YAKOOB BEG'S POLICY TOWARDS RUSSIA.
Yakoob Beg had in the earlier days of his career come into contact with
the Russians, and although, in the long interval between the fall of Ak
Musjid and his departure from Khokand, the Russians, chiefly owing to
the prostration resulting from the Crimean War, did not press on with
the energy that their first advance on the Syr Darya seemed to promise,
there is no doubt that the possibility of its occurrence was the
foremost thought in the minds of Yakoob Beg and his contemporaries. In
1865, when the Russians threatened and eventually occupied Tashkent, and
brought their frontier halfway on its journey to the Oxus, Yakoob Beg
was far too much occupied with his own affairs in Kashgar to attempt any
interference in Khokand. With, however, the dismemberment of Khokand and
the rout of the Bokhariot army in the spring of 1866, his attention was
forcibly claimed by a fact that seemed in the future to involve him as
the next victim of Russian aggrandizement. In that year, too, he had not
only overcome all resistance in the more important districts of
Kashgaria, but he had to a greater extent than before, become
responsible for the political actions of the people of this state
through the deposition of Buzurg Khan. As early as 1866, it may be
assumed that the new ruler of Kashgar had his attention directed to the
movements of his old antagonist, by their successes against the
Khokandians and Bokhariots; but it is clear that the Russians were not
equally interested in his doings at this period. With the occupation of
the northern portion of Khokand, the rule of Russia was brought into
nearer proximity with that of the new power of Kashgar, and it became
only a question of time whether the two governments were to attain a
harmonious agreement, or whether a series of petty disputes was to
result in a further extension of the Russian Empire, towards both India
and China. The independent portion of the Khanate of Khokand still
intervened, and the difficult country of the Kizil Yart mountains served
the useful purpose of giving the Athalik Ghazi breathing time, ere he
should arrive at a decision about his future relations with Russia.
Indeed, up to this point the interest of Russia in the affairs of
Kashgar had been very slight, for it does not appear that much, if any,
intercourse had been carried on between the two territories in the past.
Far otherwise was it in Ili, where the Russians had for many years been
located as merchants or as consuls. Their station at Almatie or Vernoe,
an important town and fort situated about 50 miles north of Issik Kul
and 250 west of Ili itself, had in a few years become a large and
flourishing city, instead of preserving its original character of a
small mountain fort. Russian merchants carried on a very extensive trade
by this road with Ili, Urumtsi, Hamil, and Pekin, and their relations
with the Chinese merchants had attained a very satisfactory basis. It
was, therefore, with no friendly feeling, that the Tungan rising in Ili
was regarded by a very large section of the Russians in the
neighbourhood. The disturbances that thereupon broke out, effectually
put a stop to all trade in this quarter for some time, and the old
traffic, or such of it as continued, with China had to be conducted
along the less direct route through Siberia. For six years, the Russians
tolerated the uncertain state of affairs in Ili, where the Tungani and
the Tarantchis disputed between themselves as to which should be the
ruling party; but their dissatisfaction was scarcely concealed at the
substitution of a native government for that of China. When, therefore,
Yakoob Beg, having conquered the country south of the Tian Shan, seemed
to threaten the provinces north of that barrier, it is not surprising
that the Russians availed themselves of excuses for forestalling him,
and for placing their commercial relations on an equally good footing as
they had been in the past with the inhabitants of Ili, by a forced
occupation of that territory. But the Russians were resolved to give as
little umbrage as possible to the Chinese. Ili was formally acknowledged
to be Chinese territory, and the Czar voluntarily promised, through his
representative at Pekin, to restore it as soon as the Emperor of China
was able to despatch a sufficient force to preserve order therein. This
tact secured the permanent goodwill of the Chinese, and Russia obtained,
in several important trade concessions, a very gratifying reward for her
skilful diplomacy. Her friendly action to the Celestials was also
heightened in its effect by a piece of unfortunate policy on our part.
The Panthays had erected in Yunnan a Mahomedan power, which seemed to
have broken off completely from Pekin, and report brought such tales to
our frontier of the power and goodwill of the Sultan of the Panthays
ruling in Ta-li-foo, that in an ill-advised moment we entered into
negotiations with this potentate. The Chinese authorities very naturally
took umbrage at this tacit support of a rebellious vassal, and all our
subsequent efforts have been unable to remove the suspicions produced by
our vacillating attitude on that occasion. The Russians still further
preserved the appearance of friendship for China by their refusal,
maintained during several years, to acknowledge the government set up in
Kashgar by Buzurg Khan and Yakoob Beg. This action was however the less
worthy of approval, because at that period the Russians had no immediate
concern in Kashgaria. Their sole interest lay in the course of events in
Jungaria, with which they were intimately connected by trade and
political associations, stretching back for almost a century.
Undoubtedly Jungaria was much affected by commotions in Kashgaria, and
we accordingly see, when the march of events in the latter province
assumed an aspect menacing to the future independence of Jungaria, the
Russians taking prompt measures to secure the possession of that
province for themselves. When Ili passed into the hands of Russia, the
old trade revived along this route to a certain degree, and some
intercourse ensued with the Tungani of Urumtsi, Manas and Hamil.
Measures seem to have been taken to impress on the rulers of those
cities the prudence of not interfering with merchants or travellers, and
matters became to a certain degree satisfactory for Russian
tranquillity. The city of Ili never, however, recovered its former
prosperity, for Vernoe still remains the most important town in this
region. Originally a fort constructed in 1854, as a small mountain post,
to defend the road from the marauding Kirghiz, it has increased from its
insignificant origin into a large settlement of Cossacks and Calmucks,
and is now a very thriving community. It was, therefore, it must be
remembered, primarily with Jungaria that Russia was interested. So far
as the internal affairs of Kashgar were concerned, she could have
disregarded the dispute between the rivals, Yakoob Beg and the Chinese;
it was only when a powerful Mahomedan state was erected in Eastern
Turkestan, and threatened both the independence of Ili, and also to
raise up disunion in Khokand, that Russia was compelled to consider what
policy it would be wise to adopt towards the recently proclaimed Athalik
Ghazi. Whether it was absolutely necessary or even prudent to annex Ili,
may be doubted with some reason, but it is impossible to find fault with
the Russians for that step. Probably it was the most excusable of all
their conquests, none the less may the decision have been founded on a
misapprehension of circumstances, or it may have been premature to shut
Yakoob Beg out from advancing into a region where he would have been at
the complete mercy of the Russians. Nor is it clear even that Yakoob Beg
had the intention, so generously attributed to him, of committing what
would certainly have resulted in political extinction, viz., an advance
to the northern side of the Tian Shan. The reader will, we hope,
perceive that as little interest was felt by the Russians in the events
transpiring in Kashgar as there was in India, and this indifference
continued down at all events to the end of 1866. At that date Yakoob
Beg's enterprise had been crowned with complete success and the Russian
Government, far more promptly and accurately apprised of the course of
events than our Government in India, was obliged to devote some
attention to this new power, whose appearance was already beginning to
raise a ferment in the Mahomedan states lying to the west of Kashgar.
In 1866, however, some indefinite agreement was arrived at by the
commanders of forces along the Naryn borders, to abstain from
interfering with each other's actions. The Russian forces were permitted
to follow refugees from Khokand and predatory Kirghiz within the nominal
frontier of Kashgar, and when occasion arose a similar right was
accorded to the Kashgarian officials. By some good fortune, perhaps
caused by a feeling of mutual respect, no collisions of any consequence
occurred between the representatives of the two powers during these
early and vague negotiations. Although the Russian governors of Siberia
and Turkestan refused to acknowledge either Buzurg Khan or Yakoob Beg,
they seem to have done their best to make use of these conciliatory
measures along the northern frontier as a lever for inducing Yakoob Beg
to make overtures to them for their support. If such was their intention
the firmness of Yakoob Beg thwarted all their designs, as will be seen
in the sequel. To obtain, however, some advantage out of the apparent
apprehension of the Kashgarian ruler for Russian power was absolutely
necessary, if only to demonstrate the perfection to which Muscovite
diplomacy had attained. So, while refusing to acknowledge the new state
in Eastern Turkestan and deeply deploring the departure of the Chinese,
orders were given to the frontier officers to obtain the sanction of the
Kashgarian officials in the neighbourhood to the construction of a
bridge across the Naryn and of a military road over the Tian Shan into
Kashgar. This was in 1867, and it is not to be wondered at that the
Kashgarian authorities replied with a categorical refusal. To have
acquiesced in this demand would have been to have placed the city of
Kashgar at the complete mercy of the Russians. The position of that city
is most disadvantageous in a military point of view, and the only
obstacle an army advancing from Issik Kul has to encounter is the
difficulty of the road from the Naryn torrent, and the general
impracticability of the passes through this portion of the Tian Shan
range. The Russian government was much disappointed at this rebuff
experienced at the hands of a native ruler, and accordingly in great
haste it was resolved that a fort should be constructed on the Naryn
just within their frontier. In 1868 this fort was completed, but by that
time a fresh change had taken place in the state of affairs, and hopes
were entertained that an agreement might yet be arranged by peaceful
means with Kashgar. During these two years there had been continual
disturbances and fighting in Western Turkestan. Bokhara, instigated,
according to Russian assertions, by Yakoob Beg, had joined with Khokand
and Khiva in a combined uprising against Russia; but in so far as that
uprising was combined it never occurred, for both Bokhara and Khokand
fell an easy prey in detail to the armies of the Czar. The punishment of
Khiva was reserved for a future occasion, and indeed of all the
confederates Khiva was the only one which obtained any successes in the
field. The most palpable result of that campaign was the acquisition of
Samarcand by Russia, and for a time all opposition seemed to be stamped
out. No sooner, however, had the main Russian army returned to Tashkent
than a large force invested the small garrison left in Samarcand, and
the whole country rose in arms again. The Russian garrison held tightly
on to its post, and, although in comparison to its strength its loss was
most severe, the town was preserved until the arrival of General
Kaufmann with reinforcements. Bokhara then sued for peace, which, after
some delay, was concluded with the unfortunate Ameer Mozaffur Eddin. By
that treaty the Russians obtained the right to place military
cantonments at Kermina, Charjui, and Karshi. Kermina is situated about
fifty miles east of the town of Bokhara, on the road from Katti Kurgan
and Samarcand; Karshi about sixty miles south of Katti Kurgan, and half
way to the Oxus; while Charjui is on the Oxus and some eighty miles west
of Bokhara. Of all these the last is the most important, for thence a
direct caravan route leads to Merv and Meshed. Once more, in 1870-71,
Bokhara entered the field, but the enterprise collapsed through the
unconcerted measures of the allies and the weakness of Khokand. During
these five eventful years of rebellion amongst the races of Western
Turkestan, Yakoob Beg preserved his neutrality. If the assertion is
correct that he had played an underhand part in the formation of the
league against Russia, assuredly he endeavoured to make his actions
contradict his diplomacy. Not a Kashgarian soldier participated in the
efforts made so repeatedly by Bokhara and Khokand to shake off the bonds
of Russian vassalage. Like Shere Ali of Cabul, he devoted his attention
exclusively to the affairs of his immediate province, and wars in the
extreme east of his dominions against co-religionists were a preferable
alternative to the risks attending a _jehad_ against the most formidable
enemy of Islam! Russia had indeed little to complain of in Yakoob Beg's
interference in their possessions. His instigation of premature
rebellions, or, if he did not instigate them, the approval extended to
them by some of his chief ministers, was the very kindest act he could
have conferred on the ruling power of Turkestan, for Russia never has
had anything to fear from any isolated risings among the people of this
part of Central Asia. Nothing less than an unanimous and concerted
rising in Western Turkestan, aided with a nucleus of regular troops and
officers, such as, to go no farther, either Afghanistan can supply, or
Kashgar could at one time have supplied--nothing less than this will
ever produce a complete catastrophe to the Russian arms, and in a short
campaign of a few months send the Russian legions back to their old
quarters of thirteen years ago. Whether Yakoob Beg ever was strong
enough to risk the independence of his state on so important an
enterprise may fairly be doubted, and he showed a commendable prudence
in abstaining from hostilities when he had sufficient matters to occupy
all his attention, and to task all his resources within his own borders;
but assuming such to have been the case, his indifference to the
suffering thereby inflicted on the Khokandians must remain a blot on his
fair fame. If the part he played in these earlier plots was scarcely
honourable, how much less so was his action in the last rebellion of
1875. But it may be as well to postpone considering that event until
later on in this chapter. Yakoob Beg most probably took a very selfish
view of the state of affairs. His own extremely uncertain tenure of
power made him anxious lest any storm from beyond his frontier should
wreck the frail bark in which he had asserted his claim to independence,
and the whole object of his policy was simply to divert attention from
himself to other quarters. The Russians above all must have their work
cut out for them in repression of continual sedition in their
possessions; while each day of respite witnessed Yakoob Beg in a better
position for making a strenuous resistance when the time should come,
according to Russian ideas, for an attempt to be made to crush his
power. Viewed from this standpoint, the conduct of Yakoob Beg towards
his fellow-countrymen appears in a slightly more favourable aspect,
although his policy of expediency has little in it to command
admiration. Yet the result answered his expectations. In 1868 the
construction of Fort Naryn was the avowed preliminary measure to an
occupation of Kashgar; from that danger this policy of compromise saved
him. Again, in 1870, was he pronounced an incorrigible enemy of the
Czar, and an expedition was prepared which was to bring him to his
senses; once more a revolt in Khokand intervened to distract Russian
attention and Russian arms from the Naryn to Ferghana. The expedition
against Khiva in 1873 also served the purpose of diverting to another
quarter the blow which should, according to many, have descended on the
offending head of the Athalik Ghazi; and lastly, in 1875 the
insurrection in Khokand, the most serious and the most nearly successful
of all the native wars against Russia, saved him from an invasion for
which every preparation had been made.
To return to the year 1868, when the Russian government had constructed
the fort on the Naryn, and had openly proclaimed its intention of
punishing the slight put upon it by Yakoob Beg's refusal to permit the
construction of a road over the mountains to Artosh. Up to that year the
intercourse had been of a semiofficial character between the officers on
either side of the frontier. We have now come to a phase of the question
of a slightly different import. The Russian officials endeavoured to
obtain from Yakoob Beg concessions that would be advantageous to their
country, at the same time that they categorically declined to recognize
his official _status_ as an independent prince. Their antagonist was far
too astute to permit himself to be out-manoeuvred by so simple a
device, and his officials were quite unauthorized to enter into any
arrangement without its being brought before their master in the manner
consistent with his dignity. We have seen that the Russians, failing in
their diplomatic chicane, had recourse to threats, although the irony of
fate prevented those threats ever being put into execution. But
concurrently with these efforts on the part of the Russian government,
others of a different kind were being made by individuals. The Russian
merchants of Kuldja contained in their ranks several men whose
enterprise and courage had been remarkable in the manipulation of trade
with the Chinese and the Tungani. They were not easily deterred from any
undertaking which promised them brilliant remuneration, even though the
risk and uncertainty might be great. The pioneers of commerce were free
from the fetters that hampered official movements. It was of little
moment to them who ruled in Kashgaria so long as he extended his
protection to their goods and their persons whilst they were within his
territory. The Russian government viewed with favour the efforts that
were made to cross the Tian Shan, for on the individual fell the
greatest portion of the risk, while the government profited much by the
fruits of his experience. The Russian merchants were, therefore, not
discouraged by their authorities when they laid their proposals before
General Kolpakovsky, as English merchants would have been under similar
circumstances by the authorities at Calcutta--nay, it is tolerably
certain that they received many inducements to persist in their
intention; both their patriotism and desire for advancing their own
worldly concerns were appealed to, to urge them to attempt to obtain
admission into Kashgar. When, therefore, it became evident in 1868 that
nothing was to be obtained from Yakoob Beg by indirect means, and when
it was also decided that a military remedy would not be convenient, the
field was fairly cleared for another kind of performers to begin
operations.
Early in the year 1868 a Russian merchant, named Kludof, collected at
Vernoe a small caravan. His chief commodities consisted of those
gewgaws, which, prepared in Moscow, have been found, according to
Russian experience, the most marketable articles in Western Turkestan;
but, in addition to these trumpery packages, more useful necessaries,
such as cotton goods and cutlery, were taken as specimens of some of the
real advantages that would come in the wake of Russian trade. Kludof set
out with the intention of crossing the Tian Shan by the Naryn, and
making for the border town of Ush Turfan, whence Kashgar is easily
reached by the high road. But he had not proceeded far beyond Fort
Naryn, then in course of construction, when he was attacked by a band of
marauders. With the loss of all his possessions he must still be
considered fortunate in having escaped without any serious personal
injury. Perhaps the robbers were inspired with some respect for the
person of a Russian subject, or, as the indictment against Yakoob Beg
affirms, by the express orders of that ruler, who wished to deter,
without causing any serious complication with the government, Russian
subjects of any kind whatever from entering his kingdom. As it happened,
however, Kludof was a very determined fellow, one not easily balked when
he had set his mind on accomplishing anything. The government viewed his
case with commiseration, and he was assisted in collecting together
another caravan of larger proportions than its predecessor. But before
setting out on the same road he determined to make an effort to reach
the ear of Yakoob Beg himself, and by a singular piece of good fortune
he was able to do so through a Kashgarian subject residing in Kuldja.
The presents, judiciously selected, with which he accompanied his letter
complaining of the injury he had received at the hands of Kirghiz
subjects of the ruler of Kashgar, yet only demanding as a reparation
permission to come into that state as a peaceful subject of the Czar,
fully propitiated Yakoob Beg, who sent a safe conduct to Vernoe for
Kludof and his caravan. This merchant made a most favourable impression
on the ruler of Kashgar, and it seemed at one moment as if he would
achieve what all the diplomacy of the two previous years had failed in
accomplishing. Even Yakoob Beg was induced to take a slight step towards
a better agreement with his neighbour, for in the summer of 1868, he
sent Shadi Mirza, one of his nephews, to Vernoe, requesting that he
might be permitted to go on to Tashkent, to place before the governor of
Turkestan certain proposals from his master for a complete understanding
with Russia. Simultaneously with the despatch of Shadi Mirza by Yakoob
Beg, a Russian officer, Captain Reinthal, was commissioned by General
Kolpakovsky, the governor of Kuldja, to proceed to Kashgar and demand
the surrender of some Kirghiz robbers, who, from within Yakoob Beg's
dominion, had sallied forth to pillage Russian merchants. They had also
seized several inhabitants of Khokand and the Naryn district; and the
Russian government demanded the unconditional surrender of these
individuals as her subjects. Captain Reinthal was instructed to make
these two demands in a peremptory way, and to convince the new
government that Russia would not permit any infraction of the spirit of
the treaties concluded with the old government under the Chinese.
Captain Reinthal was received in a sufficiently hospitable manner, but
his movements were scrupulously restricted to the city. He did not, on
this occasion, learn much of importance about the country, but he was
impressed favourably by the appearance of such of the army as he saw.
The Kirghiz robbers were captured by the order of Yakoob Beg, but he
stoutly refused to surrender them. The Russian prisoners were also kept
in honourable confinement as a guarantee for the safe return of Shadi
Mirza. They were, however, permitted to return to Russian territory when
it became known that Shadi Mirza was progressing favourably with his
mission to Tashkent. Captain Reinthal accomplished little or nothing on
this embassade, and had to report, on his return to his superior, the
strange tidings that the new power was resolved to play an independent
part in Asia, and to answer defiance with defiance, and threat with
threat. This report must have seemed scarcely credible, but there is no
doubt that Captain Reinthal advised, as the result of his experience,
the adoption of a lenient and friendly policy towards the new-comer.
This concession to a Central Asian despot was not agreeable at
head-quarters, and the question was shelved for the time. Shadi Mirza,
who had been detained at Vernoe, was at last permitted to continue his
journey to Tashkent, where he found General Kaufmann absent in Europe.
Instructions were then issued to send him on to St. Petersburg, where he
arrived in the last days of 1868. He had several informal interviews
with the governor of Turkestan, but he was not received by the Czar or
any of the higher officials. In fact, he was only treated as an ordinary
traveller, and not as the representative of a neighbouring state.
Nothing up to this had been done by the Russian government, showing that
they recognized Yakoob Beg as ruler of Kashgaria. The Chinese were
still, in their eyes, the _de jure_ owners of that province, whoever
might be the temporary owners _de facto_. On the return of Shadi Mirza
to Kashgar, in January, 1869, the relations between Russia and Yakoob
Beg may be said to have returned to the exact _status quo ante_. All the
Russian demands for trade had been unsuccessful, and, except the
brilliant journey of Mr. Kludof, no one had broken through the mystic
charm that shut out the Garden of Asia from all foreign spectators.
Their envoy, Captain Reinthal, had been treated in a precisely similar
manner to that in which Shadi Mirza had been received at Vernoe and St.
Petersburg; and a firm and dignified attitude had effectually checked
the Russian officer when he attempted to express those threats which
formed the principal part of his instructions. There was something
imposing in the quiet way in which Yakoob Beg asserted his equality in
rank with the Czar of All the Russias. His invariable reply, when the
great power of Russia was made use of as an argument to overcome his
refusal to accede to the trade concessions demanded, was, "My brother,
the White Czar, is a most powerful monarch, and rules over the greater
portion of the earth, and I am only an insignificant prince in
comparison to him. But none the less can I encounter the danger like a
true man, and esteem it a happiness to die in defence of my country and
my faith." To so courageous and so honourable a reply what rejoinder
could be made by the abashed officers? It is impossible to refuse Yakoob
Beg the highest admiration for his stanchness in his opposition to
Russia. If for his own narrow interests it may have been imprudent to
throw down the gage of battle so freely, all the more does that attitude
claim respect when we see him trampling on purely selfish motives, and
asserting his claim to leadership in that wider question of Asiatic
against Muscovite, of Mahomedan against Greek. Had he only been
consistent throughout his career, had he only been as firm in his
convictions and as prompt in carrying them into practice as he generally
was, when the occasion came for a great effort against Russia, how
different might have been his own fate and the present aspect of affairs
in Central Asia!
For some time after these abortive proceedings the Russians abstained
from any direct interference in Kashgar, but the conferring of the title
of Athalik Ghazi, or Commander of the Faithful, on Yakoob Beg by the
Ameer of Bokhara had roused the susceptibilities of Russia too much to
be allayed. It seemed, indeed, as if this acknowledgment of the
orthodoxy of Yakoob Beg by the Head of Islam in Central Asia heralded
forth some understanding between the two states, and that a menace was
directed against the Russian government. Whether there was any agreement
between Mozaffur Eddin and Yakoob Beg it is not possible at present to
say, but that such should have been brought about by their mutual
antipathy to Russia would not have been very wonderful. However, in the
disturbances of 1870 Yakoob Beg took no active part. While the Russian
arms were triumphing over every opponent in their newly acquired
province of Ferghana and its vicinity, Yakoob Beg was busily engaged
with the Tungani, who at that time were causing trouble to him along his
far eastern frontier. The revolt collapsed in Khokand, and Yakoob Beg,
apparently unconcerned with the events transpiring in the West, was
carrying his victorious arms to new conquests in the East. During the
year 1870, when murmurs of the approaching storm were becoming audible,
the Russian government endeavoured to obtain the alliance of Khudayar
Khan, of Khokand, for the purpose of bringing Yakoob Beg within their
influence. This Khan had, as has been already mentioned, been betrayed
by Yakoob Beg, who had followed the example of the ambitious Vizier Alim
Kuli, and was now mainly dependent on the Russians for support against
his rebellious subjects. He could not be considered in any way,
therefore, as likely to be favourably disposed towards his neighbour of
Kashgar, or as lukewarm in the cause of his protectors and benefactors.
The Russians felt assured of his hearty support in advocating their
plan, which was as follows. From time immemorial, as has been seen in
the sketch of the history of Kashgar, there have been two rival elements
in Kashgaria--the Chinese and the Khokandian. The Chinese was triumphant
in modern times for a little more than a century, while the Khokandian
has, more or less, at all other times been paramount. But whenever a
native dynasty had attained a certain degree of security therein, it was
always threatened by the ambitious designs of the Khan of Khokand, who
had generally contributed most towards its successful establishment. The
Russian government resolved to avail themselves of this historical fact
to pour into the ear of Khudayar Khan insidious counsels as to his
claims as feudal lord over Eastern Turkestan. There once more, so they
argued, had a Khokandian subject formed an independent and rival
administration, and all his victories had been won by Khokandian
sympathies, and by the good right arms of Khokandian subjects. And how
had this soldier of fortune acted towards his own country when he had
received everything from her that he needed? By offering an asylum to
all those who had participated in the plots against Khudayar Khan
himself, by encouraging sedition in the state itself against the
Russians and their nominee, Khudayar, the legal ruler of the state. As
if these crimes were not sufficiently serious, he had added thereto the
insult of having refused to recognize in Khudayar his liege lord; and
Khudayar's own personal fears were worked upon to yield that
acquiescence to the Russian proposal that was necessary to secure its
success. It was pointed out to him that a strong military power in
Kashgar might give an impetus to the plots then fermenting in the active
brain of Aftobatcha, the ambitious son of Mussulman Kuli, the prime
minister and vizier of thirty years ago. The arguments were specious,
and it cannot be doubted that they made some impression on Khudayar
Khan. This much-to-be-pitied ruler, forced by the necessities of his
position to humour his Russian advisers, still had the courage to refuse
to assert his claims as lord over Kashgar. With a gentle irony he
pointed to the map, and showed how Khokand's frontier should extend
farther to the west than it did, and that a conquest over the barren
regions of the Kizil Yart would be but a sorry equivalent for the loss
of Tashkent and Hodjent. He, however, promised to make use of his best
means for inducing Yakoob Beg to make overtures to the Russian
government for the ratification of a treaty of commerce. So Khudayar
Khan indited a letter to Yakoob Beg, at the dictation of his Russian
friends, to this effect; but he silvered the pill by a private message
giving information of the Russian intentions in the future. The tenor of
that communication was that the Russians were less eager than might
have been supposed to bring matters to a final crisis with Yakoob Beg,
and that they were most desirous of settling the question without any
flagrant loss of dignity by being the first to recommence negotiations.
Both publicly and privately Khudayar Khan advised that the Athalik Ghazi
should make some concessions in form to the Russian government. The
Russians themselves, having failed to induce Khudayar Khan to put
pressure on Yakoob Beg, appear to have arrived at the same conclusion as
that set out in the letters of Khudayar. Yakoob Beg must make the sign,
and they would meet him half way in his desire to share in the great
benefits accruing from a Muscovite alliance. The authorities at Tashkent
went so far as to flatter themselves that they had attained a solution
of one of their chief annoyances. They had, by making use of the
mediation of Khudayar, gone so far as to open the door for Yakoob Beg to
abase himself. Such condescension was unheard of, and no doubt was
entertained but that this proud Mahomedan ruler would gladly hasten to
avail himself of the last chance accorded him by the clemency of the
Czar.
But they were reckoning without their host. Yakoob Beg quickly perceived
that the bold exterior of the Russian demands concealed a vacillating
purpose, and that a power which would go out of its way so far to bring
about an arrangement, would yield much more when the discussion became
directly carried on. He had evidently impressed the few Russians who had
visited him with a belief in his strength, and rumour had magnified his
resources, and converted his small and heterogeneous following into a
regular and trained army. He was not the man to destroy, when the game
was almost in his hands too, all the favourable impressions, that stood
him in such good stead during his career, which his policy for four
years had succeeded in creating about his personality. After a suitable
delay his formal reply to the official letter of Khudayar arrived, and
its contents must have been eminently displeasing to the Russians. In
general terms he refused to enter into negotiations with the Russians,
because they had refused to acknowledge his own government, and had ever
supported the cause of his enemies the Chinese. But, not content with
this blunt refusal to the offer made from Tashkent, he went on to minor
matters and dealt with the question of Russian policy in specific
language. The common enemy of him and all his co-religionists was not
worthy of any consideration from him or his allies, the rulers of
Khokand and Bokhara. "The Russians that have come here, into my state of
Kashgar, look at these localities and become acquainted with the state
of the country, and therefore it is better to forbid their coming, for
they are a treacherous and crooked-minded people." In such plain terms
did Yakoob Beg speak of a power which could without any serious risk
have crushed him at any moment. Yet in one sense his boldness was the
height of prudence, and succeeded when perhaps a less decided attitude
would have completely failed. The Russians were fairly deluded in their
estimate of their new antagonist, and all means having been exhausted
for inducing Yakoob Beg to abandon his indifferent attitude towards
themselves, it began to be seriously discussed at Tashkent whether, if
simply for the purpose of obtaining accurate information of his country,
it would not be prudent to acknowledge the existence of a ruler who had
for nearly six years been established as responsible sovereign of a very
large portion of Asia. The path was smoothed, too, for the Russian
diplomatists by Yakoob Beg sending a letter to the governor of
Turkestan, stating that it was useless for the Czar to attempt the
establishment of diplomatic relations through the good offices of
Khudayar Khan; but that if the Russians really desired to enter into
alliance with him they could send an embassy to him, when formal steps
could be commenced for securing the trade and other agreements that were
desirable. The letter was a very dignified piece of writing, such as
one European sovereign would have sent to another in the Middle Ages.
"He did not deny," he said, "either the power or the resources of
Russia, but as a brave man he placed his trust in God, and he would
never shirk the contest, because all he aspired to was to die for his
faith." This letter produced a great impression at Tashkent, and it was
resolved to send an ambassador to Kashgar.
Before pursuing the narrative, it may be as well to sum up what had
passed between Russia and Kashgar up to this period, for henceforth
these two states were to stand in a completely different relationship
towards each other. The Russians strove to induce Yakoob Beg to make the
most favourable commercial and political concessions to them, while they
refused to grant him any equivalent, except the dubious one, "advantage
from the produce of Russian manufactures." They even added insult to
injury by openly proclaiming that they only recognized the Chinese as
the rulers of Kashgar, and refused to discuss the arguments advanced by
Shadi Mirza in favour of his uncle's claim to be considered _de facto_
sovereign. They adopted an attitude of bullying towards this Asiatic
prince, and loudly proclaimed in their practice the truth of the
aphorism, that might is right. They backed up their verbal threats on
several occasions by a show of military preparations, but not once did
they put those threats into execution. On the other hand, Yakoob Beg's
policy was consistent throughout and dignified. While studiously
avoiding any aggressive measures, even under the excuse of defensive
precautions, he was always firm in his refusal to recognize any of the
semi-official overtures that were repeatedly made to induce him to show
his hand. Instead of appearing in the light of a suppliant, as according
to all precedent he should, he assumed the position of a dictator.
"Acknowledge me as legally constituted ruler of Kashgaria, or else there
is an end to all negotiation. Send a properly accredited ambassador to
me, and he shall be honourably received. A representative of recognized
rank shall then convey my token of friendship to your master. Refuse to
grant me these just considerations, and my kingdom is closed to your
merchants and officials without exception. Admission shall only be
obtained over my own body and that of my devoted army." For the first
time in the annals of Russian history an Asiatic ruler had tired out the
finessing and intrigue that had become customary with that empire as the
means for infinite conquest. Yakoob Beg was the only sovereign who
refused to be subservient to the Czar, and eventually achieved a
diplomatic triumph over his representatives. In the spring of 1872,
Yakoob Beg was at the very acme of his prosperity. Not yet had he
commenced those later campaigns against the Tungani, which more than
anything else tended to weaken his power and to raise discontent against
his administration; and, fresh from his diplomatic success over the
Russians, he appeared in the eyes of many Asiatics as a fit champion to
redeem their fortunes in a conflict with Russia. Excusable as their
enthusiasm undoubtedly was, it is tolerably certain that the power of
Yakoob Beg was exaggerated both by the adulation of his friends and by
the nervous susceptibilities of the Russians. It is noteworthy that
Russia proved herself on one occasion to be quite as liable to this
latter disease as England is assumed to be.
To Baron Kaulbars, the explorer of the sources of the Syr Darya, was
entrusted the delicate mission of representing the Russian government
for the first time at the court of the Athalik Ghazi, and to no better
diplomatist could it have been consigned. He set out from Kuldja early
in May, 1872, carrying with him a large collection of presents for the
ruler and his chief advisers, and arrived in Kashgar without any mishap
in June of the same year. Here he was received in the most cordial
manner, and the consideration and hospitality exhibited towards him by
the ruler were beyond all expectation. In the picturesque phraseology
of the East, the Athalik Ghazi, at his first audience with Baron
Kaulbars, said, "Sit upon my knees, on my bosom, or where ye like; for
ye are guests sent me from heaven." The most complete freedom of action
was accorded, for the first time, to all the members of the embassy, and
two merchants who had accompanied it for the purpose of exploring the
country received a safe-conduct to go on to Yarkand and Khoten. Yakoob
Beg scarcely attempted to conceal his gratification at the presence of
the Russians; possibly his pleasure chiefly arose from such an
unmistakable admission of his skill as a diplomatist. But in every way
facilities were afforded his visitors for seeing all objects of interest
round Kashgar. Reviews were held in honour of the occasion, and as there
happened to be a considerable number of troops in the vicinity, passing
through to operate against the Tungani beyond Kucha, the show was
imposing enough. The Russians were favourably impressed by what they
saw, and Baron Kaulbars expressed himself surprised at the military
exactitude with which the manoeuvres were carried out. Yakoob Beg,
always open to flattery, exclaimed in an enthusiastic moment, "I look
upon the Russians as my dearest friends; if I had not, should I have
shown you my military power? Assuredly it is not usual even with you to
make known one's actual condition to an enemy." Matters were now in a
fair way to a pleasant solution. Baron Kaulbars and Yakoob Beg were
mutually delighted; but, after the time for pleasant talk had expired,
it was necessary that some definite arrangements should be drawn up for
the political and commercial relations of the two countries in the
future.
The chief objects the Russians had in view when they sent Baron Kaulbars
to Kashgar were three. In the first place they wanted to acquire general
information about that state, and to discover whether Yakoob Beg was as
powerful as report had asserted. In the second, they wished to put their
relations on such a recognized basis with him that they might know what
policy he was disposed to adopt in Turkestan and Kuldja; and in the
third they desired to secure the monopoly of the trade of his state, so
that they might forestall British enterprise, already beginning to
direct its attention to this quarter, since the journeys of Messrs. Shaw
and Forsyth. The last of these was the easiest to obtain, and the
Athalik Ghazi considered all the Russian proposals with regard to trade
in a very amicable spirit; but with regard to the second _desideratum_
nothing but the vaguest generalities could all the tact and ingenuity of
Kaulbars succeed in obtaining from his host. The first object was amply
secured, in so far as geographical and scientific information was
concerned; but the precautions taken by the Athalik Ghazi to deceive the
Russians as to his power and hold on the country appear to have been
successful. Baron Kaulbars certainly confirmed much that had previously
rested on mere hearsay; the question is rather, did he not vouch for
more than his experience justified him in doing? The result of his
mission was, that the Athalik Ghazi was elevated to a position on a
level with the Ameer of Cabul, and there is no doubt whatever that such
a comparison was not warranted by the facts. A treaty was signed by the
Athalik Ghazi and Baron Kaulbars, on the 2nd of June, 1872, but
according to the Old Style, still adopted by the Russians, this was the
21st of May, St. Constantine's day. There are two stories with respect
to this coincidence, and there is as much evidence for one version as
there is for the other.
It was said at the time that Yakoob Beg was so desirous of showing his
goodwill to the Russians that he had insisted on signing it on that day
in honour of the Grand Duke Constantine. Now there were two or three
improbabilities in this statement that struck several observers. In the
first place it was extremely improbable that Yakoob Beg knew it was St.
Constantine's day at all; and again, in the second place he was quite as
probably ignorant of the existence of a Grand Duke Constantine. At all
events, there was no valid reason why a Central Asian ruler should
conceive that his politeness to that Grand Duke in particular would
demonstrate his desire to be on good terms with Russians in general. The
other version, which, like many other circumstances, has only leaked out
in the pages of Mr. Schuyler, is altogether more probable, and is not
open to the same objections. According to this, it was Baron Kaulbars,
who of course was aware of the saint's day, who demanded that the treaty
should bear that date, and who, as soon as it was signed, sent off a
message to General Kaufmann saying that the Athalik Ghazi, out of
friendship to that general, had specially requested that the treaty
should be signed on that day in honour of General Kaufmann's patron
saint. However flattered that distinguished general and governor may
have felt at the delicate attention of his ambassador, he had to decline
the proposed honour; and in the despatch that was sent to St.
Petersburg, describing the event, the name of the Grand Duke Constantine
was substituted for his own. There is little doubt that this is the
correct statement, and it certainly suggests quite a revelation as to
the system in Russian Asia of making things pleasant and agreeable to
one another, always, however, assuming that there be an exceptional
degree of power and pomp reserved for his Excellency General Kaufmann.
Soon after the signature of this treaty, which bears the name of its
framer, Baron Kaulbars took his departure, with many expressions of
friendship and goodwill from the Athalik Ghazi. Arrangements were,
however, made, before he left, for an envoy to visit Tashkent from
Yakoob Beg. This ambassador took with him the signed stipulations to be
ratified, and was received at Tashkent with every demonstration of amity
and respect. So certain did the Russian government appear that their
relations with Kashgar would, if only for a short period, be
satisfactory, that special care was taken to make a favourable
impression on the Kashgarian envoy, and after a short residence in the
capital of Turkestan, the nephew of Yakoob Beg, Hadji Torah, who had
followed the train of the treaty on a special mission, went on to St.
Petersburg, where he was entertained by the Czar, taken to the reviews,
and treated in a most hospitable and princely fashion. The contrast
between the reception accorded to him in 1873 and that to Shadi Mirza in
1869 clearly marks the difference that was considered in well-informed
official circles to have taken place in their relations with Kashgar.
We have now to consider whether the Russian Government was justified in
assuming so confidently that it had secured the permanent friendship of
the Mahomedan ruler of Eastern Turkestan. On concluding his visit at St.
Petersburg, Hadji Torah turned south, and after stopping for a brief
delay at Moscow and Odessa, he arrived in Constantinople, where he
already had many friends and connections. Without inquiring too deeply
into his actions at the Imperial City--for of them the reader will be
able to judge best by the sequel--we will here simply observe, that
having also concluded his residence on the Golden Horn, he took passage
by the Suez Canal for India, and arrived there in time to join the
mission of Sir Douglas Forsyth, then on its way to Kashgar. Hadji Torah
therefore brought to his uncle a vast amount of information concerning
the three Powers chiefly concerned in the fortunes of Kashgar--Russia,
Turkey, and England. But even before his return home, fresh
disagreements had broken out between Russia and Yakoob Beg. The year
1872 had not closed, before the Athalik Ghazi concluded some secret
negotiations that had been pending for some time with the Sultan, and
this champion of Islam appeared in a new and holier light to Asiatics as
Emir, or Ameer. He acknowledged the suzerainty of the Porte; and, not
content with this formal declaration, gave an extra significance to the
event by issuing a fresh coinage, bearing on one side the head of Abdul
Aziz. The Russians were, it can well be imagined, displeased at this
alliance between two Mahomedan states which might both be considered
hostile to their interests, and a very large party in military circles
clamoured for an expedition to be sent at once against the insolent
Mussulman. At one moment it seemed as if this bellicose party was to
gain the day, for the testimony of all the officers and merchants who
had visited Kashgar showed that each day Yakoob Beg was becoming more
formidable. Prompt measures were pressed on the government of Tashkent,
and General Kaufmann seemed half disposed to acquiesce in the proposal
to inflict summary chastisement on the Athalik Ghazi. Fortunately for
Kashgar, the Khan of Khiva had been an older offender in the eyes of the
Russians, and the Home Government peremptorily forbade any steps being
taken in the regions bordering on the Chinese Empire. It is sufficiently
clear that the moderation of the home authorities was a wiser policy
than the impulsive demands of certain officers in Tashkent; but it is
not so evident why Yakoob Beg abstained from appearing in the _role_ of
the liberator of Khokand, at so opportune a moment as that afforded by
the great expedition against Khiva in 1873. The treaty of Baron Kaulbars
had stipulated for the free admission of Russian merchants into the
state on the payment of a 2-1/2 per cent. _ad valorem_ duty. Not only
was there to be no further exaction, but good treatment was guaranteed
to such Russian subjects as desired to travel in Kashgar, and who came
provided with a passport, and permission to travel, from a Russian
governor. During Baron Kaulbars' residence in the country, nothing could
be more considerate than the treatment extended towards the members of
his suite, and the merchants who went on to Yarkand were afforded
facilities for disposing of the small stock of merchandise which they
had brought with them on this journey. This friendly reception of such
merchants as came to Kashgar was maintained during the period over which
these negotiations extended down to the departure of Yakoob Beg's own
ambassador from Russian territory; but with the arrival of Hadji Torah
at Constantinople, and the proclamation of the fact that Yakoob Beg had
been elevated to the dignified position of Emir by the Sultan of Roum, a
change came over the spirit of his policy towards Russia. Indeed, Yakoob
Beg saw himself menaced by an unforeseen danger in this treaty of
commerce. He had formerly been averse to the presence of Russian
merchants in his state because he regarded them as spies; but now that
the necessities of his position had to some extent compelled him to
enter into a formal treaty with their government, he perceived that his
little state literally ran the risk of being invaded by the Russian
merchants and traders who flocked to Kuldja for the purpose of
participating in the spoils to be obtained by trafficking with the
inhabitants of Eastern Turkestan. He had always been averse to trade. He
was a warrior, and inclined to feel and to express contempt at the
juggling tricks of Muscovite or Khitay.
But as the former could provide him with better weapons for his army,
and warmer clothes for his people, in addition to trinkets for his
_serai_, their presence, if only they came in limited numbers, and at
stated intervals, could be tolerated; but when he perceived they were
about to descend on his state, like so many birds of prey on an
abandoned carcase, and when he surmised that in all likelihood they
would endeavour to mix themselves up in the political divisions of
Kashgar as they had in Bokhara and Khokand, he determined to impose some
other check on their visits besides that insignificant 2-1/2 per cent.
on goods that returned a profit of cent. per cent. He had given his
plighted word, however, that merchants should receive fair treatment,
and how could he find a loophole to avoid fulfilling what he had
promised, and yet at the same time escape bringing about an open rupture
with the Russian Government. The matter required most delicate
manipulation, but Yakoob Beg proved himself equal to the occasion. It
was not to be expected, however, that Yakoob Beg could accomplish his
task of discouraging Russian enterprise without giving some umbrage to
the government.
Despite the friendly reception of Baron Kaulbars, there still remained
some uncertainty in the minds of individuals, whether the Athalik Ghazi
was as sincere in his protestations as he would have it believed. There
was, consequently, some disinclination among the merchants of Kuldja to
be the first to send a caravan to Kashgar. They were all willing enough
to share the profits, but it was a risky experiment all the same; and
each would prefer that his neighbour should inaugurate the enterprise.
In commercial circles, there was much discussion on the new state, and
the prospects of trade therewith, and there was much talk as to "who
should bell the cat." The hesitation, if indeed so natural a sentiment
deserves to be specified here, soon passed off, and Mr. Pupyshef, a
merchant, who had had very large business connections with most parts of
Central Asia, resolved to send the first consignment of merchandise to
Kashgar. Mr. Pupyshef was, however, unable to go in person, so his
caravan set out under the charge of his clerk Somof. It arrived without
"let or hindrance" in Kashgar, where Mr. Somof was provided with
accommodation in the Caravanserai specially set apart for foreign
merchants. But a change was at once perceptible in the sentiments of the
ruler, as the personal freedom of the members of the expedition was
curtailed, and all their movements were watched with the most exacting
surveillance; and the residence of Mr. Somof was brief in the extreme,
for the Athalik Ghazi himself bought up the whole of his stock of
merchandise. Viewed as a commercial speculation, this result should have
been eminently satisfactory; the Russian merchant had to experience no
loss from delay in finding a purchaser for his articles. There was,
however, another matter to be taken into consideration, and that was the
mode of payment by the purchaser. Mr. Somof received so many Chinese
coins at a value fixed by the Ameer himself, and Mr. Pupyshef, on the
return of his representative, estimated the loss at 15,000 roubles. The
Russian government took up the case of their subject, and presented a
remonstrance at Kashgar, demanding the immediate restitution of the loss
incurred by the Russian merchant. Yakoob Beg's reply to this summary
request was a model of courtesy and tact. He denied altogether that Mr.
Somof had in any way been interfered with. That gentleman was always at
perfect liberty to do what, and to go where, he pleased, and he was
quite mistaken in supposing that he, the Ameer, had purchased his goods.
The Badaulet had nothing whatever to do with trade, which he left
entirely to his subjects. He was simply a warrior and a follower of the
Prophet. He had nevertheless instituted inquiries into the matter, and
he had discovered that some of his officers, who should be punished, had
purchased the merchandise in his name, hoping thereby to obtain it at a
cheaper rate. The Athalik Ghazi expressed his regret at the occurrence,
and would be most happy to refund whatever sum the Russian government
considered their subject had lost by the transaction. A commission was
appointed at Tashkent, to inquire into all the circumstances of the
case, and after some discussion the demand of Mr. Pupyshef was reduced
from 15,000 to 12,000 roubles. The Ameer acquiesced in the decision, but
many months elapsed before Mr. Pupyshef received his money, and then it
was again in a depreciated Chinese coinage. We are justified in assuming
that this was all planned, and that the obstacles thrown in the path of
Mr. Pupyshef were part and parcel of a systematic attempt to disgust
Russian merchants with Kashgar. The Russian government, too, was
afforded no clear case for complaint, as Yakoob Beg expressed his regret
without reserve for the occurrence, all the responsibility of which he
shifted on to the shoulders of some of "his officials whom he had
ordered to be punished." He paid without a murmur the fair demands of
Mr. Pupyshef, and if there was some delay in the refunding of the money,
it must be attributed to the poverty of his exchequer, and not to any
want of goodwill. The burden of his complaint was, "I am a poor prince;
my country is impoverished by the wars that have occurred since the
departure of the Chinese; and you will find little therein to repay you
for your trouble and expense in entering it. Why therefore will you
persist in coming to it? You can do neither yourselves nor my people any
good by doing so, and you only cause me anxiety and trouble in
preserving your countrymen from insult and injury, which you must admit
I have ever done." There was an under-current of truth in this statement
of the case, although it was not credited in Kuldja, where everything
that went amiss was set down to the hostility of the Ameer. Yakoob Beg
had, however, succeeded in throwing cold water on the enthusiastic
preparations that were being made for exploiting Eastern Turkestan, and
his mode of doing so had been quite original and characteristic. Few
rulers would have foreseen that the best way to get rid of a troublesome
visitor was to purchase what he had brought to sell to the people; and
that the simple remedy of paying in a questionable currency would
suffice to deter hundreds from following the example of Mr. Somof.
Yakoob Beg, however, was not satisfied with leaving well alone. Having
paid the claim of Mr. Pupyshef, it might have been supposed that he
would maintain a discreet silence on his intentions in the future with
regard to Russian merchants. He might have let the question, indeed,
find, as it would have found, its own solution; but, in a weak moment,
to place his own _bona fides_ beyond suspicion, he desired the Russian
government to send another merchant to Kashgar, and then it could judge
by his reception whether the Ameer was not amicably disposed towards his
"close allies," the Russians. The Russian authorities took him at his
word, and after an interval of more than twelve months, during which
Kashgar had been unvisited by a Russian merchant, another, a Mr.
Morozof, came to put Yakoob Beg's assertions to the test. True to his
word, the reception of this gentleman was most cordial. Facilities were
placed in his way for getting purchasers of his articles, and the Ameer
bought for his arsenals such of them as seemed suitable. Mr. Morozof
returned to Kuldja, narrating how cordially he had been welcomed by the
ruler himself, and how the enterprise had commercially been a success.
Others followed his example, and during the last two and a half years of
his rule Russian merchandise, either through Russian or native agents,
found its way in considerable quantities into Kashgar. But this trade
was always liable to periods of depression through the clouds that
frequently darkened the political horizon, and the Russians did not
derive the advantages from trade with this state, that they had
previously convinced themselves they were to do. Indeed, English
manufactures, after the year 1873, entered into keen competition with
theirs in the cities of Kashgar, and had driven their goods out of the
market of Yarkand at all events before the close of the year 1876. But
this fact only served to impress more forcibly on the Russians the
necessity either for annexing Kashgaria or establishing on its throne
some puppet, who would be content with the post of deputy of the Czar.
Indeed, many suggested that the Chinese should be brought back; but then
they were so far off, and apparently so weak. The party advocating the
absorption of Kashgaria every day became stronger and more pronounced;
and all observers agree that it was only a question of time when the
imperial fiat should go forth for the extinction of the rule of Yakoob
Beg. Colonel Reinthal was sent in 1874, to endeavour to place matters on
a more hopeful footing, but with little success. In addition to the
question of trade privileges, the Russians, in negotiating with native
states, or securing treaties at the point of the sword, always demanded
the right of having consular agents in the chief cities of the state.
The ostensible duty of these official representatives was to look after
the interests of their government, and to protect the lives and property
of Russian subjects as best they might be able. So far as these very
necessary functions were concerned, Russia had a perfect right in
demanding these safeguards, when such were deemed to be required. But
unfortunately for the reputation of that country, the experience of
Asiatics had amply demonstrated that these declared duties were the
least important part of their office.
Their secret instructions were to lose no opportunity of discovering the
drift of public sentiment in the state where they were stationed; to
learn all the ramifications of the dynastic intrigues that unfortunately
form the chief incidents in the history of these states, and to promote,
by every means at their disposal, the interests of the great empire into
whose service they had been admitted. When such latitude was allowed in
their instructions, and so many private and public inducements were
offered to raise their zeal, it cannot be matter of surprise if we find
the government informed promptly of the shiftings of public opinion in
the independent and semi-independent Khanates of Central Asia. Yakoob
Beg was keenly alive to the dangers that would arise to him personally
from the introduction of such a system into Kashgar, where the
discordant elements out of which he had welded a military organization
were far from being completely healed. If the presence of a mirza in
Khokand and Bokhara had entailed a decade of troubles and of gradual
subjection, what was he to expect, a mere military adventurer and a
foreigner in the land, from their presence in Eastern Turkestan? But
Baron Kaulbars had demanded this concession, perhaps more than any
other, and Yakoob Beg had to yield something in form, if he did not
surrender much in substance, to the importunities of his visitor. As a
great favour he consented to the appointment of _caravanbashis_, or
superintendents of the personal comforts of the merchants when they
should arrive; but a _caravan-bashi_ was an uneducated, unimportant
personage, from whom nothing need be feared. This did not at all please
the Russian administrators, and all their subsequent efforts were mainly
devoted to the attempt to obtain an alteration of this unimportant
personage into the prying and inquisitive _mirza_. To defeat their
design Yakoob Beg was no less firmly resolved, and the history of the
embassies, from that of Baron Kaulbars to that of Captain Kuropatkine,
was one long course of fruitless efforts to force the hand of the
Athalik Ghazi on this point. Colonel Reinthal was sent in 1874, after
the successful journey of Mr. Morozof, to see if any better arrangement
could be attained, but, although the Ameer entertained him very
hospitably, he fared no better than any of his predecessors. In that
year, too, Yakoob Beg's position had become firmer in his own state. The
Tungani had been driven back north of the Tian Shan beyond Turfan, and
into the regions east of Lake Lob; the disaffection, too, in the cities
of Kucha and Korla was also, to all appearance, dying out; but, above
all, the vast aegis of English protection had appeared to be thrown over
the integrity of his state. However unjustified this supposition was by
the treaty with Sir Douglas Forsyth, the Ameer made as much use as
possible of his new-found ally; and the large section of Anglo-Indians,
and authorities in this country on the affairs of Central Asia, who,
either out of sympathy for the man, or from a belief in the identity of
British interests with his cause, proclaimed the advisability of
supporting him against Russian aggression, gave a colourable excuse to
his declaration that England had extended for the first time in her
Trans-Himalayan policy her protection to a native state lying north of
her natural frontier. The Russian governments in Siberia and Turkestan,
emphatically cautioned by their Foreign Office to give this country no
cause for umbrage, were at first inclined to make that assertion an
excuse for pushing their friendly relations with the Ameer; but their
advances were not reciprocated, and as it became more clear that the
importance of the Forsyth mission had been greatly exaggerated by the
representations of the Ameer, the language of the Russian authorities
became once more peremptory and menacing. In short, matters after more
than two years' discussion had retrogressed to the condition they were
in before the Kaulbars treaty. The Russians had not obtained their chief
desire, the establishment of consular agents in Kashgar, and Yakoob Beg,
as in the past, boldly met threat with threat. Relying on his increased
reputation as the most orthodox and the most puissant of Mahomedans in
Central Asia, and confident that England would intervene between the
Russians and the collapse of his state, he even went so far as to temper
his defiant, and almost bellicose, attitude with such irony as the
following incident is a characteristic specimen of. Early in the year
1874 the Duke of Edinburgh married Marie Alexandrovna, the only daughter
of the Czar; and Yakoob Beg seized the occasion to send a message of
congratulation to the Czar of All the Russias on the auspicious
event--saying, that he had heard that the son of his good ally, the
Queen of England and of India, was about to wed the daughter of his
friend the Czar, and that he hastened to send him his congratulations
upon the event. To this effusive epistle no reply was deigned, and it is
doubtful whether it ever got farther than Tashkent. There is no
difficulty in arriving at the conclusion that such exhibitions as this
is an instance of detraction from the otherwise great and striking
characteristics of the ruler of Kashgar. His opposition to Russia was
most laudable; his maintenance of his privileges as an independent ruler
was prudent and worthy of our respect; but his petty insults to Russia
were neither wise nor dignified. He was clearly in the right in
checking the aggressive instincts of Russia, clothed in the specious
garb of commercial advantage; he commands not less our admiration for
the energetic and persistent manner in which he thwarted every endeavour
to introduce Russian espionage and intrigue into Kashgaria; but why
should he have weakened the effect of these splendid achievements, why
should he have risked all he had secured, by so senseless an insult as
the message to the Czar that has been just referred to?
The authorities in Tashkent, perceiving that it was doubtful whether
English public opinion was ripe yet for an active interference in
Central Asia, reverted, despite all orders from the home authorities to
the contrary, to their original intention of coercing the ruler of
Kashgar. In 1874, therefore, all preparations for commencing the
campaign in the approaching spring were made ready. Provisions and
munitions of war were despatched to Naryn, and an auxiliary division was
to make a flank movement by the Terek Pass on the west. It has been laid
to the charge of the Russian generals in Asia, that expeditions are
arranged for their mutual advantage, both in obtaining higher rank and
orders. So seriously bitten had every officer since Perovsky become by
the desire for promotion and distinction, that the disease became
generally known as the St. George or the St. Ann Cross fever. Now during
the seven years previous to the date at which we have arrived, if there
had been a fair share of distinction and spoil for the soldiers and the
lower ranks of the officers, some of those in higher posts considered
that they were aggrieved by the monopoly of supreme credit obtained by
General Kaufmann. This, indeed, had shown itself very clearly after the
fall of Khiva, a success for which Kaufmann obtained all the credit, and
yet towards which the division under his command contributed little or
nothing. The etiquette, too, maintained in the little court at Tashkent,
and the semi-regal state observed by the successful general, were
irksome to officers more accustomed to the licence of a camp than to the
punctilio of a palace. Nor were there wanting more sinister motives
still among some of the chief general officers who filled the
subordinate posts in the service of the Czar's representative. Prominent
among them was the youthful Scobelef, who, burning to distinguish
himself, clamoured loudly for some expedition which, when accomplished
successfully, would be recompensed with the Cross of St. George. Strong
as General Kaufmann may really be in the good opinion of his superiors,
he was unable to resist, if he were inclined, the demands pressed upon
him by Scobelef and his father, and the more warlike portion of his
forces. It is said, that in addition to these palpable reasons there
were others touching the family rivalries of the Kaufmanns and
Scobelefs, who appear to have been at feud with each other when younger
men in the service of the palace, when Nicholas was Czar. To remove
these differences, and to satisfy the demands of his other subordinates,
General Kaufmann consented that an expedition should be arranged against
Kashgar, and entrusted to the command of the younger Scobelef. Towards
the end of 1874 the war-cloud was drawing ominously over the Athalik
Ghazi, and to all observers it seemed as if it were about to break with
destructive violence on his devoted head. Loudly was it asserted that
nothing but British intervention would save him, and it was only too
clear that England's policy would be guided by events. The Viceroy had
certainly not advised that an active participation should be undertaken
in this question. The failure, too, of the Granville-Gortschakoff
negotiations to define a neutral zone had convinced this country of the
inutility of solving the question between the two countries by treaty.
But it was not clear that, even if Kashgar were to fall into the power
of Russia, our interests would suffer so much as to justify us in
adopting an extreme remedy. The path being thus left clear for Russia
to strike, every precaution was taken by Generals Kaufmann and Scobelef
that the blow should be sharp and decisive. Not fewer than 20,000
Russian troops in all were to be directed against Yakoob Beg, who too
late now attempted some concessions to his neighbours. Such troops as he
could raise were massed in the neighbourhood of Kashgar, while another
force under his son was stationed at Aksu. But of the result there could
not be two opinions. Very few weeks' respite remained to the intended
victim, when an event occurred which changed the whole current of
Russian thought into a different channel. Yakoob Beg was saved by the
outbreak of disturbances in Khokand, and, although the Russians never
acknowledged that they were so serious as to prevent them persisting in
their Kashgarian enterprise, still gradually the troops who had been
despatched to the frontier were recalled, and those who had been ordered
to set out for Naryn were retained in Tashkent and Hodjent, the two
towns chiefly threatened. Although this event is not part of Kashgarian
history, yet it performed so useful a function to that state, which
indeed it may be said to have saved, that some brief account of it here
may not be unwelcome.
Khudayar Khan, after the death of Alim Kuli, his hostile minister, in
1865, had been reinstated in his possession of Khokand, partly by the
efforts of his own faction, and partly by Russian assistance. From that
year to the year 1875 he was _de facto_ as he was _de jure_ Khan of
Khokand, and, although imbroiled on several occasions with Russia and
with his own subjects in those ten years, he still maintained a nominal
independence in the western half of Khokand, with his capital at the
city of the same name. For some reason, however, this Khan never was
popular. So far as we know concerning him, he does not appear to have
been any way worse than his neighbours; but one party in the state
accused him of being a tool of the Russians, while another, urged on by
the agents employed by that government, declared that he was gradually
drifting the country into a hopeless contest with that Power. Widespread
throughout the state there was dissatisfaction at his rule, and the
occasion afforded by a commotion among the Kirghiz was eagerly seized by
his subjects to rise for the purpose of subverting his power. At first
this movement seemed to possess no importance for the Russians, and was
regarded as one of those dynastic squabbles that had become too ordinary
an occurrence to occasion any surprise. The insurrectionary party, too,
had put on the throne Nasruddin, the eldest son of the Khan, a youth who
was supposed to be friendly to Russia, and who was not likely to prove
in any way formidable, having become passionately addicted to _vodka_
drinking. But behind this ostensible ruler there were others who aspired
to greater eminence than the king-makers of a petty state like Khokand.
Chief among these was Khudayar's brother-in-law, Abderrahman Aftobatcha,
who was entrusted with the chief control of the military arrangements.
This chief was the son of Mussulman Kuli, the Kipchak minister of
Khudayar's earlier days. Either incredulous of the maintenance of a
neutral attitude by Russia, or urged on by a patriotic impulse to free
the enslaved portion of Khokand, these confederates issued a
proclamation of war against General Kaufmann. The border districts rose
in response to the proclamation, the communications between Tashkent and
Hodjent were severed, and confusion for a time reigned supreme within
the Russian possessions. The Khokandian forces hesitated to make any
serious attack and wasted their time in useless depredations in the
mountains. Had a prompt move been made on Tashkent, or even on Hodjent,
the insurrection might have been successful. Bokhara might have struck
in at the critical moment, and Yakoob Beg awoke from the lethargy into
which his warlike spirit was sinking. Such was not to be, however; and
gradually the Russian scare wore off. Colonel Scobelef scoured the
country with his Cossacks; telegraphic communication was restored
between Hodjent and Tashkent; and the country was rapidly cleared of the
rebels. The fugitives who had accompanied Khudayar in his flight were
sent to the rear, and reinforcements were hastily summoned to take part
in the necessary offensive measures against Khokand. It will be
sufficient here to say that, having been defeated in the fight at
Makhram and several other small engagements, the party of Nasruddin and
Aftobatcha sued for peace. This was granted, but Khokand became the
Russian province of Ferghana, Colonel Scobelef was raised to a
major-general, and obtained his Cross of St. George by the battle of
Makhram. This event, generally known as the revolt of the Khokandians
against Russia of 1875, marks an important era, for it convinced the
Khokandians and other Asiatics that any attempt to obtain their liberty,
short of a concerted and organized movement, would be fruitless. There
has been no renewal of the attempt that then failed, but which ought to
have achieved more success.
To the discord unhappily existent among its victims has Russia been
chiefly indebted for the facility with which her Asiatic conquests have
been acquired, and to the same ally it seems probable that she will be
chiefly indebted for their preservation. There is no clearer evidence of
this than the history of this last war with Khokand. But when we
endeavour to divide the share of culpability for this dissension, we are
on this occasion bound to admit that the chief blame attaches to Yakoob
Beg. More than any other Asiatic ruler had he assumed to himself the
title of general protector of his religion and his order, against the
conquering strides of Russia; more than any other had he fostered, by
his bold and defiant attitude towards that state, the belief that there
still remained some hope of coping with the danger by a united league of
Central Asian states; more than any other had he seemed to justify this
aspiration; and more than any other must he be held culpable when he
permitted the moment that seemed most auspicious to slip by unutilized.
Moreover, when this insurrection broke out in Khokand, he had made every
preparation to defend himself against a Russian invasion. He saw the
Russians compelled, by the very necessities of their position, to call
off their forces to other quarters, and yet he abstained from striking a
blow in defence of those interests which he had ever declared were most
sacred to him. It is impossible to explain such apathy on so important
an occasion as this was; and his refusal to strike in on the side of
Aftobatcha must remain the greatest blot on an otherwise brilliant
reputation. With the collapse of that effort, and the subsequent
occupation of Ferghana, Russian attention seemed to become more occupied
with the state of affairs on the Oxus and in Cabul, than with the
fortunes or misfortunes of Kashgar. During the few months that
intervened between the annexation of Khokand and the appearance of the
Chinese north of the Tian Shan, Yakoob Beg adopted a more conciliatory
policy towards Russia, and might in a short time have sunk into the
position of a somewhat more important Khudayar or Mozaffur Eddin. Other
events intervened, however, and gave a complete change to the question,
as will be considered in a later chapter. We take our leave of this
narrative of his dealings with Russia with an admiration that would be
perfect but for the weakness he exhibited in 1875. Even that vacillation
will scarcely destroy all the claim that his bold defiance and
consistent opposition to all Russian pretensions to supremacy over
Eastern Turkestan gives him to our respectful and admiring
consideration.