THE PLACE OF THE SUBMARINE IN WARFARE
“Drake would have understood Trafalgar. Neither Drake nor Nelson
could understand a modern naval action.”
“Competent authorities hold that the submersible torpedo-boat is the
vessel of the future rather than either the existing type, or the
‘Destroyer’” (EXCUBITOR in the _Fortnightly Review_ for August,
1901).
“It is not only the unstable opinions of experts, liable to sudden
change, which makes the forecast of future naval war difficult; it
is that the progress of invention may be, for all we know,
undermining the whole position by disturbing the balance which
creates existing warship design” (the late Vice-Admiral P. H.
COLOMB).
“Conservatism has thus far delayed the adoption of a most valuable
offensive and defensive weapon, not because success was ever proved
to be unattainable, but because some vessels built by inexperienced
inventors happened to be failures” (Mr. J. P. HOLLAND).
“In the dawn of the twentieth century there has entered into the
history of the world’s navies a class of vessel which is probably
destined to revolutionise, eventually, the whole system of maritime
construction. The problem of submarine navigation, in a limited
sense at least, has been solved” (Lieutenant G. E. ARMSTRONG).
“Most torpedo destruction has been done with a bag of explosive tied
to the end of a pole, and the submarine boat will permit you to get
closer to the enemy with a bigger bag of explosive and with less
damage to the pole. You have all the advantages of attack with
almost absolute safety to the torpedo-boat itself.”
[Illustration:
THE FIRST SUBMARINE TO FLY THE WHITE ENSIGN.
(_By permission of the Admiralty and Messrs. Vickers, Sons, and
Maxim._)
]
At the present time opinion is divided as to the part that the submarine
boat is likely to play in the naval warfare of the future. Those who
have expressed themselves on the subject may be roughly divided into
three classes.
1. Those who have little or no faith in submarines.
2. Those who believe that submarines will revolutionise warfare, ocean
locomotion, marine industries, &c., and that an epoch may come in which
merchantmen will alone sail the ocean and all the warships will be
submarines or submersibles.
3. Those who recognise that the submarine boat of to-day is a great
improvement on the boats of twenty years ago; who believe that although
at present it suffers from grave defects, its development will continue,
and who are of opinion that it will find useful spheres of action in
time of war.
Much of the adverse criticism which the “submarine boat” has had to
encounter has been due to the popular belief that this type of craft was
intended to do its work _below_ the surface of the water. As it is
impossible at present to see beneath the waves, many critics have
declared the submarine to be a perfectly useless fighting vessel. It
cannot be too often asserted, for the sake of overcoming prejudice, that
the proper place of the submarine is _at the surface_, and that she only
goes below for short intervals. This is now universally recognised by
constructors of such craft, which it might be more correct to term
“submersibles” or “diving torpedo-boats.” So far back as 1886 Mr.
Nordenfelt remarked, “It is impossible to think of a submarine boat that
actually manœuvres and does its work under water. I gave that up from
the very commencement.”
By the term “submarine” we mean to imply a vessel capable of manœuvring
on the surface like an ordinary torpedo boat, of running awash with her
conning tower alone above water to enable her to be steered, and of
totally immersing herself for short periods either to escape detection,
avoid the fire of the enemy, or fire torpedoes.
The history of the submarine bears a curious resemblance to that of the
torpedo and the torpedo vessel in many particulars. All three have been
declared to be the weapons of the weaker power and of no possible value
to a nation which must maintain the command of the seas. The first
Whitehead torpedoes were certainly slow and erratic; now they are
capable of running within a few inches of the required depth at a speed
of over 37 miles an hour for a range up to 2,000 yards, and hitting the
point aimed at with almost the same precision as a gun.
In spite of the sneers of fossilised officials, Great Britain adopted
the torpedo-boat, and in the process of time evolved the destroyer, an
offensive weapon of no mean value, and a type of craft which some have
declared to be the fighting vessel of the future. She will soon be in
the possession of nine under-water vessels, and it may be that the
submarines of twenty years hence will bear the same resemblance to those
of to-day, as the _Albatross_ does to the _Lightning_ of 1877.
The very first submarine to figure in actual warfare was the boat
invented by David Bushnell. His attempt to blow up the British frigate
_Eagle_ failed, mainly owing to the incapacity of the operator, Sergeant
Ezra Lee. Fulton, although he blew up several old hulks in time of
peace, was afforded no opportunity of testing the capabilities of his
vessel in actual warfare.
[Illustration:
U.S. SUBMARINE “SHARK” ON THE STOCKS.
]
During the American Civil War there occurred the famous incident of the
destruction of the _Housatonic_ by the Confederate diving torpedo-boat
_David_—the only occasion on which a submarine boat has succeeded in
inflicting injury on a hostile vessel in a naval action. Though many
lives were lost in the _David_, this would not have occurred had the
most ordinary precautions been taken.
On February 5, 1886, Mr. Nordenfelt read a paper before the Royal United
Service Institution on his Submarine Boats; in the discussion that
followed many eminent naval authorities took part, and the following are
extracts taken from their speeches on this occasion:—
“My opinion is that all torpedo-boats should be submarine boats”
(Admiral ARTHUR).
“With the cupola above water the submarine boat would prove a very
formidable means of attack” (Admiral Sir ASTLEY COOPER KEY).
“Mr. Nordenfelt has done much towards solving a problem which is
likely to be of great importance in future naval operations”
(Vice-Admiral H.R.H. DUKE OF EDINBURGH).
“I think Mr. Nordenfelt is to be congratulated on having made an
enormous step forward, and one which I am sure has a great future
before it” (Admiral SELWYN).
“If you want to economically defend a port it is better to have a
boat that does not show at all. The moral effect of this boat would
be enormous, and I am perfectly certain that foreign war vessels
would not lay off a port to intercept outward- and homeward-bound
vessels if they knew that there was a submarine vessel inside that
could come out without being seen” (Major-General HARDINGE STEWART).
“As far as practicability for warfare is concerned this submarine
boat (the Nordenfelt) is pretty well accepted by the profession....
Therefore as a craft not altogether wholly submerged, but just a
boat awash for coast defence, and also for the attack of ships at
sea, and especially in heavy weather, when the fast torpedo boats
cannot act, I believe the vessel will be found of great practical
and reliable service” (Major-General Sir ANDREW CLARKE).
The Nordenfelt boats, as will be seen in Chapter XV, failed to come up
to the high expectations that had been formed of them, and the British
Admiralty considered themselves relieved from the necessity of taking up
the subject of submarine navigation.
In 1888 France added the first submarine (the _Gymnote_) to her navy,
and proceeded to lay down a certain number of under-water craft yearly.
In 1900 the United States Government bought the _Holland_, and in many
quarters the opinion was held that the Admiralty should carefully
investigate the whole question of submarine warfare.
The official mind thought otherwise, and expressed itself thus: “We know
all about submarines: they are the weapons of the weaker power; they are
very poor fighting machines, and can be of no possible use to the
Mistress of the Seas. We are very grateful to the Governments of France
and the United States for expending so much money in experimenting with
these craft, and in allowing us to buy experience for nothing; if ever
they produce a vessel which we consider satisfactory we shall begin to
build, but not till then.” The official mind was inclined to apply to
submarine warfare, the words used by Earl St. Vincent in reference to
Fulton’s torpedo warfare—“A mode of war which we who command the seas do
not want, and which, if successful, would deprive us of it.”
This council of sitting still and watching others experiment did not
commend itself to many thinking people who saw that the French and the
Americans were every year improving their vessels and converting them
little by little from expensive toys into fighting machines with which
we should have to reckon sooner or later. Even the _Engineer_, never
enthusiastic about submarine boats, went so far as to remark that “the
day for pooh-poohing them is past.”
The anti-submarine party replied that the French and Americans were
suffering from hallucinations; that the submarine boat was of no value
except for purposes of defence, as its range of action was very limited.
The advent of the _Holland_ and the _Narval_, each capable of making
long journeys, proved the fallacy of this view.
Shifting their ground they said that the submarine would be of no use as
a weapon of offence, because it was blind; that it would never be able
to fire a torpedo at a moving vessel whilst itself in motion; that its
speed was so small that big ships could always avoid it; that it would
be unable to remain under water for long, as the effect of “potted air”
on the crew would be disastrous; and that its lack of longitudinal
stability was a fatal drawback to its employment in action.
The behaviour of the _Gustave Zédé_, the _Narval_, and the _Holland_ in
manœuvres, during the course of which they have all fired fish torpedoes
whilst moving, which have hit targets, again showed that such arguments
could not hold water.
Now whilst it is one thing to say that the submarine boat is a useless
weapon to-day, it is quite another to prophecy that it will never be of
any value to a navy whose ships are intended to act on the offensive.
The introduction of gunpowder; of steam; of the screw-propeller; of
iron-built ships; of high-pressure engines; of rifled ordnance; of
explosive shells; of armour plating; of twin-screws; of breech-loading
guns; of steel-built ships; of the locomotive torpedo; of electricity on
shipboard; of quick-firing and machine guns; of collapsible boats; of
wireless telegraphy; of turbine vessels; of devices for coaling ships at
sea; of magazine-rifles, &c., &c., have been successively ridiculed by
those responsible for the condition of the British Navy.
Officialism is, and always has been, a foe to inventive progress, and
the official mind still seems incapable of realising that invention is a
plant of slow growth; that improvements or innovations when first mooted
do not necessarily represent their final form, and that all the great
advances and revolutions in the past in the world of science, invention,
and discovery have sprung from small beginnings which have grown
gradually and slowly until they forced upon themselves the recognition
that was their due.
Faraday, when asked by “practical people” the use of any of his
experimental researches, would reply, “What is the use of a baby?” An
invention resembles a baby, in that it needs to be carefully watched,
tended, and cared for in its initial stages if ever it is to be of any
value in the world.
We all remember the gentleman who said that he would eat the first
steamboat that crossed the Atlantic; the Quarterly Reviewer who wrote
with reference to the proposal to build a line to Woolwich that “he
should as soon expect the people of Woolwich to suffer themselves to be
fired off by one of Congreve’s _ricochet_ rockets as trust themselves to
the mercy of a high-pressure steam engine travelling at the awful speed
of eighteen to twenty miles an hour”; and the wiseacres who pooh-poohed
the electric telegraph and telephone, the electric light, the electric
car, the pneumatic-tyred bicycle, and many other inventions which have
come into general use.
Granting, as we do, that the submarine is at present in a very
inefficient stage of its existence, the necessity for experiment in view
of the march of science during the past century is obvious. What should
we say of a professor who pleaded that his experiments were a waste of
time and money, as he could arrive at his end quite as well by simply
reading what other professors in foreign countries were doing?
One cannot too often insist on the fact that it is only by actual
experiment that useful facts are arrived at, and that in the
investigation of new devices more can, as a rule, be learnt from an
experiment carefully arranged and personally carried out than from the
reading of voluminous reports of the work of others.
[Illustration:
LAUNCH OF U.S. SUBMARINE “SHARK.”
]
Rear-Admiral C. C. P. FitzGerald, in an article in the _Empire Review_
for February, 1901, on “Our Naval Strength,” referring to submarines
said:—“It seems a little risky to hold our hand altogether. We are said
to be ‘watching,’ and no doubt it will be very convenient if we can
allow others to spend their time and money on experiments and then just
cut in at the right moment when the submarine boat has established
itself as a practicable engine of warfare and build as many as we want
with the unrivalled resources which we are so fond of talking about. But
it should be remembered that secrets are better kept abroad than they
are in England and that a new mechanical industry always takes some time
to develop and to train the special workmen essential to its
prosecution.”
Mr. Arnold Forster has himself said that an ounce of practice is worth a
ton of theory, and it would be well if all officials thought as he does.
There is far too little experimental work and practical trial of novel
ideas both in the Army and the Navy. If we were never going to use our
soldiers or our ships in actual warfare it would be both economical and
prudent to wait until other nations had perfected inventions before
adopting them ourselves. In this case we should never make any progress
at all, for the reason that no improvement is final, and that the fleet
of to-day is a totally different thing from the fleet of fifty years
ago.
_Si vis pacem para bellum._ The essence of maritime war is, it has been
well said, its suddenness, and a day gained in striking the first blow
may make the difference between the fall of an empire and the
annihilation of the enemy. To wait to consider to what use we can put
submarine vessels and to postpone the question of discovering the most
effective method of destroying the boats of the enemy until war breaks
out is a suicidal policy, which, however, seemed for many years to
appeal to a “Government of Amateurs.”
Had there been more experimental work before the outbreak of the Boer
War our army would have probably finished its task sooner and with less
loss of life. Questions such as the employment of heavy field ordnance,
of telescopic sights, of shields for guns and rifles, of motors, of
electricity, &c., will have to be considered when the war is over, but
they should have received attention before hostilities commenced. If
every nation would agree to maintain the _status quo_ and to make no
effort to keep its navy and its army abreast of the advances of modern
scientific progress and invention, then the policy of our Admiralty and
War Office would be excellently suited to our needs. As it is, however,
Germany, France, the United States, Russia, and Japan are much more
ready to improve their services than is Great Britain, whose officials,
for the sake of peace and quiet, snub the inventor and smother their
consciences by repeating that all is well in our army and navy. Only
when great pressure is brought to bear on them will they stir
themselves. Admiral Sir E. Fremantle recently suggested that there ought
to be a committee on inventions always sitting, and Mr. Laird Clowes has
appealed for readier official interest in certain recent inventions.
The experiments with the British submarines must be carefully watched in
order that we may arrive at a well-reasoned opinion concerning their
future. It may be that it will be decided that for our purposes a means
of destroying the submarines of the enemy will be of more value than the
boats themselves. On the other hand, the conclusion may be reached that
for certain purposes this type of craft will be a useful adjunct to our
fleet. Whatever the decision may be it is quite certain that the
submarine boat will continue to receive improvements at the hands of
inventors, and that as practical applications have been found for the
Röntgen Rays and wireless telegraphy, so uses will be found for the
submarine of the future which may be as great an improvement on the
submarine of to-day as the _Deutschland_ is over the _Savannah_, the
first steam-packet that ever crossed the Atlantic.
Those who discuss submarine navigation as if it were quite a new
development are apt to forget that the earliest use of the torpedo was
in an under-water vessel. Bushnell and Fulton, no less than the
Confederates of a later day, saw that their best chance of success lay
in attacking by stealth, and though the modern Whitehead is a very
different weapon to the cases of explosive used by Bushnell and Fulton,
or the spar-torpedo employed by the Confederates in their _Davids_,
there are still the same advantages to be gained by a submarine attack.
Whilst the torpedoists of the extreme school claim that torpedo vessels
can attack with a very good chance of success in daylight, the more
general opinion is that they will he utilised chiefly under cover of
darkness, and that the destroyer and the smaller torpedo-boat would
stand no chance in broad daylight against the tremendous artillery fire
to which they would be subjected by the battleships singled out for
attack. Even at night, however, the flare from her funnels might betray
the destroyer.
A writer in the _United Service Gazette_ a few years ago remarked that
the development of quick-firing guns brought about by the increase in
the offensive and defensive power of swift torpedo-boats threatened ere
long to completely abolish the use of surface torpedo-boats in marine
warfare unless the latter could be rendered proof against those terribly
destructive weapons, the new rapid-firing guns of large calibre. To
secure this invulnerability by the aid of armour would destroy the speed
and hardiness of the torpedo-boats, and it had long been the opinion
amongst naval officers, more especially on the Continent and in America,
that if the torpedo is to be used for successful attack it would have to
be discharged from a vessel which was rendered invulnerable by being
totally submerged—that is to say, from a submarine torpedo-boat.
The submarine boat of the future will be a diving torpedo-boat capable
of manœuvring (1) on the surface, (2) awash with conning tower only
above the water, and (3) beneath the waves.
It will have two methods of propulsion, one for the surface, one for
beneath the water, and its mode of operation will be to steam on the
surface until it is within sighting range; to then take in enough water
ballast to bring it to the “awash” condition, thus greatly reducing the
chances of being hit; and, having approached within a certain distance
of the enemy, to sink entirely beneath the waves, rising once probably
for a second to take final bearings before firing its torpedo.
The nine vessels ordered for our navy are really diving torpedo-boats
and are not intended for use under water except for very short intervals
of time. The submarine of to-day bears a close resemblance to the
torpedo-boat in the early stages of its development and appears to be of
more value to a country that is desirous of defending its coasts than to
one which must maintain the command of the seas.
There are signs, however, that in the process of its evolution the
submarine will go through many of the same stages as did the torpedo
vessel, and will develop into an offensive weapon which England will be
unable any longer to despise.
That a _Holland_, a _Narval_, or a _Gustave Zédé_ is as formidable an
adversary as an _Albatross_ or an _Express_ few would claim, but the
last word has not yet been said on submarine navigation, and the future
may be expected to bring about many changes.
For purposes of coast defence the submarine may be said to have fairly
established its value. The knowledge that such craft were “in being”
would have a deterrent influence upon an admiral attacking a fort or
contemplating a blockade, and in all probability the days of close
blockade are over.
As a weapon of offence the utility of the submarine boat is not so
clearly established. It is true that some of the French boats have
operated at a considerable distance from their base, but its speed, its
seaworthiness, and range of action must be improved before the submarine
can be regarded as a useful adjunct to a fleet acting on the offensive.
The radius of action at the surface of the newest _Hollands_ is only 400
knots at 8 knots per hour, and submerged the speed is 7 knots for a four
hours’ run.
[Illustration:
THE “FULTON” RUNNING ON THE SURFACE.
]
Still even now there are uses to which a submarine boat might be put,
such, for instance, as the attack of ships shut up in a blockaded
harbour, or of vessels in port; the destruction of a mine field so that
ships may enter in safety; the cutting and repairing of cables; the
forcing an entrance through a boom, &c.
The late Captain Cairnes, in his book “The Coming Waterloo,” enunciated
the theory that even if the British fleet destroyed the French fleet it
would still be necessary for us to land an army on French soil in order
to bring hostilities to a conclusion. In that case submarine boats would
probably be employed, for some of the purposes above enumerated.
It has been suggested that small diving torpedo-boats might be carried
on battleships, and it is said that the United States have been
experimenting with vessels of this kind. The difficulties of hoisting
such vessels in and out of a big ship are, however, considerable, and
few naval officers favour this idea. Perhaps a special “submarine depot
ship” somewhat similar to the _Vulcan_ might be useful for conveying
submarines to foreign waters.
In the opinion of many naval experts most of the naval actions of the
future will be virtually decided quite outside the reach of any torpedo
yet designed, and at ranges almost beyond the ken of unaided human
vision, owing to the fact that with the breech-loading gun of to-day
accurate practice can be made at very long range. The battle of Manila
was fought and decided at a distance varying from 5,600 to 2,000 yards,
and the battle of Santiago from 5,000 to 1,600. A naval battle of the
future, according to a distinguished German admiral, if both adversaries
are determined and energetic, will resemble a conflict between two
stags, which in a moment of fury rush upon one another, entangling their
antlers, and, in the end of ends, destroying one another. Or if the
enemies are less determined, a naval battle will resemble a contest of
athletes, the combatants moving backwards and forwards in serpentine
lines; both will keep up fire from a great distance until neither has
enough ammunition left to strike a decisive blow.
In the opinion of the late M. Jean de Bloch the warfare of the future
will resemble the latter picture, but it will be remembered that this
writer in his book, “Is War now Impossible?” laid it down that the
bayonet would never be used, as troops would be unable to cross the
terrible bullet-swept zone and thus come into personal contact with the
enemy. The Boer War has proved on the contrary that the bayonet is still
a valuable weapon, and that the bravery of the soldier, combined with
artillery fire, will enable him to use it with good effect in spite of
the modern rifle.
What the bayonet is in military, that the submarine is in naval warfare.
The increasing range of rifle and cannon enable both combatants, if well
entrenched, to blaze away at one another and do very little damage, and
the necessity therefore arises, if a definite conclusion is to be
reached, for some sharp and sudden blow to be delivered at close
quarters that shall cause the enemy to evacuate his position and beat a
hasty retreat. A bayonet charge is a desperate affair no doubt, but
owing to the modern art of entrenchment, recourse must be had to it if
the enemy is to be shifted.
In much the same way a submarine attack will be ordered when firing at
long ranges has had no effect. There will be great risks, but the
chances of a successful attack will be sufficient to warrant its being
tried.
In conclusion the following extract from a recent article in the
_Engineer_—a journal which has always regarded the submarine with
suspicion—may be quoted: “We must not shut our eyes to the fact that the
semi-submarine boat may be a very dangerous foe. Years have passed since
we pointed this out. It seems to be admitted that a fast torpedo-boat
can get within say a mile of an enemy without certainty of destruction.
Indeed, up to that she is fairly safe. If now, that point reached, she
descends say five feet below the surface, leaving a conning tower just
level with the water, she can be steered, and the chances that she will
be sunk by her enemies are very small. The five feet of water above her
would deflect all projectiles from machine guns. She would have to get
very close up to be hit hard even by heavier metal, and the little
conning tower at the water level would be a very difficult matter to
strike. A fast vessel operating thus _a fleur d’eau_ would be no
despicable enemy. And it is in this direction we think that submarine
attacks will be developed with the best chance of success.”