I have received your letters of the 2d, 3d, and 7th instant. There is

no man in America, more heartily disposed than I am to remove from the

army and from all others who have claims on the public, every just

ground of complaint. But with the means in my power, how is it

possible? I have been obliged to submit to cancelling one contract and

forming another, at one third advance on the former price, for the

want of a mere trifle, compared with what we had a right to expect. I

am in advance on credit to an amount, which you can scarcely form an

idea of, although I have declined every expenditure not indispensable.

That part of the late arrival of clothing, which is unfit for

soldier's use, is now selling to pay debts contracted by the clothing

department during my administration. Among these debts are twelve

thousand dollars for needle work done by people in extreme indigence.

The clothing which arrived fit for the officers' wear, was inadequate

to the purpose of clothing them all. The division must have created

confusion and raised disputes. If this had not been the case, still

it would have been liable to the inconveniencies attending partial

payments, and we should have been justly reproached for having broken

repeated promises, that no such payments should take place. Congress

have done all in their power to procure money for the army. My own

efforts I shall not dwell upon. If money is obtained, that will

produce satisfaction; I am sure that nothing else will.

My credit has already been on the brink of ruin. If that goes, all is

gone; but if it can be preserved, there will, in the last necessity,

be some chance of making advances on credit to the army, as well as to

others. Thus, Sir, you will see that I look forward as far as my

distressed situation will admit; but after all, if the States cannot

be prevailed on to make greater exertions, it is difficult to see

where the thing is to terminate.

I have this day commissioned Major Turner as Marine Commissary of

prisoners, and I trust he will soon be in capacity to prevent your

Excellency from having any further trouble on that subject.

I am, Sir, with sincere respect and esteem, &c.

ROBERT MORRIS.

* * * * *

TO THE GOVERNOR OF NORTH CAROLINA.

Office of Finance, October 7th, 1782.

Sir,

Since the receipt of your favor of the 20th of August last, I have

received copies of a correspondence between yourself and Colonel

Carrington on the subject of specific supplies. The disposition which

you have expressed, (in your letter to me, and which indeed breathes

through your whole correspondence) to promote those plans of

regularity and economy, which Congress have adopted, command my

sincere acknowledgements.

I perceive that there is a difference of opinion between the officers

of the continent and your State on the receiving specific supplies,

which I attribute principally to some misunderstanding of the matter.

The specific supplies called for by Congress in their several

resolutions on that subject are undoubtedly receivable, and ought

above eighteen months ago to have been received, on the requisitions

which were made at the rates for that purpose mentioned. Such as it

may now suit any State to deliver on those requisitions, ought in like

manner to be carried to account. But it is very clear, that they

cannot be received on account of the subsequent money requisitions.

The several quotas of the eight millions asked for last year, to

supply the current expenditures of the year 1782, must be paid in

cash, or what is equivalent to it, in my notes or bank notes. I cannot

consent to receive anything else. It is by this means alone, that

economy can be established, order restored, and confusion, that parent

of fraud, too apt to introduce itself into public accounts, banished

and destroyed.

I incline to think, that as Congress have determined to have all

accounts settled and liquidated to the end of the year 1781, your

State would rather choose to attend only to the money requisition, and

leave the further delivery of specifics to a liquidation of the old

accounts; but if not, there can be no doubt but the specifics will be

received, and in such case I will give the gentleman whom I shall

appoint as Receiver of taxes in your State, instructions how to

dispose of them; but I must again repeat, Sir, that I will not accept

one particle of them in abatement of the State quota for the year

1782.

Before I close this letter I must take the liberty to mention a

matter, which suggests itself from one of your letters to Colonel

Carrington. You tell him that you will continue the prohibition

against sending certain things out of the State, in order that he may

purchase for the United States on better terms. Now, Sir, while I feel

it my duty to require justice for the United States it is equally my

duty to take care that equal justice be done to the several States,

individually considered, as well as to the individuals which compose

them. I am, therefore, to request that all such restrictions be taken

off. They sour people's minds, destroy the spirit of industry, impair

by a rapid as well as a certain progress, the public wealth of the

State, producing a dearth of the things embargoed, eventually enhance

the prices far more than they could have been increased by any other

mode. Whereas perfect freedom makes the people easy, happy, rich, and

able to pay taxes, and the taxes when paid can be expended amid a

plenty of products, and consequently be expended to advantage. I say a

plenty of products because I know, that liberty to dispose of them to

the greatest advantage will encourage men to raise them and produce a

plenty. Your Excellency will, I hope, excuse reflections which arise

from an ardent desire to promote the general welfare and happiness of

all the inhabitants of the United States.

I have the honor to be, &c.

ROBERT MORRIS.

* * * * *

TO MAJOR GENERAL GREENE.

Office of Finance, October 17th, 1782.

Dear Sir,

I have received your letter of the 1st of September, for which I pray

you to accept my acknowledgements. Amid the many distresses and cares,

which await every step of my administration, it is a great relief and

consolation to have met with the support of those who command (and

what is more, who worthily command) the armies of the United States. I

have felt, my Dear Sir, your efforts to support my measures, and I

know that they have been useful. I wish it were in my power to give to

you and to your brave army that full relief, which their conduct,

their sufferings, and above all, their patience, have merited.

I had intended to supply their subsistence, and the little contracts

in Virginia, from the quota of that State, as the money there

collected would have been nearest the spot where it was to be applied.

But I need not tell you how deficient that State has been. The

consequence is, that I must endeavor to supply the deficiency from

other sources, which I am now doing; but in the precarious state of

things at present, there is no reliance to be placed on any measure. I

suppose, however, that the evacuation of Carolina will enable you to

move northward, with a considerable part of your army; these will, I

hope, meet the relief intended. I shall direct a statement of the

whole to be made out by the Pay Master General, and do whatever may

lay in my power; but as to pay, my inviolable determination is, that

the whole army shall equally share whatever is disposed of in that

way.

The disposition of the State of North Carolina to pay in specie, is

far from being peculiar to that State. Attempts of the same kind have

been made by others; and they have invariably been opposed and shall

be. There is however a distinction to be taken. You recollect that

Congress called for large quotas of specie. I am perfectly persuaded,

that no State has fully obeyed that call, but many, and indeed almost

all, aver that they have overpaid. The last requisitions have been for

money; and if I had not by the publications prevented such assertions,

it would not be surprising, that they should be repeated, even as to

the money quotas. Now if the State of North Carolina are desirous of

paying in specie, on the requisitions of specie, I shall not have the

least objection; but on the requisitions for the service of the

current year, I will receive money alone. I make this distinction in

such clear and peremptory terms, to avoid all further cavils on the

subject. I see that it has already been drawn into some length, and

must, therefore, be finally terminated. Besides, under the present

appearances there can be little doubt, that specie in North Carolina

will be almost as useless as if they were in Otaheite. A copy of my

letter to Governor Martin on this subject shall be enclosed to you.

You have in several of your letters, made very just observations on

the business of my department, and such as convince me you have turned

your attention to it. I have therefore taken the liberty to enclose to

you a copy of a letter to Congress, on the subject of a mint, of one

on the establishing public credit by funding our debts; and of a

third, on the estimates for the ensuing year.

As there is a report, that the enemy got several letters intended for

you, it is possible that some or other of those, may be among the

number.

I pray you to believe me, with very sincere esteem, your most obedient

servant,

ROBERT MORRIS.

* * * * *

GEORGE WASHINGTON TO ROBERT MORRIS.

Head Quarters, October 18th, 1782.

Sir,

I take the liberty to enclose to your care, a letter for the Chevalier

de la Luzerne, on the subject of expense, which at his request I have

incurred, for the purpose of forwarding intelligence of the movements

of the enemy at New York, to the Marquis de Vaudreuil.

If our circumstances would admit, I should be very glad that this

expense should be defrayed by the United States; it is infinitely

short of the debt, which gratitude imposes on us. I submit therefore

to your judgment, whether to deliver the enclosed, or to send forward

the money from your own funds, agreeably to the monthly estimate sent

to the Minister.

The chain of expresses was instituted about the middle of August, and

will probably be continued till the sailing of the French fleet from

Boston.

I am, &c.

GEORGE WASHINGTON.

* * * * *

CIRCULAR TO THE GOVERNORS OF THE STATES.

Office of Finance, October 21st, 1782.

Sir,

I have on many occasions warned the States of the consequences which

must follow from delays in supplying the treasury. The expense which

attends such delays, has frequently been mentioned, and instances

daily occur to show, how much the public burdens are increased by the

want of a timely provision. To cite them all would be endless; but

there is one of no inconsiderable magnitude, which I think it proper

to state for your consideration. I had contracted on the part of the

United States for the supply of rations to the main army, at ten pence

Pennsylvania currency, and to the garrison at West Point for nine

pence half penny, and had agreed to pay, at the commencement of each

month for the issues of the preceding month.

These beneficial contracts have been dissolved by my inability to make

punctual payments, which rendered the contractors incapable of

performing their engagements. After many efforts on my part to supply

the want of cash, and on their part to substitute private credit and

promises in the place of ready money, they found it impracticable to

proceed further on the moderate terms stated in the contract. Some of

them told me so, and asked (what any persons in their situation would

have asked) _the promise of indemnification for any damages they might

sustain_. And a promise to pay at the end of each month, one half the

amount of issues for the preceding month in coin, and three times the

remaining half in bills or notes receivable in taxes. They offered if

I would agree to these propositions, to go on and supply the army;

but declared, that if I would not, they could no longer perform their

engagements.

From this moment I was obliged to consider the contract as dissolved;

because the dissolution of it appeared inevitable. I had already by

entering into the contract, promised on the part of the public, a

payment of the whole money due for the monthly issues. A new promise

of the half would have given no additional security, and therefore I

considered that stipulation as a request, that I should on my private

and personal honor, assure them the public funds would enable me to

make such payments. But of this I had no good prospect. The greater

part of what little came in from taxes, was the same kind of paper

with that which they asked for, being what I had long before issued

for other services. If indeed I could have trusted the assurances made

to me, I might have given the assurances required by them. But

experience had taught me caution, and the event has shown, that if I

had made the promise, I should now have been chargeable with

falsehood.

I think the contractors were prudent in requiring a promise of

indemnification; their situation made it necessary; but it was a

promise which I could not make, for although I had reason to confide

in their integrity and would have done it in my private capacity, yet

as a public officer, I could not. For there would have been no longer

certainty of the extent to which their expenditures might have been

carried, after it should have become a matter of indifference to their

private interest what prices should be given for supplies.

Thus, Sir, I found myself reduced to the alternative of making a new

agreement for subsistence of the army and garrison, or of leaving them

to subsist themselves by military collection. The latter was to be

avoided, if possible, for it would have been the most expensive mode

of obtaining supplies, not to mention other circumstances. The former,

therefore, was to be adopted, and I accordingly gave instructions to

Mr Cornell, the inspector of the contracts, to consult with the

Commander in Chief, and take the necessary arrangements. It could not

be expected, that a contract dictated by necessity, could be made on

economical terms, and the inability to perform old engagements would

necessarily influence the rate of new ones. Besides this, it was

indispensably necessary to obtain a longer credit, because otherwise

the burden would have been shifted, not removed; and the evil must

have returned with equal speed and greater magnitude. Under such

unfavorable circumstances, it was necessary to pay for a credit in

order to obtain it. A new contract is made, and the rations issued

now, are to be paid for three months hence, at the rate of thirteen

pence, Pennsylvania currency, for a ration; which is an advance of

about one third upon the former price. The public therefore will pay

for this advance of moneys, equal to feeding the army at the rate of

thirtythree and one third per cent for three months; or, to make the

matter more simple, they must pay for feeding them three months, as

much as would have fed them four months. Besides this, the public

credit sustains material injury, and damages will be expected by the

former contractors.

If, Sir, it should be supposed that this is the only instance of loss

sustained from the low state of the treasury, it is a great mistake.

The attempt to establish economical systems is vain, unless we can

support them by punctuality. Congress have placed me in a situation

where I am exposed in the first instance to claims and demands, but

these must come home to the several Legislatures, and eventually to

their constituents. My situation, therefore, makes it a duty to

expostulate freely on the circumstances of my department. I am not to

learn that free representations will sometimes give offence, and I

know that those will be always most offended, who are most in fault;

but I make no apologies for what I have to say. It is necessary that

the truth should be known to the people; to our enemies it is known

already, and has been for a long time. They hold up to contempt and

derision the contrast between resolutions to carry on the war at every

expense, and receipts of nothing in some States, and very little in

all of them put together. Those who court public favor at the expense

of public good, are very apt to inveigh against taxes, and to flatter

the indolent and avaricious with the idea that war can be carried on

without labor or money. But it is time for the people to distinguish

between their flatterers and their friends. Sooner or later the

current expense must be paid, and that payment must come from the

purses of individuals. If it were made in season, it would be lighter

by one half than it is. Congress have called for a certain sum, and

that sum paid punctually would have answered the purpose, but they

cannot be responsible for the consequences of delay. The expense will

necessarily in such case exceed their calculations, and of course

further sums must be required.

There are certain arguments, Sir, which ought not to be used if it is

possible to avoid them; but which every one invested with public

authority should suggest to his own mind, for the government of his

own conduct. How long is a nation, who will do nothing for itself, to

rely on the aid of others? In a war waged by one country to obtain

revenue from another, what is to be expected in case of conquest? How

long will one part of a community bear the burdens of the whole? How

long will an army undergo want, in the midst of plenty? How long will

they endure misery without complaint, injustice without reproach, and

wrongs without redress? These are questions which cannot be solved by

arithmetical calculation. The moral causes that may procrastinate or

precipitate events, are hidden from mortal view. But it is within the

bounds of human knowledge to determine that all earthly things have

some limits, which it is imprudent to exceed; others, which it is

dangerous to exceed, and some, which can never be exceeded. It is

possible, that we are near the close of this war, and perhaps we are

only in the middle of it. But if the war should continue, we have to

blame ourselves; for were those resources called into action, which we

really possess, the foreign enemies would soon lose all hope, and

abandon their enterprize. The greater injury, therefore, which we

sustain, is not from foreign, but from domestic enemies; from those

who impede the necessary exertions. I have mentioned one among many

instances, to show the consequences of withholding the public revenue,

and I take the liberty to observe, that it would be more manly to

declare at once, for unlimited submission to British tyranny, than to

make specious declarations against it, and yet take the direct road to

bring it about, by opposing the measures for our defence. That open

declaration will doubtless be restrained by the fear of general

resentment; but the other conduct is so much the more dangerous, as

it is calculated to close people's eyes, while they approach the

precipice, that they may be thrown down with greater ease and more

absolute certainty.

I trust that your Excellency, and every other friend to our country,

will urge forward that speedy and effectual collection of taxes, which

can alone give vigor and stability to all our measures; and I risk

nothing when I assert, that the public service shall be performed, (if

the proper revenues be obtained,) at less than half of what would

otherwise be expended.

I am, Sir, with perfect respect, &c.

ROBERT MORRIS.

* * * * *

TO THE GOVERNOR OF RHODE ISLAND.

Office of Finance, October 24th, 1782.

Sir,

My circular letter of the 23d instant, contains the estimates and

requisitions for the service of the year 1783. I must take the liberty

to make a few observations on them, which apply particularly to the

State of Rhode Island. In the letters to Congress of the 29th and 30th

of July last, copies of which were transmitted in my circular letter

of the 12th of September, I have so fully expressed my sentiments on

the subject of credit and loans, that I shall not repeat them. Your

Excellency will perceive, that in the Act of the 16th instant,

although the estimates amount to six millions, yet only two are

required and that further requisitions are suspended until the result

of measures for obtaining loans shall be known. It is unnecessary to

mention, that Congress have directed an attempt to borrow four

millions.

The propriety of this step will be self evident, when the date of

their requisitions for the present year is considered. The sums

brought in from the several States being regularly published in the

gazettes, will spare me the pain of repeating them. I say the pain,

because every such repetition will have, in some degree, the air of

reproach. It must be remembered, that the duration of the war does not

depend upon Congress. This is an invaded country; invaded for the

purpose of conquest. And between opposition and submission there is no

middle line. The idea of submission is, and ever ought to be, rejected

with disdain. Opposition, therefore, becomes a matter of necessity;

and that opposition involves expense.

There is then a certain degree of expense that cannot be avoided. And

this must be provided for. The estimates being formed under the idea

of money in hand to pay for services required, they are stated as low

as possible. It appears, therefore, that the six millions mentioned in

the estimates must be had. It appears from the experiments already

made, that the people are either unwilling or unable to pay the whole

in taxes; and whether want of power or inclination be the true cause,

is immaterial to the present inquiry, for the fact is clear. Now there

are but four modes of obtaining the supplies. Either they must be

given to us, or lent to us, or raised by taxes, or taken by force. As

to the first, we can place no dependence on it; and as to the last, it

is neither the most constitutional, the most economical, nor the most

pleasing way. Necessity may justify it, but it will be very difficult

to justify the necessity. The supplies, therefore, must be obtained by

loans or taxes; so that if they cannot be obtained by loans, taxation

is the only resource; and in that case, there is no medium between

legal taxation and military collection. For if we will not submit to

Great Britain, we must carry on the war; and if we carry on the war,

we must obtain the means; and if we cannot get the means abroad, we

must provide them at home; and if we do not provide them by law, they

must be taken by force.

The inattention of the States to the requisitions of the United

States, leaves Congress no choice between loans and military

collections. Whether they can obtain loans must depend upon other

people. They cannot obtain loans without credit, and they cannot have

credit without funds; and they cannot get funds without the

concurrence of the States. They must ask that concurrence before they

can obtain it, and they must determine on the funds before they can

ask. The making yearly requisitions of quotas to pay the interest of

public debts will not do. It is in itself a futile measure; but if it

were the best thing in the world, yet if those who are to lend do not

think so, there is an end of the matter. Now the fact is, that nobody

will lend upon the promise of such requisitions. And truly the

compliances made with those for carrying on the war, give very little

encouragement. It follows then, that Congress _must_ ask for

particular funds. They have asked for one, and it is not complied with

by two States out of thirteen. Shall Congress then adhere to the

demand; or shall they change their application? If they should change

it, could they expect that there would not then be one or two opposing

States? To answer the question let it be inquired, what objects of

taxation can be devised, to which exceptions cannot be made? Surely

there are none.

Let it be inquired next, whether there is any object so

unexceptionable as that which they have fixed upon? The answer is, no.

It follows then, that in changing the application, there would be less

prospect of success than at present. Congress then must adhere to

their requisitions; and if that fund be not granted, we cannot expect

loans. But it is demonstrated by experience, that we cannot get

sufficient taxes. We certainly cannot get rid of the war, and

therefore the people must have their property taken by force. The

necessity will justify this. But as I said before, who will justify

the necessity? Surely the authors of it should think of that in

season.

The Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution, Vol. 12 · 第 20 / 34 段