THAT THE LAWFULNESS OF THE CEREMONIES CANNOT BE WARRANTED BY ANY ORDINANCE
OF THE CIVIL MAGISTRATE; WHOSE POWER IN THINGS SPIRITUAL OR ECCLESIASTICAL
IS EXPLAINED.
_Sect._ 1. Now are we fallen upon the stronghold of our opposites, which
is the king’s majesty’s supremacy in things ecclesiastical. If they did
mean, in good earnest, to qualify the lawfulness of the ceremonies from
holy Scripture, why have they not taken more pains and travail to debate
the matter from thence? And if they meant to justify them by the laws and
constitutions of the church, why did they not study to an orderly
peaceable proceeding, and to have things concluded in a lawful national
synod, after free reasoning and mature advisement? Why did they carry
matters so factiously and violently? The truth is, they would have us to
acquiesce, and to say no more against the ceremonies, when once we hear
that they are enjoined by his Majesty, our only supreme governor. What I
am here to say shall not derogate anything from his Highness’s supremacy,
because it includeth no such thing as a nomothetical power to prescribe
and appoint such sacred and significant ceremonies as he shall think good.
The Archbishop of Armagh, in his speech which he delivered concerning the
King’s supremacy (for which king James returned him, in a letter, his
princely and gracious thanks, for that he had defended his just and lawful
power with so much learning and reason), whilst he treateth of the
supremacy, and expoundeth that title of “the only supreme governor of all
his Highness’s dominions and countries, as well in all spiritual or
ecclesiastical things or causes, as temporal,” mentioneth no such thing as
any power to dispose, by his laws and ordinances, of things external in
the worship of God. Neither yet shall this following discourse tend to the
cooling and abating of that care and zeal which princes owe to the
oversight and promotion of religion. For alas! the corruptions which have
stept into religion, and the decays which it hath felt since princes began
to take small thought of it, and to leave the care of it to popes,
bishops, monks, &c., can never be enough bewailed. _Nihil enim_, &c. “For
there is nothing (saith Zanchius(915)) more pernicious, either to the
commonwealth or to the church, than if a prince do all things by the
judgment of others, and he himself understand not those things which are
propounded to be done.”
Nor, lastly, are we to sound an alarm of rebellion; for to say that
subjects are not bound to obey such laws and statutes of their prince, as
impose upon them a yoke of ceremonies which he hath no power to impose, is
one thing, and to say that they are not bound to subject themselves unto
him faithfully and loyally, is another thing. _Recte Gerson: Qui abusui
potestatis resistit, non resistit divinae ordinationi_, saith the Bishop
of Salisbury.(916) “Subjection (saith Dr Field(917)) is required generally
and absolutely, where obedience is not.” If we have leave to speak with
divines,(918) the bond and sign of subjection is only homage, or the oath
of fidelity, whereby subjects bind themselves to be faithful to their
prince; and we take the Judge of all flesh to witness, before whose
dreadful tribunal we must stand at that great day, how free we are of
thoughts of rebellion, and how uprightly we mean to be his Majesty’s most
true and loyal subjects to the end of our lives, and to devote ourselves,
our bodies, lives, goods, and estates, and all that we have in the world,
to his Highness’s service, and to the honour of his royal crown.
_Sect._ 2. Now, for the purpose in hand, we will first examine what the
Archbishop of Spalato saith; for he discourseth much of the jurisdiction
and office of princes, in things and causes ecclesiastical. The title of
the first chapter of his sixth book, _de Rep. Eccl._, holdeth, that it is
the duty of princes _super ecclesiastica invigilare_; but in the body of
the chapter he laboureth to prove that the power of governing
ecclesiastical things belongeth to princes (which is far more than to
watch carefully over them). This the reader will easily perceive. Nay, he
himself, num. 115 and 174, professeth he hath been proving, that divine
and ecclesiastical things are to be ruled and governed by the authority
and laws of princes. The title prefixed to the sixth chapter of that same
book is this, _Legibus et edictis principum laicorum, et ecclesiastica et
ecclesiasticos gubernari_. So that in both chapters he treateth of one and
the same office of princes about things ecclesiastical.
Now, if we would learn what he means by those _ecclesiastica_ which he
will have to be governed by princes, he resolves us(919) that he means not
things internal, such as the deciding of controversies in matters of
faith, feeding with the word of God, binding and loosing, and ministering
of the sacraments (for _in pure spiritualibus_, as he speaketh in _Summa_,
cap. 5,) he yieldeth them not the power of judging and defining, but only
things external, which pertain to the external worship of God, or concern
external ecclesiastical discipline; such things he acknowledged to be _res
spirituales_;(920) but _vera spiritualia_ he will have to comprehend only
things internal, which he removeth from the power of princes. Thus we have
his judgment as plain as himself hath delivered it unto us.
_Sect._ 3. But I demand, 1. Why yieldeth he the same power to princes in
governing _ecclesiastica_ which he yieldeth them in governing
_ecclesiasticos_? For ecclesiastical persons, being members of the
commonwealth no less than laics, have the same king and governor with
them, for which reason it is (as the Bishop himself showeth out of
Molina(921)) that they are bound to be subject to their prince’s laws,
which pertain to the whole commonwealth. But the like cannot be alleged,
for the power of princes to govern _ecclesiastica_, for the Bishop, I
trust, would not have said that things ecclesiastical and things civil do
equally and alike belong to their power and jurisdiction.
2. Why confoundeth he the governing of things and causes ecclesiastical
with watching over and taking care for the same? Let us only call to mind
the native signification of the word Κυβεριάω, _guberno_ signifieth
properly to rule or govern the course of a ship; and in a ship there may
be many watchful and careful eyes over her course, and yet but one
governor directing the same.
3. Why holdeth he that things external in the worship of God are not _vera
spiritualia_? For if they be ecclesiastical and sacred ceremonies (not
fleshly and worldly), why will he not also acknowledge them for true
spiritual things? And if they be not _vera spiritualia_, why calls he them
_res spirituales_? for are not _res_ and _verum_ reciprocal as well as
_ens_ and _verum_.
4. Even as a prince in his sea voyage is supreme governor of all which are
in the ship with him, and, by consequence, of the governor who directs her
course, yet doth he not govern the actions of governing or directing the
course of a ship, so, though a prince be the only supreme governor of all
his dominions, and, by consequence, of ecclesiastical persons in his
dominions, yet he cannot be said to govern all their ecclesiastical
actions and causes. And as the governor of a ship acknowledgeth his prince
for his only supreme governor even then whilst he is governing and
directing the course of the ship (otherwise whilst he is governing her
course he should not be his prince’s subject), yet he doth not thereby
acknowledge that his prince governeth his action of directing the course
of the ship (for then should the prince be the pilot); so when one hath
acknowledged the prince to be the only supreme governor upon earth of all
ecclesiastical persons in his dominions, even whilst they are ordering and
determining ecclesiastical causes, yet he hath not thereby acknowledged
that the prince governeth the ecclesiastical causes. Wherefore, whilst the
Bishop(922) taketh the English oath of supremacy to acknowledge the same
which he teacheth touching the prince’s power, he giveth it another sense
than the words of it can bear; for it saith not that the king’s majesty is
the only supreme governor of all his Highness’s dominions, and _of_ all
things and causes therein, as well ecclesiastical or spiritual as
temporal,—but it saith that he is the only supreme governor of all his
Highness’s dominions in all things or causes, &c. Now, the spiritual
guides of the church, substituted by Christ as deputies in his stead, who
is the most supreme Governor of his own church, and on whose shoulder the
government resteth, Isa. ix. 6, as his royal prerogative, even then,
whilst they are governing and putting order to ecclesiastical or spiritual
causes, they acknowledge their prince to be their only supreme governor
upon earth, yet hereby they imply not that he governeth their governing of
ecclesiastical causes, as hath been shown by that simile of governing a
ship.
_Sect._ 4. 5. Whereas the Bishop leaveth all things external, which
pertain to the worship of God, to be governed by princes, I object, that
the version of the holy Scripture out of Hebrew and Greek into the vulgar
tongue is an external thing, belonging to the worship of God, yet it
cannot be governed by a prince who is not learned in the original tongues.
6. Whereas he yieldeth to princes the power of governing _in
spiritualibus_, but not _in pure spiritualibus_, I cannot comprehend this
distinction. All sacred and ecclesiastical things belonging to the worship
of God are spiritual things.
What, then, understands he by things purely spiritual? If he mean things
which are in such sort spiritual, that they have nothing earthly nor
external in them,—in this sense the sacraments are not purely spiritual,
because they consist of two parts; one earthly, and another heavenly, as
Rheneus saith of the eucharist;—and so the sacraments, not being things
purely spiritual, shall be left to the power and government of princes. If
it be said that by things purely spiritual he means things which concern
our spirits only, and not the outward man, I still urge the same instance;
for the sacraments are not in this sense spiritual, because a part of the
sacraments, to wit, the sacramental signs or elements, concern our
external and bodily senses of seeing, touching, and tasting.
7. The Bishop also contradicteth himself unawares; for in one place(923)
he reserveth and excepteth from the power of princes the judging and
deciding of controversies and questions of faith. Yet in another
place(924) he exhorteth kings, and princes to compel the divines of both
sides (of the Roman and reformed churches) to come to a free conference,
and to debate the matters controverted betwixt them; in which conference
he requireth the princes themselves to be judges.
_Sect._ 5. It remaineth to try what force of reason the Bishop hath to
back his opinion. As for the ragged rabble of human testimonies which he
raketh together, I should but weary my reader, and spend paper and ink in
vain, if I should insist to answer them one by one. Only thus much I say
of all those sentences of the fathers and constitutions of princes and
emperors about things ecclesiastical, together with the histories of the
submission of some ecclesiastical causes to emperors,—let him who pleaseth
read them; and it shall appear,
1. That some of those things whereunto the power of princes was applied
were unlawful.
2. There were many of them things temporal or civil, not ecclesiastical or
spiritual, nor such as pertain to the worship of God.
3. There were some of them ecclesiastical or spiritual things, but then
princes did only ratify that which had been determined by councils, and
punish with the civil sword such as did stubbornly disobey the church’s
lawful constitutions. Neither were princes allowed to do any more.
4. Sometimes they interposed their authority, and meddled in causes
spiritual or ecclesiastical, even before the definition of councils; yet
did they not judge nor decide those matters, but did only convocate
councils, and urge the clergy to see to the mis-ordered and troubled state
of the church, and by their wholesome laws and ordinances, to provide the
best remedies for the same which they could.
5. At other times princes have done somewhat more in ecclesiastical
matters; but this was only in extraordinary cases, when the clergy were so
corrupted, that either through ignorance they were unable, or through
malice and perverseness unwilling, to do their duty in deciding of
controversies, making of canons, using the keys, and managing of other
ecclesiastical matters, in which case princes might and did, by their
coactive temporal jurisdiction, avoid disorder, error, and superstition,
and cause a reformation of the church.
6. Princes have likewise, in rightly constituted and well reformed
churches, by their own regal authority, straitly enjoined things
pertaining to the worship of God, but those things were the very same
which God’s own written word had expressly commanded.
7. When princes went beyond those limits and bounds, they took upon them
to judge and command more than God hath put within the compass of their
power.
_Sect._ 6. But as touching the passages of holy Scripture which the Bishop
allegeth, I will answer thereto particularly. And first, he produceth that
place, Deut. xvii. 19, where the king was appointed to have the book of
the law of God with him, that he might learn to fear the Lord his God, and
to keep all the words of this law and these statutes to do them. What
logic, I pray, can from this place infer that princes have the supreme
power of governing all ecclesiastical causes? Next, the Bishop tells us of
David’s appointing of the offices of the Levites, and dividing of their
courses, 1 Chron. xxiii and his commending of the same to Solomon, 1
Chron. xxviii.; but he might have observed that David did not this as a
king, but as a prophet, or man of God, 2 Chron. viii. 14, yea, those
orders and courses of the Levites were also commanded by other prophets of
the Lord, 2 Chron. xxix. 25. As touching Solomon’s appointing of the
courses and charges of the priests, Levites, and porters, he did not of
himself, nor by his own princely authority, but because David, the man of
God, had so commanded, 2 Chron. viii. 24. For Solomon received from David
a pattern for all that which he was to do in the work of the house of the
Lord, and also for the courses of the priests and Levites, 1 Chron.
xxviii. 11-13.
_Sect._ 7. The Bishop comes on and tells us that Hezekiah did apply his
regal power to the reformation of the Levites, and of the worship of God
in their hands, saying, “Hear me, ye Levites, sanctify now yourselves, and
sanctify the house of the Lord God of your fathers, and carry forth the
filthiness out of the holy place.”
_Ans._ He exhorted them to no more than God’s law required of them, for
the law ordained them to sanctify themselves, and to do the service of the
house of the Lord, Num. viii. 6, 11, 15; xviii. 32; so that Hezekiah did
here constitute nothing by his own arbitration and authority, but plainly
showeth his warrant, ver. 11, “The Lord hath chosen you to stand before
him, to serve him, and that you should minister unto him.”
But the Bishop further allegeth out of 2 Chron. xxxi. that Hezekiah
appointed the courses of the priests and Levites, every man according to
his service.
_Ans._ He might have read 2 Chron. xxix., 25, that Hezekiah did all this
according to the commandment of David, and of Gad, the king’s seer, and
Nathan the prophet, “For so was the commandment of the Lord by his
prophets.” And who doubteth but kings may command such things as God hath
commanded before them?
_Sect._ 8. The next example which the Bishop allegeth is out of 2 Chron.
xxxv. where we read that Josias did set the priests and Levites again in
their charges, which example cannot prove that kings have the supreme
power of governing ecclesiastical causes, unless it be evinced that Josias
changed those orders and courses of the Levites and priests which the Lord
had commanded by his prophets, 2 Chron. xxix. 25, and that he did
institute other orders by his own regal authority, whereas the contrary is
manifest from the text; for Josias did only set the priests and Levites
those charges and courses which had been assigned unto them after the
writing of David and Solomon, ver. 4, and by the commandment of David, and
Asaph, and Heman, and Jeduthun, the king’s seer, ver. 15. Neither did
Josias command the priests and Levites any other service than that which
was written in the book of Moses, ver. 12; so that, from his example, it
only followeth, that when princes see the state of ecclesiastical persons
corrupted, they ought to interpose their authority for reducing them to
those orders and functions which God’s word commandeth.
_Sect._ 9. Moreover, the Bishop objecteth the example of Joash, who, while
he yet did right in the days of Jehoiada the priest, 2 Chron. xxiv. sent
the priests and Levites to gather from all Israel money for repairing the
house of the Lord, and when they dealt negligently in this business, he
transferred the charge of the same unto others, and, making himself the
keeper of the holy money, did both prescribe how it was to be disbursed,
and likewise take from good Jehoiada the priest the administration of the
same. Now, where he hath read that Joash made himself the keeper of the
money, and prescribed how it should be disbursed, also that he took the
administration from Jehoiada, I cannot guess; for the text hath no such
thing in it, but the contrary, viz. that the king’s scribe, and the high
priest’s officer, kept the money, and disbursed the same, as the king and
Jehoiada prescribed unto them. As to that which he truly allegeth out of
the holy text, I answer, 1. The collection for repairing the house of the
Lord was no human ordinance, for Joash showeth the commandment of Moses
for it, ver. 6, having reference to Exod. xxx. 12-14. No other collections
did Joash impose but those _quae divino jure debebantur_.(925) 2. As for
the taking of the charge of this collection from the priests, he behooved
to do so, because they had still neglected the work, when the twenty-third
year of his reign was come. And so say we, that when the ministers of the
church fail to do their duty, in providing that which is necessary for the
service of God, princes ought by some other means to cause these things be
redressed. 3. Joash did nothing with these monies without Jehoiada, but
_Pontifex eas primum laborantibus tribuit, tum in aedis sacrae
restaurationem maxime convertit_.(926) 4. And what if he had done this by
himself? I suppose no man will reckon the hiring of masons and carpenters
with such as wrought iron and brass, or the gathering of money for this
purpose, among spiritual things or causes. 5. And if these employments
about Solomon’s temple were not to be called spiritual or ecclesiastical,
far less about our material churches, which are not holy nor consecrated
as Solomon’s was for a typical use. Wherefore, without all prejudice to
our cause, we may and do commend the building and repairing of churches by
Christian princes.
_Sect._ 10. But the Bishop returneth to another example in Solomon, which
is the putting of Abiathar, the chief priest, from his office, and
surrogating of another in his place. _Ans._ Abiathar was civilly dead, as
the lawyers used to speak, and it was only by accident or by consequent
that Solomon put him from his office: he sent him away to Anathoth,
because of his treasonable following and aiding of Adonijah, whereupon
necessarily followed his falling away from the honour, dignity, and office
of the high priest, whence it only followeth, that if a minister be found
guilty of _læse_ majesty, the king may punish him either with banishment
or proscription, or some such civil punishment, whereupon by consequence
will follow his falling from his ecclesiastical office and dignity. 2. As
for Solomon’s putting of Zadok in the room of Abiathar, it maketh as
little against us, for Zadok did fall to the place _jure divino_.
The honour and office of the high-priesthood was given to Eleazar, the
elder son of Aaron, and was to remain in his family. How it came to pass
that it was transferred to Eli, who was of the family of Ithmar, we read
not. Always after that Abiathar, who was of the family of Ithamar and
descended of Eli, had by a capital crime fallen from it, it did of very
right belong to Zadok, who was chief of the family of Eleazar. And so all
this flowed, not from Solomon’s, but from God’s own authority.
_Sect._ 11. The Bishop remembereth another example in Hezekiah too,
telling us that he removed the high places, and brake the images, and cut
down the groves, and brake in pieces the brazen serpent, when the children
of Israel did burn incense unto it. Now, we wish from our hearts that from
this example all Christian kings may learn to remove and destroy the
monuments of idolatry out of their dominions. And if it be said that in so
doing kings take upon them to govern by their princely authority an
ecclesiastical or spiritual cause, it is easily answered, that when they
destroy idolatrous monuments, they do nothing by their own authority, but
by the authority of God’s law, which commanded to abolish such monuments,
and to root out the very names of idols; which commandment is to be
executed by the action of temporal power.
_Sect._ 12. Finally, saith the Bishop, the kings of the Jews, 1 Kings
xxiii.; 2 Chron. xix.; have in the temple propounded the law of the Lord
to the people, renewed the covenant of religion, pulled down profane
altars, broken down idols, slain idolatrous priests, liberated their
kingdom from abomination, purged the temple, 2 Chron. xxxiv., xxxv.; 1
Maccab. iv. 59; proclaimed the keeping of the passover, and of the feast
of dedication, Esth. ix. 26 ; and have also instituted new feasts. For all
which things they are in the Scriptures much praised by the Holy Spirit, 2
Chron. xxix. 2; xxxiv. 2, &c.
_Ans._ True it is, Josias did read the law of the Lord to the people in
the temple, and made a covenant before the Lord; but, 1. he prescribed
nothing at his own pleasure; only he required of the people to walk after
the Lord, and to keep his commandments. 2. Neither did he this work by
himself, but did convocate a council of the prophets, priests and elders
of Israel, for the advancing of that reformation, 2 Kings xxiii. 1. 3. And
if he had done it by himself, yet we are to remember that the reformation
of a church generally and greatly corrupted, craveth the more immediate
intermeddling of princes, and a great deal more than can be ordinarily and
orderly done by them in a church already reformed. The slaying of the
idolatrous priests had also the warrant and authority of the law of God,
which appointed a capital punishment for blasphemers,(927) or such as, in
contempt of God and to rub some ignominy upon his name, did traduce his
doctrine and religion, and either detract from him, and attribute to idols
that which appertained properly unto him, or else attributed unto him
either by enunciation or imprecation, such things as could not stand with
the glory of the Godhead. Concerning the abolishing of idolatry and all
the relics thereof, we have answered that it was commanded by God. The
keeping of the passover was also commanded in the law; but publish God’s
own express ordinance.
Last of all, touching two remaining examples: 1. The feast of the
dedication was not ordained by the sole authority of Judas, but by his
brethren and by the whole congregation of Israel;(928) and the days of
Purim were established by Mordecai, a prophet. Esth. ix. 20, 21. 2. We
have elsewhere made it evident, that the days of Purim, by their first
institution, were only days of civil joy and solemnity, and that the feast
of the dedication was not lawfully instituted.
_Sect._ 13. Thus having dismissed the Bishop, we will make us for clearing
the purpose in hand. But before we come to show particularly what princes
may do, and what they may not do, in making laws about things
ecclesiastical, we will first of all lay down these propositions
following:—
1. Whatsoever the power of princes be in things and causes ecclesiastical,
it is not, sure, absolute nor unbounded. _Solius Dei est_ (saith
Stapleton),(929) _juxta suam sanctissimam voluntatem, uctiunes suas omnes
dirigere, et omniafacere quæcunquc voluit._ And again, _Vis tuam
voluntatem esse regulam rerum omnium, ut omnia fiant pro uuo beneplacito?_
Whether we respect the persons or the places of princes, their power is
confined within certain limits, so that they may not enjoin whatsoever
they list. As touching their poisons, Bishop Spotswood would do no less
than warrant the articles of Perth by king James’s personal qualities:
“His person (saith he(930)), were he not our sovereign, gives them
sufficient authority, being recommended by him; for he knows the nature of
things, and the consequences of them, what is fit for a church to have,
and what not, better than we do all.”
I mean not to derogate anything from king James’s duly-deserved praise,
nor to obscure his never-dying memory; only I say, that such a prince as
the Bishop speaketh of, who knoweth what is fit for a church to have, and
what not, better than many learned and godly pastors assembled in a synod,
is _rara avis in terris nigroque simillima Cygno_. For a prince being but
a man, and so subject to error, being but one man, and so in the greater
hazard of error; for _plus videns oculi, quam oculus_; and, “woe to him
that is alone when he falleth, for he hath not another to help him up,”
saith the wisest of mortal kings, Eccl. iv. 10; being also compassed or
assailed with so many tentations which other men are free of; and lastly,
being so taken up and distracted with secular affairs and cares, that very
seldom is he found well versed or singularly learned in the controversies
of religion; may not such a one, in the common sense of Christians, be
thought more like to fail and miscarry in his judgment about things
ecclesiastical, than a whole synod, wherein there are many of the learned,
judicious, and godly ministers of the church. Papists tell us, that they
will not defend the personal actions of the Pope, _quasi ipse solus
omnibus horis sapere potuerit, id quod recte nemini concessum
perhibetur_.(931) Their own records let the world know the abominable
vices and impieties of popes. Witness Platina, in the life of John X.,
Benedict IV., John XIII., Boniface VII., John XX., John XXII., Paul II.,
&c. And further, when our adversaries dispute of the Pope’s infallibility,
they grant, for his own person, he may be an heretic, only they hold that
he cannot err _è cathedra_.
And shall we now idolise the persons of princes more than Papists do the
persons of popes? Or shall Papists object to us, that we extol the
judgment of our princes to a higher degree of authority and infallibility
than they yield to the judgment of their popes? Alas, why would we put the
weapons in the hands of our adversaries!
_Sect._ 14. But what say we of princes in respect of their place and
calling? Is not their power absolute in that respect? _Recte quidam_
(saith Saravia),(932) _illiberalis et inverecundi censet esse ingenii, de
prencipum potestate et rebus gestis questionem movere, quando et imperator
sacrilegium este scribit, de eo quod à principe factum est disputare._
Camero holdeth,(933) that in things pertaining to external order in
religion, kings may command what they will _pro authoritate_, and forbid
to seek another reason beside the majesty of their authority; yea, that
when they command _frivola, dura, et iniqua respectu nostri_, our
consciences are bound by those their frivolous and unjust commandments,
not only in respect of the end, because scandal should possibly follow in
case we obey them not, but also _jubentis respectu_, because the Apostle
biddeth us obey the magistrate for conscience’ sake. At the reading of
these passages in Saravia and Camero, horror and amazement have taken hold
on me. O wisdom of God, by whom kings do reign and princes decree justice,
upon whose thigh and vesture is written, “King of kings and Lord of
lords,” make the kings of the earth to know that their laws are but
_regulae regulatae_, and _mensurae mensuratae_! Be wise now, therefore, O
ye kings, be instructed ye judges of the earth. Serve the Lord with fear,
and rejoice with trembling. Kiss the Son, and lay down your crowns at the
feet of the Lamb that sits upon the throne,(934) _discite justitiam
moniti_, and remember that this is the beginning of wisdom, by casting
pride away, to addict yourselves to the dominion of Christ, who, albeit he
hath given the kingdoms of this world unto your hands, and non _auferet
mortalia, qui regna datio caelestia_, yet hath he kept the government of
his church upon his own shoulder, Psalm ix. 6, xxii. 21. So that _rex non
est propie rector ecclesiae sed reipublicae, ecclesiae vero defensor est_.
O all ye subjects of kings and princes, understand that in things
pertaining to the church and kingdom of Christ, ye are not the servants of
men, to do what they list, and that for their listing, 1 Cor. vii. 23. The
Apostle, Rom. xiii. urgeth, not obedience to magistrates for conscience’
sake, but only subjection for conscience’ sake, for he concludeth his
whole purpose,(935) ver. 7, “Render therefore to all their dues, tribute
to whom tribute is due, custom to whom custom, fear to whom fear, honour
to whom honour.”(936) There is not in all that chapter one word of
obedience to magistrates.
And as touching the binding power of their laws, be they never so just,
they cannot bind you any other way, nor in respect of the general end of
them. For, _per se_, they cannot bind more than the church’s laws can.
Which things Dr Forbesse(937) hath also told you out of Calvin.
And hence it followeth, that whensoever you may omit that which princes
enjoin, without violating the law of charity, you are not holden to obey
them for the majesty of princely authority. Be ashamed, O ye Formalists,
of your ascribing to princes a jurisdiction so absolute! Bury it in the
grave of eternal silence. Tell it not in Rome; publish it not among the
vassals of antichrist, lest the daughters of Babylon rejoice, lest the
worshippers of the Beast triumph! O how small confidence have the
cardinals, I say not now into the Pope’s person, but even into his chair,
when being entered in the conclave for the election of a new pope, they
spend the whole day following in the making of laws belonging to the
administration and handling of all things by him who shall be advanced to
the popedom; which laws every one of them subscribeth, and sweareth to
observe, if he be made pope, as Onephrius writeth. Though the Pope’s own
creatures, the Jesuits, in their schools and books, must dispute for his
infallibility _è cathedra_, yet we see what trust the wise cardinals, shut
up in the conclave, do put in him, with what bond they tie him, and within
what bounds they confine his power. Albeit the Pope, after he is created,
observeth not strictly this oath, as that wise writer of the _History of
the Council of Trent_ noteth,(938) yet let me say once again, Shall we set
up the power of princes higher, or make their power less limited than
Papists do the power of popes? or shall they set bounds to popes and we
set none to princes?
_Sect._ 15. But I find myself a little digressed after the roving
absurdities of some opposites. Now, therefore, to return,—the second
proposition which I am here to lay down, before I speak particularly of
the power of princes, is this: Whatsoever princes can commendably either
do by themselves, or command to be done by others, in such matters as any
way appertain to the external worship of God, must be both lawful in the
nature of it, and expedient in the use of it; which conditions, if they be
wanting, their commandments cannot bind to obedience.
For, 1. The very ground and reason wherefore we ought to obey the
magistrate(939) is, for that he is the minister of God, or a deputy set in
God’s stead to us. Now, he is the minister of God only for our good, Rom.
xiii. 4. Neither were he God’s minister, but his own master, if he should
rule at his pleasure, and command things which serve not for the good of
the subjects. Since, therefore, the commandments of princes bind only so
far as they are the ministers of God for our good,—and God’s ministers
they are not in commanding such things as are either in their nature
unlawful, or in their use inconvenient,—it followeth that such
commandments of theirs cannot bind.
2. Princes cannot claim any greater power in matters ecclesiastical than
the apostle Paul had, or the church herself yet hath; that is to say,
princes may not by any temporal or regal jurisdiction, urge any ceremony
or form of ecclesiastical policy which the Apostle once might not, and the
church yet may not, urge by a spiritual jurisdiction. But neither had the
Apostle of old, nor hath the church now, power to urge either a ceremony
or anything else which is not profitable for edifying. Paul could do
nothing against the truth, but for the truth; and his power was given to
him to edification, and not to destruction, 2 Cor. xiii. 8, 10; neither
shall ecclesiastical persons, to the world’s end, receive any other power
beside that which is for the perfecting of the saints, and for the
edifying of the body of Christ, Eph. iv. 12. Therefore, as the church’s
power(940) is only to prescribe that which may edify, so the power of
princes is in like sort given to them for edification, and not for
destruction; neither can they do aught against the truth, but only for the
truth.
3. We are bound by the law of God to do nothing which is not good and
profitable, or edifying, 1 Cor. vi. 12; xiv. 26. This law of charity is of
a higher and straiter bond than the law of any prince in the world:—
“The general rule of all indifferent things, is, Let all things be done to
edification; and, Rom. xv. 1, 2, ‘Let every man please his neighbour to
edification, even as Christ pleased not himself but others.’ Whatsoever,
then, is of this rank, which either would weaken or not edify our brother,
be it ever so lawful, ever so profitable to ourselves, ever so powerfully
by earthly authority enjoined,—Christians, who are not born unto
themselves, but unto Christ, unto his church, and fellow-members, must not
dare to meddle with it,” saith one(941) well to our well to our purpose.
_Sect._ 16. A third proposition I promit, which is this, Since the power
of princes to make laws about things ecclesiastical is not absolute, but
bound and adstricted unto things lawful and expedient, which sort of
things, and no other, we are allowed to do for their commandments; and
since princes many times may, and do, not only transgress those bounds and
limits, but likewise pretend that they are within the same, when indeed
they are without them, and enjoin things unlawful and inconvenient, under
the name, title, and show of things lawful and convenient; therefore it is
most necessary as well for princes to permit, as for subjects to take
liberty to try and examine by the judgment of discretion, everything which
authority enjoineth, whether it be agreeable or repugnant to the rules of
the word; and if, after trial, it be found repugnant, to abstain from the
doing of the same.
For, 1. The word teacheth us, that the spiritual man judgeth all things, 1
Cor. ii. 15; trieth the things that are different, Phil. i. 10; hath his
senses exercised to discern both good and evil, Heb. v. 14; and that every
one who would hold fast that which is good, and abstain from all
appearance of evil, must first prove all things, 1 Thess. v. 21.
2. Whatsoever is not of faith is sin, Rom. xiv. 23. But whatsoever a man
doth without the trial, knowledge, and persuasion of the lawfulness of it
by the word of God, that is not of faith; therefore a sin. It is the word
of God, and not the arbitration of princes whereupon faith is grounded.
And though the word may be without faith, yet faith cannot be without the
word. By it therefore must a man try and know assuredly the lawfulness of
that which he doth.
3. “Every one of us shall give account of himself to God.” But as we
cannot give an account to God of those actions which we have done in
obedience to our prince, except we have examined, considered, and
understood the lawfulness of the same; so an account could not be required
of us for them, if we were bound to obey and to keep all his ordinances in
such sort that we might not try and examine them, with full liberty to
refuse those which we judge out of the word to be unlawful or
inconvenient; for then princes’ ordinances were a most sufficient warrant
to us: we needed try no more. Let him make an account to God of his
command; we have account to make of our obedience.
4. If we be bound to receive and obey the laws of princes, without making
a free trial and examining of the equity of the same, then we could not be
punished for doing, unwillingly and in ignorance, things unlawful
prescribed by them. Whereas every soul that sinneth shall die; and when
the blind leads the blind, he who is lead falls in the ditch as well as
his leader.
5. No man is permitted to do everything which seemeth right in his eyes,
and to follow every conceit which takes him in the head; but every man is
bound to walk by rule, Gal. vi. 6. But the law of a prince cannot be a
rule, except it be examined whether it be consonant to the word of God,
_index secundum legem_, and his law is only such a rule as is ruled by a
higher rule. In so far as it is ruled by the own rule of it, in as far it
is a rule to us; and in so far as it is not ruled by the own rule of it,
in as far it is not a rule to us. _Quid ergo? an non licebit Christiano
cuique convenientiam regulae et regulati (ut vocant) observare?_ saith
Junius.(942)
6. The rule whereby we ought to walk in all our ways, and according to
which we ought to frame all our actions, is provided of God a stable and
sure rule, that it being observed and taken heed unto, may guide and
direct our practice aright about all those things which it prescribeth.
But the law of a prince (if we should, without trial and examination, take
it for our rule) cannot be such a stable and sure rule. For put the case
that a prince enjoin two things which sometimes fall out to be
incompatible and cannot stand together, in that case his law cannot direct
our practice, nor resolve us what to do; whereas God hath so provided for
us, that the case can never occur wherein we may not be resolved what to
do if we observe the rule which he hath appointed us to walk by.
7. Except this judgment of discretion which we plead for be permitted unto
us, it will follow that in point of obedience we ought to give no less,
but as much honour unto princes as unto God himself. For when God
publisheth his commandments unto us, what greater honour could we give him
by our obedience than to do that which he commandeth, for his own sole
will and authority, without making further inquiry for any other reason?
8. The Apostle, 1 Cor. vii. 23, forbiddeth us to be the servants of men,
that is, to do things for which we have no other warrant beside the
pleasure and will of men. Which interpretation is grounded upon other
places of Scripture, that teach us we are not bound to obey men in
anything which we know not to be according to the will of God, Eph. vi. 6,
7; that we ought not to live to the lusts of men, but to the will of God,
1 Pet. iv. 2, and that, therefore, we ought in everything to prove what is
acceptable to the Lord, Eph. v. 20.
9. They who cleanse their way must take heed thereto according to the
word, Psal. cxix. 9; therefore, if we take not heed to our way, according
to the word, we do not cleanse it. They who would walk as the children of
light, must have the word for a lamp unto their feet, and a light unto
their path, Psal. cxix. 105; therefore, if we go in any path without the
light of the word to direct us, we walk in darkness and stumble, because
we see not where we go. They who would not be unwise, but walk
circumspectly, must understand what the will of Lord is, Eph. v. 17;
therefore, if we understand not what the will of the Lord is concerning
that which we do, we are unwise, and walk not circumspectly.
10. _Dona Dei in sanctis non sunt otiosa_.(943) Whatsoever grace God
giveth us, it ought to be used and exercised, and not to lie idle in us;
but God giveth us _actionem cognoscendi, τα διαφεροντα discernendi_,(944)
&c. a certain measure of the spirit of discretion, to teach us what to
choose as good, and what to refuse as evil, 1 John ii. 27, “The same
anointing teacheth you of all things;” 1 Cor. ii. 15, “He that is
spiritual judgeth all things.” Therefore God would have us to exercise
that measure of the gift of discretion which he hath bestowed on us, in
discerning of things which are propounded to us, whether they ought to be
done or not.
11. Do not our divines plead for this judgment of private discretion which
ought to be permitted to Christians, when anything is propounded to be
believed or done by them? And this their judgment is to be seen in their
writings against Papists about the controversies _de interpretatione
Scripturae, de fide implicita_, &c.
12. The Bishop of Salisbury, in his prelections _de Judice
Controversiarum_, doth often and in many places commend unto Christians
the same judgment of discretion which we stand upon, and holdeth it
necessary for them to try and examine whatsoever either princes or
prelates command them to do. _Coactiva_, &c. “The coactive power of a
prince (saith he(945)), doth not absolutely bind the subject, but only
with this condition, except he would compel him to that which is unlawful.
Therefore there is ever left unto subjects a power of proving and judging
in their own mind, whether that which is propounded be ungodly and
unlawful or not; and if it be ungodly, that which the king threateneth
should be suffered, rather than that which he commandeth be done. This
Augustine hath taught,” &c. And whereas it may be objected, that this
maketh a subject to be his prince’s judge, he answereth thus.(946) _Non
se_, &c. He maketh not himself another’s judge, who pondereth and
examineth a sentence published by another, in so far as it containeth
something either to be done or to be believed by him; but only he maketh
himself the judge of his own actions. For howsoever he who playeth the
judge is truly said to judge, yet every one who judgeth is not properly
said to play the judge. He playeth the judge who, in an external court
pronounceth a sentence, which by force of jurisdiction toucheth another;
but he judgeth, who in the inferior court of his own private conscience,
conceiveth such a sentence of the things to be believed or done, as
pertaineth to himself alone. This latter way private men both may and
ought to judge of the sentences and decrees of magistrates, neither by so
doing do they constitute themselves judges of the magistrates, but judges
of their own actions.
_Sect._ 17. Finally, there is none of our opposites but saith so much as
inferreth the necessity of this judgment of private and practical
discretion; for every smatterer among them hath this much in his mouth,
that if the king or the church command anything unlawful, then we ought to
obey God rather than men; but when they command things indifferent and
lawful, then their ordinance ought to be our rule. But (good men) will
they tell us how we shall know whether the things which the king or the
church (as they speak) do enjoin are lawful or unlawful, indifferent or
not indifferent? and so we shall be at a point. Dare they say, that they
may judge those things indifferent which our superiors judge to be such?
and those unlawful which our superiors so judge of? Nay, then, they should
deliver their distinction in other terms, and say thus: If our superiors
enjoin anything which they judge to be unlawful, and which they command us
so to account of, then we ought to obey God rather than men; but if they
enjoin such things as they judge to be indifferent, and which they command
us so to account of, then we ought to obey their ordinance. Which
distinction, methinks, would have made Heraclitus himself to fall a
laughing with Democritus. What then remaineth? Surely our opposites must
either say nothing, or else say with us, that it is not only a liberty but
a duty of inferiors, not to receive for a thing lawful that which is
enjoined by superiors, because they account it and call it such, but by
the judgment of their own discretion following the rules of the word, to
try and examine whether the same be lawful or unlawful.
_Sect._. 18. These _praecognita_ being now made good, come we to speak
more particularly of the power of princes to make laws and ordinances
about things which concern the worship of God. The purpose we will unfold
in three distinctions: 1. Of things; 2. Of times; 3. Of ties. First, Let
us distinguish two sorts of things in the worship of God, viz., things
substantial, and things circumstantial. To things substantial we refer as
well sacred and significant ceremonies as the more necessary and essential
parts of worship, and, in a word, all things which are not mere external
circumstances, such as were not particularly determinable within those
bounds which it pleased God to set to his written word, and the right
ordering whereof, as it is common to all human societies, whether civil or
sacred, so it is investigable by the very light and guidance of natural
reason. That among this kind of mere circumstances sacred significant
ceremonies cannot be reckoned, we have otherwhere made it evident. Now,
therefore, of things pertaining to the substance of God’s worship, whether
they be sacred ceremonies, or greater and more necessary duties, we say
that princes have not power to enjoin anything of this kind which hath not
the plain and particular institution of God himself in Scripture. They may
indeed, and ought to publish God’s own ordinances and commandments, and,
by their coactive temporal power, urge and enforce the observation of the
same. Notwithstanding, it is a prince’s duty, “that in the worship of God,
whether internal or external, he move nothing, he prescribe nothing,
except that which is expressly delivered in God’s own written word.”(947)
We must beware we confound not things which have the plain warrant of
God’s word with things devised by the will of man. David, Jehoshaphat,
Hezekiah, Josiah, and other kings among the people of God, did, as well
laudably as lawfully, enjoin and command that worship and form of religion
which God, in his law and by his prophets, commanded; and forbid, avoid,
and abolish such corruptions as God had forbidden before them, and
appointed to be abolished; whence it followeth not that kings may enjoin
things which want the warrant of the word, but only this much, which all
of us commend, viz., “That a Christian prince’s office in religion,(948)
is diligently to take care that, in his dominion or kingdom, religion out
of the pure word of God, expounded by the word of God itself, and
understood according to the first principles of faith (which others call
the analogy of faith), either be instituted, or, being instituted, be kept
pure, or, being corrupted, be restored and reformed, that false doctrines,
abuses, idols, and superstitions, be taken away, to the glory of God, and
to his own and his subjects’ salvation.”
_Sect._ 19. But in all the Scripture princes have neither a commendable
example, nor any other warrant, for the making of any innovation in
religion, or for the prescribing of sacred significant ceremonies of men’s
devising. Jeroboam caused a change to be made in the ceremonies and form
of God’s worship, whereas God ordained the ark of the covenant to be the
sign of his presence, and that his glory should dwell between the
cherubims. Jeroboam set up two calves to be the signs representative of
that God who brought “Israel out of Egypt;” and this he means while he
saith, “Behold thy gods,” &c., 1 Kings xii. 28, giving to the signs the
thing signified; whereas God ordained Jerusalem to be the place of
worship, and all the sacrifices to be brought to the temple of Solomon,
Jeroboam made Dan and Bethel to be places of worship, and built there
altars and high places for the sacrifices; whereas God ordained the sons
of Aaron only to be his priests, Jeroboam made priests of the lowest of
the people, which were not of the sons of Levi; whereas God ordained the
feast of tabernacles to be kept on the fifteenth day of the seventh month,
Jeroboam appointed it on the fifteenth day of the eighth month. Now, if
any prince in the world might have fair pretences for the making of such
innovations in religion, Jeroboam much more. He might allege for his
changing of the signs of God’s presence, and of the place of worship, that
since Rehoboam’s wrath was incensed against him, and against the ten
tribes which adhered unto him (as appeareth by the accounting of them to
be rebels, 2 Chron. xiii. 6, and by the gathering of a huge army for
bringing the kingdom again to Rehoboam, 2 Chron. xi. 1), it was no longer
safe for his subjects to go up to Jerusalem to worship, in which case God,
who required mercy more than sacrifice, would bear with their changing of
a few ceremonies for the safety of men’s lives. For his putting down of
the priests and Levites, and his ordaining of other priests which were not
of the sons of Levi, he might pretend that they were rebellious to him, in
that they would not assent unto his new ordinances,(949) which he had
enacted for the safety and security of his subjects, and that they did not
only simply refuse obedience to these his ordinances, but in their refusal
show themselves so stedfastly minded, that they would refuse and withstand
even to the suffering of deprivation and deposition; and not only so, but
likewise drew after them many others of the rest of the tribes to be of
their judgment, 2 Chron. xi. 16, and to adhere to that manner of worship
which was retained in Jerusalem. Lastly, For the change which he made
about the season of the feast of tabernacles, he might have this pretence,
that as it was expedient for the strengthening of his kingdom(950) to draw
and allure as many as could be had to associate and join themselves with
him in his form of worship (which could not be done if he should keep that
feast at the same time when it was kept at Jerusalem); so there was no
less (if not more) order and decency in keeping it in the eighth month,
when the fruits of the ground were perfectly gathered in(951) (for
thankful remembrance whereof that feast was celebrated) than in the
seventh, when they were not so fully collected.
These pretences he might have made yet more plausible, by professing and
avouching that he intended to worship no idols, but the Lord only; that he
had not fallen from anything which was fundamental and essential in divine
faith and religion, that the changes which he had made were only about
some alterable ceremonies which were not essential to the worship of God,
and that even in these ceremonies he had not made any change for his own
will and pleasure, but for important reasons which concerned the good of
his kingdom and safety of his subjects. Notwithstanding of all this, the
innovations which he made about these ceremonies of sacred signs, sacred
places, sacred persons, sacred times, are condemned for this very reason,
because he devised them of his own heart, 1 Kings xii. 33, which was
enough to convince him of horrible impiety in making Israel to sin.
Moreover, when king Ahaz took a pattern of the altar of Damascus, and sent
it to Urijah the priest, though we cannot gather from the text that he
either intended or pretended any other respect beside the honouring and
pleasuring of his patron and protector, the king of Assyria, 2 Kings xvi.
10, 18 (for of his appointing that new altar for his own and all the
people’s sacrifices, there was nothing heard till after his return from
Damascus, at which time he began to fall back from one degree of defection
to a greater), yet this very innovation of taking the pattern of an altar
from idolaters is marked as a sin and a snare. Last of all, whereas many
of the kings of Judah and Israel did either themselves worship in the
groves and the high places, or else, at least, suffer the people to do so,
howsoever they might have alleged(952) specious reasons for excusing
themselves,—as namely, that they gave not this honour to any strange gods,
but to the Lord only; that they chose these places only to worship in
wherein God was of old seen and worshipped by the patriarchs, that the
groves and the high places added a most amiable splendour and beauty to
the worship of God, and that they did consecrate these places for divine
worship in a good meaning, and with minds wholly devoted to God’s
honour,—yet notwithstanding, because this thing was not commanded of God,
neither came it into his heart, he would admit no excuses, but ever
challengeth it as a grievous fault in the government of those kings, that
those high places were not taken away, and that the people still
sacrificed in the high places; from all which examples we learn how highly
God was and is displeased with men for adding any other sacred ceremonies
to those which he himself hath appointed.(953)
_Sect._ 20. Now as touching the other sort of things which we consider in
the worship of God, namely, things merely circumstantial, and such as have
the very same use and respect in civil which they have in sacred actions,
we hold that whensoever it happeneth to be the duty and part of a prince
to institute and enjoin any order or policy in these circumstances of
God’s worship, then he may only enjoin such an order as may stand with the
observing and following of the rules of the word, whereunto we are tied in
the use and practice of things which are in their general nature
indifferent.
Of these rules I am to speak in the fourth part of the dispute. And here I
say no more but this: Since the word commandeth us to do all things to the
glory of God, 1 Cor. x. 31; to do all things to edifying, 1 Cor. xiv. 29;
and to do all things in faith, and full persuasion of the lawfulness of
that which we do, Rom. xiv. 5, 23, therefore there is no prince in the
world who hath power to command his subjects to do that which should
either dishonour God, or not honour him; or that which should either
offend their brother, or not edify him; or, lastly, that which their
conscience either condemneth or doubteth of. For how may a prince command
that which his subjects may not do? But a wonder it were if any man should
so far refuse to be ashamed that he would dare to say we are not bound to
order whatsoever we do according to these rules of the word, but only such
matters of private action wherein we are left at full liberty, there being
no ordinance of superiors to determine our practice, and that if such an
ordinance be published and propounded unto us, we should take it alone for
our rule, and no longer think to examine and order our practice by the
rules of the word;
For, 1. This were as much as to say, that in the circumstances of God’s
worship we are bound to take heed unto God’s rules, then only and in that
case when men give us none of their rules, which, if they do, God’s rules
must give place to men’s rules, and not theirs to his.
2. If it were so, then we should never make reckoning to God, whether that
which we had done in obedience to superiors was right or wrong, good or
bad, and we should only make reckoning of such things done by us as were
not determined by a human law.
3. The law of superiors is never the supreme but ever a subordinate rule,
and (as we said before) it can never be a rule to us, except in so far
only as it is ruled by a higher rule. Therefore we have ever another rule
to take heed unto beside their law.
4. The Scripture speaketh most generally, and admitteth no exception from
the rules which it giveth: “Whatsoever ye do (though commanded by
superiors) do all to the glory of God. Let all things (though commanded by
superiors) be done to edifying. Whatsoever is not of faith (though
commanded by superiors) is sin.”
5. We may do nothing for the sole will and pleasure of men, for this were
to be the servants of men, as hath been shown. The Bishop of Salisbury
also assenteth hereunto.(954) _Non enim_ (saith he) _Deus vult, ut hominis
alicujus voluntatem regulam nostrae voluntatis atque vitae faciamus: sed
hoc privilegium sibi ac verbo suo reservatum voluit._ And again,(955) _Pio
itaque animo haec consideratio semper adesse debet, utrum id quod
praecipitur sit divino mandato contrarium necne: atque ne ex hac parte
fallantur, adhibendum est illud judicium discretionis, quod nos tantopere
urgemus._
_Sect._ 21. These things if Saravia had considered,(956) he had not so
absolutely pronounced that the power of the kings may make constitutions
of the places and times, when and where the exercises of piety may be
conveniently had, also with what order, what rite, what gesture, what
habit, the mysteries shall be more decently celebrated. But what! thought
he this power of kings is not astricted to the rules of the word? Have
they any power which is to destruction and not to edification? Can they
command their subjects to do anything in the circumstances of divine
worship which is not for the glory of God, which is not profitable for
edifying, and which they cannot do in faith? Nay, that all the princes in
the world have not such power as this, will easily appear to him who
attendeth unto the reasons which we have propounded. And because men do
easily and ordinarily pretend that their constitutions are according to
the rules of the word, when they are indeed repugnant to the same,
therefore we have also proved that inferiors may and must try and examine
every ordinance of their superiors, and that by the judgment of private
discretion, following the rules of the word. I say following the rules of
the word, because we will never allow a man to follow Anabaptistical or
Swenckfeldian-like enthusiasms and inspirations.
_Sect._ 22. Touching the application of what hath been said unto the
controverted ceremonies, there needs nothing now to be added. For that
they belong not to that sort of things which may be applied to civil uses,
with the same respect and account which they have being applied to
religious uses, the account I mean of mere circumstances serving only for
that common order and decency which is and should be observed in civil no
less than in sacred actions, but that they belong to the substance of
worship, as being sacred significant ceremonies, wherein both holiness and
necessity are placed, and which may not without his sacrilege be used out
of the compass of worship, we have elsewhere plainly evinced. And this
kind of things, whensover they are men’s devices, and not God’s
ordinances, cannot be lawfully enjoined by princes, as hath been showed.
But if any man will needs have these ceremonies in question to go under
the name of mere circumstances, let us put the case they were no other,
yet our conforming unto them, which is urged, cannot stand with the rules
of the word.
It could not be for the glory of God, not only for that it is offensive to
many of Christ’s little ones, but likewise for that it ministereth
occasion to the enemies of the Lord to blaspheme; to atheists, because by
these naughty observances they see the commandments of God made of little
or no effect, and many godly both persons and purposes despised and
depressed, whereat they laugh in their sleeve and say, Aha! so would we
have it; to Papists, because as by this our conformity they confirm
themselves in sundry of their errors and superstitions, so perceiving us
so little to abhor the pomp and bravery of their mother of harlots, that
we care not to borrow from her some of her meretricious trinkets, they
promise to themselves that in the end we shall take as great a draught of
the cup of the wine of her fornications as they themselves.
Neither yet can our conforming unto the ceremonies pressed upon us be
profitable for edifying, for we have given sufficient demonstration of
manifold hurts and inconveniences ensuing thereon.
Nor, lastly, can we conform to them in faith; for as our consciences
cannot find, so the word cannot afford, any warrant for them. Of all which
things now I only make mention, because I have spoken of them enough
otherwhere.
_Sect._ 23. The second distinction which may help our light in this
question about the power of princes, is of times; for when the church and
ministers thereof are corrupted and must be reformed, princes may do much
more in making laws about things ecclesiastical than regularly they may,
when ecclesiastical persons are both able and willing to do their duty, in
rightly taking care of all things which ought to be provided for the good
of the church, and conservation or purgation of religion. “For (saith
Junuis(957)) both the church, when the joining of the magistrate faileth,
may extraordinarily do something which ordinarily she cannot; and again,
when the church faileth of her duty, the magistrate may extraordinarily
procure that the church return to her duty; that is, in such a case
extraordinarily happening, these (ecclesiastical persons) and those
(magistrates) may extraordinarily do something which ordinarily they
cannot. For this belongeth to common law and equity, that unto
extraordinary evils, extraordinary remedies must also be applied.” We
acknowledge that it belongeth to princes(958) “to reform things in the
church, as often as the ecclesiastical persons shall, either through
ignorance, disorder of the affection of covetousness, or ambition, defile
the Lord’s sanctuary.” At such extraordinary times, princes, by their
coactive temporal power, ought to procure and cause a reformation of
abuses, and the avoiding of misorders in the church, though with the
discontent of the clergy, for which end and purpose they may not only
enjoin and command the profession of that faith, and the practice of that
religion which God’s word appointeth, but also prescribe such an order and
policy in the circumstances of divine worship as they in their judgment of
Christian discretion, observing and following the rules of the word, shall
judge and try to be convenient for the present time and case, and all this
under the commination of such temporal losses, pains, or punishments as
they shall deprehend to be reasonable. But at other ordinary times, when
ecclesiastical persons are neither through ignorance unable, nor through
malice and perverseness of affection unwilling, to put order to whatsoever
requireth any mutation to be made in the church and service of God, in
that case, without their advice and consent, princes may not make an
innovation of any ecclesiastical rite, nor publish any ecclesiastical law.
_Sect._ 24. When Dr Field(959) speaketh of the power of princes to
prescribe and make laws about things spiritual or ecclesiastical, he
saith, That the prince may, with the advice and direction of his clergy,
command things pertaining to God’s worship and service, both for
profession of faith, ministration of the sacraments, and conversation
fitting to Christians in general, or men of ecclesiastical order in
particular, under the pains of death, imprisonment, banishment,
confiscation of goods, and the like; and by his princely power establish
things formerly defined and decreed, against whatsoever error and contrary
ill custom and observation. In all this the Doctor saith very right; but I
demand, further, these two things: 1. What if the thing have not been
decreed before? and what if the free assent of the clergy be not had for
it? Would the Doctor have said that in such a case the prince hath not
power by himself, and by his own sole authority, to enjoin it, and to
establish a law concerning it? For example, that king James had not power
by himself to impose the controverted ceremonies upon the church of
Scotland at that time when as no free assent (much less the direction) of
the clergy was had for them, so neither had they been formerly decreed,
but laws and decrees were formerly made against them. If the Doctor would
have answered affirmatively that he had this power, then why did he, in a
scornful dissimulation, so circumscribe and limit the power of princes, by
requiring a former decree, and the free assent of the clergy? If he would
have answered negatively, that he had no such power, we should have
rendered him thanks for his answer. 2. Whether may the clergy make any
laws about things pertaining to the service of God which the prince may
not as well by himself, and without them, constitute and authorise? If the
affirmative part be granted unto us, we gladly take it. But we suppose Dr
Field did, and our opposites yet do, hold the negative. Whereupon it
followeth that the prince hath as much, yea, the very same power, of
making laws in all ecclesiastical things which the clergy themselves have
when they are convened in a lawful and free assembly, yet I guess from the
Doctor’s words that he would have replied, namely, that the difference is
great betwixt the power of making laws about things ecclesiastical in the
prince, and the same power in the clergy assembled together; for he
describeth the making of a law to be the prescribing of something, under
some pain or punishment, which he that so prescribeth hath power to
inflict. Whereby he would make it appear that he yieldeth not unto princes
the same power of spiritual jurisdiction, in making of ecclesiastical
laws, which agreeth to the clergy; because, whereas a council of the
clergy may frame canons about things which concern the worship of God, and
prescribe them under the pain of excommunication, and other ecclesiastical
censures, the ordinance of princes about such matters is only under the
pain of some external or bodily punishment. But I answer, _potestas_
διατακτικὴ is one thing, and _potestas_ κειτικὴ is another thing. When the
making of a law is joined either with the intention, or with the
commination of a punishment, in case of transgression, this is but
accidental and adventitious to the law, not naturally nor necessarily
belonging to the essence of the same; for many laws there hath been, and
may be, which prescribe not that which they contain under the same pain or
punishment. Gratian distinguisheth three sorts of laws: _Omnis_, &c.
“Every law (saith he(960)) either permits something; for example, let a
valorous man seek a reward: or forbids; for example, let it be lawful to
no man to seek the marriage of holy virgins: or punisheth; for example, he
who committeth murder let him be capitally punished.” And in this third
kind only there is something prescribed under a pain or punishment. It is
likewise holden by schoolmen,(961) that it is a law which permitteth
something indifferent, as well as it which commandeth some virtue, or
forbiddeth some vice. When a prince doth statute and ordain, that
whosoever, out of a generous and magnanimous spirit, will adventure to
embark and hazard in a certain military exploit against a foreign enemy,
whom he intendeth to subdue, shall be allowed to take for himself in
propriety all the rich spoil which he can lay hold on,—there is nothing
here prescribed under some pain or punishment, yet it is a law, and
properly so termed. And might not the name of a law be given unto that
edict of King Darius, whereby he decreed that all they in his dominions
should fear the God of Daniel, forasmuch as he is the living and eternal
God, who reigneth for ever, Dan. vi.; yet it prescribed nothing under some
pain or punishment to be inflicted by him who so prescribed. Wherefore,
though the prince publisheth ecclesiastical laws under other pains and
punishments than the clergy doth, this showeth only that _potestas_
κειτικὴ is not the same, but different, in the one and in the other; yet
if it be granted that whatsoever ecclesiastical law a synod of the clergy
hath power to make and publish, the prince hath power to make and publish
without them, by his own sole authority, it followeth, that the power of
the church to make laws which is called _potestas_ διατακτικὴ, doth agree
as much, as properly, and as directly to the prince, as to a whole synod
of the church.
_Sect._ 25. Now, therefore, we firmly hold, 1. That the prince may not
innovate any custom or rite of the church, nor publish any ecclesiastical
law, without the free assent of the clergy, they being neither unable for,
nor unwilling unto, their ecclesiastical functions and duties; yea,
further, that so far as is possible, the consent of the whole church ought
to be had whensoever any change is to be made of some order or custom in
the church; for that which toucheth the whole church, and is to be used by
the whole church, _ab omnibus etiam merito curatur_.(962) Therefore, when
there is any change to be made in the rites of the church, _merito fit hoc
cum omnium ordinum ecclesiae consensu_.(963) Neither was there ever a
rightly reformed church which was helped and not hurt by such rites and
customs as, to their grief and miscontentment, princes did impose upon
them. Whence it was, that “they who were orthodox did ever withstand such
a magistrate as would have, by his commandments, tied the church to that
which was burdensome to their consciences.”(964) That such inconveniences
may be shunned, it is fit, that, when any change is to be made in the
policy of a church, not the clergy alone, but the elders also, and men of
understanding among the laity, in a lawful assembly, freely give their
voices and consent thereunto. Good reason have our writers to hold against
Papists, that laymen ought to have place in councils wherein things which
concern the whole church are to be deliberated upon. 2. Lest it be thought
enough that princes devise, frame, and establish, ecclesiastical laws as
them best liketh, and then, for more show of orderly proceeding, some
secret and sinistrous way extort and procure the assent of the synod of
the church; therefore we add, that it belongeth to the synod (the clergy
having the chief place therein, to give direction and advice), not to
receive and approve the definition of the prince in things which concern
the worship of God, but itself to define and determine what orders and
customs are fittest to be observed in such things, that thereafter the
prince may approve and ratify the same, and press them upon his subjects
by his regal coactive power. To me it is no less than a matter of
admiration how Camero could so far forget himself as to say,(965) that in
things pertaining unto religion, _dirigere atque disponere penes
magistratum est proprie, penes ecclesiasticos ministerium atque executio
proprie_, telling us further, that the directing and disposing of such
things doth then only belong to ecclesiastical persons when the church
suffereth persecution, or when the magistrate permitteth that the matter
be judged by the church.
Our writers have said much of the power of the church to make laws, but
this man (I perceive) will correct them all, and will not acknowledge that
the church hath any power of making laws about things pertaining to
religion (except by accident, because of persecution or permission), but
only a power of executing what princes please to direct. More fully to
deliver our mind, we say, that in the making of laws about things which
concern the worship of God, the prince may do much _per actus imperatos_,
but nothing _per actus elicitos_. For the more full explanation of which
distinction, I liken the prince to the will of man; the ministers of the
church to man’s particular senses; a synod of the church to that internal
sense which is called _sensus communis_; the fountain and original of all
the external things and actions ecclesiastical, or such as concern the
worship of God, to the objects and actions of the particular senses; and
the power of making ecclesiastical laws to that power and virtue of the
common sense, whereby it perceiveth, discerneth, and judgeth of the
objects and actions of all the particular senses. Now as the will
commandeth the common sense to discern and judge of the actions and
objects of all the particular senses, thereafter commandeth the eye to
see, and the ear to hear, the nose to smell, &c., yet it hath not power by
itself to exercise or bring forth any of these actions, for the will can
neither see nor yet judge of the object and action of sight, &c. So the
prince may command a synod of the church to judge of ecclesiastical things
and actions, and to define what order and form of policy is most
convenient to be observed in things pertaining to divine worship, and
thereafter he may command the particular ministers of the church to
exercise the works of their ministry, and to apply themselves unto that
form of church regiment and policy which the synod hath prescribed, yet he
may not by himself define and direct such matters, nor make any laws
thereanent.
_Sect._ 26. For proof of these things I add, 1. Politic government,
_versatur circa res terrenas et hominem externum_ (saith one of our
writers(966)); _magistratus_ (saith another(967)) _instituti sunt à Deo
rerum humanarum __ quae hominum societati necessariae sunt respectu, et ad
carum curam_; but they are ecclesiastical ministers who are “ordained for
men in things pertaining to God,” Heb. v. 1, that is, in things which
pertain unto God’s worship. It belongeth not therefore to princes to
govern and direct things of this nature, even as it belongeth not to
pastors to govern and direct earthly things which are necessary for the
external and civil society of men, I mean ordinarily and regularly, for of
extraordinary cases we have spoken otherwise. But according to the common
order and regular form we are ever to put this difference betwixt civil
and ecclesiastical government, which one of our best learned divines hath
excellently conceived after this manner:(968) _Altera differentia_, &c.,
“The other difference (saith he) taken from the matter and subject of the
administrations. For we have put in our definition human things to be the
subject of civil administration, but the subject of ecclesiastical
administration we have taught to be things divine and sacred. Things
divine and sacred we call both those which God commandeth for the
sanctification of our mind and conscience as things necessary, and also
those which the decency and order of the church requireth to be ordained
and observed for the profitable and convenient use of the things which are
necessary; for example, prayers, the administration of the word and
sacraments, ecclesiastical censure, are things necessary, and essentially
belonging to the communion of saints; but set days, set hours, set places,
fasts, and if there be any such like, they belong to the decency and order
of the church, without which the church cannot be well edified, nor any
particular member thereof rightly fashioned and fitly set in the body. But
human things we call such duties as touch the life, the body, goods, and
good name, as they are expounded in the second table of the Decalogue, for
these are the things in which the whole civil administration standeth.
Behold how the very circumstances which pertain to ecclesiastical order
and decency are exempted from the compass of civil government.”
2. “Natural reason (saith the Bishop of Salisbury) telleth,(969) that to
judge of everything, and to instruct others, belongeth to them who before
others take pains and study to the care and knowledge of the same, so
physicians judge which meat is wholesome, which noisome. Lawyers declare
what is just, what unjust, and in all arts and sciences, they who
professedly place their labour and study in the polishing and practising
of the same, both use and ought to direct the judgments of others.” Since
therefore(970) the ministers of the church are those _quibus ecclesiae
cura incumbit vel maxime_, since they do above and before the civil
magistrate devote themselves to the care and knowledge of things
pertaining to God and his worship, whereabout they profess to bestow their
ordinary study and painful travail, were it not most repugnant to the law
of natural reason to say that they ought not to direct, but be directed
by, the magistrate in such matters?
3. The ministers of the church are appointed to be “watchmen in the city
of God,” Mic. vii. 4, and “overseers of the flock,” Acts xx. 28; but when
princes do, without the direction and definition of ministers, establish
certain laws to be observed in things pertaining to religion, ministers
are not then watchmen and overseers, because they have not the first
sight, and so cannot give the first warning of the change which is to be
made in the church. The watchmen are upon the walls, the prince is within
the city. Shall the prince now view and consider the breaches and defects
of the city better and sooner than the watchmen themselves? Or shall one,
within the city, tell what should be righted and helped therein, before
them who are upon the walls? Again, the prince is one of the flock, and is
committed, among the rest, to the care, attendance, and guidance of the
overseers; and, I pray, shall one of the sheep direct the overseers how to
govern and lead the whole flock, or prescribe to them what orders and
customs they shall observe for preventing or avoiding any hurt and
inconvenience which may happen to the flock?
4. Christ hath ordained men of ecclesiastical order, not only “for the
work of the ministry,”(971) that is, for preaching the word and
ministering the sacraments, for warning and rebuking them who sin, for
comforting the afflicted, for confirming the weak, &c., but also for
providing whatsoever concerneth either the private spiritual good of any
member of the church, which the Apostle calleth “the perfecting of the
saints,” or the public spiritual good of the whole church, which he
calleth the “edifying of the body of Christ,” Eph. iv. 12. Since,
therefore, the making of laws about such things, without which the worship
of God cannot be orderly nor decently (and so not rightly) performed,
concerneth the spiritual good and benefit of the whole church, and of all
the members thereof, it followeth that Christ hath committed the power of
judging, defining, and making laws about those matters, not to
magistrates, but to the ministers of the church.
5. The Apostle, speaking of the church ministers, saith, “Obey them that
have the rule over you, and submit yourselves for they watch for your
souls as they that must give account,” Heb. xiii. 17. Whence we gather,
that in things pertaining to God, and which touch the spiritual benefit of
the soul, the ministers of the church ought to give direction, and to be
obeyed, as those who, in things of this nature, have the rule over all
others of the church (and by consequence over princes also), so that it be
in the Lord. And lest this place and power which is given to ministers,
should either be abused by themselves to the commanding of what they will,
or envied by others, as too great honour and pre-eminence, the Apostle
showeth what a painful charge lieth on them, and what a great reckoning
they have to make. They watch for your souls, saith he, not only by
preaching and warning every one, and by offering up their earnest prayers
to God for you, but likewise by taking such care of ecclesiastical
discipline, order, and policy, that they must provide and procure
whatsoever shall be expedient for your spiritual good, and direct you in
what convenient and beseeming manner you are to perform the works of God’s
worship, as also to avoid and shun every scandal and inconveniency which
may hinder your spiritual good. And of these things, whether they have
done them or not, they must make account before the judgment seat of the
great Bishop of your souls. Surely, if it belong to princes to do fine and
ordain what order and policy should be observed in the church, what forms
and fashions should be used, for the orderly and right managing of the
exercises of God’s worship, how scandals and misorders are to be shunned,
how the church may be most edified, and the spiritual good of the saints
best helped and advanced, by wholesome and profitable laws, concerning
things which pertain to religion, then must princes take also upon them a
great part of that charge of pastors, to watch for the souls of men, and
must liberate them from being liable to a reckoning for the same.
_Sect._ 27. 6. Constantine the Great, Theodosius, both the one and the
other, Martianus, Charles the Great, and other Christian princes, when
there was any change to be made of ecclesiastical rites, did not, by their
own authority, imperiously enjoin the change, but convocate synods for
deliberating upon the matter, as Balduine noteth.(972) The great Council
of Nice was assembled by Constantine, not only because of the Arian
heresy, but, also (as Socrates witnesseth(973)), because of the difference
about the keeping of Easter; and though the bishops, when they were
assembled, did put up to him libels of accusation, one against another, so
that there could be no great hope of their agreement upon fit and
convenient laws; yet, notwithstanding, he did not interpone his own
definition and decree, for taking up that difference about Easter, only he
exhorted the bishops convened in the council to peace, and so commended
the whole matter to be judged by them.
7. We have for us the judgment of worthy divines. A notable testimony of
Junius we have already cited. Danaeus will not allow princes by themselves
to make laws about ecclesiastical rites,(974) but this he will have done
by a synod. _Porro quod ad ritus,_ &c. “Furthermore (saith he), for rites
and ceremonies, and that external order which is necessary in the
administration of the church, let a synod of the church convene, the
supreme and godly magistrate both giving commandment for the convening of
it, and being present in it; and let that synod of the church lawfully
assembled define what should be the order and external regiment of the
church. This decree of the ecclesiastical synod shall the godly and
supreme magistrate afterward confirm, stablish, and ratify by his edict.”
Joh. Wolphius observeth of king Joash,(975) that he did not by himself
take order for the reparation of the temple, nor define what was to be
done unto every breach therein, but committed this matter to be directed
and cared for by the priests, whom it chiefly concerned, commanding them
to take course for the reparation of the breaches of the house,
wheresoever any breach should be found, and allowing them money for the
work. Whereupon he further noteth, that as the superior part of man’s soul
doth not itself hear, see, touch, walk, speak, but commandeth the ears,
eyes, hands, feet, and tongue, to do the same; so the magistrate should
not himself either teach or make laws, but command that these things be
done by the doctors and teachers. Cartwright and Pareus upon Heb. xiii.
17, tell the Papists, that we acknowledge princes are holden to be
obedient unto pastors in things that belong unto God, if they rule
according to the word, which could not be so, if the making of laws about
things pertaining to God and his worship did not of right and due belong
unto pastors, but unto princes themselves. Our Second Book of Discipline,
chap. 12, ordaineth, “That ecclesiastical assemblies have their place,
with power to the kirk to appoint times and places convenient for the
same, and all men, as well magistrates as inferiors, to be subject to the
judgment of the same in ecclesiastical causes.” Balduine holdeth,(976)
that a prince may not by himself enjoin any new ecclesiastical rite, but
must convocate a synod for the deliberation and definition of such things.
And what mean our writers when they say,(977) that kings have no spiritual
but only a civil power in the church? As actions are decerned by the
objects, so are powers by the actions: if, therefore, kings do commendably
by themselves make laws about things pertaining to God’s worship, which is
a spiritual action, then have they also a spiritual power in the church;
but if they have no spiritual power, that is, no power of spiritual
jurisdiction, how can they actually exercise spiritual jurisdiction? That
the making of laws about things pertaining to God’s worship is an action
of spiritual jurisdiction, it needeth no great demonstration; for, 1. When
a synod of the church maketh laws about such things, all men know that
this is an action of spiritual jurisdiction flowing from that power of
spiritual jurisdiction which is called _potestas_ διατακτικὴ. And how then
can the prince’s making of such laws be called an action of civil, not of
spiritual jurisdiction? I see not what can be answered, except it be said,
that the making of those laws by a synod is an action of spiritual
jurisdiction, because they are made and published with the commination of
spiritual and ecclesiastical punishments in case of transgression, but the
making of them by the prince is an action of jurisdiction only, because he
prescribeth and commandeth, under the pain of some temporal loss or
punishment. But I have already confuted this answer, because
notwithstanding of the different punishments which the one and the other
hath power to threaten and inflict, yet, at least, that part of spiritual
jurisdiction which we call _potestas_ διατακτικὴ remaineth the same in
both, which power of making laws must not (as I show) be confounded with
that other power of judging and punishing offenders. 2. Actions take their
species or kind from the object and the end, when other circumstances
hinder not. Now, a prince’s making of laws about things pertaining to
religion, is such an action of jurisdiction, as hath both a spiritual end,
which is the edification of the church and spiritual good of Christians,
and likewise a spiritual object; for that all things pertaining to divine
worship, even the very external circumstances of the same, are rightly
called things spiritual and divine, not civil or human, our opposites
cannot deny, except they say, not only that such things touch the lives,
bodies, estates, or names of men, and are not ordained for the spiritual
benefit of their souls, but also that the synod of the church, whose power
reacheth only to things spiritual, not civil or human, can never make laws
about those circumstances which are applied unto, and used in the worship
of God; and as the prince’s making of laws about things of this nature, is
in respect of the object and end, an action of spiritual jurisdiction, so
there is no circumstance at all which varieth the kind, or maketh it an
action of civil jurisdiction only. If it be said, that the circumstance of
the person changeth the kind of the action, so that the making of laws
about things pertaining to religion, if they be made by ecclesiastical
persons, is an action of spiritual jurisdiction; but if, by the civil
magistrate, an action of civil jurisdiction, this were a most extremely
unadvised distinction; for so might Uzziah the king have answered for
himself, 2 Chron. xxvi. 18, that, in burning incense, he did not take upon
him to execute the priest’s office, because he was only a civil person; so
may the Pope say, that he might not take upon him the power of emperors
and monarchs, because he is an ecclesiastical person. Many things men do
_de facto_, which they cannot _de jure_. Civil persons may exercise a
spiritual jurisdiction and office, and, again, ecclesiastical persons may
exercise a civil jurisdiction _de facto_, though not _de jure_. Wherefore
the prince’s making of laws about things spiritual remaineth still an
action of spiritual jurisdiction, except some other thing can be alleged
to the contrary, beside the circumstance of the person. But some man,
peradventure, will object that a prince, by his civil power, may enjoin
and command not only the observation of those ecclesiastical rites which a
synod of the church prescribeth, but also that a synod (when need is)
prescribe new orders and rites, all which are things spiritual and divine.
And why then may he not, by the same civil power, make laws about the
rites and circumstances of God’s worship, notwithstanding that they are
(in their use and application to the actions of worship) things spiritual,
not civil.
_Ans._ The schoolmen say,(978) that an action proceedeth from charity two
ways, either _elicitive_ or _imperative_, and that those actions which are
immediately produced and wrought out by charity, belong not to other
virtues distinct from charity, but are comprehended under the effects of
charity itself, such as are the loving of good and rejoicing for it. Other
actions, say they, which are only commanded by charity, belong to other
special virtues distinct from charity. So, say I, an action may proceed
from a civil power either _elicitive_ or _imperative_. _Elicitive_ a civil
power can only make laws about things civil or human; but _imperative_ it
may command the ecclesiastical power to make laws about things spiritual,
which laws thereafter it may command to be observed by all who are in the
church.
_Sect._ 28. 8. Our opposites themselves acknowledge no less than that
which I have been pleading for. “To devise new rites and ceremonies (saith
Dr Bilson(979)), is not the prince’s vocation, but to receive and allow
such as the Scriptures and canons commend, and such as the bishops and
pastors of the place shall advise.” And saith not the Bishop of
Salisbury,(980) _Ceremonias utiles et decoras excogitare, ad
ecclesiasticos pertinet; tamen easdem comprobare, et toti populo
observandas imponere, ad reges spectat_? Camero saith,(981) that it is the
part of a prince to take care for the health of men’s souls, even as he
doth for the health of their bodies, and that as he provideth not for the
curing or preventing of bodily diseases directly and by himself, but
indirectly and by the physicians, so he should not by himself prescribe
cures and remedies for men’s spiritual maladies. _Perinde principis est
curare salutem animarum, ac ejusdem est saluti corporum prospicere: non
est autem principis providere ne morbi grassentur directe, esset enim
medicus, at indirecte tamen princeps id studere debet._ Whence it
followeth, that even as when some bodily sickness spreadeth, a prince’s
part is not to prescribe a cure, but to command the physicians to do it;
just so, when any abuse, misorder, confusion, or scandal in the church,
requireth or maketh it necessary that a mutation be made of some rite or
order in the same, and that wholesome laws be enacted, which may serve for
the order, decency, and edification of the church, a prince may not do
this by himself, but may only command the pastors and guides of the
church, who watch for the souls of men as they who must give account, to
see to the exigency of the present state of matters ecclesiastical, and to
provide such laws as they, being met together in the name of the Lord,
shall, after due and free deliberation, find to be convenient, and which,
being once prescribed by them, he shall by his royal authority confirm,
establish, and press.
_Sect._ 29. Needs now it must be manifest, that the lawfulness of our
conforming unto the ceremonies in question can be no way warranted by any
ordinance of the supreme magistrate, or any power which he hath in things
spiritual or ecclesiastical; and if our opposites would ponder the reasons
we have given, they should be quickly quieted, understanding that, before
the prince’s ordinance about the ceremonies can be said to bind us, it
must first be showed that they have been lawfully prescribed by a synod of
the church, so that they must retire and hold them as the church’s
ordinance. And what needeth any more? Let us once see any lawful ordinance
of the synod or church representative for them, we shall, without any more
ado, acknowledge it to be out of all doubt that his Majesty may well urge
conformity unto the same.
Now, of the church’s power we have spoken in the former chapter; and if we
had not, yet that which hath been said in this chapter maketh out our
point. For it hath been proved, that neither king nor church hath power to
command anything which is not according to the rules of the word; that is,
which serveth not for the glory of God, which is not profitable for
edifying, and which may not be done in faith; unto which rules, whether
the things which are commanded us be agreeable or not, we must try and
examine by the private judgment of Christian discretion, following the
light of God’s word.
_Sect._ 30. Resteth the third distinction, whereof I promised to speak,
and that was of ties or bonds. _Quoedam obligatio_, &c. “Some bond (saith
Gerhard(982)) is absolute, when the law bindeth the conscience simply, so
that, in no respect, nor in no case, without the offence of God and wound
of conscience, one may depart from the prescript thereof; but another bond
is hypothetical, when it bindeth not simply, but under a condition, to
wit, if the transgression of the law be done of contempt,—if for the cause
of lucre or some other vicious end,—if it have scandal joined with it.”
The former way, he saith that the law of God and nature bindeth, and that
the law of the civil magistrate bindeth the latter way; and with him we
hold that whatsoever a prince commandeth his subjects in things any way
pertaining to religion, it bindeth only this latter way, and that he hath
never power to make laws binding the former way, for confirmation
wherefore we say,
1. The laws of an ecclesiastical synod, to the obedience whereof, in
things belonging to the worship of God, we are far more strictly tied than
to the obedience of any prince in the world, who (as hath been showed) in
this sort of things hath not such a vocation nor power to make laws. The
laws, I say, of a synod cannot bind absolutely, but only conditionally, or
in case they cannot be transgressed without violating the law of charity,
by contempt showed or scandal given, which, as I have made good in the
first part of this dispute, so let me now produce for it a plain testimony
of the Bishop of Salisbury,(983) who holdeth that the church’s rites and
ordinance do only bind in such sort, _ut si extra_, &c., “That if, out of
the case of scandal or contempt, through imprudence, oblivion, or some
reasonable cause enforcing, they be omitted, no mortal sin is incurred
before God; for as touching these constitutions, I judge the opinion of
Gerson to be most true, to wit, that they remain inviolated so long as the
law of charity is not by men violated about the same.” Much less, then,
can the laws of princes about things spiritual or ecclesiastical bind
absolutely, and out of the case of violating the law of charity.
2. If we be not bound to receive and acknowledge the laws of princes as
good and equitable, except only in so far as they are warranted by the law
of God and nature, then we are not bound in conscience to obey them,
except only conditionally, in case the violating of them include the
violating of the law of God and nature; but the former is true, therefore
the latter. It is God’s peculiar sovereignty, that his will is a rule
ruling, but not ruled, and that therefore a thing is good because God will
have it to be good. Man’s will is only such a rule as is ruled by higher
rules, and it must be known to be _norma recta_ before it can be to us
_norma recti_.
3. If we be bound to try and examine, by the judgment of discretion
(following the rules of the word), whether the things which princes
command be right, and such as ought to be done; and if we find them not to
be such, to neglect them, then their laws cannot bind absolutely and by
themselves, (else what need were there of such trial and examination?) but
only conditionally, and in case they cannot be neglected without violating
some other law, which is of a superior bond. But the former we have proved
by strong reasons, therefore the latter standeth sure.
4. If neither princes may command, nor we do anything which is not lawful
and expedient, and according to the other rules of the word, then the laws
of princes bind not absolutely, but only in case the neglecting of them
cannot stand with the law of charity and the rules of the word; but the
former hath been evinced and made good, therefore the latter necessarily
followeth.
5. If the laws of princes could bind absolutely and simply, so that in no
case, without offending God and wounding our conscience, we could neglect
them, this bond should arise either from their own authority, or from the
matter and thing itself which is commanded, but from neither of these it
can arise, therefore from nothing. It cannot arise from any authority
which they have, for if, by their authority, we mean their princely
pre-eminence and dignity, they are princes when they command things
unlawful as well as when they command things lawful, and so if, because of
their pre-eminence their laws do bind, then their unlawful ordinances do
bind no less than if they were lawful; but if by their authority we mean
the power which they have of God to make laws, this power is not absolute
(as hath been said) but limited; therefore from it no absolute bond can
arise, but this much at the most, that “kings on earth must be
obeyed,(984) so far as they command in Christ.”
Neither yet can the bond be absolute in respect of the thing itself which
is commanded.
When princes publish the commandments of God, the things themselves bind
whether they should command them or not, but we speak of such things as
God’s word hath left in their nature indifferent, and of such things we
say, that if being enjoined by princes they did absolutely bind, then they
should be in themselves immutably necessary, even secluding as well the
laws of princes which enjoin them, as the end of order, decency, and
edification, whereunto they are referred. To say no more, hath not Dr
Forbesse told us in Calvin’s words,(985) _Notatu dignum_, &c.? “It is
worthy of observation, that human laws, whether they be made by the
magistrate or by the church, howsoever they be necessary to be observed (I
speak of such as are good and just), yet they do not, therefore, by
themselves bind the conscience, because the whole necessity of observing
them looketh to the general end, but consisteth not in the things
commanded.”
6. Whatsoever bond of conscience is not confirmed and warranted by the
word is, before God, no bond at all. But the absolute bond wherewith
conscience is bound to the obedience of the laws of princes is not
confirmed nor warranted by the word; therefore the proposition no man can
deny, who acknowledged that none can have power or dominion over our
consciences but God only, the great Lawgiver, who alone can save and
destroy, James iv. 12. Neither doth any writer, whom I have seen, hold
that princes have any power over men’s consciences, but only that
conscience is bound by the laws of princes, for this respect, because God,
who hath power over our consciences, hath tied us to their laws. As to the
assumption, he who denyeth it must give instance to the contrary. If those
words of the Apostle be objected, Rom. xiii. 5, “Ye must needs be subject,
not only for wrath, but also for conscience’ sake.”
I answer, 1. The Apostle saith not that we must obey, but that we must be
subject, for conscience’ sake; and how oft shall we need to tell our
opposites that subjection is one thing, and obedience another?
2. If he had said that we must obey for conscience’ sake, yet this could
not have been expounded of an absolute bond of conscience, but only of an
hypothetical bond, in case that which the magistrate commandeth cannot be
omitted without breaking the law of charity. If it be said again, that we
are not only bidden be subject, but likewise to obey magistrates, Tit.
iii. 1: _Ans._ And who denyeth this? But still I ask, are we absolutely
and always bound to obey magistrates? Nay, but only when they command such
things as are according to the rules of the word, so that either they must
be obeyed or the law of charity shall be broken; in this case, and no
other, we are bidden obey.
_Sect._ 31. Thus have we gained a principal point, viz., that the laws of
princes bind not absolutely but conditionally, not _propter se_, but
_propter aliud_. Whereupon it followeth, that except the breach of those
ceremonial ordinances wherewith we are pressed include the breach of the
law of charity, which is of a superior bond, we are not holden to obey
them. Now that it is not the breach, but the obedience of those ordinances
which violateth the law of charity, we have heretofore made manifest, and
in this place we will add only one general: Whensoever the laws of princes
about things ecclesiastical do bind the conscience conditionally, and
because of some other law of a superior bond, which cannot be observed if
they be transgressed (which is the only respect for which they bind, when
they bind at all), then the things which they prescribe belong either to
the conservation or purgation of religion; but the controverted ceremonies
belong to neither of these, therefore the laws made thereanent bind not,
because of some other law which is of a superior bond. As to the
proposition, will any man say that princes have any more power than that
which is expressed in the twenty-fifth article of the Confession of Faith,
ratified in the first parliament of king James VI., which saith thus:
“Moreover, to kings, princes, rulers, and magistrates, we affirm that
chiefly and most principally, the conservation and the purgation of the
religion appertains, so that not only they are appointed for civil policy,
but also for maintenance of the true religion, and for suppressing of
idolatry and superstition whatsoever?” _Hoc nomine_, saith Calvin,(986)
_maxime laudantur sancti reges in scriptura, quod Dei cultum corruptum vel
eversum restituerint, vel curam gesserint religionis, ut sub illis pura et
incolumis floreret_. The twenty-first Parliament of king James, holden at
Edinburgh 1612, in the ratification of the acts and conclusions of the
General Assembly, kept in Glasgow 1610, did innovate and change some words
of that oath of allegiance which the General Assembly, in reference to the
conference kept 1751, ordained to be given to the person provided to any
benefice with cure, in the time of his admission, by the ordinate. For the
form of the oath, set down by the Act of the Assembly, beginneth thus: “I,
A. B., now nominate and admitted to the kirk of D., utterly testify and
declare in my conscience, that the right excellent, right high, and mighty
prince, James VI., by the grace of God king of Scots, is the only lawful
supreme governor of this realm, as well in things temporal as in the
conservation and purgation of religion,” &c. But the form of the oath set
down by the Act of Parliament beginneth thus: “I, A. B., now nominate and
admitted to the kirk of D., testify and declare in my conscience, that the
right excellent, &c., is the only lawful supreme governor of this realm,
as well in matters spiritual and ecclesiastical, as in things temporal,”
&c. Yet I demand, whether or not do the _matters spiritual and
ecclesiastical_, of which the Act of Parliament speaketh, or those _all
spiritual or ecclesiastical things or causes_, of which the English oath
of supremacy speaketh, comprehend any other thing than is comprehended
under _the conservation and purgation of religion_, whereof the Act of
Assembly speaketh? If it be answered affirmatively, it will follow that
princes have power to destruction, and not to edification only; for
whatsoever may edify or profit the church, pertaineth either to the
conservation or the purgation of religion. If negatively, then it cannot
be denied that the conservation and purgation of religion do comprehend
all the power which princes have in things ecclesiastical.
_Sect._ 32. Now to the assumption. And first, that the controverted
ceremonies pertain not to the conservation of religion, but contrariwise
to the hurt and prejudice of the same, experience hath, alas! made it too
manifest; for O what a doleful decay of religion have they drawn with them
in this land! Let them who have seen Scotland in her first glory tell how
it was then, and how it is now. Idle and idol-like bishopping hath shut
too the door of painful and profitable catechising.(987) The keeping of
some festival days is set up instead of the thankful commemoration of
God’s inestimable benefits, howbeit the festivity of Christmas hath
hitherto served more to bacchanalian lasciviousness than to the
remembrance of the birth of Christ.(988) The kneeling down upon the knees
of the body hath now come in place of that humiliation of the soul
wherewith worthy communicants addressed themselves unto the holy table of
the Lord; and, generally, the external show of these fruitless observances
hath worn out the very life and power of religion. Neither have such
effects ensued upon such ceremonies among us only, but let it be observed
everywhere else, if there be not least substance and power of godliness
among them who have most ceremonies, whereunto men have, at their
pleasure, given some sacred use and signification in the worship of God;
and most substance among them who have fewest shows of external rites. No
man of sound judgment (saith Beza(989)) will deny, _Jesum Christum quo
nudior_, &c., “that Jesus Christ, the more naked he be, is made the more
manifest to us; whereas, contrariwise, all false religions use by certain
external gesturings to turn away men from divine things.” Zanchius saith
well of the surplice and other popish ceremonies,(990) _Quod haec nihil ad
pietatem accendendam, multum autem ad restinguendam valeant_.
Bellarmine,(991) indeed, pleadeth for the utility of ceremonies, as things
belonging to the conservation of religion. His reason is, because they set
before our senses such an external majesty and splendour, whereby they
cause the more reverence. This he allegeth for the utility of the
ceremonies of the church of Rome. And I would know what better reason can
be alleged for the utility of ours. But if this be all, we throw back the
argument, because the external majesty and splendour of ceremonies doth
greatly prejudge and obscure the spirit and life of the worship of God,
and diverteth the minds of men from adverting unto the same, which we have
offered to be tried by common experience. Durand himself, for as much as
he hath written in the defence of ceremonies, in his unreasonable
_Rationale_, yet he maketh this plain confession:(992) _Sane in primitiva
ecclesia, sacrificium fiebat in vasis ligneis et vestibus communibus: tunc
enim erant lignei calices et aurei sacerdotes: nunc vero è contra est._
Behold what followeth upon the majesty and splendour which ceremonies
carry with them, and how religion, at its best and first estate, was
without the same!