YAKOOB BEG'S GOVERNMENT OF KASHGAR.
Yakoob Beg's chief claim to our consideration is that, for more than
twelve years, he gave a settled government to a large portion of Central
Asia, and that, however faulty his external policy may have been in
critical moments, his internal management was founded on a practical and
sufficiently just basis. As a warrior he had done much to justify
admiration, and had proved on many a well-fought field, and in many a
desperate encounter, his claims to be considered a fearless and resolute
soldier; but in this quality he was equalled, if not excelled, by his
own lieutenant, Abdulla Beg, the Murat of Kashgar, while some of the
deeds of his son, Beg Bacha, will rank in daring and surpass in ferocity
anything achieved by the Athalik Ghazi. But in capacity for
administration Yakoob Beg far surpassed his contemporaries, and the
merit of his success was enhanced, not so much by the originality of the
method adopted, as by the unique vigour and perseverance with which it
was put into force. The secret of his power can only be discovered by
constantly bearing in mind the fact that he had constituted himself the
champion of the Mahomedan religion in Central Asia. The Ameers of
Bokhara and Afghanistan might trifle with the seductive promises of the
Russians, and might consent to sacrifice the interests of their religion
for a transitory advancement of their worldly possessions; but to such
degradations the Athalik Ghazi--true "champion father" as he was--never
stooped. With whatever imaginary power the sympathy and good-will of
the Mahomedan peoples of Turkestan may have clothed this ruler, there is
no question that his attitude towards the Muscovite would have warranted
the assertion of greater power than was ever attributed to him; and the
secret of this delusion, an attitude of defiant strength without any
solid foundation for so bold a course, can only be unravelled by
remembering that the Athalik Ghazi strove to represent, not so much
Kashgaria, as the whole Mahomedan world of Central Asia. The necessities
of his own position, when, having conquered Kashgar, he found that he
had aroused the susceptibilities of the Russians, compelled him to seek
in every direction for aid, and to have recourse to every artifice for
increasing his strength, or its semblance, in order to avoid the
dissolution of his state and a subjection to the Czar. So well did he
succeed in his efforts, and so prompt were his movements and so fearless
his attitude, that the Russians were deluded into a belief--which was,
as we emphatically insist, unfounded--that Kashgar would prove a more
formidable antagonist than either Bokhara, or Khokand, or Khiva.
The interior management of a state, which, young in years, yet seemed to
tower among its fellows, might be supposed to be a very interesting
topic to dilate upon; but on this subject there is less direct evidence
than could be wished. Even Sir Douglas Forsyth, in his official report,
is not able to throw as much light as is desired on the inner working of
the administrative system of Yakoob Beg. Still, such as it is, with the
exception of the Russian writer, Gregorieff, he is the only authority on
the subject.
To commence with the court and the immediate surroundings of Yakoob Beg,
we are struck by two inconsistencies. In the first place, there were no
great nobles, or indeed adherents or his family; those chiefs who,
whether they were Khokandian nobles or Kirghiz or Afghan adventurers,
had proved their fidelity to his rule, and their capacity for service,
were actively employed as governors of districts, or as commandants of
fortresses in the wide-stretching dominions of their imperious master.
Periodically they came to pay their respects in the capital, and at
frequent intervals Yakoob Beg, in his journeys to the frontier, visited
them, and superintended their operations in person; but, in so active a
community where there was a dearth of mankind, the intellectually gifted
members of the society were too valuable to be permitted to devote their
energies and their attention to the object of becoming palace ornaments.
Yakoob Beg had forced himself on a people who regarded him with
indifference, and he had to maintain himself in his place by a never
relaxing vigour. To make this possible, he required a large staff of
efficient and trustworthy subordinates, who may be divided into three
classes of various capacities, viz., soldiers, administrators, and
tax-gatherers. Until the last few months of his reign there was no
symptom that his system was declining in vigour, or that his supply of
competent officials was limited and susceptible of being exhausted. Even
in his most prosperous years, however, there was always a difficulty in
obtaining a full supply; and in all inferior posts the disaffected
Khitay had to be employed. The Tungani of Kucha and Aksu were scarcely
more to be trusted in an emergency than their Buddhist kinsmen. Yet the
extensive civil service of the state, which undertook the education, the
religion, the civil order, the local administration of the people all
into its own hands, had to be kept in working order, whatever else might
happen. It can at once be perceived that, when a government which never
obtained any deep hold on the affections of the people had only a
limited population to draw upon, it was only a question of time to solve
the difficulty by an exhaustion of the supply of suitable brain
material, or by the uprising of an, at heart, dissatisfied people. No
one will ever understand the secret of Yakoob Beg's rule unless he
constantly bears in mind that his strict orthodoxy as a Mussulman, and
his still stricter enforcement of the laws of his religion within his
borders, were elements of strength only in his external relations; in
his internal affairs they placed him in the light of a tyrant, and
prevented his people ever experiencing any enthusiasm for his person and
rule. It is doubtful whether outside the priesthood and the more
fanatical Andijanis there was any great religious zeal at all, and it is
quite a delusion to speak of the Kashgari, as a whole, as being
fanatical Mahomedans, in the same degree that it is true to say so of
the Bokhariots or Afghans. In addition to there being no noble or
wealthy official class in the city of Kashgar, there was also the
strange inconsistency of an intensely strict etiquette being enforced
side by side with extreme plainness in costume and ceremonial. It is
rare indeed to hear any traveller to Kashgar speaking of the richness or
finery of court functionaries. Even Hadji Torah, or the Seyyid Yakoob
Khan, as he is now called, and Mahomed Yunus, the governor of Yarkand,
two of the most trusted and prominent followers of the Athalik Ghazi,
were not to be distinguished from a host of minor luminaries in the
court circle by any external insignia of their elevated position. Some
of the military, officers of the household troops, wore a device of a
dragon's head worked in silk over their plain uniform of leather; and
this seems to have been a custom surviving the disappearance of the
Chinese. Hadji Torah--who recently visited this country, and who had on
previous occasions travelled in Russia, Turkey, and India--however,
alone among Kashgarian notables, had introduced into his household some
of the comforts and luxuries of European life. His example was not
imitated by many others, and, after a brief period of fashion, the
improvements he had striven to make popular died out and were lost sight
of. The ordinary dress of a person above the rank of gentleman is a
large blanket-like cloak worn over a close-fitting tunic and breeches;
and the dress of the peasant is similar, only his cloak is usually a
sheepskin. The Ameer himself set the example of exceeding plainness in
his costume, and his followers were far too skilled courtiers to vary
their practice from that of their ruler. But what his court lacked in
pomp it gained in impressiveness by the perfect system of etiquette
enforced, and by the external show of reverence to the ruler and to his
religion, manifested in every petty detail of the palace ceremonial. The
Ameer received publicly in his audience-chamber every day, when all
petitions and stringent punishments were submitted to him. His
_shaghawals_, or foreign secretaries, made their report to him on
whatever business might be most pressing, whether it was concerning his
relations with India or Russia, with Afghanistan or the Tungani; and the
local governors, who might happen to have arrived at the capital, were
received in audience, either to present their personal respects to the
ruler, or their reports of the government of their provinces. But with
the exception of a few of his kinsmen, and more intimate associates,
such as Abdulla, none were permitted to be seated in his presence. Even
these could not sit within a certain distance of their sovereign. All
subjects who were allowed to approach his person had to do so in the
humblest manner, and with the deepest expressions of humility and
subjection. His son, Kuli Beg, was still more particular in his
intercourse with his subjects. Even his cousin, Hadji Torah, a man whose
experience and lineage entitled him to exceptional consideration, never
placed himself on an equality with this youthful despot, and always
clothed his words and thoughts when in conversation with him in an
outward show of humble respect and deferential obsequiousness. It will
be at once surmised, and, so far as our information warrants an opinion,
with correctness, that all this terrorism alienated any good feeling
from the ruling family that its prowess in the field and the cabinet
might have secured for it. In Kashgar we have a forcible proof of the
truth of Tennyson's line, that "he who only rules by terror doeth
grievous wrong;" and yet, founded as it was on a military system, and on
the deepest distrust of the subject races, it could not well have been
otherwise.
The most unmistakable proof of how Yakoob Beg's rule was founded, and
how it was maintained, is to be seen in the fact that his _orda_, or
palace, was one large barrack, the interior compartments of which were
devoted to the accommodation of the royal household. His out-houses were
filled with cannon of every description, from antiquated Chinese irjirs
to modern Krupps and Armstrongs, and his select corps of artillerymen,
clothed in a scarlet uniform, seldom left the chief cities, except for
serious operations against foreign enemies. At the Yangy-Shahr of
Kashgar, too, he kept his military stores, and it was said that in his
workshops there he was able to construct cannon and muskets in
considerable numbers in imitation of the most perfect weapons of
European science. But it must be noted that we have no record of any of
his home-made weapons being used in actual hostilities, while the supply
of arms received from Russia, or this country, is known to have been
made the most of. Besides the natural aptitude of his subjects of
Chinese descent for imitation, he had in his service, particularly in
his artillery, many sepoys who had deserted our service either at the
time of the mutiny or since. These soldiers, valuable either as
non-commissioned officers or in higher ranks still, combined with a
large number of good troops from Khokand and the mountain tribes of the
neighbourhood, gave a cohesion and vigour to the whole army that was
simply inestimable. That army, it may be here convenient to say, was
divided into two classes widely differing from each other, and called
upon, except in an emergency, when all the resources of the state were
summoned to take part in its defence, to perform duties as opposite as
their own composition. The army of the Ameer, founded on that confused
assemblage with which he conquered Kashgar, was divided into two bodies,
the _jigit_ or _djinghite_, the horse soldier, and the _sarbaz_, or foot
soldier. The former of these was the more formidable warrior, being
selected for personal strength or skill. The _jigits_ were trained to
fight on foot as well as on horse, and were armed with a long
single-barrelled gun and a sabre. Their uniform was a serviceable coat
of leathern armour mostly buff in colour, and to all intents and
purposes they correspond with our dragoons, or, perhaps, still more
closely with the proposed corps of mounted riflemen. The _sarbaz_, among
whom are included the artillerymen, presented greater varieties of
efficiency than his mounted comrade; still he had gone through some
regular drill and training, and resided in barracks. He was a regular
soldier, and might be trusted in defence of his country up to a certain
point. In numbers it is impossible to state accurately how many _jigits_
and _sarbazes_ there were in the service of the state; some months ago
they would have been placed as high as 50,000 or 60,000 strong, possibly
at a higher number still; now we are wiser on the subject, and we have
gone to the other end of the scale. It is probable, however, that Yakoob
Beg never had 20,000 perfectly trustworthy soldiers in his army, and
that after the conclusion of the Tungan wars, half that number would
more accurately represent his force of _jigits_ and _sarbazes_. But in
addition to the more or less effective main body, there was a
nondescript following of Khitay, Tungani, half-savage Kirghiz, and rude
degraded savages like the Dolans, that in numbers would have presented a
very formidable appearance. The Khitay must at once be struck out of the
estimate, for they were never permitted to go beyond the immediate
vicinity of Yarkand and Kashgar, where they kept themselves apart, and
were employed as military servants, as sentries, and as workmen in the
military shops and factories. The Tungani, who enrolled themselves at
various epochs in the service of Kashgar, were more than dubious in
their fidelity to the state; besides they were of such questionable
courage, that they were no allies of any importance. Even as compared
with one another, these were of varying kinds of efficiency; the Tungani
who joined Yakoob Beg in the earlier portion of his career seeming to be
the best of them. Those who joined after the fall of Aksu and Kucha,
less efficient and more ambiguous in their fidelity; and those who dwelt
in the country from Korla to Turfan and Manas, were totally inefficient,
and not to be trusted to any degree whatever. The Kirghiz and Kipchak
nomads were rather a source of danger to their friends than of dread to
their foes. Yakoob Beg had, therefore, at his orders but a very limited
force to maintain his own dynasty against the machinations of Khoja and
Tungan, and to defend a long and vulnerable frontier against many
powerful and ambitious neighbours. It was absurd for him to think of
venturing single-handed across the path of Russia, and to do him justice
he never deluded himself into the idea that he could. All he seems to
have aspired to was to resist to the uttermost any invasion of his
territory by them, and to die sooner than surrender. Limited in numbers
as his regular forces were, they seem to have had every claim to be
placed high in the rank of Asiatic soldiers. They were certainly not as
formidable a body as the Sikhs or Ghoorkas, probably not as the Afghans;
still they were infinitely superior, except in numbers, to any forces
the Ameer of Bokhara or the Khan of Khokand could place in the line of
battle. To Yakoob Beg alone belongs the credit of their organization.
Yakoob Beg's system of administration was simple in the extreme. A
_Dadkwah_, or governor, was appointed for each district, and in his
hands was vested the supreme control in all the affairs of his province.
Yet he was no irresponsible minister who could tyrannize as he pleased.
Tyrannize in small ways, undoubtedly, many of them did, but, as the life
of the subject could only be taken away by order of the ruler himself,
the most powerful weapon in the hands of an unscrupulous viceroy was
removed.
At stated periods, too, he had to proceed to Kashgar to give a report of
the chief occurrences in his province, and on such occasions petitions
containing charges against the Dadkwah were formally considered in his
presence. It may be said that this proceeding was a farce, and it is
probably true that a favoured viceroy could laugh at any ordinary
accusation against his character. But that would be an exceptional case.
Many Dadkwahs were reduced in official rank, for malpractices, and some,
such as Yakoob Beg's own half-brother, were removed for incompetence in
their charges. Side by side, too, with the Dadkwah, ruled the Kazi or
Judge, who, if of course not on a par in rank with the viceroy, was
still invested with complete authority in all legal decisions on crime.
This prominence given to the legal authorities had a good effect on the
public mind, for, although the Kazi, as a rule, might not dare to thwart
the wishes of the Dadkwah, the effect of the law being supreme was
scarcely detracted from. And what was that law? it may naturally be
asked. Precisely the same as the law of every other Mahomedan state,
with a few innovations traceable to the influence of the Chinese. The
Shariat, the holy code of the Prophet followed in all the Sunni states,
was enforced by Yakoob Beg, with particular severity; and in its working
no sense of mercy was permitted to temper the harshness of its
regulations. Crimes committed by women were punished with greater
inflictions than the same committed by men; and the ordinary
punishments, whipping, mutilation, and torture could be inflicted by
order of the Dadkwah. Only in capital cases had the decision to rest
with the sovereign. Thieves, beggars, and vagrants found wandering about
the streets at prohibited hours were immediately locked up, and brought
before the Kazi, who would either administer a caution, or a whipping,
if the accused had previously offended. Another check on the abuse of
power by the officials was to be found in the following regulation. A
charge to be visited with a severer punishment than twenty heavy strokes
from the _dira_--a leather strap, fixed in a wooden handle--had to be
investigated by a member of each official rank; so the Kazi passed a
culprit on, with his comments, to the Mufti, the Mufti to the Alim, and
the Alim to the Dadkwah. If any of these officials dissented from the
remarks of his subordinate, and the matter was found impossible to
arrange by mutual concessions, it was either referred to the sovereign
for solution, or was permitted to fall through. The Dadkwah had also to
be present at every punishment within his jurisdiction, and was directly
responsible to the Ameer for any miscarriage of justice. The Kazi Rais,
or head judge, had the right to decide all minor matters for
himself--for instance, in his patrols through the streets, if he met a
woman unveiled he could order her to be struck so many times with the
_dira_; or if he found a man selling adulterated food, or using light
weights, he could confiscate his goods, or in some other manner mulct
him in addition to administering a certain number of strokes. He and his
attendants were particularly energetic and zealous in compelling idlers
about the bazaars to repair to the mosques at prayer time, and in a very
paternal and authoritative manner did the Rais exercise his petty power
for the good of his people. Even on his despotism there was some check,
as he had no authority to inflict more than forty blows with the _dira_
for one offence. Intimately connected with the administration of justice
was the police system, which in its intricate ramifications permeated
all sections of society. Much as we may feel admiration for the judicial
code, which, up to a certain point admirably administered, ensured a
certain kind of rough justice throughout the Athalik Ghazi's dominions,
the police laws and discipline have greater claims to our favourable
opinion, as evidences of an astonishing capacity for government. In his
legal code, Yakoob Beg simply adopted the laws enforced on all true
believers by the Koran, and he had no claims to originality as a
lawgiver. But as a ruler adopting all those checks on sedition which lie
at the disposal of an unscrupulous sovereign, and which were brought to
such a pitch of perfection under Fouche and the Second Empire, Yakoob
Beg has reason to be placed in the very highest class of such
potentates. In this achievement, too, he was not a plagiarist, and, as
he must have been ignorant of similar regulations existing in Europe, he
must be allowed the credit of having originated a system of police in
which it is difficult to find a single flaw. In China, indeed, something
of the same kind has at all times existed, and at periods when the
Emperor grasped the sceptre firmly, and made his individuality felt in
the management of affairs, the police were one of the most active tools
of power. But even in that empire there is no record of their having
attained so complete a control over the actions and sentiments of the
people as in Kashgaria during the last decade. It appears, too, that in
superiority of system lay the sole pre-eminence of the latter; for the
Tungan, or policeman, of China was, individually man for man, a superior
class to the Kashgarian and other constables of Yakoob Beg. In short,
the whole credit of their existence belongs to that ruler.
Let us now give some account of this important body. It was divided into
two chief divisions quite distinct from and irrespective of each other,
secret and municipal. The _secret_ was not, like ours, a perceptible
class of detectives, acting in combination with the municipal, to which
was entrusted the discovery of crimes and conspiracies. It may loosely
be described as consisting of every member of the community, for all
desired to stand well with the powers that be, and the easiest way to
attain that object would be to place all confidential information at
their disposal. But it is evident that even in a state of irresponsible
power, like Kashgar, a clear encouragement, such as this, to invent
libels of one's neighbours, could only end in unprofitable litigation
and confusion. There was certainly a check on the too zealous
imaginations of the subjects, and, although there is not much evidence
on the subject, it appears to have been twofold. In the first place a
libeller incurred the risk of receiving very severe punishment,
particularly if the person libelled were of saintly lineage, or if he
filled any official post. This operated as a check on too hasty
accusations, especially when it became known that the reward for such
service was seldom speedily forthcoming, and scarcely ever answered the
expectations of the informer. But this check, which alone seems to have
been adopted in the earlier years of Yakoob Beg's authority, was found
to be insufficient as his power became consolidated. The secret police
then became organized to a certain degree; that is to say, they so far
formed a distinct corps that a member had to be approved of either by
the Dadkwah or the Rais. So well, however, was the secret of their
individuality maintained that few of them were generally known to the
people. Suspicion was wide-spread throughout all ranks of society, and
the governor in his _orda_, or the Rais in his hall of justice, or the
shopkeeper in his booth, or the artisan in his hut, never felt safe that
his neighbour, the man with whom he was holding the most friendly
converse, was not dissecting his expressions to discover whether they
contained anything treasonable. Members of this formidable body were
always attached to the suite of either foreign envoys or merchants; and
their presence in the rear of the _cortege_, always effectually closed
the mouths of the inhabitants, or only induced them to open them to give
false or contradictory replies.
There can be no doubt that this secret organization, brought to a high
pitch of perfection during the later years of his reign, gave a
consistency and strength to Yakoob Beg's tenure of power that was
wanting to all his predecessors. In leaving this part of the system, it
is as well to point out in conclusion that this detective force was
only useful in discovering what was about to occur in the state among
Andijani or Tungani, and that it was powerless to attempt the repression
by force of any outbreak of popular feeling. Its members were simply
spies, and as a body its value vanished when its members became
generally known. Constant changing, and the introduction of fresh
members, were the sole effectual means of preserving the _incognito_ of
a large body of men, and women even, who preserved official
communication only with the local governor or judge.
The municipal police were subdivided into urban and suburban, and they
present a complete contrast to the vague body we have just attempted to
describe. Their functions were known and recognizable. They were the
functionaries who put into practice the behests of the Kazi, and they
maintained order in the streets and bazaars, much as our own do. The
_Corbashi_ is the head of this body, and his subordinates are styled
_tarzagchi_. They wore a distinct uniform, and had drilling grounds
attached to barracks, in which, however, they were not all compelled to
reside. They were essentially military in their rules, and presented a
powerful first front to all evil-doers and would-be rebels. It was they
who accompanied the Kazi Rais in his daily circuit of the streets and
market-place, and it was from their weapon, the _dira_, that the
ordinary punishment was received. Their principal avocation seems to
have been to maintain order in the towns during the night-time, for in
the day we only hear of a few of them being detailed for personal
attendance on the Dadkwah and Kazi. With sunset their true importance is
more visible, for not only were they stationed in all main
thoroughfares, squares, and other open places of the city; but until
sunrise patrols at frequent intervals throughout the night visited all
the chief quarters of the town. The power vested in their hands during
these hours was very great, and it was dangerous for any stranger to
venture out after prohibited hours. All persons found in the streets
after sunset were arrested and incarcerated until the morning, when, if
they could give a satisfactory account of themselves, they were
released, with a caution not to keep such unseemly hours for the future.
If, however, they were unable to explain their business, a further term
of imprisonment was imposed; and it was a matter of some difficulty for
a stranger to obtain his complete liberty for some time afterwards. The
suburban police fulfilled much the same duties, and on all the country
roads patrols passed up and down during the night, while pickets were
stationed at the cross-roads. In the same manner as in the towns all
travellers, except those armed with a passport, were interned for a
minute investigation into their affairs in the morning. And "thieves,
beggars, and wanderers" were chastised at the discretion of the local
magistrate. The vagrant laws were as much enforced, too, as they were in
this country in the days of Queen Elizabeth, and in a general mode of
interference with the thoughts and actions of its subjects, the
Kashgarian government had attained a height of excellence that would
entitle it to rank with the Inquisition. Still there was order. No riots
occurred to distract the harmony of the public weal, and to an external
observer, especially to one belonging to a country where order is
considered the greatest _desideratum_, the government of the Athalik
Ghazi seemed to be the perfection of an Asiatic state, and that order a
reason for attributing all other virtues to its originator.
Travellers, however, who were provided with a passport, were accorded
privileges of transit, and were permitted, if they felt so disposed, to
continue their journeys during hours interdicted to less privileged
mortals. In each chief town there were offices for the issue of these
permits to travel. Not many obstacles were thrown in the path of those,
who left permanent guarantees in the shape of property behind them for
their return, in accomplishing their desire for travel; but rarely was
permission granted to any one, not blessed with these worldly
advantages, to proceed farther than the neighbouring district. Indeed in
all cases leave to visit foreign states, other than Khokand or Bokhara,
was a matter of difficulty to be obtained, and only in the most
exceptional cases was it granted. But it appears that there were some
evasions of this regulation by a simulation of religious zeal, for the
Sheikh-ul-Islam had it in his power to grant permits to leave the
country on pilgrimages to Bokhara the "holy," or to Mecca. In themselves
the passports were simple in phraseology. They merely stated the name
and address of the traveller, the nature of his business, and his
destination. Having obtained the consent of the Dadkwah, and the
authority of the Kazi, no difficulty was experienced in procuring the
necessary slip of paper. Infractions of this permission, by too long an
absence, or by proceeding in some forbidden direction, were visited on a
first offence with a fine. On a repetition of it, however, the
punishment became more severe. It would be interesting to know how these
protectors of the public peace were paid, and by what means. But on this
point there is little trustworthy information. We, however, know of one
tax which was devoted to the support of the urban police, but of the
funds from which the suburban were remunerated, we have no authority for
any assertion. A weekly tax was levied from all the shop and booth
owners, to go towards the payment of their protectors; but it is not
supposed that this amounted to a sufficient sum to maintain the large
force in the more important cities. The difference was probably paid out
of the state coffers under the head of justice. Judging from this we
cannot be far wrong in assuming that a similar tax was levied on the
farmers and country residents for the support of the suburban police;
and as the secret police required less outlay in the country than in the
cities, it is possible that that tax more nearly defrayed the total
cost, than it did in Yarkand or Kashgar. The police supervision and the
military terrorism, freely resorted to on all occasions offering an
excuse for such an extreme measure, have not been without their effect
in leaving traces of their existence and influence in the daily life of
the Kashgari, and on the countenances and sentiments of the subject
peoples. Where formerly lived a light-hearted and happy race there now
seemed as if a never-to-be-removed gloom had settled down on the face of
the land, and neither the assurance of security nor the irregular
encouragement of the ruler to commerce could remove the blight that had
fallen upon the energies and happiness of the people. As one of them
expressed it, in pathetic language, "During the Chinese rule there was
everything; there is nothing now." The speaker of that sentence was no
merchant, who might have been expected to be depressed by the
falling-off in trade, but a warrior and a chieftain's son and heir. If
to him the military system of Yakoob Beg seemed unsatisfactory and
irksome, what must it have appeared to those more peaceful subjects to
whom merchandise and barter were as the breath of their nostrils? All
the advantages of a perfect police system, heavily weighted by the
incumbrance of a costly addition of spies and tale-bearers, would seem
as nothing compared with the loss incurred by the fetters placed on
individual motion and enterprise. Considered by itself, the police
organization of Kashgar was, perhaps, the most perfect design achieved
by Yakoob Beg, and his community of spies will rank with anything in
effectiveness that has ever been accomplished by any potentate. But as a
permanent addition to his strength it is permissible to doubt whether he
really secured his rule by employing the latter, or obtained much more
by the formation of the former than the services of a trained body of
trustworthy, courageous men. The restrictions imposed on trade by the
severance of all communications with the East by the Tungan wars and by
the limited amount of liberty granted the native Kashgari, proved most
deterrent to all mercantile adventure, and placed in the hands of
Khokandians or Russians on the north, and of Cashmerians and Punjabis on
the south, most of the trade still carried on with Eastern Turkestan.
The trade carried on by the Athalik Ghazi's state, if we are to judge
solely by amount, with foreign countries, was greatest with Russia and
her dependencies; but if we investigate the matter more closely we find
that the result is a little more satisfactory to ourselves. The direct
trade that was carried on by way of Leh with Khoten and Sanju was
steadily increasing, while that of Russia by Khokand had for some time
remained stationary, if it had not even decreased. And then much of the
Russian trade has to be scored to this country, for in the marts of
Kashgar, underneath Russian exteriors, were very often to be found
English interiors, and the brand of well-known Manchester and Liverpool
makers was discovered beneath some gaudy and brilliant-looking cover
hailing from Moscow or Nishni Novgorod. Besides, recent investigations
have proved that some of the goods exported from Shikarpore, in Scinde,
through the Bholan Pass find their way through the mountainous districts
that intervene into the territory of his late Highness the Ameer of
Kashgar. Nor had Yakoob Beg totally neglected all means for inducing
merchants to enter his state; indeed, his chief objection seemed to have
been, not that they should have entered his state, but that they should
leave it. Serais were built in all the chief towns for the accommodation
of such merchants as might take up a temporary abode within his
territory, and the Andijani Serai, or hotel, specially constructed for
merchants from Khokand, was one of the largest and most striking
buildings in the city of Kashgar. Yakoob Beg had even detailed off to
take care of the serai and its occupants a large number of the old
Khitay, or Yangy Mussulmans, who were generally employed throughout the
city as domestic servants. When we come to the description of the
relations of Yakoob Beg with England and with Russia we will speak more
fully of the details of those treaties of commerce which were ratified
on several occasions, and whose ostensible object was the promotion of
trade and other friendly intercourse.
We have now considered the army, the police, the administration of
justice, and the court of Yakoob Beg, and the only chief subject that
remains to be discussed are the principles of finance adopted by the
Ameer. To keep any state, even an Asiatic state, in a fit condition for
preserving its independence, a settled revenue is requisite, and Yakoob
Beg, whose atmosphere was one of almost continual warfare, was on
several occasions pressed for money in a manner difficult to be
conceived by us. His military operations languished for the want of the
sinews of war, and we are told on credible authority that many of his
soldiers received only payment out of the spoil taken at the sack of
Turfan and other places. So long as his ordinary expenditure was
increased by the addition of an extraordinary war outlay, so long was he
unable to make his receipts and expenditure balance. On the cessation of
hostilities against the Tungani, and the partial revival of trade in
consequence, his fiscal affairs assumed a brighter aspect, and it is
possible that during the last few years of his reign his revenue showed
a surplus. But to obtain that success, a most joyful one to every
embarrassed potentate, Yakoob Beg had to resort to many strange
expedients, and to manifest much patience and long-suffering; and in
overcoming petty obstacles and minor details, he proved himself to be a
man of more than average ability, no less than he had previously by the
skilful manipulation of armies and intriguers. Here again he erected a
structure distinct and separate from that handed down to him by the
Chinese. Comparatively speaking, the Chinese had been wealthy to the
Athalik Ghazi, and they received in moderate imposts on merchandise
alone almost a sufficient sum to defray the total cost of their
administration. Yakoob Beg had no such certain source of revenue; he had
to raise from an impoverished and only half-conquered state a sum almost
as large as that required by the Chinese. That he did it remains the
chief proof of his skill as a finance minister, and is another reason
for our regarding this extraordinary ruler with admiration. We may feel
sure that if we could follow closely the history of his fiscal efforts,
and the numberless plans that proved abortive, we should have revealed
one of the most instructive and interesting narratives of modern Asia.
There are no materials out of Kashgar, if there are such there, for such
an investigation however, and we can only follow as best we may be able,
the thread of events by the light of such authorities as are at our
disposal. In court and personal expenditure he set an example that might
with advantage be followed by other rulers in Asia even at the present
day, and in a strict economy and supervision of the petty sums that in
the aggregate make all the difference in any state between a surplus and
a deficit, were to be found the two guiding principles of his conduct.
Kashgaria might be in a very backward state of cultivation, and years of
commotion and warfare had undoubtedly thrown it back in the ranks of
prosperity and civilization, but the Athalik Ghazi was persuaded of the
truth of the Latin philosopher's saying, that "Parsimonia magna
vectigalia est." It must be remembered that Yakoob Beg set himself a
different task to accomplish than had the Chinese. Their idea was not so
much to extend their empire, although there has always been a tendency
with the Chinese to be aggressive against small neighbours, as to
acquire a territory that could be made a paying thing: much as the
pioneers of Anglo-Saxon conquest have made their impression in every
quarter of the globe in search of wealth and adventure, did the Chinese
by a seemingly irresistible impulse spread over the continent of Asia.
In doing so they were actuated as much by calculation of possible profit
as by any desire for military renown. The Emperor Keen-Lung himself was
flattered by the triumphs achieved beyond Gobi; but his lieutenants and
viceroys aimed at more mercenary objects, and but for the golden promise
held forth by a permanent conquest of Turkestan would have induced their
master to direct his efforts to some more profitable undertaking. The
Chinese, having acquired Kashgar, were far too sagacious to use up its
resources by an organized system of pillage, and they accordingly, let
it be granted chiefly with a view to their own personal aggrandizement,
devoted their attention to the development of its natural wealth by
means already detailed in a previous chapter. For three generations the
officials grew rich on the prosperity of their dependency, and for the
same period the people themselves were scarcely less flourishing. The
Chinese had accepted no slight responsibility in undertaking the
government of Kashgar on principles identical with those by which they
held authority in Tibet; but, owing to wonderful perseverance and good
management, they triumphed over every difficulty. The revenue raised for
state and local purposes was very great, and it sufficed to preserve
good order for many years, and to add permanent improvement to the state
in every direction. The task voluntarily undertaken by the Chinese was
far more onerous than that Yakoob Beg found he had to execute; but they
came to it with many advantages that he wanted. They had a large and
faithful army; he had only an uncertain gathering, which might flee or
desert on the first symptom of disaster: they had the resources of a
great and powerful empire at their back; he had nothing but his own
energy and determination: and above all, they had a reputation that
added to their strength and facilitated their undertakings, while he was
regarded as a mere military adventurer, receiving the contempt of Tungan
and Khoja alike. The very nature of things made the Chinese turn most of
their attention to commerce, while for years Yakoob Beg's sole thought
was to consolidate his military strength and form a large standing army.
For many years, then, Yakoob Beg only spent money on the drilling of
soldiers and the purchase of weapons. Now and then, when some danger
seemed to threaten him, either from Russia, Afghanistan, or the Tungani,
he would devote considerable sums to the construction of forts in the
line of the menaced position. But his chief expenditure was confined to
his army, and the maintenance of his dynasty by his police system. The
administration of justice required a certain sum of money, and the
Church for its support came in for a fair share of the good things that
were going. It is clear that his expenditure, if not very great in our
eyes, would severely tax a population of 1,000,000 people in no very
high state of prosperity. The chief source of wealth in the past had
always been the trade with China, and when that was broken off, the
slight increase in intercourse with Russia and India was not a
sufficient compensation. In fact, the country was very poor, without the
ingenuity and commercial instincts of the Khitay. During the days of the
war under Buzurg Khan, the only means of obtaining the necessary revenue
was by despoliation and enforced levies on the occupied portion of the
territory. When the western portion of Kashgaria was subdued, Yakoob Beg
found himself without any money in his exchequer, and no easy means of
filling it presented itself to him. In these straits he had recourse to
an expedient that, if not very novel, was at all events very effective.
He issued a proclamation to his faithful subjects to the effect that as
conqueror he was landowner of the whole state; but that he was
willing--eager would have been the more correct expression--to sell it
to them at a cheap rate. He, however, exempted from this the old
possessions of the Chinese Wangs and Ambans, and distributed their
extensive domains among the more prominent of his followers, who in
return acknowledged their liability to military service. The system was
an exact copy of the old feudal regime, and Yakoob Beg was vested with
all the rights and authority of the feudal lord of the Middle Ages. The
parallel is still further maintained by the large reward that the Church
received for its aid to the new ruler. The old revenues, devoted to the
support of the temples and religious seminaries in the past, and which
had miscarried during the troublous period of the war for the possession
of Turkestan, were restored, and fresh possessions were added thereto,
to demonstrate the generosity of the sovereign and his veneration for
the religion of Mahomed. His old friend the Sheikh-ul-Islam was still
more fortunate, and a large estate was set apart for his special
enjoyment. Nor does it appear that the Mussulman priests abused the
fresh power and advantages they thus secured; for among the toilers in
Kashgaria none were more energetic than they in educating the people,
and in extending their influence over their minds, both for the benefit
of their religion and for the security of the power of the Athalik
Ghazi. But in one respect, and it is impossible to exaggerate its
importance, Yakoob Beg's endeavours to found a strong military class,
bound to him by ties of past favours and others yet to come, were
abortive; for with rare exceptions his followers refused to fill their
new avocation of landed proprietors. Instead of devoting their attention
to the questions arising from agriculture and other rural pursuits, they
sub-let all their possessions to Andijani immigrants, and, residing in
their city _ordas_, gave themselves over either to lascivious pleasures
or to complete indolence. Even so distinguished a warrior as Abdulla
Beg, the slayer of more than 12,000 persons, as his panegyrists boasted,
suffered from the pervading effeminacy on the cessation of active
hostilities; and in the lower ranks of the service such deterioration in
energy was still more manifest. This change in the spirit of his earlier
supporters, among other things, obliged Yakoob Beg to depend the more on
the Andijani merchants and shopkeepers, and conduced to his adopting
more favourable views on foreign trade in the later years of his power.
The sum of money which he immediately received by the sale of lands
placed him in a condition to undertake those wars against the Tungani,
which added so much to the extent of his territory and to the
responsibilities of his position. Indeed, for several years after its
first enforcement it continued to bring in a certain amount to the
coffers of the State. But even this resource was transitory, and the sum
of money received by this means and in the shape of spoil, from Yarkand,
Kashgar, Khoten, and other places, was not sufficient to meet the
expenditure caused by the formation of a large army. Neither of these
practices could be regarded as a permanent means of obtaining a revenue,
for the former would scarcely admit of a repetition, and the latter soon
exhausted itself. So when his rule had become a little settled, and
these modes of raising money, in addition to the still more
reprehensible practice of robbing foreign merchants, had become out of
date to a certain degree, the Athalik Ghazi had to place his fiscal
arrangements on a more practical and honourable basis. While he laboured
under some disadvantages, already enumerated, as compared with the
Chinese, he had the great advantage over them that he strove for an
object more easily accomplished than the restoration of Kashgar to its
pristine welfare; and in his budget he had only steadily to keep in view
how much he required to maintain so many _jigits_, and so many police in
his pay, and to keep in his exchequer a small surplus for any untoward
emergency. He left the roads to take care of themselves; the irrigation
works, sadly wanted in various parts of the state, must be reserved for
his successors; and all proposals for the amelioration of the people
were shelved for a more opportune occasion. But so many thousand
_jigits_ must be in the ranks; so many fresh guns and cartridges must be
placed in the arsenals; and so many adventurers must be induced by good
pay to take service in the army as non-commissioned officers, in order
that the rank and file should be well drilled. The very necessities of
his position compelled Yakoob Beg to make all these military
preparations; but the cost was great, and the sacrifices thus imposed on
ruler and on people were a terrible strain. Recent events make us
inclined to believe that a less active military and foreign policy, and
a more peaceable and domestic one, would have tended to have added more
strength to the Athalik Ghazi's rule than the somewhat ostentatious
military parade to which he had recourse. Be that as it may, Yakoob Beg
instituted in 1867 two taxes, which may be supposed to represent the two
chief classes of receipts during his tenure of authority. The first of
these was a tithe on all the cereal produce of the country; this tax was
called the _Ushr_. The second, called the _Zakat_, was a customs due
levied on all merchandise entering Kashgar. The _Ushr_ was payable on
all land except that occupied by the Church, or by those who owed
military service to the crown instead of other payment; and even those
who rented land from the noble classes were obliged to surrender a tithe
to the ruler. It would appear, therefore, from this that it was not so
much the land as its legal possessor who was exempt from liability to
the usual obligations of citizenship. The danger contained in the
acquisition of all the crown lands by Andijani merchants, and the
gradual displacement of his more immediate followers through the energy
of these people, was not imperceptible to Yakoob Beg, and he accordingly
adopted measures for preventing his nobles selling their land without
his sanction. The receipts from this _Ushr_ were very considerable, and
it was the main source of his revenue for years. We have some idea of
the approximate value of land in Kashgar. The method of measuring land
for sale, and consequently also for taxation, is peculiar. It is not by
any given size that it is computed, or, indeed, strictly speaking by the
amount of crop it produces; but at a rate in accordance with the amount
of wheat with which it had been planted. The average rate was about a
pound for as much land as was sown with 20 lb. of wheat. The tenant, as
has been said, paid the government dues and handed over three-fourths of
the net produce to the landlord as rent, receiving for his portion only
the one-fourth remaining. Under this system it was only in very
prosperous years that any but very large tenants made sufficient to earn
a competent livelihood. In bad years it is possible that the landlord
had to satisfy himself with a smaller share, if he was not induced to
surrender his claim altogether for the disastrous period. But the
tax-farmers, entrusted with the collection of this rate, were eager to
become rich, no less than to earn a good name with the authorities for
bringing in a list with no defaulters. The unfortunate people were
completely at their mercy, and without any means of ascertaining the
accuracy of the claim, or of opposing extortionate demands on the part
of the tax-collectors. They paid without a murmur, perhaps without a
suspicion of the imposition that was being practised upon them, the sum
demanded of them, if they were able; and as their dues were payable
without delay and on demand before anything else was taken out of the
total sum of the produce, the Athalik Ghazi received his share with
regularity, and his tax-collector pocketed the excess sum for his own
satisfaction. In many cases it is known that the amount claimed by the
official exceeded by threefold the legal demand. Such a system was no
less hurtful to the ruler than it was ruinous to the people. That in one
tax alone a larger sum should be extracted from the people for the
benefit of the officials than was contributed for the necessities of the
state, exhibited a very loose system of supervision on the part of the
sovereign, and is a strong piece of evidence that in many ways Yakoob
Beg was a mixture of contradictions. We can scarcely persuade ourselves
that he was aware of these occurrences, and yet how could he be ignorant
of them?
In addition to the _Ushr_ there was another tax on home produce, viz.,
the _Tanabi_, or tax on land devoted to the production of vegetables or
fruit. The Tanab is, by the way, a lineal measure of forty-seven yards,
and a Tanabi is a piece of land forty-seven yards square. On this extent
of land cultivated for vegetables, or fruit, a small tax was raised.
More than any other tax did this vary according to the character of the
district, and to the quality of the year's crop. It was seldom less than
a shilling a Tanabi, even in the least renowned district, whereas in
some parts, in good years, it was five shillings, or even more. Here
again, however, the middleman interfered, and exacted as much as he saw
there was any possibility of his obtaining. This tax undoubtedly ought
to have produced a large sum, as a larger portion of the soil is laid
out as fruit and vegetable gardens than for crops; but whether it was
more difficult to raise, or there was more peculation _in transitu_ from
the tax-payer to the imperial exchequer, it is certain that we hear much
less of this tax than we should be disposed to imagine. The two great
taxes on home productions were therefore a corn due and a fruit due. The
rate was not in itself excessive, and could be paid by any community
without embarrassment. It is uncertain to what extent the avarice of the
officials had made the conditions of these two taxes more onerous,
although, on the most favourable supposition, the citizen was mulcted in
no inconsiderable sum. A more serious question for the ruler was, how
did it affect his own position with regard to his subjects? Did Yakoob
Beg appear in the eyes of the Kashgari as an exacting and oppressive
tyrant on account of these heavy impositions?
It is impossible to speak on this point with any degree of certainty,
but it is only natural to expect that such was the case. No tiller of
the ground can feel grateful to a sovereign who required him to hand
over almost one-third of his receipts before he made use of one penny of
them, even for the payment of his rent. It is scarcely probable that
Yakoob Beg approved of such enormous profits going to his officials;
but, that having tolerated petty exactions in his earlier days, he found
himself unable to attempt the task of coping with the evil when it had
assumed such alarming proportions. It is impossible to believe that he
remained in ignorance of what was occurring under his very eyes, and
there is some evident foundation for the accusation that he participated
in the division of the profits of his tax-gatherers. We should be loth
to admit the accuracy of such a charge, and yet the arguments in its
favour are too plausible to admit of a very confident contradiction. It
would not speak well for the efficiency of his secret police if he had
remained in ignorance of a fact which was losing him the sympathy of his
subjects.
The gold mines at Khoten were worked after the fall of that city in
1868, and continued productive down to the present time. There is no
information on the quantities of the precious metal that are there
turned out in the year, but it is probable that they are not very great.
The coal mines near Aksu and Kucha are no longer made use of, except by
a few individuals, and the copper mines in that district have, since the
departure of the Chinese, only been very partially explored. The jade
that used to come in great quantities from Aksu and Khoten, is still to
be found throughout Kashgar; but although it is probable that it still
nearly all comes from those cities, the Kashgari themselves tell a
hesitating tale as to its place of production. A visitor to Kashgar, on
going the round of the bazaars, soon found that the people's tongues
were tied by the presence, in his train, of a number of the secret
police, who had been specially told off to prevent the Feringhee
obtaining any troublesome information on the state of the people, or the
resources of the state. A striking instance was given him of the close
attention paid by these guardians of order to the veriest trifles. The
traveller inquired in one stall where the jade, which was the chief
commodity of the merchant in question, came from, and received the
reply, Aksu. Proceeding to another shop in the street, he repeated the
question, when he was informed that it was imported from Khokand. But
the traveller said, your neighbour told me it came from Aksu. The
shopkeeper, taken aback by this abrupt remark, became confused, and
admitted that it came from Aksu. Warned by a look from the official, he
then repeated his original assertion that it came from Khokand. The use
of all this absurd shuffling, and attempt to throw dust in strangers'
eyes, is impossible to discover; for it was a matter of little moment
whether jade came from Aksu, or Khokand, so long as we knew that it
formed an important commodity, both in the rough and in the chiselled
state, in the cities of Kashgaria.
The customs tax, or _Zakat_, is sanctioned by the Shariat, and was
levied at all the border posts on the various roads leading into the
state. Up to the ratification of the treaties with Great Britain and
Russia, its regulations were vague and elastic in the extreme. In fact,
any merchant who might have been so foolhardy as to venture into Kashgar
would have had reason, before these events, to think himself fortunate
if he escaped the penalty of his rashness; for assuredly his luggage
would not, but would have been confiscated for the special benefit of
his Highness the Ameer. So late as 1869, Russian merchants were robbed
of their baggage, and personally ill-treated, and only after long years
of negotiation did the Russian Government obtain any satisfaction for
the injuries and loss inflicted on one of their subjects. And then how
did the Athalik Ghazi send the sum of money he agreed to pay for the
loss the merchant had incurred?--why in a depreciated Chinese currency,
part of a large number of coins that he had found in a disused temple in
Kashgar! Before this, all the external trade had been carried on with
Khokand and Bokhara, Afghanistan and Badakshan, and the receipts from
_Zakat_ were quite insignificant, barring such treasure trove as the
spoliation of a merchant from Tashkent, or from Leh. But with the
persistent efforts on the part of the Russians on the north, and of the
English native merchants on the south, to pierce the gloom hiding the
country of Eastern Turkestan, it became impossible for Yakoob Beg to
maintain much longer the incognito he was so jealous in maintaining.
Perhaps also the prospect of deriving an income from _Zakat_, that
should smooth down many of his difficulties, was not without some
influence on his mind when he came into direct contact with civilized
empires. His expectations were far too sanguine, and he seems to have
once more, during the last twelve months of his life, become indifferent
to the advantages or disadvantages of trade with his neighbours. In
fact, when he placed his customs on a fair footing, he found that it
would require many years to recoup him for the excessive exactions he
surrendered. The merchants who first attempted to commence intercourse
with Kashgar became speedily discouraged by the dangers of the route,
and the small opening for a large remunerative trade in a country whose
wealth and population had been magnified tenfold. In a country where the
richest merchant in the chief town possessed only a capital of L8,000,
not much could be expected in the way of fortune; and although the legal
dues on all merchandise were fixed at an _ad valorem_ rate of 2-1/2 per
cent., it was soon discovered that if the ruler happened to be in want
of cash he would not scruple to take what he could from the stranger.
Both to the ruler, and to the foreign merchant, the new arrangement
contained distasteful matter. The former perceived that he had
surrendered some of his imperial rights, and that he was not to be
recompensed by his receiving more money, and the latter knew that the
treaty stipulation would not save him from having to pay excess fees.
The _Zakat_, far from showing the expected disposition to increase,
seemed rather inclined to remain stationary, if not to decrease; and
the foreign merchant had obtained some promise on the part of the ruler
of personal protection, and of assistance in the disposal of his wares.
His discontent at the stagnation in the customs soon showed itself by
his exacting excess dues, sometimes on British, sometimes on Russian,
but more often on Khokandian and Afghan merchants. Instead of increasing
his receipts, these strong measures only threw them back, and left him
in a worse plight than he was in before. He had not the patience
necessary to enable him to wait with confidence the fuller development
of trade, nor had he the perseverance or tact to place fresh inducements
in the path of merchants to renew their intercourse with him and his
state. Many visited Kashgar with merchandise a first time; but few,
indeed, repeated the visit. The ruler was off-handed in his reception of
them. They were scarcely accorded any liberty in their movements, and
the profit of their journey was greatly reduced by the payment of a due
of 5 per cent. instead of the stipulated condition of 2-1/2 per cent. It
is a pure fiction, therefore, to say that trade with Kashgar had
increased during the rule of the Athalik Ghazi through his friendly
inclination. If the amount of merchandise imported into his state had
increased, it was owing only to the necessities of its inhabitants, and
was a fact that must have taken place either by intercourse direct, or
through native states, with the two great providers of Central Asia. The
exaggerated enthusiasm that it was endeavoured to raise up in this
country about this same mythical ruler of Yarkand never spread far, and
there was always some scepticism, if there could be no disproof, of the
reports of the formidableness of this new kingdom. Looking calmly at the
real state of Yakoob Beg's position, even at the height of his power, we
find him to have always been a pecuniarily embarrassed ruler, glad of
the smallest windfall in the shape of the spoil of a single merchant.
The _Zakat_, his advisers pointed out to him, might be made a most
productive source of revenue, if foreign merchants could be induced to
bring their wares into the country. The loss the people had felt in the
departure of the Chinese might be amply repaired by the appearance of
Russian and English merchants to supply the same place that they filled.
If his aspirations were disappointed, and the _Zakat_ did not show any
signs of possessing that elasticity which had been predicted, it is
probable that in his impatience, heightened by the perception that
foreign trade might lead to foreign complications, he did not give the
scheme a sufficient time for a fair trial. His other sources of revenue,
_Ushr_ and _Tanabi_, and the gold mines of Khoten, brought in a sum
enough to meet the current expenses of the government and to maintain in
his service as many soldiers as his recruiting officers were able to
secure. But there was little if any surplus; and local improvements, and
all outlay that might have been reproductive and for the benefit of the
people, were strictly forbidden. The only works we can find constructed
by him, with a view to the advancement of the interests of his subjects,
were the merchants' _serais_, built in each city, and these were
self-supporting. Yakoob Beg has no claim to being considered as a
beneficent ruler. He was a military dictator, who had shown a rare power
for inaugurating a rough system of government, and whose campaigns had
always been singularly successful. As a ruler, showing a full
appreciation of the wants of his people, and adopting the best possible
measures to obtain them, he had no claims to consideration. Indeed, he
could not be compared with the Chinese, who, however personal may have
been their motives, certainly raised the state to a high pitch of
material prosperity, and left many enduring marks of their past
occupation. These two dominations, foisted on the Kashgari by the strong
arm, while each immeasurably superior to the Khoja claimants,
represented two distinct modes of governing a subject race. The Chinese
endeavoured to conciliate, and to make the necessity for their presence
felt by the people; the Athalik Ghazi was supremely indifferent to the
prosperity of his subjects, so long as they were willing to pay him the
tribute money, and to serve in his army. An exactly opposite result
might have been expected, for there was far more kinship between the
Khokandian adventurer and the Kashgari, than there was between the
Khitay and the Andijani. Admirers of Yakoob Beg may, of course, plead
that his rule had not acquired sufficient consistency to justify him in
tasking his strength by great undertakings, such as the construction of
roads and canals. In one respect he had not the labour at his disposal,
and he was, consequently, hampered by a difficulty that the Chinese were
free from. Still when we remember that all these works ought to have
been remunerative, and to have strengthened Yakoob Beg's individual
power, instead of taxing his resources, the excuse cannot be admitted as
entitled to our consideration. Yakoob Beg has claims only to be admired
for having given us something better than a repetition of the depravity
of the Khoja rulers, and of course among his coevals he is entitled to
far the highest place. If it is only asked for him that he should be
placed above them, no one can raise the slightest objection to it; for
beyond the shadow of a doubt, he was the most energetic and talented
ruler that had appeared among the Khanates for several centuries. But it
would be affectation to deny that a higher place than this has been
claimed for him; and before according his right to occupy it, the
evidence on which his claim rests must be sifted with the greatest care.
Even now I do not say that his claims are unproven; but that it is open
to doubt whether his work has not been exaggerated, I think must be
admitted by every one who has studied the course of his life in Kashgar.
It is absurd to talk of Yakoob Beg having been an equal of Genghis Khan
or of Timour, in any other way than that of showing that his personal
abilities were of a transcendent order. As a legislator and public
benefactor, it is fair to compare him with the Chinese, who possessed
some advantages over him, but who laboured under some disadvantages in
religion, and other conditions, as compared with him. And when we do
this, after impartial consideration we find that the balance is greatly
in favour of the Chinese. What can we judge from this, but that the rule
of Yakoob Beg, while presenting some striking features, was inferior in
degree to that of the Chinese? It is only fair to remember that the
difficulties in his path were great, and that he overcame many of them.
Before closing this chapter some description of the chief men who
assisted him to conquer the country, and then to govern it, may be not
without interest to the reader.
First among these, by right of his position as well as by his high
abilities, comes the Seyyid Yakoob Khan, or Hadji Torah, as he has more
conveniently been called, the prince who has recently visited several of
the principal courts of Europe. He is a near relative of the Athalik
Ghazi, although, strange to say, there is no consanguinity between them.
He is a son of Nar Mahomed Khan, the governor of Tashkent, who married
as his second wife Yakoob Beg's sister, and who was instrumental in
advancing the interests of Yakoob Beg during the earlier days of his
career in Khokand. The Seyyid was almost as old as his uncle, the Ameer
of Kashgar, having been born in Tashkent in 1823; but despite this near
connection Hadji Torah played no part in the conquest of Kashgar. Until
Yakoob Beg achieved complete success in his enterprise in Eastern
Turkestan he was considered by Khokandians of high rank a simple
adventurer. The Seyyid Yakoob Khan was of the best lineage in Turkestan,
and it is very possible that until the year 1867 he regarded his uncle
with a considerable amount of indifference. Certain it is that Hadji
Torah was far otherwise employed than in assisting his relative when
the latter was engaged in some of the desperate encounters of his not
uneventful career. In the civil administration of Khokand he filled,
under Alim Kuli, high posts, such as Principal of the Madrassa of
Tashkent, and then he was appointed Kazi, or Judge. It was after the
fall of Ak Musjid that he commenced that career of activity as a
traveller and a negotiator which brought him to the shores of the
Bosphorus and to the banks of the Neva and the Thames. That was in the
year 1854, and he was appointed as a sort of secretary to the embassy of
Mirza Jan Effendi, the ambassador sent by Mollah Khan to Constantinople
for aid. On a subsequent occasion he again visited Constantinople in a
similar capacity, after the death of Mollah Khan, and during the brief
tenure of power by his successor, Mahomed Khan, the nominee of Alim
Kuli. This was in 1865, and during the troubles that ensued in Khokand
and the final success of Khudayar Khan, the legal ruler of Khokand and
antagonist of Alim Kuli, Hadji Torah resided quietly at Constantinople,
where Abdul Aziz entertained him with sumptuous hospitality. It would
appear that he obtained some kind of reputation among the numerous
visitors from either Turkestan who came to Turkey, and apart from his
sacrosanct character few could fail to be impressed favourably by his
cheerful yet dignified manner. His uncle in 1870 had indeed overcome all
opposition to his rule, and it might at a first glance appear strange
why he should desire to secure the services of a man of whom he could
have seen or known little for many years. But Hadji Torah possessed
abilities and experience rare among the inhabitants of Central Asia, and
to Yakoob Beg the very talents his nephew possessed were those he was
most in need of.
In 1870 the Athalik Ghazi was anxious to draw close the bonds of
alliance with the Porte; who could assist him better than the man who
had resided in Constantinople for several years, and who had formed a
friendly intimacy with the Sultan? In 1871 Yakoob Beg first recognized
the imminence of danger to his state from Russia, then put in possession
of Kuldja; who could instruct him in the most effectual way of warding
off that danger, either by an alliance with England or by propitiating
the Russians, than the travelled Hadji Torah? The very qualities that
the Seyyid Yakoob Khan possessed were those the Ameer Yakoob Beg stood
most in need of. He might search among all his followers, those who had
shared every vicissitude of his strange fortunes, and he could not find
one other with an identical capacity. The overtures to his nephew are
thus easily intelligible, and the nephew himself gladly greeted his
entry into a wider career than was that of an honoured guest on the
hospitality of the Porte. His subsequent embassies in the service of
Kashgar to St. Petersburg, Calcutta, Constantinople, and London are too
recent and too well known to require mention here. When he settled in
Kashgar he married a daughter of Mahomed Khoja, the Sheikh-ul-Islam of
Kashgaria. His weight with the people was consequently very great, and
his judgment was greatly valued by the Ameer. Even over Beg Bacha, the
turbulent and ferocious heir-apparent, Hadji Torah had acquired some
influence by his ready tact and _bonhomie_.
Of the two chief personages, Mahomed Khoja and Abdulla Pansad, the
priest and the soldier, who assisted Yakoob Beg, it is unfortunately
impossible to discover much, and that little has already been stated in
the preceding pages. There can be no doubt, however, that they were the
principal instruments in promoting the aggrandizement of Yakoob Beg, and
the two who enjoyed more than any other the confidence and friendship of
the man they had supported so faithfully. But of another well-tried
follower we know more, chiefly through the pages of Dr. Bellew. Mahomed
Yunus seems to have been the most educated and well informed among the
governors of Yakoob Beg. He had the reputation of being quite the
best-informed man in Kashgar, but as the _curriculum_ of instruction did
not include modern languages, it is difficult to guage the exact degree
of that reputation. He was an old and trusted follower of the Athalik
Ghazi, for when he was in the service of Khokand Mahomed Yunus
officiated as his scribe. He, however, as a civilian, took no part in
the expedition of Buzurg Khan, and it was not until after the death of
Alim Kuli and the success of Khudayar Khan that he joined his firm
friend and master in Kashgar. So high an opinion had Yakoob Beg of his
talents, and so pressed was he for skilled rulers, that Mahomed Yunus
was at once appointed Dadkwah of the recently conquered district of
Yarkand, the richest, the most populous, and the most turbulent of all
the governorships in Kashgaria. The skill with which he brought the
troublesome Yarkandis into complete submission to the new ruler, and the
rare ability he manifested in his administration of his province down
almost to the present time, justify the selection of his whilome comrade
in Khokand. At first it seems that the governor ruled with a high hand,
and that the slightest symptom of insubordination was checked by an
immediate arrest and a not long-delayed execution. During the last seven
years, however, his government had become milder, chiefly because all
evil-doers had been got rid of. Among some of the minor followers may be
mentioned Alish Beg, Dadkwah of Kashgar; Ihrar Khan Torah, the first
envoy despatched from Kashgar to India; and Mahomed Beg of Artosh: but
we have no sufficient information of them to give an account of them
that would be interesting to the general reader.