I am directed by the major-general commanding to say that the
disposition you have made of your corps has been with a view to a front
attack by the enemy. If he should throw himself upon your flank, he
wishes you to examine the ground, and determine upon the positions you
will take in that event, in order that you may be prepared for him in
whatever direction he advances. He suggests that you have heavy reserves
well in hand to meet this contingency. The right of your line does not
appear to be strong enough. No artificial defences worth naming have
been thrown up; and there appears to be a scarcity of troops at that
point, and not, in the general's opinion, as favorably posted as might
be.
We have good reason to suppose that the enemy is moving to our right.
Please advance your pickets for purposes of observation as far as may
be, in order to obtain timely information of their approach.
JAMES H. VAN ALEN,
Brigadier-General and Aide-de-Camp.
Although addressed to Slocum as well as Howard, this order scarcely
applied with much force to the former, who occupied the right centre of
the army, with Birney lying between him and the Eleventh Corps. Howard
carried out his part of these instructions as well as circumstances
allowed. He posted Barlow's brigade, his largest and best, on the
Buschbeck line, in position for a general reserve for the corps, and
took advantage of the ground in a manner calculated to strengthen his
flank, and to enable it to cover a change of front if necessary; he
placed his reserve artillery on the right of the rifle-pits running
across the road at Dowdall's; he located several regiments on Dowdall's
clearing so as to wheel to the west or south as might be required;
Major Hoffman was set to work, and spent the entire day locating and
supervising the construction of field-works; and generally, Howard
disposed the forces under his command after a fashion calculated to
oppose a stubborn resistance to attacks down the pike, should they be
made.
Later on in the day, we have seen how Hooker's aide, Capt. Moore,
ordered this brigade of Barlow's away from its all-important position.
We have seen Hooker's dispositions of the Third and Twelfth Corps. We
have seen Hooker's 4.10 P.M. order to Sedgwick. No room is left to doubt
that Hooker's opinion, if he had any, underwent a change after issuing
these instructions, and that he gave up the idea of an attack upon the
right. His dispositions certainly resulted in convincing Howard that he
had done so.
But suppose Hooker still remained of the same opinion during the
afternoon, was the issue of this circular in the morning enough? If he
supposed it probable that the enemy would strike our right, was it not
the duty of the commanding general, at least to see that the threatened
flank was properly protected,--that the above order was carried out as
he intended it should be? No attack sufficient to engross his attention
had been made, or was particularly threatened elsewhere; and
a ten-minutes' gallop would bring him from headquarters to the
questionable position. He had some excellent staff-officers--Gen. Warren
among others--who could have done this duty; but there is no evidence
of any one having been sent. Gen. Howard, in fact, states that no
inspection by, or by the order of, Gen. Hooker was made during the day,
after the one in the early morning.
It may be alleged that Hooker had desired to draw in the extended right
the evening before, and had yielded only to the claim that that position
could be held against any attack coming from the front. This is true.
But when half his enemy's forces, after this disposition was made, are
moved to and massed on his right, and have actually placed themselves
where they can take his line in reverse, is it still fair to urge this
plea? Hooker claims that his "instructions were utterly and criminally
disregarded." But inasmuch as common-sense, not to quote military
routine, must hold him accountable for the removal of Barlow (for how
can a general shelter himself from the consequences of the acts of his
subordinates, when these acts are in pursuance of orders received from
his own aide-de-camp?), and himself acknowledges the disposition made of
Sickles and Slocum, can the facts be fairly said to sustain the charge?
There was, moreover, so much bitterness exhibited after this campaign,
that, had the facts in the slenderest degree warranted such action,
formal charges would assuredly have been brought against Howard and his
division commanders, on the demand alike of the commander-in-chief and a
disappointed public.