XIV. POSITION OF THE ELEVENTH CORPS.

Gen. Howard states that he located his command, both with reference to

an attack from the south, and from the west along the old turnpike and

the plank road. The whole corps lies on a ridge along which runs the

turnpike, and which is the watershed of the small tributaries of the

Rappahannock and Mattapony Rivers. This ridge is terminated on the right

by some high and easily-defended ground near Talley's.

Gen. Devens, with the first division, holds the extreme right. He has

less than four thousand men under his command. Von Gilsa's brigade has,

until this morning, been half a mile farther out the pike, and across

the road; but on receipt of Hooker's 9.30 order has been withdrawn, and

now lies with two regiments astride and north of the pike, some distance

beyond Talley's, the rest skirting the south of it. His right regiment

leans upon that portion of the Brock road which is the prolongation of

the eastern branch, and which, after crossing the plank road and pike,

bears north-westerly, and loses itself in the woods where formerly was

an old mill. McLean's brigade prolongs von Gilsa's line towards Schurz.

Dieckman's battery has two pieces trained westerly down the pike, and

four on Devens's left, covering, near Talley's Hill, the approaches

from the plank road. Devens has the Twenty-fifth and Seventy-fifth Ohio

Volunteers as a reserve, near the pike.

Schurz's (third) division continues this line on the edge of the woods

to Dowdall's. His front hugs the eastern side of the clearing between

the pike and the plank road, thence along the latter to the fork.

Schimmelpfennig's brigade is on the right, adjoining Devens;

Krzyzanowski's on the left. Three regiments of the former are on the

line, and two in reserve: the latter has two regiments on the line, and

two in reserve. On Schurz's right wing, the troops are shut in between

thick woods and their rifle-pits, with no room whatever to manoeuvre

or deploy. This condition likewise applies to many of the regiments in

Devens's line. The pike is the means of inter-communication, running

back of the woods in their rear. Dilger's battery is placed near

Dowdall's, at the intersection of the roads.

Steinwehr considers himself the reserve division. He is more or less

massed near Dowdall's. Buschbeck's brigade is in the clearing south

of the road, but has made a line of rifle-pits across the road, facing

west, at the edge of the open ground. Two regiments are deployed, and

two are in reserve. His other brigade, Barlow's, has been sent out

nearly two miles, to protect Birney's right, leaving no general reserve

whatever for the corps. Wiederich's battery is on Steinwehr's right and

left, trained south.

Three batteries are in reserve on the line of Buschbeck's rifle-pits

running north and south. Barlow had been, as above stated, massed as a

general reserve of the corps on Buschbeck's right,--the only reserve the

corps could boast, and a most necessary one.

Two companies, and some cavalry and artillery, have been sent to the

point where the Ely's Ford road crosses Hunting Creek.

Devens states that his pickets were kept out a proper distance, and that

he had constant scouting-parties moving beyond them. In his report he

recapitulates the various attacks made during the day. Shortly after

noon, cavalry attacked his skirmishers, but drew off. This was Stuart

protecting Jackson's flank, and feeling for our lines. Then two men,

sent out from Schimmelpfennig's front, came in through his, and were

despatched to Hooker with their report that the enemy was in great force

on our flank. Later, Lieut. Davis, of Devens's staff, with a cavalry

scout, was fired upon by Confederate horse. Then von Gilsa's skirmishers

were attacked by infantry,--again Stuart seeking to ascertain our

position: after which the pickets were pushed farther out. Cavalry was

afterwards sent out, and returned with information that some Confederate

troopers, and part of a battery, were in the woods on our right.

But all this seems to have been explained as a retreat. "The unvarying

report was, that the enemy is crossing the plank road, and moving

towards Culpeper."

The ground about Dowdall's is a clearing of undulating fields, closed on

three sides, and open to the west. As you stand east of the fork of the

roads, you can see a considerable distance down the plank road, leading

to Orange Court House. The pike bears off to the right, and runs up hill

for half a mile, to the eminence at Talley's.

The dispositions recited were substantially the same as those made when

the corps arrived here on Thursday. They were, early Saturday morning,

inspected by Hooker in person, and pronounced satisfactory. As he

rode along the line with Howard, and with each division commander in

succession, he was greeted with the greatest enthusiasm. His exclamation

to Howard, several times repeated, as he examined the position,--his

mind full of the idea of a front attack, but failing to seize the danger

of the two roads from the west,--was: "How strong! How strong!"

An hour or two later, having ascertained the Confederate movement across

our front, he had sent his circular to Howard and Slocum. Later still,

as if certain that the enemy was on the retreat, he depleted Howard's

line by the withdrawal of Barlow, and made dispositions which created

the gap of nigh two miles on Howard's left.

Howard, during the day, frequently inspected the line, and all

dispositions were approved by him.

And, when Barlow was ordered out to the front, both Howard and Steinwehr

accompanied him. They returned to Dowdall's Tavern just as Jackson

launched his columns upon the Eleventh Corps.

The Campaign of Chancellorsville · 第 22 / 66 题