full life of a boy.
I ask you, gentlemen, to think back for a moment and remember
Langemarck, the volunteers who, for the idea, offered their lives to
the bullets while singing “Deutschland, Deutschland ueber alles”. And
then think of the youth with the same ideological readiness of a few
decades later which does not waste one drop of blood, which in defense
and attack evades the enemy, against whom the best weapon becomes
useless because it hardly any longer can find its aim. This is a
picture of the goal of great education which starts with the playful
training of the boy in the terrain and completes itself in the training
in the Armed Forces.
If we in Germany use only a fraction of the effort which is used in the
school to prepare the boy for _that_ we will certainly get results.
Because this service has one advantage: It meets the desires of the boy
halfway while, thank heavens, sitting on a school bench never does.
Because the fate of nations will also in the future not be determined
by academicians but by politicians and finally by the soldier. Why
shouldn’t it be possible to give back to German youth what is natural
to primitive men? Our nation is healthy. The natural tendency for it
still exists. They have not been lost, they are only obscured. First,
they have to be forced so that they may grow again.
What a boy between 10 and 14 does in his games, the older boy practices
in systematic training. But nowhere is there a place for unnatural
drilling, everything shall and must be part of the life of youth. But
the effort made by the individual must be increased as he grows older.
We Germans were given a great gift by providence. That is, that we are
the only nation who knows how to hike. We are bound to nature not only
by the necessity to exploit it but by the talent to understand nature
emotionally. We experience nature when we hike because we add our own
effort.
We do not wish our youth to goose step in a column, but travel in a
small group which must find its own way. The group learns, after it
has been taught essentials, to orient itself, to read maps and to
judge the terrain. It increases the joy of hiking if the leader gives
definite problems, for instance, to find a certain point visible in the
terrain on the map, or, to look up a road on the map and lead the group
to it, etc., etc.
The trip offers the great opportunity to fit in all that which belongs
to the system: description and judgment of terrain; recognition and
description of the aim; use of terrain, scouting; reporting; securing;
and to end up in a terrain game which requires all the boy; initiative.
The trip does not alone train the boy in the terrain but, as I like
to call it, to self-help. During the war we found that the truly
useful soldiers were not those who had completed their training but
those guys who knew what to do in any situation and could take care
of themselves when it came to the smallest details. Only the mastery
of these thousands of skills makes a completely useful soldier. The
idealist reaching for the stars is of little use if he cannot deal
with all the unpleasant things which must be overcome. Of what use is
the most enthusiastic man if he neglects his footwear and has to stay
behind with bad feet. It is a useless comrade who does not know how to
set up a tent, to dig a hole for cooking, to make a fire, to dress a
wound. The many repulsive tasks in the world of war will soon cause him
to stay behind as unfit, or he will remain a constant source of trouble
to the sergeant, who will be unable to grasp how anybody could be born
with so little common sense.
We have no use for helpless professors but need agile, quick youths who
can deal with every situation in life and have learned all that at a
time when it was easiest to learn it. This is, to a large extent the
purpose of the hiking trip and the camp.
But the hiking trip has still another purpose. It is one of the best
means of education at our disposal; because it is the only way in which
the boy can get acquainted with his fatherland for which he will have
to fight one day. From the perspective of the back alley he can never
win it. But he who has not been completely satisfied will still find in
sun and rain and in his own effort the meaning of trees and soil, of
villages and old towns. He can carry it with him as his true possession
and with this possession he ceases to be a proletarian. It is even a
prerequisite for the possibility that the new state once again may
give him a piece of land. Then again it would have a meaning to the
individual.
The systematic development of physical ability for all of us today
has become something self-understood. We can hardly grasp the fact
that the old state did so little for it with a few hours of gymnastic
exercises up to the end of compulsory school and nothing up to the time
of military service. And that at a time when the number of men fit for
military service in the large cities decreased from year to year. It
does not make sense to us to provide physical training only for those
who desire it and, therefore, join sports clubs. Because he who does
not do that is certainly much more in need of physical training. A
definite program for physical training simultaneous with the physical
development of the young person is a demand already made by the Fuehrer
in his book “Mein Kampf” and which was therefore also demanded and
carried out by the new state. The gap between school, labor and army
service must finally be closed.
What shall and must be done in particular is clear today and
established. The natural is the best. General physical training is
the beginning. Then follows athletics. Track comes first, followed by
jumping, throwing and pushing. But not everything belongs to athletics
but only the simplest: short and long distance running, high and broad
jumping, shot put and instead of javelin, club-throwing. For building
the body those are the most beneficial exercises which require a
minimum of tools and at the same time not too much technique. Among
those swimming is one of the exercises which develop the body in
general. Why should a boy wait till he is 20 years old to learn how to
swim? In the question itself lies the contradiction. Why should the
army occupy itself by teaching 70 percent of the recruits how to swim.
The boy of ten can learn to swim and should master it long before he
becomes a soldier.
* * * * * * *
Of special value for the development of the body is any fighting
sport, especially boxing. Every boy first learns free wrestling and
then boxing. There is no sport which educates better to hardiness and
fighting spirit.
One could not start it too early but only after the body has almost
stopped growing, under no circumstances during the grooming periods.
After that it shall be the main part of body training.
* * * * * * *
[Pages 174-176]
Every boy endures within the proper limits of his strength and
resistance. It is the art of the educator not to go further and to
go so far that through a new test new hardiness follows and in such
a manner that the new test can be on a higher level and increase
resistance by not giving beyond its limits.
* * * * * * *
All that has been learned serves, from a military point of view,
nothing but to get close to the enemy and to bring arms into effect.
The entire education and training remains without value if it does not
lead to the full effect of the weapon against the enemy. All training,
therefore culminates in training in shooting. It cannot be emphasized
enough and because shooting is a matter of practice one cannot start
too early. In the course of years we want to achieve that a gun feels
just as natural in the hands of a German boy as a pen. It is a strange
state of mind in a nation if, through years many hours every day are
spent in practicing penmanship and grammatical writing but not a single
hour in practice-shooting. Liberalism put the following slogan above
school doors “Knowledge is power”. We, on the other hand, have found
out during the war and postwar period that the power of a nation, in
the last analysis, always rests on its arms and on those who know how
to handle them.
Shooting meets with the desire of a boy. There is hardly ever a boy
who does not experiment with it, if only with a bow and arrow he made
himself. Let us put into his hand that which suits him that gives him
real pleasure. First a new air rifle with which he can really learn
how to shoot and let us teach him how to do it correctly. Later, the
older boy gets a small caliber rifle with which all the fine points of
shooting can be taught and in the service of the army finally, as the
last stage, a weapon.
In such a training course the art of shooting can be developed to a
degree which, up to now, seemed not attainable.
* * * * * * *
In addition to general training there is special training for the new
replacement generation in the Air Force, Navy and motorized troops.
The training course for this has been established with the competent
authorities in the Armed Forces. In addition, there is training in
communications on a broad basis and, in the country, cavalry training.
* * * * * * *
With the law of 1 December 1936 on the Hitler-Youth, the Fuehrer
made it possible to extend the principles which, so far, have been
applied to the education of the Hitler-Youth to all German Youth.
Military education is one of the most important tasks to be fulfilled
by the future Hitler-Youth. Besides it, there are the other tasks
which are inseparably connected with it. In our opinion it is not
possible to divide the thinking of a human being into various sections
which then are cultivated by various organizations. But man is an
indivisible whole also in regard to education. Military education and
philosophical education belong together. The latter is not to exhaust
itself in lectures but always through ideological attitude has to draw
the conclusion through action.
During the years the boy lives in the youth organization we want to
give him the knowledge of that for which he has to fight and be a
soldier. The army of the new Reich is not only a community of men
who know how to fight according to the laws of military honor, but a
community of faith in the mission of the German people and in their own
great task. The education of youth has to take care that the knowledge
and the principles, according to which the state and the Armed Forces
of our time have been organized and which support them, enters so
thoroughly into the thoughts of the individual that they never again
can be taken away and remain direction-giving principles all through
life.
But if faith should be shattered and the idea itself should no longer
be firm enough then the German man must have been educated in such a
manner that the laws of honor, which alone enable him to live in his
community, still hold. And if even those should be shattered, there
remains as the last resort the manly discipline, the iron habit to obey
silently and to carry out, without a word that service by order of
another for which the individual will does not suffice. He who cannot
give orders to himself, must get used to obeying the orders of others
and to feel the obligation so to do so strongly that even at the most
dangerous moment it does not fail. It is a fine thing when a man of 20
learns to obey unconditionally but it is much better when the boy of
ten starts to put his own wishes aside, to renounce, to give in, and to
serve the will of the community.
Gentlemen, you can see for yourself that the tasks of present German
youth education have gone far beyond the “playful”. Within the great
order of the new Reich they have taken on a new and tremendous
significance. In order to be able to solve these problems apart from
everything old and inhibiting the Fuehrer has given its own realm to
youth. But this problem can only be solved if the large educational
organizations of the German people are coordinated in such a way that
the life of the German boy constantly increases in physical skill as
well as in ideological will. It would be a pleasure to know that I
succeeded in showing you the great possibilities and in arousing your
interest in the fact that the Armed Forces and the youth together, have
to follow _one_ road.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1992-A-PS
National Political Course for the Armed Forces, from 15 to 23 Jan.
1937.
[National-Politischer Lehrgang der Wehrmacht, vom 15.-23. Januar 1937]
Restricted for the Armed Forces.
HIMMLER: Organization and Obligations of the SS and the Police.
[Pages 141-161]
I shall speak first of all about the origin, organization, and the
spheres of activity of the SS; secondly, about the organization and
obligations of the Police; and thirdly, about the combined efforts of
the SS and the Police, and about the important and vitally necessary
question on the internal security of the Reich.
The SS originated in 1923, very early in the history of the movement,
as shock troop [Stosstrupp] Hitler, was prohibited and disbanded on
November 9, 1923. When the party was reestablished in 1925, the SA as a
protective organization for the meetings was at first prohibited. The
Fuehrer was also denied the right of speech and assembly in Prussia as
well as in Bavaria. Assembly was permitted only in Saxony and Thuringia
which at that time were entirely red.
In order to insure the success of these meetings, it was necessary to
protect them from dispersal. Therefore in 1925 the Fuehrer ordered a
small organization to be formed in order to protect these meetings,
namely the SS [Schutzstaffeln, protective squadrons]--literally
Staffeln at that time, namely small formations with the effective
strength of one leader and 10 men in each location. Even as large a
city as Berlin had a squadron of only 2 leaders and 20 men at that
time. Throughout 1925 and 1926 we succeeded in carrying out and
carrying through the meetings of the Fuehrer and also of other party
speakers in Saxony and Thuringia with these squadrons.
In 1926 the SA was again permitted to exist, and for a few years the SS
withdrew more into the background.
In the year 1929, eight years ago, I was ordered by the Fuehrer to take
over the leadership of all SS units in the entire Reich, then totaling
280 men, and to change them according to the order, into a reliable
elite organization of the Party.
I decided to tackle this problem--which I should like to discuss here
to some extent--because I was a National Socialist, of course. I want
to tell you also how this is to be interpreted. I am a strong believer
in the doctrine that, in the end, only good blood can achieve the
greatest, enduring things in the world. Strengthened by this conviction
of mine, I began to work on this problem.
Accordingly only good blood, blood which history has proved to be
leading and creative and the foundation of every state and all military
activities, only Nordic blood, can be considered. I said to myself
that should I succeed to select from the German people for this
organization as many people as possible a majority of whom possess
this desired blood, to teach them military discipline and, in time,
the understanding of the value of blood and the entire ideology which
results from it, then it will be possible actually to create such an
elite organization which would successfully hold its own in all cases
of emergency.
This form of selection of good blood has been very often theoretically
recognized. Many books have been written on it from Chamberlain
to Guenther of the years 1926/27, and many others which I shall
not mention here. Now came the difficult question of the method of
selecting these people. There are two kinds of selection procedures:
first, the most severe selection procedure brought about by war, the
struggle for life and death. In this procedure the value of blood is
shown through achievement. In the year 1929, a great number of former
soldiers still existed whose worth could be determined by their record
during the war. Wars however, are exceptional circumstances, and a way
had to be found to make selections in peace time as well, when courage
could not be given this test. Thus, I could only draw conclusions from
the appearance of the people in question. Of course, many will argue
immediately: that is all very well but if you judge by height, blond
hair and blue eyes and the dimensions of the skull then the matter is
very problematical. That is known to me very well, too. One could never
judge by that alone.
I then went on to require a certain height. I did not accept people
under 1,7 m--and here I ask you to understand the exact meaning to
my words--because I know that people who have reached a certain
height must possess the desired blood to some degree. Of course it is
impossible to be too discriminating here as it cannot be said that
people who are smaller should not possess the same blood. That is
natural but by choosing from this pool of people having the desired
height there exists a greater probability of obtaining satisfactory
results.
But we went further. It was not enough to go by height, but we began
to obtain photographs at that time. That amounted to a hundred to
two hundred people annually who were eligible for admission. I have
personally seen each photograph and asked myself: Does the face of this
man have distinct traits of foreign blood, excessive cheek bones, or as
is the common way of asking: Does this one appear Mongolic or that one
Slavic? Slavic, incidentally, is a faulty expression. It is merely a
popular expression.
Why have I done all this? I should like to call to your attention here
the types of soldier councils of the years 1918 and 1919. Everyone of
you who was an officer at that time knows a number of such people by
personal experience. You will have to admit that on the whole they were
people whose appearance affected our German eye as rather peculiar,
whose features looked strange and who had some foreign blood in them.
They were the type of people who could be disciplined, who are orderly
in normal times, who would even be brave, bold and daring in time of
war but who, because of their blood, would fail to pass the final great
test of character and nerves.
Since I knew these things I said to myself: I shall not accept people
whom I expect to quit, to complain, to become disloyal and traitors,
to have bad soldierly manners and the like at the moment of political
tests, because of the nature of the composition of their blood. We had
to be all the more careful because we had only voluntary discipline in
the SS during the years of struggle, and therefore we were unable to
compel a man to do something.
It was only possible to deprive the man of his arm band for a period
of three or four weeks or impose on him penal drills, and that only if
he voluntarily accepted the punishment. If he was unwilling he could
always say: “I resign, I don’t like it any longer.” We therefore have
followed the above-mentioned principle of selection and been able to
remove the principal causes of defect.
With this outward screening however, no final selection had been
attained, since it was always the performance of the person during the
following months and years which was of importance. It was my point of
view that we should always require difficult tasks and more than any
other organization. Valuable personnel is never trained by means of
easy service and conveniences, but by difficulties and added burdens.
We therefore began by exacting from our men higher dues in spite of the
widespread poverty of the times. At a time when no uniforms were issued
to party organizations, we asked our people to acquire black trousers
and boots from their own means--a tremendous expense for an unemployed
person who had to pay the 40 marks of his own purse. If he failed to
do so and declared: I cannot do that, then we explained to him: please
go away, for you somehow failed to understand the matter for you do not
possess the instinctive willingness to a sacrifice of your own accord,
for we cannot use you. Thus we gradually arrived at our intended and
desired picture.
This briefly-mentioned theory of selection of people may be criticised,
today after eight years I believe I can say with sincerity that its
practical application has justified its existence, and that it has
really been possible to effect a certain selection of people in the SS
already during the time of fighting.
I shall skip the next few periods and shall now occupy myself with
the year 1933. This year was for the SS the hardest trial; for it was
a time when all organizations flourished, a time of great assault
and tidal waves of those who desired membership in the party and its
organizations. A very difficult question confronted us at that time.
It was a question of deciding whether to close the party and its
organizations to further membership and thus remaining pure in quality
but small in volume, or of opening them to further membership to
increase their volume. This resulted in a dangerous situation, as was
shown as a number of people poured in who were not entirely loyal and
idealists, so that to a certain degree it became a menace of numbers,
of the masses.
The SS too was endangered by this menace. Therefore I closed it in
April 1933 while some of the other organizations still accepted as
great a number of people as possible. This way I had the SS again under
my control in April and said: We shall accept no more people. From
the end of 1933 to the end of 1935 we expelled all those of the newly
accepted members who proved unsuitable. In these years I have expelled
approximately 60,000 men. Today the strength of the SS consists of
approximately 210,000 men. This has been of great benefit to the SS and
all of its units as its quality has greatly improved whereas it would
have suffered considerably through quantity.
I shall close the question of selection by stating that today we accept
young men of 18 years of age. We know them already from the Hitler
Youth, have studied them already a few years, so that we are sure to
get only the best. With 18 years they come to us as candidates.
They are extremely thoroughly examined and checked. Of 100 men we
can use on the average 10 or 15, no more. We ask for the political
reputation record of his parents, brothers and sisters, the record
of his ancestry as far back as 1750 and naturally the physical
examination and his records of the Hitler youth. Further we ask for a
record of hereditary health showing that no hereditary diseases exist
in his parents and in his family. Last, but perhaps most important, is
a certification of the race commission. This examining commission is
composed of SS leaders, anthropologists and physicians.
The behavior of this young man in front of this commission is now what
is decisive: Not only the way he stands at attention but also his manly
disciplined bearing, the ease and composition with which he answers the
questions posed to him in the course of conversation, his gait, his
hands, in fact all that which we have come to regard in the course of
our eight years of experience as ideal. This is the way we determine
whether to accept the man or not. The first years the company has been
very unhappy in many cases. It asked: Why is this man refused us?
We have just located in this or that village a man who has in every
respect an orderly appearance and now when this man confronts the race
commission he is being refused at a time when it is so difficult to
obtain people. In such cases we have always remained and still remain
severe and that is the right thing. That is the proper way to conduct a
veritable selection.
I now come to the organization of the SS. It is necessary to
distinguish among the following organizations of the SS. First the
General SS which consists of about 190,000 men. This General SS is
entirely civilian in nature except for the higher officer corps, which
performs its duties on the higher levels, that is from Sturmbannfuehrer
up. I am very proud of the fact that only 0.4 percent of the General
SS are unemployed. These 0.4 percent come from Upper Silesia where
it is really very difficult to obtain work. We have almost only
professionals, and it is my opinion that it should be so. For a really
capable man is of little value to me if he only excels in arts, he
must also be otherwise honest and of good character, and accomplish
something in his field, in his profession. A man who changes his
position three times without satisfactory reason is expelled as we
have no further interest in him. People who stand around idle are of
no use to us. The General SS, therefore, is entirely professional
in its nature and character and performs its duties nights and
Sundays just like in war time. Besides the General SS there is the
Verfuegungstruppe; also the Death Head Units, the SD, and the race and
population system. I shall now discuss individual units in some detail.
The General SS is divided into 13 subdivisions which on the whole are
exactly adapted to the present corps districts and one corps district
being planned. Under these subdivisions headed by Oberabschnittsfuehrer
who are Gruppenfuehrer or Obergruppenfuehrer, there are those which
are headed by an Oberfuehrer or Brigadefuehrer. These subdivisions, in
their turn, are subdivided into SS regiments [Standarten]. A regiment,
if in its entire force, is made up of 1600 men. Under the regiments we
have the battalions [Sturmbanne] and companies [Stuerme], and under the
companies the platoons.
A great many SS men live very far apart. Of course, it would be much
more convenient to set up a Sturmbanne in some town and in this way
have all the people always together. That would facilitate considerably
the exercises which always take place in the evening hours, instruction
and sport, and require much less effort. However, that would inevitably
result in a decreasing quality because not enough people possessing the
desired qualities could be obtained in a town of approximately 20 to
25 thousand inhabitants. We have, therefore, extended our organization
considerably and have many platoons in the country side. These platoons
are then divided up between the villages, so that in a typical village
only the two best young men are SS members. We have meetings over the
week ends when the farmer is not too occupied, or one entire afternoon
in the winter, while in summer we only have monthly roll calls. That is
the outline of the organization of the General SS.
The age groups in the SS are as follows: With 18 years the young man
enters the SS. He is first an applicant, after three months he takes
the oath on the Fuehrer and thus becomes a candidate [Anwaerter].
As a candidate during the first year he takes examinations for his
SA sport insignia and his bronze sport insignia. At the age of 19
or 19½, according to the time of his acceptance, he is conscripted
for the labor service and subsequently for the Wehrmacht. After
two more years he comes back from the Wehrmacht unless he remains
there as a prospective non-commissioned officer or reenlists. If he
returns to us he is still candidate. In these weeks he is especially
thoroughly instructed in ideology. The first year is for him a period
of elementary ideological indoctrination. In these weeks following
his return from the Wehrmacht he receives special instruction about
the marriage law and all other laws pertaining to the family, and the
honor laws. On the 9th of November, following his return from the
Wehrmacht, he becomes an SS man in the true sense. The Reichsfuehrer of
the SS is just as much an SS man in the sense of the SS organization
as the common man at the front. On this 9th of November he is being
awarded the dagger, and at this occasion he promises to abide by the
marriage law and the disciplinary laws of the SS, since the family is
also subject to these laws. From this day on he has the right and the
duty to defend his honor with a weapon as laid down by the honor laws
of the SS. The applicants and candidates do not yet have this right.
The SS man remains in the so called active general SS until his 35th
year. From his 35th to his 45th year he is in the SS reserve, and after
his 45th year in the Stammabteilung of the SS, identified by the grey
color patch. Between the ages of 21 and 35 the SS man has to perform
a great many duties, especially up to his 25th year. In these first
four years there are a lot of marches, tournaments, i.e., sports of
all kinds which take the form of contests that take place each year
between Easter and Summer solstice so that we are able to select the
best men of every company by these demonstrations of physical ability.
Every SS man is being asked to pass some kind of annual test until his
50th year. And the reason for that? These men are for the most part
professionals. In the SS perhaps anywhere from ½ to ⅗ live in cities.
The workman in the cities is often engaged in occupations requiring him
to stand or the intellectual worker to sit for a considerable amount of
time. To that is added the misery of big cities which in my opinion is
also a very serious military question.
People of the 20th Century no longer walk but travel in the subway,
railroad or cars. Nobody is accustomed to marching in all the years
of his civilian life. Or take those who hold leading positions as an
example, all the professional State and Ministry leaders. These people
are condemned to sit. Everybody is so pressed for time he has to take
an automobile because there is no other way to keep up with the rush.
The result of this is that people grow pale and fat and in some cases
phlegmatic which is never good for the State. If we desire to remain
young we have to be sportsmen. But all that would remain on paper if I
did not hold annual checkups or arouse to a certain degree the ambition
of the men so that they really become sportsmen and pass their annual
tests. * * *
The performance insignia of the SA have the following meaning: every
form of sport which requires the use of arms is being executed with
both arms. Shot put is done with both arms; the same holds true for
stone putting. Pistols and rifles are fired left and right. That
appears terribly awkward and unaccustomed in the beginning, but it
is an excellent form of exercise and very successful. Hand grenades
and clubs are hurled left and right. In the beginning no record
performances can be expected of course of people past their twentieth
year, since the left arm or in the case of a left-handed person the
right arm, are completely untrained, so that at a distance of 10 m the
target is often missed by three or five meters. It will be, however, a
very good development and application of all physical strength if we
require such performances of youths in the ages of 13 to 14 from the
very beginning. I believe that in this way we shall be very successful.
Every year the performance insignia differ. Of course, I do not expect
the conditions and time from a 40 year old for a 100 meter race as I do
expect them from a man of 21, but I do require of the man of 40 greater
endurance in marching than I do of the man of 21. I expect a 30 year
old man to shoot calmer and better than a 19 or 20 year old with few
examples. They are also graded to the extent that a wounded war veteran
who e.g. cannot swim need not, for that reason, refuse every sport.
But I want to help him by grading the conditions so that one who lost
an arm can perform the exercise with the other arm. Such are the sport
activities of the SS from the ages of 18 to 50. Aside from the sport
activity, those between the ages of 21 and 35 receive complete training
in street patrolling and barricading for cases of internal security.
Hand in hand with physical exercise is mental and ideological training.
Weekly periods of instruction are held during which pages from Hitler’s
“Mein Kampf” are read. The older a person, the more steadfast must he
be in his ideology and the more training must he get in ideology.
I now come to the Verfuegungstruppe [Forerunner of Armed Forces SS].
The Verfuegungstruppe is divided into the following units: SS Regiment
“Adolf Hitler,” with three battalions, which is motorized and at the
same time contains infantrymen and additional companies; SS Regiment
“Deutschland” with 4 battalions with the usual motorcycle riflemen and
infantry howitzer companies; SS Regiment “Germania” with 3 battalions
also with motorcycle riflemen and infantry howitzer companies; the SS
battalion “Nurnberg,” an infantry battalion; the SS engineer battalion
today in Leisnig; later in Dresden; and the SS signal battalion today
in Berlin, later in Unna, upon completion of the barracks. The Regiment
“Adolf Hitler” is in Berlin. The Regiment “Deutschland” has three
battalions in Munich and one battalion in Ellwangen, the Regiment
“Germania” has now one battalion and two companies in Hamburg, and one
battalion in Arolsen and up to now one other battalion in Soltau. The
final garrison is not yet stationary. The time of service is 4 years.
No other form of conscription exists. The annual need for replacement
will be approximately 2200 men, not a great number.
I now come to the Death Head Units. The employment and obligations of
the Verfuegungstruppe I shall discuss later in connection with the
police. The Death Head Units originated from the guard units of the
concentration camps. In connection with these concentration camps, I
should like to give a few data. We have in Germany today the following
concentration camps which, in my opinion, should not decrease but
increase in number for certain reasons:
(1) Dachau near Munich; (2) Sachsenhausen near Berlin, which is the
former camp Esterwege in Emsland. I have dissolved this camp in
Emsland upon the suggestion of Reich Labor Leader, Hierl, and the
judiciary, who declared it was wrong to tell one person that the
service in the swamps to make land arable is an honor, and another,
by sending him there as a prisoner: “I’ll teach you people what it
means to get sent to the swamps.” This indeed is illogical, and after
half or three quarters of a year, I dissolved the camp in Esterwege
and transferred it to Sachsenhausen near Oranienburg. Then there is a
camp in Lichtenburg near Torgau, one in Sachsenburg near Chemnitz and
besides a few smaller ones. The number of prisoners is about 8000. I
shall explain to you why we must have so many and still more. We once
had a very efficiently organized German Communist Party [KPD]. This
KPD has been crushed in the year 1933. A part of the functionaries
went to foreign countries. Another part was comprised in the very high
number of protective custody prisoners in the year 1933. Because of my
extensive knowledge of Bolshevism, I have always opposed the release
of these people from the camps. It must be clear to us that the great
mass of workmen are absolutely susceptible to National Socialism and
the contemporary form of state as long as their way of thought has not
been changed by the specifically indoctrinated, trained and financially
backed functionaries. * * *
It would be extremely instructive for everyone--some members of the
Wehrmacht were already able to do so--to inspect such a concentration
camp. Once they have seen it, they are convinced of the fact that no
one had been sent there unjustly; that it is the offal of criminals
and freaks. No better demonstration of the laws of inheritance and
race, as set forth by Doctor Guett, exists than such a concentration
camp. There you can find people with hydrocephalus, people who are
cross-eyed, deformed, half-Jewish, and a number of racially inferior
products. All that is assembled there. Of course we distinguish
between those inmates who are only there for a few months for the
purpose of education, and those who are to stay for a very long time.
On the whole, education consists of discipline, never of any kind of
instruction on an ideological basis, for the prisoners have, for the
most part, slave-like souls; and only very few people of real character
can be found there. They would pretend to do all that would be asked
of them, repeat all that is said in the “Voelkischer Beobachter” but
in reality, stay the same. The discipline thus preens order. The order
begins with these people living in clean barracks. Such a thing can
really only be accomplished by us Germans, hardly another nation would
be as humane as we are. The laundry is frequently changed. The people
are taught to wash themselves twice daily, and the use of a toothbrush
with which most of them have been unfamiliar. * * *
The concentration camps are guarded by these Death Head Units. It
is impossible to use exclusively married people for guard duty as
has been suggested once, for no state can afford to do so. It is
further necessary to keep the number of such guards for concentration
camps--there are 3,500 men in Germany--at a relatively high level,
for no form of service is as exacting and strenuous for troops as the
guarding of crooks and criminals. * * *
In case of war, it must become clear to us that a considerable number
of unreliable persons will have to be put here if we are to assure
ourselves of the absence of highly disagreeable developments in case of
war.
The prisoner guards were formerly members of the general SS. We
gradually collected them into the so-called Death Head Units. They
are not arranged in companies, but in centuries (groups of 100) and
have naturally also machine guns. In such camps there are two or three
control towers, manned day and night with fully loaded machine guns, so
that any attempt of a general uprising--a possibility for which we must
always be prepared--can be immediately suppressed. The entire camp can
be strafed from three towers.
The time of service in these Death Head Units is also four years.
They consist today mainly of people who have served their time in
the Wehrmacht and then enlisted with us for a period of four years.
The Death Head Units have the additional purpose of being the cadre
centuries for approximately 30 Death Head special battalions of the SS
in case of war, for 25,000 men with whom we shall guarantee the safety
in the interior. I shall come back to this subject later.
I now come to the Security Service [SD]; it is the great ideological
intelligence service of the party and, in the long run, also that
of the state. During the time of struggle for power it was only the
intelligence service of the SS. At that time we had, for quite natural
reasons, an intelligence service with the regiments, battalions and
companies. We had to know what was going on on the opponent’s side,
whether the Communists intended to hold a meeting today or not, whether
our people were to be suddenly attacked or not and similar things.
I separated this service already in 1931 from the troops, from the
units of the general SS, because I considered it to be wrong. For one
thing, the secrecy is endangered, then the individual men or even the
companies are too likely to discuss every day problems.
That was indeed the principle of the SS from the beginning. Every day
problems do not interest us; every leader appointed by the Fuehrer will
be backed by us, every leader dismissed by the Fuehrer will be removed
by us, if necessary by force, because only the command of the Fuehrer
counts. Besides that we are only interested in ideological questions of
importance for decades or centuries, so that the man is really above
the concern of every day and knows that he is working for a great task,
which occurs but once in 2000 years. The SS man is not interested in
daily problems of the kind whether perhaps the local group is correctly
manned, whether everything is done properly in the labor front, no
matter what it is, he is not interested.
The Security Service was already separated from the troops in 1931 and
separately organized. Its higher headquarters coincide today with the
Oberabschnitte and Abschnitte (sectors), and it has also field offices,
an own organization of officials with a great many Command Posts,
approximately 3-4000 men strong, at least when it is built up. The
spheres which it handles are above all Communism, Judaism, Freemasonry,
ultra-mundane activities, the activity of political religion, and
reaction. Here, too, the details of the work are not of interest. You
will perhaps see that during your visit; I can, therefore, be short.
The security service is only interested in the great ideological
problems.
For example: Let us say that it is attempted on the part of
ultra-mundane people to effect gradually for the territory of Austria
a change into a Swiss like state by means of scientific exploitation
of the theory of the Austrian man. Just as it happened to us in our
history 700 or 800 years ago with Switzerland which, although it
still speaks the German language today, does not consider itself
inwardly as belonging to Germany; or as we had to suffer the loss
of Holland with its entire lower German territory a few centuries
ago; the attempt is now being made to point at this problem of the
South-East German people, of the Austrian people, with propaganda, by
scientific underrunning and scientific work at the universities, until
spiritual separation is also possible. We are furthermore interested:
Which German professors support this theory or are connected with any
wire-pulling abroad or elsewhere?
These are spheres which interest us. To us as a security service it
is of no interest whether, for instance, the cell organization of the
German Communist party at Berlin-Wedding has been broken up or not.
This is a question for the executive power. One day it will be broken
up, or it is broken up already, and if it is reorganized, it will be
broken up again. Therefore, this is of no interest to us, on account
of that Germany will not perish. We are interested: What are the
Communists’ large-scale plans for the next years, in which country do
they intend to begin, which influences of Bolshevism are noticeable in
foreign Freemasonry circles, what are their plans, where do the big
emissaries go now? Recently, e.g. 800 emissaries went to Austria. They
arrived there 3 or 4 months ago, and now we are extremely interested
to know: How is this going to affect Austria? Or what plans do they
have, what great organizational plans for Germany, from which angle do
they start, how does Bolshevism make common cause, for instance, with
the religious coalition [Bekenntnisfront], and suddenly supports as an
atheist movement these religious parsons, how is that possible all of a
sudden? Or we are furthermore interested in this:
What economic influence do the Jews exercise--again considered on a
large scale--to suffocate business, to commit sabotage and to transfer
foreign currency illegally? These are things which are being studied
there scientifically and--in this case the word really fits--by a
general staff, which may sometimes last for years, tasks which in many
or in most cases are only in the beginning stage.
After the Security Service follows the last pillar, the race- and
settlement organization. We thus have the general SS, which represents
the majority of the SS, of the order, the Verfuegungs troops with
a certain task in the country for the protection of the interior,
the Death Head Units, also for the protection of the interior, the
Security Service, the intelligence service of the party and the
state, and finally the race--and settlement organization whose task
of ideological training is of a positive nature, as contrasted with
the Security Service which has the negative task to seek information
about the opponent. In this race- and settlement office the marriage
applications are being handled. In the last 4 or 5 years we have the
order concerning marriages: No SS men can get married without the
approval of the SS Reich leader. A physical examination of the bride
and guarantees for the bride’s ideological and human character are
required. We are not interested whether the woman has a fortune or not.
We request only a statement whether or not she has defects. We prefer
it if the rich girls take along only what they have earned themselves,
or their dowry. In addition, the genealogical table up to 1750 is
required, the hereditary physical report of both, and several police
and other reports. This results in tremendous work, especially now that
people are getting married in an unusually great number; because it is
our concern, that our men get married. We desire that they get married
at 26 years, if possible, so that there will be really young marriages
which are also able to have children. * * *
I now turn to the Police and its structure. Today the Police is divided
into two branches, namely civil and security police; the civil police
wears a uniform. The security police is composed of the criminal police
and of the Secret State Police [Gestapo]. We can certainly state
without exaggeration that in 1933 we took over a wild confusion, a
Police the decent elements of which were humiliated; for the sword had
been taken away from the officers and a rubber truncheon had been given
to the men. The police was permeated by persons with criminal records
and by absolute Marxists; it did not care to actually take a stand
against any crime because at once the League for Human Rights, the
Peace Society and similar societies intervened, and because absolute
glorification of crime was in vogue. This was the method of planned
intellectual Bolshevization.
In Prussia, Goering took over the Police, put the uniformed police in
order, and created a Landespolizei (gendarmerie) which in 1935-1936
was absorbed by the army; the same occurred in Bavaria. From my SS
position, I first of all concerned myself only with the Secret State
Police, with the political Police of the countries and with the Secret
State Police in Prussia. Through the fact that I personally was
political police commander of all German countries, and at the same
time deputy of the Gestapo in Prussia, the Gestapo gradually came
under the control of one person.
I may skip the whole further development. On the 17th of June of the
previous year I became head of the German police, that is, of all the
German Police together with its auxiliary organizations. I shall review
for you my conception of my task as I have seen and still see it.
First:--I shall ultimately form one true Reich police out of these 16
different gendarmeries, for the Reich police is one of the strongest
binding elements that a state can have. We now have for the first
time in German history a Reich Police. Outwardly, I am eliminating
the various uniforms, the laws and regulations which were still in
force until six or nine months ago. When a Hamburg police official was
pursuing a criminal who was bold enough to go into Prussian territory,
he could not pursue him farther without the consent of the Prussian
Police. This naturally was to the great advantage of the criminal, for
he could very easily escape. The same was the case between the other
states of the federation. These things were still on such a firm legal
basis that one could not do away with them without legal revision.
For the creation of the Reich police, not only outwardly but also
inwardly, I have already made a beginning in the officers’ corps and
with the officials, by shifting the people somewhat, through transfers,
etc., in this way showing Germany to them; thus my dear Bavarians may
come North for a change, and the people from the North go South. If
that is not done they all groan a little about it at first, as was the
case with the SS a few years ago. Now a telegram arrives suddenly,
the man is to be at his new post in two days. Transfers are effected
on principle only by telegram, that keeps people young and fresh. As
stated, this is only the beginning of our work with the Reich police.
The effective strength of officers and men is very low. That is quite
understandable, for the police has given up much of its good or even
best personnel for setting up the Landespolizei. The Landespolizei
was absorbed by the Wehrmacht, and what is left in many places is the
poorest not only of equipment, trucks, autos and other things, but
sometimes the poorest of officers and men. All of this must now be
painfully built up and brought into order. * * *
As far as I can, I am now bringing the police up to full strength
with men leaving the Verfuegungstruppe (reserve unit) and the Death
Head Units; I am bringing the police officers’ corps up to full
strength with SS leaders who come into the police from the Toelz
and Brunswick Fuehrerschulen [Leader Training schools] by way of
the Verfuegungstruppe. This brings me to an important problem; I am
fighting to prevent the police officers’ corps from becoming a second
class officers’ corps. This happens very easily just as it did in the
past.
In connection with this whole matter, I now come to the main problem:
internal security and obligations of the police during war. In a future
war we shall have not only an army front on land, a navy front at sea,
and an air force front in the air over Germany, but we shall also have
a fourth theater of war, namely internal Germany. This is the basis
which must be kept sound, at all costs, lest the three combat branches
of Germany be stabbed in the back again.
We must clearly recognize that an opponent in war is an opponent not
only in a military but also in an ideological sense. When I speak here
of opponents, I obviously mean our natural opponent, international
Bolshevism, under Jewish-Masonic leadership. This Bolshevism, of
course, has its supreme citadel in Russia. But this does not mean
that there is danger of Bolshevist attack from Russia only. One must
always reckon with this danger from wherever this Jewish Bolshevism
has gained decisive influence for itself. The states or people under
Jewish-Masonic-Bolshevist leadership, or at least strong influence,
will of necessity be unfriendly toward Germany and will constitute a
danger.
Thus we must constantly ask ourselves, “Who is, or would be an opponent
in case of war? Who is an ideological opponent, that is, who is under
Jewish-Masonic-Bolshevist influence”? We must clearly realize, that
Bolshevism is the organization of the sub-humans, it is the absolute
foundation of Jewish sovereignty, it is the exact contrary of all that
is dear to an Aryan people. It is a diabolical teaching, for it appeals
to the meanest and lowest instincts of mankind and makes a religion of
this. Do not be deceived: Bolshevism, with its Lenin entombed in the
Kremlin, will take only a few decades to become the diabolical religion
of destruction, a religion native to Asia for the destruction of the
whole world. Furthermore, remember that this Bolshevism is working
according to plan for the Bolshevization of other peoples, and the
destruction is aimed at the white race. One of the first institutions
founded under Jewish leadership, as early as 1918, was an Asiatic
university as I shall call it. It has a kind of department for each
Asiatic population, whether numerous or not. The functionaries for
these populations are instructed not only in their language, but also
as to the customs, as to the religious and class quarrels, and the
economic circumstances, etc. They are instructed whether these people
are mostly rich or poor, whether the poorer class is particularly
oppressed, etc. All of this is studied down to the smallest sects.
The people who have finished their education there, then go out in a
constant stream to all of these people and exploit their wishes and
longings as their religious differences and their fanaticism, taking
advantage of social misery, to draw them into a whirlpool and thus
gradually convince them that the only ones who can really help them are
the people in Moscow.
This general movement is also directed against the white race, and
is today directed primarily against resurrected Germany, which was
generally considered to have been ruined, because of having been
subdued. If we wish to be immune to the poison of destruction in our
people, our lives must again be founded on social well-being, order
and cleanliness. We are in the process of creating both. The first
four years have passed; unemployment has almost vanished, much has
been accomplished, much more remains to be done by us. But the most
important thing is the thorough ideological permeation of all our
people with the profound realization that our people, a minority of
70 million in the heart of Europe, could stand only because we are
qualitatively more valuable than the others.
And this brings me back to what I said about the race question at the
beginning.
We are more valuable than the others who do now and always will surpass
us in numbers. We are more valuable because our blood enables us to
invent more than others, to lead our people better than the others;
because it enables us to have better soldiers, better statesmen, higher
culture, better characters. We also have better quality, speaking of
your profession, because the German soldier is more devoted to duty,
more decent, and more intelligent than the soldiers of other countries.
And we shall maintain this quality as long as we keep our blood and
people healthy, so long as this people recognizes and obeys the ancient
laws for preservation of a people which National Socialism, thanks
to Adolf Hitler, restored to it. We shall remain healthy and immune
as long as we do not slide back into democracy, into a hereditary or
legitimate imperialism which did not develop from the people. Let us
realize clearly that we shall weather the next decades only if we are
a people that has a profound conviction of itself, believes in its own
strength, and proves this strength.
I spoke of the ideological permeation of the whole people in case of
war. If this war should come sooner than any of us believe or wish,
that is, if war will come at all, we must clearly realize that there
will always be a residue among the German people who will form a
nucleus for the Comintern. The Comintern have an easy time of it, for
they have a political agitator and at the same time a military spy who
sells. Every communist is also a military spy who reveals any military
and industrial secret out of loyalty to his imaginary fatherland,
Moscow, the native land of the proletarians. Because of his conviction,
he engages in political agitation and sedition in exactly the same
way in order to start the revolution. The sooner war would come, the
greater would be the danger. The later it comes, the more generations
of youth have grown up, year after year, the less is the danger. The
danger would arise again only if the German people would deviate from
today’s path. In any case, we must prepare for this danger, for this
internal theater of war, and always realize clearly that any war
brought about by neglect of this internal theater of war would lead to
damage.
I picture the scope of obligations in case of war as follows: The
police of course would, according to their duty as I see it, be able to
give up a maximum of 15,000 to 20,000 men (not more) to the Wehrmacht
as soldiers. I have a total of 80,000 to 90,000 uniformed police. It
must be taken into consideration that a large part of this uniformed
police is over or at least over 40, so that if I should give up 15,000
to 20,000, I really would give up the backbone of this police. I can
substitute men over 55 or 60 whom I may reactivate. That could be done
if unavoidable. However, it is possible only if I assure myself of an
attack unit [Eingreiftruppe] which I can use for large scale projects.
These are the Death Head Units. By and large, I can get along with
this old Police force. I can carry out all the former tasks of the
Landsturm, i.e. guarding munition factories, railroad crossings, etc.,
with civilians over 45, who would be drafted as auxiliary police as
planned provided I have as a backbone a troop that is young. For this
the Death Head Units are provided, ranging in age from 25 to 35, not
older and not younger.
I do not wish to have any very young nor any old persons, for the
sabotage and terror troops consist of young, very lively persons with
the most modern equipment. This opponent cannot be fought with old
Landsturm personnel.
The Death Head Units will enter every government district of Germany.
The following measures have been provided: firstly, no unit is to go
to its native province, thus a Pomeranian troop would never serve
in Pomerania. Secondly, each unit will change after three months.
Thirdly, the unit will never be assigned to street duty singly. An
individual with the death head insignia will never be used as a
policeman for street service, that must not be. Fourth, if such use
is made relentless measures are to be taken. Anything else is out of
the question. Otherwise we would have to reckon in Germany with such
possibilities as parachute jumps, use of saboteurs, use of bold groups
of 16 or 20 men who might, with the support of Communist personnel,
entrench themselves in a munitions factory. If these measures are not
provided for one could not get along with such a limited personnel. * *
*
In closing, I may say one thing: I can manage with the officers’ corps
of the civil police and with the men of the Security Service, whom I
naturally cannot release even in war, and with the men and leaders of
the Death Head Units, only if I have valuable and decent people in
them. I must make it possible by way of the Verfuegungstruppe which
will be in combat, to have a constant exchange of wounded or those who
have been at the front a long time, in return for officers and men of
the police and the Death Head Units. Otherwise, I either would get no
decent characters for these home formations, and then obviously could
not fulfill the obligations; or else there would appear in the home
formations manifestations of disturbances as happened with the fleet
during the war, because it didn’t get out. This must be avoided, and
for this reason rotation is planned within the organization. Every SS
leader of the Verfuegungstruppe--we have about 300 SS leaders yearly
coming from the Toelz and Brunswick SS schools--is placed with the
civil police once every half year, in order to become a reserve officer
of the police. I can make good use of these people. If, for instance,
one of them is wounded and has only one arm, he can still render
excellent service at home.
An appreciation of this completely new kind of organization must
penetrate everywhere, as well as an understanding of this internal
theater of war which will mean the difference between the existence or
nonexistence of our people if we ever would have to stand a trial. It
is the obligation of the SS and of the police to solve positively the
problem of internal security. That is the assignment given to us by the
Fuehrer. We are tackling it in all seriousness and are really convinced
that it is no second-rate task, and we are further convinced that only
the best ideological training of our men and a racial selection will
enable us to solve this problem some day.
In this short outline I have depicted for you the task of the SS and
police. Just as I do in every address to Wehrmacht officers, I ask you
in your circle to think yourselves into these somewhat novel channels
of thought, and create understanding for it wherever you can.
Let us all clearly realize, the next decades do not signify any foreign
political argument which Germany either can or cannot overcome, but
they signify a fight of extermination of the above-mentioned subhuman
opponents in the whole world who fight Germany, as the nuclear people
of the Northern race, Germany as nucleus of the German people, Germany
as bearer of the culture of mankind; they signify the existence or
nonexistence of the white race of which we are the leading people. We
have, of course, one conviction: we are lucky enough to be alive just
at the time when once in 2,000 years an Adolf Hitler has been born, and
we are convinced that we shall survive every danger in both good and
bad times because we all hold together and because each one approaches
his work with his conviction.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1997-PS
_Copy of RK. 10714 B._
Decree of the Fuehrer concerning the administration of the
newly-occupied Eastern territories, dated the 17 July 1941.
In order to restore and maintain public order and public life in the
newly-occupied Eastern territories I decree that:
Article 1
As soon as the military operations in the newly-occupied territories
are over, the administration of these territories shall be transferred
from the military establishments to the civil-administration
establishments. I shall from time to time determine by special decree,
the territories which according to this are to be transferred to the
civil administration, and the time when this is to take place.
Article 2
The Civil Administration in the newly-occupied Eastern territories,
where these territories are not included in the administration of
the territories bordering on the Reich or the General government, is
subject to the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern territories.
Article 3
Military sovereign rights and powers are exercised by the commanders
of the Armed Forces in the newly-occupied Eastern territories in
accordance with my decree of 25 June 1941.
The powers of the Commissioner for the 4-year plan in the
newly-occupied Eastern territories, according to my decree of 29 June
1941, and those of the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police
according to my decree of 17 July 1941, are subject to special ruling,
and are not effected by the following regulations.
Article 4
I appoint Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg as Reich Minister for the
Occupied Eastern Territories. He will hold office in Berlin.
Article 5
The parts of the newly-occupied Eastern territories which are subject
to the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories are to
be divided into Reich Commissariats, which are to be divided into
General Regions [Generalbezirke] and these again into District Areas
[Kreisgebiete]. Several “Kreisgebiete” can be joined into a Main Region
[Hauptbezirk]. The Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories
will issue more detailed instructions on this subject.
Article 6
At the head of each Reich Commissariat will be a Reich Commissar; at
the head of each General Region a Commissar-General and at the head of
every District Area an Area Commissar [Gebietskommissar]. Where a Main
Region is formed, there will be a Head-Commissar [Hauptkommissar] in
charge.
The Reich Commissars and the Commissar-Generals will be appointed
by me, the heads of the main sections in the bureaux of the Reich
Commissars, as well as the Head Commissars and District Commissars will
be appointed by the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories.
Article 7
In cases where Article 3 is not applicable, the Reich Commissars will
be responsible to the Reich Minister for Occupied Eastern Territories,
and will receive instructions exclusively from him.
Article 8
It is the responsibility of the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern
Territories to legislate for the newly occupied territories under
his jurisdiction. He can delegate the legislative power to the Reich
Commissars.
Article 9
As regards civil affairs, the Reich Commissars are responsible for the
whole administration of their territory.
As long as military operations are in progress, it is the duty of the
highest competent authorities of the Reich to guarantee railway and
postal services in accordance with the instructions of the Chief of
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. Further ruling will remain pending
until the time the military operations cease.
Article 10
In order that the measures taken by the Reich Minister for the Occupied
Eastern Territories or by the Reich Commissars in their areas may
be brought into harmony with the over-all [uebergeordnete] aspects
of the interests of the Reich, the Reich Minister for the Occupied
Eastern Territories will maintain close liaison with the highest Reich
authorities. In differences of opinion which cannot be settled by
direct negotiations, my decision is to be obtained through the Reich
Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellory.
Article 11
The necessary regulations for carrying out and supplementing this
decree will be issued by the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern
Territories in agreement with the Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich
Chancellory.
Fuehrer’s Headquarters, 17 July 1941
The Fuehrer
Signed: Adolf Hitler
Chief of Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces
Signed: Keitel
Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancery
Signed: Dr. Lammers.
[L.S.]
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2000-PS
1935 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, NO. 100, PAGE 1146.
Law for the Protection of German Blood and German Honor of 15 September
1935
Thoroughly convinced by the knowledge that the purity of German blood
is essential for the further existence of the German people and
animated by the inflexible will to safeguard the German nation for
the entire future, the Reichstag has resolved upon the following law
unanimously, which is promulgated herewith:
Section 1
1. Marriages between Jews and nationals of German or kindred blood are
forbidden. Marriages concluded in defiance of this law are void, even
if, for the purpose of evading this law, they are concluded abroad.
2. Proceedings for annulment may be initiated only by the Public
Prosecutor.
Section 2
Relations outside marriage between Jews and nationals of German or
kindred blood are forbidden.
Section 3
Jews will not be permitted to employ female nationals of German or
kindred blood in their household.
Section 4
1. Jews are forbidden to hoist the Reichs and national flag and to
present the colors of the Reich.
2. On the other hand they are permitted to present the Jewish colors.
The exercise of this authority is protected by the State.
Section 5
1. A person who acts contrary to the prohibition of section 1 will be
punished with hard labor.
2. A person who acts contrary to the prohibition of section 2 will be
punished with imprisonment or with hard labor.
3. A person who acts contrary to the provisions of sections 3 or 4 will
be punished with imprisonment up to a year and with a fine or with one
of these penalties.
Section 6
The Reich Minister of the Interior in agreement with the Deputy of the
Fuehrer and the Reich Minister of Justice will issue the legal and
administrative regulations which are required for the implementation
and supplementation of this law.
Section 7
The law will become effective on the day after the promulgation,
section 3 however only on 1 January 1936.
Nurnberg, the 15 September 1935 at the Reich Party Rally of freedom.
The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor
Adolf Hitler
The Reich Minister of Interior
Frick
The Reich Minister of Justice
Dr. Guertner
The Deputy of the Fuehrer
R. Hess
Reich Minister without portfolio
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2001-PS
1933 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 141
Law to remove the distress of people and State of 24 March 1933
The Reichstag has resolved upon the following law which is promulgated
herewith with approval of the Reichsrat after it has been established
that all the requirements of legislation for changing the constitution
have been complied with.
_Section 1_
Laws for the Reich can be resolved upon also by the Reich Cabinet
besides the procedure provided by the constitution of the Reich. This
also applies to the laws pursuant to sections 85 subsection 2 and 87 of
the Reich-Constitution.
_Section 2_
The laws for the Reich resolved upon by the Reich Cabinet may deviate
from the Reich-Constitution so far as they do not deal with the
institution of the Reichstag or the Reichsrat as such. The powers of
the Reich-President will remain intact.
_Section 3_
The laws for the Reich resolved upon by the Reich-Cabinet are issued
by the Reich-Chancellor and promulgated in the Reichsgesetzblatt.
They will become effective, so far as they do not determine otherwise
on the day following their promulgation. Section 68 to 77 of the
Reich-Constitution are not applicable to the laws resolved upon by the
Reich-Cabinet.
_Section 4_
Treaties of the Reich with foreign countries relating to matters of
the legislation of the Reich do not require the approval of the bodies
participating in the legislation. The Reich-Cabinet issues the rules
necessary for the execution of such treaties.
_Section 5_
This law will become effective on the day of its promulgation. It
becomes ineffective on 1 April 1937. Moreover it becomes ineffective if
the present Reich-Cabinet should be replaced by another.
Berlin, 24 March 1933
The Reich-President
von Hindenburg
The Reich-Chancellor
Adolf Hitler
The Reich-Minister for the Interior
Frick
The Reich-Minister for Foreign Affairs
Freiherr von Neurath
The Reich-Minister for Finances
Count Schwerin von Krosigk
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2003-PS
1934 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 747
Law re the Sovereign Head of the German Reich 1 August 1934
The Reich Government has enacted the following law which is hereby
promulgated:
Section 1
The office of the Reichspraesident will be consolidated with that of
the Reich Chancellor. The existing authority of the Reichspraesident
shall consequently be transferred to the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor,
Adolph Hitler. He shall select his representative.
Section 2
This law is effective as of the time of the death of Reichspraesident
von Hindenburg.
The Reich Chancellor
Adolf Hitler
The Reich Deputy Chancellor
von Papen
The Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs
Freiherr von Neurath
The Reich Minister of Interior
Frick
The Reich Minister of Finance
Graf Schwerin von Krosigk
The Reich Minister of Labor
Franz Seldte
The Reich Minister of Justice
Dr. Guertner
The Reich Minister for Defense
von Blomberg
The Reich Postal Minister and Transportation Minister
Freiherr von Eltz
The Reich Minister for Nutrition and Agriculture
R. Walther Darre
The Reich Minister for Enlightenment and Propaganda
Dr. Goebbels
The Reich Minister for Air Travel
Hermann Goering
The Reich Minister for Science, Training and Education
Bernhard Rust
The Reich Minister without Portfolio
Rudolf Hess
The Reich Minister without Portfolio
Hanns Kerrl
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2004-PS
1933 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 153
Preliminary Law for the Coordination of the Federal States under the
Reich, 31 March 1933.
Article 4
(1) The popular representation of the federal states (diets [Landtage],
citizens’ assemblies [Burgerschuften]) is hereby dissolved with the
exception of the Prussian diet [Preussischer Landtag] elected 5 March
1933, so far as this has not already happened according to the law of
the state.
(2) They will be newly constituted according to the number of votes
which in the election to the German Reichstag were given to the
electoral lists within each federal state. In this connection, seats
falling to the Communist Party will not be given out. The same will be
true for electoral lists of electoral groups which are to be regarded
as a substitute for the electoral lists of the Communist Party.
* * * * * * *
Berlin, 31 March 1933.
The Reich Chancellor
ADOLF HITLER
The Reich Minister of Interior
FRICK
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2005-PS
1933 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 173
Second Law Integrating the Laender with the Reich 7 April 1933
The Reich Government has enacted the following law which is hereby
promulgated:
1
(1) In the German “Laender”, with the exception of Prussia, the Reich
President, upon the proposal of the Reich Chancellor, shall appoint the
Reich governor, the Reich governor shall require the observance of the
general policy laid down by the Reich Chancellor. The following powers
of “Land” authority belong to him:
1. Appointment and removal of the head of the “Land” Government, and
upon his proposal, the other members of the “Land” Government.
2. Dissolution of the legislature and designation of the new election
subject to the rule of section 8 of the Provisional Law of March
31, 1933, Integrating the German “Laender” with the Reich.
3. Preparations and publication of “Land” laws, including the laws
which are determined upon by the “Land” Government according to
section I of the Provisional Law of March 31, 1933, Integrating the
German “Laender” with the Reich. Article 70 of the Constitution of
August 11, 1919, applies accordingly.
4. Upon the proposal of the “Land” Government, appointment and
dismissal of the higher “Land” officials and judges, so far as this
formerly was accomplished by the highest “Land” officials.
5. The power of pardon.
(2) The Reich governor may preside over the meetings of the “Land”
Government.
(3) Article 63 of the German Constitution of August 11, 1919 remains
unaltered.
2
(1) A Reich governor may not simultaneously be a member of a “Land”
Government. He shall belong to the “Land” whose sovereign powers
he exercises. His official residence is at the seat of the “Land”
Government.
(2) For several “Lands” in each of which there are less than 2 million
inhabitants, a common “Lands” governor who must be a resident of one of
these “Lands”, may be appointed. The Reich President shall designate
the governor’s official residence.
3
(1) The Reich governor is appointed for the duration of a “Land”
Legislative period. He can be recalled at any time by the Reich
President on the proposal of the Reich Chancellor.
(2) The provisions of the Reich Ministry Law of March 27, 1930,
find appropriate application to the office of Reich governor. His
remuneration is borne by the Reich; the establishment of its size
remains unsettled.
4
Votes of no confidence of the “Land” legislature against the head and
the members of the “Land” Government are not permissible. * * *
The Reich Chancellor
Adolf Hitler
The Reich Minister of the Interior
Frick
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2006-PS
1934 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 75
Law for the Reconstruction of the Reich 30 January 1934
The popular referendum and the Reichstag election of November 12, 1933
have proven that the German people have attained an indestructible
internal unity superior to all internal subdivisions of political
character.
Consequently, the Reichstag has enacted the following law which is
hereby promulgated with the unanimous vote of the Reichstag after
ascertaining that the requirements of the Reich Constitution have been
met:
ARTICLE I
Popular assemblies [Volksvertretungen] of the “Laender” shall be
abolished.
ARTICLE II
(1) The sovereign powers [Hoheitsrechte] of the “Laender” are
transferred to the Reich.
(2) The “Laender” governments are placed under the Reich government.
ARTICLE III
The Reich governors are placed under the administrative supervision of
the Reich Minister of Interior.
ARTICLE IV
The Reich Government may issue new constitutional laws.
ARTICLE V
The Reich Minister of Interior may administer the necessary legal and
administrative regulations for the execution of the law.
ARTICLE VI
This law shall be effective on the day of its promulgation.
Berlin, 30 January 1934.
The Reich President
von Hindenburg
The Reich Chancellor
Adolf Hitler
The Reich Minister of the Interior
Frick
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2008-PS
1935 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 49
German Communal Ordinance 30 January 1935
The German Communal Ordinance [Deutsche Gemeindeordnung] aims at
qualifying the communes for the highest achievements in close
cooperation with Party and State, affording them full opportunities
for helping to accomplish--in the true spirit of Baron von Stein, the
creator of communal home rule--the purpose of the State: to restore
the priority of the common weal over the individual in a united people
permeated by one national will; to place the public interest before
selfish ends and to bring about the true national community under
the leadership of the best of the people, in which every willing
fellow-citizen finds the feeling of mutual solidarity.
The German Communal Ordinance is a basic law of the National Socialist
State. The reconstruction of the Reich will be completed on the
foundations laid by the act.
The Reich Government has therefore enacted the following law which is
hereby promulgated. * * *
Section 6
(1) The mayor [Burgermeister] is the head of the commune. He is
represented by the executive officers [Beigeordnete].
(2) The mayor and the executive officers receive their appointments
through the confidence of Party and State. In order to insure harmony
between the communal administration and the Party, the delegate of the
National Socialist Workers’ Party participates in certain matters.
Continuous contacts between the communal administration and the
citizens is guaranteed by the councillors [Gemeinderaete], who as
meritorious and experienced men assist the mayor through their advice.
* * *
Section 33
(1) In order to insure harmony between the communal administration and
the Party, the delegates of the National Socialist German Workers’
Party participate, apart from the appointment and recall of the mayor,
the executive officers, and the councillors (Secs. 41, 45, 51, 54), in
the following decisions of the mayor:
1. The issuance of the basic ordinance requires the approval of the
Party delegate;
2. Honorary citizenship and honorary titles may be granted or revoked
only with his consent.
(2) When the Party delegate [NSDAP] refuses to concur with the mayor
he must give his reasons in writing within two weeks after the
mayor has requested his decision. If the matter concerns the basic
ordinance, the Party delegate must state the provisions disapproved
by him, otherwise his approval is considered granted. Should further
conferences or correspondence between the Party delegate and the mayor
fail to bring about an agreement, the mayor must request the decision
of the supervisory authority, in urban counties that of the Reich
governor. In the case of the basic ordinance, the Reich governor must
have the approval of the Reich Minister of the Interior for any final
decision overruling the recommendation of the supervisory authority.
The decision of the Reich governor is binding upon the supervisory
authority. * * *
Section 41
(1) Vacant full-time positions of mayor and executive officer must be
advertised before they are filled by the commune. All applications
received are to be sent to the Party delegate, who after secretly
conferring with the councillors, nominates up to three candidates. In
the case of an executive officer, he must give the mayor an opportunity
to express his opinion of the candidate.
(2) In submitting his nominations together with all the applications,
the Party delegate proceeds as follows:
1. If the vacancy concerns the position of mayor, senior executive
officer or chamberlain in cities of more than 100,000
inhabitants, the folder is sent through the supervisory authority
to the Reich Minister of the Interior.
2. In the case of the position of another executive officer in cities
of the above class and in the case of the position of mayor and
executive officer in other urban counties, the folder is sent
through the supervisory authority to the Reich governor;
3. In the case of the position of mayor and executive officer in
cities belonging to a rural county, the folder is sent through
the supervisory authority to the higher supervisory authority,
and for all remaining communes to the supervisory authority.
(3) If the proper authority concerned with the matter approves of
a nomination, the commune appoints the candidate. Otherwise new
nominations must be submitted. If no new nomination finds the approval
of the proper authority, the latter selects a candidate, whom the
commune must appoint. The same applies if nominations are not made
within the period of time specified by the proper authority.
(4) Vacancies in the position of unpaid mayor or executive officer need
not be advertised. The proper authority may permit a commune to proceed
without advertising a vacancy in a position mentioned under (2).
Otherwise the regulations given in (1) to (3) apply accordingly.
(5) Nominations are to be kept confidential until the proper authority
according to (2) has made its decision. * * *
Section 45
(1) The proper authority according to Sec. 41 (2) may revoke the
appointment of a mayor or executive officer until the close of their
first year of office. For positions of the first category under
Sec. 41(2) the Reich governor must be invited to express himself on
the matter. The same applies to the Party delegate for position of
the third category under Sec. 41(2); cases of disagreement require a
decision of the Reich governor. * * *
Title 2
Communal Councillors
Section 48
(1) It is the duty of the councillors to keep the communal
administration in close touch with all groups of the citizenry. They
must advise the mayor on their own responsibility and uphold his
measures among the population. In their activities they are to be
guided solely by the thought of preserving and promoting the common
weal.
(2) In cities the councillors have the title of “Ratsherr.”
* * * * * * *
Section 51
(1) The Party delegate selects the councillors in agreement with
the mayor. In making the appointment, he is to take into account
national reliability, qualifications, and reputation, and must
consider personalities whose activities give the commune its special
significance or who exert an important influence upon the life of the
community.
(2) Civil servants, employees and workers of the commune and civil
servants of the supervisory authority may not be appointed councillors.
The supervisory authority may grant exceptions from this rule.
* * * * * * *
PART VII
SUPERVISION
Section 106
The State supervises the communes in order to insure that their
activities conform with the laws and the aims of national leadership.
The supervision shall be exercised in such a way that the initiative
and the sense of responsibility of the communal administration are
strengthened and not diminished.
* * * * * * *
Section 123
The provisions of this act take effect on April 1, 1935.
Berlin, 30 January 1935.
The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor
Adolf Hitler
The Reich Minister of the Interior
Frick
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2012-PS
1933 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 195
First Regulation for Administration of the Law for the Restoration of
the Professional Civil Service of 11 April 1933
On the basis of Article 17 of the Law for the Restoration of the
Professional Civil Service of 7 April 1933 (RGBl I, 175), the following
regulation is issued:
1
_To Article 2_:
Unfit, are all civil servants who belong to the communist party or
communist aid- or supplementary organization. They are, therefore, to
be discharged.
2
_To Article 3_:
1. A person is to be regarded as non-Aryan, who is descended from
non-Aryans, especially Jewish parents or grandparents. This holds true
even if only one parent or grandparent is of non-Aryan descent. This
premise especially obtains if one parent or grandparent was of Jewish
faith.
2. If a civil servant was not already a civil servant on 1 August
1914, he must prove that he is of Aryan descent, or that he fought at
the front, or that he is the son or the father of a man killed during
the World War. Proof must be given by submitting documents (birth
certificate and marriage certificate of the parents, military papers).
3. If Aryan descent is doubtful, an opinion must be obtained from the
expert on racial research commissioned by the Reich Minister of the
Interior (Sachverstaendiger fuer Rasseforschung).
3
_To Article 4_:
1. In determining whether the suppositions of Article 4, sentence
(1) are given, the whole political career of the official is to be
considered, particularly from 9 November 1918 on.
2. Every official is required on request to attest to the highest Reich
or country authority (Article 7) as to what political party he has been
a member of until the present. As political parties in the sense of
this definition reference is made to the Reichsbanner, Black-Red-Gold,
the Republican Judges’ Union and the League for the Rights of Man.
4
All negotiations, documents and official certificates which are
requisite for the fulfillment of this law, are free of duty and
stamping (gebuehren- und stempelfrei).
Berlin, 11 April 1933
The Reich Minister of the Interior
Frick
The Reich Minister of Finance
Count Schwerin von Krosigk
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2014-PS
1934 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 341
Law About Changing the Rules of Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure of
24 April 1934
CHAPTER III
Article 1
(1) A People’s Court is formed as a trial court in cases of high
treason and treason.
(2) When the People’s Court sits for trial, the decisions are made by
five members; otherwise by three members, including the President. The
President and one other member must have the qualifications of judges.
Several Senates may be formed.
(3) The Supreme Reich Prosecutor [Oberreichsanwalt] is the prosecuting
authority.
Article 2
On the suggestion of the Reich Minister of Justice, the Reich
Chancellor appoints the members of the People’s Court and their
deputies for a period of five years.
Article 3
(1) The People’s Court has jurisdiction over the investigations and
has the power to make the sole and final decision in cases of high
treason according to Articles 80-84--, treason according to Articles
89-92--, attacks against the Reich President according to Article 94,
paragraph 1 of the Reich Criminal Code: and crimes according to Article
5, paragraph 2, No. 1 of the Decree of the Reich President for the
Protection of People and State of February 28, 1933 (Reichsgesetzblatt
I, p. 83). In these cases the People’s Court also makes the decisions
enumerated in Article 73, paragraph 1 of the Law of the Organization of
the German Courts.
* * * * * * *
Article 5
* * * * * * *
(2) There is no appeal from the decisions of the People’s Court.
CHAPTER IV
* * * * * * *
Article 3
The appointment of a Council of Defense must be approved by the
President of the People’s Court.
* * * * * * *
Berlin, April 24, 1934
The Reich Chancellor
Adolf Hitler
The Reich Minister of Justice also for
the Reich Minister of the Interior
Dr. Guertner
The Reich Minister of Defense
von Blomberg
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2016-PS
1942 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 475
Order concerning the Jurisdiction of SS Courts and Police Courts in the
Protectorate Bohemia and Moravia. July 15, 1942
In pursuance of the decree of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor
concerning the Protectorate Bohemia and Moravia, dated March 16, 1939
(RGBl I, p. 485) and in agreement with the Reich Protector of Bohemia
and Moravia, the following order is issued:
Section 1
In case of direct attack by a non-German citizen against the SS or the
German Police or against any of their members, the Reich Leader of the
SS and Chief of the German Police in the Reich Ministry of the Interior
may establish the jurisdiction of a combined SS Court and Police Court,
by declaring that special interests of parts of the SS or of the Police
require that judgment be given by an SS and Police Court.
This declaration shall be sent to the Reich Protector of Bohemia and
Moravia. The SS and Police Court, which shall have jurisdiction in
individual cases, shall be specified by the Reich Leader of the SS and
Chief of the German Police in the Reich Ministry of the Interior.
Section 2
If the offense directly injures the interests of the Armed Forces, the
Reich Leader of the SS and Chief of the German Police in the Reich
Ministry of the Interior, and the Chief of the Supreme Command of the
Armed Forces shall reach an agreement as to whether the case shall be
prosecuted by an SS and Police Court or by a Military Court.
Section 3
This order shall become effective one week after its publication.
Berlin, July 15, 1942.
The Reich Minister of the Interior
By deputy: Dr. Stuckart.
The Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces
Keitel.
The Reich Minister of Justice
Dr. Schlegelberger (in charge)
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2018-PS
1939 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 1539
Fuehrer Decree Establishing a Ministerial Council For Reich Defense, 30
August 1939
For the period of the present foreign political tension, I decree the
following for the uniform leadership of administration and economy:
I
(1) A Ministerial Council for Reich Defense shall be established as a
standing committee out of the Reich Defense Council.
(2) The standing members of the Ministerial Council for Reich Defense
shall include: General Field Marshall Goering as chairman, Fuehrer’s
Deputy, Commissioner General for Reich Administration, Commissioner
General for the Economy, Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich
Chancellory, Chief of the High Command for the Armed Forces.
(3) The chairman may draw on other members of the Reich Defense Council
including further personalities for advice.
II
The Ministerial Council for Reich Defense may issue decrees with
statutory effect, in so far as I have not provided for the passing of a
law by the Reich Government or the Reichstag.
III
The authority of General Field Marshall Goering under the Decree for
the Administration of the Four-Year Plan of October 13, 1936 (RGBl I,
887) including his power to issue instructions shall remain unaffected.
IV
The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellory shall supervise
the business of the Ministerial Council for Reich Defense.
V
I shall determine the period for the expiration date of this decree.
Berlin, 30 August 1939.
The Fuehrer
Adolf Hitler
General Field Marshall
Goering
The Reichs Minister and Chief of the Reichs
Chancellory
Dr. Lammers
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2022-PS
1933 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 225
Law against overcrowding of German Schools and Higher Institutions of
25 April 1933
The Reich Government has enacted the following law that is promulgated
herewith:
* * * * * * *
Article 3
In those special schools and faculties where the number of pupils and
students is greatly disproportionate to professional demand, the number
of registered students must be reduced during the school year 1933
as far as it is, without excessive rigor, consistent with a proper
proportion.
Article 4
The number of non-Aryan Germans, within the meaning of the Law for the
Restoration of the Professional Civil Service, of 7 April 1933 (RGBl I,
p 175), who may be admitted to schools, colleges and universities, must
not exceed a number proportionate to the Aryan students in each school,
college or university compared to the percentage of non-Aryans within
the entire German population. This proportion is fixed uniformly for
the whole Reich.
If, in accordance with Article 3, the number of pupils and students is
to be reduced, there is likewise a proper proportion to be established
between the total number of students and the number of non-Aryans. In
doing so a somewhat higher proportion may be fixed.
Clauses 1 and 2 do not apply in the case of non-Aryans, whose fathers
have fought at the front during the World War for Germany or her
allies, or to children whose parents were married before the enactment
of this law, if the father or mother or two of the grandparents are of
Aryan origin. The number of these students is not to be included when
calculating the quota of non-Aryans.
* * * * * * *
Article 7
The decree is valid upon promulgation.
Berlin, 25 April 1933
The Reich Chancellor
Adolf Hitler
The Reich Minister of the Interior
Frick
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2029-PS
1933 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 104
Decree Establishing The Reich Minister of Public Enlightenment and
Propaganda of 13 March 1933
A Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda is herewith
established for the purpose of enlightening and propagandizing the
population with regard to the policies of the Reich Cabinet and the
national reconstruction of the German fatherland.
The chief of this agency has the title “Reichsminister of Public
Enlightenment and Propaganda.”
The Reichschancellor defines in detail the duties of the Reich Minister
for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda.
In agreement with the other Reich Ministers concerned, he defines the
duties which are transferred from their jurisdiction to that of the new
Ministry. This will be done even in cases where the jurisdiction of the
Ministries concerned is affected fundamentally.
Berlin, March 13, 1933
The Reich President VON HINDENBURG
The Reich Chancellor ADOLF HITLER
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2030-PS
1933 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 449
Decree Concerning the Duties of the Reich Ministry for Public
Enlightenment and Propaganda of 30 June 1933
Based upon the order of the Reich President of 13 March 1933
(Reichsgesetzblatt I, Page 104), I decree in agreement with the Reich
Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Reich Minister of the Interior,
the Reich Minister of Economics, the Reich Minister of Nutrition
and Agriculture, the Reich Post Minister, the Reich Minister of
Transportation, and the Reich Minister of Public Enlightenment and
Propaganda, as follows:
The Reich Minister of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda has
jurisdiction over the whole field of spiritual indoctrination of
the nation, of propagandizing the State, of cultural and economic
propaganda, of enlightenment of the public at home and abroad;
furthermore, he is in charge of the administration of all institutions
serving these purposes.
Therefore, the Reich Minister of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda
takes over the following jurisdictions:
1. From the jurisdiction of the Foreign Office:
News services and enlightenment in foreign countries; art; art
exhibitions; moving pictures and sport abroad.
2. From the jurisdiction of the Reich Ministry of the Interior:
General domestic enlightenment;
Academy of Politics;
Establishment and celebration of national holidays and of state
celebrations in conjunction with the Reich Minister of Interior;
Press, (including the Institute for Journalism);
Radio;
National anthem;
German Library in Leipzig;
Art (however, with the exclusion of: the Institute for the History
of Art in Florence; of protection of rights in literature and
art; the catalogue of works of art of national value;
German-Austrian agreement on export of art; protection of art
and monuments; protection and care of landscape and natural
monuments; national parks, maintenance of buildings of
historical importance; for the Science of Folkdom; Reich Honor
Monument).
Music, including the Philharmonic Orchestra;
Theater;
Moving Pictures;
Campaign against dirty and obscene literature.
3. From the jurisdiction of the Reich Minister of Economics and of the
Reich Ministry for Nutrition and Agriculture; Propaganda in the field
of business, exhibitions, fairs, and commercial publicity.
4. From the jurisdiction of the Reich Post Ministry and of the Reich
Ministry of Transportation:
Propaganda for tourism.
Furthermore, there are transferred from the Reich Post Ministry all
radio matters with the exclusion of the technical administration; the
administration of the buildings of the Reich Radio Corporation and the
Radio Corporation is not included in that exception. However, the Reich
Minister of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda must participate in the
technical administration to the extent necessary for the execution of
his own duties, especially in fixing the conditions for renting radio
installations and the regulation of fees.
The representation of the Reich in the Reich Radio Corporation and the
Radio Corporation is entirely transferred to the Reich Ministry of
Public Enlightenment and Propaganda.
In the areas designated, the Reich Minister for Public Enlightenment
and Propaganda has the predominant jurisdiction, including legislation.
The general regulations are valid so far as the other Ministers of the
Reich have to participate.
Berlin, 30 June 1933
The Reich Chancellor
ADOLF HITLER
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2031-PS
1938 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 112
Decree Concerning the Establishment of a Secret Cabinet Council dated 4
Feb. 1938
To advise me in conducting the foreign policy I am setting up a secret
cabinet council.
As president of the secret cabinet council, I nominate:
Reichsminister Freiherr von Neurath
As members of the secret cabinet council I nominate: Reichsminister
of the Exterior Joachim von Ribbentrop
Prussian Prime Minister, Reichsminister of the Air, Supreme Commander
of the Air Forces, General Field Marshall Hermann Goering
The Fuehrer’s Deputy, Reichsminister Rudolf Hess
Reichsminister for the enlightenment of the people and of propaganda,
Dr. Joseph Goebbels
Reichsminister and Chief of the Reichs Chancellory, Dr. Hans-Heinrich
Lammers
The Supreme Commander of the Army, General Walther von Brauchitsch
The Supreme Commander of the Navy, Grand Admiral Dr. (honorary) Erich
Raeder
The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, Lt. Gen.
Wilhelm Keitel
The current affairs of the secret cabinet council are handled by the
Reichsminister and Chief of the Reichs Chancellery.
Berlin, 4 February 1938
The Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor
Adolf Hitler
The Reichsminister and Chief of
the Reichs Chancellery
Dr. Lammers
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2039-PS
1942 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 419
Decree concerning the conditions of Employment of Eastern Workers of 30
June 1942
The Ministerial Council for Defense of the Reich orders with force of
law:
Chapter I
_Definition of Eastern Worker_
Article 1
Eastern workers are those laborers of non-German national origin
who inhabited the Reich Commissariat for the Ukraine, the General
Commissariat for White Russia, or territories bordering on these
territories to the east or on the former free states of Lithuania and
Estonia, and who were brought into the German Reich, including the
Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, and employed there after the
occupation by the German armed forces.
Chapter II
_Conditions of Employment_
Article 2
General Conditions
The eastern workers employed in the Reich have an employment
relationship of a special type. German labor code and labor protection
provisions shall be applicable to them only insofar as specifically
stated.
Article 3
Compensation
1. The eastern workers employed in the Reich shall receive compensation
graded according to their work.
2. The amount of this compensation shall be determined from the tables
which are attached as an appendix to this decree.
3. In determining the compensation which is to be paid individual
eastern workers under the appended tables, the point of departure shall
be the wage-rate (hourly, piece and premium wage-rates) of comparable
German workers.
If a part of the reference wage consists of payment in goods, such
payment shall be considered equivalent, in determining this wage, to
the rate calculated for it for German workers in the enterprise in
event of payment in cash.
Social security deductions and payments of all kinds to which the
German workers are subject shall not be included in the determination
of the reference wage.
With respect to incentive payments, these shall be computed, in
determining the reference wage, at the same rate at which they are made
to German workers in the enterprise for the same work. If the eastern
worker’s production falls behind the average production of a German
worker, a correspondingly reduced reference wage will be the point of
departure in determining the compensation to be paid him.
Extra pay for difficult work, dirty work, etc. shall be included in
determining the proper reference wage for calculating the individual
eastern worker’s compensation.
4. The eastern worker shall receive compensation only for work actually
performed; but the regulations on idleness resulting from bad weather
may be applied in his case.
5. Higher compensation than that determined under those provisions may
not be paid to eastern workers.
Article 4
Extra Rates and other Payments
Except as otherwise provided by the General Manpower Authority, eastern
workers shall have no claim to extra compensation for overtime or
Sunday, holiday, and night work. Per diem and maintenance payments, as
well as travel and board expense payments, may not be made.
Article 5
Payment in Goods
1. The compensation due the individual eastern worker according to the
tables appended to this decree shall be paid in cash at the end of the
regular pay period for the enterprise after deduction of the equivalent
of payments made in goods. The board and room furnished by the employer
shall be computed according to the rates specified by the tables
appended to this decree. Other payment in goods, such as clothing,
shoes, etc., shall be computed at proportionate prices.
2. Employers may cover the commutation cost of eastern workers to and
from the place of work for the entirety of eastern workers employed by
them and make deductions for this expense from the amounts to be paid
in cash according to the tables.
Article 6
Compensation in Case of Illness
For days on which the eastern worker is unable to work on account of
sickness or accident, free board and room only shall be furnished by
the employer, unless hospital care is given. In other respects the sick
care of these workers shall be regulated by prescriptions issued by the
Reich Minister of Labor.
Article 7
Leave and Family Visits
Leave and family visits will not be granted for the present. Detailed
regulations concerning the institution of leave and family visits will
be issued by the General Manpower Authority.
Article 8
Pay Invoices
Pay invoices shall not be issued to eastern workers.
Article 9
Exceptions
The Reich Trustee or Special Trustee of Labor may permit exceptions
from the provisions of this decree in regard to the calculation of
compensations.
Chapter III
_Eastern Workers Tax_
Article 10
Tax Obligation
1. Employers who use eastern workers within the German Reich, including
the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, are subject to a tax in
amounts specified by the tables appended to this decree (Eastern
Workers Tax).
2. Agricultural employers must pay only one half of this tax.
Article 11
Accruement of the Tax
The Eastern Workers Tax accrues exclusively to the German Reich.
Article 12
Tax Exemption of Eastern Workers
Eastern workers must pay no wage tax nor citizen tax during their
employment in the German Reich.
Chapter IV
_Savings_
Article 13
Eastern workers may lay up their compensation in whole or in part as
savings with interest: the sum saved is transferred to the saver’s
homeland, and is there available to him or to members of his family
according to detailed regulations issued by the Reich Minister for the
Occupied Eastern Territories or by the Commander in Chief of the Armed
Forces.
Chapter V
_Grant of Powers_
Article 14
1. The General Manpower Authority shall be empowered to issue, in
consultation with the interested Reich Ministers, regulations for the
execution, implementation, and revision of Chapters I and II of this
decree.
2. The Reich Minister of Finance shall be empowered to issue, in
consultation with the General Manpower Authority, the Reich Minister
of the Interior, the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern
Territories and, so far as eastern workers employed in agriculture
are in question, with the Reich Minister for Food and Agriculture,
regulations for the execution, implementation and revision of Chapter
III of this decree.
3. The Reich Minister of Finance, in consultation with the General
Manpower Authority, may change by executive order the amounts of the
Eastern Workers Tax as specified in the appended tables.
4. The Reich Minister of Economic Affairs, the Reich Minister for the
Occupied Eastern Territories, and the Commander in Chief of the Armed
Forces shall be empowered to issue, in consultation with the General
Manpower Authority, regulations for the execution and implementation of
Chapter IV of this decree.
Chapter VI
_Effective Date, Sphere of Validity_
Article 15
1. This decree shall become effective 15 June 1942. The provisions of
Chapters II and III shall be first applicable to compensation paid
after 15 June 1942.
2. Articles 1 to 5 and Article 7, subsection 1, of the decree
concerning taxing and treatment under the labor code for workers form
the newly occupied eastern territories [StVAOst] of 20 January 1942
(RGBl I, p. 41), as well as the regulation of the Reich Minister of
Labor concerning treatment under the labor code for workers from the
newly occupied eastern territories of 9 February 1942 (Deutscher
Reichsanz. No. 37 of 13 February 1942), shall become invalid on the
effective date of this decree.
3. This decree shall be valid also in the Protectorate of Bohemia and
Moravia and in the incorporated Eastern Territories.
Berlin, 30 June 1942
The Chairman of the Ministerial Council for Defense
of the Reich and Commissioner for the Four Year Plan
Goering, Reich Marshal
The General Manpower Authority
By Deputy: Dr. Stuckart
The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellory
Dr. Lammers
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2047-PS
1937 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 105
Law for the Extension of the Law Concerning the Removal of the Misery
of the People and the Reich of 30 January 1937
The Reichstag has decided unanimously to enact the following law which
is hereby published:
(1) The validity of the law for the removal of the misery of the people
and the Reich of 24 March 1933 (RGBl I, p. 141) is being extended to 1
April 1941.
(2) The law on the reconstruction of the Reich of 30 January 1934 (RGBl
p. 75) remains unchanged.
Berlin, 30 January 1937
The Fuehrer and Chancellor of the Reich
Adolf Hitler
The Reichs Minister of the Interior
Frick
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2048-PS
1939 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 95
Law for the Extension of the Law Concerning the Removal of the Misery
of the People and the Reich of 30 January 1939
In completion of the law of 30 January 1937 (RGBl I, p. 105), the
Reichstag has decided unanimously to enact the following law which is
hereby published:
1. The validity of the law on the removal of the misery of the people
and the Reich of 24 March 1933 (RGBl I, p. 141) is being extended to 10
May 1943.
2. The law on the reconstruction of the Reich of 30 January 1934 (RGBl
I, p. 75) remains unchanged.
Berlin, 30 January 1939.
The Fuehrer and Chancellor of the Reich
Adolf Hitler
The Reichs Minister of the Interior
Frick
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2049-PS
1934 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 1189
Second Edict concerning the Reconstruction of the Reich of November 27,
1934.
On the basis of Article 5 of the law concerning the reconstruction
of the Reich of January 30, 1934 (Reichsgesetzblatt I page 75) it is
ordered in agreement with the Prussian Minister-President:
Article 1
Up to the execution of the reorganization of the Reich, the Prussian
Provincial governors [Oberpraesidenten] are, in the Provinces over
which they have jurisdiction, simultaneously representatives of the
Reich government.
Article 2
The provincial governors [Oberpraesidenten] are empowered to receive
instructions from all Reich and federal state authorities as well
as from offices supervised by permanent Reich or State public-legal
corporations, within the Province, and to call their attention to the
authoritative viewpoints and the consequently necessary measures as
well as effect temporary regulations in case of danger in delay. These
rights they may not transfer to their supplementary officials; their
representatives may only practice those rights, when the provincial
governors are hindered not merely for a short time in the observation
of their business.
Article 3
The Reich ministers may in the execution of Reich missions furnish
directly with instructions the Prussian provincial governors and
council heads without prejudice to the supervision of the Civil Service
of the Reich and Prussian Ministers of the Interior.
Berlin, November 27, 1934.
The Minister of Interior for
the Reich and Prussia.
Frick
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2050-PS
1919 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 1383
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE GERMAN REICH
_August 11, 1919_
The German people, united in their racial elements and impelled by the
will to renew and strengthen their Reich in freedom and justice, to
serve the ends of peace at home and abroad and further social progress,
have established this Constitution.
FIRST PART
STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION OF THE REICH
_First Chapter_
Reich and Lands
_Article 1_
The German Reich is a Republic. The state power is derived from the
people.
_Article 2_
The territory of the Reich consists of the territories of the German
Member States [Lands]. Other territories may be incorporated in the
Reich by Reich statute if the inhabitants of such territory, in
exercises of the right of self-determination, so desire.
_Article 3_
The Reich colors are black, red and gold. The merchant flag is black,
white and red, with the Reich colors in the upper inside corner.
_Article 4_
The generally accepted rules of international law are to be considered
as binding integral parts of the law of the German Reich.
_Article 5_
The state power in respect to matters within the competence of the
Reich shall be exercised by the authorities of the Reich on the basis
of the Constitution of the Reich; in respect to matters within the
competence of the Member States by the authorities of the Lands, on the
basis of their respective constitutions.
_Article 6_
The Reich shall have exclusive legislative competence for:
1. Foreign affairs.
2. colonial matters.
3. questions relating to nationality, freedom of travel and residence,
immigration, emigration and extradition.
4. the organization of defense forces.
5. coinage.
6. customs, as well as the unity of customs and trading areas and
freedom of commerce.
7. post and telegraph, including the telephone.
_Article 7_
1. civil law.
2. penal law.
3. judicial procedure, including the execution of penalties and legal
aid between authorities.
4. matters relating to passports and police supervision of aliens.
5. poor relief and the care of vagrants.
6. matters relating to the press, associations and assemblies.
7. policies relating to population, maternity relief, welfare of
infants, children and youth.
8. public health, veterinary matters and the protection of plants
against disease and pests.
9. labor laws, insurance, and the protection of laborers and employees,
and employment bureaus.
10. the establishment of Reich organs of vocational representation.
11. provision for war veterans and the surviving dependents of deceased
soldiers.
12. laws relating to expropriation.
13. the socialization of natural resources and economic undertakings,
and also the production, manufacture, distribution and price regulation
of economic wares for the benefit of the general economy.
14. trade and commerce, weights and measures, the issue of paper money,
banks and banking and the stock exchanges.
15. traffic in foodstuffs, articles for consumption and luxury, and
necessaries of daily life.
16. industries and mining.
17. matters relating to insurance.
18. ocean navigation, deep-sea fishing and coastal fishing.
19. railways, inland navigation, automatic traffic on land, water,
and in the air; the construction of highways, insofar as general
communication and national defense are concerned.
20. theaters and cinemas.
_Article 8_
The Reich shall further legislate in regard to taxation and other
revenues, insofar as they are partially or wholly utilized for its own
purposes. If the Reich claims such taxes or other revenues for its own
purposes as have hitherto been available for the Member States (Lands),
the Reich shall take into consideration the preservation of the life of
the Member States.
_Article 9_
Insofar as it is necessary to issue uniform rules, the Reich shall
legislate for:
1. public welfare.
2. the protection of public order and safety.
_Article 10_
The Reich may by legislation, establish fundamental principles for:
1. the rights and duties of religious associations.
2. educational matters including high schools and scientific libraries.
3. laws relating to officers of all public corporations.
4. matters relating to the real-estate laws, distribution of the soil,
settlements and homesteads, restrictions attached to landed property,
housing and the distribution of the population.
5. matters relating to burial.
_Article 11_
The Reich may by means of legislation establish fundamental principles
concerning the admissibility and mode of:
1. injury to the revenues or commercial relations of the Reich.
2. double taxation.
3. excessive or obstructional fees for the use of public means of
communication, highways, and other facilities.
4. tax discrimination against imported goods in favor of domestic
products in interstate or inter-district commerce, or
5. export premiums,
or in order to preserve important social interests.
_Article 12_
So long as and so far as the Reich refrains from exercising the right
of legislation, the Lands shall retain the right of legislation. This
does not apply to matters for which the Reich has exclusive competence
of legislation.
The government of the Reich has the right of veto in regard to Lands
laws relating to matters within the scope of Article 7, Number 13, so
far as the general welfare of the Reich is thereby affected.
_Article 13_
Reich law takes precedence over Lands law.
Where there are doubts or differences of opinion as to whether a legal
provision of a Land is compatible with Reich law, the competent Reich
or central authorities of a Land may, in accordance with particulars
prescribed by the Reich law, appeal for decision to a Supreme Court of
the Reich.
_Article 14_
The laws enacted by the Lands shall be executed by the authorities of
the States, unless the laws of the Reich determine otherwise.
_Article 15_
The government of the Reich exercises supervision in such matters as
are within the legislative competence of the Reich.
So far as the laws of the Reich are to be executed by the authorities
of the Lands, the government of the Reich may issue general
instructions. The government is empowered to send commissioners to the
central authorities of the Lands, and with their permission, to the
lower state authorities, to supervise the execution of the laws of the
Reich.
It is the duty of the government of the Lands, at the request of the
government of the Reich, to rectify defects which have become manifest
in the execution of Reich laws. Where differences of opinion arise both
the government of the Reich and the government of the Land may appeal
for decision to the Constitutional Court, unless a different court is
prescribed by Reich law.
_Article 16_
The officers entrusted with direct Reich administration in any Land
shall, as a rule, be citizens of that Land. The officers, employees
and laborers of the Reich administration shall be employed in their
home districts if they so desire, whenever this is possible and not
inconsistent with the requirements of their training or the service.
_Article 17_
Each Land must have a republican constitution. The people’s
representatives must be elected by universal, equal, direct and secret
ballot by all German men and women in conformity with the principles of
proportional representation. The government of the Land must enjoy the
confidence of the people’s representatives.
The principles for the elections of the people’s representatives apply
equally to communal elections. A Land law, however, may make the right
to vote dependent on residence in the communal district for a period
not exceeding one year.
_Article 18_
The division of the Reich into Lands shall be such as to serve the
people to the highest possible economic and cultural attainment,
whereby the will of the population affected shall be taken into
consideration as far as possible. The alteration of territory of the
Lands and the creation of new Lands within the Reich may be effected by
means of a Reich law amending the Constitution.
If the Lands directly affected give their consent, an ordinary Reich
law is sufficient.
An ordinary Reich law is also sufficient, if one of the Lands affected
refuses consent, but the territorial alteration or the creation of a
new Land is demanded by the will of the population and the paramount
interests of the Reich.
The will of the population shall be ascertained by plebiscite. The
Government of the Reich orders the plebiscite if, in the territory to
be separated, one-third of the inhabitants qualified to vote for the
Reichstag so demand.
Three-fifths of the votes taken, but at least a majority of the
enfranchised voters, are necessary for a resolution to alter a
boundary or create a new Land. Even if it is only a question of the
disconnection of a part of a Prussian administrative district, a
Bavarian “county” or a corresponding administrative division in other
Lands, the will of the population in the whole district affected must
be ascertained. If the territory to be disconnected nowhere adjoins the
rest of the district, a specific Reich law may declare that the will of
the population in the said district is sufficient.
The consent of the population having been ascertained, the government
of the Reich shall introduce an appropriate bill for enactment in the
Reichstag.
If the unification or disconnection should give rise to a dispute
concerning the distribution of property, the Constitutional Court of
the German Reich shall decide the same on the application of one party.
_Article 19_
Constitutional disputes arising within any Land in which there is no
court competent to settle the same, of disputes not governed by private
law, arising between different Lands or between the Reich and any Land
shall be decided by the Constitutional Court of the German Reich on
the application of one party, unless some other court of the Reich is
competent to decide such dispute.
The President of the Reich executes the judgment of the Constitutional
Court of the Reich.
_Second Chapter_
The Reichstag
_Article 20_
The Reichstag is composed of the delegates of the German people.
_Article 21_
The delegates represent the whole people. They are subject only to
their own conscience and are not bound by instructions.
_Article 22_
The delegates are elected by universal, equal, direct and secret ballot
by men and women over twenty years of age, according to the principles
of proportional representation. The election day must be a Sunday, or a
public holiday.
The Reich Election Law will regulate details.
_Article 23_
The Reichstag is elected for four years. New elections must take place
at the latest on the sixtieth day after this term has run its course.
The Reichstag assembles for the first time at the latest on the
thirtieth day following the election.
_Article 24_
The Reichstag meets every year on the first Wednesday in November at
the seat of the government of the Reich. The President of the Reichstag
must summon it earlier if the President of the Reich or at least
one-third of the members of the Reichstag so demand.
The Reichstag determines the close of its session and the date of
reassembly.
_Article 25_
The President of the Reich may dissolve the Reichstag, but not more
than once for the same cause.
The new election takes place not later than the sixtieth day after
dissolution.
_Article 26_
The Reichstag chooses its president, his substitutes and its
secretaries. It sets up its own rules of procedure.
_Article 27_
Between two sessions or terms the President and his substitutes of the
preceding session continue in their duties.
_Article 28_
The President has domiciliary and police authority within the Reichstag
building. He controls the house administration; he manages the revenues
and expenditure of the house in accordance with the budget of the
Reich, and represents the Reich in all legal transactions and disputes
arising within his administration.
_Article 29_
The Reichstag proceedings are public. They may be held in camera, if,
on the motion of fifty members, a two-thirds majority so decides.
_Article 30_
Accurate reports of the proceedings of the public meetings of the
Reichstag, the State Diets, and of their committees remain free from
all responsibility.
_Article 31_
An Election Investigation Court shall be established in connection with
the Reichstag. It shall also be competent to decide whether a delegate
has forfeited his seat.
The Election Investigation Court consists of members of the Reichstag,
elected by the latter for the election period and of members of the
Reich Court of Administration, appointed by the President of the Reich
on the proposal of the presidency of the said court.
The decisions of the Election Investigation Court shall be taken
after a public oral hearing by three members of the Reichstag and two
judicial members.
Outside of the oral proceedings before the Election Investigation Court
such affairs shall be managed by a commission of the Reich, nominated
by the President of the Reich. In other respects the procedure is
regulated by the Election Investigation Court.
_Article 32_
A simple majority vote is necessary for decisions of the Reichstag,
unless the Constitution prescribes a different proportion of votes. The
rules of procedure may make exceptions in the case of elections by the
Reichstag.
The rules of procedure regulate the question of a quorum.
_Article 33_
The Reichstag and its committees may demand the presence of the
Chancellor of the Reich and of any Minister of the Reich.
The Chancellor and Ministers of the Reich and the commissioners
appointed by them have access to the sittings of the Reichstag and its
committees. The Lands are entitled to send delegates to these meetings
to state the views of their governments on the subject under discussion.
At their request the governmental delegates must be heard during the
deliberations, in the case of the representatives of the government of
the Reich, even irrespective of the agenda.
They are subject to the authority of the chairman as regards questions
of orders.
_Article 34_
The Reichstag has the right and--on the application of one-fifth of
its members--the duty, of appointing investigation committees. These
committees hear such evidence in public sittings as they or the
applicants consider necessary. The public may be excluded from the
proceedings by a two-thirds majority of the investigation committee.
The rules of procedure determine the proceedings of the committee and
determine the number of its members.
It is the duty of the judicial and administrative authorities to
accede to the requests of the said committees in regard to the taking
of evidence; the files of the authorities must be submitted to the
committees on request.
The provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure are applicable as
far as is appropriate to the investigations of the committees and the
authorities approached by them; nevertheless, the secrecy of letters,
post, telegraph and telephone remains inviolate.
_Article 35_
The Reichstag appoints a standing committee for foreign affairs,
which may also act when the Reichstag is in recess, and after the
parliamentary term has expired, or after the dissolution of the
Reichstag, until the new Reichstag meets. The meetings of this
committee are not public, unless the committee decides otherwise by a
two-thirds vote.
The Reichstag also appoints a standing committee for the maintenance of
the right of the people’s representation towards the government of the
Reich during the periods of recess, and after the term has expired or
the Reichstag is dissolved, until the new Reichstag meets.
These committees have the rights of investigation committees.
_Article 36_
No member of the Reichstag or of a Land’s Diet may at any time be
subjected to criminal or disciplinary prosecution or otherwise held
responsible outside the house on account of his vote or of remarks made
by him in the execution of his functions.
_Article 37_
During a session no member of the Reichstag or of a Land’s Diet may be
subjected to investigation or arrested on account of any punishable
offense, without the consent of the house to which such a delegate
belongs, unless he is arrested in the act of committal or at the latest
in the course of the following day.
Similar consent must be obtained for every other curtailment of
personal freedom which hinders a delegate in the execution of his
functions as representative.
Any criminal proceeding against a member of the Reichstag or a Land’s
Diet, any detention or other curtailment of his personal liberty must
be suspended for the duration of the session at the request of the
house to which the delegate belongs.
_Article 38_
Members of the Reichstag and the Land’s Diets are entitled to refuse
to give evidence in respect to persons who have confided matters to
them in their capacity as delegates or to whom they have given such
confidences in the execution of their functions as delegates, as
well as in respect to such facts. In respect also to the seizure of
documents they have the same status as persons who are entitled by law
to refuse to give evidence.
Any search or seizure may only be carried out within the precincts of
the Reichstag or a Land’s Diet with the consent of their President.
_Article 39_
Public officials and members of the defense forces need no leave for
the performance of their functions as members of the Reichstag or a
Land’s Diet.
If they are candidates for a seat in one of these bodies, the necessary
leave must be extended to them to enable them to prepare for their
election.
_Article 40_
Members of the Reichstag shall have free passes for all German railways
and receive a compensation for expenses to be fixed by Reich law.
_Third Chapter_
The Reich President and the Reich Government
_Article 41_
The Reich President is elected by the whole German people.
Every German who has completed his thirty-fifth year is eligible for
election.
Details will be regulated by a Reich law.
_Article 42_
The Reich President shall, on assuming office, take the following oath
before the Reichstag.
I swear to devote my energies to the well-being of the German people,
to further their interests, to protect them from injury, to keep
the Constitution and the laws of the Reich, to fulfill my duties
conscientiously and to administer justice to all.
It is permissible to add a religious asseveration.
_Article 43_
The Reich President’s term of office shall last seven years.
Re-election is permissible.
At the request of the Reichstag the President may be deposed from
office by plebiscite before his term has expired. A two-thirds majority
vote is necessary for such a resolution by the Reichstag.
The resolution has the effect of suspending the Reich President from
the further exercise of his office. If the deposition is rejected by
the plebiscite, this is regarded as a new election and entails the
dissolution of the Reichstag.
The Reich President cannot be prosecuted criminally without the consent
of the Reichstag.
_Article 44_
The Reich President may not at the same time be a member of the
Reichstag.
_Article 45_
The Reich President represents the Reich in the sphere of international
law. He concludes alliances and other treaties with foreign powers in
the name of the Reich. He accredits and receives Ministers.
War is declared and peace concluded by Reich law.
Alliances and treaties with foreign States which relate to matters
within the legislative competence of the Reich, require the consent of
the Reichstag.
_Article 46_
The Reich President appoints and dismisses the public officials of the
Reich and officers of the defense forces, unless otherwise provided
by law. He may allow the right of appointment and dismissal to be
exercised by other authorities.
_Article 47_
The Reich President has supreme command over all the defense forces of
the Reich.
_Article 48_
If a Land fails to fulfill the duties incumbent upon it according to
the Constitution or the laws of the Reich, the Reich President can
force it to do so with the help of the armed forces.
The Reich President may, if the public safety and order in the German
Reich are considerably disturbed or endangered, take such measures as
are necessary to restore public safety and order. If necessary he may
intervene with the help of the armed forces. For this purpose he may
temporarily suspend, either partially or wholly, the Fundamental Rights
established in Articles 114, 115, 117, 118, 123, 124 and 153.
The Reich President shall inform the Reichstag without delay of all
measures taken under Paragraph 1 or Paragraph 2 of this Article. On
demand by the Reichstag the measures shall be repealed.
In case of imminent danger, the government of any Land may take
preliminary measures of the nature described in Paragraph 2 for its own
territory. The measures are to be revoked upon the demand of the Reich
President or the Reichstag.
Details will be regulated by a Reich law.
_Article 49_
The Reich President exercises the right of pardon for the Reich.
Reich amnesties require a Reich law.
_Article 50_
All orders and decrees of the Reich President, including those
concerning the defense forces, require for their validity the
counter-signature of the Chancellor of the Reich or the competent
Minister of the Reich. By counter-signature responsibility is assumed.
_Article 51_
The Reich President shall, when prevented from functioning, be
represented in the first place by the Reich Chancellor. When such
disability is likely to be of long duration, a Reich law shall regulate
the question of representation.
The same applies in the case of a premature termination of the
Presidency until the new election takes place.
_Article 52_
The government of the Reich shall consist of the Chancellor and the
Reich Ministers.
_Article 53_
The Reich Chancellor and at his proposal the Reich Ministers shall be
appointed and dismissed by the Reich President.
_Article 54_
The Chancellor and the Reich Ministers require for the exercise of
their office the confidence of the Reichstag. Any of them must retire
if the Reichstag by express resolution withdraws its confidence.
_Article 55_
The Reich Chancellor presides over the government of the Reich and
conducts its affairs according to rules of procedure laid down by the
government of the Reich and approved by the Reich President.
_Article 56_
The Reich Chancellor determines the outlines of the policy of the State
and is responsible to the Reichstag for the same. Within these outlines
each Reich Minister conducts the office entrusted to him independently
and on his own responsibility towards the Reichstag.
_Article 57_
The Reich Ministers shall lay before the Reichstag for deliberation
and enactment all bills and all matters for which such a course is
prescribed in the Constitution or by law, as well as all differences of
opinion in regard to questions within the competence of more than one
Minister.
_Article 58_
The government of the Reich passes its resolutions by majority vote. In
the case of tie votes the chairman has a casting vote.
_Article 59_
The Reichstag is entitled to impeach the Reich President, the
Chancellor and Reich Ministers for having culpably violated the
Constitution or a statute of the Reich before the Constitutional Court.
The motion for impeachment must be signed by at least one hundred
members of the Reichstag and be approved by the majority prescribed for
amending the Constitution.
Details will be regulated by the Reich statute concerning the
Constitutional Court.
_Fourth Chapter_
The Reich Council
_Article 60_
A Reich Council shall be constituted to represent the German Lands in
the legislature and administration of the Reich.
_Article 61_
Each Land has at least one vote in the Reich Council. In the case of
larger Lands there shall be one vote for every 1,000,000 inhabitants.
A surplus, which is equal to at least the population of the smallest
Land, will be reckoned equal to 1,000,000. No Land may be represented
by more than two-fifths of the total number of votes.
German-Austria, after its union with the German Reich, shall be
entitled to participate in the Reich Council with the number of votes
proportionate to its population. Until then the representatives of
German-Austria may take part in the deliberations.
The number of votes shall be fixed anew by the Reich Council after
every general census.
_Article 62_
No Land shall have more than one vote on the committees formed by the
Reich Council from its own members.
_Article 63_
The Lands shall be represented on the Reich Council by members of their
governments. But half the Prussian votes shall belong to the Prussian
provincial administrations in accordance with a Land law.
The Lands are entitled to send as many representatives to the Reich
Council as they have votes.
_Article 64_
The government of the Reich must convene the Reich Council on the
demand of one-third of its members.
_Article 65_
A member of the government of the Reich shall preside over the Reich
Council and its committees. The members of the government of the
Reich have the right and--if so demanded--the duty of attending the
deliberations of the Reich Council and its committees. On their own
request they must be heard at any time during the proceedings.
_Article 66_
The government of the Reich and each member of the Reich Council are
entitled to lay proposals before the Reich Council.
The Reich Council regulates its procedure by rules of procedure.
The plenary sittings of the Reich Council are public. In compliance
with the rules of procedure the public may be excluded for specific
subjects of deliberation.
Decisions are taken by a simple majority of those voting.
_Article 67_
The Reich Council shall be kept informed by the Reich ministries of the
conduct of affairs of the Reich. The competent committees of the Reich
Council shall be consulted by the ministries of the Reich with regard
to important affairs.
_Fifth Chapter_
Reich Legislation
_Article 68_
Bills are introduced by the government of the Reich or by members of
the Reichstag.
Reich laws shall be enacted by the Reichstag.
_Article 69_
The introduction of bills by the government of the Reich requires
the consent of the Reich Council. If no agreement is reached between
the Reich government and the Reich Council, the Reich government may
introduce the bill notwithstanding, but must state the contrary opinion
of the Reich Council.
If the Reich Council resolves on a bill not assented to by the
government of the Reich, the latter must introduce the bill to the
Reichstag, stating its own point of view.
_Article 70_
The Reich President shall promulgate all constitutionally enacted laws
and proclaim them in the Reich’s Legal Gazette within one month.
_Article 71_
Reich laws, unless they provide otherwise, come into force on the
fourteenth day after the date on which the Reich’s Legal Gazette is
published in the capital of the Reich.
_Article 72_
The proclamation of a Reich law shall be postponed for two months on
the demand of one-third of the Reichstag. Laws stated to be urgent by
the Reichstag and the Reich Council may be proclaimed by the Reich
President notwithstanding such demand.
_Article 73_
A law enacted by the Reichstag shall be made the subject of a
referendum, if the Reich President so determines within a month.
A law, the proclamation of which has been postponed on the application
of at least one-third of the members of the Reichstag, shall be
subjected to a referendum, if one-twentieth of the persons qualified to
vote so submit.
A referendum shall further be instituted if one-tenth of the persons
qualified to vote initiate by petition the introduction of a bill.
An elaborated bill must underlie such people’s initiative. The bill
shall be submitted to the Reichstag by the government together with a
statement of its own point of view. No referendum shall take place if
the petitional bill is passed unaltered by the Reichstag.
In regard to the budget, taxation laws and laws relating to pay and
salaries, only the Reich President may inaugurate a referendum.
A Reich law shall regulate the procedure for referendum and initiative.
_Article 74_
The Reich Council is entitled to raise an objection to laws passed by
the Reichstag.
The objection must be submitted to the Reich government within two
weeks following the final vote in the Reichstag and sustained by
reasons at the latest within two further weeks.
When such objection has been raised, the law is again submitted to the
Reichstag for redecision. If by this means no agreement is reached
between the Reichstag and the Reich Council, the President may,
within three months, order that a referendum be taken on the matter
in dispute. If the President does not exercise this right, the law is
considered not to have been passed. If the Reichstag has passed the
law in spite of the objection by the Reich Council by a two-thirds
majority, then the President must either proclaim the same within three
months in the form approved by the Reichstag or order a referendum to
be taken.
_Article 75_
A referendum can nullify an enactment of the Reichstag only if a
majority of those qualified to vote take part in the vote.
_Article 76_
The Constitution may be amended by law. But acts of the Reichstag
amending the Constitution can only take effect if two-thirds of the
legal number of members are present and at least two-thirds of those
present consent. Resolutions of the Reich Council also require a
two-thirds majority of the votes taken, when an amendment to the
Constitution is in question. If on a popular initiative an amendment
to the Constitution is to be decided by referendum the consent of a
majority of those qualified to vote is required.
If the Reichstag has passed an amendment to the Constitution in spite
of an objection on the part of the Reich Council, the President may
not proclaim such law, if within two weeks the Reich Council demands a
referendum.
_Article 77_
Unless otherwise provided by law the Reich government shall issue the
general administrative provisions necessary for putting into execution
the laws of the Reich. The approval of the Reich Council is required
when the execution of the Reich laws is within the competence of the
authorities of the Lands.
_Sixth Chapter_
Reich Administration
_Article 78_
The cultivation of the relations with foreign States is exclusively a
function of the Reich.
With regard to matters the regulation of which is within the competence
of the Lands’ legislatures, the Lands may conclude treaties with
foreign States; such treaties require the approval of the Reich.
Agreements with foreign States relating to any alteration of the
boundaries of the Reich are concluded by the Reich, after the consent
of the Lands concerned has been obtained. Such boundary alterations may
only be undertaken on the basis of a Reich law, unless it is simply a
case of adjusting the boundaries of uninhabited districts.
All arrangements and measures necessary for safeguarding the interests
of individual Lands arising out of their particular economic relations
with or their proximity to foreign States shall be undertaken by the
Reich in agreement with the Lands concerned.
_Article 79_
The defense of the Reich is a function of the Reich. The defense
organization of the German people shall be uniformly regulated by Reich
law with due regard to special peculiarities of the inhabitants of the
different Lands.
_Article 80_
Colonial matters belong exclusively to the competence of the Reich.
_Article 81_
All German commercial vessels constitute one single merchant marine.
_Article 82_
Germany constitutes one single customs and trading area surrounded by a
customs frontier.
The customs frontier coincides with Germany’s foreign frontier line.
At the sea the shore of the mainland and of the islands belonging to
the territory of the Reich form the customs boundary. Deviations may
be ordered for the course of the boundary line along the sea and other
waters.
Foreign territories or parts of territories may be joined to the
customs area by means of international treaties or agreements.
Portions may be excluded from the customs area to meet particular
necessities. In the case of free ports such exclusion can only be
repealed by a law amending the Constitution.
Districts excluded from the customs area may be joined to a foreign
customs area by means of international treaties or agreements.
All products of nature and industry and art which are freely traded
within the Reich may be transported over the boundaries of the Lands
and Communes into, out of, and through them. Exceptions may be allowed
by Reich law.
_Article 83_
Customs duties and consumption taxes are administered by the
authorities of the Reich.
The authorities of the Reich, when administering taxes of the Reich,
shall take steps to enable the individual Lands to safeguard their own
particular interests in regard to agriculture, trade, commerce and
industry.
_Article 84_
The Reich shall provide by law for:
1. the institution of a tax administration of the Lands, so far as is
necessary for the uniform and equal execution of the Reich taxation laws
2. the institution and powers of the authorities entrusted with the
supervision of the execution of the Reich taxation laws
3. the accounting with the Lands
4. the reimbursement of the costs of administration in executing the
Reich taxation laws.
_Article 85_
All revenues and expenditures of the Reich must be estimated for every
fiscal year and entered in the budget.
The budget shall be passed by law before the beginning of the fiscal
year.
Appropriations are as a rule made for one year; in special cases they
may be granted for a longer period. Other provisions in the budget law
which legislate for a period beyond the fiscal year, or which have no
reference to the revenues or expenditures of the Reich, may not be
incorporated in the budget law.
The Reichstag may not increase existing or incorporate new
appropriations in the budget bill without the consent of the Reich
Council.
The consent of the Reich Council may be replaced as provided in Article
74.
_Article 86_
The Reich Minister of Finance shall, in the course of the year, account
to the Reich Council and the Reichstag for the expenditure of all the
revenues of the Reich for the preceding year in order to release the
government of the Reich from its responsibility. The auditing of this
account shall be regulated by Reich law.
_Article 87_
Funds may only be obtained by loans in the case of extraordinary
requirements and, as a rule, only for the purpose of productive outlay.
A Reich law is required for this method of procuring funds as well as
for the creation of a charge on the Reich by way of security.
_Article 88_
The post and telegraph as well as the whole telephone system are
exclusive functions of the Reich.
Postage stamps are uniform for the whole Reich.
Treaties relating to communications with foreign countries may only be
concluded by the Reich.
_Article 89_
It is a function of the Reich to take over the ownership of railways
serving as means of general traffic and to operate them as a uniform
system of communications.
The rights of the Lands to acquire private railways shall be
transferred to the Reich on demand.
_Article 90_
With the transfer of the railways the Reich acquires the right of
expropriation and the sovereign state rights of the Lands over the
railway systems. The extent of these rights shall be decided in the
case of conflict by the Constitutional Court.
_Article 91_
With the approval of the Reich Council, the government of the Reich
shall issue all decrees relating to the construction of railways, their
operation and traffic. With the consent of the Reich Council, the
government may transfer this right to the competent Reich Minister.
_Article 92_
The railways of the Reich, although their budget and accounts are
incorporated in the general budget and accounts of the Reich, shall
be operated as an independent economic enterprise, with the duty of
defraying its own expenditure including interest on and amortization
of the railway reserve fund. The amount of the amortization and the
reserve fund, and the purposes for which the latter is to be utilized
shall be regulated by special law.
_Article 93_
The government of the Reich with the consent of the Reich Council shall
establish advisory councils for the railways of the Reich to assist in
an advisory capacity in matters relating to railway traffic and rates.
_Article 94_
Once the Reich has taken over the administration of the railroads
serving the general traffic of a particular district, new railroads
serving general traffic may not be constructed within such district
except by or with the consent of the Reich. When new railroad systems
or alterations in those already existing are so projected as to
fall within the police competence of any Land, the Reich railroad
administration shall consult the Land authorities before the decision
is taken.
Whenever the Reich has not yet taken over the administration of the
railroads, it may construct such railroads on its own account as are
deemed necessary for general traffic or for national defense by virtue
of a Reich law, even against the protest of the Lands whose territory
is to be traversed, but without prejudice to the sovereign rights of
the Lands; or the Reich may entrust another with the execution of such
construction, together with the right of expropriation, if necessary.
All railroad administrations must permit the junction of other lines at
the latter’s expense.
_Article 95_
Railways of general traffic not administered by the Reich shall be
supervised by the Reich.
Railways under the supervision of the Reich shall be constructed and
equipped according to uniform principles determined by the Reich.
They must be kept in safe working order and developed as traffic
requirements dictate. Service and equipment for passenger and freight
traffic shall be maintained in accordance with their requirements.
The supervision of railway rates shall be directed to securing
nondiscriminatory and moderate charges.
_Article 96_
All railways, including those not serving as means of general traffic,
must comply with any demands of the Reich for their utilization for the
purpose of national defense.
_Article 97_
It is the duty of the Reich to take over the ownership and
administration of waterways serving the general traffic.
After they have been taken over, waterways serving the general traffic
may only be constructed or developed by the Reich or with its consent.
In the administration, development or construction of waterways,
the requirements of land and water economy must be safeguarded in
agreement with the Lands. Their improvement shall also be taken into
consideration.
Every administration of waterways must permit the connection of their
own with other inland waterways at the expense of the promoter. The
same obligation holds for the construction of a connection between
inland waterways and railways.
With the transfer of waterways the Reich acquires the right of
expropriation, the control of rates and the police survey over the
waterways and navigation.
The duties of the river conservancies in respect to the development of
the natural waterways in the Rhine, Weser, and Elbe districts shall be
taken over by the Reich.
_Article 98_
Advisory councils to cooperate in matters concerning Reich waterways
shall be formed in compliance with detailed provisions to be issued by
the Reich government with the approval of the Reich Council.
_Article 99_
On natural waterways charges may only be collected for such works,
plants and other institutions as are designed to facilitate traffic.
In the case of Lands and communal institutions they may not exceed
the necessary costs, for construction and upkeep. The construction
and maintenance costs of institutions not exclusively devoted to the
facilitation of traffic but also destined for the furtherance of other
purposes, may only be raised in a proportionate degree by shipping
charges. Interest and sinking funds on the invested capital are
included as costs of construction.
The provisions of the foregoing paragraph apply also to charges
collected for artificial waterways and to works erected thereon and in
harbors.
Within the sphere of inland navigation the entire cost of a waterway,
a river basin or a system of waterways may be utilized for calculating
the shipping charges.
These provisions apply equally to the floating of timber on navigable
waterways.
It is within the exclusive competence of the Reich to exact from
foreign ships and their cargoes other or higher charges than from
German ships and their cargoes.
_Article 100_
In order to cover the cost of the maintenance and construction of
inland navigation routes, contributions may also be levied by virtue
of a Reich law from persons enjoying benefits from the construction
of dams in other ways than by navigation, if more than one Land is
involved, or the Reich bears the costs of construction.
_Article 101_
It is the duty of the Reich to take over the ownership and
administration of all marine signal stations, particularly lighthouses,
lightships, buoys, floats, and beacons. After the Reich has taken them
over, marine signal stations may only be constructed or developed by
the Reich or with its consent.
_Seventh Chapter_
The Judiciary
_Article 102_
Judges are independent and subject only to the law.
_Article 103_
The ordinary judiciary consists of the Reich Supreme Court and the
courts of the Lands.
_Article 104_
The judges of the ordinary judiciary are appointed for life. Against
their will they may only be permanently or temporarily suspended from
office or transferred to another position or retired by virtue of a
judicial decision and only for the reasons and in the form prescribed
by law. The legislature may fix an age limit, on reaching which judges
shall retire.
A temporary suspension from office as provided by law is not affected
hereby.
If a change is effected in the organization of the courts or their
districts the judicial administrative authorities of the Lands may
order involuntary transfers to another court or removal from office,
but only on full pay.
These provisions do not apply to commercial judges, lay judges, and
jurors.
_Article 105_
Exceptional courts are prohibited. No one may be deprived of the right
to be heard by his legally prescribed judge. The legal provisions
concerning military courts and courts martial are not affected hereby.
Military courts of honor are abolished.
_Article 106_
Military jurisdiction shall be abolished except in time of war and on
men-of-war. Details shall be regulated by a Reich law.
_Article 107_
Both in the Reich and in the Lands, administrative courts shall be
established under the laws for the protection of individuals against
decrees and orders of the administrative authorities.
_Article 108_
A Constitutional Court shall be established for the German Reich in
accordance with a Reich law.
SECOND PART
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE GERMANS
_First Chapter_
The Individual Person
_Article 109_
All Germans are equal before the law.
In principle men and women have the same civil rights and duties.
Public-legal privileges or disadvantages of birth or of rank are to be
abolished.
Titles of nobility shall be regarded merely as part of the name, and
may no longer be bestowed.
Titles may only be bestowed when they indicate an office or profession;
academic degrees are not affected hereby.
Orders and decorations may not be conferred by the State.
No German may accept titles or orders from a foreign government.
_Article 110_
Citizenship of the Reich and the Lands is acquired and lost in
accordance with the provisions of a Reich law. Every citizen of a Land
is at the same time a citizen of the Reich.
Every German has in every Land of the Reich the same rights and duties
as the citizens of that Land.
_Article 111_
All Germans enjoy liberty of travel and residence throughout the whole
Reich. Everyone has the right to sojourn and settle in any place
within the Reich, to acquire real estate and to pursue any means of
livelihood. Restrictions require a Reich law.
_Article 112_
Every German is permitted to emigrate to a foreign country. Emigration
may only be restricted by a Reich law.
All citizens of the Reich within and without the territory of the Reich
are entitled to the protection of the Reich in relation to foreign
countries.
No German may be surrendered to a foreign government for prosecution or
punishment.
_Article 113_
No laws or administrative orders may prejudice in their free and
characteristic development the elements of the population of the
Reich whose mother tongue is other than German, especially in regard
to the use of their mother tongue in schools, in matters of internal
administration, and the administration of justice.
_Article 114_
The freedom of the person is inviolable. Curtailment or deprivation of
personal freedom by a public authority is only permissible on a legal
basis.
Persons who have been deprived of their freedom must be informed at the
latest on the following day by whose authority and for what reasons the
deprivation of freedom was ordered; opportunity shall be afforded them
without delay of submitting objections to their deprivation of freedom.
_Article 115_
Every German’s home is his sanctuary and is inviolable. Exceptions may
only be made as provided by law.
_Article 116_
An act can only be punishable if its penalty was fixed by law before
the act was committed.
_Article 117_
The secrecy of letters and all postal, telegraphic and telephone
communications is inviolable. Exceptions are inadmissible except by
Reich law.
_Article 118_
Every German has the right, within the limits of the general laws, to
express his opinions freely in speech, in writing, in print, in picture
form or in any other way. No conditions of work or employment may
detract from this right and no disadvantage may accrue to him from any
person for making use of this right.
Censorship is forbidden, but in the case of moving pictures deviations
from this rule may be established by law. Legal provisions are also
admissible for combatting pornography and obscene publications and for
the protection of young persons at public plays and entertainment.
_Second Chapter_
The General Welfare
_Article 119_
Marriage as the cornerstone of family life and the preservation and
increase of the nation is placed under the special protection of the
Constitution. It is based on the equal rights of both sexes.
It is the duty of the State and the Communes to foster the purity,
health, and social advancement of the family. Families with numerous
children have a claim to proportionate assistance.
Motherhood has a claim to the protection and care of the State.
_Article 120_
To provide their children with a thorough physical, spiritual, and
social education is the supreme duty and natural right of parents,
whose activities shall be supervised by the State.
_Article 121_
The same conditions shall be created by law for the physical, spiritual
and social development of illegitimate as for legitimate children.
_Article 122_
Youth shall be protected against exploitation and also against neglect
of their moral, mental or physical well-being. The States and Communes
shall make the necessary arrangements.
Compulsory measures for their welfare may only be ordered on the basis
of law.
_Article 123_
All Germans have the right to assemble peacefully and unarmed without
giving notice and without special permission.
A Reich law may make previous notification obligatory for assemblies in
the open air, and may prohibit them in the case of immediate danger to
the public safety.
_Article 124_
All the Germans have the right to form associations or societies for
purposes not contrary to criminal law. This right may not be curtailed
by preventive measures. The same provisions apply to religious
associations and societies.
Every association may become incorporated according to the provisions
of the civil law. The right may not be refused to any association on
the grounds that its aims are political, social-political or religious.
_Article 125_
The liberty and secrecy of the vote is guaranteed. Details shall be
regulated by election laws.
_Article 126_
Every German has the right to address requests or complaints in writing
to the competent authorities or to the people’s representatives. This
right may be exercised individually or by several persons collectively.
_Article 127_
Communes and communal unions have the right of self-administration
within the limits of the law.
_Article 128_
All citizens without distinction shall be eligible for public office
in accordance with the laws and according to their capabilities and
achievements.
All provisions discriminating against women are abolished.
The principles governing the legal status of the public officials shall
be regulated by Reich law.
_Article 129_
Public officials shall be appointed for life, unless otherwise provided
by law. Pensions for retired officials or the surviving dependents of
deceased officials shall be regulated by law. The vested rights of
public officials are inviolable. Legal steps may be taken by public
officials for pecuniary claims.
Public officials may be only temporarily suspended from office,
temporarily or permanently relieved or transferred to a different
office with a lower salary on the conditions and in the form provided
by law.
In every case where a disciplinary sentence is pronounced, the way must
be open for appeal and a new trial. Entries unfavorable to a public
official may not be made in his official record until opportunity has
been afforded him of expressing his own view of the facts. Public
officials shall be permitted to inspect their official records.
The inviolability of vested rights and the competence of the civil
courts to adjudicate pecuniary claims are also assured particularly
to the regular soldiers. In other respects their position shall be
regulated by Reich law.
_Article 130_
Public officials are servants of the whole community, and not of a
party.
Liberty of political opinion and freedom to form associations is
guaranteed to all public officials.
A Reich law shall provide in detail for the special representation of
public officials.
_Article 131_
If a public official in the execution of the official authority vested
in him transgresses his official duty towards a third person, the State
or the public body in whose service the officer is, is in principle
held responsible. The right of recovery from the officer is reserved.
Recourse to the ordinary civil courts may not be excluded.
Details shall be regulated by the competent legislature.
_Article 132_
It is the duty of every German to accept honorary offices in accordance
with the laws.
_Article 133_
It is the duty of all citizens to render personal services to the State
and the Commune in accordance with the laws.
The duty of military service is determined by the provisions of the
Reich Defense Law. This shall also stipulate how far single Fundamental
Rights of the Constitution shall be restricted in respect to members of
the defense forces, in the interest of the fulfillment of their tasks
and the maintenance of discipline.
_Article 134_
All citizens without distinction contribute to all public burdens in
proportion to their means and in accordance with the laws.
_Third Chapter_
Religion and Religious Associations
_Article 135_
All inhabitants of the Reich enjoy full religious and conscientious
freedom. The undisturbed exercise of religion is guaranteed by the
Constitution and is under state protection. The general state laws are
unaffected hereby.
_Article 136_
Civil and civic rights and duties are neither contingent upon nor
limited by the exercise of religious freedom.
The enjoyment of civil and civic rights and the eligibility for public
office are independent of religious belief.
Nobody is obliged to reveal his religious conviction. The authorities
are only entitled to ask questions concerning adherence to a religious
body so far as rights and duties are dependent thereon or in pursuance
of statistical inquiries prescribed by law.
No one may be compelled to attend any church service or ceremony or to
participate in religious exercises, or to take oath in religious form.
_Article 137_
There is no State Church.
Freedom to form religious societies is guaranteed. The combination of
religious societies within the territory of the Reich is subject to no
restrictions.
Every religious society regulates and administers its affairs
independently within the limits of the law, applicable to all. It
appoints its officers without the cooperation of the State or the civil
community.
Religious societies become incorporated in accordance with the general
provisions of civil law.
Religious societies remain bodies of public law if this has been their
status hitherto. Similar rights shall be granted to other religious
societies on their application, if their constitution and the number
of their members offer a guarantee of permanency. If several such
religious societies are united as public bodies, this union is also a
public body.
Such religious societies as are public bodies are entitled to levy
taxes on the basis of the civil tax-roll in accordance with the laws of
the respective Lands.
Associations devoted to the common cultivation of a philosophy of life
are placed on the same footing as religious societies.
So far as the execution of these provisions requires more detailed
regulation, this is within the competence of the Lands’ legislatures.
_Article 138_
State contributions to religious societies based on laws, contract or
special legal titles shall be commuted by Lands legislation. The Reich
shall establish the principles therefor.
Property and other rights of religious societies and associations in
their institutions, foundations, and other properties for cultural,
educational, and charitable purposes are guaranteed.
_Article 139_
Sundays and public holidays recognized by the State remain under legal
protection as days of rest and spiritual edification.
_Article 140_
Members of the defense forces shall be allowed the necessary free time
for performing their religious duties.
_Article 141_
So far as there is need for divine service and spiritual consolation
in the army, in hospitals, prisons or other public institutions,
the religious societies shall be permitted to perform the religious
offices, but all compulsion shall be avoided.
_Fourth Chapter_
Education and the Schools
_Article 142_
Art and science and the teaching thereof are free. The State guarantees
them protection and takes part in their cultivation.
_Article 143_
The education of young persons shall be provided for by means of public
institutions. The Reich, Lands and Communes shall cooperate in their
establishment.
The training of teachers shall be regulated uniformly for the whole
Reich according to the generally recognized principles of higher
education.
Teachers in public schools have the rights and duties of state
officials.
_Article 144_
The whole school system is under the supervision of the State, which
may cause the Communes to participate therein. The supervision
of schools is exercised by trained expert officials as their
occupation-in-chief.
_Article 145_
Attendance at school is universally obligatory.
In principle this duty is fulfilled by attending an elementary school
for at least eight school years and a connected continuation school
until the completion of the eighteenth year. Instruction and school
supplies are supplied free of charge in the elementary and continuation
schools.
_Article 146_
The system of public schools shall be organically developed. The
intermediate and secondary school system shall be built upon the basis
of common elementary schools. This system shall be determined by the
needs of all kinds of vocations, and for the reception of a child
into a particular school, his abilities and inclination shall be the
deciding factor, not the economic and social status or the religious
confession of his parents.
Within the Communes, however, on the petition of parents and guardians,
popular schools professing their own faith or philosophy of life shall
be established, so far as this does not interfere with an organized
school system in the sense, also, of Paragraph 1, supra. As far
as possible the will of parents and guardians shall be taken into
consideration. Details shall be regulated by Lands legislation based on
principles prescribed by a Reich law.
Public funds shall be provided by the Reich, Lands and Communes to make
the intermediate and secondary schools available for those possessed
of restricted means; in particular shall there be educational grants
for the parents of children looked upon as suitable subjects for
instruction in intermediate and secondary schools until their schooling
is completed.
_Article 147_
Private schools as substitutes for public schools require the approval
of the State and are subject to the laws of the Lands. Approval shall
be granted when the private schools are not inferior to the public
schools as regards their instructional aims and equipment and the
scientific training of the teachers, and a separation of the pupils
according to the wealth of their parents is not encouraged. The
approval shall be refused if the economic and legal position of the
teachers is not sufficiently assured.
Private elementary schools shall only be admitted when for those
parents or guardians whose wishes are to be regarded under Article
146, Paragraph 2, no public elementary school of their faith or
philosophical persuasion exists in their Commune, or if the educational
administrative authorities recognize the existence of a particular
educational need.
Private preparatory schools shall be abolished.
The existing law shall continue to apply to private schools not serving
as substitutes for public schools.
_Article 148_
In all schools moral training, a sense of civic responsibility,
personal and vocational efficiency in a spirit of national German
feeling and international conciliation shall be aimed at.
Care shall be taken that instruction in public schools shall not hurt
the feelings of those who differ in opinion.
Civics and manual training form part of the school curriculum. On
completing his obligatory schooling every pupil shall receive a copy of
the Constitution.
Popular education including popular universities shall be developed by
the Reich, Lands and Communes.
_Article 149_
Religious instruction forms part of the ordinary school curriculum
except in the nonconfessional (secular) schools; its form will be
regulated by the laws relating to schools. Religious instruction shall
be given in conformity with the principles of the religious society
concerned, without prejudice to the State’s right of supervision.
The imparting of religious instruction and the performance of religious
acts is left to the decision of the teacher, while the participation in
religious lessons, acts, and ceremonies is a matter for the decision of
those who have the right to determine the religious education of the
child.
The theological faculties in the universities shall be maintained.
_Article 150_
Artistic, historical, and natural monuments and scenery enjoy the
protection and care of the State.
It is a function of the Reich to prevent German art treasures from
passing to foreign countries.
_Fifth Chapter_
The Economic Life
_Article 151_
The regulation of economic life must be compatible with the principles
of justice, aiming at the attainment of humane conditions of existence
for all. Within these limits the economic liberty of the individual
shall be assured.
Legal compulsion is only admissible for the realization of threatened
rights or in the service of preponderant requirements of the common
welfare.
Freedom of trade and commerce is guaranteed on the basis of the Reich
laws.
_Article 152_
As far as the laws allow, there shall be freedom of contract in
business intercourse. Usury is prohibited. Legal transactions contra
bonos mores are invalid.
_Article 153_
Property is guaranteed by the Constitution. Its content and limits are
defined by the laws.
Expropriation can only take place for the public benefit and on a
legal basis. Adequate compensation shall be granted, unless a Reich
law orders otherwise. In the case of dispute concerning the amount of
compensation, it shall be possible to submit the matter to the ordinary
civil courts, unless Reich laws determine otherwise. Compensation must
be paid if the Reich expropriates property belonging to the Lands,
Communes, or public utility associations.
Property carries obligations. Its use shall also serve the common good.
_Article 154_
The right of inheritance is guaranteed according to the civil code.
The share of the State in inherited property is determined by the laws.
_Article 155_
The distribution and utilization of the land shall be supervised by
state authorities in a manner to prevent abuse and with the object of
ensuring a healthy dwelling to every German and to all German families,
especially those with numerous children, living and working quarters
in accordance with their needs. War veterans shall be particularly
considered in the enactment of homestead laws.
Real estate, the acquisition of which is necessary for housing
purposes, for the promotion of settlements and land cultivation or
to improve agriculture, may be expropriated. All entails shall be
dissolved.
The cultivation and utilization of the soil is a duty owed by the
landowner to the community. An increase in the value of land, which
arises without the expenditure of work or capital on the property,
shall be utilized for the common benefit.
All treasures of the soil and all natural forces of economic utility
are under the supervision of the State. Private mining rights shall be
transferred to the State by legislation.
_Article 156_
The Reich may, without prejudice to the right of compensation, by law
transfer to public ownership private economic enterprises suitable for
socialization, applying thereby analogously the regulations relating to
expropriation. The Reich may allot to itself, the Lands or the Communes
a share in the administration of economic enterprises and associations
or secure to itself a controlling influence therein in some other way.
The Reich may also in case of urgent necessity for socioeconomic
interests, by law effect a combination of economic enterprises and
associations on the basis of self-administration with the object of
securing the cooperation of all working elements of the population,
of allowing employers and employees a share in the management and
regulating the production, fabrication, distribution, utilization,
price fixing, and the importation and exportation of economic goods
according to the principles of national economy.
The cooperative industrial and economic associations and their unions
shall at their request be incorporated in the socialized economic
system, their constitution and peculiarities being thereby taken into
consideration.
_Article 157_
The ability to work is under the special protection of the Reich. The
Reich shall create a uniform labor law.
_Article 158_
Intellectual labor, the rights of the author, the inventor, and the
artist enjoy the protection and care of the Reich.
Recognition and protection in foreign countries also shall be secured
to German science, art and technic by means of international agreements.
_Article 159_
Freedom of association for the preservation and promotion of labor
and economic conditions is assured to everyone and to all vocations.
All agreements and measures attempting to restrict or restrain such
freedom, are unlawful.
_Article 160_
Persons working as employees or laborers are entitled to the leave
necessary for the exercise of their civic rights and, so far as the
enterprise is not materially damaged thereby, for performing the duties
attached to public honorary offices entrusted to them. The law shall
determine to what extent they retain their right to remuneration.
_Article 161_
For the maintenance of health and capacity to work, for the protection
of maternity, and for provision against the economic consequences of
age, infirmity, and the vicissitudes of life, the Reich shall organize
a comprehensive system of insurance, in which the insured persons shall
cooperate to a considerable extent.
_Article 162_
The Reich shall endeavor to obtain an interstate regulation of
the legal status of laborers which shall have as its object the
establishment of a general minimum standard of social rights for all
working classes of mankind.
_Article 163_
Every German has, without prejudice to his personal liberty, the moral
duty to utilize his intellectual and physical powers in the interest of
the general welfare.
The opportunity of earning his living by economic work shall be
afforded to every German. So far as suitable work cannot be found for
him, he shall be provided with the necessary support. Details shall be
regulated by special Reich laws.
_Article 164_
The interests of the independent middle classes in agriculture,
industry and commerce shall be promoted by legislation and
administration and protected from oppression and absorption.
_Article 165_
Laborers and employees are called upon to take part on equal terms and
together with the employers in regulating conditions of work and wages
and also in the general economic development of productive forces.
The organizations on both sides and agreements between them shall be
recognized.
Laborers and employees shall be legally represented on the Workmen’s
Councils of the Enterprise, as well as in the District Workmen’s
Councils organized for each economic area and on a Reich Workmen’s
Council.
The District Workmen’s Councils and the Reich Workmen’s Council shall
combine with the representatives of the employees and other interested
elements of the population to form District Economic Councils and a
Reich Economic Council for the purpose of performing all economic
tasks and of cooperating in carrying out the socialization laws. The
District Economic Councils and the Reich Economic Council shall be
so constituted that all important vocational groups are represented
thereon in accordance with their economic and social importance.
Social-political and political-economic bills of basic importance
shall be submitted to the opinion of the Reich Economic Council by the
government of the Reich before being introduced. The Reich Economic
Council has itself the right to propose the introduction of such
bills. If the government of the Reich does not approve them, it must
nevertheless introduce such bills to the Reichstag, stating its own
point of view. The Reich Economic Council may have the bill supported
in the Reichstag by one of its own members.
Supervision and administrative powers may be conferred on the Workmen’s
and the Economic Councils within their own spheres of work.
The regulation of the organization and tasks of the Workmen’s and
the Economic Councils as well as their relation to other social
self-governing bodies is exclusively a function of the Reich.
_Transitional and Concluding Provisions_
_Article 166_
Until the establishment of the Reich Administrative Court the Reich
Supreme Court shall take its place in the formation of the Election
Investigation Court.
_Article 167_
Article 18, sect. 3 to 6 are valid 2 years after announcement of the
Reichs Constitution.
_Article 168_
Until--but only for a year--the Landlaw, considered in Article 63 is
issued, all Prussian votes in the Reichsrat can be given by the members
of the Cabinet.
_Article 169_
The Reichs Cabinet, will set the date, when Article 83, sect. 1,
becomes valid.
_Article 170_
The postal--and telegraph agencies of Bavaria and Wuertenberg, will be
taken over by the Reich on 1 April 1921 the latest.
If, on 1 Oct 1920, no agreement on the points of the taking over has
been reached, the supreme constitutional court will decide.
Until the taking over, the present rights and duties of Bavaria and
Wuertenberg are in force. The postal and telegraph traffic with
neighboring states of foreign countries, will be regulated by the Reich.
_Article 171_
The State Railroads, Waterways and sea-marks will be taken over by the
Reich on April 1, 1921, the latest.
If on 1 Oct 1920 no agreement on the points of the taking over, has
been reached, the Supreme Constitutional Court will decide.
_Article 172_
Until the Reich law concerning the Supreme Constitutional Court comes
into force, a Senate shall exercise its powers; this Senate shall
consist of seven members of which four are chosen by the Reichstag from
its own members and three by the Supreme Court of the Reich from its
own members. The Senate shall regulate its own procedure.
_Article 173_
Until the enactment of a Reich law according to Article 138 the present
state contributions to religious societies based on laws, contracts or
special legal claims shall be continued.
_Article 174_
Until the enactment of the Reich law provided in Article 146, Paragraph
2, the present legal situation shall continue. The law shall take into
particular consideration those districts of the Reich in which a school
where no distinction of creeds is made is established by law.
_Article 175_
The provision of Article 109 does not apply to orders and decorations
to be conferred for merit in the war years 1914-1919.
_Article 176_
All public officers and members of the defense forces shall take the
oath upon the Constitution. Details shall be regulated by an order of
the Reich President.
_Article 177_
Where in the existing laws the oath is prescribed in religious form,
the oath shall be legally binding if the person taking the same,
leaving out the religious formula, declares: “I swear.” The content of
the oath as prescribed in the laws remains otherwise unaltered.
_Article 178_
The Constitution of the German Reich of April 16, 1871, and the laws of
February 10, 1918, concerning the provisional government of the Reich,
are repealed.
All other laws and orders of the Reich remain in force, so far as this
Constitution is not incompatible with them. The provisions of the
Peace Treaty signed at Versailles on June 28, 1919, are not affected
by the Constitution. With respect to the negotiations concerning the
acquisition of the island of Heligoland a regulation in favor of its
inhabitants may be made differing from that of Article 117, Paragraph 2.
Orders by the authorities which have been legally issued in conformity
with the present laws, retain their validity until they are repealed by
new orders of legislation.
_Article 179_
So far as laws or orders refer to provisions and institutions which
are repealed by this Constitution, the appropriate provisions
and institutions of this Constitution shall take their place. In
particular, the Reichstag shall take the place of the National
Assembly, the Reich Council that of the State Committee, the Reich
President elected on the basis of this Constitution that of the Reich
President elected on the basis of the law concerning the provisional
government of the Reich.
The power, hitherto pertaining to the State Committee, of issuing
executive orders is transferred to the government of the Reich, which
requires therefor the approbation of the Reich Council in accordance
with this Constitution.
_Article 180_
Until the meeting of the first Reichstag, the National Assembly shall
function as Reichstag. The President of the Reich chosen by the
National Assembly shall retain his office till 30 June 1925.
_Article 181_
The German people have passed and adopted this Constitution by means
of their National Assembly. It comes into force with the date of its
proclamation.
Schwarzburg, 11 August 1919.
_The Reich President_
EBERT
_The Reich Cabinet_
BAUER
ERZBERGER HERMAN MUELLER DR. DAVID NOSKE
SCHMIDT SCHLICKE GIESBERTS
DR. MAYER DR. BELL
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2056-PS
1938 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 1632
Decree concerning the Extension of the Jurisdiction of the Special
Courts of 20 November 1938
On authority of Chapter II of the Sixth Section of the decree of 6
October 1931 (RGBl I, page 537), Article II of the law regarding
the reunification of Austria with the German Reich of 13 March 1938
(RGBl I, page 237) and Article 7 of the decree of the Fuehrer and
Reich Chancellor regarding the administration of the Sudeten German
territories of 1 October 1938 (RGBl I, page 1331), the following order
is promulgated:
Article I
In cases of criminal acts which belong to the jurisdiction of the
Assizes or of a lower court, the prosecuting authorities can bring the
charge before the Special Court, if they believe that in consideration
of the gravity or the wickedness of the deed, or the possible arousing
of popular excitement, an immediate verdict by the Special Court is
advisable.
Article II
(1) Under the same supposition in the state of Austria and in the
Sudeten German territories the prosecuting authorities can bring the
charge before the Court of Appeal in cases of criminal acts which,
according to the existing legal procedure in those areas, belongs to
the jurisdiction of the Jury Court or of a lower court. This is decided
by the appointment of three professional judges.
(2) For the legal procedure the decree of 21 March 1933 (RGBl I, page
136) is applicable. The Reich Minister for Justice is to be consulted
for more precise definitions.
Article III
In the proceedings before the Special Court (Court of Appeals) the
period of time for summons is limited to 24 hours.
Article IV
As long as the main deliberation has not yet begun in cases of Articles
I and II, proceedings which are pending in the Assizes (Jury Court)
or a lower court at the time this decree enters into effect, are to
be referred to the Special Court of the prosecuting authorities so
proposed.
Article V
This decree becomes effective on the date of publication.
Berlin, 20 November 1938
The Reich Minister for Justice
Dr. Guertner
The Reich Minister of the Interior
Frick
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2057-PS
1934 REICHSGESETZBLATT PART I, PAGE 529
Law Relating to National Emergency Defense Measures of 3 July 1934
The Reich Government has enacted the following law, which is hereby
promulgated:
ONLY ARTICLE
The measures taken on 30 June and 1 and 2 July 1934 to counteract
attempt at treason and high treason shall be considered as national
emergency defense.
Berlin, 3 July 1934.
The Reich Chancellor
Adolf Hitler
The Reich Minister of the Interior
Frick
The Reich Minister of Justice
Dr. Guertner
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2058-PS
1933 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 462
Decree for the securing of the State Leadership of 7 July 1933
Based on paragraph 18 of the provisional law about the coordination of
the states [Laender] with the Reich of 31 March 1933 (Reichsgesetzblatt
I, page 183), I decree:
_The Reichstag and houses of delegates of the states_
Article 1
The distribution of seats, according to the electoral suggestion of the
Social Democratic Party, for the Reichstag and the provincial diets
(citizens’ committee), based on the election results of 5 March 1933
or on the results of the coordination action, according to Article 4,
Section 2 of the provisional law for the coordination of the states
with the Reich of 31 July 1933, is void. An alternate distribution will
not take place.
_Community self-administrative bodies_
Article 2
The distribution of seats, according to the elective suggestion of
the Social Democratic Party, for the community self-administrative
bodies (county diets, district diets, district councils, council of
officials, city councils, city councils of representatives, community
councils, etc.) in Prussia based on the results of the election of
12 March 1933, in the other German states based on the results of
the coordination action according to article 12, Section 2 of the
provisional law for the coordination of the states with the Reich of 31
March 1933 is void.
Article 3
In as much as it may be necessary for the maintenance of a
self-administration of the community to fill the seats whose
distribution has been nullified, the state supervisory authority can
fill these seats again according to the will of the people after the
conquering of the republic [Parteienstaat].
Article 4
The members of the community self-administrative bodies will be
appointed by the state supervisory authority according to the will
of the people after the conquering of the republic in the following
additional cases.
1. if a community body of representatives is dissolved, by the state
supervisory authority, or if their election or coordination has been
declared void in the examination of the election,
2. if a community or an association of communities is newly formed by
way of organization,
3. if a regular filling of the community body of representatives is not
possible, because, according to the elections, a sufficient number of
acceptable alternates is no longer available,
4. if in Prussia, a new election of the community body of
representatives has not taken place on 12 March 1933.
_Civic honorary positions_
Article 5
(1) The elections of honorary members of national administrative
resolution authorities, committees and of bearers of national,
individual honorary positions, who themselves belong to the Social
Democratic Party, or who were elected because of the electoral
suggestion of representatives of the Social Democratic Party, are void.
(2) The same applies to the election of honorary chairmen or members
of boards of direction of communities and association of communities,
deputations, commissions, community councils, as well as bearers of
honorary individual positions, who are themselves members of the Social
Democratic Party, or who have been elected by bodies of representatives
or other organs, entitled to vote, of the community or of the community
associations based on electoral suggestion, which have been submitted
by the representatives of the Social Democratic Party.
(3) In as much as it is necessary for the maintenance of the national
administration or of the community self-administration to fill civic
honorary positions, the election of which are void (Section 1 and 2),
the alternates will be appointed by the state supervisory authority or
by its deputized officials according to the will of the people after
the conquering of the republic.
Berlin, 7 July 1933.
The Reich Minister of the Interior
Frick
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2059-PS
1933 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 134
Decree of the Reich-President relating to the granting of amnesty of 21
March 1933
Pursuant to Section 48, subsection 2 of the Constitution of the Reich
the following is ordered:
Section 1
Amnesty is granted for penal acts committed in the national revolution
of the German People, in its preparation or in the fight for the German
soil pursuant to the following provisions:
Section 2
Penalties imposed by final judgment at the time this law becomes
effective and which have not yet been served, are annulled.
The amnesty applies to additional fines and security measures as long
as they have not been executed, to subsidiary legal consequences as
well as outstanding fines payable to the Treasury of the Reich or the
Landes and to outstanding expenses.
If a sentence has been passed to the effect that something should be
confiscated or made unusable it will remain as such.
Section 3
Pending proceedings will be discontinued if the offense has been
committed before the 21 March 1933 and further proceedings are not to
be instituted.
Section 4
Should a penalty which has not yet been served at the time when this
decree becomes effective, include one or several penalties for offences
for which amnesty is granted, such part of the entire penalty which is
proportionally meted out for the offences mentioned has to be deducted.
If a penalty constituting imprisonment has been transformed into one
of penal servitude only on account of simultaneous offences for one
of which amnesty is granted, the entire penalty which will be reduced
pursuant to subsection 1, has to be commuted into imprisonment of the
same length of time.
Judicial findings (Section 458 of Code of Criminal Procedure) relating
to whether and to what extent a penalty is to be extenuated pursuant
to the provisions of subsections 1 and 2 will be decided upon by the
court which has the jurisdiction to impose penalties for the offence
mentioned in subsection 1.
Section 5
The Court decides upon the discontinuance of pending proceedings upon
application of the parties.
If the proceedings have been instituted upon a private complaint
the costs of such proceedings are quashed. The Court may divide
the necessary expense of the private complaint and the accused
appropriately or may impose the expenses on any one of them.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2061-PS
1934 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 785
_Oath of Reich Officials and of German Soldiers, of 20 August 1934._
Law on attestation of officials and of soldiers of the Armed Forces, of
20 August 1934.
The Reich’s government has enacted the following law which is hereby
proclaimed:
Art. 1
The Public officials and the soldiers of the armed forces have to take
an oath of service on entering service.
Art. 2
1. The oath of service of public officials will be:
“I swear: I shall be loyal and obedient to Adolf Hitler, the Fuehrer
of the German Reich and people; respect the laws, and fulfill my
official duties conscientiously, so help me God.”
2. The oath of service of the soldiers of the armed forces will be:
“I swear by God this sacred oath, that I will render unconditional
obedience to Adolf Hitler, the Fuehrer of the German Reich and
people, supreme commander of the armed forces, and will be ready as
a brave soldier to risk my life at any time for this oath.”
Art. 3
Officials already in service are to be given the oath without delay
according to Art. 2, number 1.
Art. 4
The law on attestation of officials and of soldiers of the armed forces
of 1 Dec. 1933 (RGBl I. P. 1016) and the decree of the second of the
same month (RGBl I. P. 1017) are rescinded.
Berlin, 20 August 1934.
The Fuehrer and Reichschancellor
Adolf Hitler
The Reichsminister of the Interior
Frick
The Reichsminister of Defense
von Blomberg.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2073-PS
1936 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 487
Decree concerning the Appointment of a Chief of German Police in the
Reich Ministry of the Interior of 17 June 1936
I
For the unification of police duties in the Reich, a Chief of German
Police is instituted for the German Ministry of the Interior, to whom
is assigned the direction and conduct of all police affairs within
the jurisdiction of the Reich and of the Prussian Ministries of the
Interior.
II
(1) For the Chief of German Police in the Reich Ministry of the
Interior, the Deputy Chief of the Secret State Police of Prussia is
declared to be Reichsfuehrer SS Heinrich HIMMLER.
(2) He is subordinated individually and directly to the Reich and the
Prussian Ministries of the Interior.
(3) In their absence he represents for his jurisdiction the Reich and
the Prussian Ministries of the Interior.
(4) He bears the service title: Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the
German Police in the Reich Ministry of the Interior.
III
The Chief of the German Police in the Reich Ministry of the Interior
shares in the sessions of the Reich Cabinet, so far as his jurisdiction
is concerned.
IV
I commission the Reich and the Prussian Ministries of the Interior with
the conduct of this decree.
Berlin, 17 June 1936
The Fuehrer and Chancellor of the Reich
Adolf Hitler
The Reich Minister of the Interior
Frick
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2075-PS
1937 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 187
Decree
for appointment of a chief of the organization of Germans abroad within
the Foreign Office.
30 January 1937.
I
For uniform care for German Nationals abroad a Chief of the
Organization of Germans abroad is appointed within the Foreign Office
and to whom, at the same time, the leadership and processing of all
affairs of German Nationals abroad within the jurisdiction of the
Foreign Office will be given over.
II
(1) As chief of the Organization for Germans abroad within the Foreign
Office Gauleiter Ernst Wilhelm Bohle, director of the Organization for
Germans abroad of the Nazi Party is appointed.
(2) His is a personal appointment and immediately subordinate to the
Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs. His field of activity, as chief of
the organization of German nationals abroad of the Nazi Party and his
subordination to the deputy of the Fuehrer are not affected.
(3) His official title is: Chief of Organization of Germans abroad
within the Foreign Office.
III
The Chief of Organization of Germans abroad of the Foreign Office
participates in the sessions of the Reich Cabinet so far as his field
is concerned.
IV
The Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs in agreement with the deputy of
the Fuehrer will issue the implementative regulations of this decree.
Berlin, 30 January 1937.
The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor
Adolf Hitler
The Reich Foreign Minister
Freiherr von Neurath
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2076-PS
1933 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGES 136-137
Decree of the Reich Cabinet relating to the formation of special courts
of March 21, 1933
On the basis of Chapter II, Part 6 of the third decree of the Reich
President to safeguard economy and finances and to combat political
excesses, of 6 October 1931 (Reichsgesetzblatt I pp. 537, 565) the
following is decreed.
Section 1
(1) A special court will be created for the district of each court of
appeals.
(2) The special courts are courts of the State [Land].
(3) The legal administration of the State [Land] determines the seats
of the special courts.
Section 2
The special courts have jurisdiction over crimes and felonies
enumerated in the decree of the President of the Reich for the defense
of people and state, of 28 February 1933 (Reichsgesetzblatt I, p. 83)
and in the decree relating to the defense against insidious attacks
against the government of the national revolution provided that such
offenses are not within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or court
of appeals.
Section 3
(1) The special courts also have jurisdiction when a crime or felony
which is under their jurisdiction fulfills at the same time the
specifications of another offense.
(2) If another offense is directly connected with the crime or felony
which comes under the jurisdiction of the Special Courts, then the
proceedings against the offenders and accessories of the other offense
may be instituted in the Special Courts.
(3) The extended jurisdiction pursuant to Paragraphs 1 and 2 does not
apply to offenses for which the Supreme Court or Courts of Appeals have
jurisdiction.
* * * * * * *
Section 7
Proceedings may be instituted also before the Special Court in the
district of which the defendant was caught or where he is in custody.
The release of the defendant does not affect this jurisdiction once it
has been established.
* * * * * * *
Section 9
(1) No hearings relating to the warrant of arrest shall be held.
* * * * * * *
Section 11
A preliminary court investigation will not take place. If a preliminary
investigation is pending at the time this decree becomes effective, the
records are to be transferred at once to the prosecuting official with
the Special Court.
* * * * * * *
Section 16
(1) No legal remedy is admissible against the decisions of the Special
Courts.
* * * * * * *
Berlin, March 24, 1933
The Reich Chancellor
Adolph Hitler
For the Reich Minister of Justice
The Deputy of the Reich Chancellor
von Papen.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2078-PS
1934 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 365
Decree concerning the establishment of the Reichs Ministry of Science,
Education, and Popular Culture of 1 May 1934
(1) For the entire system of education, training, and instruction of
the Reich, as well as for the tasks of science, a Reich Ministry for
Science, education, and popular culture is established.
(2) The director of this office bears the title “Reich Minister for
Science, Education and Popular Culture.”
(3) The Chancellor of the Reich will determine the various duties of
the Reich Ministry for Science, Education, and Popular Culture. He
will also determine the duties which are transferred from the sphere
of activity of the Reich Ministries affected to the new Ministry and
also even if the sphere of activity of the ministries concerned is
fundamentally affected hereby.
Berlin, 1 May 1934
The President of the Reich
von Hindenburg
The Chancellor of the Reich
Adolf Hitler
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2079-PS
1935 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 1145
Reich Flag Law 15 September 1935
The Reichstag has unanimously ratified the following law which is
hereby announced:
Article 1
The colors of the Reich are black, white, and red.
Article 2
The Reich and national flag is the swastika flag. It is also the
merchant flag.
Article 3
The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor designates the design of the Reich War
Flag and the Reich Service Flag.
Article 4
The Reich Minister of the Interior releases the necessary legal and
administrative regulations for the execution and completion of this law
as long as it does not interfere with the jurisdiction of the Reich
Minister of War.
Article 5
This law becomes valid on the day of announcement.
Nurnberg 15 September 1935
on the Reichparteitag of Freedom
The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor
ADOLF HITLER
The Reich Minister of the Interior
FRICK
The Reich Minister of War and
Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht
VON BLOMBERG
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2082-PS
1933 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 661
Law relating to the Reich Chamber of Culture of September 22nd, 1933.
The Reich Government has decreed the following law which is hereby
promulgated:
Section 1
The Reich Minister for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda is ordered
and authorized to organize the functions under his jurisdiction into
public corporations.
Section 2
Pursuant to section 1, the following chambers are established:
1. a Reich Chamber of Archives,
2. a Reich Press Chamber,
3. a Reich Radio Chamber,
4. a Reich Theater Chamber,
5. a Reich Music Chamber,
6. a Reich Chamber of Creative Arts.
Section 3
In establishing the Chambers mentioned in section 2, the provisions
relating to the film industry contained in the Law relating to
the Establishment of a Provisional Film Chamber of 14 July 1933
(Reichsgesetzblatt, page 483) and supplementary executive provisions
thereunder are to receive corresponding application.
Section 4
The organization of these Chambers must be kept within the framework
of the policies laid down by the Reich Government in connection with
professional advancement.
Section 5
The corporate bodies listed in Section 2, together with the provisional
film Chamber, referred to as the Reich Film Chamber, are united into
a Reich Chamber of Culture. The Reich Chamber of Culture is under
the supervision of the Reich Minister for Popular Enlightenment and
Propaganda. It has its seat in Berlin.
Section 6
The Reich Minister for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda and the
Reich Minister of Economics are authorized to coordinate the provisions
of the Trade Laws with the provisions of this law by means of a
combined decree.
Section 7
The Reich Minister for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda is
authorized to decree laws and general administrative regulations as
well as amendments for the purpose of implementing this law. The
laws and general administrative regulations affecting financial or
trade interests of the Reich require consent of the Reich Minister of
Finance, in agreement with the Reich Minister of Economics.
Berlin, 22 September 1933.
The Reich Chancellor
Adolf Hitler
The Reich Minister for
Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda Dr. Goebbels
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2083-PS
1933 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 713
Editorial Law
4 October 1933
The Reich Government has resolved upon the following law, which is
hereby published:
Part One
The Editorial Profession
Section 1
The cooperative work carried on as main employment or based upon
appointment to the position of chief editor in the shaping of the
intellectual contents by written word, dissemination of news or
pictures of the newspapers or political periodicals, which are
published within the area of the Reich, is a public task, which is
regulated as to its professional duties and rights by the state through
this law. Its bearers are called editors. Nobody may call himself an
editor who is not entitled to do so, according to this law.