It was about noon before Lee became aware that Sedgwick had captured
his stronghold at Fredericksburg, and was where he could sever his
communications, or fall upon his rear at Chancellorsville. Both Lee
and Early (the former taking his cue from his lieutenant) state that at
first Sedgwick advanced down the Telegraph road, with an assumed purpose
to destroy the line in Lee's rear, but that he was checked by Early.
The nature, however, of Sedgwick's orders precluded his doing this, and
there is no mention of such a purpose among any of the reports. And it
was not long before Lee heard that Sedgwick was marching out towards the
battle-ground in the Wilderness, with only Wilcox in his front.
McLaws, with his own three brigades, and one of Anderson's, was
accordingly pushed forward at a rapid gait to sustain Wilcox; while
Anderson, with the balance of his division, and fourteen rifled guns,
was sent to the junction of the River road and Mine road to hold that
important position. McLaws arrived about two P.M., and found Wilcox
skirmishing, a trifle beyond Salem Church. He was drawn back a few
hundred yards, while Kershaw and Wofford were thrown out upon Wilcox's
right, and Semmes and Mahone on his left. Wofford arrived somewhat late,
as he had been temporarily left at the junction of the Mine and plank
roads to guard them. McLaws's guns were concentrated on the road, but
were soon withdrawn for lack of ammunition.
Some troops were thrown into Salem Church, and into a schoolhouse near
by, in front of the woods, forming a salient; but the main Confederate
line was withdrawn some three hundred yards within the wood, where a
clearing lay at their back.
When Sedgwick's column reached the summit along the road, about a mile
from Salem Church, Wilcox's cavalry skirmishers were met, and a section
of artillery opened with solid shot from a point near the church, where
Wilcox was hurrying his forces into line. The intervening ground was
quite open on both sides the road. The heights at Salem Church are not
considerable; but a ravine running north and south across its front, and
as far as the Rappahannock, furnishes an excellent line of defence, and
the woods come up to its edge at this point, and enclose the road.
Brooks was pushed in to attack the enemy, the main part of his division
being on the left of the road, while Newton filed in upon his right, so
soon as his regiments could be got up. Disposing his batteries (Rigby,
Parsons, and Williston) along a crest at right angles to the road, not
far from the toll-gate, where good shelter existed for the caissons and
limbers, Brooks sharply advanced his lines under a telling fire, and,
passing the undergrowth, penetrated the edge of the woods where lay
Wilcox and Semmes and Mahone. Wilcox's skirmishers and part of his
line gave way before Brooks's sturdy onset, which created no little
confusion; but Wilcox and Semmes in person headed some reserve
regiments, and led them to the charge. An obstinate combat ensues.
Bartlett has captured the schoolhouse east of the church, advances,
and again breaks for a moment the Confederate line. Wilcox throws in an
Alabama regiment, which delivers a fire at close quarters, and makes a
counter-charge, while the rest of his brigade rallies on its colors,
and again presses forward. The church and the schoolhouse are fought for
with desperation, but only after a heroic defence can the Confederates
recapture them. Bartlett withdraws with a loss of two-fifths of his
brigade, after the most stubborn contest. The line on the north of the
road is likewise forced back. A series of wavering combats, over this
entire ground, continues for the better part of an hour; but the enemy
has the upper hand, and forces our line back towards the toll-house.
Though obstinately fighting for a foothold near the church, Brooks had
thus been unable to maintain it, and he has fallen back with a loss
of nearly fifteen hundred men. Reaching his guns, where Newton has
meanwhile formed in support of his right, and where part of Howe's
division later falls in upon his left, the enemy, which has vigorously
followed up his retreat, is met with a storm of grape and canister at
short range, the distance of our batteries from the woods being not much
over five hundred yards. So admirably served are the guns, as McLaws
states, that it is impossible to make head against this new line; and
the Confederates sullenly retire to their position near the church,
which they had so successfully held against our gallant assaults,
followed, but not seriously engaged, by a new line of Brooks's and
Newton's regiments.
Wheaton's brigade manages to hold on in a somewhat advanced position on
the right, where Mahone had been re-enforced from Wofford's line; but
our left, after the second unsuccessful attempt to wrest more advanced
ground from the enemy, definitely retires to a line a short mile from
Salem Church.
The Confederate artillery had been out of ammunition, and unable to
engage seriously in this conflict. Their fighting had been confined to
the infantry regiments. But our own guns had borne a considerable share
in the day's work, and had earned their laurels well.
It was now dark, and both lines bivouacked in line of battle.
Gen. Russell was placed in command of our front line.
The Union wounded were sent to Fredericksburg.
Gen. Warren, before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, passes the
following comment upon this action:--
"Gen. Sedgwick carried the heights at Fredericksburg, and then moved on
about three miles farther, and had a fight at Salem heights, but could
not carry them. I think that by fighting the battle at Salem heights
differently, we might have won that place also."
"Gen. Brooks carried Salem heights, but not being closely enough
supported by other troops, he could not hold the heights. It was just
one of those wavering things that a moment settles. If we had been
stronger at that moment, we would have won; not being so, they won."
It is probable, that, had Brooks's attack been delayed until Newton and
Howe could reach the scene, their support might have enabled him to keep
possession of the ground he came so near to holding single-handed.
But it was a dashing fight, deserving only praise; and it is doubtful
whether the capture of Salem heights would have materially altered the
event. It was the eccentric handling of the Chancellorsville wing which
determined the result of this campaign. Sedgwick's corps could effect
nothing by its own unaided efforts.