THAT THE LAWFULNESS OF THE CEREMONIES CANNOT BE WARRANTED BY ANY
ECCLESIASTICAL LAW, NOR BY ANY POWER WHICH THE CHURCH HATH TO PUT ORDER TO
THINGS BELONGING TO DIVINE WORSHIP.
_Sect._ 1. We have proved that the ceremonies cannot be warranted by the
law of God. It followeth to examine whether any law of man, or power upon
earth, can make them lawful or warrantable unto us.
We will begin with laws ecclesiastical, where, first of all, it must be
considered well what power the church hath to make laws about things
pertaining to religion and the worship of God, and how far the same doth
extend itself. Dr Field’s resolution touching this question is as
followeth: “Thus (saith he(876)) we see our adversaries cannot prove that
the church hath power to annex unto such ceremonies and observations as
she deviseth, the remission of sins, and the working of other spiritual
and supernatural effects, which is the only thing questioned between them
and us about the power of the church. So that all the power the church
hath, more than by her power to publish the commandments of Christ the Son
of God, and by her censures to punish the offenders against the same, is
only in prescribing things that pertain to comeliness and order.
Comeliness requireth that not only that gravity and modesty do appear in
the performance of the works of God’s service that beseemeth actions of
that nature, but also that such rites and ceremonies be used as may cause
a due respect unto, and regard of, the things performed, and thereby stir
men up to greater fervour and devotion.”
And after: Order requireth that there be set hours for prayer, preaching,
and ministering the sacraments; that there be silence and attention when
the things are performed; that women be silent in the church; that all
things be administered according to the rules of discipline.
This his discourse is but a bundle of incongruities. For, 1. He saith,
that the church’s power to annex unto the ceremonies which she deviseth
the working of spiritual and supernatural effects, is the only thing
questioned between our adversaries and us about the power of the church.
Now, our adversaries contend with us also about the power of the church to
make new articles of faith, and her power to make laws binding the
conscience, both which controversies are touched by himself.(877)
2. He saith, that comeliness requireth the use of such ceremonies as may
cause a due respect unto, and regard of, the works of God’s service, and
thereby stir men up to greater fervour and devotion. But it hath been
already showed(878) that the comeliness which the Apostle requireth in the
church and service of God cannot comprehend such ceremonies under it, and
that it is no other than that very common external decency which is
beseeming for all the assemblies of men, as well civil as sacred.
3. Whilst he is discoursing of the church’s power to prescribe things
pertaining to order, contra-distinguished from her power which she hath to
publish the commandments of Christ, he reckons forth among his other
examples, women’s silence in the church, as if the church did prescribe
this as a matter of order left to her determination, and not publish it as
the commandment of Christ in his word.
4. Whereas he saith that the church hath power to prescribe such rites and
ceremonies as may cause a due respect unto, and regard of, the works of
God’s service, and thereby stir men up to greater fervour and devotion, by
his own words shall he be condemned: for a little before he reprehendeth
the Romanists for maintaining that the church hath power to annex unto the
ceremonies which she deviseth the working of spiritual and supernatural
effects. And a little after he saith, that the church hath no power to
ordain such ceremonies as serve to signify, assure, and convey unto men
such benefits of saving grace as God in Christ is pleased to bestow on
them. Now, to cause a regard of, and a respect unto the works of God’s
service, and thereby to stir up men to fervour and devotion, what is it
but the working of a spiritual and supernatural effect, and the conveying
unto men such a benefit of saving grace as God in Christ is pleased to
bestow on them? In like manner, whereas he holdeth that the church hath
power to ordain such ceremonies as serve to express those spiritual and
heavenly affections, dispositions, motions, or desires, which are or
should be in men, in the very same place he confuteth himself, whilst he
affirmeth that the church hath no power to ordain such ceremonies as serve
to signify unto men those benefits of saving grace which God in Christ is
pleased to bestow on them. Now, to express such heavenly and spiritual
affections, dispositions, motions, or desires, as should be in men, is (I
suppose) to signify unto men such benefits of saving grace, as God in
Christ is pleased to bestow on them. Who dare deny it?
_Sect._ 2. Bishop Lindsey’s opinion touching the power of the church,(879)
whereof we dispute, is, that power is given unto her to “determine the
circumstances which are in the general necessary to be used in divine
worship, but not defined particularly in the word.”
I know the church can determine nothing which is not of this kind and
quality. But the Prelate’s meaning (as may be seen in that same epistle of
his) is, that whatsoever the church determineth, if it be such a
circumstance as is in the general necessary, but not particularly defined
in the word, then we cannot say that the church had no power to determine
and enjoin the same, nor be led by the judgment of our own consciences,
judging it not expedient, but that in this case we must take the church’s
law to be the rule of our consciences. Now, by this ground which the
Prelate holdeth, the church may prescribe to the ministers of the gospel
the whole habit and apparel of the Levitical high-priest (which were to
Judaize). For apparel is a circumstance in the general necessary, yet it
is not particularly defined in the word. By this ground, the church may
determine that I should ever pray with my face to the east, preach
kneeling on my knees, sing the psalms lying on my back, and hear sermons
standing only upon one foot. For in all these actions a gesture is
necessary; but there is no gesture particularly defined in the word to
which we are adstricted in any of these exercises.
And further, because _uno absurdo dato, mille sequuntur_, by this ground
the Prelate must say, that the church hath power to ordain three or four
holidays every week (which ordinance, as he himself hath told us, could
not stand with charity, the inseparable companion of piety), for time is a
circumstance in the general necessary in divine worship, yet in his
judgment we are not bound by the word to any particular time for the
performance of the duties of God’s worship.
By this ground we were to say, that Pope Innocent III. held him within the
bounds of ecclesiastical power, when in the great _Lateran_ council, anno
1215, he made a decree, that all the faithful of both sexes should once in
the year at least, to wit, upon Easter-day, receive the sacrament of the
eucharist. From whence it hath come to pass, that the common people in the
church of Rome receive the sacrament only upon Easter. Now, the time of
receiving the sacrament is a circumstance in the general necessary, for a
time it must have, but it is not particularly defined in the word. It is
left indefinite, 1 Cor. xi. 26, yet the church hath no power to determine
Easter-day, either as the only time, or as the fittest time, for all the
faithful of both sexes to receive the eucharist. What if faithful men and
women cannot have time to prepare themselves as becometh, being avocated
and distracted by the no less necessary than honest adoes of their
particular callings?
What if they cannot have the sacrament upon that day administered
according to our Lord’s institution? What if they see Papists confirming
themselves in their Easter superstition by our unnecessary practice? Shall
they swallow these and such-like soul-destroying camels, and all for
straining out the gnat of communicating precisely upon Easter-day? But
since time is a necessary circumstance, and no time is particularly
defined, the Bishop must say more also, that the church may determine
Easter-day for the only day whereupon we may receive the Lord’s supper.
Last of all, if the church have power to determine all circumstances in
the general necessary, but not particularly defined in the word, what
could be said against that ancient order of solemn baptizing only at the
holidays of Easter and Pentecost (whereby it came to pass that very many
died unbaptized, as Socrates writeth(880))? Or, what shall be said against
Tertullian’s opinion,(881) which alloweth lay men, yea, women, to baptize.
May the church’s determination make all this good, forasmuch as these
circumstances of the time when, and the persons by whom, baptism should be
ministered, are in the general necessary, but not particularly defined in
the word? _Ite leves nugae._
_Sect._ 3. Camero,(882) as learned a Formalist as any of the former,
expresseth his judgment copiously touching our present question. He saith,
that there are two sorts of things which the church commandeth, to wit,
either such as belong to faith and manners, or such as conduce to faith
and manners; that both are in God’s word prescribed _exserte_, plainly,
but not one way, because such things that pertain unto faith and manners,
are in the word of God particularly commanded, whereas those things which
conduce to faith and manners are but generally commended unto us. Of
things that pertain to faith and manners, he saith, that they are most
constant and certain, and such as can admit no change; but as for things
conducing to faith and manners, he saith, that they depend upon the
circumstances of persons, place, and time, which being almost infinite,
there could not be particular precepts delivered unto us concerning such
things. Only this is from God commended unto the church, that whatsoever
is done publicly be done with order, and what privately be decent.
These things he so applieth to his purpose, that he determineth, in
neither of these kinds the church hath power to make laws, because in
things pertaining to faith and manners the law of our Lord Jesus Christ is
plainly expressed; and in those things, wherein neither faith nor manners
are placed, but which conduce to faith and manners, we have indeed a
general law, not having further any particular law, for that reason
alleged, namely, because this depends upon the circumstances.
Thereafter he addeth, _Quid sit fides, quid sit pietas, quid sit charitas,
verbo Dei demonstratur. Quid ad hæc conducat, seu reputando rem in
universum, seu reputando rem quatenus singulis competit, pendet ex
cognitione circumstantiarum. Jam id definire Deus voluit esse penes
ecclesiam, hae tamen lege, ut quod definit ecclesia, conveniat generali
definitioni Dei._
The matter he illustrates with this one example: God’s word doth define in
the general that we are to fast, and that publicly; but, in the
particular, we could not have the definition of the word, because there
are infinite occasions of a public fast, as it is said in the schools,
_individua esse infinita_; so that it is the church’s part to look to the
occasion, and this depends upon the consideration of the circumstances.
This discourse of his cannot satisfy the attentive reader, but deserveth
certain animadversions.
_Sect_. 4. First, then, it is to be observed how he is drawn into a
manifest contradiction; for whereas he saith, that God’s word doth
_exserte_ and _diserte_ commend unto us _generatim_, such things as
conduce to faith and manners, and that concerning things of this nature we
have a general law in Scripture, how can this stand with that which he
addeth, namely, that it is in the church’s power to define what things
conduce to faith, piety, and charity, even _reputando rem in universum_?
2. Whereas he saith that the church hath no power to make laws, neither in
things belonging to faith and manners, nor in things conducing to the
same; I would also see how this agreeth with that other position, namely,
that it is in the power of the church to define what things do conduce to
faith, piety and charity.
3. What means he by his application of order to public, and decency to
private actions, as if the Apostle did not require both these in the
public words of God’s service performed in the church?
4. Whereas he saith that such things as conduce to faith and manners do
depend upon the circumstances, and so could not be particularly defined in
the word, either he speaks of those things as they are defined in the
general, or as they are defined in the particular. Not the first; for as
they are defined in the general, they cannot depend upon changeable
circumstances, and that because, according to his own tenet, the word
defines them in the general, and this definition of the word is most
certain and constant, neither can any change happen unto it. Wherefore
(without doubt) he must pronounce this of the definition of such things in
the particular. Now, to say that things conducing to faith and manners, as
they are particularly defined, do depend upon circumstances, is as much as
to say that circumstances depend upon circumstances. For things conducing
to faith and manners, which the church hath power to determine
particularly, what are they other than circumstances? Surely he who taketh
not Camero’s judgment to be, that the church hath power to determine
somewhat more than the circumstances (and by consequence a part of the
substance) of God’s worship, shall give no sense to his words. Yet, if one
would take his meaning so, I see not how he can be saved from
contradicting himself; forasmuch as he holdeth that such things as pertain
to faith and manners are particularly defined in the word. To say no more,
I smell such things in Camero’s opinion as can neither stand with reason
nor with himself.
5. God’s word doth not only define things pertaining to faith and manners,
but also things conducing to the same, and that not only generally, but in
some respects, and sometimes, particularly. And we take for example his
own instance of fasting. For the Scripture defineth very many occasions of
fasting; Ezra viii. 21; 2 Chron. xx.; Jonah iii.; Joel ii.; Acts xiii. 3;
Josh. vii. 6; Judg. xx. 16; Esth. iv. 16; Ezra ix. x.; Zech. vii. From
which places we gather that the Scripture defineth fasting to be used,
1. For supplication, when we want some necessary or expedient good thing.
2. For deprecation, when we fear some evil.
3. For humiliation, when, by our sins, we have provoked God’s wrath.
Neither can there be any occasion of fasting whereof I may not say that
either it is particularly designed in Scripture, or else that it may be by
necessary consequence defined out of Scripture; or, lastly, that it is of
that sort of things which were not determinable by Scripture, because
circumstances are infinite, as Camero hath told us.
_Sect._ 5. Thus having failed by those rocks of offence, I direct my
course straight to the dissecting of the true limits, within which the
church’s power of enacting laws about things pertaining to the worship of
God is bounded and confined, and which it may not overleap nor transgress.
Three conditions I find necessarily requisite in such a thing as the
church hath power to prescribe by her laws:
1st. It must be only a circumstance of divine worship; no substantial part
of it; no sacred significant and efficacious ceremony. For the order and
decency left to the definition of the church, as concerning the
particulars of it, comprehendeth no more but mere circumstances. Bishop
Lindsey(883) doth but unskilfully confound things different when he
talketh of “the ceremonies and circumstances left to the determination of
the church.” Now, by his leave, though circumstances be left to the
determination of the church, yet ceremonies, if we speak properly, are
not.
Bishop Andrews avoucheth(884) that ceremonies pertain to the church only,
and to the service of God, not to civil solemnities. But so much, I trust,
he would not have said of circumstances which have place in all moral
actions, and that to the same end and purpose for which they serve in
religious actions, namely, for beautifying them with that decent demeanour
which the very light and law of natural reason requireth as a thing
beseeming all human actions. For the church of Christ being a society of
men and women, must either observe order and decency in all the
circumstances of their holy actions, time, place, person, form, &c., or
also be deformed with that disorder and confusion which common reason and
civility abhorreth. Ceremonies, therefore, which are sacred observances,
and serve only to a religious and holy use, and which may not, without
sacrilege, be applied to another use, must be sorted with things of
another nature than circumstances. _Ceremonioe_, “ceremonies (saith Dr
Field(885)) are so named, as Livy thinketh, from a town called Cære, in
the which the Romans did hide their sacred things when the Gauls invaded
Rome. Others think that ceremonies are so named _a carendo_, of abstaining
from certain things, as the Jews abstained from swine’s flesh, and sundry
other things forbidden by God as unclean. Ceremonies are outward acts of
religion,” &c. _Quapropter etiam_, saith Junius,(886) _ritus et ceremonias
inter se distincimus, quia in jure politico sunt imperati et solennes
ritus; ceremonioe vero non nisi sacroe observationes in cultu divino
appellantur. Ceremonia_, saith Bellarmine,(887) _proprie et simpliciter
sic vocata, est externa actio quoe non aliunde est bona et laudabilis,
nisi quia fit ad Deum colendum._ From which words Amesius(888) concludeth
against him, that he, and others with him, do absurdly confound order,
decency, and the like, which have the same use and praise in civil things
which they have in the worship of God, with religious and sacred
ceremonies. Yet Dr Burges(889) rejecteth this distinction betwixt
circumstances and ceremonies, as a mere nicety or fiction. And would you
know his reason? “For that (saith he) all circumstances (I mean
extrinsical) which incur not the substance of the action, when they are
once designed or observed purposely in reference to such a matter, of
whose substance they are not, they are then ceremonies.” If this be not a
nicety or fiction, I know not what is. For what means he here by a matter?
An action sure, or else a nicety. Well, then, we shall have now a world of
ceremonies. When I appoint to meet with another man at Berwick, upon the
10th day of May, because the place and the day are purposely designed in
reference to such a matter, of whose substance they are not, namely, to my
meeting with the other man, for talking of our business, therefore the
town of Berwick, and the 10th day of May, must be accounted ceremonies. To
me it is nice, that the Doctor made it not nice, to let such a nicety fall
from his pen.
When I put on my shoos in reference to walking, or wash my hands in
reference to eating, am I using ceremonies all the while? The Doctor could
not choose but say so, forasmuch as these circumstances are purposely
designed and observed in reference to such matters, of whose substance
they are not.
_Sect._ 6. 2d. That which the church may lawfully prescribe by her laws
and ordinances, as a thing left to her determination, must be one of such
things as were not determinable by Scripture, on that reason which Camero
hath given us, namely, because _individua_ are _infinita_. We mean not in
any wise to circumscribe the infinite power and wisdom of God, only we
speak upon supposition of the bounds and limits which God did set to his
written word, within which he would have it contained, and over which he
thought fit that it should not exceed. The case being thus put, as it is,
we say truly of those several and changeable circumstances which are left
to the determination of the church, that, being almost infinite, they were
not particularly determinable in Scripture; for the particular definition
of those occurring circumstances which were to be rightly ordered in the
works of God’s service to the end of the world, and that ever according to
the exigency of every present occasion and different case, should have
filled the whole world with books. But as for other things pertaining to
God’s worship, which are not to be reckoned among the circumstances of it,
they being in number neither many, nor in change various, were most easily
and conveniently determinable in Scripture. Now, since God would have his
word (which is our rule in the works of his service) not to be delivered
by tradition, but to be written and sealed unto us, that by this means,
for obviating Satanical subtility, and succouring human imbecility, we
might have a more certain way for conservation of true religion, and for
the instauration of it when it faileth among men,—how can we but assure
ourselves that every such acceptable thing pertaining any way to religion,
which was particularly and conveniently determinable in Scripture, is
indeed determined in it; and consequently, that no such thing as is not a
mere alterable circumstance is left to the determination of the church?
_Sect._ 7. 3d. If the church prescribe anything lawfully, so that she
prescribe no more than she hath power given her to prescribe, her
ordinance must be accompanied with some good reason and warrant given for
the satisfaction of tender consciences. This condition is, alas! too
seldom looked unto by law-makers, of whom one fitly complaineth thus:—
Lex quamvis ratio Ciceroni summa vocetur, Et bene laudetur lex que
ratione probatur, Invenies inter legistas raro logistas: Moris et
exempli leges sunt juraque templi.
But this fashion we leave to them who will have all their anomalies taken
for analogies. It becometh not the spouse of Christ, endued with the
spirit of meekness, to command anything imperiously, and without a reason
given.
_Ecclesioe enim est docere primum, tuin proescribere_, saith Camero.(890)
And again: _Non enim dominatur cleris, nec agit cum iis quos Christus
redemit, ac si non possent capere quod sit religiosum, quid minus._
Tertullian’s testimony(891) is known: _Nulla lex_, &c. “No law (saith he)
owes to itself alone the conscience of its equity, but to those from whom
it expects obedience. Moreover, it is a suspected law which will not have
itself to be proved, but a wicked law, which not being proved, yet beareth
rule.”
It is well said by our divines,(892) that in rites and ceremonies the
church hath no power “to destruction, but to edification;” and that the
observation of our ecclesiastical canons “must carry before them a
manifest utility.”(893) _Piis vero fratribus durum est, subjicere se rebus
illis quas nec rectas esse nec utiles animadvertunt_.(894) If here it be
objected, that some things are convenient to be done, therefore, because
they are prescribed by the church, and for no other reason. For example,
in two things which are alike lawful and convenient in themselves, I am
bound to do the one and not the other, because of the church’s
prescription. So that, in such cases, it seemeth there can be no other
reason given for the ordinance of the church but only her own power and
authority to put to order things of this nature.
I answer, that even in such a case as this, the conveniency of the thing
itself is anterior to the church’s determination; anterior, I say, _de
congruo_, though not _de facto_, that is to say, before ever the church
prescribe it, it is such a thing as (when it falleth out to be done at
all) may be done conveniently, though it be not (before the church’s
prescribing of it) such a thing as should and ought to be done as
convenient. Which being so, we do still hold that the conveniency of a
thing must always go before the church’s prescribing of it; go before, I
mean, at least _de congruo_. Neither can the church prescribe anything
lawfully which she showeth not to have been convenient, even before her
determination.
_Sect._ 8. These things being permitted, I come to extract my projection,
and to make it evident that the lawfulness of the controverted ceremonies
cannot be warranted by any ecclesiastical law; and this I prove by three
arguments:—
1st. Those conditions which I have showed to be required in that thing
which the church may lawfully prescribe by a law, are not quadrant nor
competent to the cross, kneeling, surplice, holidays, &c.
For, 1. They are not mere circumstances, such as have place in all moral
actions, but sacred, mystical, significant, efficacious ceremonies, as
hath been abundantly shown in this dispute already. For example, Dr
Burges(895) calleth the surplice a religious or sacred ceremony. And
again,(896) he placeth in it a mystical signification of the pureness of
the minister of God. Wherefore the replier(897) to Dr Mortoune’s
_Particular Defence_ saith well, that there is a great difference betwixt
a grave civil habit and a mystical garment.
2. It cannot be said that these ceremonies are of that kind of thing which
were not determinable by Scripture; neither will our opposites, for very
shame, adventure to say that things of this kind, to which cross,
kneeling, &c., do belong, viz., sacred significant ceremonies, left (in
their judgment) to the definition of the church, are almost infinite, and
therefore could not well and easily be determined in Scripture.
Since, then, such things as are not mere circumstances of worship can
neither be many nor various (as I said before), it is manifest that all
such things were easily determinable in Scripture.
3. Our ceremonial laws are not backed with such grounds and reasons as
might be for the satisfying and quieting of tender consciences, but we are
borne down with Will and authority; whereof I have said enough
elsewhere.(898)
_Sect._ 9. 2d. If the ceremonies be lawful to us because the law and
ordinance of the church prescribes them, then either the bare and naked
prescription of the church, having no other warrant than the church’s own
authority, makes them to be thus lawful; or else the law of the church, as
grounded upon and warranted by the law of God and nature. Not the first;
for divines hold,(899) _legem humanum ferri ab hominibus, cum ratione
procedunt ab illis aliis antegressis legibus. Nam legis humanae regula
proxima est duplex. Una innata quam legem naturalem dicimus, altera
inspirata, quam divinam_, &c. _Ex his ergo fontibus lex humana procedit:
hoec incunabila illius à quibus si aberrat, lex degener est, indigna legis
nomine._ We have also the testimony of an adversary; for saith not Paybody
himself,(900) “I grant it is unlawful to do in God’s worship anything upon
the mere pleasure of man?”
If they take them (as needs they must) to the latter part, then let them
either say that the ceremonies are lawful unto us, because the church
judgeth them to be agreeable to the law of God and nature, or because the
church proveth unto us, by evident reasons, that they are indeed agreeable
to these laws. If they yield us the latter, then it is not the church’s
law, but the church’s reasons given for her law, which can warrant the
lawfulness of them unto us, which doth elude and elide all that which they
allege for the lawfulness of them from the power and authority of the
church.
And further, if any such reasons be to be given forth for the ceremonies,
why are they so long kept up from us? But if they hold them at the former,
thereupon it will follow, that it shall be lawful for us to do every thing
which the church shall judge to be agreeable to the law of God and nature,
and consequently to all the Jewish, popish, and heathenish ceremonies,
yea, to worship images, if it happen that the church judge these things to
be agreeable to the law of God and nature.
It will be answered (I know), that if the church command anything
repugnant to God’s word we are not bound to do it, nor to receive it as
lawful, though the church judge so of it; but otherwise, if that which the
church judgeth to be agreeable to the law of God and nature (and in that
respect prescribeth) be not repugnant to the word of God, but in itself
indifferent, then are we to embrace it as convenient, and consonant to the
law of God and nature, neither ought we to call in question the lawfulness
of it.
But I reply, that either we must judge a thing to be repugnant or not
repugnant to the word, to be indifferent or not indifferent in itself,
because the church judgeth so of it, or else because the church proveth
unto us by an evident reason that it is so. If the latter, we have what we
would; if the former, we are just where we were: the argument is still set
afoot; then we must receive everything (be it ever so bad) as indifferent,
if only the church happen so to judge of it; for _quod competit alicui qua
tale_, &c. So that if we receive anything as indifferent, for this
respect, because the church judgeth it to be so, then shall we receive
everything for indifferent which the church shall so judge of.
_Sect._ 10. 3d. The church is forbidden to add anything to the
commandments of God which he hath given unto us, concerning his worship
and service, Deut. iv. 2; xii. 32; Prov. xxx. 6; therefore she may not
lawfully prescribe anything in the works of divine worship, if it be not a
mere circumstance belonging to that kind of things which were not
determinate by Scripture.
Our opposites have no other distinctions which they make any use of
against this argument, but the very same which Papists use in defence of
their unwritten dogmatical traditions, namely, that _additio corrumpens_
is forbidden, but not _additio perficiens_: that there is not alike reason
of the Christian church and of the Jewish; that the church may not add to
the essential parts of God’s worship, but to the accidentary she may add.
To the first of those distinctions, we answer, 1. That the distinction
itself is an addition to the word, and so doth but beg the question.
2. It is blasphemous; for it argueth that the commandments of God are
imperfect, and that by addition they are made perfect.
3. Since our opposites will speak in this dialect, let them resolve us
whether the washings of the Pharisees, condemned by Christ, were
corrupting or perfecting additions. They cannot say they were corrupting,
for there was no commandment of God which those washings did corrupt or
destroy, except that commandment which forbiddeth men’s additions. But for
this respect our opposites dare not call them corrupting additions, for so
they should condemn all additions whatsoever. Except, therefore, they can
show us that those washings were not added by the Pharisees for
perfecting, but for corrupting the law of God, let them consider how they
rank their own ceremonial additions with those of the Pharisees. We read
of no other reason wherefore Christ condemned them but because they were
doctrines which had no other warrant than the commandments of men, Matt.
xv. 9; for as the law ordained divers washings, for teaching and
signifying that true holiness and cleanness which ought to be among God’s
people, so the Pharisees would have perfected the law by adding other
washings (and more than God had commanded) for the same end and purpose.
_Sect._ 11. To the second distinction, we say that the Christian church
hath no more liberty to add to the commandments of God than the Jewish
church had; for the second commandment is moral and perpetual, and
forbiddeth to us as well as to them the additions and inventions of men in
the worship of God. Nay, as Calvin noteth,(901) much more are we forbidden
to add unto God’s word than they were. “Before the coming of his
well-beloved Son in the flesh (saith John Knox),(902) severely he punished
all such as durst enterprise to alter or change his ceremonies and
statutes,—as in Saul, (1 Kings xiii.; xv.) Uzziah, Nadab, Abihu, (Lev. x.)
is to be read. And will he now, after that he hath opened his counsel to
the world by his only Son, whom he commandeth to be heard, Matt, xvii.;
and alter that, by his holy Spirit speaking by his apostles, he hath
established the religion in which he will his true worshippers abide to
the end,—will he now, I say, admit men’s inventions in the matter of
religion? &c., 2 Cor. xi.; Col. i.; ii. For this sentence he pronounceth:
‘Not that which seemeth good in thy eyes shalt thou do to the Lord thy
God, but that which the Lord thy God commanded thee, that do thou: Add
nothing unto it, diminish nothing from it,’ Deut. iv. 12. Which, sealing
up his New Testament, he repeateth in these words: ‘That which ye have,
hold till I come,’ ” &c., Rev. ii.
Wherefore, whilst Hooker saith,(903) that Christ hath not, by positive
laws, so far descended into particularities with us as Moses with the
Jews; whilst Camero saith,(904) _Non esse disputandum ita, ut quoniam in
vetere Testamento, de rebus alioqui adiaphoris certa fuit lex, &c., id in
novo Testamento habere locum_; and whilst Bishop Lindsey saith,(905) that
in the particular circumstances of persons by whom, place where, time
when, and of the form and order how, the worship and work of the ministry
should be performed, the church hath power to define whatsoever is most
expedient, and that this is a prerogative wherein the Christian church
differeth from the Jewish synagogue, they do but speak their pleasure in
vain, and cannot make it appear that the Christian church hath any more
power to add to the commandments of God than the synagogue had of old.
It is well said by one:(906) “There were many points of service, as
sacrifices, washings, anniversary days, &c., which we have not; but the
determination of such as we have is as particular as theirs, except
wherein the national circumstances make impediment.” For one place not to
be appointed for the worship of God, nor one tribe for the work of the
ministry among us, as among them, not because more power was left to the
Christian church for determining things that pertain to the worship of God
than was to the Jewish, but because the Christian church was to spread
itself over the whole earth, and not to be confined within the bounds of
one nation as the synagogue was.
_Sect._ 12. Let us then here call to mind the distinction which hath been
showed betwixt religious ceremonies and moral circumstances; for as
touching moral circumstances, which serve for common order and decency in
the worship of God, they being so many and so alterable, that they could
not be particularly determined in Scripture, for all the different and
almost infinite cases which might occur, the Jewish synagogue had the same
power for determining things of this nature which the church of Christ now
hath. For the law did not define, but left to be defined by the synagogue,
the set hours for all public divine service,—when it should begin, how
long it should last, the order that should be kept in the reading and
expounding of the law, praying, singing, catechising, excommunicating,
censuring, absolving of delinquents, &c., the circumstances of the
celebration of marriage, of the education of youth in schools and
colleges, &c.
But as for ceremonies which are proper to God’s holy worship, shall we say
that the fidelity of Christ, the Son, hath been less than the fidelity of
Moses, the servant? Heb. iii. 2, which were to be said, if Christ had not,
by as plain, plentiful, and particular directions and ordinances, provided
for all the necessities of the Christian church in the matter of religion,
as Moses for the Jewish; or if the least pin, and the meanest appurtenance
of the tabernacle, and all the service thereof, behooved to be ordered
according to the express commandment of God by the hand of Moses, how
shall we think, that in the rearing, framing, ordering, and beautifying of
the church, the house of the living God, he would have less honour and
prerogative given than to his own well-beloved Son, by whom he hath spoken
to us in these last days, and whom he hath commanded us to hear in all
things? Or that he will accept, at our hands, any sacred ceremony which
men have presumed to bring into his holy and pure worship, without the
appointment of his own word and will revealed unto us? Albeit the worship
of God and religion, in the church of the New Testament, be accompanied
without ceremonies, _numero paucissimis, observatione facillimis,
significatione proestantissimis_ (as Augustine speaketh of our
sacraments,(907)) yet we have in Scripture, Eph. i. 18, no less particular
determination and distinct direction for our few, easy, and plain
ceremonies, than the Jews had for their many heavy and obscure ones.
_Sect._ 13. As for the third distinction, of adding to the accidentary
parts of it, I remember that I heard in the logics, of _pars essentialis_
or _physica,_ and _pars integralis_ or _mathematica_; of _pars similaris_
and _pars dissimilaris_; of _pars continua_ and _pars discreta_; but of
_para accidentaria_ heard I never till now. There is (I know) such a
distinction of _pars integralis_, that it is either _principalis_ and
_necessaria_, or _minus principalis_ and _non necessaria_; but we cannot
understand their _pars cultus accidentaria_ to be _pars integralis non
necessaria_, because, then, their distribution of worship into essential
and accidentary parts could not answer to the rules of a just
distribution, of which one is, that _distributio debet exhaurire totum
distributum_. Now, there are some parts of worship which cannot be
comprehended in the foresaid distribution, namely, _partes integrales
necessarioe_. What then? Shall we let this wild distinction pass, because
it cannot be well nor formally interpreted? Nay, but we will observe their
meaning who make use of it; for unto all such parts of worship as are not
essential (and which they are pleased to call accidentary), they hold the
church may make addition, whereunto I answer, 1. Let them make us
understand what they mean by those essential parts to which the church may
add nothing, and let them beware lest they give us an identical
description of the same.
2. That there are many parts of God’s worship which are not essential, yet
such as will not suffer any addition of the church: for proof whereof I
demand, Were all the ceremonies commanded to be used in the legal
sacraments and sacrifices essential parts of those worships? No man will
say so. Yet the synagogue was tied to observe those (and no other than
those) ceremonies which the word prescribed. When Israel was again to keep
the passover, it was said, Num. ix. 3, “In the fourteenth day of this
month at even, ye shall keep it in his appointed season, according to all
the rites of it, and according to all the ceremonies of it, shall ye keep
it.” And again, ver. 5, “According to all that the Lord commanded Moses,
so did the children of Israel.” _Ritibus et ceremoniis divinitus
institutis, non licuit homini suo arbitrio aliquid adjicere aut
detrahere_, saith P. Martyr.(908)
_Sect._ 14. 3. If those accidentary parts of worship, which are commanded
in the word, be both necessary to be used _necessitate praecepti_, and
likewise sufficient means fully adequate and proportioned to that end, for
which God hath destinated such parts of his worship as are not essential
(which must be granted by every one who will not accuse the Scripture of
some defect and imperfection), then it followeth that other accidentary
parts of worship, which the church addeth thereto, are but superfluous and
superstitious.
4. I call to mind another logical maxim: _Sublata una parte, tolitur
totum._ An essential part being taken away, _totum essentiale_ is taken
away also. In like manner, an integrant part being taken away, _totum
integrum_ cannot remain behind. When a man hath lost his hand or his foot,
though he be still a man physically, _totum essentiale_, yet he is not a
man mathematically, he is no longer _totum integrale_. Just so if we
reckon any additions (as the cross, kneeling, holidays, &c.) among the
parts of God’s worship, then put the case, that those additions were taken
away, it followeth that all the worship which remaineth still will not be
the whole and entire worship of God, but only a part of it, or at the
best, a defective, wanting, lame, and maimed worship.
5. I have made it evident that our opposites make the controverted
ceremonies to be worship,(909) in as proper and peculiar sense as anything
can be, and that they are equalled to the chief and principal parts of
worship, not ranked among the secondary or less principal parts of it.
6. Do not our divines condemn the addition of rites and ceremonies to that
worship which the word prescribeth, as well as the addition of other
things which are thought more essential? We have heard Martyr’s words to
this purpose.
Zanchius will have us to learn from the second commandment,(910) in
_externo cultu qui Deo debetur, seu in ceremonus nihil nobis esse ex
nostro capite comminiscendum_, whether in sacraments or sacrifices, or
other sacred things, such as temples, altars, clothes, and vessels,
necessary for the external worship; but that we ought to be contented with
those ceremonies which God hath prescribed.
And in another place,(911) he condemneth the addition of any other rite
whatsoever, to those rites of every sacrament which have been ordained of
Christ, _Si ceremoniis cujusvis sacramenti, alios addas ritus_, &c. Dr
Fulk pronounceth,(912) even of signs and rites, that “we must do in
religion and God’s service, not that which seemeth good to us, but that
only which he commandeth,” Deut. iv. 2; xii. 32.
And Calvin pronounceth generally,(913) _Caenam domini rem adeo
sacrosanctam esse, ut ullis hominum additamentis eam conspurcare sit
nefas._
_Sect._ 15. And thus have we made good our argument, that the lawfulness
of the ceremonies cannot be warranted by any ecclesiastical law. If we had
no more against them this were enough, that they are but human additions,
and want the warrant of the word. When Nadab and Abihu offered strange
fire before the Lord, and when the Jews burnt their sons and their
daughters in the valley of the son of Hinnon, howsoever manifold
wickedness might have been challenged in that which they did, yet if any
would dispute with God upon the matter, he stoppeth their mouths with this
one answer: “I commanded it not, neither came it into my heart,” Lev. x.
1; Jer. vii. 31. May we, last of all, hear what the canon law itself
decreeth:(914) _Is qui praeest, si praeter voluntatem Dei, vel praeter
quod in sanctis Scripturis evidenter praecipitur, vel dicit aliquid, vel
imperat, tanquam falsus testis Dei, aut sacrilegus habeatur._