So soon as Sedgwick had reduced the only formidable works in his front,
he made dispositions to push out on the plank road. Gibbon was left in
Fredericksburg to prevent the enemy from crossing to the north side of
the river, and to shield the bridges.
"Gen. Brooks's division was now given the advance, and he was farthest
in the rear, not having got moved from the crossing-place." Brooks had
so extensive a force in his front, that he was constrained to withdraw
with extreme caution. "This necessarily consumed a considerable
time, and before it was completed the sound of the cannonading at
Chancellorsville had ceased." (Warren.)
This postponement of an immediate advance might well, under the
stringency of the orders, have been avoided, by pushing on with the then
leading division. Not that it would have been of any ultimate assistance
to Hooker at Chancellorsville. At the time the storming columns
assaulted Marye's heights, Hooker had already been driven into his
lines at White House. And though none of his strictures upon Sedgwick's
tardiness, as affecting his own situation, will bear the test of
examination, time will not be considered wholly ill-spent in determining
where Sedgwick might have been more expeditious. It no doubt accords
with military precedents, to alternate in honoring the successive
divisions of a corps with the post of danger; but it may often be highly
improper to arrest an urgent progress in order to accommodate this
principle. And it was certainly inexpedient in this case, despite the
fact that Newton and Howe had fought their divisions, while Brooks had
not yet been under fire.
"The country being open, Gen. Brooks's division was formed in a column
of brigade-fronts, with an extended line of skirmishers in the front
and flank in advance, and the artillery on the road." (Warren.) The New
Jersey brigade marched on the right, and Bartlett's brigade on the
left, of the road. This disposition was adopted that the enemy might be
attacked as soon as met, without waiting for deployment, and to avoid
the usual manoeuvres necessary to open an action from close column, or
from an extended order of march.
Gen. Newton followed, marching by the flank along the road. This
"greatly extended the column, made it liable to an enfilading fire,
and put it out of support, in a measure, of the division in advance."
(Warren.) Howe brought up the rear.
Meanwhile Wilcox, having arrested Sedgwick at Guest's, as long as his
slender force enabled him to do, moved across country to the River road
near Taylor's. But Sedgwick's cautious advance gave him the opportunity
of sending back what cavalry he had, some fifty men, to skirmish along
the plank road, while he himself moved his infantry and artillery by
cross-roads to the toll-house, one-half mile east of Salem Church. Here
he took up an admirable position, and made a handsome resistance to
Sedgwick, until, ascertaining that McLaws had reached the crest at that
place, he withdrew to the position assigned him in the line of battle
now formed by that officer.
When Early perceived that Sedgwick was marching his corps up the plank
road, instead, as he expected, of attacking him, and endeavoring to
reach the depots at Hamilton's, he concentrated at Cox's all his forces,
now including Hays, who had rejoined him by a circuit, and sent word to
McLaws, whom he ascertained to be advancing to meet Sedgwick, that he
would on the morrow attack Marye's heights with his right, and extend
his left over to join the main line.