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[Illustration: PRESIDENT WILSON READING HIS WAR MESSAGE TO CONGRESS,
APRIL 2, 1917]
WORLD'S WAR EVENTS
RECORDED BY STATESMEN . COMMANDERS HISTORIANS AND BY MEN WHO FOUGHT OR
SAW THE GREAT CAMPAIGNS
COMPILED AND EDITED BY
FRANCIS J. REYNOLDS
FORMER REFERENCE LIBRARIAN . LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
AND
ALLEN L. CHURCHILL
ASSOCIATE EDITOR "THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR"
ASSOCIATE EDITOR "THE NEW INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA"
VOLUME II
[Illustration]
P. F. COLLIER & SON COMPANY
NEW YORK
Copyright 1919 BY P. F. COLLIER & SON COMPANY
WORLD'S WAR EVENTS
VOLUME II
BEGINNING WITH THE ATTACK AT VERDUN
EARLY IN 1916 THE STORY OF THE
WAR AND OF AMERICAN
AID IS CARRIED TO
THE CLOSE OF
1917
CONTENTS
ARTICLE PAGE
I. THE BATTLE OF VERDUN 7
_Raoul Blanchard_
II. THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND BANK 30
_Admiral Sir John Jellicoe's Official Despatch_
III. TAKING THE COL DI LANA 55
_Lewis R. Freeman_
IV. THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME 67
_Sir Douglas Haig_
V. RUSSIA'S REFUGEES 114
_Gregory Mason_
VI. THE TRAGEDY OF RUMANIA 124
_Stanley Washburn_
VII. SIXTEEN MONTHS A WAR PRISONER 142
_Private "Jack" Evans_
VIII. UNDER GERMAN RULE IN FRANCE AND BELGIUM 159
_J. P. Whitaker_
IX. THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN IN TURKEY 174
_James B. MacDonald_
X. KITCHENER 188
_Lady St. Helier_
XI. WHY AMERICA BROKE WITH GERMANY 194
_President Woodrow Wilson_
XII. HOW THE WAR CAME TO AMERICA 205
_Official Account_
XIII. THE WAR MESSAGE 226
_President Woodrow Wilson_
XIV. BRITISH OPERATIONS AT SALONIKI 244
_Official Report of General Milne_
XV. IN PETROGRAD DURING THE SEVEN DAYS 253
_Arno Dosch-Fleurot_
XVI. AMERICA'S FIRST SHOT 271
_J.R. Keen_
XVII. GERMAN ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES 278
_House Committee on Foreign Affairs_
XVIII. PREPARING FOR WAR 298
_Newton D. Baker, Secretary of War_
XIX. THE CAPTURE OF JERUSALEM 344
_General E. H. H. Allenby_
XX. AMERICAN SHIPS AND GERMAN SUBMARINES 369
_From Official Reports_
THE BATTLE OF VERDUN
RAOUL BLANCHARD
Copyright, Atlantic Monthly, June, 1917.
[Sidenote: Greatest drama of the war.]
The Battle of Verdun, which continued through from February 21, 1916, to
the 16th of December, ranks next to the Battle of the Marne as the
greatest drama of the world war. Like the Marne, it represents the
checkmate of a supreme effort on the part of the Germans to end the war
swiftly by a thunderstroke. It surpasses the Battle of the Marne by the
length of the struggle, the fury with which it was carried on, the huge
scale of the operations. No complete analysis of it, however, has yet
been published--only fragmentary accounts, dealing with the beginning or
with mere episodes. Neither in France nor in Germany, up to the present
moment, has the whole story of the battle been told, describing its
vicissitudes, and following step by step the development of the stirring
drama. That is the task I have set myself here.
[Sidenote: German successes in France.]
[Sidenote: Preparations for a great offensive.]
The year 1915 was rich in successes for the Germans. In the West, thanks
to an energetic defensive, they had held firm against the Allies'
onslaughts in Artois and in Champagne. Their offensive in the East was
most fruitful. Galicia had been almost completely recovered, the kingdom
of Poland occupied, Courland, Lithuania, and Volhynia invaded. To the
South they had crushed Serbia's opposition, saved Turkey, and won over
Bulgaria. These triumphs, however, had not brought them peace, for the
heart and soul of the Allies lay, after all, in the West--in England and
France. The submarine campaign was counted on to keep England's hands
tied; it remained, therefore, to attack and annihilate the French army.
And so, in the autumn of 1915, preparations were begun on a huge scale
for delivering a terrible blow in the West and dealing France the _coup
de grace_.
The determination with which the Germans followed out this plan and the
reckless way in which they drew on their resources leave no doubt as to
the importance the operation held for them. They staked everything on
putting their adversaries out of the running by breaking through their
lines, marching on Paris, and shattering the confidence of the French
people. This much they themselves admitted. The German press, at the
beginning of the battle, treated it as a matter of secondary import,
whose object was to open up free communications between Metz and the
troops in the Argonne; but the proportions of the combat soon gave the
lie to such modest estimates, and in the excitement of the first days
official utterances betrayed how great were the expectations.
[Sidenote: Troops urged to take Verdun.]
[Sidenote: Objects of the campaign.]
On March 4 the Crown Prince urged his already over-taxed troops to make
one supreme effort to "capture Verdun, the heart of France"; and General
von Deimling announced to the 15th Army Corps that this would be the
last battle of the war. At Berlin, travelers from neutral countries
leaving for Paris by way of Switzerland were told that the Germans would
get there first. The Kaiser himself, replying toward the end of February
to the good wishes of his faithful province of Brandenburg,
congratulated himself publicly on seeing his warriors of the 3d Army
Corps about to carry "the most important stronghold of our principal
enemy." It is plain, then, that the object was to take Verdun, win a
decisive victory, and start a tremendous onslaught which would bring
the war to a triumphant close.
We should next examine the reasons prompting the Germans to select
Verdun as the vital point, the nature of the scene of operations, and
the manner in which the preparation was made.
[Sidenote: Strategic advantages to be gained.]
[Sidenote: Verdun railways dominated by Germans.]
Why did the Germans make their drive at Verdun, a powerful fortress
defended by a complete system of detached outworks? Several reasons may
be found for this. First of all, there were the strategic advantages of
the operation. Ever since the Battle of the Marne and the German
offensive against St. Mihiel, Verdun had formed a salient in the French
front which was surrounded by the Germans on three sides,--northwest,
east, and south,--and was consequently in greater peril than the rest of
the French lines. Besides, Verdun was not far distant from Metz, the
great German arsenal, the fountain-head for arms, food, and munitions.
For the same reasons, the French defense of Verdun was made much harder
because access to the city was commanded by the enemy. Of the two main
railroads linking Verdun with France, the Lerouville line was cut off by
the enemy at St. Mihiel; the second (leading through Chalons) was under
ceaseless fire from the German artillery. There remained only a
narrow-gauge road connecting Verdun and Bar-le-Duc. The fortress, then,
was almost isolated.
[Sidenote: Iron mines of Lorraine.]
[Sidenote: Extent of Lotharingia.]
For another reason, Verdun was too near, for the comfort of the Germans,
to those immense deposits of iron ore in Lorraine which they have every
intention of retaining after the war. The moral factor involved in the
fall of Verdun was also immense. If the stronghold were captured, the
French, who look on it as their chief bulwark in the East, would be
greatly disheartened, whereas it would delight the souls of the
Germans, who had been counting on its seizure since the beginning of the
war. They have not forgotten that the ancient Lotharingia, created by a
treaty signed eleven centuries ago at Verdun, extended as far as the
Meuse. Finally, it is probable that the German General Staff intended to
profit by a certain slackness on the part of the French, who, placing
too much confidence in the strength of the position and the favorable
nature of the surrounding countryside, had made little effort to augment
their defensive value.
[Sidenote: Serious obstacles to an offensive.]
This value, as a matter of fact, was great. The theatre of operations at
Verdun offers far fewer inducements to an offensive than the plains of
Artois, Picardy, or Champagne. The rolling ground, the vegetation, the
distribution of the population, all present serious obstacles.
[Sidenote: The plateaus of the Meuse.]
[Sidenote: Hills and ravines.]
The relief-map of the region about Verdun shows the sharply marked
division of two plateaus situated on either side of the river Meuse. The
plateau which rises on the left bank, toward the Argonne, falls away on
the side toward the Meuse in a deeply indented line of high but gently
sloping bluffs, which include the Butte de Montfaucon, Hill 304, and the
heights of Esnes and Montzeville. Fragments of this plateau, separated
from the main mass by the action of watercourses, are scattered in long
ridges over the space included between the line of bluffs and the Meuse:
the two hills of Le Mont Homme (295 metres), the Cote de l'Oie, and,
farther to the South, the ridge of Bois Bourrus and Marre. To the east
of the river, the country is still more rugged. The plateau on this bank
rises abruptly, and terminates at the plain of the Woevre in the cliffs
of the Cotes-de-Meuse, which tower 100 metres over the plain. The brooks
which flow down to the Woevre or to the Meuse have worn the cliffs and
the plateau into a great number of hillocks called _cotes_: the Cote du
Talon, Cote du Poivre, Cote de Froideterre, and the rest. The ravines
separating these _cotes_ are deep and long: those of Vaux, Haudromont,
and Fleury cut into the very heart of the plateau, leaving between them
merely narrow ridges of land, easily to be defended.
[Sidenote: Stretches of forest.]
[Sidenote: Villages well placed for defense.]
These natural defenses of the country are strengthened by the nature of
the vegetation. On the rather sterile calcareous soil of the two
plateaus the woods are thick and numerous. To the west, the approaches
of Hill 304 are covered by the forest of Avocourt. On the east, long
wooded stretches--the woods of Haumont, Caures, Wavrille, Herbebois, la
Vauche, Haudromont, Hardaumont, la Caillette, and others--cover the
narrow ridges of land and dominate the upper slopes of the ravines. The
villages, often perched on the highest points of land, as their names
ending in _mont_ indicate, are easily transformed into small fortresses;
such are Haumont, Beaumont, Louvemont, Douaumont. Others follow the
watercourses, making it easier to defend them--Malancourt, Bethincourt
and Cumieres, to the west of the Meuse; Vaux to the east.
These hills, then, as well as the ravines, the woods, and the favorably
placed villages, all facilitated the defense of the countryside. On the
other hand, the assailants had one great advantage: the French positions
were cut in two by the valley of the Meuse, one kilometre wide and quite
deep, which, owing to swampy bottom-lands, could not be crossed except
by the bridges of Verdun. The French troops on the right bank had
therefore to fight with a river at their backs, thus imperiling their
retreat. A grave danger, this, in the face of an enemy determined to
take full advantage of the circumstance by attacking with undreamed-of
violence.
[Sidenote: Troops selected in October.]
The German preparation was, from the start, formidable and painstaking.
It was probably under way by the end of October, 1915, for at that time
the troops selected to deliver the first crushing attack were withdrawn
from the front and sent into training. Four months were thus set aside
for this purpose. To make the decisive attack, the Germans made
selection from four of their crack army corps, the 18th active, the 7th
reserve, the 15th active (the Muehlhausen corps), and the 3d active,
composed of Brandenburgers.
[Sidenote: Artillery and munitions made ready.]
These troops were sent to the interior to undergo special preparation.
In addition to these 80,000 or 100,000 men, who were appointed to bear
the brunt of the assault, the operation was to be supported by the Crown
Prince's army on the right and by that of General von Strautz on the
left--300,000 men more. Immense masses of artillery were gathered
together to blast open the way; fourteen lines of railroad brought
together from every direction the streams of arms and munitions. Heavy
artillery was transported from the Russian and Serbian fronts. No light
pieces were used in this operation--in the beginning, at any rate; only
guns of large calibre, exceeding 200 millimetres, many of 370 and 420
millimetres.
[Sidenote: Reliance on heavy artillery.]
The battle plans were based on the offensive power of the heavy
artillery. The new formula was to run, "The artillery attacks, the
infantry takes possession." In other words, a terrible bombardment was
to play over every square yard of the terrain to be captured; when it
was decided that the pulverization had been sufficient, a scouting-party
of infantry would be sent out to look the situation over; behind them
would come the pioneers, and then the first wave of the assault. In case
the enemy still resisted, the infantry would retire and leave the field
once more to the artillery.
[Sidenote: The point selected for attack.]
The point chosen for the attack was the plateau on the right bank of the
Meuse. The Germans would thus avoid the obstacle of the cliffs of Cotes
de Meuse, and, by seizing the ridges and passing around the ravines,
they could drive down on Douaumont, which dominates the entire region,
and from there fall on Verdun and capture the bridges. At the same time,
the German right wing would assault the French positions on the left
bank of the Meuse; the left wing would complete the encircling movement,
and the entire French army of Verdun, driven back to the river and
attacked from the rear, would be captured or destroyed.
[Sidenote: A ten months' battle.]
[Sidenote: The formidable German attack.]
[Sidenote: Periods of fixation.]
The Battle of Verdun lasted no less than ten months--from February 21 to
December 16. First of all, came the formidable _German attack_, with its
harvest of success during the first few days of the frontal drive, which
was soon checked and forced to wear itself out in fruitless flank
attacks, kept up until April 9. After this date the German programme
became more modest: they merely wished to hold at Verdun sufficient
French troops to forestall an offensive at some other point. This was
the _period of German "fixation,"_ lasting from April to the middle of
July. It then became the object of the French to hold the German forces
and prevent transfer to the Somme. _French "fixation,"_ ended in the
successes of October and December.
[Sidenote: Lack of foresight on the part of French.]
The first German onslaught was the most intense and critical moment of
the battle. The violent frontal attack on the plateau east of the Meuse,
magnificently executed, at first carried all before it. The commanders
at Verdun had shown a lack of foresight. There were too few trenches,
too few cannon, too few troops. The soldiers had had too little
experience in the field, and it was their task to face the most
terrific attack ever known.
[Sidenote: The battle begins.]
[Sidenote: French left driven backwards.]
On the morning of February 21 the German artillery opened up a fire of
infernal intensity. This artillery had been brought up in undreamed-of
quantities. French aviators who flew over the enemy positions located so
many batteries that they gave up marking them on their maps; the number
was too great. The forest of Gremilly, northeast of the point of attack,
was just a great cloud shot through with lightning-flashes. A deluge of
shells fell on the French positions, annihilating the first line,
attacking the batteries and finding their mark as far back as the city
of Verdun. At five o'clock in the afternoon the first waves of infantry
assaulted and carried the advanced French positions in the woods of
Haumont and Caures. On the 22d the French left was driven back about
four kilometres.
[Sidenote: Fall of Herbebois.]
The following day a terrible engagement took place along the entire line
of attack, resulting toward evening in the retreat of both French wings;
on the left Samognieux was taken by the Germans; on the right they
occupied the strong position of Herbebois.
[Sidenote: Germans enter Douaumont.]
The situation developed rapidly on the 24th. The Germans enveloped the
French centre, which formed a salient; at two in the afternoon they
captured the important central position of Beaumont, and by nightfall
had reached Louvemont and La Vauche forest, gathering in many prisoners.
On the morning of the 25th the enemy stormed Bezonvaux, and entered the
fort of Douaumont, already evacuated.
[Illustration: FIRST ATTACK ON VERDUN]
[Sidenote: Germans advance eight kilometres.]
[Sidenote: General de Castelnau and General Petain.]
[Sidenote: Hand-to-hand fighting.]
In less than five days the assaulting troops sent forward over the
plateau had penetrated the French positions to a depth of eight
kilometres, and were masters of the most important elements of the
defense of the fortress. Verdun and its bridges were only seven
kilometres distant. The commander of the fortified region himself
proposed to evacuate the whole right bank of the Meuse; the troops
established in the Woevre were already falling back toward the bluffs of
Cotes de Meuse. Most luckily, on this same day there arrived at Verdun
some men of resource, together with substantial reinforcements. General
de Castelnau, Chief of the General Staff, ordered the troops on the
right bank to hold out at all costs. And on the evening of the 25th
General Petain took over the command of the entire sector. The Zouaves,
on the left bank, were standing firm as rocks on the Cotes du Poivre,
which cuts off access from the valley to Verdun. During this time the
Germans, pouring forward from Douaumont, had already reached the Cote de
Froideterre, and the French artillerymen, out-flanked, poured their fire
into the gray masses as though with rifles. It was at this moment that
the 39th division of the famous 20th French Army Corps of Nancy met the
enemy in the open, and, after furious hand-to-hand fighting, broke the
backbone of the attack.
[Sidenote: The German frontal drive checked.]
That was the end of it. The German tidal wave could go no farther. There
were fierce struggles for several days longer, but all in vain. Starting
on the 26th, five French counter-attacks drove back the enemy to a point
just north of the fort of Douaumont, and recaptured the village of the
same name. For three days the German attacking forces tried
unsuccessfully to force these positions; their losses were terrible, and
already they had to call in a division of reinforcements. After two days
of quiet the contest began again at Douaumont, which was attacked by an
entire army corps; the 4th of March found the village again in German
hands. The impetus of the great blow had been broken, however, after
five days of success, the attack had fallen flat.
[Sidenote: German flank attacks.]
Were the Germans then to renounce Verdun? After such vast preparations,
after such great losses, after having roused such high hopes, this
seemed impossible to the leaders of the German army. The frontal drive
was to have been followed up by the attack of the wings, and it was now
planned to carrying this out with the assistance of the Crown Prince's
army, which was still intact. In this way the scheme so judiciously
arranged would be accomplished in the appointed manner. Instead of
adding the finishing touch to the victory, however, these wings now had
the task of winning it completely--and the difference is no small one.
[Sidenote: Genius of Petain and Nivelle.]
These flank attacks were delivered for over a month (March 6-April 9) on
both sides of the river simultaneously, with an intensity and power
which recalled the first days of the battle. But the French were now on
their guard. They had received great reinforcements of artillery, and
the nimble "75's," thanks to their speed and accuracy, barred off the
positions under attack by a terrible curtain of fire. Moreover, their
infantry contrived to pass through the enemy's barrage-fire, wait calmly
until the assaulting infantry were within 30 metres of them, and then
let loose the rapid-fire guns. They were also commanded by energetic and
brilliant chiefs: General Petain, who offset the insufficient railroad
communications with the rear by putting in motion a great stream of more
than 40,000 motor trucks, all traveling on strict schedule time; and
General Nivelle, who directed operations on the right bank of the river,
before taking command of the Army of Verdun. The German successes of the
first days were not duplicated.
[Sidenote: On the left of the Meuse.]
[Sidenote: Le Mort Homme.]
[Sidenote: Hill 304.]
These new attacks began on the left of the Meuse. The Germans tried to
turn the first line of the French defense by working down along the
river, and then capture the second line. On March 6 two divisions
stormed the villages of Forges and Regneville, and attacked the woods of
Corbeaux on the Cote de l'Oie, which they captured on the 10th. After
several days of preparation, they fell suddenly upon one of the
important elements of the second line, the hill of Le Mort Homme, but
failed to carry it (March 14-16). Repulsed on the right, they tried the
left. On March 20 a body of picked troops just back from the Russian
front--the 11th Bavarian Division--stormed the French positions in the
wood of Avocourt and moved on to Hill 304, where they obtained foothold
for a short time before being driven back with losses of from 50 to 60
per cent of their effectives.
[Sidenote: Crown Prince brings up reserves.]
[Sidenote: Village and fort of Vaux.]
At the same time the Germans were furiously assaulting the positions of
the French right wing east of the Meuse. From the 8th to the 10th of
March the Crown Prince brought forward again the troops which had
survived the ordeal of the first days, and added to them the fresh
forces of the 5th Reserve Corps. The action developed along the Cote du
Poivre, especially east of Douaumont, where it was directed against the
village and fort of Vaux. The results were negative, except for a slight
gain in the woods of Hardaumont. The 3d Corps had lost 22,000 men since
the 21st of February--that is, almost its entire original strength. The
5th Corps was simply massacred on the slopes of Vaux, without being able
to reach the fort. New attempts against this position, on March 16 and
18, were no more fruitful. The battle of the right wing, then, was also
lost.
[Sidenote: Fighting on both sides the Meuse.]
The Germans hung on grimly. One last effort remained to be made. After a
lull of six days (March 22-28) savage fighting started again on both
sides of the river. On the right bank, from March 31 to April 2, the
Germans got a foothold in the ravine of Vaux and along its slopes; but
the French dislodged them the next day, inflicting great damage, and
drove them back to Douaumont.
[Sidenote: Avocourt retaken.]
[Sidenote: Le Mort Homme like a volcano.]
Their greatest effort was made on the left bank. Here the French took
back the woods of Avocourt; from March 30 to the 8th of April, however,
the Germans succeeded in breaking into their adversaries' first line,
and on April 9, a sunny Sabbath-day, they delivered an attack against
the entire second line, along a front of 11 kilometres, from Avocourt to
the Meuse. There was terrific fighting, the heaviest that had taken
place since February 26, and a worthy sequel to the original frontal
attack. The artillery preparation was long and searching. The hill of Le
Mort Homme, said an eye-witness, smoked like a volcano with innumerable
craters. The assault was launched at noon, with five divisions, and in
two hours it had been shattered. New attacks followed, but less orderly,
less numerous, and more listless, until sundown. The checkmate was
complete. "The 9th of April," said General Petain to his troops, "is a
day full of glory for your arms. The fierce assaults of the Crown
Prince's soldiers have everywhere been thrown back. Infantry, artillery,
sappers, and aviators of the Second Army have vied with one another in
heroism. Courage, men: _on les aura_!"
[Sidenote: German plans ruined.]
And, indeed, this great attack of April 9, was the last general effort
made by the German troops to carry out the programme of February--to
capture Verdun and wipe out the French army which defended it. They had
to give in. The French were on their guard now; they had artillery,
munitions, and men. The defenders began to act as vigorously as the
attackers; they took the offensive, recaptured the woods of La
Caillette, and occupied the trenches before Le Mort Homme. The German
plans were ruined. Some other scheme had to be thought out.
[Sidenote: Verdun to be kept a battlefield.]
[Sidenote: A battle of attrition.]
Instead of employing only eight divisions of excellent troops, as
originally planned, the Germans had little by little cast into the fiery
furnace thirty divisions. This enormous sacrifice could not be allowed
to count for nothing. The German High Command therefore decided to
assign a less pretentious object to the abortive enterprise. The Crown
Prince's offensive had fallen flat; but, at all events, it might succeed
in preventing a French offensive. For this reason it was necessary that
Verdun should remain a sore spot, a continually menaced sector, where
the French would be obliged to send a steady stream of men, material,
and munitions. It was hinted then in all the German papers that the
struggle at Verdun was a battle of attrition, which would wear down the
strength of the French by slow degrees. There was no talk now of
thunderstrokes; it was all "the siege of Verdun." This time they
expressed the true purpose of the German General Staff; the struggle
which followed the fight of April 9, now took the character of a battle
of fixation, in which the Germans tried to hold their adversaries'
strongest units at Verdun and prevent their being transferred elsewhere.
This state of affairs lasted from mid-April to well into July, when the
progress of the Somme offensive showed the Germans that their efforts
had been unavailing.
[Sidenote: Germans still formidable.]
It is true that during this new phase of the battle the offensive vigor
of the Germans and their procedure in attacking were still formidable.
Their artillery continued to perform prodigies. The medium-calibre
pieces had now come into action, particularly the 150 mm. guns, with
their amazing mobility of fire, which shelled the French first line, as
well as their communications and batteries, with lightning speed. This
storm of artillery continued night and day; it was the relentless,
crushing continuity of the fire which exhausted the adversary and made
the Battle of Verdun a hell on earth. There was one important
difference, however: the infantry attacks now took place over restricted
areas, which were rarely more than two kilometres in extent. The
struggle was continual, but disconnected. Besides, it was rarely in
progress on both sides of the river at once. Until the end of May the
Germans did their worst on the left; then the French activities brought
them back to the right side, and there they attacked with fury until
mid-July.
[Sidenote: A period of recuperation.]
The end of April was a period of recuperation for the Germans. They were
still suffering from the confusion caused by their set-backs of March,
and especially of April 9. Only two attempts at an offensive were
made--one on the Cote du Poivre (April 18) and one on the front south of
Douaumont. Both were repulsed with great losses. The French, in turn,
attacked on the 15th of April near Douaumont, on the 28th north of Le
Mort Homme. It was not until May that the new German tactics were
revealed: vigorous, but partial, attacks, directed now against one
point, now against another.
[Sidenote: Artillery directed against Hill 304.]
[Sidenote: Cumieres and Le Mort Homme.]
On May 4 there began a terrible artillery preparation, directed against
Hill 304. This was followed by attacks of infantry, which surged up the
shell-blasted slopes, first to the northwest, then north, and finally
northeast. The attack of the 7th was made by three divisions of fresh
troops which had not previously been in action before Verdun. No gains
were secured. Every foot of ground taken in the first rush was
recaptured by French counter-attacks. During the night of the 18th a
savage onslaught was made against the woods of Avocourt, without the
least success. On the 20th and 21st, three divisions were hurled against
Le Mort Homme, which they finally took; but they could go no farther.
The 23d and 24th were terrible days. The Germans stormed the village of
Cumieres; their advance guard penetrated as far as Chattancourt. On the
26th, however, the French were again in possession of Cumieres and the
slopes of Le Mort Homme; and if the Germans, by means of violent
counter-attacks, were able to get a fresh foothold in the ruins of
Cumieres, they made no attempt to progress farther. The battles of the
left river-bank were now over; on this side of the Meuse there were to
be only unimportant local engagements and the usual artillery fire.
[Sidenote: Battles on right of Meuse.]
[Sidenote: Mangin's division attacks.]
This shift of the German offensive activity from the left side of the
Meuse to the right is explained by the activity shown at the same time
in this sector by the French. The French command was not deceived by the
German tactics; they intended to husband their strength for the future
Somme offensive. For them Verdun was a sacrificial sector to which they
sent, from now on, few men, scant munitions, and only artillery of the
older type. Their object was only to hold firm, at all costs. However,
the generals in charge of this thankless task, Petain and Nivelle,
decided that the best defensive plan consisted in attacking the enemy.
To carry this out, they selected a soldier bronzed on the battlefields
of Central Africa, the Soudan, and Morocco, General Mangin, who
commanded the 5th Division and had already played a distinguished part
in the struggle for Vaux, in March. On May 21 Mangin's division attacked
on the right bank of the Meuse and occupied the quarries of Haudromont;
on the 22d it stormed the German lines for a length of two kilometres,
and took the fort of Douaumont with the exception of one salient.
The Germans replied to this with the greatest energy; for two days and
nights the battle raged round the ruins of the fort. Finally, on the
night of the 24th, two new Bavarian divisions succeeded in getting a
footing in this position, to which the immediate approaches were held by
the French. This vigorous effort alarmed the enemy, and from now on,
until the middle of July, all their strength was focused on the right
bank of the river.
[Sidenote: The bloodiest chapter of the battle.]
[Sidenote: Intense barrage-fire.]
This contest of the right bank began on May 31. It is, perhaps the
bloodiest, the most terrible, chapter of all the operations before
Verdun; for the Germans had determined to capture methodically, one by
one, all the French positions, and get to the city. The first stake of
this game was the possession of the fort of Vaux. Access to it was cut
off from the French by a barrage-fire of unprecedented intensity; at the
same time an assault was made against the trenches flanking the fort,
and also against the defenses of the Fumin woods. On June 4 the enemy
reached the superstructure of the fort and took possession, showering
down hand-grenades and asphyxiating gas on the garrison, which was shut
up in the casemates. After a heroic resistance the defenders succumbed
to thirst and surrendered on June 7.
[Sidenote: Thiaumont changes hands repeatedly.]
Now that Vaux was captured, the German activity was directed against the
ruins of the small fort of Thiaumont, which blocks the way to the Cote
de Froideterre, and against the village of Fleury, dominating the mouth
of a ravine leading to the Meuse. From June 8 to 20, terrible fighting
won for the Germans the possession of Thiaumont; on the 23d, six
divisions, representing a total of at least 70,000 men, were hurled
against Fleury, which they held from the 23d to the 26th. The French,
undaunted, returned to the charge. On August 30 they reoccupied
Thiaumont, lost it at half-past three of the same day, recaptured it at
half-past four, and were again driven out two days later. However, they
remained close to the redoubt and the village.
[Sidenote: Battles in July.]
The Germans then turned south, against the fortifications which
dominated the ridges and ravines. There, on a hillock, stands the fort
of Souville, at approximately the same elevation as Douaumont. On July
3, they captured the battery of Damloup, to the east; on the 12th, after
insignificant fighting, they sent forward a huge mass of troops which
got as far as the fort and battery of L'Hopital. A counterattack drove
them away again, but they dug themselves in about 800 metres away.
[Sidenote: Germans cannot win Verdun.]
After all, what had they accomplished? For twelve days they had been
confronted with the uselessness of these bloody sacrifices. Verdun was
out of reach; the offensive of the Somme was under way, and the French
stood before the gates of Peronne. Decidedly, the Battle of Verdun was
lost. Neither the onslaught of the first period nor the battles of
fixation had brought about the desired end. It now became impossible to
squander on this field of death the munitions and troops which the
German army needed desperately at Peronne and Bapaume. The leaders of
the German General Staff accepted the situation. Verdun held no further
interest for them.
[Sidenote: French take the initiative.]
[Sidenote: General Nivelle's blows.]
Verdun, however, continued to be of great interest to the French. In the
first place, they could not endure seeing the enemy intrenched five
kilometres away from the coveted city. Moreover, it was most important
for them to prevent the Germans from weakening the Verdun front and
transferring their men and guns to the Somme. The French troops,
therefore, were to take the initiative out of the hands of the Germans
and inaugurate, in their turn, a battle of fixation. This new situation
presented two phases: in July and August the French were satisfied to
worry the enemy with small forces and to oblige them to fight; in
October and December General Nivelle, well supplied with troops and
material, was able to strike two vigorous blows which took back from the
Germans the larger part of all the territory they had won since February
21.
From July 15 to September 15, furious fighting was in progress on the
slopes of the plateau stretching from Thiaumont to Damloup. This time,
however, it was the French who attacked savagely, who captured ground,
and who took prisoners. So impetuous were they that their adversaries,
who asked for nothing but quiet, were obliged to be constantly on their
guard and deliver costly counter-attacks.
[Sidenote: Contest again around Thiaumont.]
[Sidenote: French colonials take Fleury.]
The contest raged most bitterly over the ruins of Thiaumont and Fleury.
On the 15th of July the Zouaves broke into the southern part of the
village, only to be driven out again. However, on the 19th and 20th the
French freed Souville, and drew near to Fleury; from the 20th to the
26th they forged ahead step by step, taking 800 prisoners. A general
attack, delivered on August 3, carried the fort of Thiaumont and the
village of Fleury, with 1500 prisoners. The Germans reacted violently;
the 4th of August they reoccupied Fleury, a part of which was taken back
by the French that same evening. From the 5th to the 9th the struggle
went on ceaselessly, night and day, in the ruins of the village. During
this time the adversaries took and retook Thiaumont, which the Germans
held after the 8th. But on the 10th the Colonial regiment from Morocco
reached Fleury, carefully prepared the assault, delivered it on the
17th, and captured the northern and southern portions of the village,
encircling the central part, which they occupied on the 18th. From this
day Fleury remained in French hands. The German counter-assaults of the
18th, 19th, and 20th of August were fruitless; the Moroccan Colonials
held their conquest firmly.
[Sidenote: The French advance.]
On the 24th the French began to advance east of Fleury, in spite of
incessant attacks which grew more intense on the 28th. Three hundred
prisoners were taken between Fleury and Thiaumont on September 3, and
300 more fell into their hands in the woods of Vaux-Chapitre. On the 9th
they took 300 more before Fleury.
[Sidenote: French programme carried out.]
It may be seen that the French troops had thoroughly carried out the
programme assigned to them of attacking the enemy relentlessly, obliging
him to counter-attack, and _holding_ him at Verdun. But the High Command
was to surpass itself. By means of sharp attacks, it proposed to carry
the strong positions which the Germans had dearly bought, from February
to July, at the price of five months of terrible effort. This new plan
was destined to be accomplished on October 24 and December 15.
[Sidenote: Four hundred millimeter guns.]
[Sidenote: Excellent troops.]
Verdun was no longer looked on by the French as a "sacrificial sector."
To this attack of October 24, destined to establish once for all the
superiority of the soldier of France, it was determined to consecrate
all the time and all the energy that were found necessary. A force of
artillery which General Nivelle himself declared to be of exceptional
strength was brought into position--no old-fashioned ordnance this time,
but magnificent new pieces, among them long-range guns of 400
millimetres calibre. The Germans had fifteen divisions on the Verdun
front, but the French command judged it sufficient to make the attack
with three divisions, which advanced along a front of seven kilometres.
These, however, were made up of excellent troops, withdrawn from
service in the first lines and trained for several weeks, who knew every
inch of the ground. General Mangin was their commander.
[Sidenote: French offensive in October.]
[Sidenote: Germans evacuate Ft. Vaux.]
The French artillery opened fire on October 21, by hammering away at the
enemy's positions. A feint attack forced the Germans to reveal the
location of their batteries, more than 130 of which were discovered and
silenced. At 11.40 a.m., October 24, the assault started in the fog. The
troops advanced on the run, preceded by a barrage-fire. On the left, the
objective points were reached at 2.45 p.m., and the village of Douaumont
captured. The fort was stormed at 3 o'clock by the Moroccan Colonials,
and the few Germans who held out there surrendered when night came on.
On the right, the woods surrounding Vaux were rushed with lightning
speed. The battery of Damloup was taken by assault. Vaux alone resisted.
In order to reduce it, the artillery preparation was renewed from
October 28 to November 2, and the Germans evacuated the fort without
fighting on the morning of the 2d. As they retreated, the French
occupied the villages of Vaux and Damloup, at the foot of the _cotes_.
Thus the attack on Douaumont and Vaux resulted in a real victory,
attested to by the reoccupation of all the ground lost since the 25th of
February, the capture of 15 cannon and more than 6000 prisoners. This,
too, despite the orders found on German prisoners bidding them to "hold
out at all cost" (25th Division), and to "make a desperate defense" (von
Lochow). The French command, encouraged by this success, decided to do
still better and to push on farther to the northeast.
[Sidenote: Operations in December.]
[Sidenote: Roads and railways constructed.]
The operations of December 15 were more difficult. They were directed
against a zone occupied by the enemy for more than nine months, during
which time he had constructed a great network of communication trenches,
field-railways, dug-outs built into the hillsides, forts, and redoubts.
Moreover, the French attacks had to start from unfavorable ground, where
ceaseless fighting had been in progress since the end of February, where
the soil, pounded by millions of projectiles, had been reduced to a sort
of volcanic ash, transformed by the rain into a mass of sticky mud in
which men had been swallowed up bodily. Two whole divisions were needed
to construct twenty-five kilometres of roads and ten kilometres of
railway, make dug-outs and trenches, and bring the artillery up into
position. All was ready in five weeks; but the Germans, finding out what
was in preparation, had provided formidable means of defense.
[Sidenote: Battle of Verdun ends in victory for the French.]
The front to be attacked was held by five German divisions. Four others
were held in reserve at the rear. On the French side, General Mangin had
four divisions, three of which were composed of picked men, veterans of
Verdun. The artillery preparation, made chiefly by pieces of 220, 274,
and 370 mm., lasted for three full days. The assault was let loose on
December 15, at 10 a.m.; on the left the French objectives were reached
by noon; the whole spur of Hardaumont on the right was swiftly captured,
and only a part of the German centre still resisted, east of Bezonvaux.
This was reduced the next day. The Cote du Poivre was taken entire;
Vacherauville, Louvemont, Bezonvaux as well. The front was now three
kilometres from the fort of Douaumont. Over 11,000 prisoners were taken
by the French, and 115 cannon. For a whole day their reconnoitring
parties were able to advance in front of the new lines, destroying
batteries and bringing in prisoners, without encountering any serious
resistance.
The success was undeniable. As a reply to the German peace proposals of
December 12, the Battle of Verdun ended as a real victory; and this
magnificent operation, in which the French had shown such superiority in
infantry and artillery, seemed to be a pledge of future triumphs.
[Sidenote: German plans and their outcome.]
The conclusion is easily reached. In February and March Germany wished
to end the war by crushing the French army at Verdun. She failed
utterly. Then, from April to July, she wished to exhaust French military
resources by a battle of fixation. Again she failed. The Somme offensive
was the offspring of Verdun. Later on, from July to December, she was
not able to elude the grasp of the French, and the last engagements,
together with the vain struggles of the Germans for six months, showed
to what extent General Nivelle's men had won the upper hand.
The Battle of Verdun, beginning as a brilliant German offensive, ended
as an offensive victory for the French. And so this terrible drama is an
epitome of the whole great war: a brief term of success for the Germans
at the start, due to a tremendous preparation which took careless
adversaries by surprise--terrible and agonizing first moments, soon
offset by energy, heroism, and the spirit of sacrifice; and finally,
victory for the Soldiers of Right.
* * * * *
On May 31st, 1916, there was fought in the North Sea off Jutland, the
most important naval battle of the Great War. While the battle was
undecisive in some of the results attained, it was an English victory,
in that the Germans suffered greater losses and were forced to flee. The
narrative of this battle which follows is by the Admiral of the British
Fleet.
THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND BANK
ADMIRAL SIR JOHN JELLICOE'S OFFICIAL DISPATCH
The German High Sea Fleet was brought to action on 31st May, 1916, to
the westward of the Jutland Bank, off the coast of Denmark.
[Sidenote: The Grand Fleet sweeping the sea.]
The ships of the Grand Fleet, in pursuance of the general policy of
periodical sweeps through the North Sea, had left its bases on the
previous day, in accordance with instructions issued by me.
[Sidenote: The British scouting force.]
In the early afternoon of Wednesday, 31st May, the 1st and 2nd
Battle-cruiser Squadrons, 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Light-cruiser Squadrons, and
destroyers from the 1st, 9th, 10th, and 13th Flotillas, supported by the
5th Battle Squadron, were, in accordance with my directions, scouting to
the southward of the Battle Fleet, which was accompanied by the 3rd
Battle-cruiser Squadron, 1st and 2nd Cruiser Squadrons, 4th
Light-cruiser Squadron, 4th, 11th, and 12th Flotillas.
The junction of the Battle Fleet with the scouting force after the enemy
had been sighted was delayed owing to the southerly course steered by
our advanced force during the first hour after commencing their action
with the enemy battle-cruisers. This was, of course, unavoidable, as had
our battle-cruisers not followed the enemy to the southward the main
fleets would never have been in contact.
[Sidenote: Vice Admiral Beatty commands battle cruisers.]
The Battle-cruiser Fleet, gallantly led by Vice-Admiral Sir David
Beatty, K.C.B., M.V.O., D.S.O., and admirably supported by the ships of
the Fifth Battle Squadron under Rear-Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas, M.V.O.,
fought an action under, at times, disadvantageous conditions, especially
in regard to light, in a manner that was in keeping with the best
traditions of the service.
The following extracts from the report of Sir David Beatty give the
course of events before the Battle Fleet came upon the scene:
[Sidenote: Enemy ships sighted.]
"At 2.20 p.m. reports were received from _Galatea_ (Commodore Edwyn S.
Alexander-Sinclair, M.V.O., A.D.C.), indicating the presence of enemy
vessels. The direction of advance was immediately altered to SSE., the
course for Horn Reef, so as to place my force between the enemy and his
base.
[Sidenote: The German force.]
"At 2.35 p.m. a considerable amount of smoke was sighted to the
eastward. This made it clear that the enemy was to the northward and
eastward, and that it would be impossible for him to round the Horn Reef
without being brought to action. Course was accordingly altered to the
eastward and subsequently to north-eastward, the enemy being sighted at
3.31 p.m. Their force consisted of five battle-cruisers.
[Sidenote: Battle begins at long range.]
"After the first report of the enemy, the 1st and 3rd Light-cruiser
Squadrons changed their direction, and, without waiting for orders,
spread to the east, thereby forming a screen in advance of the
Battle-cruiser Squadrons and 5th Battle Squadron by the time we had
hauled up to the course of approach. They engaged enemy light-cruisers
at long range. In the meantime the 2nd Light-cruiser Squadron had come
in at high speed, and was able to take station ahead of the
battle-cruisers by the time we turned to ESE., the course on which we
first engaged the enemy. In this respect the work of the Light-cruiser
Squadrons was excellent, and of great value.
[Sidenote: Scout reports enemy force considerable.]
"From a report from _Galatea_ at 2.25 p.m. it was evident that the enemy
force was considerable, and not merely an isolated unit of
light-cruisers, so at 2.45 p.m. I ordered _Engadine_ to send up a
seaplane and scout to NNE. This order was carried out very quickly, and
by 3.8 p.m. a seaplane was well under way; her first reports of the
enemy were received in _Engadine_ about 3.30 p.m. Owing to clouds it was
necessary to fly very low, and in order to identify four enemy
light-cruisers the seaplane had to fly at a height of 900 feet within
3,000 yards of them, the light-cruisers opening fire on her with every
gun that would bear.
[Sidenote: Line of battle formed.]