THE CHINESE RECONQUEST OF KASHGAR.
When Yakoob Beg died at Korla the task of reconquering Kashgar had
barely commenced. The Chinese army, victorious at Turfan, was lingering
in idleness round that city, exhausted, as some believed, by the
greatness of the effort. It was not clear even that the Chinese aspired
to achieve any greater triumph than that they had already won, viz., the
subjection of the Tungani, a subjection which could not be considered
accomplished so long as Yakoob Beg remained in the neighbourhood at the
head of a large army; and that with the withdrawal of the Kashgarian
army to Karashar the Chinese generals might call a halt of an indefinite
duration. Nor did it follow as a matter of necessity that because the
Chinese had taken Turfan they could capture Kashgar or Yarkand. Distance
alone was no slight obstacle, and when added to the barrenness of the
country, which would be made more desolate by the retreating army of the
Mussulmans, an impartial observer might have hesitated to predict any
very speedy triumph for the Chinese. But besides these, there were other
impediments, of which a prudent general had to take careful cognizance.
To seize Karashar or Korla only needed a bold attack; but to subject
Kucha might have been a more arduous undertaking than was even the siege
of Manas. A delay of two months in the heart of Eastern Turkestan must
have strained the resources of the Chinese very much, and might have
ruined their whole enterprise. And even if Kucha fell there still
remained Aksu, and afterwards Ush Turfan in the north, and Maralbashi
in the south, barring the way to the vital portion of the state round
Kashgar and Yarkand. Now the death of Yakoob Beg did not remove any one
of these defences, and for a time it was believed that his son, who had
always the repute of being a good soldier, would make the best of the
very strong line of defence that he undoubtedly possessed. As a matter
of fact, the death of Yakoob Beg was an irretrievable disaster, for it
destroyed whatever cohesion and unity there were in the country. He
himself might have been unable to avert a final overthrow, but the
contest would have been made more protracted. Therefore in the months of
May and June, 1877, immediately after the death of the Athalik Ghazi, it
is strictly true to say that the Chinese reconquest of the country had
barely commenced.
The hesitation shown by the invading generals after the victory of
Turfan was at first caused by a belief in the formidableness of their
antagonist, and, when that antagonist died, by a prudent resolve to
permit the disintegrating causes that speedily manifested themselves in
Kashgaria to have full time to work in their favour. Meanwhile they
formed their plans in secret, laid in large stores of supplies from
Russian territory, and explored the little-known passes of Tekes and
Yuldus. A large number of fresh troops was received from the Calmucks
north of Chuguchak, who during the worst period of the Tungan revolt had
preserved that city for the Chinese.
But before following the forward movement of the Chinese it is necessary
to say something of the internal disturbances in Eastern Turkestan, more
especially of the rivalry of Beg Bacha and Hakim Khan for supremacy. In
the first place, it is necessary that it should be distinctly understood
that of the events that occurred in Kashgaria between the death of the
Athalik Ghazi and the final advance of the Chinese army we are really
without any definite intelligence at all, and it is not probable that
we shall ever be accurately informed of the course of events during
those five months. In the absence of exact _data_, we must assume the
events to have taken place which are most in accordance with
probability. On Yakoob Beg's death, his eldest son, Beg Kuli Beg, was
either in the city of Kashgar or somewhere on the road thither. It is
probable that he had been despatched to the rear, to bring up
reinforcements after the defeat at Turfan, and in his absence Hacc Kuli
Beg, the Ameer's second son, assumed the command of the army when his
father died. It is certain that he accompanied the funeral cortege of
Yakoob Beg back to Kashgar, and that he was murdered outside the walls
by his brother. It was during this time that Hakim Khan Torah appeared
upon the scene. It should be remembered that tidings of the death of
Yakoob Beg travelled very slowly to this country, and that almost
immediately after it arrived we received intelligence of events that had
occurred many weeks after the death of the Ameer. We were therefore
hearing at the same time the particulars of the circumstances of Yakoob
Beg's death, and of those commotions which broke out some weeks after
that event.
When Hacc Kuli Beg left Korla no personal representative remained there
of the dynasty of the Athalik Ghazi, and during that interval the
occasion arose for the intriguing elements that a mixed court, such as
that of Yakoob Beg, could never be free from. Hakim Khan seized that
opportunity, and established his authority in Karashar, Korla, and,
probably, Kucha also; and during a short time Kashgaria was accordingly
divided into three hostile camps. It appears that Beg Bacha, lulled into
a false sense of security by the inactivity of the Chinese, resolved to
chastise the insolence of his rebellious governor, a task which he
should have left for the Chinese. A war then broke out between Beg Bacha
and Hakim Khan, which exhausted the few resources that still remained to
a ruler of Kashgar. The contest appears to have been of a desultory
nature, and although the final result was in favour of Beg Bacha, he
never appears to have recovered possession of Karashar and Korla. In the
neighbourhood of Aksu the battle of this war took place, and Hakim Khan
was defeated, "by the overwhelming numbers of his enemy." Beg Bacha's
chief loss was the death of Mahomed Yunus, the Dadkhwah of Yarkand, his
ablest and most faithful adviser. Hakim then fled to Russian territory,
with 1,000 _sarbazes_, who were promptly interned by order of General
Kolpakovsky, and there he sought to restore his shattered fortunes by
carrying on intrigues with the Russian government. It is scarcely
necessary to say that these came to nothing, and that Hakim Khan has
sunk into that insignificance which, to judge from his acts when called
into public life, is his most befitting atmosphere.
While engaged on this successful campaign east of Aksu, an event
occurred of singular significance, as illustrating the condition of
Kashgar under Beg Bacha. The Kirghiz chief Sadic Beg, who had
disappeared from the scene since his old rivalry with Yakoob Beg
thirteen years before, seized the opportunity afforded by Beg Bacha's
embarrassment to attack the city of Kashgar, denuded of the greater
portion of its garrison. He plundered the suburbs, and only withdrew
when the young Ameer hastened back from Aksu to defend his capital. The
Kirghiz, true to their nature, at once sought the desolate regions of
Kizil Yart. They had, however, made the confusion arising from the death
of the Ameer and the disaffection of Hakim Khan worse confounded, and
completed those elements of weakness and discord which had always proved
an invaluable ally to the Chinese. By themselves both Hakim Khan and the
Kirghiz depredator were beneath contempt; but with an enemy established
on the soil of the country, they assumed a too clear and mischievous
importance. The minor seditions that manifested themselves in Sirikul
and at Khoten completed the round of dissension that, combined with
external force, shattered the fair show of Yakoob Beg's empire. We are
completely ignorant of the details of the disturbances that were
reported to have taken place round Tashkurgan or Sirikul; but it is
plausible to suppose that these were caused either by inroads on the
part of the Wakhis or Badakshis, or by some fresh Kirghiz attack. The
inhabitants of Tashkurgan being Yarkandi settlers, it is not probable
that the rising, or whatever form the commotion assumed, originated with
them; at Khoten the rising was more tangible, and more easily
understood. The people of that city never forgave Yakoob Beg his
treachery towards their ruler, and the instant he disappeared they
hastened to take their revenge. When the Kashgarian garrison was
withdrawn the towns-people simply deposed their _dadkwah_, and nominated
a ruler of their own, who retained authority until the triumph of the
Chinese made it politic for them and him to bow to the rising sun. The
example of Khoten had been followed by Sanju and the vicinity; and thus
the whole southern portion of the state acquiesced in the Chinese
conquest, after the fall of Kashgar, without the necessity for a single
Chinese soldier to be advanced south of Yarkand. It seems probable that
at this very moment the Chinese troops have remained content with the
submission of these districts, and have not garrisoned those important
towns which skirt the Kuen Lun range with their own soldiers.
When Beg Bacha returned post haste to Kashgar, to encounter the Kirghiz,
we said that Sadic Beg fled to the Kizil Yart; but he did not remain
there long, for soon we find him back again at the capital in high
favour with the Ameer, with whom he had come to terms. His Kirghiz
followers were taken into the pay of the state, and just as this
alliance had been struck up, tidings came of events that made that
alliance, however futile and insignificant, a matter of the first
necessity, both to Kirghiz and Kashgar. The Chinese army was at last
advancing. The danger that had for five months been hanging in suspense
over the devoted heads of a Mussulman people was close upon them. The
long-feared and long-expected Khitay were drawing nigh to the capital,
in irresistible strength; and the apprehensions of a cowed people made
them know, too surely, that their end was at hand. The dissensions among
the people themselves, the discord in the ruling house, and the
dissentient elements in every effort towards unity, had all operated in
favour of the invader. While the Chinese had plotted and prepared in the
deliberate manner of a great nation, the people of Kashgar had entered
into cabals and schemes of party tactics that were well nigh ludicrous.
And all the time that the sap of their vigour was being expended, the
Chinese generals were drawing the noose more closely together that was
to strangle the newly erected state beyond all chance of recovery. It
would almost seem as if the Kashgari and their rulers had recovered from
their first shock at the Chinese invasion, and were becoming reconciled
to their presence east of Korla, when they experienced a second, more
severe, and more lasting shock, in the announcement that the Chinese
were again advancing. Their brief contentment passed away, and all their
old terror revived in tenfold force. Hope died within their bosoms, and
the resignation of despair only nerved them to bear a fate which their
own valour should have striven to avert. It is time for us now to return
to the Chinese army, and to follow its decisive operations.
North of the Tian Shan the supreme command was vested in the hands of
Tso Tsung Tang, generalissimo of the army operating against Kashgar, and
Viceroy of the province of Kansuh. South of it the commanders were
Generals Kin Shun and Chang Yao, the former the hero of the siege of
Manas, the latter of the diversion against Turfan from Hamil. The base
of the former was Manas, of the latter Turfan. Their sources of supply
were Hamil, Barkul, and Chuguchak, within the Chinese frontier, and
Kuldja, Semiretchinsk, and Semipalatinsk, without. Their weapons and
ammunition were transported across the desert from Lanchefoo, and their
ranks were swollen by recruits from the Calmuck and other tribes. It
does not appear that the Chinese were very eager to enlarge their army
in size; they rather aimed at increasing its efficiency by the
distribution of Berdan rifles and Krupp's cannon; and during the heat of
the summer months they remained at rest in their recently acquired
possessions. Nor is it probable that those epidemics broke out in their
ranks which it was asserted had appeared amongst them. A sensational
paragraph was published in the _Tashkent Gazette_, which was copied by
some of the London newspapers, asserting that a species of cholera,
known in Kashgar by the name of _vuoba_, had decimated the Chinese army,
and that in consequence of that calamity its advance was permanently
checked. Certainly, this was a piece of gross exaggeration, even if
there were a substratum of fact for the assertion. Then, again, we were
apprised, on high authority, that the Russian government had put a stop
to the despatch of provisions to the country occupied by the Chinese
army, at the request of its new-found friend, Beg Bacha. Yet there is no
question that the caravans of Mr. Kamensky continued to pass between
Kuldja and Manas, and that the chief caterers for the Chinese army were
the Russian merchants of Central Asia. In the course of their
intercourse the best feelings do not appear to have prevailed between
the Russians and Chinese. The latter, flushed with their triumph, had
become arrogant, and were too fond of referring to the question of
Kuldja to be agreeable to the actual possessors of that province. On one
or two occasions these verbal disputes assumed a more dangerous aspect,
and from words the disputants proceeded to blows. Whether this collision
was magnified or not, the Russian government took no diplomatic steps
to secure reparation for injury to their subjects, and continued to wink
at, if they did not actually approve of, their merchants supplying the
Chinese. The clearest proof of this is that the moment Aksu fell a large
caravan was despatched there by Mr. Kamensky. Still there was no little
bad blood between the two people, and for a long time it was doubtful
whether Russia would preserve her attitude of neutrality until Kashgar
had been finally subdued. Beneath all this doubt, and the uncertainty of
the strength and of the ultimate intentions of China, there existed a
sentiment of dissatisfaction in the minds of the Russians at the renown
China was acquiring, as well as at the prospect of having to restore a
rich and paying province.
In short, beneath the Tungan and the Kashgarian questions there
smouldered the Kuldja question. Having now shown how well prepared the
Chinese were at every point, how well armed, and how well fed was the
tactical unit, and how Russia, although far from indifferent as to the
results, was really abetting the side of China, we may pass on to those
more active movements which proved that the Chinese generals possessed
the ability and military knowledge necessary to make full use of the
very powerful weapon which they had created, and which was capable of
accomplishing the most arduous of enterprises.
The first move was made south of the Tian Shan. So far as we know, Tso
Tsung Tang did not break up from Manas until many weeks afterwards. A
brigadier-general, by name Tang Jen-Ho, left Toksoun on the 25th of
August, 1877, with the advanced guard, to occupy the outlying villages
of Subashi and Agha Bula. He does not appear to have had under him more
than a few hundred men. A fortnight later, on the 7th of September,
Generals Tung Fuh-siang and Chang Tsun followed after him with 1,500
troops, all infantry. They advanced through Agha Bula, Kumush, and Usha
Tal to Kuhwei. At this place the troops were concentrated.
The chief duty of these detachments was to prepare the road for the
advance of the main body, to lay in at stated places stores of fuel and
water, and to erect temporary fortifications. So thoroughly was this
portion of the task performed, that General Kin Shun, now known as Liu
Kin-Tang, gave the order for a general forward movement on the 27th of
September.
The infantry followed the main road, while the cavalry, under the
immediate orders of the general, proceeded by by-paths in the same
direction. On the 2nd of October the Chinese army south of the Tian Shan
was assembled at Kuhwei. Its numbers were probably about fifteen
thousand men all told. On the 24th of September a small force of
Kashgarian troops threatened General Tang Jen-Ho's communications, but
on the appearance of the Chinese they "turned tail and dashed away." The
very next day after his arrival at Kuhwei General Kin Shun continued his
forward movement. Two brigadier-generals, whose names it is not
necessary to mention, were entrusted with one division, 6,000 strong,
with which to perform a flanking movement against Korla. The commander
in person led his main body against Korla, arriving at the River Kaidu,
which flows into Lake Bostang, half-way between Karashar and Korla. But
his advance was here checked, as Bayen Hu, the rebel leader, had flooded
the country by damming up the course of the river. The depth of the
inundation was said to be in the deepest parts over a man's head, and in
the shallowest it came up to the horses' cruppers. The Chinese march was
then changed to a northerly direction, in order to strike the river
higher up, where the obstruction raised by the enemy would be more
easily overcome. A cart-road was carefully constructed along these
alkaline plains, and the Kaidu was dammed to stop the flow from the
upper course, and a bridge was erected over it. This detour had caused
some delay, yet Karashar was reached on the 7th of October, four days
after Kin Shun had set out in person from Kuhwei. The inundation from
the Kaidu had spread as far as here, and the town was several feet under
water. All the official and private residences had been destroyed alike,
and the Turki-Mussulman, as the _Pekin Gazette_ styles them, population
had been compelled by Bayen Hu to follow him in his retreat. It would be
interesting to know whom the Chinese meant by Bayen Hu, but it is almost
impossible to say. As it was not Hakim Khan, the most probable personage
would be one of the Tungan leaders, either of Urumtsi or Hamil, who had
been mediatized by Yakoob Beg and placed in command of the Turfan
region. He appears to have been the commander of that portion of the
Kashgarian army which was left round Korla.
Not only was Karashar deserted by its inhabitants, but so was the whole
country round about. Some, indeed, had fled to the mountains, but these
were afraid to return when they saw the Chinese established in their
homes. And then the conquerors followed out their usual plan by settling
fresh colonists in the town. The Mongol noble, Cha-hi-telkh, was
directed to move up some hundreds of the members of his tribe to occupy
this important post, to restore the homes and to retill the fields; and
while this work of restoration was proceeding on territory conquered by
the Chinese, that through which they passed in hostile guise was
subjected to far other treatment. On the 9th of October the Chinese
marched against Korla from two sides, and on that day a cavalry skirmish
took place, in which fifteen of Bayen Hu's horsemen were slain, and two
taken prisoners. From the evidence of these, who were dressed in the
Khokandian garb, but were Mussulman subjects of China, being natives of
Shensi, it was learnt that Bayen Hu had withdrawn with all his forces to
Kucha, taking with him the produce of the country and the majority of
the people. They affirmed that the small detachment to which they
belonged was only a scouting party, sent out to learn what the Chinese
army was doing. When the Chinese had exhausted their stock of
information they beheaded them. The same day they entered Korla, which
they found to be completely deserted, although not flooded. The walls
remained, but many of the houses had been thrown down. Here the general
was nearly reduced to a desperate plight, as the provision train, which
was transported by cart and camel, did not come up, and there was the
prospect of starvation compelling the victorious army to retreat. But
happily the thought struck the able general, or perhaps some one gave
him a hint, that there might be some stores concealed in the city which
the Kashgari had been unable to carry away with them. Accordingly the
whole army set to work to search the houses, and to dig into the ground
in all likely places for hidden stores. Their toil was soon rewarded,
and "several tens of thousand catties' weight of food" were discovered.
As a catty weighs 1-3/4 lb., this was no slight supply for an army of
men which was probably under 10,000 strong. These concerted movements of
the army south of the Tian Shan placed the country as far west as
Karashar in the possession of the invader. Their next advance, which
they could not expect to be as unopposed as their late one, would bring
them into the plain of Kashgar. No sooner had Karashar and Korla fallen
into their possession than an edict was issued inviting the Mahomedan
population to return to their homes, and many of them accepted the
invitation. In this quarter the arms of China were not disgraced by any
excesses, and moderation towards the unarmed population extenuated their
severity towards armed foes.
While halting some days at Korla, Kin Shun heard that Bayen Hu was
coercing the people east of Kucha at Tsedayar and other places, and
compelling them to withdraw to Kucha and to destroy their crops. He at
once resolved to frustrate the plan, and set out in person at the head
of 1,500 light infantry and 1,000 cavalry to protect the inhabitants. By
forced marches, sometimes carried on through the better part of the
night, he reached Tsedayar on the 17th of October, when he learnt that
Bayen Hu had driven off the whole of the population, and was already at
Bugur, on the road to Kucha. At the next village to Tsedayar, a
fortified post known as Yangy Shahr, he found that Bayen Hu was still
ahead of him, and that he was setting fire to the villages on his line
of march. Kin Shun left a portion of his infantry behind to put out the
conflagration, and resolutely pressed on with the remainder of his force
to Bugur. This small town had also been set on fire, but here the
rapidity of the Chinese general's advance was rewarded with the news
that the enemy's army, with a large number of the inhabitants, was only
a short distance ahead. The rear-guard, composed of 1,000 cavalry, was
soon touched, and the Kashgari, emboldened by the small numbers of the
Chinese, came on to the attack in gallant fashion. Their charge was
broken, however, by the steadiness of the Chinese infantry, armed with
excellent rifles, and the cavalry performed the rest. The Kashgari left
100 slain on the field of battle and twelve prisoners. From these latter
it was discovered that the main body of 2,000 soldiers was some distance
on the road to Kucha, with the family of Bayen Hu and the villagers
under its charge. It was too late to advance further that day, but on
the next the forward movement was resumed. A large multitude--"some tens
of thousands of people"--was speedily sighted by the advanced guard, but
on examining these through glasses it was discovered that scarcely more
than a thousand carried arms. All the troops were then brought to the
front, and Kin Shun issued instructions that all those found with arms
in their hands should be slain, but the others spared.
The armed portion of the Kashgarian army drew off from the unarmed,
leaving in the midst the large assemblage of Mussulman villagers who
were being carried off to Kucha. These were sent to the rear by order of
Kin Shun, and distributed in such of the villages as were most
convenient. In the meanwhile a sharp fight took place a few miles in the
rear of the old position, near a village called Arpa Tai. The action
appears to have been well contested, but the superior tactics and
weapons of Kin Shun's small army prevailed; and the Mussulman army
retreated with considerable loss and in great disorder. Kin Shun
followed up his success with marvellous rapidity and restless energy,
while the Kashgarian troops fled incontinently to Kucha, abandoning the
people and the country to the invader. The unfortunate inhabitants
implored with piteous entreaties the mercy of the conqueror, and it is
with genuine satisfaction we record the fact that Kin Shun informed them
of their safety, and bade them have no further alarm.
By this time it is probable that the Chinese army had been largely
reinforced from the rear, for we have now come to a more arduous portion
of the enterprise, the attack against Kucha. When the Chinese appeared
before its walls they found that a battle was proceeding there between
the Kashgarian soldiers and the townspeople, who refused to accompany
them in a further retreat westward. On the appearance of the Chinese
army, the Kashgarian force evacuated the city, and joined battle with it
on the western side of Kucha. The Chinese at once attacked them, at
first with little success; and a charge of the cavalry, numbering some
four or five thousand men, was only repulsed with some difficulty. But
the cannon of the Chinese were playing with remarkable effect upon the
Mahomedans, and the Chinese reserves were every moment coming upon the
ground. The infantry were at last ordered to advance, under cover of a
heavy artillery fire, and the cavalry made a charge at a most opportune
moment. The whole army then broke and fled in irretrievable confusion,
leaving more than a thousand of their number on the ground. Their
general, Ma-yeo-pu the Chinese called him, was wounded early in the day,
but, although stated to be a noted man, it is impossible to recognize
his identity under the Chinese appellation. This was certainly the most
sanguinary and the best-contested action of the whole war. The numbers
on each side were probably about 10,000 men, and it was won as much by
superior tactics and skill as by brute force and courage. All the
movements of the Chinese were characterized by remarkable forethought,
and evinced the greatest ability on the part of the general and his
lieutenants, as well as obedience, valour, and patience on the part of
his soldiers. The rapid advance from Kuhwei to Karashar, the forced
march thence to Bugur, the capture of Kucha, the forbearance of the
conqueror towards the inhabitants, all combine to make this portion of
the war most creditable to China and her generals, to Kin Shun in
particular. The reason given in the Official Report for the Kashgarian
authorities attempting to carry off the population was that the rebels
wished in the first place to deprive the invading force of all
assistance, thus making further pursuit a work of difficulty, and in the
second place, to ingratiate themselves with the new Pahia (probably
Bacha) of Kashgar, Kuli Beg, by delivering this large mass of
Turki-Mussulmans into his hands. Bayen Hu was, therefore, certainly not
Hakim Khan. It is tolerably clear that he must have been either a Tungan
refugee or a subordinate of Beg Bacha's.
A depot was formed at Kucha, and a large body of troops remained there
as a garrison; but the principal administrative measures were directed
to the task of improving the position of the Turki-Mussulman population.
A board of administration was instituted for the purpose of providing
means of subsistence for the destitute, and for the distribution of
seed-corn for the benefit of the whole community. It had also to
supervise the construction of roads, and the establishment of ferry
boats, and of post-houses, in order to facilitate the movements of trade
and travel, and to expedite the transmission of mails. Magistrates and
prefects were appointed to all the cities, and special precautions were
taken against the outbreak of epidemic or of famine. All these wise
provisions were carried out promptly, and in the most matter-of-fact
manner, just as if the legislation and administration of alien states
were the daily avocations of Chinamen. There is no reason to believe
that in the vast region from Turfan to Kucha the Chinese have departed
from the statesmanlike and beneficent schemes which marked their
re-installation as rulers; and whatever harshness or cruelty they
manifested towards the Tungani rebels and the Kashgarian soldiers was
more than atoned for by the mildness of their treatment of the people.
On the 19th, or more probably the 22nd of October, Kin Shun resumed his
forward movement, encountering no serious opposition. His first halt was
at a village called Hoser, where he halted for one night, which he
employed in inditing the report to Pekin, which described the successes
and movements of the previous three weeks. At the next town, known as
Bai, Kin Shun halted to await the arrival of the rear-guard, under
General Chang Yao. This force came up before the close of October, and
the advance against Aksu was resumed. Up to this point the chief
interest centred in the army south of the Tian Shan, and in the
achievements of Kin Shun. Our principal, in fact our only, authority for
this portion of the campaign is the _Pekin Gazette_.
We have now to describe the movements of the Northern Army, which was
under the immediate command of Tso Tsung Tang, and which was operating
in the north of the state, in complete secrecy. That general had under
him, at the most moderate computation, an army of 28,000 men. By some it
was placed at a higher figure; but a St. Petersburg paper, on the
authority of a Russian merchant, who had been to Manas, computed it to
be of that strength. It was concentrated in the neighbourhood of Manas,
and along the northern skirts of the Tian Shan; and also on the
frontier of the Russian dominions in Kuldja. To all appearance this army
was consigned to a part of enforced inactivity, since it was impossible
to enter Kuldja, and thus proceed by their old routes through the passes
of Bedal or Muzart. But it was not so; the travels of Colonel Prjevalsky
in the commencement of 1877 had not been unobserved by the Chinese, and
it was assumed that where a Russian officer with his Cossack following
could go, there also could go a Chinese army. By those little-known
passes, which are made by the Tekes and Great Yuldus rivers, the Chinese
army, under Tso Tsung Tang, crossed over into Kashgaria; and it is
probable that the two armies joined in the neighbourhood of Bai. It was
by this stroke of strategy on the part of Tso Tsung Tang that the
Chinese found themselves before the walls of Aksu, with an overwhelming
army, at the very sight of which all thought of resistance died away
from the hearts of the Mussulman peoples and garrisons. Tso Tsung Tang
appeared before the walls of Aksu, the bulwark of Kashgar on the east,
and its commandant, panic stricken, abandoned his post at the first
onset. He was subsequently taken prisoner by an officer of Kuli Beg, and
executed. The Chinese then advanced on Ush Turfan, which also
surrendered without a blow. As we said, the Chinese have not published
any detailed description of this portion of the war, and we are
consequently unable to say what their version is of those reported
atrocities at Aksu and Ush Turfan, of which the Russian papers have made
so much. There is no doubt that a very large number of refugees fled to
Russian territory, perhaps 10,000 in all, and these brought with them
the tales of fear and exaggerated alarm. We may feel little hesitation
in accepting the assertion as true, that the armed garrisons were
slaughtered without exception; but that the unarmed population and the
women and children shared the same fate we distinctly refuse to credit.
There is every precedent in favour of the assumption that a more
moderate policy was pursued, and there is no valid reason why the
Chinese should have dealt with Aksu and Ush Turfan differently to Kucha
or Turfan. The case of Manas has been greatly insisted upon by the
agitators on this "atrocity" question; but there is the highest
authority for asserting that only armed men were massacred there. This
the Chinese have always done; it is a national custom, and they
certainly did not depart from it in the case of the Tungani and Kashgar.
But there is no solid ground for convicting them of any more heinous
crime, even in the instances of Manas and Aksu, which are put so
prominently forward.
Early in December the last move of all began against the capital, and on
the 17th of that month the Chinese took it by a _coup de main_. Beg Kuli
Beg, according to one account, fought a battle outside the town, in
which he was defeated; according to another report, he had withdrawn to
Yarkand, whence he fled to Russian territory, when he heard of the fall
of Kashgar. It is more probable that he resisted the Chinese attack on
Kashgar, for he certainly reached Tashkent, in company with the Kirghiz
Chief, Sadic Beg, who was wounded in that battle. With the fall of
Kashgar the Chinese reconquest of Eastern Turkestan was completed, and
the other cities, Yangy Hissar and Yarkand, speedily shared the same
fate. Khoten and Sirikul also sent in formal promises of subjection. But
the capture of Kashgar virtually closed the campaign. No further
resistance was encountered, and the new rulers had only to begin the
task of reorganization. When Kashgar fell the greater portion of the
army, knowing that they could expect no mercy at the hands of the
Chinese, fled to Russian territory, and then spread reports of fresh
Chinese massacres, which probably only existed in their own imagination.
There can be no doubt that the Chinese triumph has been thorough, and
that it will be many years before the people of Eastern Turkestan will
have again the heart to rebel against their authority. The strength of
China has been thoroughly demonstrated, and the vindication of her
prestige is complete. Whatever danger there may be to the permanence of
China's triumph lies rather from Russia than from the conquered peoples
of Tian Shan Nan Lu; nor is there much danger that the Chinese laurels
will become faded even before an European foe. Tso Tsung Tang and his
lieutenants, Kin Shun, who has since fallen into disgrace,--perhaps he
had excited the envy of his superior--and Chang Yao, accomplished a task
which would reflect credit on any army and any country. They have given
a lustre to the present Chinese administration which must stand it in
good stead, and they have acquired a personal renown that will not
easily depart. The Chinese reconquest of Eastern Turkestan is beyond
doubt the most remarkable event that has occurred in Asia during the
last fifty years, and it is quite the most brilliant achievement of a
Chinese army, led by Chinamen, that has taken place since Keen-Lung
subdued the country more than a century ago. It also proves, in a manner
that is more than unpalatable to us, that the Chinese possess an
adaptive faculty that must be held to be a very important fact in
every-day politics in Central Asia. They conquered Kashgar with European
weapons, and by careful study of Western science and skill. Their
soldiers marched in obedience to instructors trained on the Prussian
principle; and their generals manoeuvred their troops in accordance
with the teachings of Moltke and Manteuffel. Even in such minor matters
as the use of telescopes and field glasses we find this Chinese army
well supplied. Nothing was more absurd than the picture drawn by some
over-wise observer of this army, as consisting of soldiers fantastically
garbed in the guise of dragons and other hideous appearances. All that
belonged to an old-world theory. The army of Eastern Turkestan was as
widely different from all previous Chinese armies in Central Asia as it
well could be; and in all essentials closely resembled that of an
European power. Its remarkable triumphs were chiefly attributable to
the thoroughness with which China had in this instance adapted herself
to Western notions.
With the flight of Beg Kuli Beg to Tashkent closed the career of the
house of the Athalik Ghazi in Kashgar. Whatever turn events may take in
this portion of Central Asia, whatever schemes there may be formed in
Khokand, or elsewhere, of challenging anew the Chinese domination, it
will not be round the banner of Kuli Beg that the ousted Khokandian
officials will rally. By his flight in the hour of danger, by the
hesitation which marked all his movements, and by the murder of his
brother in cold blood, this prince, of whom much at one time was
expected, has irretrievably ruined both his career and his reputation.
If on any future occasion Russia should seek to play the part played of
old by Khans of Khokand in the internal history of Kashgar, it will not
be Kuli Beg whom they will put forward as their puppet. His old rival,
Hakim Khan, stands a much better chance than he, more especially if it
be true that he is the representative of the Khojas, being the son of
Buzurg Khan, as many have asserted. But the fact remains clear, that all
the dreams of Yakoob Beg of founding a personal dynasty in Eastern
Turkestan are now dispelled beyond all prospect of realization.