At Chattanooga we found and were welcomed by Colonel Morgan and our
gallant comrades, and never did brothers meet after separation and
danger, with more hearty joy. For the first time, then, we learned who
had been lost, and as we talked it over, the pleasure and
congratulation, so natural at our reunion, gave way to sadness as we
named the dead and counted up the captives. Although much reduced in
numbers, the squadron was unbroken in spirit and courage; the men who
had safely gone through the dangers of the late expedition, were more
eager than ever for another, and burned to wipe out any stain that might
dim their reputation and to avenge their comrades. They had completely
recovered from the fatigue of the raid, and their first thought (when
they welcomed the accession to the command that we brought), was of
instant march to Kentucky.
Gano and his Texians were greeted with enthusiasm, and were delighted
with the choice they had made of a leader and brothers-in-arms. The work
of reorganization was immediately commenced. The three companies of the
squadron, much depleted, were filled nearly to the maximum by recruits
who came in rapidly--and became (of course), the three first companies
of the regiment which was now formed.
Some three hundred men of the First Kentucky infantry (which had been
just disbanded in Virginia, their term of service having expired), came
to Chattanooga to join Morgan. A good many of them went into the old
companies, and the remainder formed companies under officers known to
them in their original regimental organization. Captain Jacob Cassell
was appointed by Colonel Morgan (who now began to exercise in good
earnest the appointing power), to the command of Company A. Captain
Thomas Allen resigned (on account of extreme ill health), the Captaincy
of Company B. and his brother, John Allen (once Colonel in Nicaragua
under Walker), was appointed to command it. Captain Bowles remained in
command of Company C. John B. Castleman, who had just come out of
Kentucky (fighting as he came) with a number of recruits, was made
Captain of company D. John Hutchinson, formerly Lieutenant in the First
Kentucky infantry, was made Captain of Company E. Captain Thomas B.
Webber, who had served at Pensacola, under General Bragg, during the
past year, brought with him from Mississippi, a company of most gallant
soldiers, many of them his former comrades. This company was admitted
into the regiment as Company F., and glad was Colonel Morgan to welcome
it. Captain McFarland, of Alabama, brought with him a few men, and was
promised that so soon as his company was recruited to the proper
standard, it should take its place in the regiment as Company G.
Thus it will be seen that Morgan's old regiment was composed of the men
of his old squadron, of veterans from Virginia, and men (from nearly all
the Southern States) who had, with few exceptions, seen service. These
six companies, and the fragment of the seventh, numbered in all not
quite four hundred men. The field and staff, were immediately organized.
I became Lieutenant Colonel; G.W. Morgan, formerly of the Third
Tennessee infantry, better known as Major Wash, was appointed Major.
Gordon E. Niles once editor of a New York paper, and a private of
Company A., was appointed Adjutant. He was a gallant soldier, and died,
not long afterward, a soldier's death. Captain Thomas Allen, formerly of
Company B., was appointed Surgeon--Doctor Edelin, the Assistant Surgeon,
performed for many months the duties of both offices, on account of the
illness of the former. D.H. Llewellyn and Hiram Reese, both members of
the old squadron, were appointed respectively, Quartermaster and
Commissary.
While we were at Chattanooga, General Mitchell came to the other side
of the river and shelled and sharpshot at the town. The commandant of
the place General Leadbetter, had two or three guns in battery, and
replied--when the gunners, who were the most independent fellows I ever
saw, chose to work the guns. The defense of the place was left entirely
to the individual efforts of those who chose to defend it; nothing
prevented its capture but the fact that the enemy could not cross the
river. Very little loss was sustained, and the damage done the town by
the shells was immaterial. We tried to keep our men in camp, but some
joined in the fight; one only was hurt. He volunteered to assist in
working one of the guns and had part of his tongue shot off by a
rifleman upon the opposite bank. About five, P.M., the enemy seemed to
be withdrawing. The artillery was still playing on both sides, and the
enemy occupied the hights where their battery was planted, but the
infantry and sharpshooters had disappeared from the low land, just
opposite to the city. Colonel Morgan (desirous to ascertain certainly if
they had gone) crossed the river in a canoe. I was unwilling to see him
go alone, and, after trying in vain to dissuade him, very regretfully
accompanied him. Several shells flew over the canoe and one burst just
above it, some of the fragments falling in it. We landed just opposite
the wharf, and stole cautiously through a straggling thicket to the
position which the enemy had occupied. We stood upon the very ground
which they had held only a short time before, and as nothing could be
seen of them, we concluded that they had drawn off entirely. I was very
much relieved by this reflection. Such a situation--without a horse--and
with no means of escape but a canoe, if indeed we could have gotten back
to the river at all--was not to my taste, and I devoutly thanked
Providence that the enemy had left.
As we returned, we met Jack Wilson (the trustiest soldier that ever
shouldered a rifle) who had paddled us over, on his way to look for us;
unable to endure the suspense, he had left the canoe, over which he had
been posted as guard.
After a week or ten days sojourn at Chattanooga, we set out for
Knoxville. The better-part of the men were mounted, and those, who were
not, had _great hopes_. When we reached Knoxville, the Second Kentucky
(as our regiment was designated in the rolls of the War Department) and
the Texas squadron were encamped in close vicinity, and for two or three
weeks both were drilled strictly, twice a day, and mightily distressed
by guard-mounting and dress-parades. These dress-parades presented a
graceful and pleasing spectacle on account of the variegated appearance
of the ranks.
The men were all comfortably clad, but their clothing was uniform, only,
in its variety. Strange as it may seem to the unexperienced, dress has a
good deal to do with the spirit of soldiers. The morale of troops
depends, in a great measure, upon pride, and personal appearance has
something to do with pride. How awful, for instance, must it be to a
sensitive young fellow, accustomed at home to wear good clothes and
appear confidently before the ladies, when he is marching through a town
and the girls come out to wave their handkerchiefs, to feel that the
rear of his pantaloons has given way in complete disorder. The
cavalryman, in such cases, finds protection in his saddle, but the
soldier on foot is defenseless: and thus the very recognition, which, if
he has a stout pair of breeches, would be his dearest recompense for all
his toils, becomes his most terrible affliction. Many a time, have I
seen a gallant infantryman, who would have faced a battery
double-shotted with grape and canister with comparative indifference,
groan and turn pale in this fearful ordeal. It was a touching sight to
see them seek to dispose their knapsacks in such a manner that they
should serve as fortifications.
[Illustration: MAP SHOWING ROUTE TAKEN BY GEN. MORGAN _In his First Raid
into the_ "Blue Grass Region" Of Kentucky, July, 1862.]
The ideas which the experience of the past eight months had suggested,
regarding the peculiar tactics best adapted to the service and the kind
of fighting we had to do, were now put into practical shape. A specific
drill, different in almost every respect from every other employed for
cavalry, was adopted. It was based upon a drill taught in the old army
for Indian fighting, called "Maury's skirmish tactics for cavalry," I
believe; but as that drill contemplated the employment of but a very few
men, and ours had to provide for the evolutions of regiments, and
eventually brigades, the latter was necessarily much more comprehensive.
The formation of the company, the method of counting off in sets, and of
dismounting and deploying to the front, flanks, or rear, for battle, was
the same as in Maury's tactics; but a great many movements necessary to
the change of front, as the kind of ground or other circumstances
required it to be made in various ways, to the formations from column
into line, and from line into column, the methods of taking ground to
the front, or rear, in establishing or changing line, the various
methods of providing, as circumstances might require, for the employment
of all, or only part of a regiment or brigade, or for the employment of
supports and reserves, all these evolutions had to be added. It would be
uninteresting to all but the practical military reader, and unnecessary,
as well, to enter into a minute explanation of these matters.
If the reader will only imagine a regiment drawn up in single rank, the
flank companies skirmishing, sometimes on horseback, and then thrown out
as skirmishers on foot, and so deployed as to cover the whole front of
the regiment, the rest of the men dismounted (one out of each set of
four and the corporals, remaining to hold horses) and deployed as
circumstances required, and the command indicated, to the front of, on
either flank, or to the rear of the line of horses--the files two yards
apart--and then imagine this line moved forward at a double-quick, or
oftener a half run, he will have an idea of Morgan's style of fighting.
Exactly the same evolutions were applicable for horseback, or foot
fighting, but the latter method was much oftener practiced--we were, in
fact, not cavalry, but mounted riflemen. A small body of mounted men was
usually kept in reserve to act on the flanks, cover a retreat, or press
a victory, but otherwise our men fought very little on horseback, except
on scouting expeditions. Our men were all admirable riders, trained
from childhood to manage the wildest horses with perfect ease; but the
nature of the ground on which we generally fought, covered with dense
woods, or crossed by high fences, and the impossibility of devoting
sufficient time to the training of the horses, rendered the employment
of large bodies of mounted men to any good purpose, very difficult. It
was very easy to charge down a road in column of fours, but very hard to
charge across the country in extended line, and keep any sort of
formation. Then we never used sabers, and long guns were not exactly the
weapons for cavalry evolutions. We found the method of fighting on foot
more effective--we could maneuver with more certainty, and sustain less
and inflict more loss. "The long flexible line curving forward at each
extremity," as an excellent writer described it, was very hard to break;
if forced back at one point, a withering fire from every other would be
poured in on the assailant. It admitted, too, of such facility of
maneuvering, it could be thrown about like a rope, and by simply facing
to the right or left, and double-quicking in the same direction, every
man could be quickly concentrated at any point where it was desirable to
mass them.
It must be remembered that Morgan very rarely fought with the army; he
had to make his command a self-sustaining one. If repulsed, he could not
fall back and reform behind the infantry. He had to fight infantry,
cavalry, artillery; take towns when every house was a garrison, and
attack fortifications with nothing to depend on but his own immediate
command. He was obliged, therefore, to adopt a method which enabled him
to do a great deal in a short time, and to keep his men always in hand,
whether successful or repulsed. With his support from forty to five
hundred miles distant, an officer had better learn to rely on himself.
If General Morgan had ever been enabled to develope his plan of
organization as he wished, he would have made his division of mounted
riflemen a miniature army. With his regiments armed as he wished
them--a battalion of two or three hundred men, appropriately armed, and
attached to each brigade, to be used only as cavalry, and with his
battery of three-inch Parrots, and train of mountain howitzers, he could
have met any contingency. The ease and rapidity with which this simple
drill was learned, and the expedition with which it enabled all
movements to be accomplished, chiefly recommended it to Morgan, I have
seen his division, when numbering over three thousand men, and stretched
out in column, put into line of battle in thirty minutes. Regular
cavalry can no doubt form with much more dispatch, but this was quicker
than it is often done in this country.
The weapon which was always preferred by the officers and men of the
command, was the rifle known as the "medium Enfield." The short Enfield
was very convenient to carry, but was deficient both in length of range
and accuracy. The long Enfield, without any exception the best of all
rifles, was unwieldy either to carry or to use, as sometimes became
necessary, on horseback. The Springfield rifle, nearly equal to the long
Enfield, was liable to the same objections, although in a less degree.
Now that the military world has finally decided in favor of
breech-loading guns, it may seem presumptuous to condemn them; but, so
far as my own experience goes, they are decidedly inferior. When I say
inferior, I mean not so much that they will not carry far, nor
accurately, although a fair trial of every sort I could lay my hands
upon with the Enfield and Springfield, convinced me of the superiority,
in these respects, of the two latter; but that for other reasons they
are not so effective as the muzzle-loading guns. Of the two best
patterns, the Sharp and the Spencer--for the Maynard is a pop-gun, and
the others are so contrived that, generally, after one shot, the shell
of the cartridge sticks in the chamber--of these two, I have seen the
Sharp do the most execution. It has been the verdict of every officer of
the Western Confederate cavalry with whom I have talked upon the
subject, and it certainly has been my experience, that those Federal
cavalry regiments which were armed with breech-loading guns did least
execution. The difference in the rapidity with which men dropped when
exposed to the fire of an infantry regiment, and the loss from that of a
cavalry regiment of equal strength, even when the latter fought well,
ought of itself to go far to settle the question, for the federal
infantry were all armed with muzzle-loading guns.
A close study of the subject will convince any man that the very fact of
having to load his gun will make a soldier comparatively cool and
steady. If he will stay to load at all, and will fix his mind upon what
he is doing, he will become cool enough to take aim. While if he has
only to stick in a cartridge and shoot, or turn a crank and pull
trigger, he will fire fast, but he will fire wildly. I have seen some of
the steadiest soldiers I ever knew, men who were dead shots with an
Enfield, shoot as if they were aiming at the sun with a Spencer. The
Spencer rifle would doubtless be an excellent weapon for a weak line to
hold works with, where the men were accustomed to note the ground
accurately, and would, therefore, be apt to aim low, and it is desirable
to pour in a rapid, continuous fire to stagger an attacking line.
It is perhaps a first-rate gun for small skirmishes on horseback,
although for those, our cavalry decidedly preferred the revolver. But in
battle, when lines and numbers are engaged, accurate and not rapid
firing is desirable. If one fiftieth of the shots from either side were
to take effect in battle, the other would be annihilated. If rapid
firing is so desirable, why do the same critics who advocate it also
recommend that troops shall hold their fire until they can pour in
deadly volleys? Why do they deprecate so much firing, and recommend the
use of the bayonet?
It is folly to talk to men who have seen battles, about the moral effect
of rapid firing, and of "bullets raining around men's heads like hail
stones." That is like the straggler's excuse to General Lee that he was
"stung by a bomb." Any man who has ever heard lines of battle engaged,
knows that, let the men fire fast or slow, the nicest ear can detect no
interval between the shots; the musketry sounds like the incessant,
unintermitted crash of a gong--even cannonading, when one or two hundred
guns are working, sounds like the long roll of a drum--and the hiss of
bullets is perfectly ceaseless. Good troops will fight well with almost
any sort of guns. Mean troops will not win, no matter how they are
armed. If the matter were investigated, it would probably be found that
the regiments which won most distinction, in the late war on this
continent, on both sides, fired the fewest number of rounds.
At one time--when Morgan's command was somewhat demoralized--the men
were loud in describing the terrific effect of the Spencer rifle, when
it was notorious that, at that time, it was an unusual occurrence to
lose a man--they subsequently became ashamed of their panic, and met the
troops carrying Spencer rifles, with more confidence than those armed in
any other way. It would be very convenient to attribute every whipping
we ever got to the use of breech-loading rifles by our antagonists, but
it would be very wide of the truth. It was impossible, however, to
obtain, when we were organizing at Knoxville, the exact description of
guns we wished. One company, was armed with the long Enfield, another
had the medium, and Company A got the short Enfield. Company C was
furnished with Mississippi rifles and Company B retained the shot-guns
which they had used for nearly a year. Company E was provided with a
gun, called from the stamp upon the barrel, the "Tower gun;" it was of
English make, and was a sort of Enfield carbine. Its barrel was rather
short and bore immense; it carried a ball larger than the Belgian. Its
range and accuracy were first rate. The roar of this gun was almost as
loud as that of a field piece and the tremendous bullet it carried would
almost shatter an ordinary wall.
It was some months before each company of the regiment was armed with
the same or similar guns. Nearly every man had a pistol, and some two.
Shortly afterward, when they were captured in sufficient numbers, each
man was provided with a pair. The pistol preferred and usually worn by
the men, was the army Colt furnished to the Federal cavalry
regiments--this patent is far the best and most effective of any I have
ever seen. At this time two mountain howitzers were sent from Richmond
for Morgan's use. It is unnecessary to describe a piece so well known,
but it may be as well to say, that no gun is so well adapted in all
respects to the wants of cavalry, as these little guns. With a large
command, it is always well enough to have two or four pieces of longer
range and yet of light draught, such as the three-inch Parrot--but if I
were required to dispense with one or the other, I would choose to
retain the former. They can be drawn (with a good supply of ammunition
in the limbers), by two horses over any kind of road. They can go over
ravines, up hills, through thickets, almost any where, in short, that a
horseman can go; they can be taken, without attracting attention, in as
close proximity to the enemy as two horsemen can go--they throw shell
with accuracy eight hundred yards, quite as far as there is any
necessity for, generally in cavalry fighting--they throw canister and
grape, two and three hundred yards, as effectively as a twelve
pounder--they can be carried by hand right along with the line, and as
close to the enemy as the line goes--and they make a great deal more
noise than one would suppose from their size and appearance. If the
carriages are well made, they can stand very hard service, and they are
easily repaired, if injured. These little guns were attached to the
Second Kentucky, and the men of that regiment became much attached to
them. They called them familiarly and affectionately, the "bull pups,"
and cheered them whenever they were taken into a fight. They remained
with us, doing excellent service, until just before the Ohio raid; and,
then, when General Bragg's ordnance officer arbitrarily took them away
from us, it came near raising a mutiny in the regiment. I would, myself,
have gladly seen him tied to the muzzle of one of them and shot off.
They were captured by the enemy in two weeks after they were taken from
us.
Just before Morgan left Knoxville to go on the expedition known as "the
First Kentucky raid," he was joined by a gentleman "from abroad," whose
history had been a curious and extraordinary series of exciting
adventures, and who now came to see something of our war. This was
Lieutenant Colonel St. Leger Greenfell, of the English service, and of
all the very remarkable characters who have figured (outside of popular
novels) in this age, he will receive the suffrages of our Western
cavalrymen, for pre-eminence in devil-may-care eccentricity. He had
commenced life (I believe) by running away from his father, because the
latter would not permit him to enter the army, and in doing so, he
showed the good sense that he really possessed, for the army was the
proper place for him--provided they went to war often enough. He served
five years in some French regiment in Algeria, and then quitting the
service, lived for a number of years in Tangiers, where he did a little
business with the Moorish batteries, when the French bombarded the
place. He served four years with Abd-El-Kader, of whom he always spoke
in the highest terms, as having been every thing that he ought to have
been, except a member of the Church of England. Having exhausted life in
Africa, he looked elsewhere for excitement, and passed many years of his
subsequent life in great happiness and contentment, amid the pleasant
scenes of the Crimean war, the Sepoy rebellion, and Garibaldi's South
American service.
When the war broke out over here he came of course--and taking a fancy
to Morgan, from what he had heard of him, came to join him. He was very
fond of discussing military matters, but did not like to talk about
himself, and although I talked with him daily, it was months before he
told any thing of his history. He was a thorough and very accomplished
soldier--and may have encountered something in early life that he
feared, but if so, it had ceased to exist.
He became Morgan's Adjutant General and was of great assistance to him,
but sometimes gave trouble by his impracticable temper--he persisted,
among other things, in making out all papers in the style he had learned
in the English service, the regulations and orders of the War Department
"to the contrary notwithstanding."
He was always in a good temper when matters were active--I never saw him
hilarious but once--and that was the day after the battle of Hartsville;
he had just thrashed his landlord, and doubled up a brother Englishman,
in a "set-to" about a mule, and was contemplating an expedition on the
morrow, with General Morgan to Nashville. He was the only gentleman, I
ever knew, who liked to fight with his fists, and he was always cheerful
and contented when he could shoot and be shot at.
After he left Morgan he was made Chief Inspector of Cavalry, and became
the terror of the entire "front." He would have been invaluable as
commander of a brigade of cavalry, composed of men who (unlike our
volunteers) appreciated the "military necessity" of occasionally having
an officer to knock them in the head. If permitted to form, discipline,
and drill such a brigade of regular cavalry after his own fashion, he
would have made gaps in many lines of battle, or have gotten his
"blackguards well peppered" in trying.
Sometime in the latter part of June, Colonel Hunt of Georgia arrived at
Knoxville with a "Partisan Ranger" regiment between three and four
hundred strong, to accompany Morgan upon his contemplated raid.
When the entire force of able bodied and mounted men was estimated, it
was found eight hundred and seventy-six strong. Hunt's regiment
numbering about three hundred and fifty; mine, the Second Kentucky,
about three hundred and seventy, and Gano's squadron making up the
balance.
Fifty or sixty men, from all the commands, were left at Knoxville for
lack of horses. Perhaps two hundred men of this force, with which Morgan
commenced the expedition, were unarmed, and a much larger number were
badly mounted and provided with the most indifferent saddles and
equipments.
The command set out from Knoxville on the morning of the 4th of July,
1862, and took the road to Sparta (a little place on the confines of the
rugged mountainous country which separates Middle Tennessee from the
rich valley of East Tennessee) in which Knoxville is situated. Sparta is
one hundred and four miles from Knoxville. We reached it, after
tolerably hard marching, for the road was terribly rough, on the evening
of the third day, and encamped five miles beyond it on the road to
Livingston.
While traversing the region between Knoxville and Sparta, we were
repeatedly fired upon by bushwhackers, but had only one man killed by
them--a Texian of Gano's squadron. We made many unsuccessful attempts to
capture them, but they always chose the most inaccessible points to fire
from and we could never get to them. Frequently they would shoot at us
from a ledge of rocks not forty feet above our heads, and yet to get to
it we would have had to go hundreds of yards--they consequently always
escaped.
At Sparta, Champ Ferguson reported himself as a guide, and I, for the
first time, saw him, although I had often heard of him before. He had
the reputation of never giving quarter, and, no doubt, deserved it (when
upon his own private expeditions), although when with Morgan he
attempted no interference with prisoners. This redoubted personage was a
native of Clinton county, Kentucky, and was a fair specimen of the kind
of characters which the wild mountain country produces. He was a man of
strong sense, although totally uneducated, and of the intense will and
energy, which, in men of his stamp and mode of life, have such a
tendency to develope into ferocity, when they are in the least injured
or opposed. He was grateful for kindness, and instinctively attached to
friends, and vindictive to his enemies. He was known as a desperate man
before the war, and ill-treatment of his wife and daughter, by some
soldiers and Home-guards enlisted in his own neighborhood, made him
relentless in his hatred of all Union men; he killed all the parties
concerned in the outrage upon his family, and, becoming then an outlaw,
kept up that style of warfare. It is probable that, at the close of the
war, he did not himself know how many men he had killed. He had a
brother, of the same character as himself, in the Union army, and they
sought each other persistently, mutually bent on fratricide. Champ
became more widely known than any of them, but the mountains of Kentucky
and Tennessee were filled with such men, who murdered every prisoner
that they took, and they took part, as their politics inclined them,
with either side. For a long time Ferguson hunted, or was hunted by, a
man of his own order and nearly as notorious on the other side, namely,
"Tinker Dave Beattie." On the evening of the 7th, we encamped in the
vicinity of Livingston. Leaving early next morning, by midday we reached
the Cumberland river at the ford near the small village of Selina. Here
Colonel Morgan received positive information of the strength and
position of the enemy at Tompkinsville, eighteen miles from Selina. He
had learned at Knoxville that a Federal garrison was at this place, and
had determined to attack it. One battalion of the 9th Pennsylvania,
under command of Major Jordan, about three hundred and fifty strong,
constituted the entire force. It was Morgan's object to surprise and
capture the whole of it. He accordingly sent forward scouts to watch and
report every thing going on at their camp, while he halted the bulk of
the command until nightfall. The men employed the interval of rest in
attention to their horses, and in bathing in the river. At eleven
o'clock the March was resumed; the road was rough and incumbered at some
points with fallen timber, so that the column made slow progress. When
within four or five miles of Tompkinsville, Gano's squadron and
Hamilton's company of Tennessee Partisan Rangers, which had joined us
the evening before, were sent by a road which led to the right to get in
the rear of the enemy and upon his line of retreat toward Glasgow. The
rest of the command reached Tompkinsville at five o'clock. It was
consequently broad daylight, and the enemy had information of our
approach in time to form to receive us. Colonel Hunt was formed upon the
left, and my regiment upon the right, with the howitzers in the center.
It was altogether unnecessary to form any reserve, and as our numbers
were so superior, our only care was to "lap around" far enough on the
flanks to encircle the game.
The enemy were posted on a thickly wooded hill, to reach which we had to
cross open fields. They fired, therefore, three or four volleys while we
were closing on them. The Second Kentucky did not fire until within
about sixty yards of them, and one volley was then enough. The fight did
not last ten minutes. The enemy lost about twenty killed and twenty or
thirty wounded. Thirty prisoners, only, were taken on the ground, but
Gano and Hamilton intercepted and captured a good many more, including
the commander, Major Jordan. Our force was too much superior in strength
for them to have made much resistance, as we outnumbered them more than
two to one.
Our loss was only in wounded, we had none killed. But a severe loss was
sustained in Colonel Hunt, whose leg was shattered and it was necessary
to leave him; he died in a few days of the wound. Three of the Texians
also were wounded in their chase after the fugitives. The tents, stores,
and camp equipage were destroyed. A wagon train of twenty wagons and
fifty mules were captured and a number of cavalry horses. Abundant
supplies of coffee, sugar, etc., etc., were found in the camp. The guns
captured were useless breech-loading carbines, which were thrown away.
Leaving Tompkinsville at three o'clock in the afternoon, after paroling
the prisoners, we reached Glasgow about one o'clock that night. This
town was unoccupied by any garrison, and its people were very friendly
to us. Company C, of the old squadron had been principally recruited
here. The command rested at Glasgow until 9 A.M. next day; during the
time, the ladies busied themselves in preparing breakfast for us, and
before we left, every man had taken in a three days' supply. A straggler
captured at Glasgow gave us some "grape vine" intelligence which annoyed
us no little. He stated that McClellan had taken Richmond. When we left
Knoxville, the battle of the seven days was going on, and we had, of
course, heard nothing after we started. Our prisoner, however, was
gravely assured, just before he was paroled, that a courier had just
reached us with the information that McClellan was in Richmond, but as a
prisoner, and with half his army in the same condition. This fellow, who
represented himself to be an officer, turned out to be one of the
buglers of the Ninth Pennsylvania, and all the information he gave was
as reliable as the McClellan story. A halt of two or three hours was
made at Bear Wallow, to enable Mr. Ellsworth (popularly known as
"Lightning"), the telegraphic operator on Colonel Morgan's staff, to tap
the line between Louisville and Nashville, and obtain the necessary
information regarding the position of the Federal forces in Kentucky.
Connecting his own instrument and wire with the line, Ellsworth began to
take off the dispatches. Finding the news come slow he entered into a
conversation with Louisville and obtained much of what was wanted. He in
return communicated such information as Colonel Morgan desired to have
the enemy act upon. One statement, made at hap hazard, and with no other
knowledge to support it, except that Forrest was in Middle Tennessee,
was singularly verified. Morgan caused Ellsworth to telegraph that
Forrest had taken Murfreesboro' and had captured the entire garrison.
Forrest did exactly what was attributed to him on that or the next day.
A heavy storm coming on caused them, after several fruitless efforts to
continue, to desist telegraphing.
The column was put in motion again immediately upon Colonel Morgan's
return, and marching all night got within about fifteen miles of Lebanon
by 11 A.M. next morning. Here Company B was detached, to push rapidly to
the railroad between Lebanon and Lebanon junction, and ordered to
destroy it, so that troops might not be thrown into Lebanon in time to
oppose us. The march was not resumed until three or four in the
afternoon, so that when we reached Rolling Fork river, six miles from
Lebanon, it was dark. Colonel Morgan, who was riding with his staff in
front of the advance guard, was fired upon as he entered the small
covered bridge across the stream, by a party of the enemy stationed at
the other end of it. His hat was shot from his head, but neither he nor
any of his staff were touched. One of the howitzers was immediately run
up and a shell was thrown into the bridge. A platoon of the leading
company was dismounted and carried at a double-quick to clear it. When
they reached it, the enemy, alarmed by the shell, which had killed one
man, had retreated, the bottom of the bridge was found to have been torn
up, and a short time was spent in repairing it. This was a strong
position and one which the enemy ought, by all means, to have occupied
with his entire force.
There was no ford for six or eight miles above or below; the bridge was
the only means of crossing without a wide detour; and not twenty yards
from the mouth of the bridge (on the side held by the enemy), and
perfectly commanding it, was a steep bluff (not too high) covered with
timber, and affording an admirable natural fortification. As soon as the
bridge was repaired, the column crossed and pressed on to Lebanon.
Within a mile of the town, skirmishing commenced with the force which
held it. Two companies (E and C of the Second Kentucky) were thrown out
on foot, and advanced at a brisk pace, driving the enemy before them.
Two or three of the enemy were killed; our loss was nothing. The town
was surrendered by its commandant about ten o'clock; some two hundred
prisoners were taken.
Pickets were immediately posted on every road, and the whole command
encamped in such a manner that it could be immediately established in
line. It was necessary to remain at Lebanon until the large quantity of
stores of all kinds, which were there, were disposed of, and, as we
were now in the midst of enemies, no precaution could be omitted.
Captain Allen, who, as has been mentioned, was detached with Company B
of the Second Kentucky to prevent the train from bringing reinforcements
to Lebanon, struck the railroad at New Hope Church and had just
commenced to destroy it, when a train came with a large number of troops
on board for Lebanon. He attacked it, and a skirmish of a few minutes
resulted in the train going back. The night was very dark, and little
loss, if any, was inflicted on either side.
On the next day, an examination of the stores showed an abundance of
every description. A sufficient number of excellent guns were gotten to
arm every man efficiently, and some thousands were destroyed. A large
building was found to be filled with cartridges and fixed ammunition. An
abundant supply of ammunition for small arms was thus obtained, and a
fresh supply of ammunition was also gotten for the howitzers. After
taking what was needed, all this was destroyed. There was also a stone
magazine not far from the depot, which was full of powder. The powder
was all taken out of it, and thrown into the stream near by.
Very large supplies of provisions were found--meat, flour, sugar,
coffee, etc.--which were turned over to the citizens, and when they had
helped themselves, the remainder was burned. A great deal of clothing
had also been collected here, and the men were enabled to provide
themselves with every thing which they needed in the way of
under-clothing. While at Lebanon, copies of a flaming proclamation,
written and published at Glasgow, were circulated.
After the destruction of the stores had been completed, and Ellsworth
had closed his business at the telegraph office, the command was again
put in motion. It left the town about two P.M., on the Springfield road.
Before leaving Knoxville, Colonel Morgan, appreciating the necessity of
having an advance-guard which could be thoroughly relied on, and
disinclined to trust to details, changed every day, for that duty, had
organized a body of twenty-five men, selected with great care from the
entire force under his command, to constitute an advance-guard for the
expedition. So well did this body perform the service assigned it, that
the men composing it, with some additions to make up the tale as others
were taken out, were permanently detailed for that duty, and it became
an honor eagerly sought, and a reward for gallantry and good conduct
second only to promotion, to be enrolled in "the advance." The
non-commissioned officers were chosen with the same care, and First
Lieutenant Charles W. Rogers of Company E, formerly of the First
Kentucky Infantry, was appointed to command it. This officer possessed
in an eminent degree the cool judgment, perfect fearlessness, command of
men, and shrewdness of perception requisite for such an office.
This guard habitually marched at a distance of four hundred yards in
front of the column; three videttes were posted at intervals of one
hundred yards between it and the column. Their duties were to transmit
information and orders between the column and the guard, and to regulate
the gait of the former, so that it would not press too close on the
latter, and, also, to prevent any straggling between the two. Six
videttes were thrown out in front of the guard--four at intervals of
fifty yards, and with another interval of the same distance from the
fourth of these, two rode together in the extreme front. These two were
consequently at a distance of two hundred and fifty yards in front of
the body of the guard. At first these videttes were regularly relieved,
but it was afterward judged best to keep the same men always on the same
duty. The advance videttes were required to examine carefully on all
sides, and report to the officer of the guard the slightest indication
which seemed suspicious. When they came to by-roads or cross-roads one
or both, as the case might require, immediately galloped some two or
three hundred yards down them, and remained until relieved by men sent
for that purpose from the head of the column, when they returned to
their posts.
As soon as they notified the officer of the guard (by calling to the
videttes next behind them), that they were about to leave their posts,
he took measures to supply their places. The two videttes next to them
in the chain galloped to the front, the other two, also moved up,
respectively, fifty yards, and two men were sent from the guard to fill
the places of the last.
When the videttes, regularly in advance returned, the original
disposition was resumed. If an enemy was encountered, men were
dispatched from the guard to the assistance of the videttes, or the
latter fell back on the guard, as circumstances dictated. If the enemy
was too strong to be driven by the advance, the latter endeavored to
hold him in check (and was reinforced if necessary), until the command
could be formed for attack or defense. Scouting parties were of course
thrown out on the front and flanks, as well as to the rear, but as these
parties were often miles away in search of information, a vigilant
advance guard was always necessary. During an engagement, the advance
was generally kept mounted and held in reserve.
Passing through Springfield without a halt, the column marched in the
direction of Harrodsburg. Late in the evening, some of the scouts had an
engagement at a little place called Macksville, with a Home-guard
organization, in which two or three were wounded and two captured.
During the night, finding that it would be impossible to ferret out the
captors, we negotiated an exchange of prisoners. On the next morning,
about nine o'clock we entered Harrodsburg, another stronghold of our
friends, and were warmly welcomed.
It was Sunday, and a large concourse of people were in town. We found
that the ladies, in anticipation of our coming, had prepared the most
inviting rations, and the men after attending to their horses and
supplying them with forage, a "superabundance of which," to use the old
forage-master's expression, was stacked close by, fell to themselves,
and most of them were eating, with short intervals employed in
sleeping, until the hour of departure. Harrodsburg is twenty-eight miles
from Lexington, the headquarters then of the Federal forces of the
region. Gano, with his squadron, was detached at Harrodsburg to go
around Lexington and burn the bridges on the Kentucky Central Railroad,
in order to prevent troops from being thrown into Lexington from
Cincinnati. Captain Allen was sent to destroy the bridges over Benson
and other small streams on the Louisville and Lexington road, to prevent
the transmission of troops by that road, and also to induce the
impression that the command was making for Louisville. About dark the
column moved from Harrodsburg on the Frankfort pike. It was Morgan's
wish to induce the belief that he intended to attack Frankfort, but to
suddenly turn to the right and make for Lexington, capture that place if
he could, and if he could not, at least enjoy the fine country in its
vicinity.
At one P.M. that night we encamped at Lawrenceburg, the county seat of
Anderson county, twenty miles from Harrodsburg and about fifteen from
Frankfort. A scouting party was sent immediately on in the direction of
Frankfort, with instructions to drive in the pickets after daybreak, and
to rejoin us at Versailles. The command had now marched three hundred
and odd miles in eight days, but the men, despite the fatigue usually
resulting from night marching, were comparatively fresh, and in the most
exultant spirits. So far, every thing had gone well; although
encompassed by superior forces, celerity of movement, and skillful
selection of route, had enabled us to elude them; a good many little
affairs had occurred with the Home-guards, which I have not mentioned,
but they had been expected, and the damage from them was trifling.
Leaving Lawrenceburg next morning at daybreak, the column took the road
to Versailles, but was compelled to halt at Shryock's ferry, seven miles
from Versailles. On account of the ferry-boat having been sunk, it was
necessary to raise and repair it, so that the howitzers might be
crossed. This delay prevented us from reaching Versailles before night
fell. It was now deemed good policy to march more slowly, obtain
perfectly accurate information, and increase the confusion already
prevailing by threatening all points of importance. This policy was not
a hazardous one, under the circumstances, for although the forces
surrounding the point where we now were, were each a superior to our
own, yet by getting between them and preventing their concentration, and
industriously creating the impression to which the people were, at any
rate disposed, that our force was four or five thousand strong, Morgan
had demoralized them, and they were afraid to come out and meet him. The
ease with which he had, hitherto, pressed right on, without a momentary
check, confirmed the belief that he was very strong.
The command remained encamped at Versailles during the night. Scouts
were sent in every direction, and upon their return next day reported
that a very general consternation prevailed, as well as uncertainty
regarding our movements. The Home-guards and little detachments of
troops were running, on the one side for Lexington, and on the other for
Frankfort. Leaving Versailles next day about 10 A.M., the column moved
toward Georgetown.
Before leaving Versailles, the scouting parties which had been
dispatched to Frankfort rejoined the command. Frankfort was by this time
relieved of all fear of immediate attack, and Colonel Morgan became
apprehensive that the troops there might be marched out after him, or
that communication might be opened with Lexington which might lead to a
simultaneous attack upon him by the forces of the two points. He hoped
that the detachment under Captain Allen returning, after the destruction
of the bridge between Frankfort and Louisville, and necessarily marching
close to the former (in doing so), would produce the impression there,
that an attack was again imminent. We reached Midway (about 12 M.), a
little town on the railroad, and equi-distant from Lexington and
Frankfort. What took place at Midway is best described in Ellsworth's
language. He says, "At this place I surprised the operator, who was
quietly sitting on the platform in front of his office, enjoying himself
hugely. Little did he suspect that the much-dreaded Morgan was in his
vicinity. I demanded of him to call Lexington and inquire the time of
day, which he did. This I did for the purpose of getting his style of
handling the 'key' in writing dispatches. My first impression of his
style, from noting the paper in the instrument, was confirmed. He was,
to use a telegraphic term, a 'plug' operator. I adopted his style of
telegraphing, and commenced operations. In this office I found a signal
book, which proved very useful. It contained the calls of all the
offices. Dispatch after dispatch was going to and from Lexington,
Georgetown, Paris and Frankfort, all containing something in reference
to Morgan. On commencing operations, I discovered that there were two
wires on the line along this railroad. One was what we term a 'through
wire,' running direct from Lexington to Frankfort, and not entering any
of the way offices. I found that all military messages were sent over
that line. As it did not enter Midway office I ordered it to be cut,
thus forcing Lexington on to the wire that did run through the office. I
tested the line and found, by applying the ground wire, it made no
difference with the circuit; and, as Lexington was Head-Quarters, I cut
Frankfort off. Midway was called, I answered, and received the
following:
'LEXINGTON, _July 15, 1862_.
'_To J.W. Woolums, operator, Midway_:
'Will there be any danger in coming to Midway? Is every thing right?
'TAYLOR--_Conductor_.'
"I inquired of my prisoner (the operator) if he knew a man by the
name of Taylor. He said Taylor was the conductor. I immediately gave
Taylor the following reply:
'MIDWAY, _July 15, 1862_.
'_To Taylor, Lexington_:
'All right; come on. No sign of any rebels here.
'WOOLUMS.'
"The operator in Cincinnati then called Frankfort. I answered and
received about a dozen unimportant dispatches. He had no sooner finished
than Lexington called Frankfort. Again I answered, and received the
following message:
'LEXINGTON, _July 15, 1862_.
'_To General Finnell, Frankfort_:
'I wish you to move the forces at Frankfort, on the line of the
Lexington railroad, immediately, and have the cars follow and take them
up as soon as possible. Further orders will await them at Midway. I
will, in three or four hours, move forward on the Georgetown pike; will
have most of my men mounted. Morgan left Versailles this morning with
eight hundred and fifty men, on the Midway road, moving in the
direction of Georgetown. 'BRIGADIER-GENERAL WARD.'
"This being our position and intention exactly, it was thought proper to
throw General Ward on some other track. So, in the course of half an
hour, I manufactured and sent the following dispatch, which was approved
by General Morgan:
'MIDWAY, _July 15, 1862_.
'_To Brigadier-General Ward, Lexington_:
'Morgan, with upward of one thousand men, came within a mile of here,
and took the old Frankfort road, marching, we suppose, for Frankfort.
This is reliable.
'WOOLUMS--_Operator_.'
"In about ten minutes Lexington again called Frankfort, when I received
the following:
'LEXINGTON, _July 15, 1862_.
'_To General Finnell, Frankfort_;
'Morgan, with more than one thousand men, came within a mile of here,
and took the old Frankfort road. This dispatch received from Midway,
and is reliable. The regiment from Frankfort had better be recalled.
'BRIGADIER-GENERAL WARD.'
"I receipted for this message, and again manufactured a message to
confirm the information General Ward received from Midway, and not
knowing the tariff from Frankfort to Lexington, I could not send a
formal message; so, appearing greatly agitated, I waited until the
circuit was occupied, and broke in, telling them to wait a minute, and
commenced calling Lexington. He answered with as much gusto as I called
him. I telegraphed as follows:
'_Frankfort to Lexington_:
'Tell General Ward our pickets are just driven in. Great excitement.
Pickets say the force of enemy must be two thousand. 'OPERATOR.'
It was now two P.M., and General Morgan wished to be off for Georgetown.
I ran a secret ground connection, and opened the circuit on the
Lexington end. This was to leave the impression that the Frankfort
operator was skedaddling, or that Morgan's men had destroyed the
telegraph.
While at Midway, dispositions were made for the capture of the trains
coming from both ends of the road; but they were not sent. The command
reached Georgetown just at sundown. A small force of Home-guards had
mustered there to oppose us. Morgan sent them word to surrender, and
they should not be hurt. The leader of this band is said to have made
his men a speech of singular eloquence and stirring effect. If he was
reported correctly, he told them that "Morgan, the marauder and
murderer--the accursed of the Union men of Kentucky," was coming upon
them. That, in "his track every where prevailed terror and desolation.
In his rear, the smoke of burning towns was ascending, the blood of
martyred patriots was streaming, the wails of widowed women and orphan
children were resounding. In his front, Home-guards and soldiers were
flying." That "Tom Long reported him just outside of town, with ten or
twelve thousand men, armed with long beards and butcher-knives;" and the
orator thought that they "had better scatter and take care of
themselves." They accordingly "scattered" at full speed. Several
prisoners (Southern sympathizers) were confined in the court-house;
among them, a man whom many Kentuckians have a lively recollection
of--poor Will Webb. He, upon seeing the Home-guards flee, thrust his
body half out of a window, and pointing to the stars and stripes still
flying, apostrophized the fugitives in terms that ought to have made a
sutler fight. "Are you going to desert your flag?" he said. "Remain, and
perform the pleasing duty of dying under its glorious folds, and afford
us the agreeable spectacle that you will thus present." This touching
appeal was of no avail.
The geographical situation of Georgetown with relation to the towns of
that portion of Kentucky--especially those occupied by Federal
troops--made it an excellent point for Colonel Morgan's purposes. He was
in a central position here, nearly equi-distant from all points of
importance, and could observe and checkmate movements made from any of
them. Georgetown is twelve miles from Lexington, and eighteen from
Frankfort, the two points from which he had chiefly to anticipate
attacks. Although not directly between these two places, Georgetown is
so nearly on a line with them, that its possession enabled him to
prevent communication of any kind between the troops occupying them.
As the command greatly needed rest, Colonel Morgan remained here (where
he felt more secure, for the reasons I have mentioned) during two days.
He was not entirely idle, however, during that time. He sent Captain
Hamilton, with one company, to disperse a Home-guard organization at the
Stamping Ground, thirteen miles from Georgetown. Hamilton accomplished
his mission, and burned the tents, and destroyed the guns. Detachments
were kept constantly at or near Midway, to prevent any communication by
the railroad between Lexington and Frankfort. Captain Castleman was sent
to destroy the bridges on the Kentucky Central Railroad between
Lexington and Paris--which he did; and was instructed to rejoin the
command in three or four days at Winchester, in Clark county. For other
than strategic reasons, Georgetown was an admirable selection as a
resting point. The large majority of the people throughout this region
were, even at that time, strongly Southern in sentiment and sympathy,
and their native inclination to hospitality was much enhanced by the
knowledge that they were feeding their friends, when we would suddenly
descend upon them. There was a drawback in the apprehension of a visit
from some provost-guards, to investigate the circumstances of this
profuse and practical sympathy with armed rebels. But they hit upon an
expedient which they thought would obviate all the unpleasant
after-claps. They _would give nothing of their own free will and
accord_; but forced us to "impress" every thing that we needed. Many a
time have I seen an old farmer unlock all the closets and presses in his
house--press the keys of his meat-house into the hands of the
Commissary, point out to the Quartermaster where forage could be
obtained, muster his negroes to cook and make themselves generally
useful, protesting all the time that he was acting under the cruelest
compulsion, and then stand by, rubbing his hands and chuckling to think
how well he had reconciled the indulgence of his private sympathies with
his public repute for loyalty. The old ladies, however, were serious
obstacles to the establishment of these decorous records. They wished
not only to give but to talk freely, and the more the husband wisely
preached "policy" and an astute prudence, the more certainly were his
cob-webs of caution torn into shreds by the trenchant tongue of his
wife.
Of all the points which we could have reached just at that time,
Georgetown was the one where this sympathy for us was strongest. There
were only a very few Union men living in the town, and these had run
away; and the county (Scott) was the very hot-bed of Southern feeling.
To Owen and Boone we did not contemplate paying a visit. We had not yet
reached Harrison; but in halting in Scott county and at Georgetown, we
felt that our situation would not need to be improved. A good many
recruits had been obtained at various points in the State, and at
Georgetown a full company was raised, of which W.C.P. Breckinridge, a
young lawyer of Lexington, was elected Captain. He had just run the
blockade established around the latter town.
While lying at Georgetown the command was encamped in line of battle,
day and night, and scouting parties were sent three or four times a day
toward Lexington--which were instructed to clear the road of the enemy's
pickets and reconnoitering parties. While here, Gano and Allen rejoined
the column, having accomplished their respective missions.
Gano (in making a detour around Lexington) had driven in the pickets on
every road--creating a fearful amount of confusion in the place among
its gallant defenders, and causing the order that all rebel
sympathizers, seen on the streets should be shot, to be emphatically
reiterated. As Gano had approached Georgetown, after leaving Lexington
and on his way to burn the bridges below Paris, an assemblage of a
strange character occurred. He had formerly lived near Georgetown and
knew nearly every man in the county. He stopped at the house of an
intimate personal friend, who was also a notorious "sympathizer," who
lived four or five miles from Georgetown, and "forced" him to feed his
men and horses. While there, two or three of the Southern citizens of
Scott, among them Stoddard Johnston (afterward Lieutenant Colonel on
General Breckinridge's staff) came to the house, and were immediately
and with great solemnity, placed under arrest.
Shortly afterward the assistant provost marshal of Georgetown (who was a
very clever fellow), came out to protect the house and grounds from any
disorder that the troops might be inclined to indulge in--thinking (in
his simplicity) when he heard that troops were quartered there, that
they must be "Union." The owner of the house (of course) interceded for
him, and Gano pleased with the motive which had actuated him, promised
to detain him, only until he himself moved again. In a short time
another arrival was announced. The most determined, deeply-pitted,
high-colored and uncompromising Union man in Georgetown, came galloping
up the road to the house, and asked in a loud and authoritative tone for
the commander of the detachment. Gano walked forth and greeted him. "Why
how are you, Dick," said the new comer, "I didn't know that you were in
the Union army; I've got something for you to do, old fellow." Gano
assured him that he was delighted to hear it. "Where is the commander of
these men," continued the "dauntless patriot." "I am their commander,"
said Gano. "Well then here's an order for you," said the bearer of
dispatches handing him a communication from the Home-guard headquarters,
in Georgetown. Gano read it. "Oliver," he then said, slowly and very
impressively, "I should be truly sorry to see you injured, we were
school mates, and I remember our early friendship." Oliver's jaw fell,
and his intelligent eye grew glassy with a "wild and maddening"
apprehension, but his feelings would not permit him to speak. "Oliver,"
continued Gano after a pause (and keeping his countenance remarkably)
"isn't it possible that you may be mistaken in these troops. To which
army do you think they belong?" "Why," gasped Oliver; "ain't they
Union?" "Union!" echoed Gano with a groan of horror, "don't let them
hear you say so, I mightn't be able to control them. They are Morgan's
Texas Rangers." He then led the half fainting Oliver, who under the
influence of this last speech had become "even as a little child," to
the house, and placed him with the other prisoners.
Saddest and most inconsolable of these were the sympathizers who had
come purposely to be captured. When the hour drew near for Gano's
departure, he held a brief conference with the "secesh," and then
paroled the whole batch, including his host, binding them not to divulge
any thing which they had seen or heard. All were impressed with the
solemn nature of this obligation, but the melancholy gravity of Johnston
(who had suggested it) was even awful.
Colonel Morgan finding how strongly Lexington was garrisoned, gave up
all thought of attacking it, but it was high time that he made his
arrangements to return to Dixie. He determined to make a dash at
Cynthiana, the county seat of Harrison county, situated on the Kentucky
Central Railroad, thirty-two miles from Lexington, and about twenty-two
by turnpike from Georgetown. By moving in this direction, and striking a
blow at this point, he hoped to induce the impression that he was aiming
at Cincinnati, and at the same time thoroughly bewilder the officer in
command at Lexington regarding his real intentions. When he reached
Cynthiana he would be master of three or four routes, by either of which
he could leave Kentucky, completely eluding his pursuers, and he did not
doubt that he could defeat whatever force might be collected there.
He left Georgetown on the morning of the 18th, having first dispatched
parts of two companies to drive all scouts and detachments of every kind
into Lexington. While moving rapidly with the bulk of his command toward
Cynthiana, these detachments protected his march and prevented it from
being discovered too soon. Cynthiana was occupied by three or four
hundred men of Metcalfe's regiment of cavalry, and about the same number
of Home-guards, all under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Landrum, of
Metcalfe's regiment. There was but one piece of artillery in the town, a
brass twelve-pound howitzer. This was under charge of a company of
firemen from Cincinnati, under command of "Captain Billy Glass of the
Fourth Ward," and they went to work when the fight opened as if they
were "putting out a fire." We struck the pickets a mile or two from the
town, and the advance guard chased them in, capturing three or four.
General Morgan had previously determined upon his dispositions for the
attack, well knowing the country, and they were made immediately after
the alarm to the pickets. Between us and the town was the Licking river,
crossed at the Georgetown pike, which we were traveling, by a narrow,
covered bridge. Just by the side of the bridge, there was a ford about
waist-deep. Nowhere else, in the then stage of water, was the river
fordable in that immediate vicinity. But above and below about a mile,
respectively, from the bridge, were fords, and to these were sent, Gano
above, and the Georgians below, with instructions to cross and attack
the town upon the respective quarters by which they approached it. The
Second Kentucky was ordered to attack upon the road by which we had
advanced.
The enemy held all the houses upon the opposite bank of the river, which
runs close to the town, and opened a smart fire of musketry upon the
regiment as it advanced. Companies A and B were deployed upon the right
of the road, E and F upon the left, and C was held in reserve, mounted;
the advance-guard had been sent with Gano. The recruits, most of whom
were unarmed, were also, of course, kept in the rear. The howitzers were
planted near the road, about three hundred and fifty yards from the
bridge, and were opened at once upon the houses, evidently filled with
the enemy.
The enemy's single piece of artillery swept the bridge and road, and
commanded the position where the howitzers were stationed. Companies E
and F advanced to the river's edge and poured such a fire across the
narrow stream that they compelled the troops exposed to it to throw down
their guns and surrender. They were then made to swim the river in order
to join their captors. In the meantime, Company A, after having been
repulsed two or three times in attempting to rush across the bridge,
plunged into the river and, holding their guns and ammunition above
their heads, crossed at the ford above-mentioned, and effected a
lodgment on the other side. For awhile those first over were compelled
to take shelter behind a long warehouse near the bridge, and even when
the entire company had gotten over, and assistance had been sent to it,
it seemed that the enemy, who concentrated to oppose us here, and
redoubled his fire, would drive all back. The adjacent houses and yards
were filled with sharpshooters, who poured in telling volleys as the men
sought to close with them.
The lines were at this point not more than forty yards apart, and most
of our loss was sustained here, and by Company A.
The howitzers were brought up, and posted on the corner, but the close
fire drove the gunners away from them. One gunner named Talbot loaded
and fired his piece two or three times by himself, while the balls were
actually striking it. He was afterward made a Lieutenant. The team of
one of the pieces, smarting with wounds, ran away with the limber, and
carried it into the midst of the enemy. This check did not last more
than three or four minutes. Company C charged across the bridge and up
the principal street, on horseback, losing three or four men only, and
distracting the enemy's attention. Company B got a position on the other
bank where they could shoot right into the party which was holding
Company A in check. The latter made a determined rush, at the head of
which were Sergeants Drake and Quirk and private James Moore, of
Louisiana, a little fellow, not yet sixteen years old, who fell with two
severe wounds, but recovered, to make one of the most gallant officers
of our command. In this dash, Sergeant Quirk, out of ammunition, and
seeing his friend, Drake, in imminent peril, knocked down his assailant
with a stone. The enemy then gave way; the other companies were, in the
mean time, brought up to press them.
Gano came in on the one side, and the Georgians on the other, each
driving all opponents before them. The Texians, Georgians, and
Kentuckians arrived simultaneously at the piece of artillery, which the
enemy had kept busily employed all the time. It was immediately taken,
each claiming its capture.
The enemy immediately evacuated the town, and retreated eastwardly, but
were closely pressed, and the better part captured. Greenfell headed a
charge upon the depot, in which some of them took refuge. He received
eleven bullets through his horse, person, and clothes, but was only
slightly hurt. A curious little scarlet skull cap, which he used to
wear, was perforated. It fitted so tight upon his head that I
previously thought a ball could not go through it without blowing his
brains out.
Colonel Landrum was chased eight or ten miles. Little Billy Peyton, a
mere boy (Colonel Morgan's Orderly), but perfectly fearless, followed
him closely, and exhausted two pistols without hitting him. The Colonel
was riding a superb horse, which attracted attention to him, but which
saved him. The enemy's loss was about ninety in killed and wounded; ours
was about forty. Four hundred and twenty prisoners were taken.
It would be an unfair description of this fight if mention were omitted
of the gallant conduct of the recruits. Although the most of them, as
has been stated, were unarmed, they all "went in" like game cocks.
Plenty of fine guns, with ammunition, were captured; also a large
quantity of stores, and two or three hundred horses.
Cynthiana, like Georgetown and Versailles, was full of our devoted
friends, and we felt satisfied that the wounded we were obliged to leave
behind us would be well taken care of. Two men who subsequently died of
their wounds, privates George Arnold and ---- Clarke, behaved with such
conspicuous gallantry, and were always so noted for good conduct, that
their loss caused universal regret. Arnold was a member of the
advance-guard, and volunteered to accompany Company C in the charge
through the town. He fell with an arm and a thigh broken. Clarke
undertook to carry an order through the enemy's line to Gano, who was in
their rear, and fell pierced through the body with five balls. The best
men were among the killed. Private Wm. Craig, of Company A, first to
cross the river, was killed as he mounted the bank. All of the other
officers having been wounded, the command of Company A devolved upon the
Third Lieutenant, S.D. Morgan.
Leaving Cynthiana at one or two P.M., the command marched for Paris.
About five miles from that place, we encountered a deputation of
citizens, coming out to surrender the town. We reached Paris about
sundown, and rested there during the night. I have omitted to mention
that at Georgetown, Lieutenant Niles was appointed by Colonel Morgan
upon his staff, and P.H. Thorpe, formerly Captain in the First Kentucky
Infantry, was made Adjutant in his stead. I mention these appointments
as if they were regular and valid, because they were all so in the end.
The War Department made some trouble about them, as was expected, and
perfectly proper, but as the appointees were borne on the muster and pay
rolls as officers, there was nothing to be done but recognize them.
R.A. Alston, formerly a member of a South Carolina regiment of cavalry,
but a member and private at the time of Company A, Second Kentucky, had
been selected at Knoxville by Colonel Morgan to perform the duties of
Adjutant-General, on account of his superior fitness for that position.
He was permitted to recruit a company during the raid, in order that he
might obtain the rank of Captain. He got his commission, and his company
was divided between some others, and he was continued upon staff duty,
although Greenfell, immediately after the conclusion of this raid became
Adjutant-General.
The next morning after our arrival at Paris, a large force came down the
Lexington road, and about eight A.M. gave us strong reasons for resuming
our march. This force, about twenty-five hundred or three thousand men,
was commanded by General G. Clay Smith. Our scouts had notified us of
its approach the previous night, and as the command was encamped on the
Winchester road, the one which we wished to travel, there was no danger
of its cutting us off. It came on very slowly, and there was at no time
any determined effort made to engage us. If a dash had been made at us
when we prepared to leave, we could have been compelled to fight, for
although the prisoners had all been paroled, we were very much
incumbered with carriages containing wounded men, brought off from
Cynthiana and other points.
Morgan always made it a point to carry off every wounded man who could
be safely moved; in this way he prevented much of the demoralization
attending the fear the men felt of falling, when wounded, into the hands
of the enemy. I was once seriously told that a belief prevailed with
some people, that Morgan killed his own wounded to prevent the enemy
from making them prisoners.
The command reached Winchester about 12 P.M. and remained there until 4
P.M., when the march was taken up again and we crossed the Kentucky
river just before dark. Marching on, we reached Richmond at 4 the next
morning. Here we met with another very kind reception, and were joined
by a company of recruits under Captain Jennings. It was admitted into
the Second Kentucky as Company K. Leaving Richmond at 4 P.M. that day we
marched toward Crab Orchard, and reached that place about day break next
morning.
It had, at first, been Colonel Morgan's intention to make a stand at
Richmond, as the whole population seemed inclined to join him, but his
real strength was now known to the enemy, and they were collecting to
attack him in such numbers, that he concluded that it was too hazardous.
He would have had to have fought three battles at least, against
superior forces, and have won all before he would have been safe.
Clay Smith was following him, Woolford was collecting forces to the
southward to intercept him, and troops were coming from Louisville and
other points to push after him. In the march from Paris to Crab Orchard,
a good many wagons and a large number of guns were captured, and
all--wagons and guns--that were not needed were burned. The horses
captured with the twelve pounder at Cynthiana gave out and died before
we reached the Kentucky river.
Leaving Crab Orchard at 11 A.M., the command moved toward Somerset and
reached that place about sundown. The telegraph was again taken
possession of, and Colonel Morgan instructed Ellsworth to countermand
all of General Boyle's orders for pursuit. At Crab Orchard and Somerset
one hundred and thirty Government wagons were captured and burned. At
Somerset a great many stores of all kinds, blankets, shoes, etc., were
found. Several wagons were loaded with as much as could be conveniently
carried away, and the rest were destroyed. Arms, and ammunition for
small arms and artillery, were also found in abundance, and were
destroyed.
From Somerset the column marched to Stagall's ferry on the Cumberland
river, and crossed there. We reached Monticello twenty-one miles from
the river that night, but all danger was over when we had gotten safely
across the river. The next day we proceeded leisurely toward Livingston,
having a little excitement with the bushwhackers, but suffering no loss.
For several days after leaving Somerset, and indeed after reaching
Livingston, we suffered greatly for want of rations, as this country was
almost bare of provisions. Colonel Morgan's objects in making this raid,
viz; to obtain recruits and horses, to thoroughly equip and arm his men,
to reconnoiter for the grand invasion in the fall, and to teach the
enemy that we could reciprocate the compliment of invasion, were pretty
well accomplished. Enough of spare horses and more than enough of extra
guns, saddles, etc., were brought out, to supply all the men who had
been left behind. A great many prisoners were taken, of whom I have made
no mention. But the results of the expedition are best summed up in the
words of Colonel Morgan's report--
"I left Knoxville on the 4th day of this month, with about nine hundred
men, and returned to Livingston on the 28th inst. with nearly twelve
hundred, having been absent just twenty-four days, during which time I
have traveled over a thousand miles, captured seventeen towns, destroyed
all the Government supplies and arms in them, dispersed about fifteen
hundred Home-guards and paroled nearly twelve hundred regular troops. I
lost in killed, wounded and missing of the number that I carried into
Kentucky, about ninety."
One practice was habitually pursued, on this raid, that may be
remembered by some of our friends in the state for whose benefit it was
done. Great pains were always taken to capture the most bitter Union man
in each town and neighborhood--the one who was most inclined to bear
down on Southern men--especially if he were provost marshal. He would be
kept, sometimes a day or two, and thoroughly frightened. Colonel Morgan,
who derived infinite amusement from such scenes, would gravely assure
each one, when brought into his presence, that one of the chief objects
of his raid was to catch him. It was a curious sight to see the mixed
terror and vanity this declaration would generally excite--even in the
agonies of anticipated death, the prisoner would be sensibly touched by
the compliment. After awhile, however, a compromise would be effected;
the prisoner would be released upon the implied condition that he was,
in the future, to exert himself to protect Southern people. It was
thought better to turn all the captured provost marshals loose and let
them resume their functions, than to carry them off, and let new men be
appointed, with whom no understanding could be had.
Ellsworth wound up his operations at Somerset, with complimentary
dispatches from Colonel Morgan to General Jerry Boyle, Prentice, and
others, and concluded with the following general order on his own part
to the Kentucky telegraphic operators:
'HEADQUARTERS, TELEGRAPH DEPT. OF KY., CONFEDERATE STATES OF
AMERICA.
'_General Order No. 1._
'When an operator is positively informed that the enemy is marching
on his station, he will immediately proceed to destroy the
telegraphic instruments and all material in his charge. Such
instances of carelessness, as were exhibited on the part of the
operators at Lebanon, Midway, and Georgetown, will be severely dealt
with. By order of
G.A. ELLSWORTH,
_General Military Supt. C.S. Telegraphic Dept._'
At Livingston Colonel Morgan left the Second Kentucky and proceeded to
Knoxville, taking with him the Georgians, Gano's squadron, and the
howitzers--which needed some repairs. After remaining at Livingston
three days, I marched the regiment to Sparta, where more abundant
supplies could be obtained, and facilities for shoeing horses could be
had. While at Livingston, the men suffered extremely with hunger, and
one man declared his wish to quit a service in which he was subjected to
such privations. He was deprived of his horse, arms, and equipments, and
"blown out" of the regiment; that is, upon dress parade, he was marched
down the front of the regiment (after his offense and the nature of the
punishment had been read by the Adjutant), with the bugler blowing the
"Skedaddle" behind him amid the hisses of the men, who were thoroughly
disgusted with him; he was then driven away from the camp. At Sparta we
found a better country and the kindest and most hospitable people.