CHAPTER XIV.

THE CHINESE FACTOR IN THE CENTRAL ASIAN QUESTION.

The overthrow of the Tungani, and the reconquest of Kashgaria, have not

completed the task that lay before Chinese generals and soldiers in

Central Asia. Great and remarkable as those triumphs were, the Chinese

are not satisfied with them, because there yet remains more work to be

done. They have restored to the Emperor Tian Shan Nan Lu, but so long as

the Russians hold Kuldja, Tian Shan Pe Lu is only half won back.

Moreover, so long as a great military power is domiciled in Kuldja,

China's hold on the country west of Aksu must be only on sufferance. As

of old, the Chinese so often reconquered Kashgar, when it had shaken off

the Chinese rule, from Ili, so might the Russians at their good pleasure

play the same part against the Chinese. In short, the Russians remaining

in Ili would neutralize all the advantages that China had secured by her

recent military success. But, although there is a foundation of well

grounded apprehension at the strategical advantages of Russia, at the

root of China's demand for the surrender of Kuldja, that is not the only

cause, or even the principal one, for the Chinese making it. Of all

their Central Asian possessions, Ili was the most cherished, and it was

to recover that region more especially that Tso Tsung Tang undertook

those arduous campaigns which have so far ended in triumph, and which

were designed for, among other purposes, the purpose of giving that

Viceroy a prestige and influence that would enable him to play the

rival to Li Hung Chang. Ili was their metropolis in Central Asia, and

its fall marked the wide difference that there was between the

Tungan-Khoja rising of 1862-63 and all its predecessors. The fall of Ili

meant the fall of Chinese power, and Chinese power cannot be held to be

completely restored so long as Ili remains in alien hands. On this point

the Chinese are very keen.

Russia, on the other hand, hesitates to hand over Ili for various

reasons. In the first place, it is not certain that China has

_permanently_ reconquered Eastern Turkestan, nor is it clear that the

Imperial exchequer will be able to bear a continual strain upon it for

Central Asian expenditure. Moreover there is the unknown quantity of the

rivalry of Li Hung Chang and Tso Tsung Tang, and whatever influence the

latter may have with the army and the ruling caste on account of his

Mantchoo blood, the former holds the purse in his hands, and can at any

moment paralyse Chinese activity and strength in Central Asia. The

Russians also, whatever rash promises they may have given at Pekin--and

they certainly did promise to retrocede Kuldja to China, whenever the

Chinese should be strong enough to return to Central Asia--formally

(_teste_ General Kolpakovsky's proclamation) annexed Kuldja "in

perpetuity." In the eyes of the people of Central Asia, that

proclamation defines Russia's tenure of Kuldja, and not the vague

promise that was uttered in the ears of the authorities at Pekin. Now

Russia knows this as well as we do; and she is aware that no strict

adherence to her word of honour will induce the people of Western, as

well as of Eastern, Turkestan to believe that she retrocedes Kuldja for

any other cause than fear of the Chinese. The Khokandians, the

Bokhariots, as well as the Kirghiz, the Calmucks, and the Kashgari, will

all argue that Russia restores Kuldja not through any desire to fulfil

her engagements, but simply because she cannot decline to fulfil them

without engaging in a war with China, and her compliance with the

demand would then be construed as an admission of her disinclination to

encounter China in the field. In fact, even if Russia had promptly

restored Kuldja, she would not have secured the credit she might have

claimed for her good faith, and she would have had no guarantee that the

Chinese would have rested content with the cession of Ili proper and not

gone on to claim, in a moment of military arrogance, the restoration of

the Naryn district, which China at a period of weakness had herself

ceded to Russia more than twenty years ago. Then, besides these

objections to the surrender of Kuldja on political grounds, there are

commercial and fiscal reasons why Russia should be loth to restore this

province. Not only has it become highly prosperous and thickly populated

under Russian rule, but it has also been raised into one of the most

fiscally remunerative portions of the Russian possessions in Central

Asia, and then there is its admirable frontier in the Tian Shan, which

places the future trade with the western parts of China more at its

disposal, than it is through the Semipalatinsk and Chuguchak route, and,

above all, it effectually dispels all sense of real danger from attack.

The Chinese would find that to force the Tian Shan range into Kuldja

would be a task almost impossible for them, and they would be compelled

to enter the province from the north by Karkaru. By so doing, they would

leave the whole of their flank and line of communication exposed to an

attack with telling effect both at Manas and in Kashgar, and with a

scientific foe such as Russia, no sane Chinaman could dream of attacking

Kuldja except in the most overwhelming force. It may be as well to

sketch here the history of Russia's rule in Kuldja from 1871 to the

present time, before proceeding with the consideration of the questions

aroused by the difficulty between Russia and China.

When an independent government had been founded in Kuldja in 1866, a

ruler of the name of Abul Oghlan was placed upon the throne. He appears

to have been a Tungan, and he certainly was a truculent and

self-confident potentate. He refused to abide by the stipulations of the

Treaties of Kuldja and Pekin, and in petty matters as in great, set

himself in direct opposition to Russia. For five years he pursued his

career undisturbed by exterior influences, and during that period he

tolerated the inroads of his subjects into Russian territory, urged the

Kirghiz tribes beyond his frontier to revolt, and forbade Russian

merchants to enter his dominions. On a small scale, he aped the manners

subsequently adopted by Yakoob Beg. But he was only a minor and

insignificant despot. His people groaned under his tyranny, and the

75,000 slaves within his dominions were only too anxious to be relieved

from their bondage by any deliverer whatsoever. The state of Kuldja, as

administered by Abul Oghlan, was pre-eminently one that would fall to

pieces at the first rude shock from outside. For five years, or

thereabouts, the Russian authorities at Vernoe, Naryn, and in

Semiretchinsk put up with his veiled hostility; but when it became

evident that his state was on the eve of falling into divers fragments,

of which Yakoob Beg would, probably, come in for the lion's share, the

Russians, whose patience had become well-nigh exhausted, resolved not to

be forestalled in Kuldja, either by the Athalik Ghazi, or the Tungani

Confederation. A kind of _ultimatum_ was presented to Kuldja, in which

Abul Oghlan was given a last chance of retaining power, if he consented

to ratify the terms of the past treaties with China. He does not appear

to have distinctly refused to do so, when he was required to enter into

this agreement with Russia. But he prevaricated and delayed, until at

last the patience of the Muscovite authorities was quite exhausted. They

resolved to destroy the government of Abul Oghlan, to annex Kuldja, and

to bring their frontier down to the Tian Shan.

In May, 1871, Major Balitsky crossed the river Borodshudsir, which

formed the boundary between the two countries, and, at the head of a

small detachment, advanced some distance into the dominions of Abul

Oghlan. His force, however, was small, and, after a brief

reconnaissance, he retired within Russian territory. Six weeks

afterwards the main body under General Kolpakovsky crossed the frontier

into Kuldja and marched on the capital. That invading army consisted of

only 1,785 men and sixty-five officers. At first the forces of Abul

Oghlan offered a brave resistance, but the Russian cannon and rifles

carried everything before them; and on the 4th of July the ruler

presented himself at the Russian outposts. When taken before General

Kolpakovsky, he said, "I trusted to the righteousness of my cause, and

to the help of God. Conquered, I submit to the will of the Almighty. If

any crime has been committed, punish the sovereign, but spare his

innocent subjects." The next day the Russian general entered the capital

after a campaign that had only lasted eight or nine days. Protection was

promised to all who would lay down their arms, and the army of Abul

Oghlan was disbanded. Abul Oghlan was pensioned, and Orel was appointed

as his place of residence. Kuldja or "Dzungaria," as it is called in the

proclamation, was annexed "in perpetuity," and became the Russian

sub-governorship of Priilinsk. There can be no doubt but that the

Russian occupation of Kuldja was an unqualified benefit to the

inhabitants of that region. The declaration of the abolition of slavery

alone released seventy-five thousand human beings from a life of

hardship and hopelessness. The return of trade, which had become

stagnant, ensured the prosperity and advancement of the active portion

of the community, and during the seven years Russia has ruled in Kuldja,

the people have steadily progressed in moral and material welfare. The

population has during the same period remarkably increased, and the

valleys of the Ili teem with a population at once contented and

prosperous. The rule of Russia in Kuldja is the brightest spot in her

Central Asian administration. The Chinese in demanding the retrocession

of Kuldja labour under the one disadvantage that they come to oust a

beneficent rule. This disadvantage is made the greater by the bad name

the Chinese have earned in Kashgar and the Tungan country, by the

atrocities they are said to have committed. Those who will take the

trouble to scan the matter carefully, and to consult the _Pekin

Gazette_, as much as they do the _Tashkent_, will find that these

atrocities are for the most part the creation of panic, and of malicious

observers, and in the few cases where Chinese vindictiveness overcame

military discipline, as at Manas and Aksu, we have clear evidence that

women and children were spared. The _Tashkent Gazette_ has laboured

strenuously, and not in vain, to disseminate the report of Chinese

atrocities; and one London paper has so far assisted the object of the

Russian press in raising a feeling of indignation against China, on

account of these reported massacres in Eastern Turkestan, that it has

placed translations of these charges before the English reader, and, on

the authority of the _Tashkent Gazette_, has indicted and summarily

convicted the Chinese of the grossest acts of inhumanity. We would

venture to suggest, that in common fairness to the Chinese this journal

should place before its readers the temperately worded and dignified

reports that have appeared in the _Pekin Gazette_ of those events upon

which the _Tashkent Gazette_ has commented so indignantly.

As we said, the Chinese are fully resolved to regain Ili. They may not

be able to induce Russia easily to surrender it, yet they will not

despair. In all probability they will fail altogether to re-acquire it

by diplomatic means, yet they will not omit to employ all the artifices

that are sanctioned by modern diplomacy. There have been rumours that

China intended handing over to Russia a strip of territory in

Manchuria, which would give to the Russian harbour of Vladivostock a

land communication with the forts on the Amoor. But this rumour had no

solid foundation, and the latest intelligence goes to show that China's

successes beyond Gobi, instead of making her moderate in the north, have

given her confidence sufficient to arouse her into a state of opposition

to further encroachments on the part of Russia in that direction. It is

now said that Russia demands pecuniary indemnification for the money she

has expended in raising Kuldja to its present highly prosperous

condition; and at a first glance nothing could seem fairer, nor do we

think that the Chinese would have raised objections to the payment of a

moderate sum. But the sum demanded by the Russians is far from moderate.

The exact amount has not been mentioned, but the Chinese declare that it

exceeds the total cost of the campaign in the north-west, and that

certainly was not less than two millions sterling. This is, of course,

too exorbitant, and is only put forward as a reason for declining to

abide by her former agreement, and to give her diplomatists a _locus

standi_ in their discussions with the Chinese representatives. A Chinese

Embassy has been authorized to proceed to St. Petersburg, and to

endeavour to effect an understanding with Russia upon the Kuldja

question; but it does not appear to have started, and the real

settlement lies in the hands of Tso Tsung Tang and General Kaufmann. The

latest report is that the former has demanded afresh the restoration of

Kuldja; the Russian reply is awaited with eagerness and some anxiety. In

the meanwhile the Chinese have suffered a local reverse of no

significance at the hands of a chief of Khoten, and their power does not

seem to extend south of Yarkand. But they are hurrying up

reinforcements, and 20,000 fresh troops had reached Manas some weeks

ago. They have also an extensive recruiting ground amongst the Calmucks,

and their position of Chuguchak might be of great strategical

importance. If the Kuldja question give rise to a Russo-Chinese war, the

Chinese are sufficiently numerous and sufficiently prepared to task the

capacity of an army of 20,000 Russians; and it is quite certain there

are not 5,000 in Kuldja at present. But the Kuldja question, despite the

prominence it has attained, is only one, if the most important and

pressing, of those questions that are raised and suggested by the

appearance of the Chinese in Central Asia. More especially is this the

case if, as can scarcely be doubted, the Russians refuse to restore

Kuldja; yet the Chinese, knowing the strength of their adversary, shall

hesitate to attack where they cannot but recognize that the penalties of

failure must be immense. In that event the Kuldja question will long

remain unsolved, and for a time perhaps it will be forgotten. But the

Chinese will not forget, nor will they condone the offence. But whatever

may be the interval, and however great the delay, the Kuldja question

will continue to remain a most important portion of Central Asian

politics, and must, so long as it is unsettled, operate in a manner

adverse to the interests of Russia. The Chinese need only maintain their

camps at Chuguchak, Karakaru, Manas, Aksu, Ush Turfan and Kashgar, and

slowly bring up reinforcements from Kansuh and from the Calmuck country,

to render Russia's hold on Kuldja dangerously insecure. In fact, in this

matter the Chinese have the game in their own hands, and can play a

waiting game; whereas Russia can only hope to profit by precipitation on

the part of Tso Tsung Tang. If the Chinese refuse to hold any

intercourse with the faithless Russians, and simply content themselves

with the declaration that they cannot re-enter into political or

commercial relations with them until Kuldja is retroceded, Russia can

never rest tranquil either in Kuldja, Naryn, or Khokand. Above all, so

long as she is occupied in Western Asia as she is at present, she could

never dare to cross the path of China, and enter upon a war which would

rage from Vladivostock and the Amoor to Kuldja and Kashgar. Therefore

the settlement of the Kuldja question is not such an easy matter as

might be supposed; nor does it find Russia so strong or China so weak as

might have been expected. But after all, as we have just said, the

Kuldja question is not the only one suggested by the appearance of the

Chinese in Eastern Turkestan. There is the far wider one raised by the

appearance of the Chinese as a factor in the great Central Asian

question. The three great Asiatic Powers have now converged upon a

point; what is to be the result?

The only way to be in a position to venture upon a surmise as to the

future, is to realize in its full significance the lessons of the past.

What have been the mutual relations between England, Russia, and China?

We have assumed throughout this volume, and we shall assume here, the

irreconcilable hostility of England and Russia, in Asia at all events,

veneered over as it is by a lacquer of politeness and civilization. We

have only to consider the relations between England and China, and

between Russia and China. To take the latter first, they have always

been united by ties of friendship and reciprocity in commercial and

political rights. Their intercourse has been on the whole singularly

harmonious, and while we have been compelled to wage three wars to

obtain a standing for our merchants in the seaports, Russia, without

being compelled to resort to anything like the same extreme measures,

has been able to secure all she, or her merchants, wanted in Middle and

Western China. She has made the Amoor a Russian river; she dominates the

Yellow and Japanese seas from Vladivostock; and she has acquired in her

position among the Khalkas, and in Kuldja, two portals to various weak

points in the Chinese Empire. Yet all the time she has been on terms of

the closest amity with China. She has several commercial treaties of the

most favourable character, and she has always been on the footing of

"the most favoured nation." But she has been more than that; she has

been the most favoured nation. But the Chinese have not failed to

observe that this good understanding with Russia has, so far as

advantages arising from it go, been a very one-sided affair. For all

Russia's protestations of friendship and good-will, what advantages has

China reaped from those high-flown promises? Whereas, the patriotic

Chinaman has but to look to the Amoor, and to the attenuated province of

Manchuria, to see what Russian friendship means. He can go farther

still. He has only to enquire into the relations Russia has managed to

conclude with the Taranath Lama; he has only to hear what the people of

Ourga think of Russia's position in the vicinity of that important city;

and he cannot fail to form a very clear and decided opinion as to what

Russia's friendship signifies. The Chinese have, in the full extent of

their northern frontier, a great question in discussion with Russia. So

long as China was weak, and consequently unable to resent the patronage

of her friend, so long was Russia able to play "my lady bountiful" with

a good grace and perfect success. But the moment China became strong,

and in a position to resent the condescension of her whilome ally, the

Chinese took a different tone, and already we hear of the Chinese

assuming a semi-hostile attitude in the Amoor region. But whereas

China's apprehension--for it is apprehension that is at the root of her

hostility to Russia, at Russia's designs in Manchuria and among the

Khalkas is vague at present--her indignation is clear and easily defined

at Russia retaining possession of Kuldja after she has demanded its

restoration. In short, all her apprehension along the northern frontier,

which has slumbered, but never died out, since the Russians seized the

Amoor posts during the Crimean War, is reduced to a focus in Central

Asia, where Russia appears inclined to throw herself in the path of, or

at least to retard, their victorious career. It is not so much the

Kuldja question, which is of local importance, that is of pressing

moment, as the rupture between Russia and China, that a crisis in the

Issik Kul region will make complete. That rupture has already taken

place, and no concession on the part of Russia will restore her good

name with the Chinese. She may hand Kuldja over now, or she may keep it

by the strong arm if she can; but she has forfeited all claim to

consideration by the Chinese, through delaying to accede to that which

those people consider in every sense their right and due. Had Russia at

once said to China, "We will abandon Kuldja, and only require you to

guarantee the safety of the population," there would have been not only

the preservation of the good understanding between the countries, but

there might have been, for fresh purposes, a Russo-Chinese alliance in

Central Asia. That alliance must have been fraught with danger to this

country, and for reasons that will best be described under the head of

Anglo-Chinese relations.

But the Russian authorities failed to grasp the situation in its full

extent. They treated the Kuldja question as a mere local affair, and

they trifled with the Chinese as if the latter had no very strong

interest in the matter. They altogether ignored the terrible earnestness

of the Chinese character, and they treated the demands of Tso Tsung Tang

in a spirit of levity that must have roused the ire of that general.

Their policy, regarded from any point of view, was shallow and unwise,

but, bearing in mind the past tact and diplomatic skill shown by Russia

in her dealings with China, it must appear more shallow and foolish. Of

course this Kuldja question differs from all previous questions in the

essential point of all, that here for the first time Russia had to go

back instead of advancing, as always had been the case heretofore. The

Russian authorities simply regarded the matter from the point of view

of what effect it would have upon the peoples of Central Asia. They

persuaded themselves that to hand over Kuldja would be to give an

impetus to every hostile element in Western Turkestan, as well as to

lower their prestige generally throughout Asia. As a leading Russian

paper expressed it, "the retrocession of Kuldja would be an act of

political suicide, for not only would it raise the prestige of China to

a higher point than ever before, but it would also undermine our

position in Eastern Asia, by giving the Chinese a strong military

position within our natural frontier. For these reasons Kuldja cannot be

restored." That paragraph sums up the arguments the Russians will employ

in defence of their continuing to retain possession of Kuldja. They add

something to their effect in the popular mind by diatribes against the

Chinese for rumoured barbarities, by drawing comparisons, flattering to

themselves and to their administrative capacity, between the present

condition of Kuldja, and what it would become under a restored Chinese

rule. In depicting what this would be, they entirely ignore the

prosperous condition of Kuldja before the Tungan revolt, and they appear

to assume that the anarchy existing there, when they entered it in 1871,

was due to the Chinese, instead of being caused by the ingratitude and

fickleness of its own people. And they shut their eyes to the great

benefits China conferred upon Central Asia during the century that she

was paramount therein. They would like us, and every other observer of

the crisis, to do the same. That is impossible, for the teaching of

history is clear, and points to a diametrically opposite conclusion. We

do not dispute the beneficence of Russia's government of Kuldja. We

freely admit it. That is no reason for maligning the Chinese, and

asserting that they are utter barbarians; nor is it a reason, in the

eyes of Chinamen, for a refusal to restore Kuldja. By refusing to

entertain the overtures of Tso Tsung Tang, which were made, there is

reason to believe, before the attack on Yakoob Beg, the Russians huffed

the Chinese; and by procrastinating ever since, when questioned upon the

subject, they have still further displeased them. The Russians are aware

of this, and feel convinced that, no matter how obliging they might be

disposed to be, the Chinese will now no longer appreciate their

moderation. If we admit this, as can scarcely be gainsaid, what becomes

of the Kuldja question, and of its peaceful solution that many claim to

see? How can it be peacefully solved, if Russia will not accede to the

terms from which China is resolved not to budge? Surely not by a fresh

commotion on the part of the Mussulman population, which some persons

have pretended to forecast by magnifying a petty success that has been

obtained by the insignificant ruler of Khoten over a Chinese detachment.

Surely not by such trivial circumstances as the hostility of an outlying

dependency, will China be either expelled from Kashgar, or induced to

forego her claims on Kuldja. The success of the Khoten chief is but a

minor incident in the campaign, and for that district and its people it

must be pronounced a great misfortune. The Chinese will exact a terrible

revenge. The Kuldja question will not be solved by such means, English

readers can feel assured; and the hostility of Russia and China towards

each other will become more pronounced every day. Already petty

disturbances are reported to have taken place along the border. Russian

merchants have been molested by parties of brigands, among whom the

assailed assert there were Chinese soldiers; and no satisfaction could

be obtained from their generals. Representations have been made to Tso

Tsung Tang upon the subject, and his reply has not been very amicable.

Russian caravans, which were always welcome during the progress of the

war at Manas, Karakaru, and Urumtsi, are now no longer greeted with the

same cordiality, and the Chinese are evincing an intention to close

their frontier to Russians. Few caravans, the _Tashkent Gazette_ informs

us, now care to leave Kuldja for the territory occupied by the Chinese

army; and slowly, but none the less surely, is the old alliance between

Russia and China departing to join the things that were, but are not.

But, although so much is clear, it is almost impossible to predicate the

future course of the Kuldja question. It is not probable that Tso Tsung

Tang will openly attack the Russians, yet his hand may be forced by the

home authorities, and he may be left no alternative between that and the

abandonment of his enterprise. It must be always remembered that

Russia's best weapon is intrigue at Pekin, and a skilful envoy might so

far manipulate the rivalry between Tso and Li Hung Chang as to induce

the latter to paralyze the ambition of the former by withholding

supplies and reinforcements from the army of Central Asia. So

unpatriotic a course would, we believe, be hateful to Li Hung Chang, and

it, certainly, would be attended with great danger, sure to recoil upon

his guilty head, if for a personal rivalry he debased himself so far as

to become the tool of his country's foe. But yet it is in vain to deny

that there is danger to the preservation of China's most cherished

interests in the rivalry of some of her chief statesmen. The Kuldja

question, which scarcely admits of peaceful solution in Central Asia,

might be solved in the palace at Pekin more easily and more effectually

than by a campaign on a large scale in Jungaria and Turkestan; and there

is a possibility that Russia may by this means seek to nullify the

danger from Tso Tsung Tang, and to stultify the recent Chinese

successes. It is very doubtful whether they would succeed, for Chinese

opinion runs high upon the topic, and the Mantchoo caste is united in

its support of its member Tso Tsung Tang. Even if they did, it would

only be shelving the Kuldja question, for so long as the Chinese remain

in Kashgaria, and at Manas and Karakaru, they must regard the presence

of Russia in Kuldja as a slight to themselves, as well as a menace to

their line of communications.

But every probability is against their succeeding. Li Hung Chang's

position is not so secure that he can dare to put himself in face of

those who champion a national cause, as is the re-absorption of Chinese

Turkestan. The return of Tso Tsung Tang with his veterans would be the

least danger that the adoption of an unpatriotic policy would entail. If

this home danger, then, does not arise, the Kuldja question will be

settled between Tso and the Russian authorities in Khokand and Kuldja.

The result of that discussion cannot be doubtful. The advocates on

either side are soldiers, each equally confident in their own abilities

and power, and each flushed by a long tide of success. They will come to

the discussion of the question with heated blood and excited nerves;

reason will not be the presiding goddess at the council board. There

will be accusations and recriminations bandied from one side to the

other. If such be the case, the Kuldja question will not be long in

discussion, and before the close of the present year perhaps, but more

probably early next spring, there will be war between Russia and China

along the Tian Shan range. Even if Tso is content to permit his

arguments to be clothed in diplomatic language, there will be no

solution of the difficulty, so long as Russia remains where she is; and

consequently the difference will be as great between Russia and China as

if there were open hostilities between the countries. And this, after

all, is the main point, for the destruction of all friendly sentiment

between Russia and China means the addition of another element to "the

great game in Central Asia," and that element, as an adverse one to

Russia, is a beneficial circumstance for this country. The difference

over the Kuldja question magnifies the previously existing discordant

points between the countries, and irretrievably wrecks whatever prospect

there once was of Russia and China pursuing an identical policy towards

Baroghil and Cashmere. We have now to consider the past relations

between England and China, in order that we may be in a position to

appreciate the full significance of China's reappearance in Central

Asia, and also what is to be the probable outcome of the gradual

approximation of the three Great Powers, and the slow extinction of the

once innumerable petty states of Asia.

What, then, have been the mutual relations between England and China in

the past? There is no necessity to enter into the question of the

footing we are on along the sea-coast, for that is really beside the

question; nor need we recapitulate the wars which we have at various

times been compelled to wage in Eastern China. The result of those wars,

those treaties, and that constant inter-communication has been, that

Englishmen have secured a foothold in many of the principal cities, and

that English trade is supreme there. But the relations along the land

frontier are quite the opposite of those obtained on the sea-board, and

they are influenced by entirely different considerations. During the

last century, and for a considerable portion of the present, we were

not, strictly speaking, neighbours of the Chinese; for between the two

empires there intervened a belt of semi-independent states, who

nominally owned allegiance to China. Some of these were Nepaul, Sikhim,

Bhutan and Birma, with its dependency of Assam. It was in the days of

Lord Cornwallis that we first realized the significance of the fact that

Chinese prestige had penetrated south of the Himalaya. The Ghoorka

rulers of Nepaul had, on several occasions, molested the peaceable

Tibetans, and at last had grown so bold, that on one expedition they

advanced as far as Lhasa, which they plundered. At that moment the aged

Keen-Lung was meditating the retirement from public life, which a few

years afterwards, like the Asiatic Charles the Fifth that he was, he

adopted; but, on the news of this insult to his authority, his warlike

spirit fired up, and he vowed that the marauders of Khatmandoo should

dearly pay for their audacity. A large army, of the reputed strength of

70,000 men, was collected, and the Chinese generals advanced by the

Kirong Pass upon the Nepaulese capital. A desperate battle was fought

along this elevated road, resulting in victory to the Chinese. Several

other encounters took place with the same result, and the Ghoorkas were

compelled to sue for terms. The Chinese showed no disposition to stay

their advance, until Lord Cornwallis mediated between the foes, and

peace ensued. Nepaul acknowledged its suzerainty to China, and agreed to

send tribute every five years to Pekin. For more than half a century

this was regularly sent, but during the last thirty years it has been

either discontinued, or has grown irregular. But for us the main point

is, after all, that the Chinese, although yielding to the remonstrance

of Lord Cornwallis, really did so with a bad grace. We had stood between

them and their prey.

But this was not the full extent of the mistake we had actually

committed. We had annoyed the Chinese; but we had absolutely offended

the people and the ruling Lamas of Tibet. Warren Hastings had sent two

missions--one under Mr. George Bogle, the other under Captain Turner--to

the Teshu Lama, and by means of these embassies had broken ground very

happily in Tibet. He had also conferred an obligation upon him by

dealing leniently with the intractable Bhutanese or Bhuteas; and he had

followed up that sense of obligation by the despatch of two successful

missions. When Lord Cornwallis threw the _aegis_ of British protection

over Nepaul, it is true that we had no diplomatic relationship with

Tibet, but we were on a good footing with the people generally, having a

native representative at Lhasa named Purungir Gosain, and being in high

repute at Shigatze, the chief city of the southern portion of Tibet. The

Tibetans, the instant the Ghoorkas raided their country, notified the

same to our government, and requested its good offices to prevent the

Ghoorkas invading their country. The Chinese, their lawful protectors,

were so far away that much damage could be inflicted upon them before

the Chinese could have time to despatch a vindicating army; therefore

they appealed to their friends the English, whom they had always found

so just, for assistance in their extremity. Their appeal was evidently

made with the impression that it would be granted. Therefore it was with

double regret they saw the English remain indifferent while the Ghoorkas

were pressing on against Lhasa, and ravaging the fertile districts

watered by the Sanpu. But their regret and surprise at our government

remaining indifferent were as nothing compared with their indignation

when they learnt that we were actually interfering on behalf of the

marauding Ghoorkas. We saved the Ghoorkas from condign chastisement, and

we of course prevented the establishment of a Chinese garrison at

Khatmandoo, which we could whenever we chose have easily expelled; but

we offended the Tibetans and the Chinese, and induced them to unite in a

policy of hostility against ourselves. After that war (1792) the

Himalayan passes were closed against us, and the Chinese block-houses

have effectually barred the way to Tibet and Northern Asia ever since.

Mr. Thomas Manning, one of the most intrepid and highly gifted of

English travellers, penetrated into Tibet in 1812, and resided there

some time. But that is the only instance in which an English traveller

overcame Bhutea and Ghoorka indifference and Chinese hostility. Tibet

remains a sealed book, and, despite treaty rights to enter it, no

Englishman goes thither, although the attraction is great, and the prize

to be secured far from vague or trivial. The assumed reason is the

covert hostility of the Chinese.

If we turn farther to the east, to Assam--which we have absorbed--to

Birma, and even to Siam, we find the same causes in operation. We

recognized in Yunnan the Panthay Sultan of Talifoo; we have always

striven to treat the kings of Birma and Siam as independent princes,

whereas they are only Chinese vassals; and we are believed to have

carried on intrigues with the Shans and other tribes beyond the Assamese

frontier. These steps may be prudent or they may not for other reasons;

but they certainly are imprudent for the reason that they offend the

Chinese. As a policy intended to conciliate the Chinese, our frontier

policy on the north and the east has been the worst possible, and a

tissue of blunders from beginning to end; and the result is that for the

last half-century we have lived on the very worst terms with the

Chinese. We should have conciliated them, but we aroused instead all

their latent suspicion and dislike. We should have become friendly

neighbours, and, on the contrary, we are neighbours who, if not

decidedly hostile to each other, shun each other's presence. And the

real base of our sentiment towards the Chinese is to be seen in the fact

that one of the first articles in the creed of Indian state policy is

"to keep China as far off as possible." That precept, which may have

been very useful, has served its turn, and it is time that our

Indo-Chinese policy should be set upon a new basis. With China once more

supreme upon our whole northern frontier, and with her presenting

ultimatums at Bangkok, and coercing the ruler of Mandalay as she esteems

fit, it is high time for us, apart from the Central Asian question

altogether, to set our house in order with the Chinese. The mistakes we

made in championing the Ghoorkas, in acknowledging the Panthays, and in

a general policy of indifference to Chinese opinion, have all tended to

bring about the present deadlock in our relations with China. Our

acknowledgment of the Athalik Ghazi cannot have conduced to the creation

of any very friendly sentiment among the Chinese towards us, and,

therefore, at the present moment we must assume that the state of

feeling existing among the Chinese in Tibet and Yunnan towards us exists

in Kashgaria also; and that feeling is a veiled hostility. Therefore,

while the Chinese are beginning to regard Russia with the hostile

feelings that once were reserved for England, they have by no means

altered their old sentiments towards us. We have done nothing whatever

to induce them to do so. We have not helped them in any way to regain

Kashgar, and on the whole English opinion may be said to have been more

adverse to, than in favour of, their claims. They have found in the

arsenals of Kashgar and Yarkand many proofs of England's alliance with,

and friendship for, Yakoob Beg; and, on the other hand, they certainly

owe much to the assistance of Russian merchants, and the forbearance of

the Russian government. Nor should we for an instant delude ourselves

with the fallacy that the Chinese will look to us for aid against

Russia, as Yakoob Beg did. They have conquered Eastern Turkestan without

us--in fact, despite of our moral opposition; and they will retain it if

they can by their own right arms. It will not enter their head for an

instant to play the old game of Yakoob Beg, of setting England off

against Russia. But, although they will play a perfectly independent

game, it by no means follows that they will be hostile to this country,

if by some fortunate stroke of diplomacy we could bring home to their

minds the fact that England is glad at the result of the war in Central

Asia, however much she may have failed during its progress to recognize

which was the rightful cause. But what is that fortunate stroke of

diplomacy to be? and how is it to be brought to pass? To each of these

questions it would be rash to give any confident reply. In dealing with

the Chinese we are not only treating with a people whom we very

imperfectly understand, but also with a government the secret springs of

whose policy we neither know nor appreciate. The action we might

therefore adopt, founded though it should be on the experience of some

Englishman versed in the mysteries of China, might fail to accomplish

what it seemed calculated to secure. It might be crowned with success,

it might be condemned with failure. Of course the first thing to decide

is, how are we to take official cognizance of China's reconquest of

Kashgaria, and how are we to bring home to the minds of Tso Tsung Tang

and his lieutenants the knowledge that we have repented of our

shortsighted policy towards Yakoob Beg, and are willing to atone for it

in so far as we are able by an ample recognition of the change in

affairs north of the Karakoram?

The Che-foo Convention gave us the right to send an embassy to Tibet, on

the condition that it should be acted upon within a given space. We did

not avail ourselves of that concession, and the Chinese, we are

informed, consider that the right has lapsed. We may have been wise or

we may have been foolish--in my opinion we have been foolish--in

declining to enforce the only real concession China made, in reparation

for the murder of Mr. Margary. Does this concession, which we never made

use of, entitle us to send a mission to the Chinese in Kashgar? Acting

upon this precedent, are we justified in supposing that the Chinese

would hold out a hand of friendship to an English envoy coming from Leh

to Yarkand? It is much to be feared that it would not. At the present

moment, too, the country must be in such a disturbed state, that the

Chinese would have a ready excuse if any accident befel our envoy.

Moreover, at the present moment an envoy would have no definite object

before him. A few years hence, when the Chinese rule shall be completely

restored throughout Eastern Turkestan, it may be reasonable to expect a

revival of trade in this direction; but at present it would be premature

to agitate for it. Nor would a simple embassy of congratulation look

well. We have too recently befriended the Athalik Ghazi to make our

congratulations to his conqueror anything but a mockery. The Chinese

would be puffed up with vanity, and think that we were only worshipping

their rising sun. Whatever action we do take in Central Asia, to effect

an understanding with the Chinese, we must be very careful that it has

been well considered, and that it is as cautious as it must be clearly

defined. Any mistake would be simply fatal to the preservation of good

relations with China. Therefore, we must do nothing. _Quieta non movere_

must be our motto, and we must only look forward to some auspicious

occasion when it may be possible to enter into cordial relations with

China.

But, although our hands are tied in Central Asia, they are not fettered

at Pekin, and we certainly should congratulate, if we have not done so

already, the Chinese on their remarkable successes in the Tian Shan

regions. That step might be pregnant with beneficent results, and our

desire to be on good terms with our new, yet our old, neighbour might be

met in a cordial manner by the Chinese. The Chinese will not stoop to

propitiate us in order to preserve their rule in Eastern Turkestan; but

it is against common sense to suppose that they will be eager to embroil

themselves with us at the same moment that they are quarrelling with the

Russians. The Kuldja question must throw China into our alliance, if we

are not precipitate, and do not offer her any slight by meddling with

this semi-independent chief of Khoten, who is said to have overthrown a

Chinese detachment. And, in negotiating with the rulers of Kashgaria, we

must remember that commercial advantages are all very well, but that

political are infinitely more important. It has been tersely said that

we patronized Yakoob Beg in order to make a market for Kangra tea; but

the very trivial advantages we secured in a commercial sense were far

more than counterbalanced by the political disadvantages we derived from

a recognition of the Athalik Ghazi. In dealing with the Chinese we must

not set before us, as our guiding star, the privilege of supplying the

good people of Kashgar and Yarkand with tea and other necessaries. What

we aspire to is to be on terms of amity with China, as a power in

Central Asia, which will possess everything it desires when Ili has

been restored, and which most accordingly be inclined to resent with us

the undue aggrandizement of Russia. These are the future advantages that

may accrue from an understanding between England and China. But at the

present juncture there are others similar in kind, but immediate in

effect. The Afghan question, which now clamours for solution, and which

will scarcely pass through this crisis without finding our hold on Cabul

made more assured, is in many respects connected with the Kuldja.

In each case the ambition of Russia is the motive power, and in each she

seeks to play her game with as little risk, and as much gain, as

possible. In neither will she fight, if she can avoid the necessity, yet

in each there is a point beyond which her honour and her interests alike

refuse to permit her to remain concealed and neutral. The solution of

the two questions is being worked out simultaneously, and the progress

of the Afghan question will at least very seriously affect the later

stages of the Kuldja. If Russia has to fight to defend Shere Ali, then

we may be sure that Tso Tsung Tang's legions will not remain inactive,

and that General Kolpakovsky will either have to beat a retreat to

Vernoe, or engage in a war out of which, on his own resources alone, it

will be impossible for him to issue victorious. If Russia interfere

openly in defence of Shere Ali, Kuldja must be restored to the Chinese,

otherwise Russia's flank would be exposed to a crushing blow, which the

Chinese would not be slow to take advantage of. Present events on the

Ili and on the Cabul have, therefore, this much in common, that they

both aim, directly or indirectly, at the fabric of Russian supremacy in

Central Asia. The occupation of Afghanistan by England, or even a

partial occupation of it as is very probable, would seriously weaken

Russian prestige in Western Turkestan. A Chinese occupation of Kuldja

would undermine her position in Vernoe and Naryn and among the Kirghiz.

Admitting these, is it not natural to suppose that in each case Russia

will fight, or that, even if she does not fight in each case, she will

fight in the one that she may deem of the most importance? But we need

not pursue the subject farther. The Chinese are face to face with Russia

in the heart of Central Asia, just as a few short months ago they were

opposed to Yakoob Beg and the power of the Tungani.

Their army is drawn up in hostile array; it is each day becoming more

numerous and more perfectly prepared. Its generals are the same who have

led it to constant victory; its main body is the veterans of three

campaigns. The Chinese are persuaded, and it is impossible to say not

justly persuaded, of the righteousness of their cause. The Russians can

have no equal confidence either in their strength, or in their moral

position. They are not exactly championing a bad cause, or a lost one,

but, in comparison to the Chinese, they have no legal position. It

remains to be seen whether by force of arms, or by diplomatic

superiority, they can make up for the flaw in their tenure of Kuldja.

Farther on, in the vista of the events yet to come, there looms the

prospect of an Anglo-Chinese alliance, that must be most beneficial to

the peoples of Asia generally. But, before it will be possible for

Englishmen to count upon the presence of the Chinese as a favourable

"factor in the Central Asian question," our relations with China must be

placed upon a firmer and a more friendly basis than any which has yet

existed. We have it in our power to do this, and the ever-widening

breach between Russia and China simplifies our task in no slight degree.

The day will come when Russia will discover that the Kuldja question was

no trivial matter at all, and that to it can be traced many important

events in Central Asia. England may also recognize in it one of the most

useful circumstances that have ever operated in her favour in her long

rivalry with Russia. At the very crisis of our border history, when we

are on the eve of dealing out well merited chastisement to an Ameer of

Cabul, Russia finds herself weakened by being compelled to discuss a

question with China, when her attention is required elsewhere. She will

not yield what the Chinese demand, yet she dare not refuse; and the

latter will simply bide their time until she is hampered elsewhere. It

is no rash prophecy to say that China will be reinstalled, either by

peaceful means or by force, in Kuldja before the close of next year,

probably long before. An alliance between any two of the three great

Asiatic Powers must then be conclusive in all Central Asian matters,

and, before that alliance, the third will have the prudence to submit.

It behoves us to learn our lesson, when that day comes, thoroughly and

in good time.

APPENDIX.

THE POSITION OF LOB-NOR.

Lake Lob-Nor is placed in the map accompanying this volume in accordance

with the explorations of Colonel Prjevalsky in 1876-77; the result of

which was published in Dr. Petermann's _Mittheilungen_ as an extra

number during the spring of the present year. The accuracy of the

gallant explorer in identifying Lob-Nor with his lake of Kara Koshun had

not been challenged when this map was drawn, and when the following good

reasons for doubting its accuracy were published on the 14th of

September, it was too late to make the necessary alteration.

The quotation of Baron Ferdinand von Richthofen's strictures on Colonel

Prjevalsky's lakes is taken from the _Athenaeum_ of the 14th of

September, 1878:--

"It would appear that the Russian traveller Prejevalsky, in his last

remarkable journey in the heart of Central Asia, did not explore Lob-Nor

at all, as he claims to have done. Baron Ferdinand von Richthofen, one

of the first comparative geographers of the day, has examined the

account of the journey, more especially by the light of Chinese

literature, and proves, almost incontestably to our thinking, that the

true Lob-Nor must lie somewhere north-east of the so-called Kara Kotchun

Lake discovered by Prejevalsky, and that, in all probability, it is fed

by an eastern arm of the Tarim river. This, at all events, would account

for the remarkable diminution in bulk undergone by the waters of that

stream as they proceed southward, which could not but strike an

attentive reader of the Russian explorer's narrative. We have not space

to reproduce all the arguments which Von Richthofen adduces, but the

more important are these:--Prejevalsky's lake was fresh, whereas Lob-Nor

has been called _The_ Salt Lake, _par excellence_, in all ages; Shaw,

Forsyth, and other authorities, report that the name Lob-Nor was known

in those regions, whereas Prejevalsky found no such name applied to his

lake; the Chinese maps, of the accuracy of which Von Richthofen has had

repeated proofs, represent Lob-Nor as lying more to the north-east, and

call two lakes lying nearly in the position of those discovered by

Prejevalsky, Khasomo, Khas being the Mongolian for jade, a famous

product of Khotan of which mediaeval traders from China went in quest,

passing by these very lakes _en route_. Another important argument is,

as we have mentioned, based on the bulk of water discharged by the Tarim

at its mouth. Von Richthofen's theory presupposes that the Tarim River

has altered its course, and that the main rush of water is now

south-east instead of due east as formerly. The whole question is well

worthy of further investigation, and it is possible that Prejevalsky,

whom a recent telegram from St. Petersburg reports about to return to

Central Asia, may be enabled to elucidate it. He will return to Zaissan,

the Russian frontier post, and thence endeavour to make his way into

Tibet by way of Barkul and Hami.

"It is, however, certain that he will encounter great, if not

insuperable, obstruction, for we learn from private advices from India,

that the ill-advised publication in the Chefoo Convention of the then

proposed mission to Tibet has resulted in the issue of the most

stringent orders to the Tibetan officials at all the various routes and

passes to allow no European traveller to enter into the country on any

pretext whatever."

Having stated the view of Baron Ferdinand von Richthofen, which is

endorsed by the high authority of the _Athenaeeum_, and which bears,

moreover, conviction upon its face, it is but fair to give the vital

portion of Colonel Prjevalsky's own description. The _Geographical

Magazine_, for May, 1878 Contains _in extenso_ the report, and the

sentences here quoted are from that translation.

"At a distance of fifteen versts from the smaller lake, Kara Buran, the

party diverged southward to the village of Charchalyk, built about

thirty years ago by outlaws from Khotan, of which there are at present

114 engaged in tilling fields for the state.... Where Charchalyk now

stands, and also at the distance of two days' journey from it, are the

ruins of two towns, called Ottogush-Shari (from Ottogush, a former

ruler) and Gas-Shari respectively. Close to Lob-Nor (Kara Koshun) are

the ruins of a third and pretty extensive town called Kune-Shari. From

inquires, Prejevalsky ascertained that about 1861 or 1862 a colony of

Russians numbering about 160 or 170 people, including women and

children, with their pack-horses and armed with flint-lock muskets,

settled on the Lower Tarim and at Charchalyk, but that they made no long

stay, and soon returned to Urumchi, via Turfan.... Turning to the

Lob-Nor Lake (Kara Koshun), which the travellers reached in the early

days of February, it should be observed that the Tarim discharges itself

first into a smaller lake (from thirty to thirty-five versts in length,

and between ten and twelve versts in breadth) called Kara Buran (_i.e._

black storms) into which the Cherchendaria flows as well. A great part

of the Kara Buran, as of Lob-Nor, is overgrow with reeds, the river

flowing in its bed in the centre. The name Lob-Nor is applied by the

natives to the whole lower course of the Tarim, the larger lake being

called Chok-kul or Kara Koshun. This lake, or rather morass, is in the

shape of an irregular ellipse running south-west and north-east.

"Its major axis is about 90 or 100 versts in length, its minor axis not

more than twenty versts. This information is derived from the natives,

as Prejevalsky himself explored only the southern and western end, and

proceeded by boat down the river for about half the length of the lake,

further progress being rendered impossible by the increasing shallowness

of the water and the masses of reeds in every direction. The water

itself is clear and sweet, though there are salt marshes all round the

lake, and beyond them a strip of ground parallel with the present

borders of the lake and overgrown with tamarisks. It is probable that

this strip was formerly the periphery of the lake, and this conclusion

is corroborated by the natives, who say that thirty years ago the lake

was deeper."

It is clear that the true position of Lob-Nor has yet to be defined by

modern exploration, but we may safely assume with the _Athenaeum_ that

Colonel Prjevalsky's Kara Koshun is _not_ Lob-Nor. The accompanying map

then, in this particular, is unfortunately erroneous.

There is every reason for believing that Lob-Nor will be found in the

position assigned to it on the Chinese chart, the accuracy of which has

been so strikingly proved by the correct position given to the two lakes

Khas-omo, which are identical with the Kara Koshun and Kara Bunar of

Prjevalsky.

It would be most interesting to obtain a diary or other account of those

Russian settlers mentioned by Prjevalsky, who entered the _terra

incognita_ of Central Asia during the halcyon days after the signature

of the Treaty of Kuldja, and just before the outbreak of the Tungan

revolt. It is possible that they may have solved during their return

journey to Urumtsi the enigma of Lob-Nor without knowing what they had

achieved. The reader will, therefore, have the kindness to bear in mind

that Lob-Nor is really (probably about three-quarters of a degree)

north-east of where it is placed on the map, and that the lake

represented there is only the Kara Koshun, or Chok Kul of Colonel

Prjevalsky.

The most recent information is, that Colonel Prjevalsky adheres to his

view as to the position of Lob-Nor, and is preparing a reply which will

be published in a few weeks from this date (October 1st).

TREATY BETWEEN RUSSIA AND CHINA.

TREATY OF COMMERCE CONCLUDED BETWEEN RUSSIA AND CHINA, AT KULDJA, ON THE

25TH DAY OF JULY, 1851, AND RATIFIED ON THE 13TH DAY OF NOVEMBER, 1851.

The plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, and

the plenipotentiaries of His Majesty the Bogdokhan of Tatsing, hereby

declare; the Governor General of Ili, and its dependent provinces, as

well as his deputy, have, after consulting together, concluded in the

city of Ili (Kuldja), in favour of the subjects of both empires, a

Treaty of Commerce, which establishes a traffic in the cities of Ili

(Kuldja), and of Tarbagatai (Chuguchak). This treaty is composed of the

following articles:--

ARTICLE I.

The present Treaty of Commerce, concluded in the interests of both

powers, by demonstrating their mutual solicitude for the maintenance of

peace between, as well as for the well-being of, their respective

subjects, ought to draw still closer together those links of friendship

which at the present moment unite the two Powers.

ARTICLE II.

The merchants of the two Empires will regulate between themselves the

interchange of commerce, and arrange the various charges at their own

will, and without any extraneous pressure. On the part of Russia a

consul will be appointed to superintend the affairs of all Russian

subjects; and on the part of China, a functionary of the superior

administration of Ili. In the event of any collision between the

subjects of either Power, each of these agents will decide, in

accordance with justice, the affairs of his own countrymen.

ARTICLE III.

This commerce being opened in consideration of the mutual friendship of

the two Powers, it will not be in contravention of existing rights on

either side.

ARTICLE IV.

Russian merchants going either to Ili (Kuldja) or to Tarbagatai

(Chuguchak) will be accompanied by a syndic (caravanbashi). When a

caravan going to Ili (Kuldja) shall arrive at the Chinese picket of

Borokhondjir, and when that destined for Tarbagatai (Chuguchak) shall

reach the first Chinese picket, the syndic shall present to the officer

of the guard the certificate of his government. The said officer, after

having noted the number of men, of beasts, and of loads of merchandise,

shall permit the caravan to pass, and shall furthermore cause it to be

escorted from picket to picket by an officer and soldiers. During the

march, all disturbance, or cause for such, shall be interdicted to

soldiers and merchants alike.

ARTICLE V.

In order to facilitate the task of officers and soldiers, Russian

merchants shall be obliged, in virtue of the present treaty, to follow

the route chosen by their body guard, both going and returning.

ARTICLE VI.

If, whilst Russian caravans follow their route outside the limit of the

guard of Chinese soldiers, bands of brigands from the outer clans

(Kirghiz) shall commit acts of pillage, of assault, or other crimes, the

Chinese government shall not be required to interfere in the matter.

When the caravan shall have arrived on Chinese territory, similarly also

during its residence in the factories where merchandise is stored,

Russian merchants must themselves guard and defend their property. They

will be expected still more carefully to look after their animals when

out at pasturage. If, despite all precaution, something should happen to

go astray, notice of such loss must be promptly given to the Chinese

official; who conjointly with the Russian consul shall trace out with

all possible diligence the lost article. If traces of it are discovered,

and those in a village held by Chinese subjects, and the thief be

captured, the punishment shall be prompt and severe. If the thing lost

be recovered, or any portion of it, it shall be restored to the person

to whom it belonged.

ARTICLE VII.

In the event of disputes, litigations, or other trivial incidents,

between the respective subjects, the Russian consul and the Chinese

official, of whom mention has previously been made, shall use all their

efforts to settle the affair satisfactorily. But if, despite every

effort to avoid such, a criminal case or one of general importance

should arise, it shall be decided conformably with the regulations

actually in force on the Kiachta frontier.

ARTICLE VIII.

Russian merchants shall arrive each year with their merchandise between

the 25th day of March and the 10th day of December (of our style, or

according to the Chinese calendar between the day Tchin-ming and the day

Tong-tchi); after the latter of these dates, the arrival of caravans

shall cease. If the merchandise imported during that period (8-1/2

months) should not be sold, it shall be permissible to the merchants to

remain a longer space in China, in order to complete their sale; after

which the consul shall take charge of their departure. It is moreover

understood that Russian merchants shall not obtain an escort of officers

and soldiers, neither for going nor for returning, if they have not at

the least twenty camels laden with merchandise. If a merchant or the

Russian consul has need for some special matter to send an express

message, every facility shall be accorded him for doing so. But in order

that the service of officers and soldiers should not become too onerous,

there shall only be twice in the same month these extraordinary

expeditions outside the line of the advanced guards.

ARTICLE IX.

Russian and Chinese merchants can see each other without restriction

about matters of business; but Russian subjects, finding themselves in

the factory under the care of the Russian consul, may not walk about in

the suburbs and the streets, unless provided with a "permit" from the

consul; without such permit, they must not go out of their enclosure.

Whoever shall go out without permission shall be led back to the

consul, who will proceed against him according to law.

ARTICLE X.

If a criminal belonging to either of the two Empires should flee to the

other, he shall not be afforded sanctuary; but, on the part of each

Power, the local authorities shall take the most severe measures, and

make the most searching enquiries to arrest him. There shall be

reciprocal extradition of fugitives of this class.

ARTICLE XI.

As it is to be foreseen that the Russian merchants, who shall come to

China on commercial matters, will have with them carriages and beasts of

burden, there shall be assigned for their use, near the city of Ili,

certain places on the banks of the river Ili, and also near the city of

Tarbagatai other places where there is both water and pasturage. In

these encampments the Russian merchants shall confide their animals to

the charge of their own people, who shall take care that neither

cultivated lands nor cemeteries shall be in any case injured or

desecrated. Those who may contravene this enactment shall be brought

before the consul to be punished.

ARTICLE XII.

In the exchange of articles of merchandise between the merchants of the

two Empires, nothing shall be left on credit on either side. If,

notwithstanding this clause, some one should purchase his merchandise on

credit, the Russian and Chinese officials shall on no account interfere,

and shall admit of no complaint, even if cause for such might exist.

ARTICLE XIII.

As Russian merchants arriving in China for commercial reasons should

necessarily have special places for their warehouses, the Chinese

government shall assign them, in the two commercial cities of Ili and

Tarbagatai, plots of land near the bazaar, so that the Russian subjects

may be able to construct there, at their own expense, dwelling-houses

and factories for their wares.

ARTICLE XIV.

The Chinese government shall not interpose obstacles in any case where

Russian subjects celebrate, within their own buildings, divine service

according to the rite of their religion. In case a Russian subject in

China should happen to die either at Ili or at Tarbagatai, the Chinese

government shall set apart an empty space outside the walls of those

cities, to serve as a cemetery.

ARTICLE XV.

If Russian merchants should take to Ili or Tarbagatai sheep for the

purpose of exchanging them, the local authorities shall take, on account

of the government, two sheep out of every ten, and shall give in

exchange for each sheep a piece of linen cloth (_da-ba_, of the legal

measure); the remainder of the animals and every other kind of

merchandise shall be exchanged between the merchants of the two Empires

at a price mutually agreed upon, and the Chinese government shall not

intermeddle in any manner whatsoever.

ARTICLE XVI.

The ordinary official correspondence between the two Empires shall be

made, on the part of the Russian government, through the medium of the

superior administration of Western Siberia, and under the seal of that

administration; and on the part of the Chinese government through the

medium, and under the seal, of the superior administration of Ili.

ARTICLE XVII.

The present Treaty shall be authenticated by the signatures and seals of

the respective plenipotentiaries. On the part of Russia there will be

prepared four copies in the Russian language, signed by the

plenipotentiary of Russia; on the part of China, four copies in the

Mantchoo language, signed by the Chinese plenipotentiary and his

adjunct. The respective plenipotentiaries will each keep a copy in the

Russian language, and a copy in the Mantchoo, for the purpose of putting

the treaty into execution, and to serve for constant reference. A

Russian copy and a Mantchoo copy shall be sent to the directing Senate

of Russia; and a copy in each language to the Chinese Tribunal for

Foreign Affairs, to be there sealed and preserved after the ratification

of the Treaty.

All the above articles of the present Treaty concluded by the respective

plenipotentiaries of Russia and China are hereby signed and sealed. The

twenty-fifth day of July, in the year 1851, in the 26th year of the

reign of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor and Autocrat of All the

Russias.

(Signed) Colonel in the corps of Engineers.

KOVALEVSKI.

I Chan,

Bovyantai.

TREATY BETWEEN ENGLAND AND CASHMERE.

TREATY BETWEEN THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND HIS HIGHNESS MAHARAJA RUNBEER

SINGH, G.C.S.I., MAHARAJA OF JUMMOO AND CASHMERE, HIS HEIRS AND

SUCCESSORS, EXECUTED ON THE ONE PART BY THOMAS DOUGLAS FORSYTH, C.B., IN

VIRTUE OF THE FULL POWERS VESTED IN HIM BY HIS EXCELLENCY THE RIGHT

HONOURABLE RICHARD SOUTHWELL BOURKE, EARL OF MAYO, VISCOUNT MAYO OF

MONYCROWER, BARON NAAS OF NAAS, K.P., G.M.S.I., P.C., &c., &c., &c.,

VICEROY AND GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA, AND ON THE OTHER PART BY HIS

HIGHNESS MAHARAJA RUNBEER SINGH AFORESAID, IN PERSON.

Whereas in the interest of the high contracting parties and their

respective subjects it is deemed desirable to afford greater facilities

than at present exist for the development and security of trade with

Eastern Turkestan, the following Articles have with this object been

agreed upon:--

ARTICLE I.

With the consent of the Maharaja, officers of the British Government

will be appointed to survey the trade routes through the Maharaja's

territories from the British frontier of Lahoul to the territories of

the Ruler of Yarkand, including the route _via_ the Chang Chemoo Valley.

The Maharaja will depute an officer of his Government to accompany the

surveyors, and will render them all the assistance in his power. A map

of the routes surveyed will be made, an attested copy of which will be

given to the Maharaja.

ARTICLE II.

Whichever route towards the Chang Chemoo Valley shall, after examination

and survey as above, be declared by the British Government to be the

best suited for the development of trade with Eastern Turkestan shall be

declared by the Maharaja to be a free highway in perpetuity, and at all

times for all travellers and traders.

ARTICLE III.

For the supervision and maintenance of the road in its entire length

through the Maharaja's territories, the regulation of traffic on the

free highway described in Article II., the enforcement of regulations

that may be hereafter agreed upon, and the settlement of disputes

between carriers, traders, travellers, or others using that road, in

which either of the parties or both of them are subjects of the British

Government or of any foreign State, two Commissioners shall be annually

appointed, one by the British Government, and the other by the Maharaja.

In the discharge of their duties, and as regards the period of their

residence, the Commissioners shall be guided by such rules as are now

separately framed, and may, from time to time, hereafter be laid down by

the joint authority of the British Government and the Maharaja.

ARTICLE IV.

The jurisdiction of the Commissioners shall be defined by a line on each

side of the road, at a maximum width of two statute _koss_, except where

it may be deemed by the Commissioners necessary to include a wider

extent for grazing grounds. Within this maximum width the surveyors

appointed under Article I. shall demarcate and map the limits of

jurisdiction which may be decided on by the Commissioners as most

suitable, including grazing grounds; and the jurisdiction of the

Commissioners shall not extend beyond the limits so demarcated. The land

included within these limits shall remain in the Maharaja's independent

possession, and, subject to the stipulations contained in this Treaty,

the Maharaja shall continue to possess the same rights of full

sovereignty therein as in any other part of his territories, which

rights shall not be interfered with in any way by the Joint

Commissioners.

ARTICLE V.

The Maharaja agrees to give all possible assistance in enforcing the

decisions of the Commissioners, and in preventing the breach or evasion

of the regulations established under Article III.

ARTICLE VI.

The Maharaja agrees that any person, whether a subject of the British

Government, or of the Maharaja, or of the Ruler of Yarkand, or of any

foreign State, may settle at any place within the jurisdiction of the

Commissioners, and may provide, keep, maintain, and let for hire at

different stages the means of carriage and transport for the purposes of

trade.

ARTICLE VII.

The two Commissioners shall be empowered to establish supply depots, and

to authorize other persons to establish supply depots, at such places on

the road as may appear to them suitable; to fix the rates at which

provisions shall be sold to traders, carriers, settlers, and others, and

to fix the rent to be charged for the use of any rest-houses or serais

that may be established on the road. The officers of the British

Government in Kullu, &c., and the officers of the Maharaja in Ladakh

shall be instructed to use their best endeavours to supply provisions on

the indent of the Commissioners at market rates.

ARTICLE VIII.

The Maharaja agrees to levy no transit duty whatever on the aforesaid

free highway, and the Maharaja further agrees to abolish all transit

duties levied within his territories on goods transmitted in bond

through His Highness's territories from Eastern Turkestan to India and

_vice versa_, on which bulk may not be broken within the territories of

His Highness. On goods imported into or exported from His Highness's

territory, whether by the aforesaid free highway or any other route, the

Maharaja may levy such import or export duties as he may think fit.

ARTICLE IX.

The British Government agree to levy no duty on goods transmitted in

bond through British India to Eastern Turkestan or to the territories of

His Highness the Maharaja. The British Government further agree to

abolish the export duties now levied on shawls and other textile fabrics

manufactured in the territories of the Maharaja, and exported to

countries beyond the limits of British India.

ARTICLE X.

This Treaty, consisting of ten Articles, has this day been concluded by

Thomas Douglas Forsyth, C.B., in virtue of the full powers vested in him

by His Excellency the Right Honourable Richard Southwell Bourke, Earl of

Mayo, Viscount Mayo, of Monycrower, Baron Naas of Naas, K.P., G.M.S.I.,

P.C., &c., &c., Viceroy and Governor-General of India, on the part of

the British Government, and by the Maharaja Runbeer Singh aforesaid; and

it is agreed that a copy of this Treaty, duly ratified by His Excellency

the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, shall be delivered to the

Maharaja on or before the 7th of September, 1870. Signed, sealed, and

exchanged at Sealkote on the second day of April, in the year of our

Lord one thousand eight hundred and seventy, corresponding with the 22nd

day of Bysack Sumbut, 1927.

Signature of the Maharaja of Cashmere.

(Signed) T. D. FORSYTH,

MAYO.

This Treaty was ratified by His Excellency the Viceroy and

Governor-General of India at Sealkote on the 2nd day of May, 1870.

(Signed) C. U. AITCHISON,

Officiating Secretary to the Government

of India, Foreign Department.

TREATY BETWEEN RUSSIA AND KASHGAR.

THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS OF FREE TRADE WERE PROPOSED AND AGREED UPON

BETWEEN GENERAL AIDE-DE-CAMP VON KAUFMANN AND YAKOOB BEG, CHIEF OF

DJETY-SHAHR.

ARTICLE I.

All Russian subjects, of whatsoever religion, shall have the right to

proceed for purposes of trade to Djety-Shahr, and to all the localities

and towns subjected to the Chief of Djety-Shahr, which they may desire

to visit in the same way as the inhabitants of Djety-Shahr have hitherto

been, and shall be in the future, entitled to prosecute trade throughout

the entire extent of the Russian Empire. The honourable chief of

Djety-Shahr undertakes to keep a vigilant guard over the complete safety

of Russian subjects, within the limits of his territorial possessions,

and also over that of their caravans, and in general over everything

that may belong to them.

ARTICLE II.

Russian merchants shall be entitled to have caravanserais, in which they

alone shall be able to store their merchandise, in all the towns of

Djety-Shahr in which they may desire to have them. The merchants of

Djety-Shahr shall enjoy the same privilege in the Russian villages.

ARTICLE III.

Russian merchants shall, if they desire it, have the right to have

commercial agents (caravanbashis) in all the towns of Djety-Shahr, whose

business it is to watch over the regular courts of trade, and over the

legal imposition of customs dues. The merchants of Djety-Shahr shall

enjoy the same privilege in the towns of Turkestan.

ARTICLE IV.

All merchandise transported from Russia to Djety-Shahr, or from that

province into Russia, shall be liable to a tax of 2-1/2 per cent. _ad

valorem_. In every case this tax shall not exceed the rate of the tax

taken from Mussulmans being subject to Djety-Shahr.

ARTICLE V.

Russian merchants and their caravans shall be at liberty, with all

freedom and security, to traverse the territories of Djety-Shahr in

proceeding to countries conterminous with that province. Caravans from

Djety-Shahr shall enjoy the same advantages for passing through

territories belonging to Russia.

* * * * *

These conditions were sent from Tashkent on the 9th of April, 1872.

General Von Kaufmann I., Governor-General of Turkestan, signed the

treaty and attached his seal to it.

In proof of his assent to these conditions, Mahomed Yakoob, Chief of

Djety-Shahr, attached his seal to them at Yangy-Shahr, on the 8th of

June, 1872.

* * * * *

This treaty was negotiated by Baron Kaulbars.

TREATY BETWEEN ENGLAND AND KASHGAR.

TREATY BETWEEN THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND HIS HIGHNESS THE AMEER MAHOMED

YAKOOB KHAN, RULER OF THE TERRITORY OF KASHGAR AND YARKAND, HIS HEIRS

AND SUCCESSORS, EXECUTED ON THE ONE PART BY THOMAS DOUGLAS FORSYTH,

C.B., IN VIRTUE OF FULL POWERS CONFERRED ON HIM IN THAT BEHALF BY HIS

EXCELLENCY THE RIGHT HON. THOMAS GEORGE BARING, BARON NORTHBROOK OF

STRATTON, AND A BARONET, MEMBER OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL OF HER MOST

GRACIOUS MAJESTY THE QUEEN OF GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND, GRAND MASTER OF

THE MOST EXALTED ORDER OF THE STAR OF INDIA, VICEROY AND

GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA, IN COUNCIL, AND ON THE OTHER PART BY SYUD

MAHOMED KHAN TOORAH, MEMBER OF THE 1ST CLASS OF THE ORDER OF MEDJIDIE,

&C., IN VIRTUE OF FULL POWERS CONFERRED ON HIM BY HIS HIGHNESS.

Whereas it is deemed desirable to confirm and strengthen the good

understanding which now subsists between the high contracting parties,

and to promote commercial intercourse between their respective subjects,

the following Articles have been agreed upon:--

ARTICLE I.

The high contracting parties engage that the subjects of each shall be

at liberty to enter, reside in, trade with, and pass with their

merchandise and property into and through all parts of the dominions of

the other; and shall enjoy in such dominions all the privileges and

advantages with respect to commerce, protection or otherwise, which are,

or may be, accorded to the subjects of such dominions, or to the

subjects or citizens of the most favoured nation.

ARTICLE II.

Merchants of whatever nationality shall be at liberty to pass from the

territories of the one contracting party to the territories of the

other, with their merchandise and property at all times, and by any

route they please; no restriction shall be placed by either contracting

party upon such freedom of transit, unless for urgent political reasons

to be previously communicated to the other; and such restriction shall

be withdrawn as soon as the necessity for it is over.

ARTICLE III.

European British subjects entering the dominions of His Highness the

Ameer, for purposes of trade, or otherwise, must be provided with

passports certifying to their nationality. Unless provided with such

passports they shall not be deemed entitled to the benefit of this

treaty.

ARTICLE IV.

On goods imported into British India from territories of His Highness

the Ameer, by any route over the Himalayan passes, which lie to the

south of His Highness's dominions, the British Government engages to

levy no import duties. On goods imported from India into the territories

of His Highness the Ameer, no import duty exceeding 2-1/2 per cent., _ad

valorem_, shall be levied. Goods imported, as above, into the dominions

of the contracting parties may, subject only to such excise regulations

and duties, and to such municipal or town regulations and duties, as may

be applicable to such classes of goods generally, be freely sold by

wholesale or retail, and transported from one place to another within

British India, and within the dominions of His Highness the Ameer

respectively.

ARTICLE V.

Merchandise imported from India into the territories of His Highness the

Ameer will not be opened for examination, till arrival at the place of

consignment. If any disputes should arise as to the value of such goods,

the customs officer, or other officer acting on the part of His Highness

the Ameer, shall be entitled to demand part of the goods, at the rate of

one in forty, in lieu of the payment of duty. If the aforesaid officer

should object to levy the duty by taking a portion of the goods, or if

the goods should not admit of being so divided, then the point in

dispute shall be referred to two competent persons, one chosen by the

aforesaid officer, and the other by the importer, and a valuation of the

goods shall be made, and if the referees shall differ in opinion, they

shall appoint an arbitrator whose decision shall be final, and the duty

shall be levied according to the value thus established.

ARTICLE VI.

The British Government shall be at liberty to appoint a Representative

at the Court of His Highness the Ameer, and to appoint a Commercial

Agent, subordinate to him in any town or place considered suitable

within His Highness's territories. His Highness the Ameer shall be at

liberty to appoint a Representative with the Viceroy and

Governor-General of India, and to station Commercial Agents at any

places in British India considered suitable. Such Representatives shall

be entitled to the rank and privileges accorded to ambassadors by the

law of nations, and the Agents shall be entitled to the privileges of

Consuls of the most favoured nation.

ARTICLE VII.

British subjects shall be at liberty to purchase, sell, or hire land, or

houses, or depots for merchandise, in the dominions of His Highness the

Ameer, and the houses, depots, or other premises of British subjects,

shall not be forcibly entered or searched without the consent of the

occupier, unless with the cognizance of the British Representative or

Agent, and in presence of a person deputed by him.

ARTICLE VIII.

The following arrangements are agreed to for the decision of Civil Suits

and Criminal Cases within the territories of His Highness the Ameer, in

which British subjects are concerned:--

(_a._) Civil suits in which both plaintiff and defendant are

British subjects, and Criminal Cases in which both

prosecutor and accused are British subjects, or in which the

accused is a European British subject, mentioned in the

Third Article of this Treaty, shall be tried by the British

Representative or one of his Agents, in the presence of an

Agent appointed by His Highness the Ameer;

(_b._) Civil suits in which one party is a subject of His Highness

the Ameer, and the other party a British subject, shall be

tried by the Courts of His Highness, in the presence of the

British Representative or one of his Agents, or of a person

appointed in that behalf by such Representative or Agent;

(_c._) Criminal cases in which either prosecutor or accused is a

subject of His Highness the Ameer shall, except as above

otherwise provided, be tried by the Courts of His Highness

in presence of the British Representative, or of one of his

Agents, or of a person deputed by the British

Representative, or by one of his Agents;

(_d._) Except as above otherwise provided, Civil and Criminal Cases

in which one party is a British subject, and the other the

subject of a foreign power, shall, if either of the parties

be a Mahomedan, be tried in the Courts of His Highness; if

neither party is a Mahomedan, the case may, with consent of

the parties, be tried by the British Representative or one

of his Agents; in the absence of such consent, by the Courts

of His Highness;

(_e._) In any case disposed of by the Courts of His Highness the

Ameer to which a British subject is party, it shall be

competent to the British Representative, if he considers

that justice has not been done, to represent the matter to

His Highness the Ameer, who may cause the case to be

re-tried in some other Court, in the presence of the British

Representative, or of one of his Agents, or of a person

appointed in that behalf by such Representative or Agent.

ARTICLE IX.

The rights and privileges enjoyed within the dominions of His Highness

the Ameer by British subjects under the Treaty, shall extend to the

subjects of all Princes and States in India in alliance with Her Majesty

the Queen; and if, with respect to any such Prince or State, any other

provisions relating to this Treaty or to other matters should be

considered desirable, they shall be negotiated through the British

Government.

ARTICLE X.

Every affidavit and other legal document filed or deposited in any Court

established in the respective dominions of the high contracting parties,

or in the Court of the Joint Commissioners in Ladakh, may be proved by

an authenticated copy, purporting either to be sealed with the seal of

the Court to which the original document belongs, or, in the event of

such Court having no seal, to be signed by the Judge, or by one of the

Judges of the said Court.

ARTICLE XI.

When a British subject dies in the territory of His Highness the Ameer

his movable and immovable property situate therein shall be vested in

his heir, executor, administrator, or other representative on interest

or (in the absence of such representative) in the Representative of the

British Government in the aforesaid territory. The person in whom such

charge shall be so vested shall satisfy the claims outstanding against

the deceased, and shall hold the surplus (if any) for distribution among

those interested. The above provisions, _mutatis mutandis_, shall apply

to the subjects of His Highness the Ameer, who may die in British India.

ARTICLE XII.

If a British subject residing in the territories of His Highness the

Ameer becomes unable to pay his debts or fails to pay any debt within a

reasonable time after being ordered to do so by any Court of Justice,

the creditors of such insolvent shall be paid out of his goods and

effects; but the British Representative shall not refuse his good

offices, if needs be, to ascertain if the insolvent has not left in

India disposable property which might serve to satisfy the said

creditors. The friendly stipulations in the present Article shall be

reciprocally observed with regard to His Highness's subjects who trade

in India under the protection of the laws.

This treaty having this day been executed in duplicate and confirmed by

His Highness the Ameer, one copy shall, for the present, be left in the

possession of His Highness, and the other, after confirmation by the

Viceroy and Governor-General of India, shall be delivered to His

Highness within twelve months in exchange for the copy now retained by

His Highness.

Signed and sealed at Kashgar on the second day of February, in the year

of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and seventy-four, corresponding

with the fifteenth day of Zilhijj, one thousand two hundred and ninety

Hijree.

(Signed) T. DOUGLAS FORSYTH,

Envoy and Plenipotentiary.

Whereas a Treaty for strengthening the good understanding that now

exists between the British Government and the Ruler of the territory of

Kashgar and Yarkand, and for promoting commercial intercourse between

the two countries, was agreed to and concluded at Kashgar, on the second

day of February, in the year of our Lord eighteen hundred and

seventy-four, corresponding with the fifteenth day of Zilhijj, twelve

hundred and ninety Hijree, by the respective Plenipotentiaries of the

Government of India and of His Highness the Ameer of Kashgar and

Yarkand, duly accredited and empowered for that purpose: I, the Right

Hon. Thomas George Baring, Baron Northbrook of Stratton, &c., &c.,

Viceroy and Governor-General of India, do hereby ratify and confirm the

Treaty aforesaid.

Given under my hand and seal at Government House, in Calcutta, this

thirteenth day of April, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight

hundred and seventy-four.

(Signed) NORTHBROOK.

+-------+

| |

| Seal. |

| |

+-------+

RULES FOR THE GUIDANCE OF THE JOINT COMMISSIONERS APPOINTED FOR THE NEW

ROUTE TO EASTERN TURKESTAN.

1. As it is impossible, owing to the character of the climate, to retain

the Commissioners throughout the year, the period during which they

shall exercise their authority shall be taken to commence on 15th May,

and to end on 1st December.

2. During the absence of either Commissioner, cases may be heard and

decided by the other Commissioner, subject to appeal to the Joint

Commissioners.

3. In the months when the Joint Commissioners are absent, _i.e._ between

1st December and 15th May, all cases which may arise shall be decided by

the Wuzeer of Ladakh, subject to appeal to the Joint Commissioners.

4. The Joint Commissioners shall not interfere in cases other than those

which affect the development, freedom, and safety of the trade, and the

objects for which the Treaty is concluded, and in which one of the

parties, or both, are either British subjects, or subjects of a foreign

state.

5. In civil disputes the Commissioners shall have power to dispose of

all cases, whatever be the value of the property in litigation.

6. When the Commissioners agree, their decision shall be final in all

cases. When they are unable to agree, the parties shall have the right

of nominating a single arbitrator, and shall bind themselves in writing

to abide by his award. Should the parties not be able to agree upon a

single arbitrator, each party shall name one, and the two Commissioners

shall name a third, and the decision of the majority of the arbitrators

shall be final.

7. In criminal cases the powers of the Commissioners shall be limited to

offences such as in British territory would be tried by a subordinate

Magistrate of the First Class, and as far as possible the procedure of

the Criminal Procedure Code shall be followed. Cases of a more heinous

kind should be made over to the Maharaja for trial, if the accused be

not a European British subject; in the latter case he should be

forwarded to the nearest British Court of competent jurisdiction for

trial.

8. All fines levied in criminal cases, and all stamp receipts levied

according to the rates in force for civil suits in the Maharaja's

dominions, shall be credited to the Cashmere Treasury. Persons sentenced

to imprisonment shall, if British subjects, be sent to the nearest

British jail. If not British subjects, offenders shall be made over for

imprisonment in the Maharaja's jails.

9. The practice of cow-killing is strictly prohibited throughout the

jurisdiction of the Maharaja.

10. If any places come within the line of road from which the towns of

Leh, &c., are supplied with fuel or wood for building purpose, the Joint

Commissioners shall so arrange with the Wuzeer of Ladakh that those

supplies are not interfered with.

11. Whatever transactions take place within the limits of the road shall

be considered to refer to goods in bond. If a trader opens his load, and

disposes of a portion, he shall not be subject to any duty so long as

the goods are not taken for consumption into the Maharaja's territory

across the line of road. And goods left for any length of time in the

line of road subject to the jurisdiction of the Commissioners shall be

free.

12. Where a village lies within the jurisdiction of the Joint

Commissioners, then, as regards the collection of revenue, or in any

case where there is necessity for the interference of the usual Revenue

authorities on matters having no connection with the trade, the Joint

Commissioners have no power whatever to interfere; but, to prevent

misunderstanding, it is advisable that the Revenue officials should

first communicate with the Joint Commissioners before proceeding to take

action against any person within their jurisdiction. The Joint

Commissioners can then exercise their discretion to deliver up the

person sought, or to make a summary inquiry to ascertain whether their

interference is necessary or not.

13. The Maharaja agrees to give rupees 5,000 this year for the

construction of the road and bridges, and in future years His Highness

agrees to give rupees 2,000 per annum for the maintenance of the road

and bridges. Similarly for the repairs of serais a sum of rupees 100 per

annum for each serai will be given. Should further expenditure be

necessary, the Joint Commissioners will submit a special report to the

Maharaja, and ask for a special grant. This money will be expended by

the Joint Commissioners, who will employ free labour at market rates for

this purpose. The officers in Ladakh and in British territory shall be

instructed to use their best endeavours to supply labourers on the

indent of the Commissioners at market rates. No tolls shall be levied on

the bridges on this line of road.

14. As a temporary arrangement, and until the line of road has been

demarcated, or till the end of this year, the Joint Commissioners shall

exercise the powers described in these rules over the several roads

taken by the traders through Ladakh from Lahoul and Spiti.

(Signed) MAHARAJA RUNBEER SINGH.

" T. D. FORSYTH.

(These rules were agreed upon in 1872, between the Indian Government and

Cashmere, for the purpose of promoting trade with Eastern Turkestan and

Central Asia, which had been sanctioned by the Treaty of Commerce of

1870.)

A STORY FROM KASHGAR.

Mirza Mulla Rahmat, of Kashgar, who arrived at Peshawur lately, on his

way to Mecca, has told what he knows about events in Kashgar. The

following is his story:--In the month of Jamadi-us-sani 1294 (June-July,

1877), that Mahomed Yakoob Khan, the Badshah of Kashgar, collected a

large army to fight the Chinese. He died near the town of Balisan (?

Bai), and his army then recognized Hakim Khan Torah as his successor.

The mullahs in Kashgar in the meantime appointed Beg Kuli Beg, Yakoob's

eldest son, as their Badshah, according to Yakoob's will. Hakim Khan and

the army which joined him then came to Aksu, where Beg Kuli Beg also

arrived, meaning to capture the place and the person of the usurper. A

battle was fought between Kuli Beg and Hakim Khan on the 26th and 27th

of Rajah (27th and 28th July, 1877), and Hakim Khan was defeated. Many

of the soldiers belonging to Hakim Khan's force fell in the battle, and

many others were starved, and some were drowned crossing a river. Hakim

Khan then went into Russian territory with 1,000 chosen soldiers. Beg

Kuli Beg now seized several towns and returned to Kashgar. In the

meantime Naiz Hakim Beg, the Governor of Khoten, rebelled, and Kuli Beg

met him in the field, and captured Khoten. The Beg was scarcely a week

at that place when he heard that the Chinese had arrived at Aksu and had

taken it. An officer (Kho Dalay?) of the Chinese army who had turned

Mahomedan (but subsequently recanted) attacked Yangy Shahr, the

capital, and, capturing it, shut himself up there. The town was then

besieged by the Governor of Kashgar, and the siege continued for fifty

days. Then Kuli Beg came up, and, forcing his entry into the town, took

possession of it, and destroyed the fort. But on the 10th of Zillhij

(16th of December) a strong Chinese force entered the country, and

rapidly reconquered the possessions of the late Yakoob Khan. Beg Kuli

Beg then fled with his men to Tashkent, which he reached by Mingyol Osh

and Marghilan, and put himself under the protection of the Russian

Governor there. Mulla Yunus Jan, the Governor of Yarkand, and his son

and brother fell into the hands of Hasan Jan Bai, Ikskal (? Aksakal).

The above is taken from the columns of an Indian journal, and is

inserted here for the purpose of showing that the converted Chinese, or

Yangy Mussulmans, did revolt from their allegiance to Yakoob Beg the

instant a Khitay force appeared in Altyshahr.

INDEX OF SUBJECTS.

Aali, _see_ Hakim Khan.

Ababakar, 34-36.

Abderrahman Aftobatcha, 18, 209-210, 211.

Abderrahman Khoja (King of Yarkand), 102.

Abdul Aziz, 170, 196.

Abdul Melik, 248.

Abdullah (Yusuf's son), 46, 47.

Abdullah Pansad, 102, 104, 107, 114-116, 117, 137, 158, 171.

Abdullah Zizad, 23.

Ablai (Kirghiz chief), 50.

Acbash, 44.

AEgis of British protection, 204.

Afak, 44.

Afghan Ameer sends embassy to Pekin, 51.

Afghanistan, 8, 49.

Afghan settlers, 16, _passim_.

Afridun Wang, 98-99.

Agha Bula, 265.

Ahmad, 35, 46.

Ak Musjid, siege of, 79-81.

Ak Robat, 228.

Aksai Plateau, 3.

Aksakal, 57-58, 64, 69, _passim_.

Aksakals (risings under), 66, _passim_.

Aksu, 2, 3, 37, 46, 66, 272, 273.

coal at, 163.

description of, 7.

siege of, 127, 273.

Aktaghluc, 37, 44-46, 47, 49.

description of, 52-53.

Alaja "the slayer," 35; _see_ Ahmad.

Alim, 146.

Alim Kuli, 83-85, 86, 87, _passim_.

Alish Beg, 172, 231.

Almatie, _see_ Vernoe.

Alty Shahr, 8, 16, 44, _passim_.

Amban, 54, 63, _passim_.

of Yarkand, or Khan Amban, 54.

Ameer, or Emir, 196, 220, _passim_.

Ameers of Central Asia, 39.

Amoor, 25, 42.

Amursana, 45-48, 49, 252.

Andijani, 4, 12, 158, 160.

Andijani Serai, 153.

Appak Khoja, 252.

Arabdan Khan, 45.

Arabs, 23.

Arpa Tai, battle of, 270.

Artosh, 12, 22, 181.

Aryan family, 14, 17.

Athalik Ghazi, 1, 118, 186, _passim_.

Azmill Khoja, 31.

Babur, 36.

Badakshan, 8, 33, 36, 48, 49, 106, 107, 118.

Badakshi settlers, 16.

Badaulet, 200, 248.

Bahanuddin (son of Sarimsak), 64.

Bai, 272.

Barhanuddin, 46, 47, 48, 49.

Baroghil, 8, 29.

Bartchuk, 3; _see_ also Maralbashi.

Bayen Hu, 253, 266, 267, 271.

Bazandai, 125.

Bedal Pass, 273.

Beg, 220-221.

Beg Bacha, _see_ Kuli Beg.

Bellew, Dr., 22, 171, 222.

Benefits conferred by China on Kashgar, 58, _passim_.

Berdan rifles, 246.

Bhots, 9.

Biddulph, Capt., 222.

Birlas, 32.

Birma, 42.

Black Sea, 14.

Bokhara, 18, 23, 25, 30, 69, 83, 178, 209, _passim_.

Russian treaty with, 179.

sack of, 30.

Bolor, 37, 65.

Bostang Lake, 266.

Buddhism, 25, _passim_.

Buddhists, 16, 31, _passim_.

Bugur, fight at, 269.

Burac, 30.

Buzurg Khan, 2, 71, 87, 91, 103, 107, 108, 110.

intrigues against Yakoob Beg, 111, 117.

deposed by Yakoob Beg, 117.

Cabul, 28, 211.

Calmucks, 19, 44, _passim_.

Calmuck settlements, 19, 44.

Canals, 59.

Candahar, 28.

Caravanbashi, 204.

Carts used in Kashgar, 227-228.

Cashmere, 1, 37, 60.

Caspian, 14.

Cay Yoli, 67.

Chaghtai Khan, 29.

Cha-hi-telkh, 267.

Champion Father, 118.

Chang Lung, 67.

Chang Tay, 112.

Chang Yao, 237, 246, 247, 263, 272.

Chapman, Capt., 222.

Charjui, 179.

Chightam, 10, 134, _passim_.

China, 41-43, _passim_.

Chinaz, 85.

Chinese and Khokand, 49.

Chinese army, character of, 275.

Chinese at Lhasa, 234.

Chinese Empire in Central Asia, 22, 39, 43.

Chinese, first reverse of, 65.

Chinese in Kashgar, 49, 54-75.

Chinese merchants, 5.

Chinese moderation, 249, 270.

Chinese north of Tian Shan, 236.

Chinese overthrow Tungani, 236-237, 238.

Chinese pay Khokand annual sum, 64.

Chinese principle in ruling Kashgar, 156.

Chinese reconquer Kashgar, 258-276.

Chinese revindicating army, strength of, 246.

Chinese rule, benefits and disadvantages of, 74-75.

Chinese, strategical advantages of, 66.

Chinese Turkestan, _see_ Eastern Turkestan.

Chitral, 29.

Christians, 25.

Chuguchak, 10, _passim_.

Chuntche, 42.

Coal mines, 60.

Cochin China, 42.

Comparison between rule of Chinese and Yakoob Beg, 168-169, 255-257.

Constantinople, 196, _passim_.

Corbashi, 149.

Corps of artillerymen, 142.

Crusade, propagandist, against Khitay, 47.

Czar, the, 185.

Dadkwah, _passim_, functions of, 144-145.

Danyal, 44, 45.

Darius, 36.

Darwas, 72.

Dastarkhwan, 225.

Dava Khan, 30.

Davatsi, 45-46.

Delhi, 28.

Destruction caused by Genghis Khan, 28.

Devanchi, 244, 247.

Devan defile, 244, _passim_.

Difference between Eastern and Western Turkestan, 15.

Dihbid, 76.

Disunion in Central Asia, 120-121, 210-211.

in China, 92.

in Kashgar, 259-263.

Djinghite, _see_ Jigit.

Dolans, 9, 143.

Dungani, _see_ Tungani.

Dungans, _see_ Tungani.

Durani, 51.

Dylon Yulduc, 26.

Eastern Turkestan, 1, 15, 17, 38-42, 59, _passim_.

Edinburgh, Duke of, 205.

Effects of Khoja risings on China's prestige, 70.

Effects of past misrule in Kashgar, 39.

Elchi Khana, 228.

Eleuthian, or Eleuth princes, 42, 46.

Emir, or Ameer, 198, 220, _passim_.

England's policy towards China, 257; _see_ chapter 14 also.

towards Kashgar, 212-235.

trade with Kashgar, 153, 202.

trans-Himalayan policy, 204; _see_ chapter 14 also.

English mission guests of Yakoob Beg, 232.

Eshan Khan, 71.

Ferghana, 25, 32, 181, 187, 210.

First outbreak against China in Eastern Turkestan, 64.

Forsyth, Sir T. D., 6, 22, 194, 196, 204, 216, 218-219, 233, 234.

Forsyth's report, 221, 233.

interview with Yakoob Beg, 228-230.

second mission to Kashgar, 221-232.

Galdan, 44, 45.

"Garden of Asia," 2, 59.

Genghis Khan, 25-20, 220, _passim_.

code of, 20.

Ghizni, 28.

Gibbon, 220.

Glacier, _see_ Muzart Pass.

Gobi, 1, 2, 19, 156, 246, _passim_.

Goes Benedict, 37.

Goitre, 12, _passim_.

Gordon, Col., 92, 222.

Gorkhan, 25.

Granville-Gortschakoff negotiations, 207.

Great road from Kashgar to Hamil and Kansuh, 12.

Great Yuldus, 273.

Gregorieff, Professor, 138.

Grim Pass, 223-224.

Guchen, 10, 246.

Gulbagh, 55, 66.

Guoharbrum, 11.

Hacc Kuli Beg (Khokandian general), 69.

Hacc Kuli Beg (Yakoob Beg's son), 79, 133, 244, 252-253, 260.

Hadayatulla, 37, 38.

Hadji Torah, 140, 141, 169-171, 196, 220, 221, 223, 232, 233, 248.

Haft Khojagan, 71.

Hai Yen, 239.

Hakim Beg, 55.

Hakim Khan, 250-253, 259-261.

Hamil, 10, 59, 130, 246, 247.

Han Hing Nung, 240.

Hastings, Warren, 213.

Hayward, Mr., 216.

Hazrat Afak, 37, 38, 74.

Heh Tsun, 240.

Henderson, Dr., 218, 219.

Her Majesty, autograph letter of, 230.

"High Tartary," 212.

Himalaya, 213.

Himalayan passes, 213.

Hindoo Koosh, 14, 17, 28.

Hodjent, 37, 44, 84, 208, 209, _passim_.

Hordes, Kirghiz, 50.

Hoser, 272.

Houchow, 95.

Houtan, 7.

Husen, 32.

Hwang Tsang, 4.

Hydar Kuli, Hudaychi, 84.

Hydar, 35.

Ihrar Khan Torah, 172, 218, 219, 228.

Ilchi, 7.

Ili, 1, 2, 7, 22, 25, 44, 45, 48, 176; _see_ chapter 14, _passim_.

Ili, Viceroy of, 56, _passim_.

Irjar, 85.

Isa Dadkwah, 65-66.

Ishac Wang, 68.

Islamism, 20.

Ismail Shah, 72.

Issik Kul, 17, 33, 174.

Jade, 60, 163-164, _passim_.

Jallab, 6.

Jattah Ulus, or Jattahs, 29, 33, 35.

Jehangir (Ababakar's son), 36.

Jehangir (Sarimsak's son), 64, 65-68.

Jehangir (Timour's son), 34.

Jigit, 143, _passim_.

Jungaria, 1, 2, 15, 17, 25, 33, 34, 47, 134, 175, 236, _passim_.

Kabil Shah, 32.

Kafiristan, 37.

Kafirs, 37.

Kaidu River, 30, 266.

Khalkhalu, 24.

Kamaruddin, 33.

Kamensky, Mr., 248, 264, 265.

Kamschatka, 41.

Kanaat Shah, 82-83.

Kanghi, 42.

Kansuh, 20, 24, 43, 92, _passim_.

Kara Khitay, 24, 25.

Kara Kirghiz, 17.

Karakoram, 2, 37, 48, 213.

Karakoram (city), 29.

Karanghotagh, 36.

Karashar, 2, 9, 20, 130, 247, 266.

Karataghluc, 37, 44, 46, 49.

description of, 52-53.

Karatakka mountains, 68.

Karategin, 68, 77.

Karghalik, 225.

Karshi, 179.

Kashgar River, _see_ Kizil Su.

Kashgari resigned to Chinese conquest, 52.

Kashgar, 12, 25, 35, 45, 178, _passim_.

history of, 22-40.

Kashgaria, 1, 2, 13, _passim_.

Kashgarian valley, description of, 10.

Kashgarian scenery, 11.

Kashgari not fanatics, 140.

dress of, 140.

"Kashmir and Kashgar," 223.

Katti Torah, Khoja, 71.

Kaufmann, General, 185, 195, 197, 206, 207, 209, 250.

Kaulbars, Baron, 192-195, 197.

Kaulbars Treaty, 219.

Kazalinsk, 79.

Kazan Ameer, 31, 32.

Kazi, 145, 146.

Kazi Rais, 6, 146.

Keen-Lung, 43-45, 63, 93, 156, _passim_.

Kermina, 179.

Khalkas, 19.

Khan, 220-221.

Khan Amban, _see_ Amban of Yarkand.

Khan Khoja, 38, 48.

Khans of Central Asia, 39.

Khaton, 23.

Khitay, 5, 21, 46, 93, 143, 240, _passim_.

Khitay merchants, 58.

Khiva, 25, 27, 178, 181, 197, 206.

Khivan desert, 32.

Khize Khoja, 33.

Kho Dalay, 111.

Khoja Ahmad, 44.

Khoja family, 37, 48, 64.

Khoja invasion, 73.

Khoja Ishac, 52.

Khoja Kalan, 52.

Khoja Kalar, 37.

Khoja Kings, 31.

Khoja Kulan, 102.

Khoja Padshah, _see_ Abdullah.

Khojam Beg, 45.

Khokand, 3, 17, 36, 48, 49, 187, _passim_.

Khokand pays tribute to China, 50, 63-64.

Khokand, rising in, 209-210.

Khokandian intrigues, 57.

Khokandian tax-gatherers, 97.

Khoten, 17, 24, 25, 50, 118, 121-123, 224-225.

description of, 6.

rising at, 262.

Khoten gold mines, 163.

Khoten jade, 163, _passim_.

Khudadar, 34.

Khudayar Khan, 71, 81-86, 120, 187-189, 208-209, _passim_.

Khwaresm, _see_ Khiva.

Kiachta, 48.

Kichik Khan, 72.

Kin Shun, 136, 263, 266-272.

Kipchak, 14, 25, _passim_.

description of, 18.

Kirghiz, 14, 16, 17, 104, 143, 184, 209, _passim_.

description of, 17.

nomads submit to China, 50.

Kish, 32.

Kizil Su, 3.

Kizil Yart, 17, _passim_.

Kludof, 182-185.

Kohistan, 2.

Kok Robat, battle of, 72, 228.

Kolpakovsky, General, 182, 184, 281.

Kooda Kuli Beg, 79, 130.

Koosh Bege, 79, _passim_.

Korla, description of, 9, 245, 248, 267, 268, _passim_.

Koshluk, 25.

Kouralia, _see_ Korla.

Kouroungli, _see_ Korla.

Kucha, 2, 8, 127-130, 268, 269, 270, _passim_.

battle at, 270-271.

description of, 9.

Kucha coal mines, 163.

Kucha Khojas, 127, _passim_.

Kuen Lun, 7.

Kuhna Turfan, 7; _see_ Turfan.

Kuhwei, 265, 266.

Kuldja, 2, 94.

Kuldja question, 265.

Kuli Beg. 79, 133, 137, 141, 171, 250, 251, 252-253, 260-263, 274, 276.

Kumush, 265.

Kunar, 29.

Kurama, 76, 82, _passim_.

Kuropatkine, Capt., 204, 244-245.

Kurtka Fort, 65.

Kutaiba, 24.

Ladakh, 213.

Lahore, 31.

"Lahore to Yarkand," 219.

Lake Lob, 134, 245.

Lanchefoo, 45, 59, 246, _passim_.

Laws in Kashgar, 145-146.

Leaoutung, 41.

Leh, 153.

Lhasa, 60.

Little Bokhara, 1, 213.

Liu Kin Tang, _see_ Kin Shun.

Lob Nor, _see_ Lake Lob.

Mah Dalay, 100.

Mahomedanism in Kashgar, 24.

Mahomedanism, _passim_.

Mahomed Ali Khan (ruler of Khokand), 37, 66, 68, _passim_.

Mahomed Arif, 77.

Mahomed Beg of Artosh, 172.

Mahomed Khan, 170.

Mahomed Khoja, 171; _see_ also Sheikh-ul-Islam.

Mahomed Kuli, 102.

Mahomed Latif, _see_ Pur Mahomed.

Mahomed Nazzar. 214, 215.

Mahomed Seyyid Wang, of Kashgar, 66.

Mahomed Yunus Jan, 140, 171-172, 215, 226, 227, 261.

Makhram, battle of, 210.

Manas, 133, 236, 263.

siege of, 239-240.

Manchuria, 19.

Manning, Thomas, 213, 294.

Mansur, 35.

Mantchoo, 41, 42.

Maralbashi, 8, 31, 66, 110, 121; _see also_ Bartchuk.

Marco Polo, 14, 30.

Maulana Khoja Kasani, 52.

Ma-yeo-pu, 270.

Mecca, 37.

Merv, 179.

Meshed, 179.

Michell, Messrs, opinion on Kashgar, 213.

Military settlers, 50.

Mines in Kashgar, 8.

Ming dynasty, 41.

Mingyol, battle at, 69.

Mir, 82.

Mirza, 204.

Mirza Jan Effendi, 170.

Mollah Khan, 82, 170.

Mongols, 25, 41.

Mongols, murder of, 27.

Moorcroft, Mr., 213.

Moral of Yakoob Beg's career, 257.

Morozof, Mr., 202.

Moscow gewgaws, 182.

"Moses in the land," 39.

Mourad Beg, 69.

Mozaffur Eddin, 83, 179, 186, _passim_.

Mufti, 146.

Mufti Habitulla, 122-123.

murder of, 123.

Mughol _see_ Mongol.

Mugholistan. 1, 29.

Muhtasib, 6.

Mussulman Kuli, 18, 81-82, _passim_.

Muzart Pass, 61, 78, 273.

Mysoka Bahadur, 26.

Nadir Shah, 51, _passim_.

Naiman tribe, 25.

Nankin, 92.

Nar Mahomed Khan, 77, 169.

Naryn, 8, 61, 177, 178, 180, 183, _passim_.

Nasruddin, 209-210.

Nestorian Christians, 30.

New Turfan, 7.

Nur Ali (Kirghiz), 50.

Ogdai Khan, 29, 34.

Oigur princes, 23.

Oigurs, 16.

Old saying in Kashgar, 39.

Olja Turkan Khaton, 32.

Opinion of Chinese rule, 152.

Orda, or palace, at Kashgar, 3, 142.

Orda, _passim_.

Oxus, 23, 211.

Pamere, _see_ Pamir.

Pamir, 1, 2, 8, 25, 36, 48.

Panjkora, 28.

Panthays, 92, 175, _passim_.

Pekin, 29, 47, _passim_.

_Pekin Gazette_, 238, 249, 253, 267, 272.

Perovsky, General, 79-81.

Perovsky Fort, 81.

Persia, 14, 23.

Piskent, 76, 77.

Population of Kashgaria, 2, 59, 157.

of city of Kashgar, 3.

of city of Kucha, 9.

of city of Yarkand, 5.

Powers interested in Kashgar, 196.

Presents to Yakoob Beg, 230-231.

Prester John, 25.

Prince of Kashgar, _see_ Ishac Wang.

Prjevalsky, Col., 20, 245, 250, 273.

Pupyshef, Mr., 199-200.

Pur Mahomed Mirza, 76.

Rashid, 37, 52.

Reinthal's, Capt., mission to Kashgar, 184-185, 202-204.

Rising against Russia, folly of, if not combined, 180.

Risings in Khokand, _see_ Khokand.

Road between Ili and Kashgar, 61.

"Road Board," 62.

Romanoffski, General, 85.

"Roof of the World," 222.

Royal Body Guard, 226.

Ruduk, 233.

Russia at Vernoe, 130.

Russia demands Consuls in Kashgar, 203, 205.

Russia in Central Asia, 47, 173.

Russia in Kuldja or Ili, 133, 174-177, 279-282.

Russia invades Kuldja, 206.

Russia promises to restore Ili, 175.

Russian attitude towards Chinese, 248.

Russian merchants, 164, 182, 193, 197, 199, 202.

Russian policy towards Kashgar, 177-209.

Russian trade with Kashgar, 153.

Sadic Beg, 86, 87, 102, 103, 104, 107, 116, 117, 261, 263, 275.

embassy to Tashkent, 87.

truce with, 107.

Sahib Khan, 81.

Said, 35, 36, 37, 52.

Salara, 95.

Samarcand, 25, 33, 52, 179.

Saniz, 34.

Sanju, 7, 36, 224, _passim_.

Sanju Devan, 11, 223.

Sarbaz, 143, _passim_.

Sarimsak Khoja, 48, 51, 64, 65.

Satuk Bughra Khan, 24.

Schlagintweit, Messrs., 16, 214 _passim_.

Schuyler, Eugene, 195.

Scobelef, Gen., 207.

Scobelef, Col., 207, 210.

Scourges of God, 28, 33.

Seistan, 32.

Seven Khoja princes, 71.

Seyyid Ali, 34.

Seyyid Yakoob Khan, _see_ Hadji Torah.

Shadi Mirza, 184-185.

Shahidoolah, 223.

Shahrisebz, 32.

Sham, 226.

Shariat, 90, 145.

Shaw, Robt., 16, 194, 212, 213, 215, 218, 221, 232, 234.

Sheikh-ul-Islam, 116-117, 151, 158.

Sheikh Nizamuddin, 77.

Shensi, 20, 92, 237.

Shere Ali (Cabul), 8, 118, 179.

Shere Ali Khan (Khokand), 83.

Siberia, 1, 47.

Sirikul, 8, 106, 118, 132.

Six Cities, _see_ Altyshahr.

Sobo tribes, 94.

Somof, Mr., 109-200.

St. George and St. Anne Cross Fever, 206.

St. Petersburg, 185, 196.

Stoliczka, Dr., 222.

Story of St Constantine's day, 194.

Subashi, 265.

"Sublimely Pure," 42.

Sule, 1.

Sultan Mourad, 83.

Sultan Seyyid, 83, 86.

Suranchi Beg, 65, 104.

Syr Darya, 18, 79, 192.

Swat, 28.

Szchuen, 58, 237.

Taepings, 92.

Tagharchi, 106.

Tajik, 14, 78.

Talifoo, 92, 175, 237.

Tamerlane, _see_ Timour.

Tanab, 162.

Tanabi, 162.

Tang dynasty, 22.

Tang Jen Ho, 265.

Tangut, 27.

Tarantchis. 12, 68, 124-125.

Tarfur, _see_ Turfan.

Tartar, 15 _passim_.

Tarzagchi, 149.

Tash Balik, 65.

Tashkent, 25, 32, 49, 84, 208.

battle of, 85, 209, _passim_.

etiquette at, 206.

_Tashkent Gazette_, _see_ Turkestan.

Tashkurgan, 8.

Tatsing, 42.

Tawats, _see_ Davatsi.

Taxes in Kashgar, 56, 62, 63, 151-160.

Tay Dalay, 55.

Tchernaief, 84-85.

Tchimkent, 84.

Tekes, river and pass, 133, 273.

Tenure of land in Kashgar, 161.

Terek Pass, 61, 103.

Tian Shan, 2, 20, 33, 59, 247, _passim_.

Tian Shan Nan Lu, 61.

Tian Shan Pe Lu, 61.

Tibet, 7, 37, 42, 50, 56, 60, 213, 217.

Cashmerian, 2.

Tibetan table-land, 36.

Timour, 32-34, 91.

Timour Khan (Chinese Emperor), 31.

Timour, Yakoob Beg's descent from, 77.

Tobolsk, 48.

Toghluc Timour, 31, 33.

Toksoun, 242, 244, 264.

battle at, 247.

To Teh Lin, 240.

Trade, 153.

Trade privileges, 57.

Trade with China, 217-218; _see_ chapter 14.

Trade with Kashgar, 106, 216-217.

Treaty between England and Kashgar, 232.

Treaty between Russia and Kashgar, 194.

Treaty with Khokand, 69.

Trotter, Captain, 222.

Tsedayar, 268.

Tso Tsung Tang, 246, 247, 263, 265, 272, 275, _passim_.

army of, 272.

Tungani, 2, 19, 20, 21, 93, 130, 144, 239, 241, 243, _passim_.

description of, 19, 93-94.

Tungan rising proper, 95, 96, 123-124.

in Kashgar, 96, 102.

in Kuldja, 124-125.

Tungani desert Yakoob Beg, 249.

Tungani unorthodox, 127.

defend Kucha, 127-130.

Turanian family, 14, 15.

Turcomans, 32.

Turfan, 21, 130, 242, 244, 264.

battle at, 247.

Turfan Ush, _see_ Ush Turfan.

Turghay, 32.

Turkestan, Eastern, _see_ Eastern Turkestan.

Western, _see_ Western Turkestan.

_Turkestan Gazette_, 251, 252, 264, _passim_.

Turkestan Trading Company, 232.

Tyfu, 231.

Uigurs, _see_ Oigurs.

Uman Sheikh, 36.

Urumtsi, 10, 130, 131, 134, 236.

siege of, 238-239.

Usbeg, 14.

Usha Tal, 265.

"Ushr" tax, 62, 160.

Ush Turfan, 7, 45, 46, 47, 130, 183, 273.

rising at, 51.

Vagrants, laws against, 150.

Value of land in Kashgar, 160-161.

Vernoe, 8, 130, 174, 176, 182.

Viceroy of Ili, 55, _passim_.

Viceroy of Kansuh, 237-238; _see also_ Tso Tsung Tung.

"Vodka," 209.

"Vuoba," 264.

Wakhan, 8, 64.

Wali Khan, 71, 72, 214.

character of, 72-73.

Wangs, 56, 63, _passim_.

Wanleh, 41.

Wealth of Kashgar merchants, 165.

Western Turkestan, 14, 15, _passim_.

Yahya, 38.

Yakoob Beg, birth of, 76;

early career, 78-91;

character of, 88, 91;

charges against, 89;

sets out against Kashgar, 91;

expedition against Kashgar, 103-118;

fails to take Yarkand, 106;

defeats Tungan army near Yangy Hissar, 109;

marries Kho Dalay's daughter, 112;

attacks Yarkand again, 113-116;

reverse at Yarkand, 114;

takes Yarkand, 116;

reasons for wars with Tungani, 120;

wars with Tungani, 126-127, 127-130, 132-136;

retrospect of his invasion of Kashgar, 119;

his army, 134-135, 142-144;

policy towards Tungani, 135-136;

internal policy, 137-139;

foreign policy, _see_ chapters 10 and 11;

court of, 138-139;

police system of, 146-152;

principles of finance of, 154-167;

expenses of, 157;

revenue of, 167;

reply to Russian threats, 186, 191-192;

reply to Khudayar Khan's overtures, 190;

sends envoy to Tashkent, 195;

arrangement with Sultan, 196;

his opinion of trade, 198;

out-manoeuvres Russia, 199-201;

congratulates Czar on marriage of his daughter, 205;

prepares to defend himself against Russia, 208;

weakness of his foreign policy, 210-211;

policy towards England, 218-233;

decline of friendship towards England, 231;

prepares to defend himself against China, 244-246;

comparison with China, 241-249;

death of, 250-253;

resume of career, 253-257, _passim_.

Yakoob Khan, 220; _see_ Yakoob Beg.

Yakoob Khan, of Cabul, 221.

Yangabad, battle of, 67.

Yangy Hissar, 4, 24, 35, 36, 44, 105, 228.

fort surrenders to Yakoob Beg, 106.

Yangy Mussulmans, 112, 243, _passim_.

Yangy Shahr, 34, 68, _passim_.

at Yarkand, gallant defence of, 101.

at Kashgar, 102, 107, 111-112.

Yarkand, 3, 5, 44, 226.

embassy to, 22.

river, 5, 59.

Tungan rising in, 99-102, 105-106.

Yuldus, 133; _see also_ Great Yuldus.

Yung Ching, 43.

Yunus, 34, 35, 40.

Yusuf (son of Galdan), 46.

Yusuf (son of Sarimsak), 64, 69.

Yuzbashi Mahomed Zareef Khan, 223.

"Zakat" tax, 62, 160, 164-167.

Zilchak, 226.

Zuelik, 79.

Zuhuruddin, 70-72.

Woodfall & Kinder, Printers, Milford Lane, Strand, London, W.C.

Transcriber's Note:

The following modifications have been made to the text.

Page 205: detracted replaced with detraction.

There is no difficulty in arriving at the conclusion that such

exhibitions as this is an instance of detracted from the

otherwise great and striking characteristics of the ruler of

Kashgar.

Page 250: Missing period added at the end of sentence.

They were probably not aware of what was taking place some 300

miles from their camp until many weeks after it had happened;

and then conceived that their best policy would be to give time

for the disintegrating causes at work within the state to have

their full effect before they advanced westward.

Page 255: unaminity replaced with unanimity.

There were superior strategy and superior weapons; greater force

and greater determination; no hesitation in action, and perfect

unaminity in council; all combined to crush one poor forlorn

man, fighting with all the desperation of despair for life, if

not for liberty.

Page 258: Missing t added, aken replaced with taken.

Nor did it follow as a matter of necessity that because the

Chinese had aken Turfan they could capture Kashgar or Yarkand.

Page 278: momet replaced with moment.

Moreover there is the unknown quantity of the rivalry of Li Hung

Chang and Tso Tsung Tang, and whatever influence the latter may

have with the army and the ruling caste on account of his

Mantchoo blood, the former holds the purse in his hands, and can

at any momet paralyse Chinese activity and strength in Central

Asia.

Page 306: accurracy replaced with accuracy.

the accurracy of which has been so strikingly proved by the

correct position given to the two lakes Khas-omo,

Page 337: Period replaced with comma after 209-210.

Abderrahman Aftobatcha, 18, 209-210. 211.

Page 339: Hyder replaced with Hydar.

Hyder, 35.

Page 340: Kalkhalu replaced with Khalkhalu.

Kalkhalu, 24.

End of Project Gutenberg's The Life of Yakoob Beg, by Demetrius Boulger