When General Albert Sidney Johnson came to the command of the great
Western Department, he found but a few thousand troops at his disposal
to defend a territory of immense extent, and vulnerable at a hundred
points.
At that time the Trans-Mississippi Confederate States were included in
the same Department with the States of Tennessee, Alabama, and
Mississippi. Missouri on the Western side of the Mississippi, and
Kentucky on the Eastern--respectively the Northernmost of the Western
and Middle Slaveholding States--were debatable ground, and were already
occupied, the former by both, the latter by one of the contending
forces.
General Johnson assumed command about the latter part of August, or
first of September, 1861, and at once commenced his vast labor with a
vigor and wisdom which were neither appreciated by his countrymen, nor
were fruitful of happy results until after his glorious death. Missouri
had become the theater of military operations some months previously.
The people had partially responded to the proclamation of Governor
Jackson, issued June 12, 1861, which called on them to resist the
military authorities appointed in the State by President Lincoln.
Smarting under a sense of the aggressions and the insolence of these
officials, believing that they were the victims of intolerable injustice
and flagrant faithlessness, the Missouri rebels were eager to take the
field, and irregular organizations, partisan, and "State-guard" were
formed in various sections of the State. Several skirmishes, the most
important of which were "Booneville" and "Carthage," occurred between
these organizations and the Federal troops, before any troops regularly
in the Confederate service were sent into the State. After winning the
battle of "Carthage," and forcing Siegel to retreat until he affected a
junction with Lyon, General Price was compelled, in his turn, to retreat
before the then concentrated Federal army of Missouri.
On the 7th of August, Generals Price and McCullough, commanding
respectively such portions of the Missouri State-guard as could be
concentrated at that time, and the Confederate troops destined for
service in the extreme West, making an aggregate, between them, of some
six thousand effective men, established themselves in the vicinity of
Springfield, a small town in Southwestern Missouri, confronting the
Federal army which had pushed on to that point in pursuit of Price. On
the 9th of August, the battle, called by the one side "Oak Hill," and by
the other "Wilson's Creek," was fought. The Federal army made the
attack, was repulsed and routed (with the exception of that portion of
it commanded by Sturges, or protected by him in the retreat), and its
commander, General Lyon, was killed. This victory laid open, and placed
completely at the disposal of the Rebel commanders, the southwestern and
middle portions of the State. Unhappily Generals Price and McCullough
differed totally in opinion regarding the proper policy to be pursued
after the battle, and the result of their disagreement was a separation
of their forces. Price pushed forward into the interior of Missouri,
where he believed that the fruits of the Victory just gained were to be
gleaned. McCullough remained upon the Arkansas border. The campaign
which General Price then made is well known. He captured Lexington,
taking a large number of prisoners, and, what was much more valuable to
him, a considerable quantity of military stores, many stand of small
arms, and some artillery. He placed himself in a position to enable the
scattered detachments of his State-guard to join him, and, encouraging
the people, friendly to the South, by his bold advance into the heart of
the State immediately after they had received the news of the victory he
had helped to win, he obtained recruits and abundant supplies. He was
subsequently compelled to retreat before a vastly superior force, but
not until, taking into consideration the means at his disposal, he had
accomplished wonders. Not only were his men perfectly raw, upon their
first campaign, but no attempt was made to train or form them. Method,
administration, discipline, drill, were utterly unknown in his camps;
the officers knew only how to set a gallant example to their men; the
men were rendered almost invincible by their native courage and the
devotion they felt to their chief and their cause. Upon this campaign
General Price exhibited, perhaps, more strikingly than ever afterward,
his two great qualities as a commander--the faculty of acquiring the
affection and implicit confidence of his men, and his own gallant and
perfect reliance upon them. Without presuming to reflect upon General
McCullough, who was a brave, honest, and zealous officer, it may be
safely assumed that had Price, at this period, been backed by the force
which McCullough commanded (much superior in equipment and organization
to his own), he could have effected results which, in all probability,
would have stamped a very different character upon the subsequent
conduct of the war in the Trans-Mississippi States. The consequence of
another such victory as that of "Oak Hill" gained in the heart of the
State, as by their combined forces might very readily have been done, at
the time when Price was forced to retreat, would have been of
incalculable value to the Confederacy. But the fate, which throughout
the contest, rendered Southern prowess unavailing, had already commenced
to rule. At the date of the battle of "Oak Hill," General Hardee was
advancing through Southeastern Missouri with about thirty-five hundred
effective men.
His base was the little village of Pocahontas, situated, nearly upon the
Missouri and Arkansas border, and at the head of navigation upon the Big
Black river. Here General Hardee had collected all the Arkansas troops
which were available for service upon that line, amounting to perhaps
six or seven thousand men. Various causes contributed to reduce his
effective total to about one half of that number. All of the troops were
indifferently armed, some were entirely unarmed. The sickness always
incidental to a first experience of camp life, in the infantry, had
prostrated hundreds. Change of diet and of habits, and the monotony of
the camp are sufficient of themselves, and rarely fail to induce
diseases among raw troops, but a scourge broke out among the troops
collected at Pocahontas which confounded all, at least of the
non-medical observers. This was nothing more than measles, but in an
intensely aggravated and very dangerous form. It was hard to believe
that there was such a proportion of adult men who had escaped a malady
generally thought one of the affections of childhood. It was so
virulent, at the time and place of which I write, and in so many
instances fatal, that many confidently believed it to be a different
disease from the ordinary measles, although the Surgeons pronounced it
the same. It was called "black measles," and was certainly a most
malignant type of the disease. I have been since informed that it raged
with equal fury and with the same characteristics among the volunteers
just called into the field in many other localities. Its victims at
Pocahontas were counted by the scores.
As the Big Black river is navigable for small craft at all seasons,
General Hardee had no difficulty in supplying the troops stationed at
Pocahontas, but after leaving that point he was compelled to depend for
supplies upon wheel transportation, with which he was very indifferently
provided, and upon the country, which was sterile and sparsely settled.
The only line of advance from Pocahontas which gave promise of important
results, or which, indeed, was practicable, was by Greenville, distant
some fifty-five or sixty miles from Pocahontas, and Frederickton, to
Ironton, and thence along the Iron Mountain Railroad by the most
practicable roads to St. Louis. The country between Pocahontas and
Ironton is rugged and heavily wooded. It is penetrated by few roads,
and, in 1861, by no means abounded in supplies. General Hardee advanced
as far as Greenville, and threatened Ironton.
This latter place, the terminus of the Iron Mountain Railroad, is
ninety-seven miles from St. Louis. It is a place of great natural
strength, and was already, at the time that Hardee advanced toward it,
partially fortified. General Hardee expected when he moved from
Pocahontas to effect a junction with General Pillow at Frederickton, a
small town to the east of north of Greenville, twenty miles from Ironton
and on the line between that place and New Madrid. Pillow's force was
six or eight thousand strong, and the best armed and accoutered of all
the western Confederate commands.
General Pillow could very easily have reached Frederickton from New
Madrid, as soon as Hardee could have gotten to the former place from
Pocahontas, had there been a timely and definite understanding between
them to that effect. And the united strength of the two Generals, with
the addition of some two thousand of the State-guard, which were at hand
under General Jeff. Thompson (as well armed and better organized than
those which had already done such excellent service under Price), would
have enabled them, most probably, to take Ironton. At any rate, by
flanking and threatening to get between that place and St. Louis, they
would certainly have compelled its evacuation, and then, either
defeating the garrison in the open field, or driving it back in disorder
and demoralization upon St. Louis, they would have become masters of the
situation. They would have cut off and destroyed the defeated and routed
army of Lyon, then in full flight for St. Louis.
General Price would have gladly embraced the opportunity of uniting with
them--the whole State would have risen to join them. It is almost
certain, when the number and condition of the Federal troops then in
Missouri are taken into consideration, and the facts that but few troops
were available from the neighboring States for the defense of St. Louis,
and that the city was not fortified--it is almost positively certain,
that St. Louis would have fallen into their hands, and that the entire
State of Missouri, at least all South of the Missouri river, would have
passed securely into their possession. At all events, General Hardee was
extremely desirous of attempting just such a campaign.
It was deemed, however, more important, at that time, to occupy and
fortify Columbus, in Kentucky, situated on the Mississippi river, some
twenty-two miles below the mouth of the Ohio. This measure, it was
thought, would protect the States lying along the Mississippi from
invasion, by enabling the Confederates to hold the river, as it was by
the river, only, that those States could be conveniently reached.
General Pillow's forces were consequently ordered to that point. Finding
that his plans were rendered impossible of execution, on account of the
want of General Pillow's co-operation, Hardee returned to Pocahontas,
and was shortly afterward transferred, with the greater portion of the
troops under his command, to the eastern side of the river, and was
ordered to Bowlinggreen as soon as that place was occupied. Up to the
date of General Johnston's taking command, the chief difficulty in the
way of action and decisive operations in the West (independently of the
inferior number and miserable equipment of the troops) was the lack of
uniformity and concert in the plans and operations of the various
commanders. There was no one in supreme military control from whom the
subordinate Generals could receive definite instructions, and orders
which they felt obliged to obey. While an immense extent of country was
included in one Department, and theoretically under one chief, yet
practically every officer, no matter what was the strength or nature of
his command, who happened not to be troubled with a senior immediately
at his elbow, planned and acted for himself and with a perfect
indifference to the operations of every one else. The President and
Secretary of War were too distant to do any good, if such interference
ever does any good, and a ruling mind was needed at the theater of
events. It is true that General Polk, whose headquarters were at
Memphis, was senior to the others, he being a Major-General, and all the
rest but Brigadiers, and he was ostensibly in chief command and directed
to a certain extent, the movements of all.
But, whether it was that, in a period when nothing was fairly organized,
his authority was not clearly defined, or that he felt some hesitation
in vigorously exercising it, it is certain that each of the Generals,
who have been here mentioned, acted as if he knew himself to be, to all
intents and purposes, in independent command.
This evil was completely remedied by the appointment to the chief
command in the West of General Johnson, and the prompt and decided
measures which he instituted. General Johnson's whole life had been one
of the most thorough military training, and no officer of his years in
the old army of the United States had seen more service; but more than
that, he was a soldier by instinct, and Nature had intended him for
military command.
He felt the full importance of careful preparation, and the
establishment by order and system in every branch and department of the
service. No martinet of the schools was ever more alive to the necessity
of rigid method and exact discipline, for he knew that without their
inauguration and strict observance, it would be impossible to even
partially discharge the duties of his vast commission. But he also saw
clearly the vital necessity of maintaining in tact the spirit which
animated the men of his army, and which had summoned them into the
field. He knew that to impair the ardor which had induced them to become
soldiers was to destroy their morale; that to attempt to make them
machines would result in making them worthless.
Although the troops at his disposal seriously needed instruction and
more perfect organization, he did not waste precious moments in seeking
to impart them then. He did not permit the high spirit of his gallant
army to sink into lethargy, nor the interest which the people felt in
the conduct of military affairs to abate by remaining inactive, and in
a position which would reduce him, under all circumstances, to the
defensive. A concentration of his forces any where upon the Tennessee
border would not only have placed him at great strategic disadvantage,
but would have been instantly accepted by the soldiery and the people as
a signal of his intention to await the pleasure and movements of his
adversary. Almost immediately after his arrival at Nashville, the troops
which had collected at Camp Boone, the rendezvous of the Kentucky
regiments, and the Tennessee troops which were available, were pushed
into Kentucky. Kentucky's neutrality, for a time recognized
provisionally, and so far as a discreet silence upon the subject
amounted to recognition by the Federal Government, had already been
exploded. The Government of the United States, having made the necessary
preparations, was not disposed to abandon a line of invasion which led
right to the vitals of the Confederacy, and promised a successful
reduction of the rebellion in at least three of the seceded States,
because of the partially rebellious attitude assumed by Kentucky.
Camp Dick Robinson had been organized and put into successful operation
in July. General Anderson took command at Louisville on the 20th of
September. The other portions of the state were occupied, and definite
lines were established by the opposing forces, nearly about the same
time. General Johnson advanced as far as Green river, making it his line
of defense for his center, while his right rested on the Cumberland and
the rugged ranges of its hills. His line might be said to extend from
Columbus through Hopkinsville, Munfordsville and Somerset to the
Virginia border somewhere in the vicinity of Pound Gap. The Federal
forces were pushed down, almost simultaneously with General Johnson's
advance to Green river, to Elizabethtown, and in a few days afterward to
Nolin creek. Their line may be described as running almost directly from
Paducah in the West, to Prestonburg in the East. This line gave them
possession of the mouths of the Tennessee, Cumberland and Green
rivers, of the Blue grass region, and of a greater share of the central
and eastern portions of the State.
[Illustration: MAP SHOWING THE Military Situation IN Kentucky and
Tennessee, 1861]
A single glance at the map will show the importance of Bowlinggreen as a
strategic point. It will be seen that it is admirably adapted for a base
of operations, offensive or defensive, in such a campaign as General
Johnson was about to inaugurate at the time of its occupation. Situated
upon the bank of the Barren river, it has that river and the Green river
to protect it against attack from the front. The Barren river empties
into the Green some twenty miles from and northwest of Bowlinggreen, and
the Green flowing in a northwesterly direction, affords an admirable
line of defense for many miles to the left. There are few fords and
ferries of Green river after its junction with the Barren, and those
which it has can be easily held. The danger of attack from the extreme
left flank was guarded against, but as the result showed imperfectly, by
Forts Henry and Donelson constructed respectively upon the Tennessee and
Cumberland rivers. The one just upon, the other about ten miles from,
the Kentucky and Tennessee border. As there was little danger to be
apprehended in that direction, except from forces brought up those
rivers and established in the rear of Bowlinggreen, these forts, whose
strength was overrated, were thought to sufficiently protect that flank.
The Cumberland river rising, in the mountains of Southeastern Kentucky,
flows nearly due East and West and upon the same parallel of latitude on
which Bowlinggreen is situated, until within sixty or seventy miles of
that place, when it inclines to the Southwest. The Green river affords a
line extending eastward, and defensible, beyond the point where the
Cumberland begins to bend to the Southwest. At this point the two rivers
are about thirty miles apart. The country throughout this section of the
State is broken but accessible to the march of large bodies of troops.
It is apparent, however, that an army, with Bowlinggreen for its base,
unless immensely outnumbered, would have it in its power to take
advantage of an opponent advancing upon Bowlinggreen by that route.
Even if pressed in front, it could hold the river with detachments until
with the bulk of its strength it struck the enemy coming from the East.
The line of march of the latter would render its communications, and
concert of action with its friends, very difficult, and liable at any
time to be entirely destroyed; while the General upon the defensive, if
vigilant and active, could know the movements of both advancing columns,
and attack either, with the mass of his army, when he pleased. Moreover,
in the disposition of the Confederate forces, General Zollicoffer with
some two or three thousand men, was stationed at Monticello, about
ninety-five miles from Bowlinggreen, and a little to the south of east.
Monticello is twenty-one miles from the Cumberland; all the neighboring
fords were in Zollicoffer's possession, and his scouts explored the
country for some distance beyond the river. It is plain that any hostile
force moving upon Bowlinggreen by this eastern flank would have exposed
itself to attack by Zollicoffer.
An army strong enough to hold all the approaches to Bowlinggreen might
rest in perfect security regarding its communications. There is the
railroad from Bowlinggreen to Clarksville, running through many
important points, and affording communication with every thing upon that
flank. Excellent roads run from Bowlinggreen to Monticello upon the
south side of the Barren, affording secure communication with the right.
Were both of these lines interrupted, there would remain means of
certain and speedy communication with both flanks, in the railroad and
turnpike running from Bowlinggreen to Nashville, the turnpike from
Glasgow to Nashville, and the Cumberland river navigable to Fort
Donelson on the one side and Burkesville on the other.
The country thus commanded is fertile, and almost exhaustless of
supplies. The railroad from Bowlinggreen to Louisville, and the two
turnpikes, respectively, from Bowlinggreen and from Glasgow to
Louisville, and with which good roads running in every direction are
connected, afford admirable facilities for offensive operations. These
two turnpikes cross Green river within eight miles of each other, but an
army, once on the north side of the river, and in possession of both
roads, could march with perfect ease in any direction. It will scarcely
be denied that if General Johnson had done nothing else to establish his
high reputation as a strategist, his selection of this line would be
enough to sustain it. In this advance into Kentucky, the Kentucky
regiments under Buckner, about thirteen hundred strong in all, took the
lead; the 2nd Kentucky infantry under Colonel Roger W. Hanson, to which
were temporarily attached Byrne's battery of four pieces, and one
company of Tennessee cavalry, was pushed on to Munfordsville on Green
river. The rest of the Kentuckians and two or three thousand
Tennesseeans (and some odds and ends) were stopped at Bowlinggreen.
All the cavalry which were available for that purpose, were sent to
scout the country between the Cumberland and Green rivers, and
subsequently Forrest's regiment was stationed at Hopkinsville, watching
the country in that vicinity. Shortly after he was sent there, Forrest
attacked and defeated at Sacramento, a little village not far from
Hopkinsville, a regiment of Federal cavalry. This was the first cavalry
fight in the west, and the Federals were completely routed.
Zollicoffer was sent to take position at Monticello, as has been
described before, at or nearly about the same time of the advance to
Bowlinggreen. Thus, it will be seen, that all the important points of
the line were almost simultaneously occupied.
Columbus was occupied by General Polk, as has been stated, on the 4th,
some days earlier.
It was generally believed that General Buckner, who, as has been already
stated, led the van, would have had no difficulty in capturing
Louisville had he pressed on. Very little doubt was entertained, then,
of the adequacy of his command, small as it was, to have taken the
place, and, I presume, no one doubts it now. An impression prevailed
that General Buckner was strongly in favor of continuing his advance to
Louisville, and that he urgently solicited permission to do so. But
whether it was suggested or not, it found no favor with General Johnson.
A plan to take and hold Louisville, without any provision for the
occupation of other portions of Kentucky up to the Ohio river, would
have been, to say the least, a very rash one, and at that time captures
with a view only to temporary occupation were not in fashion. To hold
the State, an army would have been required numerous enough to furnish
strong garrisons for Paducah and Smithland, at the mouths of the
Tennessee and Cumberland rivers, for the protection of the mouth of
Green river for Carrollton, at the mouth of Kentucky river, for
Louisville, Covington, and other points farther eastward. General
Johnson could not have held Kentucky two months after he had occupied
her northern territory (if he had taken possession of it) with the
forces which he had at his disposal. He would either have had to
establish the garrisons, which have been indicated, and provide the
supporting force, or he would have been compelled to adopt another plan,
perhaps more advisable, viz: to have organized three separate corps, one
for the western, one for the middle, and the third for the eastern
portion of the State, each charged with the defense of a certain length
of river line, and so disposed as to be readily concentrated, at short
notice, at any point upon it.
To properly carry into effect either plan, many more troops would have
been required than General Johnson had--it would have been folly to have
attempted either with his handful of men.
Another line in advance of that of the Green river, might have been
taken, which would have secured additional and very valuable territory.
General Johnson might have established one half of his army at
Muldraugh's Hill, thirty miles from Louisville, and upon the Louisville
and Nashville railroad, and the other half in the country about
Lexington and Frankfort, and have thus obtained possession of the
greater part of central Kentucky, and the Blue-grass region. The country
between the point indicated upon the Louisville and Nashville railroad,
and Frankfort, and also in front of the line thus drawn, is extremely
rugged and difficult of access The hills of Salt river, the Benson and
Chaplin Hills, and those of the Kentucky, present a barrier not easily
forced. Directly in front, too, of Frankfort and Lexington, at a
distance of from twenty to forty miles stretches a belt of broken and
defensible ground from the Kentucky to the main fork of the Licking
river, and on to the eastward.
A thorough tearing-up of the Louisville and Nashville railroad, which
would deprive the enemy of the use of the Bardstown and Lebanon
junctions, and the destruction of the Lexington and Louisville, and
Lexington and Covington railroads, would have rendered this line secure
against any attack from the front, while the excellent roads traversing
the region lying just south of it, would have made communication easy
between the salient positions. But the left flank and the main line of
retreat and of communication with Nashville, would have been constantly
and dangerously exposed.
These were all matters for a military chief to study; but far above all
mere strategic considerations, was the moral effect of these movements,
and that, it is certain, had been profoundly pondered by General
Johnson. The idea of an advance to the Ohio, of occupying the entire
slaveholding territory east of the Mississippi, of subsidizing all of
its resources, of arousing and recruiting from its whole population, was
very fascinating then, and opens a wide field for speculation now. But
then there was the reverse of the picture to be considered. The
unsettled, bewildered condition of the Kentucky mind, has already been
described. There were many who confidently predicted that the
Kentuckians would flock to the Confederate standard as soon as it waved
upon the banks of the Ohio, and innumerable bitter objurgations were
launched against them, because so few resorted to it when it was planted
upon the bluffs of Green river.
The patriotism which inspired, alike, the prophesies and the curses,
can not be called in question. But Albert Sidney Johnson, while he felt
the enthusiasm which was the concomitant of his perfect courage and high
military genius, had trained himself to coolly examine, and carefully
calculate every influence which could affect his plans. He had studied,
and, I believe, he rightly estimated the popular feeling.
Revolutions may be inaugurated and accomplished by the unsworn, unarmed,
unorganized masses; wars, once fairly commenced, must be won by
soldiers. An entire population is frequently ripe for revolution, only a
portion of it is available for, and will enlist for, war. Even had the
most favorable accounts of the unanimity of the people of Kentucky, and
their devotion to the Southern cause, reached General Johnson from
credible sources, he would have been justified in still doubting that he
would derive immediate benefit from it. There are no braver men than the
Tennesseeans, they were then practically unanimous, except in the
eastern portion of the State, they were very ardent, and yet the
Tennesseeans took their time in flocking to the Confederate standard.
The gallantry and patriotism of the Mississippians are as bright as the
light of day; and yet, in September, 1861, thousands of young
Mississippians who afterward bled for the cause, were at home dealing
out fiery denunciations against slaveholding States which would not
secede. The same history is true of every other seceding State--States,
unlike Kentucky, already embarked in and committed to the war. It was
not because the men of these States lacked purpose--throngs of them who
stayed at home until the news of our first disasters came, then
enlisted, and fought and died with the quenchless valor which had
descended to them from unconquered sires, and was traditional in a race
which had believed itself invincible. It was because they knew little of
war at all, and were utterly ignorant of the kind of war that was
coming. The mighty conviction had not yet forced itself upon them. It is
true that the Confederate Government had refused regiments raised and
tendered by these States some time previously. Unable to arm them, it
dismissed them, instead of placing them in camps of instruction until
arms could be procured.
If, among the many errors which have been attributed to the great
patriot, hero and statesman who was at the head of that Government,
there was one really grave and fatal in its consequences, it was that he
himself failed to appreciate the danger, failed to comprehend the
magnitude of the struggle when it began, and failed therefore to arouse
his people to an early and tremendous exertion, which might have
triumphed. The absolute confidence of the Government blinded the people,
and its policy tended rather to quiet, than to excite their enthusiasm.
But whatever may have been the causes, it was for General Johnson to
consider the effect. If, after the war had lasted four months, his
immense department, composed of seceded States, could furnish him only
six thousand troops, when he advanced to Bowlinggreen, with what show of
reason could he count on obtaining from Kentucky--Kentucky that had not
yet seceded, that was divided, distracted by conflicting opinions--the
vast concourse of recruits, which so many professed to expect her to
furnish, and which she was so indignantly denounced for not furnishing?
Could General Johnson have occupied Northern Kentucky without
opposition, and have held it undisturbed for some months, it is highly
probable that all dissensions would have been allayed, that the
revolutionary fever would have spread through Kentucky (perhaps it might
even have been propagated north of the Ohio), and thousands of
Kentuckians would have joined the Confederate army, many of whom were
subsequently its most formidable foes. But it must be remembered that
the Federal Government had not been idle, that the North was on fire
with the war spirit, that a host of sturdy volunteers had been gathered
and organized for the special purpose of holding Kentucky, that, with
the abundant means at its command, the Federal Government had already
efficiently armed its soldiers, and provided all that was necessary for
active and immediate service.
In forty-eight hours after Louisville had fallen, certainly before he
could have brought up the forces to dispute its entrance at any point,
an army from the North, vastly stronger than General Johnson's, could
have been thrown into Kentucky. Could General Johnson have defeated this
army? If defeated himself in such a situation, what would have been the
consequences, not only to his hopes of revolutionizing Kentucky, not
only to the army immediately under his command, but to the Confederate
cause in the West? Would he, then, have been warranted in risking so
much upon this throw? If General Johnson had been constrained to fight
at once, and had been driven back, he would have sustained a disaster,
perhaps fatal. The effect it would have had in Kentucky can easily be
understood, and it would have had some and not a very cheering effect in
more Southern latitudes. The patriotism and integrity of the mass of the
people is undeniable, but for all that, "there is a great deal of human
nature in man." Success is the most eloquent of arguments. He who
appeals to the suffrages of an enlightened community after a victory
will be better received then he who canvasses after a defeat. Again (it
is a truth that will bear repetition) in revolutions, popular
convulsions, political agitations--a method may be safely attempted
which will be hazardous and of doubtful policy after actual war has
commenced. In the former periods, enthusiasm runs higher, patriotism is
more reckless and demonstrative than when the bayonets are about. The
danger then is distant, and with the majority of men, when a general
excitement is prevailing, the remote danger excites no fear. Many a
patriot is willing to be Brigadier General of the peaceful militia, and
to devote himself to a cause, from the stump, who would feel a strong
and very natural reluctance to leave home, wife, children and property,
to accept the hardships of a soldier's life, and be shot at whenever his
officers feel enterprising.
If the sentiment of the people be not unanimous and very decided, the
secret of success in revolutions is to captivate the popular fancy, give
the first direction to the popular current. It is a struggle between the
leaders, and the most audacious, not to say the least scrupulous, are
apt to win.
It is unsafe, in such periods, to rely surely upon any sort of action
from the people--it would be the mistake of supposing that every man,
unshaken by any influence, had made up his mind, and knew what he was
going to do, and that the majority by some instinct, would be
immediately obeyed. A brave, honest, intelligent people will be likely,
once convinced and committed, to abide gallantly by their decision. If
their education has been wholesome, and their traditions unique, they
will be stimulated by ordinary perils and disasters to increased energy
and exertions.
But whether the revolutionary fermentation be in process, or the stand
has been taken--it is easier to induce the masses of a people to vote
for resolutions than to become soldiers.
It doubtless would have proven a successful policy, to have pushed
Buckner instantly to Louisville, and Zollicoffer to Lexington, to stay
as long as they were safe, and return with the recruits and the supplies
that they could have collected, leaving behind them the positive
assurance that the country was not inaccessible to Confederate troops.
But to have taken the army into Northern Kentucky, upon the supposition
that the unarmed population would arise and enable it to remain
there--in the face of the threatening dangers and the almost positive
certainty of instant battle--would have been a blind, unreasoning
daring, which had no place among the qualities of General Johnson. The
wisdom and prescience of the great commander were afterward so
abundantly demonstrated, that we may be pardoned for believing his
judgment right in this instance also.
In establishing his base at Bowlinggreen, he secured, as has been shown,
a line well adapted to enable him to assume the offensive so soon as his
army was sufficiently strong to do so with effect. The very fact of his
moving into Kentucky at all was a pledge and guarantee to the people of
his department, that, if sustained by them, he would keep the war out of
their territory, and encouraged his army to hope for an active, dashing
campaign. He placed himself where the more enterprising and determined
of the Kentucky rebels could join him, and he spared no effort, no
appeal, which could stimulate enlistment in his army among the young men
of Kentucky, or of the States of his department.
That his appeals were neglected was not only his, but the Confederacy's
deadly misfortune. Numerical weakness frustrated in September 1861, his
plan to appear before the people, not only of Northern Kentucky, but of
the Northwestern States, as the victor of a decisive battle, and, in the
following February, forced him to retreat from Kentucky altogether. The
first and most golden opportunity was lost; and the future history of
the war in the West, was a series of terrible reverses to the
Confederate arms, or of victories brilliant indeed, but, in the end,
fruitless.
The condition of the Confederate troops was far better, in many
respects, at this time, than at any subsequent period of the war.
There were, then, facilities and means for providing them with
necessaries and comforts which more latterly did not exist. Provisions
were abundant everywhere, and were regularly supplied.
The railroads, which were then, all in good repair and well provided
with rolling stock, afforded sure means of supplying the troops which
were stationed in those parts of the country through which they ran. The
numerous navigable streams also afforded facilities, and practically
shortened the routes of supply.
In all cases, however, in which neither the railways nor the rivers
could be used to supply them, troops were compelled to depend for
subsistence, in a great measure, upon the country immediately about
their cantonments, and as they exhausted the surplus provisions in
different neighborhoods, they would shift their encampments. This was
owing to the great lack of wheel transportation. It was very difficult
to procure wagons, except by purchase or impressment from the citizens,
and those so gotten were of course inferior. Much less inconvenience was
subsequently experienced on this score, after they began to be
manufactured in the Confederate and were captured in great numbers from
the enemy. At this time, many articles such as sugar, coffee, etc.,
indispensable to the comfort and conducive to the health of troops in
the field, were plentifully furnished--after the first year of the war
they were known among us only by camp-fire traditions. The men rarely
suffered, then, from the want of clothing, blankets, shoes, etc., even
when the quartermasters could not furnish them, for they could obtain
them from home, or purchase them, wherever they happened to be
quartered, at reasonable prices. There was, perhaps, no regiment in the
army which had not its full complement of tents; they were manufactured
at Memphis, and other points, in numbers adequate to the wants of all
the troops.
Cooking utensils, also, could be had in abundance--the marching commands
suffered, not from the want of them, but from the lack of transportation
for them. It is true that those which were furnished us were not of the
kind and pattern which experience has prescribed as most fitting for
military use, but they were capital substitutes for flat stones and
forked twigs.
In the medical department there was an almost total lack of the
necessary material. The supply of medicines in the South at the outbreak
of the war was barely sufficient for the wants of the population at that
time. Some medicines were run through the blockade from the North, in
small quantities, during the spring and summer of 1861. But the supply
thus obtained by no means met the demand. The volunteers collected
together in camps and crowded cantonments, subjected to a sudden change
of diet and mode of living, sickened in great numbers. Diseases which
had never before, or but in rare instances, proven dangerous, now
assumed alarming types. The systems of the patients may have been
relaxed and their vitality partially impaired, during the early period
of camp life, when they were just foregoing their old habits and were
not yet hardened to the new, or it may be that when men are congregated
in great numbers, certain diseases, by transmission from one to another,
may be cultivated into extraordinary malignancy--at any rate a large
proportion of the inmates of every camp sickened and many died. At
Bowlinggreen in the winter of 1861 and 1862, the mortality was dreadful,
measles, typhoid fever, pneumonia and diseases of the bowels, carried
off a host of victims--every sickness, however, seemed fatal at that
time.
There was, consequently, a great and constantly increasing need of
medicines; and, perhaps, some waste of them, when they were collected in
large quantities and shipped from point to point, was unavoidable. But
all these problems, all the difficulties of properly supplying the army,
began to be solved and modified, as the genius of adaptation and
substitution was developed among the troops themselves. If a man could
not get a blanket, he made an old carpet, cut to the proper size and
lined on one side with a piece of strong cotton cloth, serve him
instead. The soldier who lacked shoes bid defiance to the rough roads,
or the weather, in a pair of ox-hide buskins, or with complicated
wrappings of rags about his feet. I have known more than one orderly
sergeant make out his morning report upon a shingle, and the surgeon who
lacked a tourniquet used a twisted handkerchief. Of the most necessary
military material, arms and ordnance stores, there was the greatest
scarcity. Perhaps one half of the entire western army (of all the troops
in the department) were armed (at the time that General Johnson came)
with shot-guns and squirrel rifles, and the majority of the other half
with scarcely as serviceable flint-lock muskets.
The troops under General Bragg at Pensacola were perhaps better armed,
but the rule held good with regard to the others. A few companies
composed of young men from the cities, and of rich planters, were armed
with fancy guns, Maynard rifles, etc., altogether unsuitable for the
armament of infantry. In September of 1861, there were probably not one
thousand Springfield and Enfield rifles in the army which General
Johnson was trying to concentrate in Kentucky, and it was several months
later before these unequaled weapons (the right arms for soldiers who
mean to fight) could be supplied in numbers at all adequate to the need
of them. In the advance to Bowlinggreen, more than three hundred
able-bodied men of the Second Kentucky, and an equal, if not greater
number of the Third Kentucky were left in the rear because arms could
not be gotten for them. In November one or two regiments of the Kentucky
brigade were given the Belgian in place of the flint-lock musket, and in
December flint-lock guns, altered to percussion locks, were given the
other regiments of the brigade. Proper accouterments were as scarce as
guns. Cartridge-boxes, knapsacks, canteens, when they could be gotten at
all, were very inferior. By great industry and effort, a considerable
quantity of ammunition had been prepared and worked up into cartridges,
but there was such a scarcity of lead and powder in the South, and such
inferior facilities for the manufacture of the latter, that apprehension
was felt lest, when the supply on hand was exhausted, it could not be
replaced.
There was scarcely a percussion cap to be had (in the early part of the
war) in the department, with the exception of some that were
manufactured by an enterprising citizen of Nashville, and zealous
Confederate, Mr. S.D. Morgan, an uncle of the General. But while so few
of the Confederate soldiers were efficiently armed, almost every man of
them, presuming that the Yankees were to be whipped in rough and tumble
style, had his bowie-knife and revolver. The Arkansas and Texas troops,
especially, carried enormous knives, that might have made a Malay's
blood run cold, but in the end those huge weapons did duty far oftener
as cleavers than as bayonets. The organization of the troops first put
in the field was, of course, to some extent, imperfect. A good deal has
been said about the evils of the system of electing officers, and much
just censure has been passed upon it. It has been claimed that it gives
rise to a laxity of discipline, and a disposition on the part of
officers, who owe their positions to the suffrages of the men they
command, to wink at irregularities and pardon gross neglect of duty.
This is undoubtedly true, in a great measure, and what is stranger, but
equally as true, is the fact that troops which have been longest in the
service, which know best what qualities are necessary to constitute a
good officer, which appreciate perfectly the necessity of having good
officers, not only to their efficiency and success in the field, but to
their well-being at all times--just such troops seem least able to
resist the temptation of electing some good-natured fellow, whom they
will never respect, and will, perhaps, grow ashamed of, rather than men
who will enforce their obedience, but promote alike their efficiency and
their comfort. At all times they will look to and rely upon the good
officer, but when they come to elect, the love of doing as they please,
unchecked by the irksome restraints of discipline, is apt to make them
vote for the man who will indulge them. But I believe that all those who
observed these matters carefully will agree, that there was far less of
this sort of feeling among the men who volunteered at the outbreak of
the war than there was later.
The officers elected by the regiments first raised were, generally,
about the best men that could have been selected. The men, at that time,
in good faith, chose those they believed best qualified for the duties
of command, and elected individuals who had manifested, or were thought
to possess, courage, energy, and good sense. Of course some mistakes
were made, and experience disclosed the fact, now well-established, that
many men who figured respectably in times of peace, are unfitted for
military responsibility, and weaken in the ordeal of military life.
No opportunity had been afforded then, for testing and discovering
those qualified for positions of trust and importance--it was all a
matter of experiment. Many injudicious selections were made, but it
quite as often happened that the appointing system (as it was exercised
at the beginning of the war) gave incompetent officers to the army. The
graduates of West Point themselves, and even those officers who had
served for years in the "Old Army," knew little or nothing of actual
war. Their studies at the academy, and the reading appropriate to their
profession, had instructed them in the theory of war.
They had the knowledge which the routine of camp and garrison duty
teaches. Most of them had seen service in expeditions against the
Indians on the Western plains. Some of them had served with distinction
and benefit to themselves in Mexico, but this was an experience which
they shared with many civilians. They had soldierly habits. They were
well acquainted with, and knew the importance of the military etiquette
and ceremonial so conducive to proper subordination and discipline, and
without which neither can be maintained in an army. But beyond the
necessity (permanently impressed upon them, and rendered a constant
influence with them by long training and habit) of strictly obeying all
the rules of discipline themselves, and of exacting the same obedience
from others, they knew nothing which a quick mind, if endowed with a
natural military aptitude and appreciation of military essentials, can
not readily acquire. While the regulations prescribed clear and
excellent rules of organization, the strictest conformity was not always
had to them, and it was sometimes difficult to strictly apply them.
Companies sometimes overran the maximum in a way that rendered them as
embarrassing to the regiments in which they were placed, as they were
painfully unwieldy to the unlearned Captains and Lieutenants who
immediately commanded them.
When it was known that a very popular man was recruiting, the number of
enlistments in his company was limited only by the number of able bodied
men in his district who were inclined to enlist. As each volunteer had
the right to select his Captain and company, and generally objected very
decidedly to being transferred to any other, it was a delicate and
difficult task to reduce these over-grown companies to proper
proportions. Regiments frequently, on account of the popularity of their
Colonels, or from other causes, swelled out of due bounds also. I knew
one regiment, which in the early part of September, 1861, had in it
seventeen companies and numbered, when all answered to roll call, more
than two thousand men. There was at this time a very favorite, and very
anomalous organization, known as the "Legion," which fortunately in a
few months entirely disappeared. It was something between a regiment and
a brigade, with all of a hybrid's vague awkwardness of conformation. It
was the general supposition, too, for little was ever definitely known
about it, that it was to be somewhat of an independent corps, something
like the "Partisan Ranger" regiment of later date. When the army was in
the first process of organization, these "Legions" could be heard of
everywhere.
The idea doubtless originated with some officer who felt that he
deserved a higher grade than that of Colonel, and could not obtain a
Brigadier's commission.
As organization went on, and system prevailed, the "Legions," perhaps
according to the merit of their commanders, or their numerical strength,
sank into companies, were regularly organized as regiments, or were
elevated into brigades. The brigades were from three to seven or eight
thousand strong, and all arms of the service were represented in them;
they included regiments of infantry and cavalry and batteries of
artillery. It was in a measure necessary that this organization should
be adopted, from the fact that for some months, each brigade commander
was entrusted with supervision and defense of a large tract of
territory, and it was impossible to dispense with either of the three
arms. Divisions were not organized until late in the fall of 1861--the
strength of the brigades was then, to some extent, equalized by the
reduction of the larger ones; Army Corps were of still later creation.
A significant custom prevailed of denoting the companies of the first
regiments which were raised, not by letter, but by some company
denomination which they had borne in the militia organization, or had
assumed as soon as mustered as an indispensable _nom-de-guerre_. They
seemed to vie with each other in inventing titles of thrilling interest:
"The Yellow Jackets," "The Dead Shots," "The Earthquakes," "The
Chickasaha Desperadoes," "The Hell-roarers," are a few which made the
newspapers of that day, in recording their movements, read like the
pages of popular romance. So fondly did the professors of these
appellations cling to them, that it was found almost as difficult to
compel their exchange for the proper designations, as to effect far more
harassing and laborious reforms. The spirit which prompted these
particular organizations to adopt this method of distinguishing and
identifying themselves, remained to the last characteristic of the
Southern troops. Regiments, especially in the cavalry service, were
quite as often styled by the names of their commanders, as by the
numbers which they properly bore, and, if the commanders were popular,
the former method was always the most agreeable.
In the latter part of the war, after every effort had been made to do
away with this feeling, it was at length adjudged expedient to enjoin
such a designation of brigades, by the names of their commanders, by
order from the War Department. This peculiar affectation was but one
form in which the temper of the Southern people was manifested--a temper
which revolted against complete loss of individuality, and was prone to
self-assertion. It is a temper which ought to be characteristic of a
free and high spirited people, which, while for prudential reasons it
will consent to severe restraints, seeks to mark the fact that the
restraint is self-imposed. Few will doubt, upon reflection, that this
feeling could have been turned to better account in the Southern army;
that to have allowed commands to win distinctive and honorable
appellations by extraordinary bravery would have elevated the standard
of _morale_, as much as did promotion for personal gallantry and good
conduct. The excellence of a command mentioned in general orders might
be only partially known, but the fame conferred by the title of the
"Stonewall Brigade" is universal. For the first year, there was, in the
true sense of the word, no discipline in the Western army at all. The
good sense and strong feeling of duty which pervaded the entire soldiery
made them obedient, zealous, and tolerably patient. High courage and
natural resolution made them fight well from the first, and, long
exposure to the storms of battle taught them coolness in the midst of
danger, and the comparative indifference to it, which become habitual
with the veteran, and which are usually confounded with the effects of
discipline, although they frequently exist where discipline has never
obtained. A spirit of emulation induced them to readily learn the drill
and all the more ostentatious duties of the soldier. A fortitude which,
until they were put to the test, they were not themselves aware of,
enabled them to endure without diminution of spirit, great hardship and
privation. Pride and patriotism, in the midst of every suffering and
temptation, kept them true and patient to the last. While all these
influences combined to make excellent soldiers of the material of which
that army was composed, it will be nearer the truth to say, that there
was, in the true sense of the word, no discipline in the Western army,
not only in the first year of the war, but at any time during the War.
The rigid method introduced by General Bragg undoubtedly told with good
effect upon the men of least pride and mettle, and kept all such men
nearer the mark, but for the rest, Bragg's discipline improved the army
rather by its operations upon the officers than upon the men.
No man who has intimately known the Southern soldiery can escape the
conviction, that, while capable of acquiring any degree of instruction,
and, if the word may be used, _veteranship_, they can not really be
disciplined, that is, be converted, by the infliction and fear of
punishment, into unreasoning machines. If there were no other proof of
this, the reflection which was invariably shed upon the _morale_ and
tone of every command by the personal character, prowess and skill of
its particular leader, would be sufficient proof of it, and the fact
that the Southern troops almost always read their chances of success or
defeat, not in the odds opposed to them, but in the reputation and
character of their commander--it would be as wide of the truth to call
this discipline, as it would be to speak of the perfect discipline of
the Norman knights, who would insult a cowardly and indolent Prince upon
his throne, and would, yet, obey with "proud humility" an heroic
adventurer.
While no practical soldier will underrate the value of discipline and
the marvels it works--still the experience of the late war will make
many officers believe that it is no match for native intelligence, zeal,
and pride--when those qualities have become trained and used to the
requirements of war. Instruction and skill in military duties, are
indispensable, although discipline is not always so. Give the high
strung young soldier who has brains and good blood, some practice and
knowledge of actual warfare, and the unthinking automaton, formed by
routine and punishment, can no more stand before him than a tree can
resist the stroke of the lightning, than the book general and paper
tactician can resist the genius which throws his plans out of gear, and
his mind into convulsions.
It will be well for those who read Southern histories of the war to keep
in mind that the writers mean, when they use the word "discipline," the
pride which stimulated the soldiers to learn their duties rather than
incur disgrace, and the subordination which proceeded from self respect,
and respect for an officer whom they thought worthy to command them. It
was not the fault of the Southern men who took the field, that the
efforts of the Southern people failed to establish, for themselves, a
separate and independent Government.
Two great mistakes were made at the outset and were never retrieved.
Mistakes which have lost battles and campaigns innumerable, and in this
instance lost a war. The vigor and irresistible audacity which is gained
by "taking the start" was lost to us by the defensive policy, and our
troops were scattered so widely that even an energetic defense could
nowhere be made, except in Virginia. The Government did not mass the
troops for attack upon vulnerable points in the enemy's territory, nor
to fall upon some one of his invading columns. Not only was the
defensive strictly maintained, but an effort was made to defend every
inch of the border. In the face of superior forces concentrating for
invasion at certain points, a skirmish line, which employed all of our
forces, was thrown out to hold all points from Richmond to the Western
prairies.
But one original and cardinal error gave birth to all the others. The
Confederate Government failed to invoke the only spirit which could have
done its bidding. It ought, with out delay, to have stimulated the ardor
and turned loose the tremendous energies of revolution, and have made
the people drunken with its inspiration. The time was propitious, the
Government was just established and was popular, the people were,
practically, unanimous, and were irretrievably committed to the
movement--they had never seen hostile troops or been daunted by the
sights of war. The presence of formidable armed foes might have aroused
prudence, but when Sumpter fell and war became inevitable, there were no
armies in the field on either side. When the first gun boomed, the
Government ought to have taken advantage of the glow of enthusiasm which
was as yet unchilled by any fear of the yet distant danger. It ought to
have asked for powers which the people in their, then, thorough
confidence in their leaders would have readily granted. They felt, that
if the struggle was really for important principles and vital rights, it
was better to make rulers of their own choice, omnipotent for a short
time, than to run the risk of defeat which would cause them entire, and,
perhaps eternal, loss of liberty. The leaders knew that the temper of
the people could be relied on--that if frankly told that success could
be achieved only by prompt and enormous efforts and sacrifices--the
efforts and sacrifices would be made. They were made later, when instead
of universal hope and enthusiasm, there prevailed a feeling of almost
despair. The strategy of revolution is identical, in principle, with
that of war--the side which masses and marches fast wins. If, while it
was yet a contest of peoples and not yet a conflict of armies, the
entire white population of the South had been aroused, her territory
converted into one vast camp, every male citizen between the ages of
sixteen and sixty made a soldier, leaving to the President the power of
exempting certain classes, and not regulating by law a matter so
essentially discretionary, and every dollar's worth of property had been
pledged to the cause, how different might have been the result? All this
could have been done in the then condition of public sentiment; not a
dissentient voice would have been heard. It would have been far more
popular than the "Conscript Act" was a year later, and that caused
little complaint.
Let any man think of what might have been done in May, 1861, with all
the men, which were subsequently in the Confederate army, arrayed and
pressed on the front. If unarmed, they would have met opponents also
unarmed. Men followed the armies in Missouri and picked up guns on the
battle field, while the Government was rejecting regiments because it
had not arms to give them. Subsequently it found arms easier to be
gotten than men.
If Jefferson Davis had possessed one tithe of the unscrupulous ambition
of which he has been accused, he would not now be the inmate of a
prison. He could have made, with all ease his Government a
dictatorate--or turning off the useless and clamorous Congress, as an
incumbrance to a Government which (until the war was won) was an
experiment, have ruled during the war with a "committee of public
safety."
To excite the energies of the people to the utmost, and then direct and
employ them by means of some such machinery, was the way to win. But he
preferred to believe that the danger was not great. He would have died
sooner than assume unconstitutional power. The ardor of the people was
rebuffed, and they sank into an apathy, from which they were awakened by
terrible disasters, to find themselves encompassed by fierce and hostile
armies.