FOOTNOTE:

[25] Mr. Vartkes was an Armenian deputy in the Ottoman Parliament, who

was murdered, together with another deputy, Mr. Zohrab, when he was

being escorted by gendarmes from Aleppo to be court-martialled at

Diyarbekir (see Documents 7 and 9).--EDITOR.

X

GREAT BRITAIN AND ARMENIA--THE LATE DUKE OF ARGYLL'S VIEWS--AN

APPEAL TO BRITAIN

There is no brighter page in the glorious history of the British Empire

than the records of the liberties that conduce to the contentment and

happiness of peoples--freedom of thought and worship, freedom of speech

and association, freedom of movement and habitation, freedom of

language, etc.; as well as measures of self-government varying in

accordance with local needs and circumstances--granted unstintingly to

the great family of nations and races constituting that marvellous

commonwealth. This policy of broad, liberal justice has proved, under

the stern test of this great war, the highest statesmanship and the

strongest bond of empire. Freedom, justice, humanity have proved an

infinitely stronger impetus to loyalty than "frightfulness," a stronger

cement, a superior and better "paying" stock-in-trade of empire by far

than the jack-boot and the _yatagan_. The conclusive and practical

demonstration of this great fact by the British Empire will probably

exercise a far-reaching influence for good on the future policies of

empires and the liberties of mankind. The British Flag has not only

carried security, order and justice wherever it has gone, it has

scrupulously respected religious and national sentiment everywhere. It

has not denied to the peoples under its sway, or attempted to suppress,

the sentiments and allegiances which it has itself held sacred. It has

maintained the freedom of the seas as I believe no international device

could have achieved it. I do not say this to please British readers. I

have lived and travelled among small peoples and subject peoples large

and small, and that is the impression I have gathered. Thus the Union

Jack has become a symbol of freedom and fairplay the world over, and

persecuted peoples have long had the conviction, deep down in their

hearts, that British influence is continually at work towards their

ultimate liberation. If we were to reverse Mr. Gladstone's famous

challenge concerning Austria, and ask, _mutatis mutandis_: "Can any one

put his finger on the map of the world and say, 'Here the British Empire

has wrought evil'?" it may be that Count Reventlow himself and the

author of the "Hymn of Hate" might find themselves baffled. However

opinions may differ as to the justice of some of her wars, the just and

liberal treatment of the peoples that have come under British dominion

is an indisputable historical fact to which the masses of mankind owe at

least as much gratitude as they do to the French Revolution. Ireland may

be singled out, and not without reason, if I may say so, as the one

shaded spot on this bright page of the story of the spread of British

liberty. To the neutral observer it certainly seems strange that

Ireland, so near the home of liberty and the stronghold of democratic

institutions, should be so long denied the full and free enjoyment of

those blessings liberally bestowed upon the more distant parts of the

empire. Possibly neutral observers do not and cannot understand the

difficulties and obstacles that have hitherto proved insuperable. It is

outside the scope of my subject and beyond my competence to enter into a

discussion of the Irish question here, but this much I may say, that

Ireland should convince rulers in all countries that material prosperity

alone "is no remedy." Security, order, prosperity, an efficient and

equitable administration may palliate but can never heal a political

injustice. They can never satisfy the legitimate aspirations for

self-rule of a high-spirited and cultured people conscious of a strong,

indestructible will as well as the undoubted capacity to govern itself.

On the other hand, to compare the wrongs and sufferings of Ireland (and

Poland) with the agony of Armenia, as is sometimes done, is to compare a

headache, an acute headache if you will, with the Black Death.

It is in keeping with the ill-fortune that has dogged the footsteps of

the Armenian people for five centuries that Armenia should have been the

one exception to the rule; the one country which has been denied the

blessings and benefits that have accrued to every small people which has

come within the sphere of, or whose fortunes have been directly or

indirectly affected by, the policy or interests of the British Empire.

One of the most striking features of what has been said and written in

this country on the treatment meted out by the Turks to their Armenian

subjects during the war has been the paucity of reference to the effect,

incidental and indirect no doubt, but the real and disastrous effect,

nevertheless, of British policy in Turkey since the Crimean War upon the

fate of the Armenian subjects of the Turk. This is in contrast with what

was said and written during previous massacres, and is no doubt

attributable to the fact of the country being at war. I am not touching

this aspect of the question in the way of a grievance. I well know, and

most gratefully recognize what the British Government and people have

done and are still doing for us during the long and ghastly nightmare

through which we are passing. The noble and unremitting efforts of Lord

and Lady Bryce, Lady Frederick Cavendish, Mr. Aneurin Williams, Mr. T.

P. O'Connor, Miss Robinson, Mrs. and Miss Hickson, Mrs. Cole, Mr. Noel

Buxton and his brother the Rev. Harold Buxton, Mr. Arthur G. Symonds,

Mr. Llew Williams, the Rev. Greenland, Mr. Arnold J. Toynbee, and so

many other friends of Armenia in this country, have placed us under a

lasting debt of gratitude to them and to Britain. Lord Bryce's name will

live in Armenian history as long as Armenia lasts.

But I do think it is fair, in justice to the people of this great and

righteous empire, to one-half of the Armenian nation who have fallen as

heroes and heroines both in war and martyrdom, and to "the little blood"

that is left to the Armenian people, that the facts in this connection

should be placed frankly and fully before the British public at this

juncture, so that it may be able to form an equitable estimate of the

reparation due to the Armenians, not only for the crimes and ravages

committed by the enemy during the war, but also in the light of the

obligations and responsibilities incurred by Europe in general and

Great Britain in particular for the Armenian subjects of the Ottoman

Empire by Art. 61 of the Treaty of Berlin and the Cyprus Convention.

I have said "Great Britain," but it would be more accurate to say "the

British Government of the day," for I firmly believe--in fact, who will

doubt?--that if the British people had had the slightest suspicion that

the Treaty of Berlin and the Cyprus Convention had in them the germs of

the disaster that has since overtaken the Christian subjects of the

Porte, they would never have ratified those treaties. Nor do I suggest,

I need hardly say, that the statesmen who are responsible for these

diplomatic instruments consciously and deliberately jeopardized the

existence of an ancient Christian people. Lord Salisbury's sympathetic

utterances in 1895-96 show unmistakably how deeply distressed he was at

the grievous turn events had taken, and still more at the powerlessness

of the Concert of Europe to save the Armenians from the position of

extreme peril in which the Concert had placed them in 1878.

Successive British Governments have made frequent attempts to improve

the lot of the Armenians; but the more they tried the more the Turks

massacred. There is no fairer-minded public than the British, whose

hospitality and the blessings of whose rule I have gratefully enjoyed

for many years, as have some thousands of my compatriots in almost every

part of the empire. There is also no one more ready and anxious to pay

his debt than the Briton when he knows what he owes. I have therefore no

fear whatever of arousing any resentment by calling the attention of the

British public to the existence of this old liability. On the contrary,

I am convinced that the fact will be taken note of in good part, and by

most even thankfully. I read a Press article not long ago--it was, if I

remember rightly, a review of Mr. Llew Williams's book, _Armenia Past

and Present_ in _The Court Journal_--which ended with the following

question: "If these terrible things are true and we have any

responsibility, why are we not told so?"

As regards the nature of the responsibilities and obligations, I refer

my readers to the Appendix, where will be found the texts of Art. 61 of

the Treaty of Berlin, Art. 18 of the Treaty of San Stefano--which was

torn up and superseded by the Treaty of Berlin--the full text of the

Cyprus Convention, and Lord Salisbury's Dispatch to Sir Henry Layard

containing instructions for the negotiation of that Convention.

I may here point out that though at first sight there appears to be

little difference between the wording of Art. 16 of the Treaty of San

Stefano and Art. 61 of the Treaty of Berlin, there is this fundamental

difference between the application of the two clauses that, while the

former left the Russian Army in occupation of the Armenian provinces

until the reforms should be an accomplished fact, the latter was a mere

Turkish promise to be performed after their evacuation by the Russian

forces. How the Turk performed his promise is well enough known, and

forms the darkest page of modern history--probably of all history.

Those who have the interest and the time for fuller information on the

subject I recommend to refer to Mr. Gladstone's famous speeches on the

Eastern Question and the Treaty of Berlin, the debates in both Houses of

Parliament on the massacres of 1895-96, Canon Maccoll's "The Sultan and

the Powers," Mr. W. Llew Williams's "Armenia Past and Present," and last

but not least, "Our Responsibilities for Turkey," by the late Duke of

Argyll. This frank and admirable commentary on the bearing of British

policy upon the Armenian question is now unfortunately out of print. I

therefore quote, with apologies, the following lengthy extract for the

convenience of those who may have difficulty in procuring a copy. It is

an authority that will command general and respectful attention.[26]

(The italics are mine.)

"Nothing can be more childish than to suppose that the significance and

effect of such a change as this[27] can be measured or appreciated by

looking at the mere grammatical meaning of the words. The words seemed

harmless enough. They may even seem to be most benevolent and most wise

in the interests of the Christian subjects of the Porte in Armenia. But

when we look at the facts which lay behind the words, and at the motives

which were at work among the contracting parties, we must see that

nothing could have been devised more fatal to their interests. The

change which the new words affected in the Treaty of San Stefano wounded

the pride and the most justifiable ambition of Russia to be the

protector of her co-religionists in provinces with which no other

Christian Power had any natural connection. On the other hand, it

delighted the low cunning of the Turk, in constituting another 'rift

within the lute' which by and by would be quite sure to make the 'music

mute' of any effective concert between the Powers of Europe. The Turk

could see at a glance that, whilst it relieved him of the dangerous

pressure of Russia, it substituted no other pressure which his own

infinite dexterity in delays could not easily make abortive. _As for the

unfortunate Armenians, the change was simply one which must tend to

expose them to the increased enmity of their tyrants, whilst it damaged

and discouraged the only protection which was possible under the

inexorable conditions of the physical geography of the country._[28]

"But this is not the whole of the responsibility which falls on us out

of the international transactions connected with the Treaty of Berlin.

After that treaty had been concluded, we entered by ourselves into a

separate, and for a while a secret, convention with Turkey, by which we

undertook to defend her Asiatic provinces by force of arms from any

further conquests on the part of Russia, and in return we asked for

nothing more than a lease of Cyprus, and a new crop of Turkish promises

that she would introduce reforms in her administration of Armenia. No

security whatever was asked or offered for the execution of those

promises. We simply repeated the old mistake of 1856, of trusting

entirely to the good faith of Turkey, or to her gratitude. But this time

the mistake was repeated after twenty-two years' continued experience of

the futility of such a trust. As to gratitude, it must have been quite

clear to the Turks that we were acting in our own supposed interests in

resisting the advance of Russia at any cost.

"No doubt we had occasion to remember, with some natural bitterness, the

sacrifice to Russia of all that the gallant General Williams had done

for Turkey in his splendid defence of Kars. But we ought to have

remembered, also, how dreadful had been the account given by that able

and gallant man of the detestable Government which he was defending. We

ought to have remembered how easy were the reforms which he had

recommended, if the Turkish Government had been honest; and how they had

all been systematically evaded. We ought, above all, to have considered

the inevitable effect of this new treaty of guarantee upon the sharp

cunning of the Turks. They saw how eagerly it was sought by us, and they

must have concluded that, whilst we were clearly not only earnest, but

excited, in our opposition to Russia, we were comparatively careless and

lukewarm about any changes in their own system of government. _They must

have seen that the new convention_[29] _practically superseded even the

slightest restraints put upon them by the Treaty of Berlin, and that the

Christian population of Armenia were practically left entirely at their

mercy._

"Let us look back upon all these transactions as a whole, and try to

form some estimate of the position of responsibility in which they have

placed us towards the Christian populations subject to the Ottoman

dominion. In 1854-56 we had saved that dominion from destruction by

defeating, and locally disarming, its great natural enemy. We had set

up that dominion with new immunities from attack, and we had choked off

from any protectorate over the Christians the only Power which would or

could exert any such influence with effect. We had done this without

providing any substitute of our own, except a recorded promise from the

Turks. We had provided no machinery whereby bad faith on the part of

Turkey could be proved and punished. Then, twenty years later, in 1876,

we had obstinately refused to join the other Powers of Europe in

remedying this great defect, by putting a combined pressure on Turkey to

compel her to establish effective guarantee for the future. In 1878 we

had denounced the treaty in which Russia, by her own expenditure of

blood and treasure, had imposed on Turkey the obligations which we had

admitted to be needful, but which we had ourselves declined to do

anything to enforce. Then, in the same year, at Berlin, we had again

done all we could to choke off the only Power which had the means and

the disposition to secure the fulfilment of any promises at all.

_Particularly in Armenia we had substituted for a promise to Russia

which her power, her geographical position, and her pride might have

really led her to enforce, another promise to all the Powers which, on

the face of it, was absurd--namely, a promise to let all the Powers

'superintend the execution' of domestic reforms in a remote and very

inaccessible country._ Lastly, in the same year, as we had already

choked off Russia, we now proceeded by a separate Convention to choke

off also all the other Powers collectively, by inducing Turkey to give a

special promise to ourselves, apart from them altogether. For the

performance of this special promise we provided no security whatever,

but trusted entirely, as we had done in 1856, to the good faith of a

Power which we knew had none. _With Russia deeply offended and

estranged, and the rest of Europe set aside or superseded--such were the

conditions under which we abandoned the Christian subjects of the Porte

in Asia to a Government incurably barbarous and corrupt._

"And now, we are astonished and disgusted by finding that the terrible

consequences of all this selfish folly have fallen on those whom we had

professed, and whom we were bound by every consideration of honour, to

protect. Surely these years might have brought us a reconsideration of

our position. The fever of our popular Russophobia had sensibly abated.

We had secured our "scientific frontier" in India, and Russian expansion

had taken a new direction in the Far East. New combinations--and some

new disseverments--had taken place in Europe. The whole position of

affairs was favourable to a policy of escape from bad traditions--from

obsolete doctrines--and from duties which it was impossible we could

discharge. Surely we might have asked ourselves, What had we been doing

all these years to fulfil those duties? Nothing. And yet all along we

were not ignorant that the vicious Government which we had so long

helped to sustain against all the natural agencies that would have

brought it to an end long ago was getting no better, but rather worse.

We knew this perfectly well, and we have recorded our knowledge of it in

a document of unimpeachable authority. In the second year after the

Treaty of Berlin, when the obligations we had undertaken under it were

still fresh in our recollection, we had made one more endeavour to

recall the Ottoman Power to some sense of shame, if not to some sense of

duty. In 1880 we had a special Envoy at the Porte, one of our most

distinguished public men--Mr. Goschen; and we had called together at

Constantinople a meeting of all the Ambassadors of the six Powers of

Europe who were signatories of the Treaty of Berlin. They drew up an

Identic Note, which they all signed and presented to the Porte. In that

Note they declared that no reforms had been, or were even on the way to

being, adopted, and that so desperate was the misgovernment of the

country, that 'it would lead in all probability to the destruction of

the Christian population of vast districts.' Could a more dreadful

confession have been made in respect to the conduct and policy of any

Christian Government?

"This Identic Note commented severely on the calculated falsehoods of

all kinds, and on the cunning procrastinations, which characterized the

conduct and language of the Porte. It concluded by reminding that

Government, as an essential fact, 'that by treaty engagements Turkey was

bound to introduce the reforms which had been often indicated,' and that

these reforms were to be 'carried out under the supervision of the

Powers.'

"We might as well have addressed our representations to a convict just

released from a long sentence, and determined at once to renew his

career of crime. And so we had gone on for fifteen more years since

1880, failing to take, or even attempt taking, any effectual measures to

protect the helpless populations subject to a Government which we knew

to be so cruel and oppressive--_populations towards whom we lay under so

many responsibilities, from our persistent protection of their

oppressors_. At last comes, in 1894, one of those appalling outbreaks of

brutality on the part of the Turks which always horrify, but need never

astonish, the world. They are all according to what Bishop Butler would

have called the 'natural constitution and course of things,' that is to

say, they are the natural results of the nature and government of the

Ottoman Turks."

Such is the nature of Great Britain's debt to us. It was rashly incurred

by her statesmen. Successive British Governments have made strenuous

efforts and run great risks to discharge it. But it has proved

undischargeable for forty years, with consequences to us which are well

known. This terrible war and the ensuing peace will give Great Britain

both the power and the opportunity to discharge that obligation, and our

weapons for enforcing our claim are the honour, the conscience and the

never-failing sense of justice of England, Scotland, Wales, Ireland and

the British Empire. I appeal to these in the name of my sorely-stricken

nation, pale, prostrate and bleeding almost to death, to stand by us and

fight our battle at the Peace Conference. And if my appeal reaches a

wide enough circle of British and Irish men and women, I am confident

that my nation will not die, but will live and prosper, and carve out a

future that will amply compensate her for the past.

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