Island, and Maryland, have not yet passed the laws recommended by the
resolutions of the third of February, 1781. I learn, (though not
officially,) that the State of Virginia has lately suspended the
operation of the law, which they had passed in conformity to that
resolution. The bare mention of these things is sufficient to mark the
consequences. Our debt being unfunded and unprovided for, the interest
cannot be paid. Those, therefore, who trusted us in the hour of
distress, are defrauded. To expect that, under such circumstances,
others will confide in the government, would be folly; and to expect
that foreigners will trust a government, which has no credit with its
own citizens, would be madness. The whole weight, therefore, of the
war must be borne in the present moment; and even the slightest
anticipations of revenue are made on the personal credit of the
Minister.
This, Sir, is not said boastingly, but with unaffected concern. I have
labored to establish a credit for my country, that when the period
should arrive, (and I hoped it was not far distant,) in which I could
lay down the burden now pressing upon me, my successor in office
should have no other difficulties to struggle with, than those which
necessarily attend an extensive and complicated administration. It is,
therefore, with no common degree of anxiety and distress, that I see
my wishes frustrated. I feel as an American for my country, as a
public servant for the interest and honor of those whom I serve, and
as a man, that I cannot enjoy the ease and tranquillity I have sought
for through a life of continual care and unremitted labor. It is my
duty to mention to you the fact, and to apprize you, that in such
circumstances, our operations will continue to be desultory efforts of
individual power, rather than the combined exertion of political
strength and firmness.
The repeated assurances we daily receive from the Ministers of his
Most Christian Majesty, of their steady determination to grant no
further pecuniary aid, will not leave room to doubt of their
intentions. I candidly acknowledge that I had formed not only hopes,
but even expectations from that quarter. For I had persuaded myself,
that when the brilliant successes of the last campaign should be
known, and when it should also be known how much the United States are
capable of, and how necessary an aid of money is to call their power
into action, the King would have again extended that relief, which
must be most beneficial to the common cause. Even now, I shall request
that Congress will instruct the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to make
the most pointed representations on this subject through our Minister
at the Court of Versailles, and I shall readily furnish all such
materials in my department as may be necessary for the purpose; but I
must not conceal my doubts as to the effect of such representations.
Duty to this country requires that they should be made, but prudence
forbids a reliance on their success, and will dictate to us a farther
duty, which is, to act under the influence of a belief, that they will
not succeed.
As to hopes of pecuniary aid from any other quarter, the delusion has
already passed away. It is in vain that expensive establishments are
kept up to solicit succor from Spain, who appears neither able nor
willing to afford it; from Holland, who seeks peace and not to
increase the causes of war; or from Russia, who seems more inclined
to crush, than to support us. Let us apply to borrow wherever we may,
our mouths will always be stopped by the one word, security. The
States will not give revenue for the purpose, and the United States
have nothing to give but a general national promise, of which their
enemies loudly charge them with the violation.
Thus, Sir, compelled, however reluctantly, to look at home for the
means of supporting ourselves against an enemy, whose power has rather
increased with the increase of her foes, whose force has risen
superior to defeats, and has found resources in a situation, which
might have inspired despair, we must no longer rely on those who may
neglect us, but take care that we be not charged with neglecting
ourselves. I would to God, that I could say, that there were even the
appearances of general vigor and exertion. But the truth is very
different. The United States have called for eight millions of dollars
early in November last, of which the first quarterly payment was to
have been made on the 1st day of April next; but I cannot find that a
single State has yet laid the taxes. I neither know what they will
think proper to give, nor when. Happy to experience a momentary relief
from the clamor and revolt of a starving army, from the rage and
devastation of an inveterate enemy, and from the waste and
extravagance of cumbrous, unwieldy departments, there appears to be no
solicitude anywhere for the support of arrangements, on which the
salvation of our country depends.
To give a little time for the people to breathe, and to remedy some of
the many abuses, which were equally palpable and enormous, I early
ventured on the business of contracting, and I have extended it as far
as prudence would in any degree justify. Nay, relying on the States
for support, I have made engagements, which, in almost any other
circumstances, would savor of temerity, and which nothing would have
led me to do, but a hope that by retrenching expenses, they would be
sooner induced to grant revenue. So thoroughly am I convinced of the
superior economy, which attends the present mode of supplying our
armies, that I would have offered contracts for the southern
department, could I have formed any well grounded expectation of
moneys sufficient for the purpose from the southern States. Nor should
I have been deterred even by the distance of the period at which it
could be had, if I could have formed a reasonable reliance on it at
some certain period. Our expenses, it is true, are retrenched, and to
give an idea to what degree, I will mention, that for the amount of
salaries alone in the Commissary's department to the northward of
Potomac river, between three and four thousand soldiers are now fed
with full rations. But though the retrenchments are great, the
expenses are great also, and they must rapidly increase every moment
in preparing for an early and vigorous campaign.
A view either of general politics or of our own situation will impress
the conviction, that we ought to make an early and vigorous campaign.
The blow, which the enemy have received in Virginia, should be
followed as soon as possible before they have time for reflection, for
reinforcement, or for defence. We must not imagine that Great Britain
will be so stunned by this blow that she cannot recover, or that she
will, for such a check, abandon the object both of her interest and
her wishes, an object in which national importance appears to be
combined with her national existence, and where every covetous and
angry passion is strongly excited. What aid she may find from foreign
powers must depend upon the manner of considering the propositions,
which may be made, perhaps upon their interests, and, perhaps, upon
their caprice. A nation, which can hold at bay one half the force of
Europe, is by no means a despicable ally.
But whether she gets aid from others, or whether she draws it, as
before, from domestic credit and confidence, this, at least, is
certain, that we ought to expect new efforts against us, and that we
ought not to expect any in our favor. If then, we can strike before
she is ready to ward off the stroke, or bear the blow, our own people
will be animated, the doubtful will be convinced, and the convinced
will be confirmed. Nations, who are friendly to us, will give marks of
amity. Nations, who are hostile, will be deterred from their attempts.
The councils of our enemy will be distracted. Their intended succors
may land on hostile ground, and where they want relief, it may be too
late to obtain it. At what point, and in what manner, and for what
purpose our efforts are to be made, is the province of the General to
determine; but, I repeat again, it is our indispensable duty to put
him speedily in possession of the means.
In order that anything effectual may be done, we must have both men
and money, and we must have them early. On the 10th of December last,
Congress were pleased to call on the States in the most pressing
manner, to have their respective quotas in the field by the 1st day of
March next; and they determined, that recruits should be raised to
complete the quotas at the expense of the States, in the first
instance to be reimbursed by the United States. The intention of
these resolutions, however clear, may be misunderstood, and attempts
made to deduct the expenditures of the recruiting service from the
supplies, which were required by the Acts of the 30th of October and
3d of November. For this reason, and also that the States may be more
effectually stimulated to comply with the views and wishes of
Congress, I shall, before I close this letter, submit certain
additions and explanations of their Act of the 10th of December. At
present, I shall only observe, that it gives me very sincere pleasure
to find the United States in Congress, so fully impressed with the
necessity of early efforts. This circumstance leads me to hope that
they will be equally impressed with the duty of urging a compliance
with their requisitions. It is at least my duty to suggest it. A duty,
which I owe to America at large, and which no hope of praise, or
apprehension of blame, shall induce me to neglect. I know there is a
delicacy, which influences some minds to treat the States with
tenderness and even adulation, while they are in the habitual
inattention to the calls of national interest and honor. I know that
delicacy, and I disclaim it. Nor will I be deterred from waking those
who slumber on the brink of ruin. But my voice, Sir, is feeble, and I
must therefore pray to be assisted by the voice of the United States
in Congress. Supported by them, I may, perhaps, do something; but,
without that support, I must be a useless incumbrance.
It is also a duty to economise the moneys which are in our possession,
and it receives a double force of obligation from the peculiarity of
our circumstances. What moneys the States may grant, and when they may
grant them, is known only to Him who knoweth all things; but that
which we have is certain, and ought not to be expended but for useful
purposes. If we look back to the conduct of the several States in
former times, we shall find that the negligence with which they have
treated the requests of Congress has been unequalled, unless by the
earnestness of entreaty, with which those requests were made. And I
fear that there is little hope, that the conduct now to be pursued
will in one instant become the counter part of former experiences. We
have reason to apprehend a continuance of that shameful negligence,
which has marked us to a proverb, while all Europe gazed in
astonishment at the unparalleled boldness and vastness of claims,
blended with an unparalleled indolence, and imbecility of conduct. But
let the several States be ever so negligent, the confederation has
given no power to compel. While it confers on Congress the privilege
of asking everything, it has secured to each State the prerogative of
granting nothing. Since, then, the Congress cannot compel the States
to make a grant of money, they must at least take care to prevent the
States from making an unnecessary expenditure of those moneys, which
are in our possession. Nor is this all. We are called on by the
principles of justice as well as of duty to prevent such expenditure.
The requisitions of Congress have been for men and money. The States
have furnished officers and transmitted a variety of accounts, demands
and complaints; but while officers continue numerous they have
neglected to provide soldiers. Instead of it, some of them have formed
State regiments, and given State bounties to all those regiments;
regiments confined to the limits of the State, as if the ultimate
object of military employment were the show of parade, or to consume
the fruits of the earth. In the meantime, the continental officers,
whose services have entitled them to respectful attention, and whose
experience has enabled them to be essentially useful, are left without
men to command, and forced to bear the mortification which must
afflict every generous mind, perceiving themselves a useless burden to
the community.
But while such pains are taken to enhance expense, every request for
revenue to pay it is treated with neglect. Congress have determined to
keep up the establishment agreed on in October, 1780. I shall,
therefore, by no means propose any reduction. On the contrary I am
persuaded, that nothing would so speedily terminate the war as the
bringing such an army into the field, with proper funds and materials
for its support and operation. This would render us truly independent,
independent of the smiles of our friends and the frowns of our
enemies. But although I will not propose any reduction of our
establishment, I cannot consent that the Union bear the expense of a
great number of officers without men to command. Neither will I
propose the expedient of sending them home upon half pay, and liable
to be called into service. This is an expedient for halving a
difficulty, which ought to be wholly cured, and at the same time it
subjects the individual officer to very serious difficulties, which he
has by no means merited. It is not the officer's fault that he has not
men, and while he holds himself in readiness to obey the orders of his
General, he ought to receive that compensation which his commission
entitles him to. He ought, therefore, to draw his full pay and
subsistence; but until the State provide men for him to command, that
pay and subsistence should be drawn from the States. If the States
will not find soldiers, the continent ought not to pay their officers.
It is unequal and it is unjust. Some States at a great expense, bring
men into the field and lay taxes for the general support. Others send
officers without men, and draw money from the treasury without putting
any in it. I am regardless where the censure lights. If it fall
nowhere, then all are innocent; but if it is merited, those to whom it
applies must blame their own misconduct. My justification is already
made in the mind of every honest man.
But it is not only necessary that the States bring men into the field.
It is necessary that this be done at an early period. Recruits which
do not join the army until the autumn, come too late for anything but
to increase expense, and to lose their lives by the diseases incident
at that season, to those who have not been accustomed to the habits of
a military life. Nor is this all. Recruits sent forward at a late
period only serve to fill up the vacancies occasioned by sickness,
deaths, and desertions, without increasing the effective force of the
army.
To remedy the evils which have been pointed out, I take the liberty to
propose to the United States in Congress assembled, a resolution,
That on the 1st day of April next, accurate returns be made to the War
Office of every non-commissioned officer and private in the army, and
of the particular State to which they belong.
That every State be debited in account for the recruiting service for
every non-commissioned officer and private, assigned to such State
respectively in October, 1780, the sum of one hundred dollars in
specie.
That every State be credited in the said account for the recruiting
service for every non-commissioned officer and private in the army,
and belonging to the States respectively on the said 1st day of April
next, a like sum of one hundred dollars.
That for every recruit which shall join after the 1st day of April and
before the 2d day of May, the State shall be credited in the said
account ninety dollars. For every recruit which shall join after the
1st day of May and before the 2d day of June eighty dollars. For every
recruit after the 1st day of June and before the 2d day of July
seventy dollars. For every recruit after the 1st day of July and
before the 2d day of August sixty dollars. For every recruit after the
1st day of August and before the 2d day of September fifty dollars.
For every recruit after the 1st day of September and before the 2d day
of October forty dollars. But that no allowance be made for any
recruit whose period of enlistment shall be less than three years or
during the war.
That every recruit shall be considered as joined, as soon as he shall
march for the place to which he is ordered on service, from the place
of general rendezvous within the State, to be appointed by the
Commander in Chief.
That to determine such time of marching, the time of arrival shall be
determined and a time allowed for marching thither, calculating on the
distance at the rate of fifteen miles per day.
That the recruits be maintained at the expense of the States, until
they shall join as aforesaid; but that during the time of marching an
allowance be made to the State for each officer and man, at the rate
of one sixtieth of a dollar per mile for every mile from the said
place of rendezvous to the place where they shall arrive as aforesaid.
That the Minister of War cause the several men of the different State
lines to be arranged within their respective lines, in such manner as
to form complete corps, or parts of corps, so that there be a due
proportion of men to the officers according to the establishment as
near as may be.
That the remaining officers, excepting such as the Commander in Chief
may think proper to retain in service for particular purposes, retire
to their respective States until such times as the States shall
provide men for them to command agreeably to the establishment; and
that in the meantime the said States provide the pay, rations, and
forage allowed to the officers respectively by the several resolutions
and Acts of Congress upon that subject.
And in order to explain fully the reasons for taking such measures I
would also propose, that an address be prepared to the people of
America stating the want of power in Congress to take measures for the
defence of the country, the conduct of the several States heretofore,
the importance of making exertions in the present moment, with the
dangerous consequences of inattention to, and neglect of, the late
requisitions, and calling upon them to urge through their respective
Legislatures the measures recommended by Congress.
My reason for this proposal is, a conviction that the people are
heartily disposed to support the revolution, but that the public
service is too frequently delayed by local disputes and animosities,
which consume the time to be devoted to important purposes, and that
individuals in the several Legislatures are too apt to believe, that
by sparing grants they render themselves agreeable to their
constituents, although in effect such policy cannot but prove highly
expensive and dangerous if not destructive.
That Congress may be enabled to judge of the saving, which would arise
from the proposition I have had the honor of making, with respect to
the officers of our army, I enclose an estimate, by which it will
appear, that this would be upwards of sixty thousand dollars a month;
and to this must be added a further consideration of very great
importance, that as the servants to officers are taken from among the
soldiers, the army would in effect, receive a considerable
reinforcement.
With respect to the price of recruiting, I do not consider anything
proposed as being by any means definitive. I have stated each at one
hundred dollars, and I would suggest, that as the design is to raise
men and not money, it is better to value them too high than too low. I
am far from considering this as the best mode of recruiting an army.
On the contrary, I am convinced, that if it were a continental instead
of a State army, the raising as well as maintaining of it, would be
infinitely easier and cheaper; but under the present limited power,
which Congress are invested with, it becomes the duty of their
servants to propose such measures as appear to them best. What I have
had the honor of stating, is submitted with all possible deference,
and I hope the decisions of Congress will be as speedy as the nature
of the business will permit. With perfect confidence in their wisdom,
I have the honor to be, &c.
ROBERT MORRIS.
* * * * *
CIRCULAR TO THE GOVERNORS OF THE STATES.
Office of Finance, February 15th, 1782.
Sir,
In the circular letter, which I did myself the honor to transmit on
the 19th day of October last, I stated our situation as clearly and
explicitly as I could, so that you might be in a capacity to form a
solid judgment as to what would be proper. I am now to inform you,
that the most recent and authentic information from Europe, contains
the reiterated determination on the part of France, to grant us no
further pecuniary aid. Spain appears to have neither the inclination
nor the ability to afford any, and in Holland it can only be obtained
from individuals, who will always require security, and of consequence
will not lend to the United States, who as you well know have no
security to give. The want of proper funds has so reduced domestic
credit, that we can draw no resources from thence, and until domestic
credit is established, foreign credit cannot exist, for it is absurd
to expect, that foreigners will confide in a government, which has not
the confidence of its own citizens.
It is hardly possible to describe the consequences, which have
followed on a loss of credit. We have seen the people diffident,
jealous, and unhappy, nor have they yet recovered, even where the
removal of undue restrictions has given them time to breathe from the
load of oppression. But the public is, if possible, in a still worse
situation. No persons will trust the public from a deep apprehension
of ruin if they should, and consequently our operations must be
bounded by the taxes, which can be collected, while at the same time
we must contend for our very existence as a free country at an
expense, which we cannot limit because we cannot limit the efforts
made against us. Whenever proper methods shall have been taken to
restore credit, the benefits arising from it will be as evident to
all, as the want is now, to those who are intrusted with the
administration. Our expense at this moment is greater than it ought to
be, though less than it was, and I cannot retrench, because I have not
sufficient means in my power, and have not at this moment any certain
reliance on sufficient aid from the several States.
I am much inclined to believe, that individuals in the several
Legislatures are unacquainted with the real state of affairs, or
flatter themselves that they are better than they really are, even
after information. If gentlemen would consider seriously the situation
of the public servants, they would at least not suspect them of
describing our dangers as greater than they are. They could not, for
instance suppose, that I would give a high coloring to the disorders
of our finances, because they must see, that on the contrary, I should
derive a degree of credit from the general belief, that such disorders
do not exist. And when I declare my apprehensions, I injure so far my
own operations. My reason for describing our situation in its true
light is, that the States may be excited to grant us relief. I might
by an appearance of wealth extend my operations for a little while,
but in the end they would fail, and how we should then be extricated,
no man can tell. At present I must bear the evils, which result from
the want of resources, and limit my views accordingly, but it would be
madness to inculcate an opinion, that things are worse than they are,
because then I could not derive the full benefit of those resources
which we have. You must, therefore, be convinced, that I give you no
exaggerated account, and I trust, Sir, that your Legislature will give
due weight to assertions, which they have every reason to believe, and
which if neglected, they will be convinced of by a melancholy and
perhaps fatal experience.