AND IN ANOTHER PART OF THE SAME TREATISE.

Hence it is necessary that a king should not be vanquished by

pleasure, but that he should vanquish it; that he should not be

similar to, but far excel the multitude; and that he should not

conceive his proper employment to consist in the pursuit of pleasure,

but rather in the acquisition of probity. At the same time also it is

fit that he who has occasion to rule over others should first be able

to govern his own passions.

But with respect to the desire of obtaining great property, it must

be observed, that a king ought to be wealthy in order that he may

benefit his friends, relieve those that are in want, and justly

punish his enemies. For the enjoyment of prosperity in conjunction

with virtue is most delightful. The same thing must be said

concerning the transcendency of a king. For since he always surpasses

others in virtue, it is fit to form a judgment of his empire with

reference to virtue, and not with reference to riches, or power, or

his military strength. For he possesses one of these [viz. riches]

in common with any casual persons; another [viz. power] in common

with irrational animals; and the last in common with tyrants. But

virtue is alone the peculiarity of good men. Hence, whatever king is

temperate with respect to pleasures, liberal with respect to money,

and prudent and most skilful in governing, he will be in reality

a king. The people, however, have the same analogy with respect

to the virtues and the vices, as the parts of the human soul. For

the desire of accumulating more than is fit subsists about the

irrational part of the soul: for desire is not rational[15]. But

ambition and ferocity subsist about the irascible part: for this is

the fervid and strenuous part of the soul. And the love of pleasure

subsists about the epithymetic part: for this is the effeminate and

yielding part of the soul. But injustice, which is the most perfect

vice, and is of a composite nature, subsists about the whole soul.

Hence it is necessary that the king should coharmonize like a lyre

the city that is furnished with good laws, first establishing in

himself the most just boundary and order of law, as knowing that

the proper arrangement of the people, over whom divinity has given

him dominion, ought to be coadapted to this boundary. It is also

necessary that a good king should establish becoming positions

and habits in the delivery of public orations, conducting himself

politically, seriously, and earnestly, in order that he may neither

appear to be rough to the multitude; nor may be contemptible; but

may be agreeable and easy in his manners. He will however obtain

these things, if in the first place he is venerable in his aspect and

his discourse, and appears to deserve the sovereign authority which

he possesses. But, in the second place, if he proves himself to be

benign from his behaviour to those whom he may happen to meet, from

his countenance and his beneficence. And in the third place, if he is

formidable from his hatred of depravity, from the punishment which he

inflicts on it, from his celerity in inflicting it, and, in short,

from his skill and exercise in the art of government. For venerable

gravity, being a thing which imitates divinity, is capable of causing

him to be admired and honoured by the multitude. Benignity will

render him pleasing and beloved. And his being formidable will cause

him to be terrible to and unconquered by his enemies, and magnanimous

and confident to his friends.

It is necessary, however, that his gravity should have nothing in

it of an abject or vulgar nature, but that it should be admirable,

and such as becomes the dignity of empire and a sceptre. Nor should

he ever contend with his inferiors, or his equals, but with those

that are greater than himself; and he should conceive, conformably to

the magnitude of his empire, that those pleasures are the greatest

which are derived from beautiful and great deeds, and not those which

arise from sensual gratifications; separating himself indeed from

human passions, and approximating to the Gods, not through arrogance,

but through magnanimity and an invincible transcendency of virtue.

Hence he should invest himself with such a gracefulness and majesty

in his aspect and his reasonings, in the conceptions of his mind,

in the manners of his soul, and in his actions and the motions and

gesture of his body, that those who survey him may perceive that he

is adorned and fashioned with modesty and temperance, and a decorous

disposition. For a good king should convert to himself the souls

of those that behold him, no less than the sound of a flute and

harmony attract the attention of those that hear them. And thus much

concerning the venerable gravity of a king.

But I shall now endeavour to speak of his benignity. Universally,

therefore, every king will be benign, if he is just, equitable, and

beneficent. For justice is a connective and collective communion,

and is alone that disposition of the soul which adapts itself to

those that are near to us. For as rhythm is to motion, and harmony

to the voice, so is justice to communion; since it is the common

good of those that govern, and those that are governed, because it

coharmonizes political society. But equity and benignity are certain

assessors of justice; the former indeed softening the severity of

punishment; but the latter extending pardon to less guilty offenders.

It is necessary, however, that a good king should give assistance to

those that are in want of it, and be beneficent. But his assistance

should be given not in one way only, but in every possible way. And

it is requisite to be beneficent, not looking to the magnitude of

honour, but to the manner and deliberate choice of him by whom honour

is conferred. It is likewise necessary that a worthy king should

so conduct himself towards all men as to avoid being troublesome

to them, but especially towards men of an inferior rank and of a

slender fortune: for these, like diseased bodies, can endure nothing

of a troublesome nature. Good kings, indeed, have dispositions

similar to those of the Gods, and which especially resemble those

of Jupiter, the ruler of all things. For he is venerable and

honourable, through transcendency and magnitude of virtue. He is

benign, because he is beneficent, and the giver of good; and hence

he is said by the Ionic poet [Homer] to be the father of men and

Gods. He is also terrible and transcendent, because he punishes the

unjust, and reigns and rules over all things. But he carries thunder

in his hand, as a symbol of his formidable excellence. From all these

particulars, therefore, it is requisite to remember that a kingdom is

a God-resembling thing.

Political fragments of Archytas, Charondas, Zaleucus, and other ancient Pythagoreans, preserved by Stobæus · 第 26 / 60 题