"About the beginning of 424 B. C. Brasidas did for Sparta what

Demosthenes had done for the Athenians. Just as Demosthenes

had understood that the severest blow which he could inflict

on Sparta was to occupy the coasts of Laconia, so Brasidas

understood that the most effective method of assailing the

Athenians was to arouse the allies to revolution, and by all

means to aid the uprising. But since, from lack of a

sufficient naval force, he could not work on the islands, he

resolved to carry the war to the allied cities of the

Athenians situated on the coast of Macedonia; especially since

Perdikkas, king of Macedonia, the inhabitants of Chalkidike,

and some other districts subject to the Athenians, had sought

the assistance of Sparta, and had asked Brasidas to lead the

undertaking. Sparta permitted his departure, but so little did

she appear disposed to assist him, that she granted him only

700 Helots. In addition to these, however, he succeeded,

through the money sent from Chalkidike, in enrolling about

1,000 men from the Peloponnesus. With this small force of

1,700 hoplites, Brasidas resolved to undertake this

adventurous and important expedition. He started in the spring

of 424, and reached Macedonia through eastern Hellas and

Thessaly. He effected the march with great daring and wisdom,

and on his way he also saved Megara, which was in extreme

danger from the Athenians. Reaching Macedonia and uniting

forces with Perdikkas, Brasidas detached from the Athenians

many cities, promising them liberty from the tyranny they

suffered, and their association in the Peloponnesian alliance

on equal terms. He made good these promises by great military

experience and perfectly honest dealings. In December he

became master of Amphipolis, perhaps the most important of all

the foreign possessions of Athens. The historian Thucydides,

to whom was intrusted the defense of that important town, was

at Thasos when Brasidas surprised it. He hastened to the

assistance of the threatened city, but did not arrive in time

to prevent its capture. Dr. Thirlwall says it does not appear

that human prudence and activity could have accomplished

anything more under the same circumstances; yet his

unavoidable failure proved the occasion of a sentence under

which he spent twenty years of his life in exile, where he

composed his history. … The revolution of the allied cities

in Macedonia astonished the Athenians, who almost at the same

time sustained other misfortunes. Following the advice of

Kleon, instead of directing their main efforts to the

endangered Chalkidike, they decided, about the middle of 424,

to recover Bœotia itself, in conjunction as usual with some

malcontents in the Bœotian towns, who desired to break down

and democratize the oligarchical governments. The undertaking,

however, was not merely unsuccessful, but attended with a

ruinous defeat. A force of 7,000 hoplites [among them,

Socrates, the philosopher—see DELIUM], several hundred

horsemen, and 25,000 light-armed under command of Hippokrates,

took possession of Delium, a spot strongly situated,

overhanging the sea, about five miles from Tanagra, and very

near the Attic confines. But while the Athenians were still

occupied in raising their fortifications, they were suddenly

startled by the sound of the Bœotian pæan, and found

themselves attacked by an army of 7,000 hoplites, 1,000 horse,

and 500 peltasts. The Athenians suffered a complete defeat,

and were driven away with great loss. Such was the change of

affairs which took place in 424 B. C. During the preceding

year they could have ended the war in a manner most

advantageous to them. They did not choose to do so, and were

now constantly defeated. Worse still, the seeds of revolt

spread among the allied cities. The best citizens, among whom

Nikias was a leader, finally persuaded the people that it was

necessary to come to terms of peace, while affairs were yet

undecided. For, although the Athenians had suffered the

terrific defeat near Delium, and had lost Amphipolis and other

cities of Macedonia, they were still masters of Pylos, of

Kythera, of Methone, of Nisæa, and of the Spartans captured in

Sphakteria; so that there was now an equality of advantages

and of losses. Besides, the Lacedæmonians were ever ready to

lay aside the sword in order to regain their men. Again, the

oligarchy in Sparta envied Brasidas, and did not look with

pleasure on his splendid achievements. Lately they had refused

to send him any assistance whatever: The opportunity,

therefore, was advantageous for the conclusion of peace, …

Such were the arguments by which Nikias and his party finally

gained the ascendency over Kleon, and in the beginning of 423

B. C. persuaded the Athenians to enter into an armistice of

one year, within which they hoped to be able to put an end to

the destructive war by a lasting peace. Unfortunately, the

armistice could not be carried out in Chalkidike. The cities

there continued in their rebellion against the Athenians.

Brasidas could not be prevailed upon to leave them unprotected

in the struggle which they had undertaken, relying on his

promises of assistance. The war-like party at Athens, taking

advantage of this, succeeded in frustrating any definite

conditions of peace. On the other hand, the Lacedæmonians,

seeing that the war was continued, sent an ample force to

Brasidas. This army did not succeed in reaching him, because

the king of Macedonia, Perdikkas, had in the meantime become

angered with Brasidas, and persuaded the Thessalians to oppose

the Lacedæmonians in their passage. The year of the armistice

passed, and Kleon renewed his expostulations against the

incompetency of the generals who had the control of affairs in

Chalkidike. … The Athenians decided to forward a new force,

and intrusted its command to Kleon. He therefore, in August,

422 B. C., started from the Peiræus, with 1,200 hoplites, 300

horsemen, a considerable number of allies, and thirty

triremes. Reaching Chalkidike, he engaged in battle against

Brasidas in Amphipolis, suffered a disgraceful defeat, and was

killed while fleeing. Brasidas also ended his short but

glorious career in this battle, dying the death of a hero. The

way in which his memory was honored was the best evidence of

the deep impression that he had made on the Hellenic world.

{1586}

All the allies attended his funeral in arms, and interred him

at the public expense, in front of the market-place of

Amphipolis. … Thus disappeared the two foremost champions of

the war—its good spirit, Brasidas, and its evil, Kleon. The

party of Nikias finally prevailed at Athens, and that general

soon after arranged a conference with King Pleistoanax of

Sparta, who was also anxious for peace. Discussions continued

during the whole autumn and winter after the battle of

Amphipolis, without any actual hostilities on either side.

Finally, at the beginning of the spring of 421 B. C., a peace

of fifty years was agreed upon. The principal conditions of

this peace, known in history as the 'peace of Nikias,' were as

follows:

1. The Lacedæmonians and their allies were to restore

Amphipolis and all the prisoners to the Athenians. They were

further to relinquish to the Athenians Argilus, Stageirus,

Acanthus, Skolus, Olynthus, and Spartolus. But, with the

exception of Amphipolis, these cities were to remain

independent, paying to the Athenians only the usual tribute of

the time of Aristeides.

2. The Athenians should restore to the Lacedæmonians

Koryphasium, Kythera, Methone, Pteleum, and Atalante, with all

the captives in their hands from Sparta or her allies.

3. Respecting Skione, Torone, Sermylus, or any other town in

the possession of Athens, the Athenians should have the right

to adopt such measures as they pleased.

4. The Lacedæmonians and their allies should restore Panaktum

to the Athenians.

When these terms were submitted at Sparta to the consideration

of the allied cities, the majority accepted them. The

Bœotians, Megarians, and Corinthians, however, summarily

refused their consent. The Peloponnesian war was now

considered to be at an end, precisely ten years from its

beginning; Both the combatants came out from it terribly

maimed. Sparta not only did not attain her object—the

emancipation of the Hellenic cities from the tyranny of the

Athenians—but even officially recognized this tyranny, by

consenting that the Athenians should adopt such measures as

they choose toward the allied cities. Besides, Sparta obtained

an ill repute throughout Hellas, because she had abandoned the

Greeks in Chalkidike, who had at her instigation revolted, and

because she had also sacrificed the interests of her principal

allies. … Athens, on the other hand, preserved intact her

supremacy, for which she undertook the struggle. This,

however, was gained at the cost of Attica ravaged, a multitude

of citizens slain, the exhaustion of the treasury, and the

increase of the common hatred."

_T. T. Timayenis,

History of Greece,

part 5, chapter 4 (volume 1)._

ALSO IN:

_C. Thirlwall,

History of Greece,

chapter 23 (volume 3)._

GREECE: B. C. 421-418.

The Peloponnesian War:

New combinations.

The Argive League against Sparta.

Conflicting alliances of Athens with both.

Rising influence of Alcibiades.

War in Argos.

Spartan victory at Mantinea.

Revolution in Argos.

"All the Spartan allies in Peloponnesus and the Boeotians

refused to join in this treaty [of Nicias]. The latter

concluded with the Athenians only a truce of ten days … ,

probably on condition, that, if no notice was given to the

contrary, it was to be constantly renewed after the lapse of

ten days. With Corinth there existed no truce at all. Some of

the terms of the peace were not complied with, though this was

the case much less on the part of Athens than on that of

Sparta. … The Spartans, from the first, were guilty of

infamous deception, and this immediately gave rise to bitter

feelings. But before matters had come to this, and when the

Athenians were still in the full belief that the Spartans were

honest, all Greece was startled by a treaty of alliance

between Athens and Sparta against their common enemies. This

treaty was concluded very soon after the peace. … The

consequence was, that Sparta suddenly found herself deserted

by all her allies; the Corinthians and Boeotians renounced

her, because they found themselves given over to the

Athenians, and the Boeotians perhaps thought that the

Spartans, if they could but reduce the Eleans to the condition

of Helots, would readily allow Boeotia to be subdued by the

Athenians. Thus Argos found the means of again following a

policy which ever since the time of Cleomenes it had not

ventured to think of, and … became the centre of an alliance

with Mantinea, 'which had always been opposed to the

Lacedaemonians,' and some other Arcadian towns, Achaia, Elis,

and some places of the Acte. The Arcadians had dissolved their

union, the three people of the country had separated

themselves, though sometimes they united again; and thus it

happened that only some of their towns were allied with Argos.

Corinth at first would listen to neither party, and chose to

remain neutral; 'for although for the moment it was highly

exasperated against Sparta, yet it had at all times

entertained a mortal hatred of Argos, and its own interests

drew it towards Sparta.' But when, owing to Sparta's

dishonesty, the affairs on the coasts of Thrace became more

and more complicated, when the towns refused to submit to

Athens, and when it became evident that this was the

consequence of the instigations of Sparta, then the relation

subsisting between the two states became worse also in Greece,

and various negotiations and cavillings ensued. … After much

delay, the Athenians and Spartans were already on the point of

taking up arms against each other; but then they came to the

singular agreement (Olympiad 89, 4), that the Athenians should

retain possession of Pylos, but keep in it only Athenian

troops, and not allow the Helots and Messenians to remain

there. After this the loosened bonds between the Spartans,

Corinthians, and Boeotians, were drawn more closely. The

Boeotians were at length prevailed upon to surrender Panacton

to the Spartans, who now restored it to the Athenians. This

was in accordance with the undoubted meaning of the peace; but

the Boeotians had first destroyed the place, and the Spartans

delivered it to the Athenians only a heap of ruins. The

Athenians justly complained, that this was not an honest

restoration, and that the place ought to have been given back

to them with its fortifications uninjured. The Spartans do not

appear to have had honest intentions in any way. … While

thus the alliance between Athens and Sparta, in the eyes of

the world, still existed, it had in reality ceased and become

an impossibility. Another alliance, however, was formed

between Athens and Argos (Olympiad 89, 4) through the

influence of Alcibiades, who stood in the relation of an

hereditary proxenus to Argos.

{1587}

A more natural alliance than this could not be conceived, and

by it the Athenians gained the Mantineans, Eleans, and other

Peloponnesians over to their side. Alcibiades now exercised a

decisive influence upon the fate of his country. … We

generally conceive Alcibiades as a man whose beauty was his

ornament, and to whom the follies of life were the main thing,

and we forget that part of his character which history reveals

to us. … Thucydides, who cannot be suspected of having been

particularly partial to Alcibiades, most expressly recognises

the fact, that the fate of Athens depended upon him, and that,

if he had not separated his own fate from that of his native

city, at first from necessity, but afterwards of his own

accord, the course of the Peloponnesian war, through his

personal influence alone, would have taken quite a different

direction, and that he alone would have decided it in favour

of Athens. This is, in fact, the general opinion of all

antiquity, and there is no ancient writer of importance who

does not view and estimate him in this light. It is only the

moderns that entertain a derogatory opinion of him, and speak

of him as an eccentric fool, who ought not to be named among

the great statesmen of antiquity. … Alcibiades is quite a

peculiar character; and I know no one in the whole range of

ancient history who might be compared with him, though I have

sometimes thought of Caesar. … Alcibiades was opposed to the

peace of Nicias from entirely personal, perhaps even mean,

motives. … It was on his advice that Athens concluded the

alliance with Argos and Elis. Athens now had two alliances

which were equally binding, and yet altogether opposed to each

other: the one with Sparta, and an equally stringent one with

Argos, the enemy of Sparta. This treaty with Argos, the

Peloponnesians, etc., was extremely formidable to the

Spartans; and they accordingly, for once, determined to act

quickly, before it should be too late. The alliance with

Argos, however, did not confer much real strength upon Athens,

for the Argives were lazy, and Elis did not respect them,

whence the Spartans had time again to unite themselves more

closely with Corinth, Boeotia, and Megara. When, therefore,

the war between the Spartans and Argives broke out, and the

former resolutely took the field, Alcibiades persuaded the

Athenians to send succour to the Argives, and thus the peace

with Sparta was violated in an unprincipled manner. But still

no blow was struck between Argos and Sparta. … King Agis had

set out with a Spartan army, but concluded a truce with the

Argives (Olympiad 90, 2); this, however, was taken very ill at

Sparta, and the Argive commanders who had concluded it were

censured by the people and magistrates of Argos. Soon

afterwards the war broke out again, and, when the Athenian

auxiliaries appeared, decided acts of hostility commenced. The

occasion was an attempt of the Mantineans to subdue Tegea: the

sad condition of Greece became more particularly manifest in

Arcadia, by the divisions which tore one and the same nation

to pieces. The country was distracted by several parties; had

Arcadia been united, it would have been invulnerable. A battle

was fought (Olympiad 90, 3) in the neighbourhood of Mantinea,

between the Argives, their Athenian allies, the Mantineans,

and part of the Arcadians ('the Eleans, annoyed at the conduct

of the Argives, had abandoned their cause'), on the one hand,

and the Spartans and a few allies on the other. The Spartans

gained a most decisive victory; and, although they did not

follow it up, yet the consequence was, that Argos concluded

peace, the Argive alliance broke up, and at Argos a revolution

took place, in which an oligarchical government was

instituted, and by which Argos was drawn into the interest of

Sparta (Olympiad 90, 4). This constitution, however, did not

last, and very soon gave way to a democratic form of

government. Argos, even at this time, and still more at a

later period, is a sad example of the most degenerate and

deplorable democracy, or, more properly speaking, anarchy."

_B. G. Niebuhr,

Lectures on Ancient History,

lecture 49 (volume 2)._

ALSO IN:

_Plutarch,

Alcibiades._

_W. Mitford,

History of Greece,

chapter 17 (volume 3)._

GREECE: B. C. 416.

Siege and conquest of Melos by the Athenians.

Massacre of the inhabitants.

"It was in the beginning of summer 416 B. C. that the

Athenians undertook the siege and conquest of the Dorian

island of Mêlos, one of the Cyclades, and the only one, except

Thêra, which was not already included in their empire. Mêlos

and Thêra were both ancient colonies of Lacedæmon, with whom

they had strong sympathies of lineage. They had never joined

the confederacy of Delos, nor been in any way connected with

Athens; but, at the same time, neither had they ever taken

part in the recent war against her, nor given her any ground

of complaint, until she landed and attacked them in the sixth

year of the recent war. She now renewed her attempt, sending

against the island a considerable force under Kleomêdês and

Tisias."

_G. Grote,

History of Greece,

part 2, chapter 56._

"They desired immediate submission on the part of Melos, any

attempt at resistance being regarded as an inroad upon the

omnipotence of Athens by sea. For this reason they were wroth

at the obstinate courage of the islanders, who broke off all

further negotiations, and thus made it necessary for the

Athenians to commence a costly circumvallation of the city.

The Melians even succeeded on two successive occasions in

breaking through part of the wall built round them by the

enemy, and obtaining fresh supplies; but no relief arrived;

and they had to undergo sufferings which made the 'Melian

famine' a proverbial phrase to express the height of misery;

and before the winter ended the island was forced to surrender

unconditionally. … There was no question of quarter. All the

islanders capable of bearing arms who had fallen into the

hands of the Athenians were sentenced to death, and all the

women and children to slavery."

_E. Curtius,

History of Greece,

book 4, chapter 4 (volume 3)._

ALSO IN:

_Thucydides,

History,

book 5, sections 84-116._

GREECE: B. C. 415.

The mutilation of the Hermæ at Athens.

See ATHENS: B. C. 415.

GREECE: B. C. 415-413.

The Peloponnesian War:

Disastrous Athenian expedition against Syracuse.

Alcibiades a fugitive in Sparta.

His enmity to Athens.

See SYRACUSE: B. C. 415-413.

{1588}

GREECE: B. C. 413.

The Peloponnesian War:

Effects and consequences of the Sicilian expedition.

Prostration of Athens.

Strengthening of Sparta.

Negotiations with the Persians against Athens.

Peloponnesian invasion of Attica.

The Decelian War.

"The Sicilian expedition ended in a series of events which, to

this day, it is impossible to recall without a feeling of

horror. … Since the Persian wars it had never come to pass,

that on the one side all had been so completely lost, while on

the other all was won. … When the Athenians recovered from

the first stupefaction of grief, they called to mind the

causes of the whole calamity, and hereupon in passionate fury

turned round upon all who had advised the expedition, or who

had encouraged vain hopes of victory, as orators, prophets, or

soothsayers. Finally, the general excitement passed into the

phase of despair and terror, conjuring up dangers even greater

and more imminent than existed in reality. The citizens every

day expected to see the Sicilian fleet with the Peloponnesians

appear off the harbor, to take possession of the defenceless

city; and they believed that the last days of Athens had

arrived. … Athens had risked all her military and naval

resources for the purpose of overcoming Syracuse. More than

200 ships of state, with their entire equipment, had been

lost; and if we reckon up the numbers despatched on successive

occasions to Sicily, the sum total, inclusive of the auxiliary

troops, may be calculated at about 60,000 men. A squadron

still lay in the waters of Naupactus; but even this was in

danger and exposed to attack from the Corinthians, who had

equipped fresh forces. The docks and naval arsenals were

empty, and the treasury likewise. In the hopes of enormous

booty and an abundance of new revenues, no expense had been

spared; and the resources of the city were entirely exhausted.

… But, far heavier than the material losses in money, ships,

and men, was the moral blow which had been received by Athens,

and which was more dangerous in her case than in that of any

other state, because her whole power was based on the fear

inspired in the subject states, so long as they saw the fleets

of Athens absolutely supreme at sea. The ban of this fear had

now been removed; disturbances arose in those island-states

which were most necessary to Athens, and whose existence

seemed to be most indissolubly blended with that of Attica,

—in Eubœa, Chios, and Lesbos; everywhere the oligarchical

parties raised their head, in order to overthrow the odious

dominion of Athens. … Sparta, on the other hand, had in the

course of a few months, without sending out an army or

incurring any danger or losses, secured to herself the

greatest advantages, such as she could not have obtained from

the most successful campaign. Gylippus had again proved the

value of a single Spartan man: inasmuch as in the hour of the

greatest danger his personal conduct had altered the course of

the most important and momentous transaction of the entire

war. He was, in a word, the more fortunate successor of

Brasidas. The authority of Sparta in the Peloponnesus, which

the peace of Nicias had weakened, was now restored; with the

exception of Argos and Elis, all her allies were on amicable

terms with her; the brethren of her race beyond the sea, who

had hitherto held aloof, had, by the attack made by the

Athenian invasion, been drawn into the war, and had now become

the most zealous and ardent allies of the Peloponnesians. …

Moreover, the Athenians had driven the most capable of all

living statesmen and commanders into the enemy's camp. No man

was better adapted than Alcibiades for rousing the

slowly-moving Lacedæmonians to energetic action; and it was he

who supplied them with the best advice, and with the most

accurate information as to Athenian politics and localities.

Lastly, the Spartans were at the present time under a warlike

king, the enterprising and ambitious Agis, the son of

Archidamus. … Nothing was now required, except pecuniary

means. And even these now unexpectedly offered themselves to

the Spartans, in consequence of the events which had in the

meantime occurred in the Persian empire. … Everywhere [in

that empire] sedition raised its head, particularly in Asia

Minor. Pissuthnes, the son of Hystaspes, who had on several

previous occasions interfered in Greek affairs, rose in

revolt. He was supported by Greek soldiers, under the command

of an Athenian of the name of Lycon. The treachery of the

latter enabled Darius to overthrow Pissuthnes, whose son,

Amorges, maintained himself by Athenian aid in Caria. After

the fall of Pissuthnes, Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus appear in

Asia Minor as the first dignitaries of the Great King.

Tissaphernes succeeded Pissuthnes as satrap in the maritime

provinces. He was furious at the assistance offered by Athens

to the party of his adversary; moreover, the Great King

(possibly in consequence of the Sicilian war and the

destruction of the Attic fleet) demanded that the tributes

long withheld by the coast-towns, which were still regarded as

subject to the Persian empire, should now be levied.

Tissaphernes was obliged to pay the sums according to the rate

at which they were entered in the imperial budget of Persia;

and thus, in order to reimburse himself, found himself forced

to pursue a war policy. … Everything now depended for the

satrap upon obtaining assistance from a Greek quarter. He

found opportunities for this purpose in Ionia itself, in all

the more important cities of which a Persian party existed.

… The most important and only independent power in Ionia was

Chios. Here the aristocratic families had with great sagacity

contrived to retain the government. … It was their

government which now became the focus of the conspiracy

against Athens, in the first instance establishing a

connection on the opposite shore with Erythræ. Hereupon

Tissaphernes opened negotiations with both cities, and in

conjunction with them despatched an embassy to Peloponnesus

charged with persuading the Spartans to place themselves at

the head of the Ionian movement, the satrap at the same time

promising to supply pay and provisions to the Peloponnesian

forces. The situation of Pharnabazus was the same as that of

Tissaphernes. Pharnabazus was the satrap of the northern

province. … Pharnabazus endeavored to outbid Tissaphernes in

his promises; and two powerful satraps became rival suitors

for the favor of Sparta, to whom they offered money and their

alliance. … While thus the most dangerous combinations were

on all sides forming against Athens, the war had already

broken out in Greece. This time Athens had been the first to

commence direct hostilities. … A Peloponnesian army under

Agis invaded Attica, with the advent of the spring of B. C.

413 (Olympiad xci. 3); at which date it was already to be

anticipated how the Sicilian war would end. For twelve years

Attica had been spared hostile invasions, and the vestiges of

former wars had been effaced.

{1589}

The present devastations were therefore doubly ruinous; while

at the same time it was now impossible to take vengeance upon

the Peloponnesians by means of naval expeditions. And the

worst point in the case was that they were now fully resolved,

instead of recurring to their former method of carrying on the

war and undertaking annual campaigns, to occupy permanently a

fortified position on Attic soil." The invaders seized a

strong position at Decelea, only fourteen miles northward from

Athens, on a rocky peak of Mount Parnes, and fortified

themselves so strongly that the Athenians ventured on no

attempt to dislodge them. From this secure station they

ravaged the surrounding country at pleasure. "This success was

of such importance that even in ancient times it gave the name

of the Decelean War to the entire last division of the

Peloponnesian War. The occupation of Decelea forms the

connecting link between the Sicilian War and the

Attico-Peloponnesian, which now broke out afresh. … Its

immediate object … it failed to effect; inasmuch as the

Athenians did not allow it to prevent their despatching a

fresh armament to Sicily. But when, half a year later, all was

lost, the Athenians felt more heavily than ever the burden

imposed upon them by the occupation of Decelea. The city was

cut off from its most important source of supplies, since the

enemy had in his power the roads communicating with Eubœa. …

One-third of Attica no longer belonged to the Athenians, and

even in the immediate vicinity of the city communication was

unsafe; large numbers of the country-people, deprived of labor

and means of subsistence, thronged the city; the citizens were

forced night and day to perform the onerous duty of keeping

watch."

_E. Curtius,

History of Greece,

book 4, chapters 4-5 (volume 3)._

ALSO IN:

_G. Grote,

History of Greece,

chapter 61 (volume 7)._

GREECE: B. C. 413-412.

The Peloponnesian War:

Revolt of Chios, Miletus, Lesbos, and Rhodes from Athens.

Revolution at Samos.

Intrigues of Alcibiades for a revolution at Athens and for his

own recall.

"Alkibiades … persuaded the Spartans to build a fleet, and

send it over to Asia to assist the Ionians in revolting. He

himself crossed at once to Chios with a few ships, in order to

begin the revolt. The government of Chios was in the hands of

the nobles; but they had hitherto served Athens so well that

the Athenians had not altered the government to a democracy.

Now, however, they revolted (B. C. 413). This was a heavy blow

to Athens, for Chios was the most powerful of the Ionian

States, and others would be sure to follow its example.

Miletus and Lesbos revolted in B. C. 412. The nobles of Samos

prepared to revolt, but the people were in favour of Athens,

and rose against the nobles, killing 200 of them, and

banishing 400 more. Athens now made Samos its free and equal

ally, instead of its subject, and Samos became the

head-quarters of the Athenian fleet and army. … The

Athenians … had now manned a fresh navy. They defeated the

Peloponnesian and Persian fleets together at Miletus, and were

only kept from besieging Miletus by the arrival of a fleet

from Syracuse. [This reinforcement of the enemy held them

powerless to prevent a revolt in Rhodes, carried out by the

oligarchs though opposed by the people.] Alkibiades had made

enemies among the Spartans, and when he had been some time in

Asia Minor an order came over from Sparta to put him to death.

He escaped to Tissaphernes, and now made up his mind to win

back the favour of Athens by breaking up the alliance between

Tissaphernes and the Spartans. He contrived to make a quarrel

between them about the rate of pay, and persuaded Tissaphernes

that it would be the best thing for Persia to let the Spartans

and Athenians wear one another out, without giving help to

either. Tissaphernes therefore kept the Spartans idle for

months, always pretending that he was on the point of bringing

up his fleet to help them. Alkibiades now sent a lying message

to the generals of the Athenian army at Samos that he could

get Athens the help of Tissaphernes, if the Athenians would

allow him to return from his exile: but he said that he could

never return while there was a democracy; so that if they

wished for the help of Persia they must change the government

to an oligarchy (B. C. 412). In the army at Samos there were

many rich men willing to see an oligarchy established at

Athens, and peace made with Sparta. … Therefore, though the

great mass of the army at Samos was democratical, a certain

number of powerful men agreed to the plan of Alkibiades for

changing the government. One of the conspirators, named

Pisander, was sent to Athens to instruct the clubs of nobles

and rich men to work secretly for this object. In these clubs

the overthrow of the democracy was planned. Citizens known to

be zealous for the constitution were secretly murdered. Terror

fell over the city, for no one except the conspirators knew

who did, and who did not, belong to the plot; and at last,

partly by force, the assembly was brought to abolish the

popular government."

_C. A. Fyffe,

History of Greece

(History Primer),

chapter 5, sections 36-39._

ALSO IN:

_G. W. Cox,

The Athenian Empire,

chapter 6._

_Thucydides,

History,

book 8, chapters 4-51._

GREECE: B. C. 411-407.

The Peloponnesian War:

Athenian victories at Cynossema and Abydos.

Exploits of Alcibiades.

His return to Athens and to supreme command.

His second deposition and exile.

While Athens was in the throes of its revolution, "the war was

prosecuted with vigour on the coast of Asia Minor. Mindarus,

who now commanded the Peloponnesian fleet, disgusted at length

by the often-broken promises of Tissaphernes, and the scanty

and irregular pay which he furnished, set sail from Miletus

and proceeded to the Hellespont, with the intention of

assisting the satrap Pharnabazus, and of effecting, if

possible, the revolt of the Athenian dependencies in that

quarter. Hither he was pursued by the Athenian fleet under

Thrasyllus. In a few days an engagement ensued (in August, 411

B. C.), in the famous straits between Sestos and Abydos, in

which the Athenians, though with a smaller force, gained the

victory, and erected a trophy on the promontory of Cynossema

[see CYNOSSEMA] near the tomb and chapel of the Trojan queen

Hecuba. The Athenians followed up their victory by the

reduction of Cyzicus, which had revolted from them. A month or

two afterward, another obstinate engagement took place between

the Peloponnesian and Athenian fleets near Abydos, which

lasted a whole day, and was at length decided in favour of the

Athenians by the arrival of Alcibiades with his squadron of 18

ships from Samos."

_W. Smith,

Smaller History of Greece,

chapter 13. _

{1590}

Alcibiades, although recalled, had "resolved to delay his

return until he had performed such exploits as might throw

fresh lustre over his name, and endear him to all classes of

his fellow-citizens. With this ambition he sailed with a small

squadron from Samos, and having gained information that

Mindarus, with the Peloponnesian fleet, had gone in pursuit of

the Athenian navy, he hastened to afford his countrymen

succour. Happily he arrived at the scene of action, near

Abydos, at a most critical moment; when, after a severe

engagement, the Spartans had on one side obtained an

advantage, and were pursuing the broken lines of the

Athenians. … He speedily decided the fortune of the day,

completely routed the Spartans, … broke many of their ships

in pieces, and took 30 from them. … His vanity after this

signal success had, however, nearly destroyed him; for, being

desirous of appearing to Tissaphernes as a conqueror instead

of a fugitive, he hastened with a splendid retinue to visit

him, when the crafty barbarian, thinking he should thus

appease the suspicions of the Spartans, caused him to be

arrested and confined in prison at Sardis. Hence, however, he

found means to escape. … He sailed immediately for the

Athenian camp to diffuse fresh animation among the soldiers,

and induce them hastily to embark on an expedition against

Mindarus and Pharnabazus, who were then with the residue of

the Peloponnesian fleet at Cyzicum" (Cyzicus). Mindarus was

defeated and killed and Pharnabazus driven to flight (B. C.

410). "Alcibiades pursued his victory, took Cyzicum without

difficulty, and, staining his conquest with a cruelty with

which he was not generally chargeable, put to death all the

Peloponnesians whom he found within the city. A very short

space of time elapsed after this brilliant success before

Alcibiades found another occasion to deserve the gratitude of

Athens," by defeating Pharnabazus, who had attacked the troops

of Thrasyllus while they were wasting the territory of Abydos.

He next reduced Chalcedon, bringing it back into the Athenian

alliance, and once more defeating Pharnabazus, when the

Persian satrap attempted to relieve the town. He also

recovered Selymbria, and took Byzantium (which had revolted)

after a severe fight (B. C. 408). "Alcibiades having raised

the fortunes of his country from the lowest state of

depression, not only by his brilliant victories, but his

conciliating policy, prepared to return and enjoy the praise

of his successes. He entered the Piræus [B. C. 407] in a

galley adorned with the spoils of numerous victories, followed

by a long line of ships which he had taken from the foe. …

The whole city came down to the harbour to see and welcome

him, and took no notice of Thrasybulus or Theramenes, his

fellow-commanders. … An assembly of the people being

convened, he addressed them in a gentle and modest speech,

imputing his calamities not to their envy, but to some evil

genius which pursued him. He exhorted them to take courage,

bade them oppose their enemies with all the fresh inspiration

of their zeal, and taught them to hope for happier days.

Delighted with these assurances, they presented him with a

crown of brass and gold, which never was before given to any

but the Olympic victors, invested him with absolute control

over their naval and military affairs, restored to him his

confiscated wealth, and ordered the ministers of religion to

absolve him from the curses which they had denounced against

him. Theodorus, however, the high-priest, evaded the last part

of the decree, by alleging that he had never cast any

imprecation on him, if he had committed no offence against the

republic. The tablets on which the curses against him had been

inscribed were taken to the shore, and thrown with eagerness

into the sea. His next measure heightened, if possible, the

brief lustre of his triumph. In consequence of the

fortification of Decelea by the Lacedæmonians, and their

having possession of the passes of the country, the procession

to Eleusis, in honour of Athene, had been long unable to take

its usual course, and being conducted by sea, had lost many of

its solemn and august ceremonials. He now, therefore, offered

to conduct the solemnity by land. … His proposal being

gladly accepted, he placed sentinels on the hills; and,

surrounding the consecrated band with his soldiers, conducted

the whole to Eleusis and back to Athens, without the slightest

opposition, or breach of that order and profound stillness

which he had exhorted the troops to maintain. After this

graceful act of homage to the religion he was once accused of

destroying, he was regarded by the common people as something

more than human; they looked on him as destined never to know

defeat, and believed their triumph was certain so long as he

was their commander. But, in the very height of his

popularity, causes of a second exile were maturing. The great

envied him in proportion to the people's confidence, and that

confidence itself became the means of his ruin: for, as the

people really thought the spell of invincibility was upon him,

they were prepared to attribute the least pause in his career

of glory to a treacherous design. He departed with a hundred

vessels, manned under his inspection, with colleagues of his

own choice, to reduce the isle of Chios to obedience. At

Andros he once more gained a victory over both the natives and

the Spartans, who attempted to assist them. But, on his

arrival at the chief scene of action, he found that he would

be unable to keep the soldiers from deserting, unless he could

raise money to pay them sums more nearly equal to those which

the Lacedæmonians offered, than the pay he was able to bestow.

He was compelled, therefore, to leave the fleet [at Notium]

and go into Caria in order to obtain supplies. While absent on

this occasion, he left Antiochus in the command. … To this

officer Alcibiades gave express directions that he should

refrain from coming to an engagement, whatever provocations he

might receive. Anxious, however, to display his bravery,

Antiochus took the first occasion to sail out in front of the

Lacedæmonian fleet, which lay near Ephesus, under the command

of Lysander, and attempt, by insults, to incite them to attack

him. Lysander accordingly pursued him; the fleets came to the

support of their respective admirals, and a general engagement

ensued, in which Antiochus was slain, and the Athenians

completely defeated. On receiving intelligence of this unhappy

reverse, Alcibiades hastened to the fleet, and eager to repair

the misfortune, offered battle to the Spartans; Lysander,

however, did not choose to risk the loss of his advantage by

accepting the challenge, and the Athenians were compelled to

retire. This event, for which no blame really attached to

Alcibiades, completed the ruin of his influence at Athens.

{1591}

It was believed that this, the first instance of his failure,

must have arisen from corruption, or, at least, from a want of

inclination to serve his country. He was also accused of

leaving the navy under the direction of those who had no other

recommendation to the charge but having been sharers in his

luxurious banquets, and of having wandered about to indulge in

profligate excesses. … On these grounds, the people in his

absence took from him his command, and confided it to other

generals. As soon as he heard of this new act of ingratitude,

he resolved not to return home, but withdrew into Thrace, and

fortified three castles … near to Perinthus. Here, having

collected a formidable band, as an independent captain, he

made incursions on the territories of those of the Thracians

who acknowledged no settled form of government, and acquired

considerable spoils."

_Sir T. N. Talfourd,

Early History of Greece (Encyclopedia Metropolitana),

chapter 11._

ALSO IN:

_C. Thirlwall,

History of Greece,

chapter 29 (volume 4)._

_Plutarch,

Alcibiades._

_Xenophon,

Hellenica,

book 1, chapters 1-4._

GREECE: B. C. 406.

The Peloponnesian War:

Battle of Arginusæ.

Trial and execution of the generals at Athens.

Alcibiades was succeeded by Conon and nine colleagues in

command of the Athenian fleet on the coast of Asia Minor. The

Athenians, soon afterwards, were driven into the harbor of

Mitylene, on the island of Lesbos, by a superior Peloponnesian

fleet, commanded by Callicratidas, and were blockaded there

with small chance of escape. Conon contrived to send news of

their desperate situation to Athens, and vigorous measures

were promptly taken to rescue the fleet and to save Mitylene.

Within thirty days, a fleet of 110 triremes was fitted out at

the Piræus, and manned with a crew which took nearly the last

able-bodied Athenian to make it complete. At Samos these were

joined by 40 more triremes, making 150 in all, against which

Callicratidas was able to bring out only 120 ships from

Mitylene, when the relieving armament approached. The two

fleets encountered one another near the islands of Arginusæ,

off Cape Malea, the southern promontory of Lesbos. In the

battle that ensued, which was the greatest naval conflict of

the Peloponnesian War, the Athenians were completely

victorious; Callicratidas was drowned and no less than 77 of

the Peloponnesian ships were destroyed, while the Athenians

themselves lost 25. As the result of this battle Sparta again

made overtures of peace, as she had done after the battle of

Cyzicus, and Athens, led by her demagogues, again rejected

them. But the Athenian demagogues and populace did worse. They

summoned home the eight generals who had won the battle of

Arginusæ, to answer to a charge of having neglected, after the

victory, to pick up the floating bodies of the Athenian dead

and to rescue the drowning from the wrecked ships of their

fleet. Six of the accused generals came home to meet the

charge; but two thought it prudent to go into voluntary exile.

The six were brought to trial; the forms of legality were

violated to their prejudice and all means were unscrupulously

employed to work up the popular passion against them. One man,

only, among the prytanes—senators, that is, of the tribe then

presiding, and who were the presidents of the popular

assembly—stood out, without flinching, against the lawless

rage of his fellow citizens, and refused, in calm scorn of all

fierce threats against himself, to join in taking the

unconstitutional vote. That one was the philosopher Socrates.

The generals were condemned to death and received the fatal

draught of hemlock from the same populace which pressed it a

little later to the lips of the philosopher. "Thus died the

son of Pericles and Aspasia [one of the generals, who bore his

father's name], to whom his father had made a fatal gift in

obtaining for him the Attic citizenship, and with him

Erasinides, Thrasylus, Lysias, Aristocrates, and Diomedon. The

last-named, the most innocent of all, who had wished that the

whole fleet should immediately be employed in search of the

wrecked, addressed the people once more; he expressed a wish

that the decree dooming him to death might be beneficial to

the state, and called upon his fellow-citizens to perform the

thanksgiving offerings to the saving gods which they, the

generals, had vowed on account of their victory. These words

may have sunk deep into the hearts of many of his hearers; but

their only effect has been to cast a yet brighter halo in the

eyes of subsequent generations around the memory of these

martyrs. Their innocence is best proved by the series of

glaring infractions of law and morality which were needed to

ensure their destruction, as well as by the shame and

repugnance which seized upon the citizens, when they had

recognized how fearfully, they had been led astray by a

traitorous faction.

_E. Curtius,

History of Greece,

book 4, chapter 5 (volume 3)._

Mr. Grote attempts to uphold a view more unfavorable to the

generals and less severe upon the Athenian people.

_G. Grote,

History of Greece,

part 2, chapter 64._

ALSO IN:

_Xenophon,

Hellenica,

book 1, chapters 5-7._

See, also,

ATHENS: B. C. 424-406.

GREECE: B. C. 405.

The Peloponnesian War

Decisive battle of Aigospotamoi.

Defeat of the Athenians.

After the execution of the generals, "no long time passed

before the Athenians repented of their madness and their

crimes: but, yielding still to their old besetting sin, they

insisted, as they had done in the days of Miltiades and after

the catastrophe at Syracuse, on throwing the blame not on

themselves but on their advisers. This great crime began at

once to produce its natural fruits. The people were losing

confidence in their officers, who, in their turn, felt that no

services to the state could secure them against illegal

prosecutions and arbitrary penalties. Corruption was eating

its way into the heart of the state, and treason was losing

its ugliness in the eyes of many who thought themselves none

the worse for dallying with it. … The Athenian fleet had

fallen back upon Samos; and with this island as a base, the

generals were occupying themselves with movements, not for

crushing the enemy, but for obtaining money. … The Spartans,

whether at home or on the Asiatic coast, were now well aware

that one more battle would decide the issue of the war; for

with another defeat the subsidies of the Persians would be

withdrawn from them as from men doomed to failure, and perhaps

be transferred to the Athenians. In the army and fleet the cry

was raised that Lysandros was the only man equal to the

emergency. Spartan custom could not appoint the same man twice

to the office of admiral; but when Arakos was sent out with

Lysandros [Lysander] as his secretary, it was understood that

the latter was really the man in power."

{1592}

In the summer of 405 B. C. Lysandros made a sudden movement

from the southern Ægean to the Hellespont, and laid siege to

the rich town of Lampsacus, on the Asiatic side. The Athenians

followed him, but not promptly enough to save Lampsacus, which

they found in his possession when they arrived. They took

their station, thereupon, at the mouth of the little stream

called the Aigospotamoi (the Goat's Stream), directly opposite

to Lampsacus, and endeavored for four successive days to

provoke Lysandros to fight. He refused, watching his

opportunity for the surprise which he effected on the fifth

day, when he dashed across the narrow channel and caught the

Athenian ships unprepared, their crews mostly scattered on

shore. One only, of the six Athenian generals, Conon, had

foreseen danger and was alert. Conon, with twelve triremes,

escaped. The remaining ships, about one hundred and seventy in

number, were captured almost without the loss of a man on the

Peloponnesian side. Of the crews, some three or four thousand

Athenians were pursued on shore and taken prisoners, to be

afterwards slaughtered in cold blood. Two of the incapable

generals shared their fate. Of the other generals who escaped,

some at least were believed to have been bribed by Lysandros

to betray the fleet into his hands. The blow to Athens was

deadly. She had no power of resistance left, and when her

enemies closed around her, a little later, she starved within

her walls until resistance seemed no longer heroic, and then

gave herself up to their mercy.

_G. W. Cox,

The Athenian Empire,

chapter 7._

ALSO IN:

_C. Thirlwall,

History of Greece,

chapter 30 (volume 4)._

_Plutarch,

Lysander._

_Xenophon,

Hellenica,

book 2, chapter 1._

GREECE: B. C. 404.

End of the Peloponnesian War.

Fall of Athens.

See ATHENS: B. C. 404.

GREECE: B. C. 404-403.

The Year of Anarchy at Athens.

Reign of the Thirty.

See ATHENS: B. C. 404-403.

GREECE: B. C. 401-400.

The expedition of Cyrus, and the Retreat of the Ten Thousand

Greeks.

See PERSIA: B. C.,401-400.

GREECE: B. C. 399-387.

Spartan war with Persia.

Greek confederacy against Sparta.

The Corinthian War.

Peace of Antalcidas.

The successful retreat of the Ten Thousand from Cunaxa,

through the length of the Persian dominions (B. C. 401-400),

and the account which they brought of the essential hollowness

of the power of the Great King, produced an important change

among the Greeks in their estimate of the Persian monarchy as

an enemy to be feared. Sparta became ashamed of having

abandoned the Greek cities of Asia Minor to their old

oppressors, as she did after breaking the strength of their

protector, Athens, in the Peloponnesian War. When, therefore,

the Persians began to lay siege to the coast cities which

resisted them, Sparta found spirit enough to interfere (B. C.

399) and sent over a small army, into which the surviving

Cyreans were also enlisted. The only immediate result was a

truce with the Persian satrap. But, meantime, the Athenian

general Conon—he who escaped with a few triremes from

Ægospotami and fled to Cyprus—had there established relations

with the Persian court at Susa and had acquired a great

influence, which he used to bring about the creation of a

powerful Persian armament against Sparta, himself in command.

The news of this armament, reaching Sparta, provoked the

latter to a more vigorous prosecution of the war in Asia

Minor. King Agesilaus took the field in Ionia with a strong

army and conducted two brilliant campaigns (B. C. 396-395),

pointing the way, as it were, to the expedition of Alexander a

couple of generations later. The most important victory won

was on the Pactolus, not far from Sardis. But, in the midst of

his successes, Agesilaus was called home by troubles which

arose in Greece. Sparta, by her arrogance and oppressive

policy, had already alienated all the Greek states which

helped her to break down Athens in the Peloponnesian War.

Persian agents, with money, had assisted her enemies to

organize a league against her. Thebes and Athens, first, then

Argos and Corinth, with several of the lesser states, became

confederated in an agreement to overthrow her domination. In

an attempt to crush Thebes, the Spartans were badly beaten at

Haliartus (B. C. 395), where their famous Lysander, conqueror

of Athens, was killed. Their power in central and northern

Greece was virtually annihilated, and then followed a struggle

with their leagued enemies for the control or the Corinthian

isthmus, whence came the name of the Corinthian War. It was

this situation of things at home which called back King

Agesilaus from his campaigns in Asia Minor. He had scarcely

crossed the Hellespont on his return, in July B. C. 394,

before all his work in Asia was undone by an overwhelming

naval victory achieved at Cnydus by the Athenian Conon,

commanding the Persian-Phœnician fleet. With his veteran army,

including the old Cyreans, now returning home after seven

years of incredible adventures and hardships, he made his way

through all enemies into Bœotia and fought a battle with the

league at Coronea, in which he so far gained a victory that he

held the field, although the fruits of it were doubtful. The

Spartans on the isthmus had also just gained a considerable

success near Corinth, on the banks of the Nemea. On the whole,

the results of the war were in their favor, until Conon and

the Persian satrap, Pharnabazus, came over with the victorious

fleet from Cnydus and lent its aid to the league. The most

important proceeding of Conon was to rebuild (B. C. 393), with

the help of his Persian friends, the Long Walls of Athens,

which the Peloponnesians had required to be thrown down eleven

years before. By this means he restored to Athens her

independence and secured for her a new career of commercial

prosperity. During six years more the war was tediously

prolonged, without important or decisive events, while Sparta

intrigued to detach the Persian king from his Athenian allies

and the latter intrigued to retain his friendship. In the end,

all parties were exhausted—Sparta, perhaps, least so—and

accepted a shameful peace which was practically dictated by

the Persian and had the form of an edict or mandate from Susa,

in the following terms: "The king, Artaxerxes, deems it just

that the cities in Asia, with the islands of Clazomenae and

Cyprus, should belong to himself; the rest of the Hellenic

cities he thinks it just to leave independent, both small and

great, with the exception of Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros, which

three are to belong to Athens as of yore. Should any of the

parties concerned not accept this peace, I, Artaxerxes, will

war against him or them with those who share my views.

{1593}

This will I do by land and by sea, with ships and with money."

By this, called the Peace of Antalcidas (B. C. 387) from the

Lacedæmonian who was instrumental in bringing it about, the

Ionian Greeks were once more abandoned to the Persian king and

his satraps, while Sparta, which assumed to be the

administrator and executor of the treaty, was confirmed in her

supremacy over the other Grecian states.

_Xenophon,

Hellenica (translated by Dakyns),

books 3-5 (volume 2)._

ALSO IN:

_C. Sankey,

The Spartan and Theban Supremacies,

chapters 7-9._

_W. Mitford,

History of Greece,

chapters 24-25 (volume 4)._

_G. Rawlinson,

The Five Great Monarchies,

volume 3; Persia, chapter 7._

GREECE: B. C. 385.

Destruction of Mantinea by the Spartans.

The Mantineians, having displayed unfriendliness to Sparta

during the Corinthian War, were required by the latter, after

the Peace of Antalcidas, to demolish their walls. On their

refusal, king Agesipolis was sent to subdue them. By damming

up the waters of the river Ophis he flooded the city and

brought it to terms. "The city of Mantineia was now broken up,

and the inhabitants were distributed again into the five

constituent villages. Out of four-fifths of the population

each man pulled down his house in the city, and rebuilt it in

the village near to which his property lay. The remaining

fifth continued to occupy Mantineia as a village. Each village

was placed under oligarchical government and left

unfortified."

_G. Grote,

History of Greece,

part 2, chapter 76 (volume 9)._

ALSO IN:

_Xenophon,

Hellenica,

book 5, chapter 2._

GREECE: B. C. 383.

The betrayal of Thebes to the Spartans.

When the Spartans sent their expedition against Olynthus, in

383 B. C., it marched in two divisions, the last of which,

under Phoebidas, halted at Thebes, on the way, probably having

secret orders to do so. "On reaching Thebes the troops

encamped outside the city, round the gymnasium. Faction was

rife within the city. The two polemarchs in office, Ismenias

and Leontiades, were diametrically opposed, being the

respective heads of antagonistic political clubs. Hence it was

that, while Ismenias, ever inspired by hatred to the

Lacedaemonians, would not come anywhere near the Spartan

general, Leontiades, on the other hand, was assiduous in

courting him; and when a sufficient intimacy was established

between them, he made a proposal as follows: 'You have it in

your power,' he said, addressing Phoebidas, 'this very day to

confer supreme benefit on your country. Follow me with your

hoplites, and I will introduce you into the citadel.'"

_Xenophon,

Hellenica

(translated by Dakyns),

book 5, chapter 2 (volume 2)._

"On the day of the Thesmophoria, a religious festival

celebrated by the women apart from the men, during which the

acropolis, or Kadmeia, was consecrated to their exclusive use,

Phœbidas, affecting to have concluded his halt, put himself in

march to proceed as if towards Thrace; seemingly rounding the

walls of Thebes, but not going into it. The Senate was

actually assembled in the portico of the agora, and the heat

of a summer's noon had driven everyone out of the streets,

when Leontiades, stealing away from the Senate, hastened on

horseback to overtake Phœbidas, caused him to face about, and

conducted the Lacedæmonians straight up to the Kadmeia; the

gates of which, as well as those of the town, were opened to

his order as Polemarch. There were not only no citizens in the

streets, but none even in the Kadmeia; no male person being

permitted to be present at the feminine Thesmophoria; so that

Phœbidas and his army became possessed of the Kadmeia without

the smallest opposition. … The news of the seizure of the

Kadmeia and of the revolution at Thebes [was] … received at

Sparta with the greatest surprise, as well as with a mixed

feeling of shame and satisfaction. Everywhere throughout

Greece, probably, it excited a greater sensation than any

event since the battle of Ægospotami. Tried by the recognised

public law of Greece, it was a flagitions iniquity, for which

Sparta had not the shadow of a pretence. … It stood

condemned by the indignant sentiment of all Greece,

unwillingly testified even by the philo-Laconian Xenophon

himself. But it was at the same time an immense accession to

Spartan power. … Phœbidas might well claim to have struck

for Sparta the most important blow since Ægospotami, relieving

her from one of her two really formidable enemies."

_G. Grote,

History of Greece,

part 2, chapter 76._

ALSO IN:

_C. Thirlwall,

History of Greece,

chapter 37 (volume 5)._

GREECE: B. C. 383-379.

Overthrow of the Olynthian confederacy by Sparta.

Among the Greek cities which were founded at an early day in

that peninsula of Macedonia called Chalcidice, from Chalcis,

in Eubœa, which colonized the greater number of them, Olynthus

became the most important. It long maintained its independence

against the Macedonian kings, on one hand, and against Athens,

when Athens ruled the Ægean and its coasts, on the other. As

it grew in power, it took under its protection the lesser

towns of the peninsula and adjacent Macedonia, and formed a

confederacy among them, which gradually extended to the larger

cities and acquired a formidable character. But two of the

Chalcidian cities watched this growth of Olynthus with

jealousy and refused to be confederated with her. More than

that, they joined the Macedonians in sending an embassy (B. C.

383) to Sparta, then all-powerful in Greece, after the Peace

of Antalcidas, and invoked her intervention, to suppress the

rising Olynthian confederacy. The response of Sparta was

prompt, and although the Olynthians defended themselves with

valor, inflicting one severe defeat upon the Lacedæmonian

allies, they were forced at last (B. C. 379) to submit and the

confederacy was dissolved. "By the peace of Antalkidas, Sparta

had surrendered the Asiatic Greeks to Persia; by crushing the

Olynthian confederacy, she virtually surrendered the Thracian

Greeks to the Macedonian princes. … She gave the victory to

Amyntas [king of Macedonia], and prepared the indispensable

basis upon which his son Philip afterwards rose, to reduce not

only Olynthus, but … the major part of the Grecian world, to

one common level of subjection."

_G. Grote,

History of Greece,

part 2, chapter 76 (volume 9)._

ALSO IN:

_E. A. Freeman,

History of Federal Government,

chapter 4, section 3._

GREECE: B. C. 379-371.

The liberation of Thebes and her rise to supremacy.

The humbling of Sparta.

For three years after the betrayal of the Acropolis, or

Cadmea, of Thebes to the Spartans, the city groaned under the

tyranny of the oligarchical party of Leontiades, whom the

Spartans supported. Several hundreds of the more prominent of

the democratic and patriotic party found a refuge at Athens,

and the deliverance of Thebes was effected at last, about

December, B. C. 379, by a daring enterprise on the part of

some of these exiles.

{1594}

Their plans were concerted with friends at Thebes, especially

with one Phyllidas, who had retained the confidence of the

party in power, being secretary to the polemarchs. The leader

of the undertaking was Melon. "After a certain interval Melon,

accompanied by six of the trustiest comrades he could find

among his fellow-exiles, set off for Thebes. They were armed

with nothing but daggers, and first of all crept into the

neighbourhood under cover of night. The whole of the next day

they lay concealed in a desert place, and drew near to the

city gates in the guise of labourers returning home with the

latest comers from the fields. Having got safely within the

city, they spent the whole of that night at the house of a man

named Charon, and again the next day in the same fashion.

Phyllidas meanwhile was busily taken up with the concerns of

the polemarchs, who were to celebrate a feast of Aphrodite on

going out of office. Amongst other things, the secretary was

to take this opportunity of fulfilling an old undertaking,

which was the introduction of certain women to the polemarchs.

They were to be the most majestic and the most beautiful to be

found in Thebes. … Supper was over, and, thanks to the zeal

with which the master of the ceremonies responded to their

mood, they were speedily intoxicated. To their oft-repeated

orders to introduce their mistresses, he went out and fetched

Melon and the rest, three of them dressed up as ladies and the

rest as their attendant maidens. … It was preconcerted that

as soon as they were seated they were to throw aside their

veils and strike home. That is one version of the death of the

polemarchs. According to another, Melon and his friends came

in as revellers, and so despatched their victims."

_Xenophon,

Hellenica,

(translated by Dakyns),

book 5, chapter 4._

Having thus made way with the polemarchs, the conspirators

surprised Leontiades in his own house and slew him. They then

liberated and armed the prisoners whom they found in

confinement and sent heralds through the city to proclaim the

freedom of Thebes. A general rally of the citizens followed

promptly. The party of the oppression was totally crushed and

its prominent members put to death. The Spartan garrison in

the Cadmea capitulated and was suffered to march out without

molestation. The government of Thebes was reorganized on a

more popular basis, and with a view to restoring the Bœotian

League, in a perfected state, with Thebes for its head.

See THEBES: B. C. 378.

In the war with Sparta which followed, Athens was soon

involved, and the Spartans were driven from all their

footholds in the Bœotian towns. Then Athens and Thebes

quarreled afresh, and the Spartans, to take advantage of the

isolation of the latter, invaded her territory once more. But

Thebes, under the training of her great statesman and soldier,

Epaminondas, had become strong enough to face her Lacedæmonian

enemy without help, and in the momentous battle of Leuctra,

fought July 6, B. C. 371, on a plain not far from Platæa, the

domineering power of Sparta was broken forever. "It was the

most important of all the battles ever fought between Greeks.

On this day Thebes became an independent power in Greece, and

a return of Spartan despotism was henceforth impossible for

all times."

_E. Curtius,

History of Greece,

book 6, chapter 1 (volume 4)._

ALSO IN:

_Plutarch,

Pelopidas_.

_G. Grote,

History of Greece,

part 2, chapters 77-78._

_C. Sankey,

The Spartan and Theban Supremacies,

chapters 10-11._

GREECE: B. C. 378-357.

The new Athenian Confederacy.

The Social War.

See ATHENS: B. C. 378-357.

GREECE: B. C. 371.

The Arcadian union.

Restoration of Mantinea.

Building of Megalopolis.

One of the first effects of the battle of Leuctra (B. C. 371),

which ended the domination of Sparta in Greek affairs, was to

emancipate the Arcadians and to work great changes among them.

Mantinea, which the Spartans had destroyed, was rebuilt the

same year. Then "the chiefs of the parties opposed to the

Spartan interest in the principal Arcadian towns concerted a

plan for securing the independence of Arcadia, and for raising

it to a higher rank than it had hitherto held in the political

system of Greece. With a territory more extensive than any

other region of Peloponnesus, peopled by a hardy race, proud

of its ancient origin and immemorial possession of the land,

and of its peculiar religious traditions, Arcadia—the Greek

Switzerland—had never possessed any weight in the affairs of

the nation; the land only served as a thoroughfare for hostile

armies, and sent forth its sons to recruit the forces of

foreign powers. … The object was to unite the Arcadian

people in one body, yet so as not to destroy the independence

of the particular states; and with this view it was proposed

to found a metropolis, to institute a national council which

should be invested with supreme authority in foreign affairs,

particularly with regard to peace and war, and to establish a

military force for the protection of the public safety. …

Within a few months after the battle of Leuctra, a meeting of

Arcadians from all the principal towns was held to deliberate

on the measure; and under its decree a body of colonists,

collected from various quarters, proceeded to found a new

city, which was to be the seat of the general government, and

was called Megalepolis, or Megalopolis (the Great City). The

site chosen was on the banks of the Helisson, a small stream

tributary to the Alpheus. … The city was designed on a very

large scale, and the magnitude of the public buildings

corresponded to its extent; the theatre was the most spacious

in Greece. … The population was to be drawn … from a great

number of the most ancient Arcadian towns. Pausanias gives a

list of forty which were required to contribute to it. The

greater part of them appear to have been entirely deserted by

their inhabitants."

_C. Thirlwall,

History of Greece,

chapter 39 (volume 5)._

"The patriotic enthusiasm, however, out of which Megalopolis

had first arisen, gradually became enfeebled. The city never

attained that preeminence or power which its founders

contemplated, and which had caused the city to be laid out on

a scale too large for the population actually inhabiting it."

_G. Grote,

History of Greece,

part 2, chapter 78._

GREECE: B. C. 371-362.

Popular fury in Argos.

Arcadian union and disunion.

Restoration of Mantinea.

Expeditions of Epaminondas into Peloponnesus.

His attempts against Sparta.

His victory and death at Mantinea.

"In many of the Peloponnesian cities, when the power of Sparta

seemed visibly on the wane, internal commotions had arisen, and

much blood had been shed on both sides. But now Argos

displayed the most fearful example of popular fury recorded in

Greek annals, red as they are with tales of civil bloodshed.

{1595}

The democratic populace detected a conspiracy among the

oligarchs, and thirty of the chief citizens were at once put

to death. The excitement of the people was inflamed by the

harangues of demagogues, and the mob, arming itself with

cudgels, commenced a general massacre. When 1,200 citizens had

fallen, the popular orators interfered to check the

atrocities, but met with the same fate; and, sated at length

with bloodshed, the multitude stayed the deadly work. But

where the pressure of Spartan interference had been heaviest

and most constant, there the reaction was naturally most

striking. The popular impulses which were at work in Arkadia

[see above] found their first outlet in the rebuilding of

Mantineia." But there was far from unanimity in the Arkadian

national movement. "In Tegea … public opinion was divided.

The city had been treated by Sparta with special

consideration, and had for centuries been her faithful ally;

hence the oligarchical government looked with disfavour upon

the project of union. But the democratical party was powerful

and unscrupulous; and, with the help of the Mantineians, they

effected a revolution, in which many were killed, and 800

exiles fled to Sparta." The Spartans, under Agesilaos, avenged

them by ravaging the plain in front of Mantineia. "This

invasion of Arkadia is chiefly important for the pretext which

it furnished for Theban intervention. The Mantineians applied

for help at first to Athens, and, meeting with a refusal, went

on to Thebes. For this request Epameinondas must have been

thoroughly prepared beforehand, and he was soon on the march

with a powerful army. … On his arrival in the Peloponnese

[B. C. 370], he found that Agesilaos had already retired; and

some of the Theban generals, considering the season of the

year, wished at once to return." But Epameinondas was

persuaded by the allies of Thebes to make an attempt upon

Sparta itself. "In four divisions the invading host streamed

into the land which, according to the proudest boast of its

inhabitants, had felt no hostile tread for 600 years. At

Sellasia, not ten miles distant from Sparta, the army

reunited; and, having plundered and burnt the town, swept down

into the valley of the Eurotas, and marched along the left

bank till it reached the bridge opposite the city. Within

Sparta itself, though a universal terror prevailed, one man

rose equal to the emergency. While the men fainted in spirit

as they thought how few they were, and how wide their unwalled

city, … Agesilaos accepted, not without mistrust, the

services of 6,000 helots, collected reinforcements, preserved

order, suppressed conspiracy, stamped out mutiny, posted

guards on every vantage-ground, and refused to be tempted to a

battle by the taunts of foes or the clamours of over-eager

friends. … After one unsuccessful cavalry skirmish, the

Theban general, who, in a campaign undertaken on his sole

responsibility, dared not risk the chance of defeat, decided

to leave the 'wasps'-nest' untaken. He completed his work of

devastation by ravaging the whole of southern Lakonia, … and

then turned back into Arkadia to devote himself to the more

permanent objects of his expedition." Messene was now rebuilt

(see MESSENIAN WAR, THE THIRD), and "the descendants of the

old Messenian stock were gathered to form a new nation from

Rhegion and Messene [Sicily], and from the parts of Lybia

round Kyrene. … By thus restoring the Messenians to their

ancient territory, Epameinondas deprived Sparta at one blow of

nearly half her possessions. … At last Epameinondas had done

his work; and, leaving Pammenes with a garrison in Tegea, he

hastened to lead his soldiers home. At the Isthmus he found a

hostile army from Athens," which had been persuaded to send

succor to Sparta; but the Athenians did not care to give

battle to the conquering Thebans, and the latter passed

unopposed. On the arrival of Epameinondas at Thebes, "the

leaders of a petty faction threatened to bring him and his

colleagues to trial for retaining their command for four

months beyond the legal term of office. But Epameinondas stood

up in the assembly, and told his simple tale of victorious

generalship and still more triumphant statesmanship; and the

invidious cavils of snarling intriguers were at once

forgotten." Sparta and Athens now formed an alliance, with the

senseless agreement that command of the common forces "should

be given alternately to each state for five days. … The

first aim of the confederates was to occupy the passes of the

isthmus," but Epameinondas forced a passage for his army,

captured Sikyon, ravaged the territory of Epidauros, and made

a bold but unsuccessful attempt to surprise Corinth. Then, on

the arrival of reinforcements to the Spartans from Syracuse,

he drew back to Thebes (B. C. 368). For a time the Thebans

were occupied with troubles in Thessaly, and their Arkadian

proteges in Peloponnese were carrying on war against Sparta

independently, with so much momentary success that they became

over-confident and rash. They paid for their foolhardiness by

a frightful defeat, which cost them 10,000 men, whilst no

Spartan is said to have fallen; hence the fight was known in

Sparta as the Tearless Battle. "This defeat probably caused

little grief at Thebes, for it would prove to the arrogant

Arkadians that they could not yet dispense with Theban aid;

and it decided Epameinondas to make a third expedition into

the Peloponnese." The result of his third expedition was the

enrolment of a number of Achaian cities as Theban allies,

which gave to Thebes "the control of the coast-line of the

Corinthian gulf." But the broad and statesmanlike terms on

which Epameinondas arranged these alliances were set aside by

his narrow-minded fellow citizens, and a policy adopted by

which Achaia was "converted from a lukewarm neutral into an

enthusiastic supporter of Sparta. In this unsettled state of

Greek politics the Thebans resolved to have recourse, like the

Spartans before them, to the authority of the Great King.

Existing treaties, for which they were not responsible,

acknowledged his right to interfere in the internal affairs of

Greece." Pelopidas and other envoys were accordingly sent to

Susa (E. C. 366), where they procured from Artaxerxes a

rescript "which recognised the independence of Messene and

ordered the Athenians to dismantle their fleet." But the

mandate of the Great King proved void of effect. "After this

the confusion in Greece grew infinitely worse. An accident

transferred the town of Oropos … from the hands of Athens to

those of Thebes; and as the Peloponnesian allies of the

Athenians refused to help them to regain it, they broke with

them, and, in spite of the efforts of Epameinondas, formed an

alliance with Arkadia. …

{1596}

The Athenians made soon after a vain attempt to seize the

friendly city of Corinth, and the disgusted Corinthians,

together with the citizens of Epidauros and Phlious, …

obtained the grudging consent of Sparta, and made a separate

peace with Thebes. As soon as tranquillity was restored in one

quarter, in another the flame of war would again burst forth."

Its next outbreak (B. C. 365) was between Elis and Arkadia,

the former being assisted by Sparta, and its principal event

was a desperate battle fought for the possession of Olympia.

The Arkadians held part of the city and acquired possession of

the sacred treasures in the Olympian temple, which they

determined to apply to the expenses of the war. "Raising the

cry of sacrilege, the Mantineians, who were jealous both of

Tegea and Megalopolis, at once broke loose and shut their

gates." Soon afterwards, Mantineia separated herself wholly

from the Arkadian confederacy and entered the Spartan

alliance. This was among the causes which drew Epameinondas

once more, and for the last time, into the Peloponnese (B. C.

362). "The armies of Greece were now gathering from all

quarters for the great struggle. On the one side stood Sparta,

Athens, Elis, Achaia, and a part of Arkadia, led by Mantineia;

on the other side were ranged Boiotia [Thebes], Argos,

Messenia, and the rest of Arkadia, while a few of the smaller

states—as Phokis, Phlious, and Corinth—remained neutral."

At the outset of his campaign, Epameinondas made a bold

attempt, by a rapid night march, to surprise Sparta; but a

traitorous warning had been given, the Spartans were

barricaded and prepared for defence, and the undertaking

failed. Then he marched quickly to Mantineia, and failed in

his design there, likewise. A pitched battle was necessary to

decide the issue, and it was fought on the plain between

Mantineia and Tegea, on the 3d day of July, B. C. 362. The

fine discipline of the Theban troops and the skilful tactics

of Epameinondas had given the victory into his hands, when,

"suddenly, the aspect of the battle changed. Except among the

light troops on the extreme right, the advance was everywhere

stayed. The Spartan hoplites were in full flight, but the

conquerors did not stir a step in the pursuit. … The fury of

the battle had instantly ceased. … Epameinondas had fallen

wounded to death, and this was the result. … Every heart was

broken, every arm paralysed. … Both sides claimed the

victory in the battle, and erected the usual trophies, but the

real advantage remained with the Thebans. … By the peace

that ensued, the independence of Messenia was secured, and

Megalopolis and the Pan-Arkadian constitution were preserved

from destruction. The work of Epameinondas, though cut short,

was thus not thrown away; and the power of Sparta was confined

within the limits which he had assigned."

_C. Sankey,

The Spartan and Theban Supremacies,

chapter 12._

ALSO IN:

_Xenophon,

Hellenica,

books 5-6._

_E. Curtius,

History of Greece,

book 6, chapter 2._

_G. Grote,

History of Greece,

part 2, chapter 80 (volume 10)._

GREECE: B. C. 359-358.

First proceedings of Philip of Macedonia.

His acquisition of Amphipolis.

The famous Philip of Macedon succeeded to the Macedonian

throne in 359 B. C., at the age of 23. In his youth he had

been delivered to the Thebans as one of the hostages given

upon the conclusion of a treaty of peace in 368. "His

residence at Thebes gave him some tincture of Grecian

philosophy and literature; but the most important lesson which

he learned at that city was the art of war, with all the

improved tactics introduced by Epaminondas. Philip …

displayed at the beginning of his reign his extraordinary

energy and abilities. After defeating the Illyrians he

established a standing army, in which discipline was preserved

by the severest punishments. He introduced the far-famed

Macedonian phalanx, which was 16 men deep, armed with long

projecting spears. Philip's views were first turned towards

the eastern frontiers of his dominions, where his interests

clashed with those of the Athenians. A few years before the

Athenians had made various unavailing attempts to obtain

possession of Amphipolis, once the jewel of their empire, but

which they had never recovered since its capture by Brasidas

in the eighth year of the Peloponnesian war."

_W. Smith,

Smaller History of Greece,

chapter 19._

The importance of Amphipolis to the Athenians arose chiefly

from its vicinity to "the vast forests which clothed the

mountains that enclose the basin of the Strymon, and afforded

an inexhaustible supply of ship-timber." For the same reason

that the Athenians desired ardently to regain possession of

Amphipolis their enemies were strong in the wish to keep it

out of their hands. Moreover, as the Macedonian kingdom became

well-knitted in the strong hands of the ambitious Philip, the

city of "the Nine Ways" assumed importance to that rising

power, and Philip resolved to possess it. It was at this point

that his ambitions first came into conflict with Athens. But

the Athenians were not aware of his aims until too late. He

deceived them completely, in fact, by a bargain to give help

in acquiring Amphipolis for them, and to receive help in

gaining Pydna for himself. But when his preparations were

complete, he suddenly laid siege to Amphipolis and made

himself master of the city (B. C. 358), besides taking Pydna

as well. At Athens, "Philip was henceforth viewed as an open

enemy, and this was the beginning—though without any formal

declaration—of a state of hostility between the two powers,

which was called, from its origin, the Amphipolitan War."

_C. Thirlwall,

History of Greece,

chapter 42 (volume 5)._

GREECE: B. C. 357-336.

Advancement of Philip of Macedonia to supremacy.

The Sacred Wars and their consequences.

The fatal field of Chæronea.

Philip's preparations for the invasion of Asia.

His assassination.

A war between the Thebans and their neighbors, the Phocians,

which broke out in 357 or 356 B. C., assumed great importance

in Greek history and was called the Sacred War,—as two

earlier contests, in which Delphi was concerned, had been

likewise named. It is sometimes called the Ten Years Sacred

War. Thebes, controlling the shadowy Amphictyonic Council, had

brought a charge of sacrilege against the Phocians and

procured a decree imposing upon them a heavy fine. The

Phocians resisted the decree with unexpected energy, and, by a

bold and sudden movement, gained possession of Delphi, where

they destroyed the records of the Amphictyonic judgment

against them. Having the vast accumulation of the sacred

treasures of the Delphic temple in their hands, they did not

scruple to appropriate them, and were able to maintain a

powerful army of mercenaries, gathered from every part of

Greece, with which they ravaged the territories of Bœotia and

Locris, and acquired control of the pass of Thermopylæ.

{1597}

In the midst of their successes they were called upon for help

by the tyrant of Pheræ in Thessaly, then being attacked by

Philip of Macedon (B. C. 353). The Phocians opposed Philip

with such success, at first, that he retreated from Thessaly;

but it was only to recruit and reanimate his army. Returning

presently he overthrew the Phocian army, with great

slaughter—Onomarchus, its leader, being slain—and made

himself master of all Thessaly. Both Athens and Sparta were

now alarmed by this rapid advance into Central Greece of the

conquering arms of the ambitious Macedonian, and both sent

forces to the help of the Phocians. The former was so

energetic that an army of 5,000 Athenian foot-soldiers and 400

horse reached Thermopylæ (May 352 B. C.) before Philip had

been able to push forward from Thessaly. When he did advance,

proclaiming his purpose to rescue the Delphian temple from

sacrilegious robbers, he was repulsed at the pass and drew

back. It was the beginning of the struggle for Greek

independence against Macedonian energy and ambition. A few

months later Demosthenes delivered the first of his immortal

orations, called afterwards Philippics, in which he strove to

keep the already languishing energy of the Athenians alive, in

unfaltering resistance to the designs of Philip. For six years

there was a state of war between Philip and the Athenians with

their allies, but the conquests of the former in Thrace and

the Chalcidian peninsula were steadily pressed. At length (B.

C. 346) Athens was treacherously persuaded into a treaty of

peace with Philip (the Peace of Philocrates) which excluded

the Phocians from its terms. No sooner had he thus isolated

the latter than he marched quickly to Thermopylæ, secured

possession of the pass and declared himself the supporter of

Thebes. The Sacred War was ended, Delphi rescued, Phocis

punished without mercy, and Greece was under the feet of a

master. This being accomplished, the Peace of Philocrates was

doubtfully maintained for about six years. Then quarrels broke

out which led up to still another Sacred War, and which gave

Philip another opportunity to trample on the liberties of

Greece. Curiously, the provoking causes of this outbreak were

an inheritance from that more ancient Sacred War which brought

ruin upon the town of Cirrha and a lasting curse upon its

soil. The Locrians of Amphissa, dwelling near to the accursed

territory, had ventured in the course of years to encroach

upon it with brick-kilns, and to make use of its harbor. At a

meeting of the Amphictyonic Council, in the spring of B. C.

339, this violation of the Sacred Law was brought to notice,

by way of retaliation for some offence which the deputies of

Amphissa had given to those of Athens. Hostilities ensued

between the citizens of Delphi, pushed on by the Amphictyons,

on one side, and the Amphissians on the other. The influence

of Philip in the Amphictyonic Council was controlling, and his

partisans had no difficulty in summoning him to act for the

federation in settling this portentous affair. He marched into

Bœotia, took possession of the strong city of Elatea, and very

soon made it manifest that he contemplated something more than

mere dealing with the refractory trespassers of Amphissa.

Athens watched his movements with terror, and even Thebes, his

former ally, took alarm. Through the exertions of Demosthenes,

Thebes and Athens, once more, but too late, gave up their

ancient enmity and united their strength and resources in a

firm league. Megara, Corinth and other states were joined to

them and common cause was made with the Locrians of Amphissa.

These movements consumed a winter, and war opened in the

spring. Philip gained successes from the beginning. He took

Amphissa by surprise and carried Naupactus by storm. But it

was not until August—the first day of August, B. C. 338—that

the two combatants came together in force. This occurred in

the Bœotian valley of the Cephisus, near the town of Chæronea,

which gave its name to the battle. The Sacred Band of Thebes

and the hoplites of Athens, with their allies, fought

obstinately and well; but they were no match for the veterans

of the Macedonian phalanx and most of them perished on the

field. It was the last struggle for Grecian independence.

Henceforth, practically at least, Hellas was swallowed up in

Macedonia. We can see very plainly that Philip's "conduct

towards Athens after the victory, under the appearance of

generosity, was extremely prudent. His object was, to separate

the Thebans from the Athenians, and he at once advanced

against the former. The Athenian prisoners he sent home, free

and clothed, accompanied by Antipater; he ordered the dead

bodies to be burned, and their ashes to be conveyed to Athens,

while the Thebans had to purchase their dead from him. He then

entered Thebes, which he seems to have taken without any

resistance, placed a Macedonian garrison in the Cadmea, and,

with the same policy which Sparta had followed at Athens after

the Peloponnesian war, he established an oligarchy of 300 of

his partizans, who were for the most part returned exiles, and

who now, under the protection of the garrison in the Cadmea,

ruled like tyrants, and raged in a fearful manner. … Philip

accepted all the terms which were agreeable to the Athenians;

no investigations were to be instituted against his enemies,

and none of them was to be sent into exile. Athens was not

only to remain a perfectly sovereign city, but retain Lemnos,

Imbros, and Scyros, nay even Samos and Chersonnesus, though he

might have taken the latter without any difficulty, and though

the Athenians had most cleruchiae in Samos. Thus he bought

over the Athenians through this peace, against which

Demosthenes and others, who saw farther, could not venture to

protest, because Philip offered more than they could give him

in return. … The only thing which the Athenians conceded to

Philip, was, that they concluded a symmachia with him, and

conferred upon him the supreme command in the Persian war. For

with great cunning Philip summoned an assembly of the Greeks

whom he called his allies, to Corinth, to deliberate upon the

war against Persia. The war of revenge against the Persians

had already become a popular idea in Greece. … Philip now

entered Peloponnesus with his whole army, and went to the diet

at Corinth, where the Greek deputies received his orders. In

Peloponnesus he acted as mediator, for he was invited as such

by the Arcadians, Messenians, and Argives, to decide their

disputes with Lacedaemon, and they demanded that he should

restore to them their ancient territories.

{1598}

The Arcadians had formerly possessed many places on the

Eurotas, and the Messenians were still very far from having

recovered all their ancient territories. He accordingly fixed

the boundaries, and greatly diminished the extent of Laconia.

… The Spartans, on that occasion, behaved in a dignified

manner; they were the only ones who refused to acknowledge

Philip as generalissimo against Persia. … Even the ancients

regarded the day of Chaeronea as the death-day of Greece;

every principle of life was cut off; the Greeks, indeed,

continued to exist, but in spirit, and politically, they were

dead. … Philip was now at the height of his power.

Byzantium, and the other allied cities, had submitted to the

conqueror, when he sent his army against them, and he was

already trying to establish himself in Asia. 'A detachment of

troops, under Attalus, had been sent across, to keep open the

road for the great expedition, and had encamped on mount Ida.'

Philip was thus enabled to commence his passage across the

Hellespont whenever he pleased. But the close of his career

was already at hand." He was assassinated in August, B. C.

336, by a certain Pausanias, at the instigation, it is said,

of Olympias, one of Philip's several wives—and the mother of

his famous son Alexander—whom he had repudiated to please a

younger bride. "Philip was unquestionably an uncommon and

extraordinary man, and the opinion of several among the

ancients, that by the foundation of the Macedonian state he

did something far greater than Alexander by the application of

the powers he inherited, is quite correct. … When we regard

him as the creator of his state, by uniting the most different

nations, Macedonians and Greeks; … when we reflect what a

man he must have been, from whom proceeded the impulse to

train such great generals, … to whom Alexander, it must be

observed, did not add one, for all Alexander's generals

proceeded from the school of Philip, and there is not one whom

Alexander did not inherit from Philip;—when we perceive the

skill with which he gained over nations and states, … we

cannot but acknowledge that he was an extraordinary man."

_B. G. Niebuhr,

Lectures on Ancient History,

lectures 69 and 66 (volume 2)._

ALSO IN:

_C. Thirlwall,

History of Greece,

chapters 43-46 (volumes 5-6)._

_T. Leland,

History of the Life and Reign of Philip of Macedon,

books 2-5._

GREECE: B. C. 351-348.

The Olynthian War.

Destruction of Olynthus by Philip of Macedonia.