Lee and Jackson spent Friday night under some pine-trees, on the plank
road, at the point where the Confederate line crosses it. Lee saw that
it was impossible for him to expect to carry the Federal lines by direct
assault, and his report states that he ordered a cavalry reconnoissance
towards our right flank to ascertain its position. There is, however, no
mention of such a body having felt our lines on the right, in any of the
Federal reports.
It is not improbable that Lee received information, crude but useful,
about this portion of our army, from some women belonging to Dowdall's
Tavern. When the Eleventh Corps occupied the place on Thursday, a watch
was kept upon the family living there. But in the interval between the
corps breaking camp to move out to Slocum's support on Friday morning,
and its return to the old position, some of the women had disappeared.
This fact was specially noted by Gen. Howard.
However the information was procured, the Federal right was doubtless
ascertained to rest on high ground, where it was capable of making
a stubborn resistance towards the south. But Lee well knew that its
position was approached from the west by two broad roads, and reasoned
justly that Hooker, in canvassing the events of Friday, would most
probably look for an attack on his left or front.
Seated on a couple of cracker-boxes, the relics of an issue of Federal
rations the day before, the two Confederate chieftains discussed the
situation. Jackson, with characteristic restless energy, suggested a
movement with his entire corps around Hooker's right flank, to seize
United-States Ford, or fall unawares upon the Army of the Potomac.
This hazardous suggestion, which Lee in his report does not mention
as Jackson's, but which is universally ascribed to him by Confederate
authorities, was one as much fraught with danger as it was spiced with
dash, and decidedly bears the Jacksonian flavor. It gave "the great
flanker" twenty-two thousand men (according to Col. A. S. Pendleton, his
assistant adjutant-general, but twenty-six thousand by morning report)
with which to make a march which must at best take all day, constantly
exposing his own flank to the Federal assault. It separated for a still
longer time the two wings of the Confederate army; leaving Lee with only
Anderson's and McLaws's divisions,--some seventeen thousand men,--with
which to resist the attack of thrice that number, which Hooker, should
he divine this division of forces, could throw against him, the while he
kept Jackson busy with the troops on his own right flank.
On the other hand, Hooker had shown clear intention of fighting a
defensive battle; and perhaps Lee measured his man better than the Army
of the Potomac had done. And he knew Jackson too. Should Hooker remain
quiet during the day, either voluntarily or by Lee's engrossing his
attention by constant activity in his front, the stratagem might
succeed. And in case of failure, each wing had open ground and good
roads for retreat, to form a junction towards Gordonsville.
Moreover, nothing better presented itself; and though, in the presence
of a more active foe, Lee would never have hazarded so much, the very
aggressiveness of the manoeuvre, and the success of Jackson's former
flank attacks, commended it to Lee, and he gave his lieutenant orders to
proceed to its immediate execution.
For this division of his forces in the presence of an enemy of twice
his strength, Lee is not entitled to commendation. It is justifiable
only--if at all--by the danger of the situation, which required a
desperate remedy, and peculiarly by the success which attended it. Had
it resulted disastrously, as it ought to have done, it would have been
a serious blow to Lee's military prestige. The "nothing venture, nothing
have" principle applies to it better than any maxim of tactics.
Before daybreak Jackson sends two of his aides, in company with some
local guides, to find a practicable road, by which he may, with the
greatest speed and all possible secrecy, gain the position he aims at on
Hooker's right and rear, and immediately sets his corps in motion, with
Rodes, commanding D. H. Hill's division, in the advance, and A. P. Hill
bringing up the rear.
Jackson's route lay through the woods, along the road on which rested
Lee's line. His corps, since Friday's manoeuvres, was on the left; and,
as he withdrew his troops at dawn, Lee deployed to the left to fill
the gap, first placing Wright where Jackson had been on the west of the
plank road, and later, when Wright was ordered to oppose Sickles at the
Furnace, Mahone's brigade.
This wood-road led to Welford's or Catherine's Furnace, from which place
a better one, called the Furnace road, zigzagged over to join the Brock
(or Brook) road, the latter running northerly into Y-shaped branches,
each of which intersected the pike a couple of miles apart.
Jackson was obliged to make some repairs to the road as he advanced, for
the passage of his artillery and trains. In many places the bottom, none
too reliable at any time, was so soft with the recent rains, that it had
to be corduroyed to pull the guns through. But these men were used to
marches of unequalled severity, and their love for their leader made no
work too hard when "Old Jack" shared it with them. And although they had
already been marching and fighting continuously for thirty hours, this
circuit of well-nigh fifteen miles was cheerfully done, with an alacrity
nothing but willing and courageous hearts, and a blind belief that they
were outwitting their enemy, could impart.
His progress was masked by Stuart, who interposed his cavalry between
Jackson and the Union lines, and constantly felt of our skirmishers and
pickets as he slowly kept abreast with the marching column.
At the Furnace comes in another road, which, a short distance above,
forks so as to lead to Dowdall's Tavern on the left, and to touch the
Union lines by several other branches on the right. It was this road
down which Wright and Stuart had advanced the evening before in their
attack on our lines.
Here, in passing Lewis's Creek (Scott's Run) and some elevated ground
near by, the column of Jackson had to file in full view of the Union
troops, barely a mile and a half away. The movement was thus fully
observed by us, hundreds of field-glasses pointing steadily at his
columns.
It seems somewhat strange that Jackson should have made this march,
intended to be quite disguised, across the Furnace-clearing. For there
was another equally short route, making a bend southward through the
woods, and, though possibly not so good as the one pursued, subsequently
found available for the passage of Jackson's trains, when driven from
the Furnace by Sickles. It is probably explained, however, by the fact
that this route, selected during the night, was unfamiliar to Jackson,
and that his aides and guides had not thought of the point where the
troops were thus put en evidence. And Jackson may not have been with the
head of the column.
So early as eight o'clock Birney of the Third Corps, whose division had
been thrust in between Howard and Slocum, reported to Sickles that a
movement in considerable force was being made in our front. Sickles
conveyed the information to Hooker, who instructed him to investigate
the matter in person. Sickles pushed out Clark's rifled battery, with
a sufficient support, to shell the passing column. This, says Sickles,
obliged it to abandon the road. It was observed that the column was
a large one, and had a heavy train. Sickles considered it either a
movement for attack on our right, or else one in retreat. If the former,
he surmised at the time that he had arrested it; if the latter, that the
column had taken a more available route.
It was while Rodes was filing past the Furnace that the first attack by
Clark's battery was made; and Col. Best, with the Twenty-third Georgia
Regiment, was sent out beyond the Furnace to hold the road. Best
subsequently took position in and about the Furnace buildings, and
placed some troops in the railroad cutting south.
Sickles, meanwhile, had again reported to Hooker, and been instructed
to strengthen his reconnoissance. But it was noon before this order was
given, and he was then advised to push out with great caution. He asked
for the whole of Birney's division, and another one in support. With
these he thought to get possession of the road on which the enemy was
moving, and, if it was a retreat, cut him off; if a flank movement,
thrust himself in between the two bodies of the enemy. Hooker accorded
this request; and Birney was advanced a mile and a half through the
woods, bridging two or three arms of Scott's Run, and some marshy
ground, and making his way with great difficulty. Two regiments of
Berdan's sharpshooters were thrown out in front, and the Twentieth
Indiana Infantry led Birney's division. Considerable opposition
was encountered, say the reports of these regiments; but after some
skirmishing, Berdan managed to surround Best's command, and captured
nearly the entire force.
Why Birney advanced through the woods is not readily understood; for
there was a good road close by his position, leading to the Furnace, by
using which many hours could have been saved.
From the prisoners of the Twenty-third Georgia, and some others
intercepted, it was clearly ascertained, by two P.M., that Jackson was
moving towards our right flank, with, as the prisoners stated, some
forty thousand men.
These facts Sickles also reported to Hooker, requesting Pleasonton's
cavalry, and his own third division, to cooperate in a flank attack,
which he seems to have assumed he could make on Jackson. Hooker ordered
Whipple up into supporting distance to Birney, with instructions to
connect the latter with Slocum; and directed Williams (Slocum's right
division) to cover the left of the advancing column, and if necessary
attack the enemy there. Howard received instructions from Capt. Moore,
who had been announced in general orders as on Hooker's staff, to
cover Birney's right; and he detached his reserve brigade, the best and
largest in the Eleventh Corps, commanded by Barlow, and led it out in
person to its position.
Hooker subsequently denied having sent Capt. Moore to Howard, alleging
the order to have emanated from Sickles; but, as Capt. Moore was on
Hooker's staff, Howard certainly could do no less than he did, supposing
the order to be by authority from headquarters.
Sickles now imagined that every thing promised the most brilliant
success. He was preparing to make his attack, as he supposed,--to judge,
at least, from what he says,--on Jackson's flank. "McLaws's opposition
had all but ceased," says he; "and it was evident that in a few moments
five or six regiments would be cut off, and fall into our hands."
But Sickles had been deceived by a simple rear-guard of the enemy; while
Jackson, by a long circuit, was not only far beyond his reach, but in
position to crush Howard, and cut off Sickles from communication with
the rest of the army.
Pleasonton, whom Hooker had sent out to Sickles's aid, held his three
regiments and Martin's horse-battery, in the clearing at Scott's Run,
being unable to operate to any advantage on the ground occupied by
Birney. Three or four other Third-Corps batteries were also here for a
similar reason.
When Sickles's attack, leading to the capture of the Twenty-third
Georgia, was made, Col. Brown's battalion of Confederate artillery
happened to be within reach, and was speedily ordered up by Jackson,
and placed on a cleared eminence south of the railroad cutting. Here,
gathering a few detached companies in support, he opened smartly upon
Sickles. The latter, bearing in mind his orders impressing caution in
his advance, was for the moment checked, long enough, at all events, to
enable Jackson's trains to get out of reach by the lower road.
Birney had barely reached the Furnace when Brown's fire became
quite annoying. He accordingly placed Livingstone's, and afterwards
Randolph's, batteries in position, and spent some time in silencing
the Confederate guns; after accomplishing which, he threw forward his
skirmishers, and occupied Welford's house, while Graham, with four
regiments, got possession of the railroad cutting.
By this time Jackson's troops had passed a couple of miles beyond the
Furnace; but on hearing of Sickles's attack, and the capture of an
entire regiment, Archer, who commanded the rear brigade, promptly
retraced his steps with his own and Thomas's brigades, and supported
Brown's excellent work. So soon as the trains had got well along, these
two brigades rejoined their command; and their work as rear-guard was
undertaken by Posey, and subsequently by Wright, whom Anderson ordered
out, and threw across his own left flank to engage the attention of
Sickles's column.
Jackson's divisions were well out of reach, a half-dozen miles from
Sickles, before this officer was ready for an advance in force. Jackson
had marched on, or parallel to, the Brock road. When he reached the
Orange plank road, he was shown an eminence from which he could observe
the position of the Union lines. Riding up alone, so as not to attract
attention, after--as Cooke affirms--driving the Federal cavalry from the
spot, he examined our position carefully; and, seeing that he was not
yet abreast of our flank on this road, he ordered his troops farther
along the Brock road to the old turnpike.
But he sent Fitz Hugh Lee's cavalry, supported by Paxton, along the
plank road, to hold it in case his designs were prematurely discovered
and met.
By four P.M. he had reached the right and rear of the Union line;
while Hooker complacently viewed the situation from his comfortable
headquarters at the Chancellor house, apparently in a semi-torpid state,
retaining just enough activity to initiate manoeuvres, which, under the
circumstances, were the most unfortunate possible.
For not only had he robbed his right corps of Barlow's brigade, the only
general reserve of the "key of his position," as himself has called it,
and despatched Birney two miles into the woods, supported by Whipple,
and protected on the left by Williams; but about five P.M. he ordered
Geary from his position on Slocum's left, to move forward, and make an
attack down the plank road. This order Geary carried out in person
with several regiments. He had a smart skirmish with the enemy, and was
considerably advanced, when, about sundown, he was suddenly ordered to
return to his position.
Hooker's right flank, of less than ten thousand men, was thus isolated
from the rest of the army, with no supports within two miles.
And yet the full evidence of Jackson's whereabouts was before him. There
had been a constant feeling of the Union lines (by Stuart's cavalry and
some infantry skirmishers) all day, gradually working from east to west.
This fact was noticed by many officers, and is particularly referred to
by Pleasonton, Warren, and Howard. Jackson's columns and trains had been
strongly reconnoitred, their force estimated, and their direction noted.
The question as to what might be the objective of such a movement, had
been the main topic of discussion during the day throughout the right of
the army.
At noon a cavalry picket on the plank road was driven in, and gave
notice of the passing of a heavy column a mile beyond our lines. About
3.30 P.M. the leading divisions of Jackson's corps, arriving on the old
turnpike, sent a party forward to feel our lines, and a ten-minutes'
skirmish resulted, when the Confederate party withdrew. There had been a
number of minor attacks on our outlying pickets, some of them occurring
when Gen. Howard was present. All these facts were successively reported
to headquarters.
About the same time two men, sent out as spies, came in, and reported
the enemy crossing the plank road on our right, in heavy columns.
These men were despatched by Howard to Hooker, with instructions to the
officer accompanying them to see that Hooker promptly received their
information. On the other hand, a half-hour before Jackson's attack
came, Howard sent a couple of companies of cavalry out the plank road to
reconnoitre. These men, from negligence or cowardice, failed to go far
enough to ascertain the presence of Jackson, and returned and reported
all quiet. This report was, however, not forwarded to Hooker.
There was not an officer or man in the Eleventh Corps that afternoon who
did not discuss the possibility of an attack in force on our right, and
wonder how the small body thrown across the road on the extreme flank
could meet it. And yet familiar with all the facts related, for that
they were reported to him there is too much cumulative evidence to
doubt, and having inspected the line so that he was conversant with
its situation, Hooker allowed the key of his position to depend upon a
half-brigade and two guns, facing the enemy, while the balance of the
wing, absolutely in the air, turned its back upon the general whose
attack was never equalled for its terrible momentum during our war, or
excelled in any, and whose crushing blows had caused the brave old Army
of the Potomac more than once to stagger.
Moreover, the "key of the position" was confided to a corps which was
not properly part of the Army of the Potomac, and untried as yet. For
not only had the Eleventh Corps, as a corps, seen no active service, but
the most of its regiments were made up of raw troops, and the elements
of which the corps was composed were to a degree incongruous. Of itself
this fact should have caused Hooker to devote serious attention to his
right flank.