SEE ATHENS: B. C. 489-480.

GREECE: B. C. 481-479.

Congress at Corinth.

Hellenic union against Persia.

Headship of Sparta.

"When it was known in Greece that Xerxes was on his march into

Europe, it became necessary to take measures for the defence

of the country. At the instigation of the Athenians, the

Spartans, as the acknowledged leaders of Hellas and head of

the Peloponnesian confederacy, called on those cities which

had resolved to uphold the independence of their country to

send plenipotentiaries to a congress at the Isthmus of

Corinth. When the envoys assembled, a kind of Hellenic

alliance was formed under the presidency of Sparta, and its

unity was confirmed by an oath, binding the members to visit

with severe penalties those Greeks who, without compulsion,

had given earth and water to the envoys of Xerxes. This

alliance was the nearest approach to a Hellenic union ever

seen in Greece; but though it comprised most of the

inhabitants of the Peloponnesus, except Argos and Achæa, the

Megarians, Athenians, and two cities of Bœotia, Thespiæ and

Platæa, were the only patriots north of the Isthmus. Others,

who would willingly have been on that side, such as the common

people of Thessaly, the Phocians and Locrians, were compelled

by the force of circumstances to 'medize.' From the time at

which it met in the autumn or summer of 481 to the autumn of

480 B. C., the congress at the Isthmus directed the military

affairs of Greece. It fixed the plan of operations. Spies were

sent to Sardis to ascertain the extent of the forces of

Xerxes; envoys visited Argos, Crete, Corcyra, and Syracuse, in

the hope, which proved vain, of obtaining assistance in the

impending struggle. As soon as Xerxes was known to be in

Europe, an army of 10,000 men was sent to hold the pass of

Tempe, but afterwards, on the advice of Alexander of Macedon,

this barrier was abandoned; and it was finally resolved to

await the approaching forces at Thermopylæ and Artemisium. The

supreme authority, both by land and sea, was in the hands of

the Spartans; they were the natural leaders of any army which

the Greeks could put into the field, and the allies refused to

follow unless the ships also were under their charge. … When

hostilities were suspended, the congress re-appears, and the

Greeks once more meet at the Isthmus to apportion the spoil

and adjudge the prizes of valour. In the next year we hear of

no common plan of operations, the fleet and army seeming to

act independently of each other; yet we observe that the

chiefs of the medizing Thebans were taken to the Isthmus

(Corinth) to be tried, after the battle of Platæa. It appears

then that, under the stress of the great Persian invasion, the

Greeks were brought into an alliance or confederation; and for

the two years from midsummer 481 to midsummer 479 a congress

continued to meet, with more or less interruption, at the

Isthmus, consisting of plenipotentiaries from the various

cities. This congress directed the affairs of the nation, so

far as they were in any way connected with the Persian

invasion. When the Barbarians were finally defeated, and there

was no longer any alarm from that source, the congress seems

to have discontinued its meetings. But the alliance remained;

the cities continued to act in common, at any rate, so far as

naval operations were concerned, and Sparta was still the

leading power."

_E. Abbott,

Pericles and the Golden Age of Athens,

chapter 3._

ALSO IN:

_C. O. Müller,

History and Antiquity of the Doric Race,

volume 1, appendix 4._

GREECE: B. C. 480.

The Persian War: Thermopylæ.

"Now when tidings of the battle that had been fought at

Marathon [B. C. 490] reached the ears of King Darius, the son

of Hystaspes, his anger against the Athenians," says

Herodotus, "which had been already roused by their attack on

Sardis, waxed still fiercer, and he became more than ever

eager to lead an army against Greece. Instantly he sent off

messengers to make proclamation through the several states

that fresh levies were to be raised, and these at an increased

rate; while ships, horses, provisions and transports were

likewise to be furnished. So the men published his commands;

and now all Asia was in commotion by the space of three

years." But before his preparations were completed Darius

died. His son Xerxes, who ascended the Persian throne, was

cold to the Greek undertaking and required long persuasion

before he took it up. When he did so, however, his

preparations were on a scale more stupendous than those of his

father, and consumed nearly five years. It was not until ten

years after Marathon that Xerxes led from Sardis a host which,

Herodotus computes at 1,700,000 men, besides half a million

more which manned the fleet he had assembled. "Was there a

nation in all Asia," cries the Greek historian, "which Xerxes

did not bring with him against Greece? Or was there a river,

except those of unusual size, which sufficed for his troops to

drink?" By a bridge of boats at Abydos the army crossed the

Hellespont, and moved slowly through Thrace, Macedonia and

Thessaly; while the fleet, moving on the

coast circuit of the same countries, avoided the perilous

promontory of Mount Athos by cutting a canal.

{1573}

The Greeks had determined at first to make their stand against

the invaders in Thessaly, at the vale of Tempe; but they found

the post untenable and were persuaded, instead, to guard the

narrower Pass of Thermopylæ. It was there that the Persians,

arriving at Trachis, near the Malian gulf, found themselves

faced by a small body of Greeks. The spot is thus described by

Herodotus: "As for the entrance into Greece by Trachis, it is,

at its narrowest point, about fifty feet wide. This, however,

is not the place where the passage is most contracted; for it

is still narrower a little above and a little below

Thermopylae. At Alpeni, which is lower down than that place,

it is only wide enough for a single carriage; and up above, at

the river Phœnix, near the town called Anthela, it is the

same. West of Thermopylæ rises a lofty and precipitous hill,

impossible to climb, which runs up into the chain of Œta;

while to the east the road is shut in by the sea and by

marshes. In this place are the warm springs, which the natives

call 'The Cauldrons'; and above them stands an altar sacred to

Hercules. A wall had once been carried across the opening; and

in this there had of old times been a gateway. … King Xerxes

pitched his camp in the region of Malis called Trachinia,

while on their side the Greeks occupied the straits. These

straits the Greeks in general call Thermopylæ (the Hot Gates);

but the natives and those who dwell in the neighbourhood call

them Pylæ (the Gates). … The Greeks who at this spot awaited

the coming of Xerxes were the following:—From Sparta, 300

men-at-arms; from Arcadia, 1,000 Tegeans and Mantineans, 500

of each people; 120 Orchomenians, from the Arcadian

Orchomenus; and 1,000 from other cities; from Corinth, 400

men; from Phlius, 200; and from Mycenæ 80. Such was the number

from the Peloponnese. There were also present, from Bœotia,

700 Thespians and 400 Thebans. Besides these troops, the

Locrians of Opus and the Phocians had obeyed the call of their

countrymen, and sent, the former all the force they had, the

latter 1,000 men. … The various nations had each captains of

their own under whom they served; but the one to whom all

especially looked up, and who had the command of the entire

force, was the Lacedæmonian, Leonidas. … The force with

Leonidas was sent forward by the Spartans in advance of their

main body, that the sight of them might encourage the allies

to fight, and hinder them from going over to the Medes, as it

was likely they might have done had they seen Sparta backward.

They intended presently, when they had celebrated the Carneian

festival, which was what now kept them at home, to leave a

garrison in Sparta, and hasten in full force to join the army.

The rest of the allies also intended to act similarly; for it

happened that the Olympic festival fell exactly at this same

period. None of them looked to see the contest at Thermopylæ

decided so speedily." For two days Leonidas and his little

army held the pass against the Persians. Then, there was found

a traitor, a man of Malis, who betrayed to Xerxes the secret

of a pathway across the mountains, by which he might steal

into the rear of the post held by the Greeks. A thousand

Phocians had been stationed on the mountain to guard this

path; but they took fright when the Persians came upon them in

the early dawn, and fled without a blow. When Leonidas learned

that the way across the mountain was open to the enemy he knew

that his defense was hopeless, and he ordered his allies to

retreat while there was yet time. But he and his Spartans

remained, thinking it "unseemly" to quit the post they had

been specially sent to guard. The Thespians remained with

them, and the Thebans—known partisans at heart of the

Persians—were forced to stay. The latter deserted when the

enemy approached; the Spartans and the Thespians fought and

perished to the last man.

_Herodotus,

History

(translated by Rawlinson), book 7._

ALSO IN:

_E. Curtius,

History of Greece,

book 3, chapter 1._

_G. Grote,

History of Greece,

part 2, chapter 40 (volume 4)._

See, also,

ATHENS: B. C. 480-479.

GREECE: B. C. 480.

The Persian Wars: Artemisium.

On the approach of the great invading army and fleet of

Xerxes, the Greeks resolved to meet the one at the pass of

Thermopylæ and the other at the northern entrance of the

Eubœan channel. "The northern side of Eubœa afforded a

commodious and advantageous station: it was a long beach,

called, from a temple at its eastern extremity, Artemisium,

capable of receiving the galleys, if it should be necessary to

draw them upon the shore, and commanding a view of the open

sea and the coast of Magnesia, and consequently an opportunity

of watching the enemy's movements as he advanced towards the

south; while, on the other hand, its short distance from

Thermopylæ enabled the fleet to keep up a quick and easy

communication with the land force."

_C. Thirlwall,

History of Greece,

chapter 15 (volume 1)._

The Persian fleet, after suffering heavily from a destructive

storm on the Magnesian coast, reached Aphetæ, opposite

Artemisium, at the mouth of the Pagasæan gulf. Notwithstanding

its losses, it still vastly outnumbered the armament of the

Greeks, and feared nothing but the escape of the latter. But,

in the series of conflicts which ensued, the Greeks were

generally victorious and proved their superior naval genius.

They could not, however, afford the heavy losses which they

sustained, and, upon hearing of the disaster at Thermopylæ and

the Persian possession of the all-important pass, they deemed it

necessary to retreat.

_W. Mitford,

History of Greece,

chapter 8, section 4 (volume 2)._

GREECE: B. C. 480.

The Persian Wars: Salamis.

Leonidas and his Spartan band having perished vainly at

Thermopylæ, in their heroic attempt to hold the pass against

the host of Xerxes, and the Greek ships at Artemisium having

vainly beaten their overwhelming enemies, the whole of Greece

north of the isthmus of Corinth lay completely at the mercy of

the invader. The Thebans and other false-hearted Greeks joined

his ranks, and saved their own cities by helping to destroy

their neighbors. The Platæans, the Thespians and the Athenians

abandoned their homes in haste, conducted their families, and

such property as they might snatch away, to the nearer islands

and to places of refuge in Peloponnesus. The Greeks of

Peloponnesus rallied in force to the isthmus and began there

the building of a defensive wall. Their fleet, retiring from

Artemisium, was drawn together, with some re-enforcements,

behind the island of Salamis, which stretches across the

entrance to the bay of Eleusis, off the inner coast of Attica,

near Athens.

{1574}

Meantime the Persians had advanced through Attica, entered the

deserted city of Athens, taken the Acropolis, which a small

body of desperate patriots resolved to hold, had slain its

defenders and burned its temples. Their fleet had also been

assembled in the bay of Phalerum, which was the more easterly

of the three harbors of Athens. At Salamis the Greeks were in

dispute. The Corinthians and the Peloponnesians were bent upon

falling back with the fleet to the isthmus; the Athenians, the

Eginetans and the Megarians looked upon all as lost if the

present combination of the whole naval power of Hellas in the

narrow strait of Salamis was permitted to be broken up. At

length Themistocles, the Athenian leader, a man of fertile

brain and overbearing resolution, determined the question by

sending a secret message to Xerxes that the Greek ships had

prepared to escape from him. This brought down the Persian

fleet upon them at once and left them no chance for retreat.

Of the memorable fight which ensued (September 20 B. C. 480)

the following is a part of the description given by Herodotus:

"Against the Athenians, who held the western extremity of the

line towards Eleusis, were placed the Phœnicians; against the

Lacedæmonians, whose station was eastward towards the Piræus,

the Ionians. Of these last, a few only followed the advice of

Themistocles, to fight backwardly; the greater number did far

otherwise. … Far the greater number of the Persian ships

engaged in this battle were disabled, either by the Athenians

or by the Eginetans. For as the Greeks fought in order and

kept their line, while the barbarians were in confusion and

had no plan in anything that they did, the issue of the battle

could scarce be other than it was. Yet the Persians fought far

more bravely here than at Eubœa, and indeed surpassed

themselves; each did his utmost through fear of Xerxes, for

each thought that the king's eye was upon himself. … During

the whole time of the battle Xerxes sat at the base of the

hill called Ægaleos, over against Salamis; and whenever he saw

any of his own captains perform any worthy exploit he inquired

concerning him; and the man's name was taken down by his

scribes, together with the names of his father and his city.

… When the rout of the barbarians began, and they sought to

make their escape to Phalêrum, the Eginetans, awaiting them in

the channel, performed exploits worthy to be recorded. Through

the whole of the confused struggle the Athenians employed

themselves in destroying such ships as either made resistance

or fled to shore; while the Eginetans dealt with those which

endeavoured to escape down the straits; so that the Persian

vessels were no sooner clear of the Athenians than straightway

they fell into the hands of the Eginetan squadron. … Such of

the barbarian vessels as escaped from the battle fled to

Phalêrum, and there sheltered themselves under the protection

of the land army. … Xerxes, when he saw the extent of his

loss, began to be afraid lest the Greeks might be counselled

by the Ionians, or without their advice might determine, to

sail straight to the Hellespont and break down the bridges

there; in which case he would be blocked up in Europe and run

great risk of perishing. He therefore made up his mind to

fly."

_Herodotus,

History

(edited and translated by Rawlinson),

book 8, sections 85—97 (volume 4)._

ALSO IN:

_E. Curtius,

History of Greece,

book 3, chapter 1 (volume 2)._

_G. Grote,

History of Greece,

part 2, chapter 4 (volume 4)._

_W. W. Goodwin,

The Battle of Salamis

(Papers of the American School at Athens, volume 1)._

GREECE: B. C. 479.

The Persian Wars: Platæa.

When Xerxes, after the defeat of his fleet at Salamis, fled

back to Asia with part of his disordered host, he left his

lieutenant, Mardonius, with a still formidable army, to repair

the disaster and accomplish, if possible, the conquest of the

Greeks. Mardonius retired to Thessaly for the winter, but

returned to Attica in the spring and drove the Athenians once

more from their shattered city, which they were endeavoring to

repair. He made overtures to them which they rejected with

scorn, and thereupon he destroyed everything in city and

country which could be destroyed, reducing Athens to ruins and

Attica to a desert. The Spartans and other Peloponnesians who

had promised support to the Athenians were slow in coming, but

they came in strong force at last. Mardonius fell back into

Bœotia, where he took up a favorable position in a plain on

the left bank of the Asopus, near Platæa. This was in

September, B. C. 479. According to Herodotus, he had 300,000

"barbarian" troops and 50,000 Greek allies. The opposing

Greeks, who followed him to the Asopus, were 110,000 in

number. The two armies watched one another for more than ten

days, unwilling to offer battle because the omens were on both

sides discouraging. At length the Greeks undertook a change of

position and Mardonius, mistaking this for a movement of

retreat, led his Persians on a run to attack them. It was a

fatal mistake. The Spartans, who bore the brunt of the Persian

assault, soon convinced the deluded Mardonius that they were

not in flight, while the Athenians dealt roughly with his

Theban allies. "The barbarians," says Herodotus, "many times

seized hold of the Greek spears and brake them; for in

boldness and warlike spirit the Persians were not a whit

inferior to the Greeks; but they were without bucklers,

untrained, and far below the enemy in respect of skill in

arms. Sometimes singly, sometimes in bodies of ten, now fewer

and now more in number, they dashed forward upon the Spartan

ranks, and so perished. … After Mardonius fell, and the

troops with him, which were the main strength of the army,

perished, the remainder yielded to the Lacedæmonians and took

to flight. Their light clothing and want of bucklers were of

the greatest hurt to them: for they had to contend against men

heavily armed, while they themselves were without any such

defence." Artabazus, who was second in command of the

Persians, and who had 40,000 immediately under him, did not

strike a blow in the battle, but quitted the field as soon as

he saw the turn events had taken, and led his men in a retreat

which had no pause until they reached and crossed the

Hellespont. Of the remainder of the 300,000 of Mardonius'

host, only 3,000, according to Herodotus, outlived the battle.

It was the end of the Persian invasions of Greece.

_Herodotus,

History

(translated by Rawlinson), book 9._

_G. Grote,

History of Greece,

part 2, chapter 42 (volume 5)._

_C. Thirlwall,

History of Greece,

chapter 16 (volume 1)._

_G. W. Cox,

History of Greece,

book 2, chapter 7 (volume 1)._

{1575}

In celebration of the victory an altar to Zeus was erected and

consecrated by the united Greeks with solemn ceremonies, a

quintennial festival, called the Feast of Liberty, was

instituted at Platæa, and the territory of the Platæans was

declared sacred and inviolable, so long as they should

maintain the appointed sacrifices and funeral honors to the

dead. But these agreements did not avail to protect the

Platæans when the subsequent Peloponnesian War broke out, and

they stood faithfully among the allies of Athens. "The last

act of the assembled army was the expedition against Thebes,

in order, according to the obligation incumbent upon them, to

take revenge on the most obstinate ally of the national enemy.

Eleven days after the battle Pausanias appeared before the

city and demanded the surrender of the party-leaders,

responsible for the policy of Thebes. Not until the siege had

lasted twenty days was the surrender obtained. … Timagenidas

and the other leaders of the Thebans were executed as traitors

against the nation, by order of Pausanias, after he had

dismissed the confederate army."

_E. Curtius,

History of Greece,

book 3, chapter 1 (volume 2)._

GREECE: B. C. 479.

The Persian Wars: Mycale.

The same day, in September, B. C. 479, on which the Greeks at

Platæa destroyed the army of Mardonius, witnessed an almost

equal victory won by their compatriots of the fleet, on the

coast of Asia Minor. The Persian fleet, to avoid a battle with

them, had retreated to Mycale on the narrow strait between the

island of Samos and the mainland, where a land army of 60,000

men was stationed at the time. Here they drew their ships on

shore and surrounded them with a rampart. The Greeks, under

Leotychides the Lacedæmonian, landed and attacked the whole

combined force. The Ionians in the Persian army turned against

their masters and helped to destroy them. The rout was

complete and only a small remnant escaped to reach Sardis,

where Xerxes was still lingering.

_Herodotus,

History

(translated by Rawlinson),

book 9._

ALSO IN:

_C. Thirlwall,

History of Greece,

chapter 16 (volume 1)._

_G. Grote,

History of Greece,

part 2, chapter 42 (volume 5)._

GREECE: B. C. 479-478.

Athens assumes the protection of Ionia.

Siege and capture of Sestus.

Rebuilding and enlargement of Athens and its walls.

Interference of Sparta foiled by Themistocles.

See ATHENS: B. C. 479-478.

GREECE: B. C. 478-477.

Reduction of Byzantium.

Mad conduct of Pausanias.

His recall.

Alienation of the Asiatic Greeks from Sparta.

Their closer union with Athens.

Withdrawal of the Spartans from the war.

Formation of the Delian Confederacy.

"Sestos had fallen: but Byzantion and the Thrakian Doriskos,

with Eion on the Strymon and many other places on the northern

shores of the Egean, were still held by Persian garrisons,

when, in the year after the battle of Plataiai, Pausanias, as

commander of the confederate fleet, sailed with 20

Peloponnesian and 30 Athenian ships to Kypros (Cyprus) and

thence, having recovered the greater part of the island, to

Byzantion. The resistance here was as obstinate perhaps as at

Sestos; but the place was at length reduced, and Sparta stood

for the moment at the head of a triumphant confederacy. It was

now in her power to weld the isolated units, which made up the

Hellenic world, into something like an organised society, and

to kindle in it something like national life. … But she had

no statesman capable, like Themistokles, of seizing on a

golden opportunity, while in her own generals she found her

greatest enemies." Pausanias "was, it would seem, dazzled by

Persian wealth and enamoured of Persian pleasures. He had

roused the indignation of his own people by having his name

inscribed, as leader of all the Greek forces, on the tripod

which was to commemorate the victory of Plataiai: and now his

arrogance and tyranny were to excite at Byzantion a discontent

and impatience destined to be followed by more serious

consequences to his country as well as to himself. On the fall

of Byzantion he sent to the Persian king the prisoners taken

in the city, and spread the report that they had escaped. He

forwarded at the same time, it is said, … a letter in which

he informed Xerxes that he wished to marry his daughter and to

make him lord of all Hellas." Xerxes opened negotiations with

him, and "the head of this miserable man was now fairly

turned. Clad in Persian garb, he aped the privacy of Asiatic

despots; and when he came forth from his palace it was to make

a royal progress through Thrace, surrounded by Median and

Egyptian life guards, and to show his insolence to men who

were at least his equals. The reports of this significant

change in the behaviour of Pausanias led to his recall. He was

put on his trial; but his accusers failed to establish the

personal charges brought against him, while his Medism also

was dismissed as not fully proved. The suspicion, however, was

so strong that he was deprived of his command. … All these

events were tending to alienate the Asiatic Greeks and the

islanders of the Egean from a state which showed itself

incapable of maintaining its authority over its own servants."

Even before the recall of Pausanius, "the Asiatic Greeks

intreated Aristeides the Athenian commander to admit them into

direct relations with Athens; and the same change of feeling

had passed over all the non-medising Greek states with the

exception of the Peloponnesian allies of Sparta. In short, it

had become clear that all Hellas was divided into two great

sections, the one gravitating as naturally to Sparta, the

great land power, as the other gravitated to Athens with her

maritime preponderance. When therefore a Spartan commission

headed by Dorkis arrived with a small force to take the place

of Pausanias, they were met by passive resistance where they

had looked for submission; and their retirement from the field

in which they were unable to compel obedience left the

confederacy an accomplished fact."

_G. W. Cox,

History of Greece,

book 2, chapter 8 (volume 2)._

This confederacy of the Asiatic Greeks with Athens, now

definitely organized, is known as the Confederacy of Delos, or

the Delian League. "To Athens, as decidedly the preponderant

power, both morally and materially, was of necessity, and also

with free good-will, consigned the headship and chief control

of the affairs and conduct of the alliance; a position that

carried with it the responsibility of the collection and

administration of a common fund, and the presidency of the

assemblies of delegates. As time went on and circumstances

altered, the terms of confederation were modified in various

instances; but at first the general rule was the contribution,

not only of money or ships, but of actual personal service.

… We have no precise enumeration of the allies of Athens at

this early time, but the course of the history brings up the

mention of many.

{1576}

… Crete was never directly affected by these events, and

Cyprus was also soon to be left aside; but otherwise all the

Greek islands of the Aegean northwards—except Melos, Thera,

Aegina, and Cythera—were contributory, including Euboea; as

were the cities on the coasts of Thrace and the Chalcidic

peninsula from the Macedonian boundary to the Hellespont;

Byzantium and various cities on the coasts of the Propontis,

and less certainly of the Euxine; the important series of

cities on the western coast of Asia Minor—though apparently

with considerable exceptions—Aeolian, Ionian, Dorian, and

Carian, as far as Caunus at least on the borders of Lycia, if

not even round to the Chelidonian isles. The sacred island of

Delos was chosen as the depository of the common treasure and

the place of meeting of the contributors. Apart from its

central convenience and defensibleness as an island, and the

sanctity of the temple, … it was a traditional centre for

solemn reunions of Ionians from either side the Aegean. … At

the distinct request of the allies the Athenians appointed

Aristides to superintend the difficult process of assessing

the various forms and amounts of contribution. … The total

annual amount of the assessment was the large sum of 460

talents (£112,125), and this perhaps not inclusive of, but

only supplementary to, the costly supply of equipped ships."

_W. W. Lloyd,

The Age of Pericles,

chapter 14 (volume 1)._

ALSO IN:

_E. Abbott,

History of Greece,

part 2, chapters 6 and 8._

GREECE: B. C. 477-462.

Advancing democracy of Athens.

Sustentation of the Commons from the Confederate Treasury.

The stripping of power from the Areopagus.

See ATHENS: B. C. 477-462.

GREECE: B. C. 477-461.

Athens as the head of the Delian League.

Triumph of Anti-Spartan policy at Athens and approach of war.

Ostracism of Cimon.

"Between the end of the Persian war and the year 464 B. C.,

Sparta had sunk from the champion of the whole of Hellas to

the half-discredited leader of the Peloponnese only. Athens,

on the contrary, had risen from a subordinate member of the

league controlled by Sparta to be the leader and almost the

mistress of a league more dangerous than that over which

Sparta held sway. Sparta unquestionably entertained towards

Athens the jealous hatred of a defeated rival. By what steps

Athens was increasing her control over the Delian League, and

changing her position from that of a president to that of an

absolute ruler will be explained. …

See ATHENS: B. C. 466-454.

She was at the same time prosecuting the war against Persia

with conspicuous success. Her leader in this task was Cimon.

In the domain of practice Athens produced no nobler son than

this man. He was the son of Miltiades, the victor of Marathon,

and by heredity and inclination took his stand with the

conservative party in Athens.

See ATHENS: B. C. 477-462, to 460-449.

He succeeded here to the leading position of Aristides, and he

possessed all that statesman's purity of character. … It was

as a naval commander, and as a supporter of a forward policy

against Persia, that Cimon won his greatest renown. But he had

also a keen interest in the domestic development of Athens and

her attitude to the other states of Greece. To maintain

friendship with Sparta was the root of all his policy. His

perfect honesty in supporting this policy was never

questioned, and Sparta recognised his good will to them by

appointing him Proxenus in Athens. It was his duty in this

capacity to protect any Spartan resident in or visiting

Athens. His character and personality were eminently

attractive. … Under his guidance the Athenian fleet struck

Persia blow on blow. … In 466, near the mouth of the

Eurymedon in Pamphylia [see ATHENS: B. C. 470-466], the

Persian fleet was destroyed, and after a fierce struggle her

land forces also were defeated with very great slaughter. It

was long before Persian influence counted for anything again

on the waters of the Mediterranean. Cimon, with the personal

qualities of Aristides, had obtained the successes of

Themistocles. Opposition to Cimon was not wanting. The

Athenian democracy had entered on a path that seemed blocked

by his personal supremacy. And now the party of advancing

democracy possessed a leader, the ablest and greatest that it

was ever to possess. Pericles was about thirty years of age.

… He was related to great families through both father and

mother, and to great families that had championed the

democratic side. His father Zanthippus had prosecuted

Miltiades, the father of Cimon. … To lead the party of

advanced democracy was to attack Cimon, against whom he had

hereditary hostility. … When in 465 Thasos rebelled from

Athens, defeat was certain unless she found allies. She

applied to Sparta for assistance. Athens and Sparta were still

nominally allies, for the creation of the Delian League had

not openly destroyed the alliance that had subsisted between

them since the days of the Persian war. But the Thasians hoped

that Sparta's jealousy of Athens might induce her to disregard

the alliance. And they reckoned rightly. The Spartan fleet was

so weak that no interference upon the sea could be thought of,

but if Attica were attacked by land the Athenians would be

forced to draw off some part of their armament from Thasos.

Sparta gave a secret promise that this attack should be made.

But before they could fulfil their promise their own city was

overwhelmed by a terrible earthquake. … Only five houses

were left standing, and twenty thousand of the inhabitants

lost their lives. King Archidamus saved the state from even

more appalling ruin. While the inhabitants were dazed with the

catastrophe, he ordered the alarm-trumpet to be blown; the

military instincts of the Spartans answered to the call, and

all that were left assembled outside of the city safe from the

falling ruins. Archidamus's presence of mind saved them from

even greater danger than that of earthquake. The disaster

seemed to the masses of Helots that surrounded Sparta clear

evidence of the wrath of the god Poseidon. … The Helots

seized arms, therefore, and from all sides rushed upon Sparta.

Thanks to Archidamus's action, they found the Spartans

collected and ready for battle. They fell back upon Messenia,

and concentrated their strength round Mount Ithome, the

natural Acropolis of that district. … All the efforts of

their opponents, never very successful in sieges, failed to

dislodge them. At last, in 464, Sparta had to appeal to her

allies for help against her own slaves; and, as Athens was her

ally, she appealed to Athens. Should the help be granted? …

Cimon advocated the granting of Sparta's demand with all his

strength. … But there was much to be said on the other side,

and it was said by Ephialtes and Pericles.

{1577}

The whole of Pericles's foreign policy is founded on the

assumption that union between Athens and Sparta was

undesirable and impossible. In everything they stood at

opposite poles of thought. …. Cimon gained the vote of the

people. He went at once with a force of four thousand

heavy-armed soldiers to Ithome. Athenian soldiers enjoyed a

great reputation for their ability in the conduct of sieges;

but, despite their arrival, the Helots in Ithome still held

out. And soon the Spartans grew suspicious of the Athenian

contingent. The failure of Sparta was so clearly to the

interest of Athens that the Spartans could not believe that

the Athenians were in earnest in trying to prevent it; and at

last Cimon was told that Sparta no longer had need of the

Athenian force. The insult was all the more evident because

none of the other allies were dismissed. Cimon at once

returned to Athens. …

See MESSENIAN WAR, THE THIRD.

On his return he still opposed those complete democratic

changes that Pericles and Ephialtes were at this time

introducing into the state. A vote of ostracism was demanded.

The requisite number of votes fell to Cimon, and he had to

retire into exile (461). … His ostracism doubtless allowed

the democratic changes, in any case inevitable, to be

accomplished without much opposition or obstruction, but it

also deprived Athens of her best soldier at a time when she

needed all her military talent. For Athens could not forget

Sparta's insult. In 461 she renounced the alliance with her

that had existed since the Persian wars; and that this rupture

did not mean neutrality was made clear when, immediately

afterwards, Athens contracted an alliance with Argos, always

the enemy and now the dangerous enemy of Sparta, and with the

Thessalians, who also had grounds of hostility to Sparta.

Under such circumstances war could not be long in coming."

_A. J. Grant,

Greece in the Age of Pericles,

chapter 5._

ALSO IN:

_Plutarch,

Cimon; Pericles._

_C. Thirlwall,

History of Greece,

chapter 17 (volume 3)._

_E. Abbott,

Pericles and the Golden Age of Athens,

chapters 5-6. _

GREECE: B. C. 460-449.

Disastrous Athenian expedition to Egypt.

Cimon's last enterprise against the Persians.

The disputed Peace of Cimon, or Callias.

Five years truce between Athens and Sparta.

See ATHENS: B. C. 460-449.

GREECE: B. C. 458-456.

Alliance of Corinth and Ægina against Athens and Megara.

Athenian victories.

Siege and conquest of Ægina.

The Spartans in Bœotia.

Defeat of Athens at Tanagra.

Her success at Œnophyta.

Humiliation of Thebes.

Athenian ascendancy restored.

Crippled by the great earthquake of 464 B. C., and harassed by

the succeeding Messenian War, "nothing could be done, on the

part of Sparta, to oppose the establishment and extension of

the separate alliance between Athens and Argos; and

accordingly the states of Northern Peloponnesus commenced

their armaments against Athens on their own account, in order

to obtain by force what formerly they had achieved by secret

intrigues and by pushing forward Sparta. To stop the progress

of the Attic power was a necessary condition of their own

existence; and thus a new warlike group of states formed

itself among the members of the disrupted confederation. The

Corinthians entered into a secret alliance with Ægina and

Epidaurus, and endeavored to extend their territory and obtain

strong positions beyond the Isthmus at the expense of Megara.

This they considered of special importance to them, inasmuch

as they knew the Megareans, whose small country lay in the

midst between the two hostile alliances, to be allies little

deserving of trust. … The fears of the Corinthians were

realized sooner than they had anticipated. The Megareans,

under the pressure of events, renounced their treaty

obligations to Sparta, and joined the Attico-Argive alliance.

… The passes of the Geranea, the inlets and outlets of the

Doric peninsula, now fell into the hands of the Athenians;

Megara became an outwork of Athens; Attic troops occupied its

towns; Attic ships cruised in the Gulf of Corinth, where

harbors stood open to them at Pegæ and Ægosthena. The

Athenians were eager to unite Megara as closely as possible to

themselves, and for this reason immediately built two lines of

walls, which connected Megara with its port Nisæa, eight

stadia off, and rendered both places impregnable to the

Peloponnesians. This extension of the hostile power to the

boundaries of the Isthmus, and into the waters of the western

gulf, seemed to the maritime cities of Peloponnesus to force

them into action. Corinth, Epidaurus, and Ægina commenced an

offensive war against Athens—a war which opened without

having been formally declared; and Athens unhesitatingly

accepted the challenge thrown out with sufficient distinctness

in the armaments of her adversaries. Myronides, an experienced

general and statesman, … landed with an Attic squadron near

Halieis (where the frontiers of the Epidaurians and Argives

met), and here found a united force of Corinthians,

Epidaurians, and Æginetans awaiting him. Myronides was

unsuccessful in his campaign. A few months later the hostile

fleets met off the island of Cecryphalea, between Ægina and

the coast of Epidaurus. The Athenians were victorious, and the

struggle now closed round Ægina itself. Immediately opposite

the island ensued a second great naval battle. Seventy of the

enemy's ships fell into the hands of the Athenians, whose

victorious fleet without delay surrounded Ægina. The

Peloponnesians were fully aware of the importance of Ægina to

them. Three hundred hoplites came to the relief of the island,

and the Corinthians marched across the Geranea into Megaris to

the relief of Ægina. It seemed impossible that, while the

fleet of the Athenians was fighting in the land of the Nile,

and another was lying before Ægina, they should have a third

army in readiness for Megara. But the Peloponnesians had no

conception of the capabilities of action belonging to the

Athenians. True, the whole military levy was absent from the

country, and only enough men were left at home for the mere

defence of the walls. Yet all were notwithstanding agreed that

neither should Ægina be given up nor the new allies be left in

the lurch. Myronides advanced to meet the Corinthians with

troops composed of those who had passed the age of military

service or not yet reached it. In the first fight he held his

ground: when the hostile forces returned for the second time,

they were routed with tremendous loss. Megara was saved, and

the energy of the Athenians had been most splendidly

established.

{1578}

In attestation of it the sepulchral pillars were erected in

the Ceramicus, on which were inscribed the names of the

Athenian soldiers who had fallen in one and the same year (Ol.

lxxx 3; B. C. 458-7) off Cyprus, in Egypt, Phœicia, Halieis,

Ægina, and Megara. A fragment of this remarkable historical

document is preserved to this day. While thus many years'

accumulation of combustible materials had suddenly broken out

into a flame of the fiercest war in Central Greece, new

complications also arose in the north. The Thebans, who had

suffered so deep a humiliation, believed the time to have

arrived when the events of the past were forgotten, and when

they could attain to new importance and power. In opposition

to them the Phocians put forth their strength. … After the

dissolution of the Hellenic Confederation, and the calamities

which had befallen the Spartans, the Phocians thought they

might venture an attack upon the Dorian tetrapolis, in order

to extend their frontiers in this direction. … For Sparta it

was a point of honor not to desert the primitive communities

of the Dorian race. She roused herself to a vigorous effort,

and, notwithstanding all her losses and the continuance of the

war in Messenia, was able to send 11,500 men of her own troops

and those of the confederates across the Isthmus before the

Athenians had time to place any obstacles in their way [B. C.

457]. The Phocians were forced to relinquish their conquests.

But when the Spartan troops were about to return home across

the Isthmus they found the mountain-passes occupied by Athens,

and the Gulf of Corinth made equally insecure by the presence

of hostile ships. Nothing remained for the Lacedæmonians but

to march into Bœotia, where their presence was welcome to

Thebes. They entered the valley of the Asopus, and encamped in

the territory of Tanagra, not far from the frontiers of

Attica. Without calculating the consequences, the Athenians

had brought themselves into an extremely dangerous situation.

… Their difficulties increased when, contemporaneously, evil

signs of treasonable plots made their appearance in the

interior of the city. …

See ATHENS: B. C. 460-449.

Thus, then, it was now necessary to contend simultaneously

against foes within and foes without, to defend the

constitution as well as the independence of the state. Nor was

the question merely as to an isolated attack and a transitory

danger; for the conduct of the Spartans in Bœotia clearly

showed that it was now their intention to restore to power

Thebes … because they were anxious to have in the rear of

Athens a state able to stop the extension of the Attic power

in Central Greece. This intention could be best fulfilled by

supporting Thebes in the subjugation of the other Bœotian

cities. For this purpose the Peloponnesians had busily

strengthened the Theban, i. e. the oligarchical party, in the

whole of the country, and encircled Thebes itself with new

fortifications. Thebes was from a country town to become a

great city, an independent fortified position, and a base for

the Peloponnesian cause in Central Greece. Hence Athens could

not have found herself threatened by a more dangerous

complication. The whole civic army accordingly took the field,

amounting, together with the Argives, and other allies, to

14,000 men, besides a body of Thessalian cavalry. In the low

ground by the Asopus below Tanagra the armies met. An arduous

and sanguinary struggle ensued, in which for the first time

Athens and Sparta mutually tested their powers in a regular

battle. For a long time the result was doubtful; till in the

very thick of the battle the cavalry went over to the enemy,

probably at the instigation of the Laconian party. This act of

treason decided the day in favor of Sparta, although patriotic

Athenians would never consent to count this among the battles

lost by Athens. The Spartans were far from fulfilling the

expectations of the party of the Oligarchs. As soon as they

knew that the passes of the Isthmus were once more open, they

took their departure, towards the fall of the year, through

Megara, making this little country suffer for its defection by

the devastation of its territory. … They reckoned upon

Thebes being for the present strong enough to maintain herself

against her neighbors; for ulterior offensive operations

against Athens, Tanagra was to serve as a base. The plan was

good, and the conjuncture of affairs favorable. But whatever

the Spartans did, they did only by halves: they concluded a

truce for four months, and quitted the ground. The Athenians,

on the other hand, had no intention of allowing a menacing

power to establish itself on the frontiers of their country.

Without waiting for the return of the fair season, they

crossed Mount Parnes two months after the battle, before any

thoughts of war were entertained in Bœotia; Myronides, who was

in command, defeated the Theban army which was to defend the

valley of the Asopus, near Œnophyta. This battle with one blow

put an end to all the plans of Thebes; the walls of Tanagra

were razed. Myronides continued his march from town to town;

everywhere the existing governments were overthrown, and

democratic constitutions established with the help of Attic

partisans. … Thus, after a passing humiliation, Athens was

soon more powerful than ever, and her sway extended as far as

the frontiers of the Phocians. Nay, during the same campaign

she extended her military dominion as far as Locris. …

Meanwhile the Æginetans also were gradually losing their power

of resistance. For nine months they had resisted the Attic

squadron. … Now their strength was exhausted; and the proud

island of the Æacidæ, which Pindar had sung as the mother of

the men who in the glorious rivalry of the festive games shone

out before all other Hellenes, had to bow down before the

irresistible good fortune of the Athenians, and was forced to

pull down her walls, to deliver up her vessels of war, and

bind herself to the payment of tribute. Contemporaneously with

this event, the two arms of walls [at ATHENS] … between the

upper and lower town were completed. Athens was now placed

beyond the fear of any attack. … The Peloponnesian

confederation was shaken to its very foundations; and Sparta

was still let and hindered by the Messenian revolt, while the

Athenians were able freely to dispose of their military and

naval forces."

_E. Curtius,

History of Greece,

book 3, chapter 2 (volume 2)._

ALSO IN:

_G. W. Cox,

History of Greece,

book 2, chapter 9 (volume 2)._

_Thucydides,

Peloponnesian War

(translated by Jowett),

book 1, sections 107-108._

{1579}

GREECE: B. C. 449-445.

Quarrel of Delphians and Phocians.

Interference of Sparta and Athens.

Bœotian revolution.

Defeat of Athenians at Coroneia.

Revolt of Eubœa and Megara.

The Thirty Years Truce.

In 449 B. C. "on occasion of a dispute between the Delphians

and the Phocians as to which should have the care of the

temple and its treasures, the Lacedæmonians sent an army, and

gave them to the former; but as soon as they were gone,

Pericles led thither an Athenian army, and put the Phocians in

possession. Of this the Lacedæmonians took no notice. The

right of Promanty, or first consulting the oracle, which had

been given to Sparta by the Delphians, was now assigned to

Athens by the Phocians; and this honor was probably the cause

of the interference of both states. As the Athenians had given

the upper hand to the democratic party in Bœotia, there was of

course a large number of the opposite party in exile. These

had made themselves masters of Orchomenus, Chæroneia, and some

other places, and if not checked in time, might greatly

endanger the Athenian influence. Tolmidas, therefore, led an

army and took and garrisoned Chæroneia; but, as he was

returning, he was attacked at Coroneia by the exiles from

Orchomenus, joined by those of Eubœa and their other friends.

Tolmidas fell, and his troops were all slain or made

prisoners. (Ol. 83, 2.) [B. C. 447.] The Athenians, fearing a

general war, agreed to a treaty, by which, on their prisoners

being restored, they evacuated Bœotia. The exiles returned to

their several towns, and things were placed on their old

footing. … Eubœa was now (Ol. 83, 3) [B. C. 446] in revolt:

and while Pericles was at the head of an army reducing it, the

party in Megara adverse to Athens rose and massacred all the

Athenian garrisons except that of Nisæa. Corinthians,

Sicyonians, and Epidaurians came to their aid: and the

Peloponnesians, led by one of the Spartan kings, entered and

wasted the plain of Eleusis. Pericles led back his army from

Eubœa, but the enemy was gone; he then returned and reduced

that island, and having expelled the people of Hestiæa, gave

their lands to Athenian colonists; and the Athenians, being

unwilling to risk the chance of war with the Dorian

confederacy, gladly formed (Ol. 83, 4) [B. C. 445] a truce for

thirty years, surrendering Nisæa and Pegæ, and withdrawing a

garrison which they had in Trœzen, and ceasing to interfere in

Achaia."

_T. Keightley,

History of Greece,

part 2, chapter 1._

"The Athenians saw themselves compelled to give up their

possessions in Peloponnesus, especially Achaia, as well as

Trœzene and Pagæ, an important position for their

communication with the peninsula. Even Nisæa was abandoned.

Yet these losses, sensibly as they affected their influence

upon the Grecian continent, were counterbalanced by a

concession still more significant, the acknowledgment of the

Delian League. It was left open to states and cities which

were members of neither confederacy to join either at

pleasure. These events happened in Ol. 83,3 (B. C. 445)—the

revolt of Megara and Eubœa, the invasion of Pleistoanax, the

re-conquest of Eubœa, and the conclusion of the treaty, which

assumed the form of an armistice for thirty years. Great

importance must be attributed to this settlement, as involving

an acknowledgment which satisfied both parties and did justice

to the great interests at stake on either side. If Athens

renounced some of her possessions, the sacrifice was

compensated by the fact that Sparta recognized the existence

of the naval supremacy of Athens, and the basis on which it

rested. We may perhaps assume that the compromise between

Pericles and Pleistoanax was the result of the conviction felt

by both these leading men that a fundamental dissociation of

the Peloponnesian from the Delian league was a matter of

necessity. The Spartans wished to be absolutely supreme in the

one, and resigned the other to the Athenians."

_L. von Ranke,

Universal History:

The Oldest Historical Group of Nations and the Greeks,

chapter 7, section 2._

_ALSO IN:

Sir E. B. Lytton,

Athens: Its Rise and Fall,

book 5, chapter 1._

GREECE: B. C. 445-431.

Splendor of Athens and greatness of the Athenian Empire under

the rule of Pericles.

See ATHENS: B. C. 445-431.

GREECE: B. C. 440.

Subjugation of revolted Samos by the Athenians.

Spartan interference prevented by Corinth.

See ATHENS: B. C. 440-437.

GREECE: B. C. 435-432.

Causes of the Peloponnesian War.

"In B. C. 431 the war broke out between Athens and the

Peloponnesian League, which, after twenty-seven years, ended

in the ruin of the Athenian empire. It began through a quarrel

between Corinth and Kerkyra [or Korkyra, or Corcyru], in which

Athens assisted Kerkyra. A congress was held at Sparta;

Corinth and other States complained of the conduct of Athens,

and war was decided on. The real cause of the war was that

Sparta and its allies were jealous of the great power that

Athens had gained. A far greater number of Greek States were

engaged in this war than had ever been engaged in a single

undertaking before. States that had taken no part in the

Persian war were now fighting on one side or the other. Sparta

was an oligarchy, and the friend of the nobles everywhere;

Athens was a democracy, and the friend of the common people;

so that the war was to some extent a struggle between these

classes all over Greece."

_C. A. Fyffe,

History of Greece (History Primer),

chapter 5._

"The Peloponnesian War was a protracted struggle, and attended

by calamities such as Hellas had never known within a like

period of time. Never were so many cities captured and

depopulated—some by Barbarians, others by Hellenes themselves

fighting against one another; and several of them after their

capture were re-peopled by strangers. Never were exile and

slaughter more frequent, whether in the war or brought about

by civil strife. … There were earthquakes unparalleled in

their extent and fury, and eclipses of the sun more numerous

than are recorded to have happened in any former age; there

were also in some places great droughts causing famines, and

lastly the plague which did immense harm and destroyed numbers

of the people. All these calamities fell upon Hellas

simultaneously with the war, which began when the Athenians

and Peloponnesians violated the thirty years' truce concluded

by them after the recapture of Euboea. Why they broke it and

what were the grounds of quarrel I will first set forth, that

in time to come no man may be at a loss to know what was the

origin of this great war. The real though unavowed cause I

believe to have been the growth of the Athenian power, which

terrified the Lacedaemonians and forced them into war."

_Thucydides,

History

(translated by Jowett),

book 1, section 23._

The quarrel between Corinth and Korkyra, out of which, as an

immediate excitement, the Peloponnesian War grew, concerned

"the city of Epidamnus, known afterwards, in the Roman times,

as Dyrrachium, hard by the modern Durazzo—a colony founded by

the Korkyreans on the coast of Illyria, in the Ionic gulf,

considerably to the north of their own island."

{1580}

The oligarchy of Epidamnus, driven out by the people, had

allied themselves with the neighboring Illyrians and were

harassing the city. Korkyra refused aid to the latter when

appealed to, but Corinth (of which Korkyra was itself a

colony) promptly rendered help. This involved Corinth and

Korkyra in hostilities, and Athens gave support to the latter.

_E. Curtius,

History of Greece,

volume 3, book 4._

ALSO IN:

_C. Thirlwall,

History of Greece,

chapters 19-30._

_G. Grote,

History of Greece,

part 2, chapters 47-48 (volume 5)._

GREECE: B. C. 432.

Great Sea-fight of the Corinthians

with the Korkyrians and Athenians.

Revolt of Potidæa.

"Although Korkyra became the ally of Athens, the force sent to

her aid was confined to the small number of ten ships, for the

express purpose of making it clear to the Corinthians that no

aggressive measures were intended; and the generals received

precise instructions to remain strictly neutral unless the

Corinthians should attempt to effect a landing either on

Korkyra or on any Korkyraian settlements. The Corinthians lost

no time in bringing the quarrel to an issue. With a fleet of

150 ships, of which 60 were furnished by their allies, they

sailed to the harbor of Cheimerion near the lake through which

the river Acheron finds its way into the sea about thirty

miles to the east of the southernmost promontory of Korkyra.

The conflict which ensued exhibited a scene of confusion which

the Athenian seamen probably regarded with infinite contempt.

After a hard struggle the Korkyraians routed the right wing of

the enemy's fleet, and chasing it to its camp on shore, lost

time in plundering it and burning the tents. For this folly

they paid a terrible price. The remainder of the Korkyraian

fleet, borne down by sheer force of numbers, was put to

flight, and probably saved from utter ruin only by the open

interference of the Athenians, who now dashed into the fight

without scruple, and came into direct conflict with the

Corinthians. The latter were now resolved to press their

advantage to the utmost. Sailing through the enemy's ships,

they applied themselves to the task not of taking prizes, but

of indiscriminate slaughter, to which not a few of their own

people fell victims. After this work of destruction, they

conveyed their disabled ships with their dead to Sybota, and,

still unwearied, advanced again to the attack, although it was

now late in the day. Their Paian, or battle cry, had already

rung through the air, when they suddenly backed water. Twenty

Athenian ships had come into sight, and the Corinthians,

supposing them to be only the vanguard of a larger force,

hastily retreated. The Korkyraians, ignorant of the cause of

this movement, marvelled at their departure: but the darkness

was now closing in, and they also withdrew to their own

ground. So ended the greatest sea-fight in which Hellenes had

thus far contended not with barbarians but with their own

kinsfolk. On the following day the Korkyraians sailed to

Sybota with such of their ships as were still fit for service,

supported by the thirty Athenian ships. But the Corinthians,

far from wishing to come to blows with the newcomers, were

anxious rather for their own safety. Concluding that the

Athenians now regarded the Thirty Years' Truce as broken, they

were afraid of being forcibly hindered by them in their

homeward voyage. It became necessary therefore to learn what

they meant to do. The answer of the Athenians was plain and

decisive. They did not mean to break the truce, and the

Corinthians might go where they pleased, so long as they did

not go to Korkyra or to any city or settlement belonging to

her. … Upwards of a thousand prisoners had fallen into the

hands of the Corinthians. Of these 250 were conveyed to

Corinth, and treated with the greatest kindness and care. Like

the Athenians, the Corinthians were acting only from a regard

to their own interests. Their object was to send these

prisoners back to Korkyra, nominally under pledge to pay a

heavy ransom for their freedom, but having really covenanted

to put down the Demos, and thus to insure the hearty alliance

of Korkyra with Corinth. These men returned home to stir up

the most savage seditions that ever disgraced an Hellenic

city.

_G. W. Cox,

General History of Greece,

book 3, chapter 1._

"The evils of this imprudent interference of the Athenians

began now to be seen. In consequence of the Corcyrian

alliance, the Athenians issued an order to Potidæa, a

Macedonian town acknowledging their supremacy, to demolish its

walls; to send back certain officers whom they had received

from Corinth, and to give hostages for their good conduct.

Potidæa, although an ally of Athens, had originally been a

colony of Corinth, and thus arose the jealousy which

occasioned these harsh and peremptory orders. Symptoms of

universal hostility to Athens now appeared in the states

around. The Corinthians and their allies were much irritated;

the oppressed Potidæans were strongly instigated to revolt;

and Perdiccas, king of Macedon, who had some time since been

at open war with the Athenians, now gladly seized the

opportunity to distress them, by exciting and assisting the

malcontents. The Potidæans, however, deputed ambassadors to

Athens to deprecate the harsh orders which had been sent them;

but in the mean time to prepare for the worst, they also sent

messengers to Sparta entreating support, where they met

deputies from Corinth and Megara. By these loud and general

complaints Sparta was at length roused to head the conspiracy

against Athens, and the universal flames of war shortly

afterwards broke forth throughout Greece." The revolt of

Potidæa followed immediately; the Corinthians placed a strong

force in the town, under Aristeus, and the Athenians sent an

army under Phormion to lay siege to it.

_Early History of Greece

(Enc. Metropolitana),

page 283._

GREECE: B. C. 432-431.

Charges brought by Corinth against Athens.

The hearing and the Congress at Sparta.

Decision for war.

Theban attack on Platæa.

The Peloponnesian War begun.

The Corinthians "invited deputies from the other states of the

confederacy to meet them at Sparta, and there charged the

Athenians with having broken the treaty, and trampled on the

rights of the Peloponnesians. The Spartans held an assembly to

receive the complaints of their allies, and to discuss the

question of peace or war. Here the Corinthians were seconded

by several other members of the confederacy, who had also

wrongs to complain of against Athens, and urged the Spartans

for redress. … It happened that at this time Athenian

envoys, who had been sent on other business, were still in

Sparta.

{1581}

They desired permission to attend and address the assembly.

… When the strangers had all been heard, they were desired

to withdraw, that the assembly might deliberate. The feeling

against the Athenians was universal; most voices were for

instant war. … The deputies of the allies were then informed

of the resolution which the assembly had adopted, and that a

general congress of the confederacy would shortly be summoned

to deliberate on the same question, in order that war, if

decided on, might be decreed by common consent. … The

congress decided on the war; but the confederacy was totally

unprepared for commencing hostilities, and though the

necessary preparations were immediately begun and vigorously

prosecuted, nearly a year elapsed before it was ready to bring

an army into the field. In the meantime embassies were sent to

Athens with various remonstrances and demands, for the double

purpose of amusing the Athenians with the prospect of peace,

and of multiplying pretexts for war. An attempt was made, not,

perhaps, so foolish as it was insolent, to revive the popular

dread of the curse which had been supposed to hang over the

Alcmæonids. The Athenians were called upon, in the name of the

gods, to banish all who remained among them of that

blood-stained race. If they had complied with this demand,

they must have parted with Pericles, who, by the mother's

side, was connected with the Alcmæonids. This, indeed, was not

expected; but it was hoped that the refusal might afford a

pretext to his enemies at Athens for treating him as the

author of the war. The Athenians retorted by requiring the

Spartans to expiate the pollution with which they had profaned

the sanctuary of Tænarus, by dragging from it some Helots who

had taken refuge there, and that of Athene, by the death of

Pausanias. … Still, war had been only threatened, not

declared; and peaceful intercourse, though not wholly free

from distrust, was still kept up between the subjects of the

two confederacies. But early in the following spring, B. C.

431, in the fifteenth year of the Thirty Years' Truce, an

event took place which closed all prospects of peace,

precipitated the commencement of war, imbittered the animosity

of the contending parties, and prepared some of the most

tragical scenes of the ensuing history. In the dead of night

the city of Platæa was surprised by a body of 300 Thebans,

commanded by two of the great officers called Bœotarchs. They

had been invited by a Platæan named Nauclides, and others of

the same party, who hoped, with the aid of the Thebans, to rid

themselves of their political opponents, and to break off the

relation in which their city was standing to Athens, and

transfer its alliance to Thebes. The Thebans, foreseeing that

a general war was fast approaching, felt the less scruple in

strengthening themselves by this acquisition, while it might

be made with little cost and risk. The gates were unguarded,

as in time of peace, and one of them was secretly opened to

the invaders, who advanced without interruption into the

marketplace. … The Platæans, who were not in the plot,

imagined the force by which their city had been surprised to

be much stronger than it really was, and, as no hostile

treatment was offered to them, remained quiet, and entered

into a parley with the Thebans. In the course of these

conferences they gradually discovered that the number of the

enemy was small, and might be easily overpowered. … Having

barricaded the streets with wagons, and made such other

preparations as they thought necessary, a little before

daybreak they suddenly fell upon the Thebans. The little band

made a vigorous defence, and twice or thrice repulsed the

assailants; but as these still returned to the charge, and

were assisted by the women and slaves, who showered stones and

tiles from the houses on the enemy, all, at the same time,

raising a tumultuous clamour, and a heavy rain increased the

confusion caused by the darkness, they at length lost their

presence of mind, and took to flight. But most were unable to

find their way in the dark through a strange town, and several

were slain as they wandered to and fro in search of an outlet.

… The main body, which had kept together, entered a large

building adjoining the walls, having mistaken its gates, which

they found open, for those of the town, and were shut in. The

Platæans at first thought of setting fire to the building; but

at length the men within, as well as the rest of the Thebans,

who were still wandering up and down the streets, surrendered

at discretion. Before their departure from Thebes it had been

concerted that as large a force as could be raised should

march the same night to support them. The distance between the

two places was not quite nine miles, and these troops were

expected to reach the gates of Platæa before the morning; but

the Asopus, which crossed their road, had been swollen by the

rain, and the state of the ground and the weather otherwise

retarded them, so that they were still on their way when they

heard of the failure of the enterprise. Though they did not

know the fate of their countrymen, as it was possible that

some might have been taken prisoners, they were at first

inclined to seize as many of the Platæans as they could find

without the walls, and to keep them as hostages. … The

Thebans afterward alleged that they had received a promise,

confirmed by an oath, that, on condition of their retiring

from the Platæan territory, the prisoners should be released;

and Thucydides seems disposed to believe this statement. The

Platæans denied that they had pledged themselves to spare the

lives of the prisoners, unless they should come to terms on

the whole matter with the Thebans; but it does not seem likely

that, after ascertaining the state of the case, the Thebans

would have been satisfied with so slight a security. It is

certain, however, that they retired, and that the Platæans, as

soon as they had transported their movable property out of the

country into the town, put to death all the prisoners—

amounting to 180, and including Eurymachus, the principal

author of the enterprise, and the man who possessed the

greatest influence in Thebes. On the first entrance of the

Thebans into Platæa, a messenger had been despatched to Athens

with the intelligence, and the Athenians had immediately laid

all the Bœotians in Attica under arrest; and when another

messenger brought the news of the victory gained by the

Platæans, they sent a herald to request that they would

reserve the prisoners for the disposal of the Athenians. The

herald came too late to prevent the execution; and the

Athenians, foreseeing that Platæa would stand in great need of

defence, sent a body of troops to garrison it, supplied it

with provisions, and removed the women and children and all

persons unfit for service in a siege.

{1582}

After this event it was apparent that the quarrel could only

be decided by arms. Platæa was so intimately united with

Athens, that the Athenians felt the attack which had been made

on it as an outrage offered to themselves, and prepared for

immediate hostilities. Sparta, too, instantly sent notice to

all her allies to get their contingents ready by an appointed

day for the invasion of Attica."

_C. Thirlwall,

History of Greece,

chapter 19 (volume 1)._

ALSO IN:

_Thucydides,

History,

books 1-2._

GREECE: B. C. 431-429.

The Peloponnesian War: How Hellas was divided.

The opposing camps.

Peloponnesian invasions of Attica.

The Plague at Athens.

Death of Pericles.

Surrender of Potidæa to the Athenians.

"All Hellas was excited by the coming conflict between her two

chief cities. … The feeling of mankind was strongly on the

side of the Lacedaemonians; for they professed to be the

liberators of Hellas. … The general indignation against the

Athenians was intense; some were longing to be delivered from

them, others fearful of falling under their sway. … The

Lacedaemonian confederacy included all the Peloponnesians with

the exception of the Argives and the Achaeans—they were both

neutral; only the Achaeans of Pellene took part with the

Lacedaemonians at first; afterwards all the Achaeans joined

them. Beyond the borders of the Peloponnese, the Megarians,

Phocians, Locrians, Boeotians, Ambraciots, Leucadians, and

Anactorians were their allies. Of these the Corinthians,

Megarians, Sicyonians, Pellenians, Eleans, Ambraciots, and

Leucadians provided a navy, the Boeotians, Phocians, and

Locrians furnished cavalry, the other states only infantry.

The allies of the Athenians were Chios, Lesbos, Plataea, the

Messenians of Naupactus, the greater part of Acarnania,

Corcyra, Zacynthus, and cities in many other countries which

were their tributaries. There was the maritime region of

Caria, the adjacent Dorian peoples, Ionia, the Hellespont, the

Thracian coast, the islands that lie to the east within the

line of Peloponnesus and Crete, including all the Cyclades

with the exception of Melos and Thera. Chios, Lesbos and

Corcyra furnished a navy; the rest, land forces and money.

Thus much concerning the two confederacies, and the character

of their respective forces. Immediately after the affair at

Plataea the Lacedaemonians determined to invade Attica, and

sent round word to their Peloponnesian and other allies,

bidding them equip troops and provide all things necessary for

a foreign expedition. The various states made their

preparations as fast as they could, and at the appointed time,

with contingents numbering two-thirds of the forces of each,

met at the Isthmus." Then followed the invasion of Attica, the

siege of Athens, the plague in the city, the death of

Pericles, and the success won by the indomitable Athenians, at

Potidaea, in the midst of their sore distress.

_Thucydides,

History

(translated by Jowett),

book 2, sections 8-70 (volume 1)._

ALSO IN:

_E. Abbott,

Pericles,

chapters 13-15._

See ATHENS: 431 B. C. 431 and 430-429.

GREECE: B. C. 429-427.

The Peloponnesian War:

Siege, capture and destruction of Platæa.

"In the third spring of the war, the Peloponnesians changed

their plan of offence. By the invasion and ravage of Attica

for two following summers, tho much injury had been done to

the Athenians, little advantage had accrued to themselves: the

booty was far from paying the expense of the expedition; the

enemy, it was found, could not be provoked to risk a battle,

and the great purpose of the war was little forwarded. The

Peloponnesians were yet very unequal to attempt naval

operations of any consequence. Of the continental dependencies

of Athens none was so open to their attacks, none so

completely excluded from naval protection, none so likely by

its danger to superinduce that war of the field which they

wished, as Platæa. Against that town therefore it was

determined to direct the principal effort. … Under the

command still of Archidamus, the confederate army accordingly

entered the Platæid, and ravage was immediately begun. … The

town was small, as may be judged from the very small force

which sufficed for an effectual garrison; only 400 Platæans,

with 80 Athenians. There were besides in the place 110 women

to prepare provisions, and no other person free or slave. The

besieging army, composed of the flower of the Peloponnesian

youth, was numerous. The first operation was to surround the

town with a palisade, which might prevent any ready egress;

the neighboring forest of Cithæron supplying materials. Then,

in a chosen spot, ground was broken, according to the modern

phrase, for making approaches. The business was to fill the

town-ditch, and against the wall to form a mound, on which a

force sufficient for assault might ascend. … Such was at

that time the inartificial process of a siege. Thucydides

appears to have been well aware that it did no credit to the

science of his age. … To oppose this mode of attack, the

first measure of the besieged was to raise, on that part of

their wall against which the mound was forming, a strong

wooden frame, covered in front with leather and hides; and,

within this, to build a rampart with bricks from the

neighboring houses. The wooden frame bound the whole, and kept

it firm to a considerable height: the covering of hides

protected both work and workmen against weapons discharged

against them, especially fiery arrows. But the mound still

rising as the superstructure on the wall rose, and this

superstructure becoming unavoidably weaker with increasing

height, while the mound was liable to no counterbalancing

defect, it was necessary for the besieged to devise other

opposition. Accordingly they broke through the bottom of

their wall, where the mound bore against it, and brought in

the earth. The Peloponnesians, soon aware of this, instead of

loose earth, repaired their mound with clay or mud inclosed in

baskets. This requiring more labor to remove, the besieged

undermined the mound; and thus, for a long time unperceived,

prevented it from gaining height. Still, however, fearing that

the efforts of their scanty numbers would be overborne by the

multitude of hands which the besiegers could employ, they had

recourse to another device. Within their town-wall they built,

in a semilunar form, a second wall, connected with the first

at the extremities. These extended, on either side, beyond the

mound; so that should the enemy possess themselves of the

outer wall, their work would be to be renewed in a far less

favorable situation. … A ram, advanced upon the

Peloponnesian mound, battered the superstructure on the

Platæan rampart, and shook it violently; to the great alarm of

the garrison, but with little farther effect.

{1583}

Other machines of the same kind were employed against

different parts of the wall itself, but to yet less purpose.

… No means however were neglected by the besiegers that

either approved practice suggested, or their ingenuity could

devise, to promote their purpose; yet, after much of the

summer consumed, they found every effort of their numerous

forces so completely baffled by the vigilance, activity, and

resolution of the little garrison, that they began to despair

of succeeding by assault. Before however they would recur to

the tedious method of blockade, they determined to try one

more experiment, for which their numbers, and the neighboring

woods of Cithæron, gave them more than ordinary facility.

Preparing a very great quantity of faggots, they filled with

them the town-ditch in the parts adjoining to their mound, and

disposed piles in other parts around the place, wherever

ground or any other circumstance gave most advantage. On the

faggots they put sulphur and pitch, and then set all on fire.

The conflagration was such as was never before known, says

Thucydides, to have been prepared and made by the hands or

men. … But fortunately for the garrison, a heavy rain,

brought on by a thunderstorm without wind, extinguished the

fire, and relieved them from an attack far more formidable

than any they had before experienced. This attempt failing,

the Peloponnesians determined immediately to reduce the siege

to a blockade. … To the palisade, which already surrounded

the town, a contravallation was added; with a double ditch,

one without, and one within. A sufficient body of troops being

then appointed to the guard of these works, the Bœotians

undertaking one half, the other was allotted to detachments

drafted from the troops of every state of the confederacy,

and, a little after the middle of September, the rest of the

army was dismissed for the winter."

_W. Mitford,

History of Greece,

chapter 15, section 1 (volume 2)._

When the blockade had endured for more than a year, and food

in the city grew scarce, about half of the defending force

made a bold dash for liberty, one stormy night, scaled the

walls of circumvallation, and escaped. The remainder held out

until some time in the next year, when they surrendered and

were all put to death, the city being destroyed. The families

of the Platæans had been sheltered at Athens before the siege

began.

_Thucydides,

History,

books 2-3._

GREECE: B. C. 429-427.

The Peloponnesian War:

Phormio's sea-fights.

Revolt of Lesbos.

Siege and capture of Mitylene.

The ferocious decree of Cleon reversed.

"At the same time that Archidamus laid siege to Plataea, a

small Peloponnesian expedition, under a Spartan officer named

Cnemus, had crossed the mouth of the Gulf of Corinth, and

joined the land forces of the Leucadians and Ambraciots. They

were bent on conquering the Acarnanians and the Messenians of

Naupactus, the only continental allies whom Athens possessed

in Western Greece. … When Cnemus had been joined by the

troops of Leucas and the other Corinthian towns, and had

further strengthened himself by summoning to his standard a

number of the predatory barbarian tribes of Epirus, he

advanced on Stratus, the chief city of Acarnania. At the same

time a squadron of Peloponnesian ships collected at Corinth,

and set sail down the gulf towards Naupactus. The only

Athenian force in these waters consisted of twenty galleys

under an able officer named Phormio, who was cruising off the

straits of Rhium, to protect Naupactus and blockade the

Corinthian Gulf. Both by land and by sea the operations of the

Peloponnesians miscarried miserably. Cnemus collected a very

considerable army, but as he sent his men forward to attack

Stratus by three separate roads, he exposed them to defeat in

detail. … By sea the defeat of the Peloponnesians was even

more disgraceful; the Corinthian admirals Machaon and

Isocrates were so scared, when they came across the squadron

of Phormio at the mouth of the gulf, that, although they

mustered 47 ships to his 20, they took up the defensive.

Huddling together in a circle, they shrank from his attack,

and allowed themselves to be hustled and worried into the

Achaian harbour of Patrae, losing several ships in their

flight. Presently reinforcements arrived; the Peloponnesian

fleet was raised to no less than 77 vessels, and three Spartan

officers were sent on board, to compel the Corinthian

admirals, who had behaved so badly, to do their best in

future. The whole squadron then set out to hunt down Phormio.

They found him with his 20 ships coasting along the Aetolian

shore towards Naupactus, and at once set out in pursuit. The

long chase separated the larger fleet into scattered knots,

and gave the fighting a disconnected and irregular character.

While the rear ships of Phormio's squadron were compelled to

run on shore a few miles outside Naupactus, the 11 leading

vessels reached the harbour in safety. Finding that he was now

only pursued by about a score of the enemy—the rest having

stayed behind to take possession of the stranded Athenian

vessels—Phormio came boldly out of port again. His 11

vessels took 6, and sunk one of their pursuers; and then,

pushing on westward, actually succeeded in recapturing most of

the 9 ships which had been lost in the morning. This

engagement, though it had no great results, was considered the

most daring feat performed by the Athenian navy during the

whole war. … The winter passed uneventfully, and the war

seemed as far as ever from showing any signs of producing a

definite result. But although the Spartan invasion of 428 B.

C. had no more effect than those of the preceding years, yet

in the late summer there occurred an event so fraught with

evil omens for Athens, as to threaten the whole fabric of her

empire. For the first time since the commencement of

hostilities, an important subject state made an endeavour to

free itself by the aid of the Spartan fleet. Lesbos was one of

the two Aegean islands which still remained free from tribute,

and possessed a considerable war-navy. Among its five towns

Mitylene was the chief, and far exceeded the others in wealth

and resources. It was governed by an oligarchy, who had long

been yearning to revolt, and had made careful preparation by

accumulating war-like stores and enlisting foreign

mercenaries. … The whole island except Methymna, where a

democracy ruled, rose in arms, and determined to send for aid

to Sparta. The Athenians at once despatched against Mitylene a

squadron of 40 ships under Cleïppides, which had just been

equipped for a cruise in Peloponnesian waters. This force had

an engagement with the Lesbian fleet, and drove it back into

the harbour of Mitylene.

{1584}

To gain time for assistance from across the Aegean to arrive,

the Lesbians now pretended to be anxious to surrender, and

engaged Cleïppides in a long and fruitless negotiation, while

they were repeating their demands at Sparta. But at last the

Athenian grew suspicious, established a close blockade of

Mitylene by sea, and landed a small force of hoplites to hold

a fortified camp on shore. … Believing the revolt of the

Lesbians to be the earnest of a general rising of all the

vassals of Athens, the Peloponnesians determined to make a

vigorous effort in their favour. The land contingents of the

various states were summoned to the Isthmus—though the

harvest was now ripe, and the allies were loath to leave their

reaping—while it was also determined to haul over the

Corinthian Isthmus the fleet which had fought against Phormio,

and then to despatch it to relieve Mitylene. … The Athenians

were furious at the idea that their vassals were now about to

be stirred up to revolt, and strained every nerve to defend

themselves. While the blockade of Mitylene was kept up, and

100 galleys cruised in the Aegean to intercept any succours

sent to Lesbos, another squadron of 100 ships sailed round

Peloponnesus and harried the coastland with a systematic

ferocity that surpassed any of their previous doings. To

complete the crews of the 250 ships now afloat and in active

service proved so great a drain on the military force of

Athens, that not only the Thetes but citizens of the higher

classes were drafted on shipboard. Nevertheless the effect

which they designed by this display of power was fully

produced. To defend their own harvests the confederates who

had met at the Isthmus went homewards, while the dismay at the

strength of the Athenian fleet was so great that the plan of

sending naval aid to Lesbos was put off for the present. …

All through the winter of 428-7 B. C. the blockade of Mitylene

was kept up, though its maintenance proved a great drain on

the resources of Athens. On the land side a considerable force

of hoplites under Paches strengthened the troops already on

the spot, and made it possible to wall the city in with lines

of circumvallation. … When the spring of 427 B. C. arrived,

the Spartans determined to make a serious attempt to send aid

to Lesbos; but the fear of imperiling all their naval

resources in a single expedition kept them from despatching a

fleet of sufficient size. Only 42 galleys, under an admiral

named Alcidas, were sent forth from Corinth. This squadron

managed to cross the Aegean without meeting the Athenians, by

steering a cautious and circuitous course among the islands.

But so much time was lost on the way, that on arriving off

Embatum in Ionia, Ælia found that Mitylene had surrendered

just seven days before. … Learning the fall of Mitylene, he

made off southward, and, after intercepting many merchant

vessels off the Ionian coast and brutally slaying their crews,

returned to Corinth without having struck a single blow for

the cause of Sparta. Paches soon reduced Antissa, Eresus, and

Pyrrha, the three Lesbian towns which had joined in the revolt

of Mitylene, and was then able to sail home, taking with him

the Laconian general Salaethus, who had been caught in hiding

at Mitylene, together with the other leaders of the revolt.

When the prisoners arrived at Athens Salaethus was at once put

to death without a trial. But the fate of the Lesbians was the

subject of an important and characteristic debate in the

Ecclesia. Led by the demagogue Cleon, the Athenians at first

passed the monstrous resolution that the whole of the

Mitylenaeans, not merely the prisoners at Athens, but every

adult male in the city, should be put to death, and their

wives and families sold as slaves. It is some explanation but

no excuse for this horrible decree that Lesbos had been an

especially favoured ally, and that its revolt had for a moment

put Athens in deadly fear of a general rising of Ionia and

Aeolis. Cleon the leather-seller, the author of this infamous

decree, was one of the statesmen of a coarse and inferior

stamp, whose rise had been rendered possible by the democratic

changes which Pericles had introduced into the state. … On

the eve of the first day of debate the motion of Cleon had

been passed, and a galley sent off to Paches at Mitylene,

bidding him slay all the Lesbians; but on the next morning …

the decree of Cleon was rescinded by a small majority, and a

second galley sent off to stay Paches from the massacre. …

By extraordinary exertions the bearers of the reprieve

contrived to reach Lesbos only a few hours after Paches had

received the first despatch, and before he had time to put it

into execution. Thus the majority of the Mitylenaeans were

saved; but all their leaders and prominent men, not less than

1,000 in number, were put to death. … The land of the

Lesbians was divided into 3,000 lots, of which a tenth was

consecrated to the gods, while the rest were granted out to

Athenian cleruchs, who became the landlords of the old

owners."

_C. W. C. Oman,

History of Greece,

chapter 28._

ALSO IN:

_Thucydides,

History,

book 2, sections 80-92,

and book 3, sections 1-50._

_E. Curtius,

History of Greece,

book 4, chapter 2 (volume 3)._

GREECE: B. C. 425.

The Peloponnesian War:

Spartan catastrophe at Sphacteria.

Peace pleaded for and refused by Athens.

In the seventh year of the Peloponnesian War (B. C. 425), the

enterprising Athenian general, Demosthenes, obtained

permission to seize and fortify a harbor on the west coast of

Messenia, with a view to harassing the adjacent Spartan

territory and stirring up revolt among the subjugated

Messenians. The position he secured was the promontory of

Pylus, overlooking the basin now called the Bay of Navarino,

which latter was protected from the sea by the small island of

Sphacteria, stretching across its front. The seizure of Pylus

created alarm in Sparta at once, and vigorous measures were

taken to expel the intruders. The small force of Demosthenes

was assailed, front and rear, by a strong land army and a

powerful Peloponnesian fleet; but he had fortified himself

with skill and stoutly held his ground, waiting for help from

Athens. Meantime his assailants had landed 420 men on the

island of Sphacteria, and these were mostly hoplites, or

heavy-armed soldiers, from the best citizenship of Sparta. In

this situation an Athenian fleet made its sudden and

unexpected appearance, defeated the Peloponnesian fleet

completely, took possession of the harbor and surrounded the

Spartans on Sphacteria with a ring from which there was no

escape. To obtain the release of these citizens the Spartans

were reduced to plead for peace on almost any terms, and

Athens had her opportunity to end the war at that moment with

great advantage to herself. But Cleon, the demagogue,

persuaded the people to refuse peace. The beleaguered hoplites

on Sphacteria were made prisoners by force, and little came of

it in the end.

{1585}

_Thucydides,

History,

book 4, sections 2-38._

Pylus remained in the possession of the Athenians until

B. C. 408, when it was retaken by the Spartans.

_G. Grote,

History of Greece,

part 2, chapter 52._

ALSO IN:

_E. Curtius,

History of Greece,

book 4, chapter 2 (volume 3)._

GREECE: B. C. 424-421.

The Peloponnesian War:

Brasidas in Chalcidice.

Athenian defeat at Delium.

A year's Truce.

Renewed hostilities.

Death of Brasidas and Cleon at Amphipolis.

The Peace of Nikias (Nicias).