Meade held the left, extending from a small bluff near Scott's Dam on
the Rappahannock, and covering the roads on the river, along a crest
between Mine and Mineral Spring Runs towards and within a short mile of
Chancellorsville.
This crest was, however, commanded from several points on the east,
and, according to the Confederate authorities, appeared to have been
carelessly chosen. Meade's front, except at the extreme river-flank, was
covered by impenetrable woods. The Mine road intersected his left flank,
and the River road was parallel to and a mile in his front.
Couch joined Meade's right, and extended southerly to Chancellorsville,
with Hancock thrown out on his front, and facing east, astride the River
road, and up to and across the old turnpike; his line being formed south
of this road and of the Chancellor clearing. The division of French, of
Couch's corps, was held in reserve along the United-States Ford road.
From here to Dowdall's Tavern the line made a southerly sweep outwards,
like a bent bow, of which the plank road was the string.
As far as Hazel Grove, at the centre of the bow, Slocum's Twelfth Corps
held the line, Geary's division joining on to Couch, and Williams on
the right. From Slocum's right to the extreme right of the army, the
Eleventh Corps had at first been posted; but Hooker determined on
Saturday morning that the line was too thin here, and thrust Birney's
division of the Third Corps in between Slocum and Howard. The rest of
the Third Corps was in reserve, massed in columns of battalions, in
Bullock's clearing, north of the Chancellor house, with its batteries at
the fork of the roads leading to the United-States and Ely's Fords.
Towards sunset of Friday, Birney had advanced a strong line of
skirmishers, and seized a commanding position in his front. Birney's
line then lay along the crest facing Scott's Run from Dowdall's to
Slocum's right.
Pleasonton's cavalry brigade was massed at headquarters, ready for duty
at any point.
Howard held the line, from Dowdall's Tavern (Melzi Chancellor's) to
beyond Talley's farm on the old pike, with his right flank substantially
in the air, and with two roads, the main thoroughfares from east to
west, striking in on his right, parallel to his position.
As will be noticed from the map, the right, being along the pike, was
slightly refused from the rest of the line, considering the latter as
properly lying along the road to headquarters. From Dowdall's west,
the rise along the pike was considerable, and at Talley's the crest was
high. The whole corps lay on the watershed of the small tributaries of
the Rappahannock and Mattapony Rivers.
As a position to resist a southerly attack, it was as good as the
Wilderness afforded; although the extreme right rested on no obstacle
which superiority in numbers could not overcome. And a heavy
force, massed in the clearing at Dowdall's as a point d'appui, was
indispensable to safety, inasmuch as the conformation of the ground
afforded nothing for this flank to lean upon.
Having forfeited the moral superiority gained by his advance, having
withdrawn to his intrenchments at Chancellorsville, and decided, after
surprising his enemy, upon fighting a defensive battle, Hooker, early
on Saturday morning, examined his lines, and made sundry changes in the
forces under his command.
The position he occupied, according to Gen. Lee, was one of great
natural strength, on ground covered with dense forest and tangled
under-growth, behind breastworks of logs and an impenetrable abattis,
and approached by few roads, all easily swept by artillery. And, while
it is true that the position was difficult to carry by direct assault,
full compensation existed in other tactical advantages to the army
taking the offensive. It is not probable that Lee, in Hooker's place,
would have selected such ground. "Once in the wood, it was difficult
to tell any thing at one hundred yards. Troops could not march without
inextricable confusion." Despite which fact, however, the density of
these very woods was the main cause of Lee's success.
In this position, Hooker awaited the assault of his vigorous opponent.
As in all defensive battles, he was at certain disadvantages, and
peculiarly so in this case, owing to the terrain he had chosen, or
been forced to choose by Friday's easily accepted check. There were no
debouches for throwing forces upon Lee, should he wish to assume the
offensive. There was no ground for manoeuvring. The woods were like
a heavy curtain in his front. His left wing was placed so as to be of
absolutely no value. His right flank was in the air. One of the roads
on which he must depend for retreat was readily assailable by the enemy.
And he had in his rear a treacherous river, which after a few hours'
rain might become impassable, with but a single road and ford secured to
him with reasonable certainty.
And, prone as we had always been to act upon unwarrantable
over-estimates of the strength of our adversaries, Hooker had not this
reason to allege for having retired to await Lee's attack. For he had
just received excellent information from Richmond, to the effect that
Lee's rations amounted to fifty-nine thousand daily; and we have seen
that he told Slocum, on Thursday, that his column of nearly forty
thousand men was much stronger than any force Lee could detach against
him. Hooker acknowledges as much in his testimony before the Committee
on the Conduct of the War, when, in answer to the question, "What
portion of the enemy lay between you and Gen. Sedgwick?" he replied:--
"Lee's army at Fredericksburg numbered sixty thousand, not including the
artillery, cavalry, and the forces stationed up the river, occupying the
posts at Culpeper and Gordonsville. I think my information on this point
was reliable, as I had made use of unusual means to ascertain. The
enemy left eight thousand men to occupy the lines about Fredericksburg;
Jackson marched off to my right with twenty-five thousand; and Lee had
the balance between me and Sedgwick."
It will be well to remember this acknowledgment, when we come to deal
with Hooker's theories of the force in his own front on Sunday and
Monday.