The position assumed by Kentucky, at the inception of the late struggle,
and her conduct throughout, excited the surprise, and, in no small
degree, incurred for her the dislike of both the contending sections.
But while both North and South, at some time, doubted her good faith and
complained of her action, all such sentiments have been entirely
forgotten by the latter, and have become intensified into bitter and
undisguised animosity upon the part of a large share of the population
of the former.
The reason is patent. It is the same which, during the war, influenced
the Confederates to hope confidently for large assistance from Kentucky,
if once enabled to obtain a foothold upon her territory, and caused the
Federals, on the other hand, to regard even the loudest and most zealous
professors of loyalty as Secessionists in disguise, or, at best,
Unionists only to save their property. It is the instinctive feeling
that the people of Kentucky, on account of kindred blood, common
interests, and identity of ideas in all that relates to political rights
and the objects of political institutions, may be supposed likely to
sympathize and to act with the people of the South. But a variety of
causes and influences combined to prevent Kentucky from taking a decided
stand with either of the combatants, and produced the vacillation and
inconsistency which so notably characterized her councils and paralyzed
her efforts in either direction, and, alas, it may be added, so
seriously affected her fair fame.
Her geographical situation, presenting a frontier accessible for several
hundreds of miles to an assailant coming either from the North or South,
caused her people great apprehension, especially as it was accounted an
absolute certainty that her territory (if she took part with the South)
would be made the battle-ground and subjected to the last horrors and
desolation of war. The political education of the Kentuckians, also,
disposed them to enter upon such a contest with extreme reluctance and
hesitation.
Originally a portion of Virginia, settled chiefly by emigration from
that State, her population partook of the characteristics and were
imbued with the feelings which so strongly prevailed in the mother
commonwealth.
From Virginia, the first generation of Kentucky statesmen derived those
opinions which became the political creed of the Southern people, and
were promulgated in the celebrated resolutions of '98, which gave shape
and consistency to the doctrine of States' Rights, and popular
expression to that construction of the relations of the several States
to the General Government (under the Federal Constitution), so earnestly
insisted upon by the master-minds of Virginia. The earlier population of
Kentucky was peculiarly inclined to adopt and cherish such opinions, by
the promptings of that nature which seems common to all men descended
from the stock of the "Old Dominion," that craving for the largest
individual independence, and disposition to assert and maintain in full
_measure_ every personal right, which has always made the people of the
Southern and Western States so jealous of outside interference with
their local affairs. It was natural that a people, animated by such a
spirit, should push their preference for self-government even to
extremes; that they should esteem their most valued franchises only safe
when under their own entire custody and control; that they should prefer
that their peculiar institutions should be submitted only to domestic
regulation, and that the personal liberty, which they prized above all
their possessions, should be restrained only by laws enacted by
legislators chosen from among themselves, and executed by magistrates
equally identified with themselves and appreciative of their instincts.
In short, they were strongly attached to their State Governments, and
were not inclined to regard as beneficent, nor, even exactly legitimate,
any interference with them, upon the part of the General Government, and
desired to see the powers of the latter exercised only for the "common
defense and general welfare."
Without presuming to declare them correct or erroneous, it may be safely
asserted that such were the views which prevailed in Kentucky at a
period a little subsequent to her settlement.
This decided and almost universal sentiment was first shaken, and the
minds of the people began to undergo some change, about the time of, and
doubtless in consequence of, the detection of the Burr conspiracy. Burr
had been identified with the party which advocated the extreme State
Rights doctrines, and his principal confederates were men of the same
political complexion.
The utter uselessness of his scheme, even if successful, and the little
prospect of any benefit accruing from it, unless to the leading
adventurers, had disposed all the more sober minded to regard it with
distrust. And when it became apparent that it had been concocted for the
gratification of one man's ambition, the very people whom it had been
part of the plan to flatter with hopes of the most brilliant advantages,
immediately conceived for it the most intense aversion.
The odium into which Burr and his associates immediately fell, became,
in some measure, attached to the political school to which they had
belonged, and men's minds began to be unsettled upon the very political
tenets, in the propriety and validity of which they had previously so
implicitly believed. The able Federalist leaders in the State, pursued
and improved the advantage thus offered them, and for the first time in
the history of Kentucky, that party showed evidence of ability to cope
with its rival. Doubtless, also, the effect of Mr. Madison's attempt to
explain away the marrow and substance of the famous resolutions, which
told so injuriously against the State Rights party every where,
contributed, at a still later day, to weaken that party in Kentucky; but
the vital change in the political faith of Kentucky, was wrought by
Henry Clay. All previous interruptions to the opinions which she had
acquired as her birthright from Virginia, were but partial, and would
have been ephemeral, but the spell which the great magician cast over
his people was like the glamour of mediaeval enchantment. It bound them
in helpless but delighted acquiescence in the will of the master. Their
vision informed them, not of objects as they were, but as he willed that
they should seem, and his patients received, at his pleasure and with
equal confidence, the true or the unreal. In fact, the undoubted
patriotism and spotless integrity of Mr. Clay, so aided the effect of
his haughty will and superb genius, that his influence amounted to
fascination. Although himself, in early life, an advocate of the
principles of (what has been since styled) the Jeffersonian school of
Democracy, he became gradually, but thoroughly, weaned from his first
opinions, and a convert to the dogmas of the school of politics which he
had once so ably combatted. The author of the American System, the
advocate of the United States Bank, the champion of the New England
manufacturing and commercial interests, with their appropriate and
necessary train of protective tariffs, bounties and monopolies, could
have little sympathy with the ideas that the several States could, and
should, protect and develope their own interests without Federal
assistance, that the General Government was the servant of all the
States and not the guardian and dry nurse of a few--the doctrine, in
short, of "State Sovereignty and Federal Agency." Mr. Clay fairly and
emphatically announced his political faith in word and deed. He declared
that he "owed a paramount allegiance to the whole Union: a subordinate
one to his own State," and, throughout the best part of his long
political life, he wrought faithfully for interests distinct from, if
not adverse to, those of his own State and section. His influence,
however, in his own State, has determined, perhaps forever, her
destiny. If he did not educate the people of Kentucky (as has been so
often charged) to "defer principle to expediency," he at least taught
them to study the immediate policy rather than the ultimate effect of
every measure that they were called to consider, and to seek the
material prosperity of the hour at the expense, even, of future safety.
He taught his generation to love the Union, not as an "agency" through
which certain benefits were to be derived, but as an "end" which was to
be adhered to, no matter what results flowed from it.
Mr. Clay sincerely believed that in the union of the States resided the
surest guarantees of the safety, honor, and prosperity of each, and he
contemplated with horror and aversion any thought of disunion. His own
lofty and heroic nature could harbor no feeling which was not manly and
brave, but, in striving to stimulate and fortify in his people the same
love of union which he entertained himself, he taught many Kentuckians
to so dread the evils of war, as to lose all fear of other and as great
evils, and to be willing to purchase exemption from civil strife by
facile and voluntary submission. After the death of Mr. Clay, Kentucky,
no longer subjected to his personal influence, began to forget it.
In 1851, John C. Breckinridge had been elected to Congress from Mr.
Clay's district, while the latter still lived, and beating one of his
warmest friends and supporters. Under the leadership of Mr.
Breckinridge, the Democratic party in Kentucky rallied and rapidly
gained ground. During the "Know-nothing" excitement, the old Whigs, who
had nearly all joined the Know-nothing or American party, seemed about
to regain their ascendency, but that excitement ebbing as suddenly as it
had arisen, left the Democracy in indisputable power. In 1856, Kentucky
cast her Presidential vote for Buchanan and Breckinridge by nearly seven
thousand majority. Mr. Breckinridge's influence had, by this time,
become predominant in the State, and was felt in every election. The
troubles in Kansas and the agitation in Congress had rendered the
Democratic element in Kentucky more determined, and inclined them more
strongly to take a Southern view of all the debated questions. The John
Brown affair exasperated her people in common with that of every other
slaveholding community, and led to the organization of the State-guard.
Created because of the strong belief that similar attempts would be
repeated, and upon a larger scale, and that, quite likely, Kentucky
would be selected as a field of operations, it is not surprising that
the State-guard should have expected an enemy only from the North,
whence, alone, would come the aggressions it was organized to resist,
and that it should have conceived a feeling of antagonism for the
Northern, and an instinctive sympathy for the Southern, people.
These sentiments were intensified by the language of the Northern press
and pulpit, and the commendation and encouragement of such enterprises
as the Harper's Ferry raid, which were to be heard throughout the North.
In the Presidential election of 1860, the Kentucky Democracy divided on
Douglas and Breckinridge, thereby losing the State. After the election
of Mr. Lincoln and the passage of ordinances of secession by several
Southern States, when the most important question which the people of
Kentucky had ever been required to determine, was presented for their
consideration, their sentiments and wishes were so various and
conflicting, as to render its decision by themselves impossible, and it
was finally settled for them by the Federal Government.
The Breckinridge wing of the Democracy was decidedly Southern in
feelings and opinions, and anxious to espouse the Southern cause.
The Douglas wing strongly sympathized with the South, but opposed
secession and disunion.
The Bell-Everett party, composed chiefly of old Clay Whigs, was
decidedly in favor of Union. Such was the attitude of parties, with
occasional individual exceptions. The very young men of the State were
generally intense Southern sympathizers, and were, with few exceptions,
connected with the State-guard. Indeed, divided as were the people of
Kentucky at that time, sympathy with the Southern people was prevalent
among all classes of them, and the conviction seemed to be strong, even
in the most determined opponents of secession, that an attack upon the
Southern people was an attack upon themselves. Among the Union men it
was common to hear such declarations as that "When it becomes a direct
conflict between North and South, we will take part with the South,"
"The Northern troops shall not march over our soil to invade the South,"
"When it becomes apparent that the war is an abolition crusade, and
waged for the destruction of slavery, Kentucky will arm against the
Government," etc.; each man had some saving clause with his Unionism. It
is no hazardous assertion that the Union party, in Kentucky, condemned
the secession of the Southern States, more because it was undertaken
without consultation with them, and because they regarded it as a blow
at Kentucky's dignity and comfort, than because it endangered "the
national life." Certainly not one of the leading politicians of that
party would have dared, in the winter and spring of 1861, to have openly
advocated coercion, no matter what were his secret views of its
propriety.
Upon the 17th February, 1861, the Legislature met in extra session at
the summons of Governor Magoffin. Seven Southern States had seceded, the
Confederate Government had been inaugurated, and it was time for the
people of Kentucky to understand what they were going to do. The
Governor addressed a message to the Legislature advising the call of a
State Convention. This the Legislature declined to do, but suggested the
propriety of the assembling of a National Convention to revise and
correct the Federal Constitution, and recommended the "Peace
Conference," which was subsequently held at Washington. In certain
resolutions passed by this Legislature, in reference to resolutions
passed by the States of Maine, New York and Massachusetts, this language
occurs: "The Governor of the State of Kentucky is hereby requested to
inform the executives of said States, that it is the opinion of this
General Assembly that whenever the authorities of these States shall
send armed forces to the South for the purpose indicated in said
resolutions, the people of Kentucky, uniting with their brethren of the
South, will as one man, resist such invasion of the soil of the South,
at all hazards and to the last extremity." Rather strong language for
"Union" men and a "loyal" legislature to use. It would seem that
Kentucky, at that time, supposed herself a "sovereign" State addressing
other "sovereign" States, and that she entirely ignored the "Nation."
Her Legislature paid as little attention to the "proper channel of
communication" as a militia Captain would have done. The Union men who
voted for the resolutions in which this language was embodied, would be
justly liable to censure, if it were not positively certain that they
were _insincere_; and that they _were_ insincere is abundantly proven by
their subsequent action, and the fact that many of them held commissions
in the "armed forces" sent to invade the South. On the 11th of February
the Legislature resolved, "That we protest against the use of force or
coercion by the General Government against the seceded States, as unwise
and inexpedient, and tending to the destruction of our common country."
At the Union State Convention, held at Louisville on the 8th of January,
certain amendments to the Constitution of the United States were
"recommended," and it was resolved, "that, if the disorganization of the
present Union is not arrested, that the States agreeing to these
amendments of the Federal Constitution shall form a _separate
Confederacy_, with power to admit new States under our glorious
Constitution thus _amended_;" it was resolved also that it was
"expedient to call a convention of the border free and slave States,"
and that "we deplore the existence of a Union to be held together by the
sword."
It almost takes a man's breath away to write such things about the most
loyal men of the loyal State of Kentucky. For a Union Convention to
have passed them, and Union men to have indorsed them, the resolutions
whose substance has been just given, have rather a strange sound. They
ring mightily like secession.
"If the disorganization of the present Union is not arrested," the Union
men of Kentucky would also help it along. A modified phrase much in
vogue with them, "separate State action" expressed their "conservative"
plan of seceding. Unless the proper distinctions are drawn, however, the
action of this class of politicians will always be misunderstood. They
indignantly condemned the secession of South Carolina and Georgia. No
language was strong enough to express their abhorrence and condemnation
of the wickedness of those who would inaugurate "the disorganization of
the present Union." But they did not, with ordinary consistency,
"Compound for sins they were inclined to
By damning those they had no mind to!"
They committed the same sin under another name, and advocated the
"separate Confederacy" of "the border free and slave States," under our
glorious Constitution thus amended.
"Orthodoxy," was their "doxy;" "Heterodoxy," was "another man's doxy."
Every candid man, who remembers the political status of Kentucky at that
period, will admit that the Union party propounded no definite and
positive creed, and that its leaders frequently gave formal expression
to views which strangely resembled the "damnable heresies of secession."
Indeed, the neglect of the seceding States to "consult Kentucky,"
previously to having gone out, seemed to be, in the eyes of these
gentlemen, not so much an aggravation of the crime of secession, as, in
itself, a crime infinitely graver. There were many who would condemn
secession, and in the same breath indicate the propriety of
"co-operation." These subtle distinctions, satisfactory, doubtless, to
the intellects which generated them, were not aptly received by common
minds, and their promulgation induced, perhaps very unjustly, a very
general belief that the Union party was actuated not more by a love of
the Union, than by a salutary regard for personal security and comfort.
It seemed that the crime was not in "breaking up the Union," but in
going about it in the wrong way.
The people of Kentucky heard, it is true, from these leaders indignant
and patriotic denunciations of "secession," and, yet, they could listen
to suggestions amounting almost to advocacy, from the same lips, of
"central confederacies" or "co-operations."
Is it surprising, then, that no very holy horror of disunion should have
prevailed in Kentucky?
But any inclination to tax these gentlemen with inconsistency should be
checked by the reflection that they were surrounded by peculiar
circumstances. It appeared to be by no means certain, just then, that an
attempt would be made to coerce the seceding States, or that the
Southern Confederacy would not be established without a war. In that
event, Kentucky would have glided naturally and certainly into it, and
Kentucky politicians who had approved coercion, would have felt
uncomfortable as Confederate citizens. The leaders of the Union party
were men of fine ability, but they were not endowed with prescience, nor
could they in the political chaos then ruling, instinctively detect the
strong side. Let it be remembered that, just so soon as they discerned
it, they enthusiastically embraced it and clave to it, with a few
immaterial oscillations, through much tribulation. As was explained by
one of the most distinguished among them (in the United States Senate),
it was necessary to "educate the people of Kentucky to loyalty." It is
true that in this educational process, which was decidedly novel and
peculiar, many Kentuckians, not clearly seeing the object in view, were
made rebels, and even Confederate soldiers, although not originally
inclined that way.
But it is seldom that a perfectly new and original system works
smoothly, and the "educators" made amends for all their errors by
inflexible severity toward the rebels who staid at home, and by
"expatriating" and confiscating the property of those who fled. A
"States Rights Convention" was called to assemble at Frankfort on the
22nd of March, 1861, but adjourned, having accomplished nothing.
After the fall of Fort Sumpter and the issuing of the proclamation of
April 15, 1861, Governor Magoffin responded to President Lincoln's call
for troops from Kentucky in the following language:
"FRANKFORT, _April 16, 1861_.
"_Hon. Simon Cameron, Secretary of War_;
"Your dispatch is received. In answer, I say, emphatically, that
Kentucky will furnish no troops for the wicked purpose of subduing
her sister Southern States.
"B. MAGOFFIN, _Governor of Kentucky_."
Governor Magoffin then a second time convened the Legislature in extra
session, to consider means for putting the State in a position for
defense. When the Legislature met, it resolved,
"That the act of the Governor in refusing to furnish troops or military
force upon the call of the Executive authority of the United States,
under existing circumstances, is approved." Yeas, eighty-nine; nays,
four.
On the 18th of April a large Union meeting was held at Louisville, at
which the most prominent and influential Union men of the State
assisted. Resolutions were adopted,
"That as the Confederate States have, by overt acts, commenced war
against the United States, _without consultation with Kentucky and their
sister Southern States_, Kentucky reserves to herself the right to
choose her own position; and that while her natural sympathies are with
those who have a common interest in the protection of slavery, she still
acknowledges her loyalty and fealty to the Government of the United
States, which she will cheerfully render until that Government becomes
aggressive, tyrannical, and regardless of our rights in slave
property;" Resolved,
"That the National Government should be tried by its acts, and that the
several States, _as its peers in their appropriate spheres_, will hold
it to a rigid accountability, and require that its acts should be
fraternal in their efforts to bring back the seceded States, and not
sanguinary or coercive."
The Senate resolved, just before the adjournment of the Legislature,
that "Kentucky will not sever her connection with the National
Government, nor take up arms for either belligerent party; but arm
herself for the preservation of peace within her borders."
This was the first authoritative declaration of the policy of
"Neutrality," which, however, had been previously indicated at a Union
meeting held at Louisville on the 10th of April, in the following
resolutions:
"That as we oppose the call of the President for volunteers for the
purpose of coercing the seceded States, so we oppose the raising of
troops in this State to co-operate with the Southern Confederacy."
"That the present duty of Kentucky is to maintain her present
independent position, taking sides, not with the Administration nor with
the seceding States, but with the Union against them both, declaring her
soil to be sacred from the hostile tread of either, and, if necessary,
to make the declaration good with her strong right arm."
In other words, Kentucky would remain in the Union, but would refuse
obedience to the Government of the United States, and would fight its
armies if they came into her territory. Was it much less "criminal" and
"heretical" to do this than to "take sides with the seceding States?"
What is the exact shade of difference between the guilt of a State which
transfers its fealty from the Union to a Confederacy, and that of a
State which declares her positive and absolute independence, entering
into no new compacts, but setting at defiance the old one? Where was the
boasted "loyalty" of the Union men of Kentucky when they indorsed the
above given resolutions?
In May of that year, the _Louisville Journal_, the organ of the Union
party of Kentucky, said, in reference to the response which it was
proper for Kentucky to make to the President's call for troops: "In our
judgment, the people of Kentucky have answered this question in advance,
and the answer expressed in every conceivable form of popular
expression, and finally, clinched by the glorious vote of Saturday, is;
arm Kentucky efficiently, but rightfully, and fairly, with the clear
declaration that the arming is not for offense against either the
Government or the seceding States, but purely for defense against
whatever power sets hostile foot upon the actual soil of the
Commonwealth. In other words, the Legislature, according to the manifest
will of the people, should declare the neutrality of Kentucky in this
unnatural and accursed war of brothers, and equip the State for the
successful maintenance of her position at all hazards?"
It is well known that loyalty means unqualified, unconditional, eternal
devotion and adherence to the Union, with a prompt and decorous
acquiescence in the will and action of the Administration. Although a
definition of the term has been frequently asked, and many have affected
not to understand it, it is positively settled that every man is a
traitor who doubts that this definition is the correct one. It is
impossible, then, to avoid the conviction that in the year 1861, there
was really no loyalty in the State of Kentucky. A good deal was
subsequently contracted for, and a superior article was furnished the
Government a few months later.
Had their been during the winter and spring of 1861, a resolute and
definite purpose upon the part of the Southern men of Kentucky, to take
the State out of the Union; had those men adopted, organized and
determined action, at any time previously to the adjournment of the
Legislature, on the 24th of April, the Union party of Kentucky would
have proven no material obstacle.
The difficulty which was felt to be insuperable by all who approved the
secession of Kentucky, was her isolated position. Not only did the long
hesitation of Virginia and Tennessee effectually abate the ardor and
resolution of the Kentuckians who desired to unite their State to the
Southern Confederacy, but while it lasted it was an insurmountable,
physical barrier in the way of such an undertaking. With those States
antagonistic to the Southern movement, it would have been madness for
Kentucky to have attempted to join it. When at length, Virginia and
Tennessee passed their ordinances of secession, Kentucky had become
infatuated with the policy of "neutrality." With the leaders of the
Union party, it had already been determined upon as part of their system
for the "education" of the people. The Secessionists, who were without
organization and leaders, regarded it as something infinitely better
than unconditional obedience to the orders and coercive policy of the
Federal Government; and the large class of the timid and irresolute of
men, who are by nature "neutral" in times of trouble and danger,
accepted it joyfully, as such men always accept a compromise which
promises to relieve them of immediate responsibility and the necessity
of hazardous decision. Disconnected from the views and intentions of
those who consented to it, this "neutrality" will scarcely admit of
serious discussion. Such a position is certainly little else than
rebellion, and the principle or conditions which will justify it, will
also justify secession. If a State has the legal and constitutional
right to oppose the action, and to refuse compliance with the
requisitions of the Federal Government, to disobey the laws of Congress,
and set at defiance the proclamations of the Executive, to decide for
herself her proper policy in periods of war and insurrection, and levy
armed forces to prevent the occupation of her territory by the forces of
the United States, then she can quit the Union when she pleases, and is
competent to contract any alliance which accords, with her wishes. If,
however, it be a revolutionary right which she may justly exercise in a
certain condition of affairs, then the same condition of affairs will
justify any other phase or manner of revolution.
The practical effects of such a position, had it been stubbornly
maintained, would have been to involve Kentucky in more danger than she
would have incurred by secession and admission into the Confederacy. A
declaration of neutrality in such a contest was almost equivalent to a
declaration of war against both sides; at any rate it was a proclamation
of opposition to the Government, while it discarded the friendship of
the South, and seemed at once to invite every assailant. The Government
of the United States, which was arming to coerce seceded States, would
certainly not permit its designs to be frustrated by this attitude of
Kentucky, and it was not likely that the States, about to be attacked,
would respect a neutrality, which they very well knew would be no
hindrance to their adversary. But few men reason clearly in periods of
great excitement, or, in situations of peril, look steadfastly and
understandingly at the dangers which surround them. Nor, it may be
added, do the few who possess the presence of mind to study and the
faculty of appreciating the signs of such a political tempest, always
honestly interpret them. As has been said, a large class eagerly
welcomed the decision that Kentucky should remain neutral in the great
struggle impending, as a relief, however temporary, from the harassing
consideration of dangers at which they shuddered. Nine men out of ten,
will shrink from making up their minds upon a difficult question, and
yet will accept, with joy, a determination of it, however paltry and
inconclusive, from any one who has the nerve to urge it. A great many
Union men, who would have earnestly opposed a concurrence of Kentucky in
the action of the seceding States, if for no other reason than that they
regarded it as "a trick of the Democratic party," and yet as obstinately
opposed the policy and action of the Government, thought they perceived
in "neutrality" a solution of all the difficulties which embarrassed
them. A few of the more sagacious and resolute of the leaders of the
Union party, who were perhaps not incommoded with a devotion to their
State, their section, or to the "flag," but who realized that they could
get into power only by crushing the Democratic party, and knew that in
the event of Kentucky's going South, the Democratic party would dominate
in the State, these men saw in this policy of neutrality the means of
holding Kentucky quiet, until the Government could prepare and pour into
her midst an overwhelming force. They trusted, and as the sequel showed,
with reason, that they would be able to demoralize their opponents after
having once reduced them to inaction. The Kentuckians who wished that
their State should become a member of the Confederacy, but who saw no
immediate hope of it, consented to neutrality as the best arrangement
that they could make under the circumstances. They knew that if the
neutrality of Kentucky were respected--a vital portion of the
Confederacy, a border of four or five hundred miles would be safe from
attack and invasion--that the forces of the Confederacy could be
concentrated for the defense of the other and threatened lines, and that
individual Kentuckians could flock to the Southern army. They believed
that in such a condition of affairs, more men would leave Kentucky to
take part with the South than to enlist in the service of the
Government.
Some time in the early part of the summer, General S.B. Buckner,
commanding the Kentucky State-guard, had an interview with General Geo.
B. McClellan, who commanded a department embracing territory contiguous
to Kentucky--if, indeed, Kentucky was not included by the commission
given him in his department. General Buckner obtained, as he supposed, a
guarantee that the neutrality of Kentucky would be observed by the
military authorities of the United States. He communicated the result of
this interview to Governor Magoffin, and, immediately, it became a
matter of _official_ as well as popular belief that the neutrality of
Kentucky was safe for all time to come.
The dream, however, was a short one, and very soon afterward the Federal
Government commenced to recruit in Kentucky, to establish camps and
organize armed forces in the State.
"Camp Dick Robinson," some twenty-six miles from Lexington, was the
largest, first formed, and most noted of these establishments. For many
weeks the Kentuckians were in a high state of excitement about "Camp
Dick," as it was called. They used the name as if it were synonymous
with the Federal army, and spoke of the rumors that "Camp Dick" was to
be moved from point to point, as glibly as if the ground it occupied had
possessed the properties of the flying carpet of the fairy tale.
The Legislature, notwithstanding its high-sounding resolutions about
neutrality, stood this very quietly, although many citizens (Union men)
endeavored to have these camps broken up and the troops removed. Others,
again, professed to desire that the Federal troops should be removed,
but clandestinely advised President Lincoln to rather increase than
withdraw the forces, and offered their services to introduce into
Kentucky guns for the armament of the loyal Home-guards. These men were
of the class of "Educators." But the game required two to play it. On
the 4th of September, in anticipation of a Federal movement upon that
point, General Polk, of the Confederate army, occupied Columbus, in
Kentucky.
In the midst of the excitement created by the information of the
occupation of Columbus, Governor Magoffin sent in the following message:
"EX. DEP'T, FRANKFORT, _Sept. 9, 1861_.
"_Gentlemen of the Senate and House of Representatives_:
"I have received the following dispatches by telegraph from General
Leonidas Polk, which I deem proper to lay before you,
"B. MAGOFFIN."
[If any answer were needed to the outcries of those who so strongly
condemned his action, General Polk certainly furnished it. His first
dispatch was a simple intimation to Governor Magoffin of his presence
upon the soil of Kentucky, and of the authority by which he remained.]
"COLUMBUS, KENTUCKY, _Sept. 9, 1861_.
"_Governor B. Magoffin_:
A military necessity having required me to occupy this town, I have
taken possession of it by the forces under my command. The
circumstances leading to this act we reported promptly to the President
of the Confederate States. His reply was, the necessity justified the
action. A copy of my proclamation I have the honor to transmit you by
mail.
"_Respectfully_,
"LEONIDAS POLK, _Major-General Commanding_."
In a letter of the same date, inclosing his proclamation, General Polk
said, after explaining the cause of his delay in writing:
"It will be sufficient to inform you, which my short address here will
do, that I had information, on which I could rely, that the Federal
forces intended, and were preparing, to seize Columbus. I need not
describe the danger resulting to West Tennessee from such success, nor
say that I could not permit the loss of so important a position, while
holding the command intrusted to me by my government. In evidence of
the information I possessed, I will state that as the Confederate
forces occupied this place, the Federal troops were formed, in
formidable numbers, in position upon the opposite bank, with their
cannon turned upon Columbus. The citizens of the town had fled with
terror, and not a word of assurance of safety or protection had been
addressed to them."
General Polk concluded with this language:
"I am prepared to say that I will agree to withdraw the Confederate
troops from Kentucky, provided that she will agree that the troops of
the Federal Government be withdrawn simultaneously; with a guarantee,
which I will give reciprocally for the Confederate Government, that the
Federals shall not be allowed to enter, or occupy any point of Kentucky
in the future.
"I have the honor to be
"Your obedient servant, respectfully,
"LEONIDAS POLK, _Major-Gen, Com._"
General Folk's proclamation was as follows:
"COLUMBUS, _Sept. 14, 1861_.
"The Federal Government having in defiance of the wishes of the people
of Kentucky, disregarded their neutrality, by establishing camps and
depots of arms, and by organizing military companies within their
territory, and by constructing a military work, on the Missouri shore,
immediately opposite, and commanding Columbus, evidently intended to
cover the landing of troops for the seizure of the town, it has become
a military necessity, worth the defense of the territory of the
Confederate States, that the Confederate forces occupy Columbus in
advance. The Major-General commanding has, therefore, not felt himself
at liberty to risk the loss of so important a position, but has decided
to occupy it. In pursuance of this decision, he has thrown a sufficient
force into the town and ordered fortifying it. It is gratifying to know
that the presence of his troops is acceptable to the people of
Columbus, and on this occasion they assure them that every precaution
will be taken to insure their quiet, the protection of their property,
with their personal and corporate rights.
LEONIDAS POLK."
Dispatches, concerning the peculiar manner in which Kentucky observed
her neutrality and permitted it to be observed by her Federal friends,
began to pour in on the Governor about this time. He had already
received, on the 7th, a dispatch from Lieutenant Governor Reynolds, of
Missouri, on the subject. Governor Reynolds stated that, "The
Mississippi river below the mouth of the Ohio, is the property of
Kentucky and Missouri conjointly." He then alluded to the "presence of
United States gunboats in the river at Columbus, Kentucky, to protect
the forces engaged in fortifying the Missouri shore immediately
opposite." "This," he went on to say, "appears to me to be a clear
violation of the neutrality Kentucky proposes to observe in the present
war." And then again on the 14th came a dispatch from Knoxville,
Tennessee, as follows:
"_To his Excellency B. Magoffin_:
SIR: The safety of Tennessee requiring, I occupy the mountain passes at
Cumberland, and the three long mountains in Kentucky. For weeks I have
known that the Federal commander at Hoskin's Cross Roads was
threatening the invasion of East Tennessee, and ruthlessly urging our
own people to destroy their own road bridges. I postponed this
precaution until the despotic Government at Washington, refusing to
recognize the neutrality of Kentucky, has established formidable camps
in the center and other parts of the State, with the view first to
subjugate our gallant sister, then ourselves. Tennessee feels, and has
ever felt, toward Kentucky as a twin sister; their people, are as our
people in kindred, sympathy, valor, and patriotism; we have felt and
still feel a religious respect for Kentucky's neutrality; we will
respect it as along as our safety will permit. If the Federal forces
will now withdraw from their menacing positions, the forces under my
command shall be immediately withdrawn.
Very respectfully,
F.K. ZOLLICOFFER,
_Brigadier General Commanding_."
It would seem that each one of these communications put the case very
clearly, and that, Kentucky having permitted her neutrality to be
violated by the one side, after her emphatic and definite declaration
that it was meant to be good against both, could consistently take no
action, unless it should be such as Generals Polk and Zollicoffer
suggested, viz: to provide for a simultaneous withdrawal of both Federal
and Confederate forces. Certainly Kentucky meant that neither of the
combatants should occupy her soil--as has been shown, her declarations
upon that head were clear and vigorous. If she intended that troops of
the United States should come into her territory, for any purpose
whatever, while the Confederate forces should be excluded, it is
unnecessary to say that she selected in "neutrality" a word, which very
inaccurately and lamely expressed her meaning. The people of Kentucky
had long since--two months at least, a long time in such a period,
before this correspondence between their Governor and the Confederate
Generals--ceased to do anything but blindly look to certain leaders, and
blindly follow their dictation. The Southern men of the State, and their
peculiar leaders, were sullen and inert; the mass of the people were
bewildered, utterly incompetent to arrive at a decision, and were
implicitly led by the Legislature to which all the politicians, who
aspired to influence, now resorted. In view of the history of this
neutrality, of the professions made, only a few weeks previously, by the
same men who returned an answer from the Capital of Kentucky to the
propositions of the Confederate authorities that Kentucky should act
fairly, and not declare one policy and clandestinely pursue another--in
view of the facts which are fastened in the record--what sort of men
does that answer prove them to have been? This was the answer:
"_Resolved, By the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Kentucky that
his Excellency, Governor Magoffin, be, and he is hereby instructed to
inform those concerned, that Kentucky expects the Confederate or
Tennessee troops to be withdrawn from her soil unconditionally._"
This, after a pledge to their own people, and a proclamation to both
sections, of neutrality! After Federal troops, and Federal encampments
had been for weeks upon the soil of Kentucky, and in response to action
(which their own had invited) from men (to whom they had promised
assistance in just such a contingency as was then upon them), when they
resolved the previous January, that Governor Magoffin should inform the
Governors of New York, Maine and Massachusetts, that when Northern
troops should march to invade the South, "the people of Kentucky,
uniting with their brethren of the South, will as one man resist such
invasion of the soil of the South, at all hazards, and to the last
extremity!" The Committee on Federal Relations, to which was referred
the communications addressed to Governor Magoffin, exerted itself to
outdo the resolutions given above, and reported resolutions of which the
substance was, that as Kentucky had been invaded by the Confederate
forces, and the commanders of said forces had "insolently prescribed the
conditions upon which they will withdraw;" "that the invaders must be
expelled, _inasmuch as there are now in Kentucky Federal troops
assembled for the purpose of preserving the tranquillity of the State,
and of defending and preserving the people of Kentucky in the peaceful
enjoyment of their lives and property_." A candid confession, truly, and
one which it required nerve to make! Brave, honorable, consistent
men--fit to be the guardians of a people's honor! Declare neutrality,
and warn both combatants off the soil of their State! proclaim that
Kentucky can and will take care of herself, and then coolly resolve,
when the issue is made, "that as there are now Federal troops in
Kentucky, for the purpose," etc., that the mask shall be thrown off, and
deception no longer practiced. But the cup of shame was not yet full;
this unblushing Legislature passed yet other resolutions, to publish to
the world the duplicity and dissimulation which had characterized their
entire conduct. After going on to set forth the why and wherefore
Kentucky had assumed neutrality, it was resolved, "that when the General
Government occupies our soil for its defense, in pursuance of a
constitutional right, _it neither compromises our assumed neutrality_,
nor gives the right to the Confederate forces to invade our State on
the assumption that our neutrality has been violated, especially _when
they first set foot upon our soil_ upon the plea of military necessity."
"That when the General Government occupies our soil for its defense, it
neither compromises our assumed neutrality," etc. Well! it is useless to
attempt comment on this--"it is impossible to do the subject justice."
We rebels never contended that the Government was bound to respect
Kentucky's neutrality, if it had the right to coerce the seceded States.
We denied the constitutional right and power of coercion--but if the
Government had that power, we conceded that there was the same right and
reason to employ it against Kentucky's neutrality as against South
Carolina's secession. But for the neutrality-mongers to say this--were
they generously striving to fool themselves also? And, then, in hearing,
as they had been for weeks, of the morning and evening guns of "Camp
Dick Robinson," to speak of the Confederates having "_first set foot
upon our soil_." Is it an unfair construction of such conduct, to
suppose that the men guilty of it were, in part, time-servers, who had
striven all the while to get upon the strong and safe side, and believed
that they had succeeded, and, in part, politicians unscrupulous, if in
plan consistent, who had deliberately deceived the people of Kentucky,
and lulled them into a condition in which they would receive the
handcuffs, to be slipped upon them, without resistance?
But now that the men of purpose saw that it was no longer necessary to
conceal it, and the wavering had become satisfied which side it was safe
and politic to adopt, there was no more dallying.
The Legislature prepared to finally crush the State-guard and "an act to
enlarge the powers of the Military Board of this State," was passed. It
was enacted, "That the Military Board created at the last session of the
Legislature, are hereby authorized to order into the custody of said
Board any State arms which may have been given out under the act
creating said Board, or other law of the State, whenever said Board
shall deem it expedient to do so; said Board shall have like power over
the accouterments, camp equipage, equipments, and ammunition of the
State." Willful failure or refusal "to return any of said property for
forty-eight hours after the receipt of the order of the Board to that
effect," was made a high misdemeanor, and punishable by fine of not less
than one nor more than five thousand dollars, and imprisonment until the
fine was paid, and the arms or other property restored. The removal,
concealment, or disposal of any of the property, mentioned in the first
section of the act, was made felony and punishable by not less than one
nor more than two years in the penitentiary. A further resolution in the
spirit of the same kind of neutrality was approved September 23rd, "That
the Military Board be and they are hereby authorized to place any
portion of the arms, accouterments, equipments, camp equipage, baggage
trains, ammunition, and military stores of the State, not in use, under
the control of the commander of the Federal forces in Kentucky," etc.
Having once gotten on the right track (as they were compelled to believe
it, inasmuch as it was clearly the one which conducted to immediate
profit and safety) these gentlemen thought they could not go too fast.
"The people were educated to loyalty," now, and it was high time to
commence the punishment of those who had shown an inaptness to receive
the lessons, or a distaste for the method of instruction. The dignity of
Kentucky had been sacrificed by the avarice and cowardice of her own
sons, who sat in her councils--this is the way in which those
legislative-panders sought to assert it again. They passed an act
entitled "an act to prohibit and prevent rebellion by citizens of
Kentucky and others in this State." By this act it was provided that any
citizen of this State, who as a soldier or officer of the Confederate
army, should, as part of an armed force, enter the State to make war
upon it, should be punished by confinement in the penitentiary. "Making
war upon the State," doubtless meant any attack made upon the "Federal
soldiers assembled" (in the State) "for the purpose of preserving the
tranquillity of the State." And it was farther enacted that, "any person
who shall, within the limits of this State, persuade or induce any
person to enlist or take service in the army of the so-called
Confederate States, and the persons so persuaded or induced does enlist
or take service in the same, shall be deemed guilty of a high
misdemeanor and upon conviction, shall be fined in a sum not exceeding
one thousand dollars, and imprisonment not exceeding six months."
Whether, in passing this act, the Legislature of Kentucky was treating a
question involving belligerent rights, is a matter for lawyers to pass
upon; but that it was disgracing the State is patent. Such action might
have been proper and competent--against both belligerents--had Kentucky
adopted it as a measure necessary to the maintenance of her neutrality.
It would have been, at least, dignified, had she earnestly and
unequivocally declared, from the beginning, an adherence to the
Government, and a resolution to support its policy.
But under all the circumstances, and after the repeated declarations of
its authors that, to resist coercion, the very measures ought to be
taken (for the punishment of which this act was now passed), it is
difficult to stigmatize, with appropriate emphasis, such conduct.
The lapse of time has mitigated the hostility of the actual combatants,
but has only intensified the contempt, and deepened the distrust which
the people of Kentucky feel for these men.
The sincere Union men of Kentucky, and the men who sincerely sympathized
with the Southern movement and the Southern people, can mutually respect
each other. The Kentucky soldiers, who fought against each other in the
contending armies, can appreciate and admire the devotion to the chosen
cause, the gallantry which each displayed. But for the men who showed so
plainly by that they were attached to no cause and no principle, but
were ready to sell and barter each and all, who manifested all through
the struggle, that they were moved by the most groveling ambition,
influenced by the meanest thirst for self-aggrandisement--for them there
is no forgiveness.
All Kentucky has suffered from their duplicity, cowardice and heartless
avarice of gold and power--now they have neither, and none regret it.
But, happily, the past political differences, and the animosity
engendered by the long, bitter strife, are fast being forgotten by the
Kentuckians who confronted each other under hostile banners. The sons of
the same Mother Commonwealth (who in all sincerity gave their blood for
her interests, safety and honor, as each believed they could be best
conserved), are no longer antagonists--and, at no distant day, may find
the respect they have felt for each other as foes, replaced by the
cordial friendship and alliance, which the same blood and the same views
should induce. May Kentucky have learned from her lesson in the past few
years, and may she remember, that safety is never best consulted by
giving heed to the suggestions of timidity, that the manliest and most
consistent course, is also the most truly expedient, and that the
interest and honor of a people go hand-in-hand, and are inseparable.