Hooker states: "Gen. Warren represented to me that Gen. Sedgwick
had said he could do no more; then it was I wanted him to take some
position, and hold it, that I might turn the enemy in my immediate
front. I proposed to leave troops enough where I was, to occupy
the enemy there, and throw the rest of my force down the river, and
re-enforce Sedgwick; then the whole of Lee's army, except that which
had been left in front of Sedgwick, would be thrown off the road to
Richmond, and my army would be on it.
"As soon as I heard that Gen. Sedgwick had re-crossed the river, seeing
no object in maintaining my position where I was, and believing it
would be more to my advantage to hazard an engagement with the enemy at
Franklin's Crossing, where I had elbow-room, than where I was, the army
on the right was directed to re-cross the river, and did so on the night
between the 5th and 6th of May."
Now, the Franklin's Crossing plan, or its equivalent, had been tried by
Burnside, in December, with a loss of twelve thousand men; and it had
been fully canvassed and condemned as impracticable, before beginning
the Chancellorsville manoeuvre. To resuscitate it can therefore serve no
purpose but as an idle excuse. And the argument of elbow-room, if made,
is the one Hooker should have used against withdrawing from the open
country he had reached, to the Wilderness, on Friday, May 1.
"Being resolved on re-crossing the river on the night between the 4th
and 5th, I called the corps commanders together, not as a council
of war, but to ascertain how they felt in regard to making what I
considered a desperate move against the enemy in our front." Be it
remembered that the "desperate move" was one of eighty thousand men,
with twenty thousand more (Sedgwick) close at hand as a reserve, against
at the outside forty-five thousand men, if Early should be ordered up
to re-enforce Lee. And Hooker knew the force of Lee, or had as good
authority for knowing it as he had for most of the facts he assumed, in
condemning Sedgwick. Moreover, from the statements of prisoners we had
taken, very nearly an exact estimate could be made of the then numbers
of the Army of Northern Virginia.
All the corps commanders were present at this conference, except Slocum,
who afterwards came in. All were in favor of an advance, except Sickles;
while Couch wavered, fearing that no advance could be made to advantage
under Hooker. Hancock, (testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of
the War,) says: "I understood from him" (Couch) "always that he was in
favor of fighting then." Hooker claims Couch to have been for retreat;
but the testimony of the generals present, as far as available, goes to
show the council to have been substantially as will now be narrated.
Hooker retired for a while, to allow free expression of opinion; and,
with one exception, all present manifested a desire for another attack,
in full force,--Howard, Meade, and Reynolds being especially urgent to
this purpose. The one dissentient voice was Sickles; and he expressed
himself, confessedly, more from a political than a strategic standpoint.
He allowed the military reasons to be sound for an advance, and modestly
refrained from putting his opinion against that of men trained to the
profession of arms; though all allowed his right to a valid judgment.
But he claimed, with some reason, that the political horizon was dark;
that success by the Army of the Potomac was secondary to the avoidance
of disaster. If, he alleged, this army should be destroyed, it would be
the last one the country would raise. Washington might be captured; and
the effect of this loss upon the country, and upon Europe, was to be
greatly dreaded. The enemies of the administration were strong, and
daily gaining ground. It was necessary that the Army of the Potomac
should not run the risk of destruction. It was the last hold of the
Republican party in Virginia. Better re-cross and recuperate, and then
attempt another campaign, than run any serious risk now. These
grounds largely influenced him in agreeing with the general-in-chief's
determination to retire across the river. But there were other reasons,
which Sickles states in his testimony. The rations with which the men
had started had given out, and there had been no considerable issue
since. Singularly enough, too, (for Hooker was, as a rule, unusually
careful in such matters,) there had been no provision made for supplying
the troops against a possible advance; and yet, from Sunday noon
till Tuesday night, we had lain still behind our intrenchments, with
communications open, and with all facilities at hand to prepare for a
ten-days' absence from our base. This circumstance wears the look of
almost a predetermination to accept defeat.
Now, at the last moment, difficulties began to arise in bringing over
supplies. The river had rapidly risen from the effects of the storm.
Parts of the bridges had been carried away by the torrent. The ends of
the others were under water, and their entire structure was liable at
any moment to give way. It was not certain that Lee, fully aware of
these circumstances, would, for the moment, accept battle, as he
might judge it better to lure the Army of the Potomac away from the
possibility of victualling. Perhaps Sedgwick would be unable to cross
again so as to join the right wing. The Eleventh Corps might not be in
condition to count on for heavy service. The Richmond papers, received
almost daily through channels more or less irregular, showed that
communications were still open, and that the operations of the Cavalry
Corps had not succeeded in interrupting them in any serious manner. On
the coming Sunday, the time of service of thirty-eight regiments was up.
Many of these conditions could have been eliminated from the problem,
if measures had been seasonably taken; but they now became critical
elements in the decision to be made. And Hooker, despite his well-earned
reputation as a fighting man, was unable to arrive at any other than
the conclusion which Falstaff so cautiously enunciated, from beneath his
shield, at the battle of Shrewsbury, that "the better part of valor is
discretion."