MONT ST. QUENTIN AND PÉRONNE
From early dawn on Saturday, August 31st, until the evening of
September 3rd, three Divisions of the Australian Corps engaged in a
heroic combat which will ever be memorable in Australian history.
At its conclusion we emerged complete masters of the situation. Mont
St. Quentin, the Bouchavesnes spur, the large town of Péronne, and the
high ground overlooking it from the east and north-east, were in our
possession. A wide breach had been driven into the line of defence
which the enemy had endeavoured to establish on the series of heights
lying to the east of the Somme and of the Canal du Nord.
From the edges of this breach, the flanks of that portion of his line
which were still intact were being threatened with envelopment. For
him there was nothing for it, but finally to abandon the line of the
Somme, and to resume his retreat helter-skelter to the hoped-for secure
protection of the great Hindenburg Line.
The extraordinary character of this Australian feat of arms can best be
appreciated by a realization of the supreme efforts which the enemy put
forward to prevent it.
The shower of blows which he had received on the front of his
Second Army from August 8th onwards, had wrought upon it a grievous
disorganization. The battered remnants of his line Divisions had been
reinforced from day to day by fresh units, scraped up from other parts
of his front, and thrown into the fight as fast as they could be made
available.
Sometimes they were complete Divisions from Reserve, often single
reserve Regiments of Divisions already deeply involved, and
sometimes even single Battalions torn from other Regiments--Pioneer
Battalions, units of the Labour Corps, Army Troops, Minenwerfer
Companies had all been thrown in, indiscriminately.
This brought about a heterogeneous jumble of units, and of German
nationalities, for Prussians, Bavarians, Saxons and Würtembergers were
captured side by side. The tactical control of such mixed forces,
during a hasty and enforced retreat, and their daily maintenance, must
have presented sore perplexities to the Headquarters of the German
Second Army in those fateful days.
To meet the crisis with which Ludendorff was now confronted, he
determined to throw in one of the finest of the reserve Divisions still
left at his disposal. The Second Prussian Guards Division was sent
forward to occupy the key position of Mont St. Quentin, and to hold it
at all costs.
This famous Division comprised among its units, the Kaiserin Augusta
and the Kaiser Alexander Regiments, almost as famous in history and
rich in tradition as are our own Grenadiers and Coldstreams. There is
no doubt that this celebrated Division fought desperately to obey its
instructions.
For the defence of Péronne, the enemy command went even further, and
called for volunteers, forming with them a strong garrison of picked
men drawn from many different line Regiments, to man the ramparts which
surround the town. Dozens of machine guns were posted in vantage points
from which the approaches could be swept.
All over the river flats lying in the angle of the Somme between
Cléry, Mont St. Quentin and Péronne ran line upon line of barbed wire
entanglements, a legacy from the 1916 fighting, and much of this was
still intact, although breaches had been made in many places both
by the French in 1917 and by the Germans themselves, to facilitate
movement over the ground, during their respective re-occupations of
this territory.
The terrain, which was in greater part open, and exposed in every
direction to full view from the heights, sloped gently upwards
towards the commanding knoll. Cover was scarce, and the few ruins of
brickfields and sugar refineries which dotted the landscape had also
been garrisoned by the enemy as centres of resistance, designed to
break up and dislocate any general attack.
Our infantry was deprived of the assistance of any Tanks, for the heavy
casualties which had been suffered by this Arm made it imperative to
allow the Tank Corps time for repairs, renewals and the training of
fresh crews. Nor was any appreciable quantity of Heavy Artillery yet
available, since the congested and dilapidated condition of the roads
prevented the advance of all but a few of the lighter varieties of
heavy guns.
The fighting of these four days was, therefore, essentially a pure
infantry combat, assisted only by such mobile Artillery of lesser
calibres as was available.
Such was the formidable nature of the task, and of the disabilities
under which the Second, Third and Fifth Divisions approached it.
That they overcame all obstacles, gained all their objectives, and
captured nearly 2,000 prisoners, mainly from crack Prussian regiments,
constitutes an achievement memorable in military annals and standing to
the everlasting glory of the troops who took part in it.[17]
It is difficult to write a connected and consecutive account of the
details of the fighting which took place. The most that is possible
in the brief space available is to indicate on general lines the
successive stages of the battle. Indeed, a minute account of the action
of each of the 35 Battalions engaged would only prove wearisome and
confusing. The best method of presenting a general picture of the
course of the engagement is to follow the fortunes of each Brigade in
turn.
First in order of time, and of most importance in relation to its
immediate results, was the action of the Second Division. It was the
5th Brigade (Martin) which Major-General Rosenthal had detailed to open
the attack. The remaining two Brigades of the Divisions (6th and 7th)
received orders to rest the troops as much as possible, but to be in
readiness to move at the shortest notice.
A Machine Gun Company (16 guns) was placed at the disposal of
Brigadier-General Martin, while the Artillery at the disposal of
the Division, comprising five Brigades of Field Artillery and one
Brigade of Heavy Artillery, remained under the personal control of the
Divisional Commander.
The attack opened with three Battalions of the 5th Brigade in the
first line, and one Battalion in support. The total strength of the
assaulting Infantry of this whole Brigade was on this day not more than
70 Officers and 1,250 other ranks. The centre Battalion was directed
straight at the highest knoll of Mont St. Quentin, while the right
Battalion prolonged the line to the right. The left Battalion had
assigned to it as an immediate objective the ruins of the village of
Feuillaucourt, from which it was hoped that a flank attack upon the
Mount could be developed.
The advance began at 5 a.m. It was a dull morning and still quite dark.
The two right Battalions advanced with as much noise as possible, a
ruse which secured the surrender of numbers of the enemy lying out in
advanced outpost positions. A nest of seven Machine Guns was rushed and
captured without any loss to us.
At the appointed hour, our Artillery opened on selected targets, the
ranges being lengthened from moment to moment in sympathy with the
advance of the Infantry. Although during the advance a great deal of
machine gun fire was encountered, all went well. The centre and left
Battalions gained a footing respectively in Feuillaucourt and on the
main hill, but the progress of the right Battalion was arrested by
heavy machine gun fire from St. Denis. This was the site of a ruined
sugar refinery, and lay on the main road between Péronne and Mont
St. Quentin. It was a strong point that presented a great deal of
difficulty and held out to the last.
The centre Battalion had by 7 a.m. passed through the ruins of Mont
St. Quentin village and had crossed the main road from Péronne to
Bouchavesnes. It now had to receive the full brunt of a determined
counter attack, at a moment when it was still disorganized and
breathless from its difficult assault. The Battalion was therefore
withdrawn across the road and firmly established itself in an old
trench system to the west of it.
In this position it beat off five successive counter attacks,
inflicting most severe losses upon the enemy. The Brigade maintained
its position until nightfall. Its losses for the day were 380.
In the meantime the 6th Brigade (Robertson) of the Second Division had
been ordered to cross the Somme and move up behind the 5th Brigade,
in readiness to carry on the attack, and obtain possession of the
remainder of the main spur of Mont St. Quentin. As this Brigade only
entered into the fight at a later hour, I must revert to the events of
the forenoon of August 31st.
It was about 8 a.m. that I was able to report to General Rawlinson,
by telephone, that we had obtained a footing on Mont St. Quentin
itself. He was at first totally incredulous, but soon generously
congratulatory, proclaiming that the event was calculated to have a
most important influence upon the immediate future course of the war.
He expressed the hope that we should be able to hold on to all that we
had gained.
To this task I now had to bend myself, and I found it necessary to put
a severe strain upon the endurance and capacity of the troops. Great as
had always been my concern in the pitched battles of the days recently
passed to reduce to very definite limits the demands made upon the
physical powers of the Infantry soldier, a juncture had arrived and
a situation had been created, which demanded the utmost rapidity in
decision and action, and a relentless insistence upon prompt response
by the troops.
The 5th Brigade had been thrust out nearly two miles beyond our
general line. Its flanks were in the air. It was undoubtedly fatigued.
Everything must be done and done promptly to render it adequate
support, to take advantage of its success, and to ensure that its
effort had not been in vain.
It will be remembered that the Fifth and Second Divisions had both been
instructed to endeavour to secure a crossing over the river. Whichever
Division first succeeded was to accord right of way to its neighbour.
No success had yet attended the efforts of the Fifth Division, the main
Péronne bridges being still inaccessible from the south. The bridge
sites were under the enemy's fire, which precluded the possibility of
repair; and the approaches to them were also swept by Machine Gun fire.
The Second Division, on the other hand, had during the past 48 hours
succeeded in making the Feuillères bridge traffickable for guns and
vehicles, and those at Buscourt and Ommiécourt for foot traffic. It
transpired later that the enemy, rightly suspecting that I would
attempt to use this latter crossing, kept it under heavy Artillery fire
all day.
As soon as I had formed a judgment on the situation, about 8.30 a.m.
(August 31st), I issued instructions to General Hobbs immediately to
put in motion his reserve Brigade, the 14th (Stewart). He was to direct
it towards the Ommiécourt crossing, and later in the day to pass it
across the river and through the ground won that morning by the 5th
Brigade, with a view to developing at the earliest possible moment an
attack in a south-easterly direction upon the town of Péronne itself.
The ultimate objective was still to be the high ground south and east
of Péronne. His 8th Brigade was also to be held ready to move at the
shortest notice.
It was a serious performance to demand, and it was fraught with many
risks. There was no time to assemble responsible Commanders concerned,
separated as they were by long distances over bad and congested roads.
In the absence of properly co-ordinated action, there was every chance
of confusion, and cross-purposes, and even of collision of authority
arising from the troops of one Division passing over ground under the
tactical control of another Division.
But the only alternative was to do nothing and attempt nothing. That
would have been the worst of bad generalship, and it was an occasion
when risks must be taken.
The course of subsequent events fully demonstrated that the only true
solution was the one chosen, for the whole of the defences of Péronne
were thereby taken with a rush, while they were still being organized
by the enemy. The delay of only a day or two would have meant that
the capture of Péronne would have been many times more costly than it
actually proved to be.
The 14th Brigade had before it a march of some seven miles to
bring it into a position in which it could deploy for an attack on
Péronne. Working according to text book such a march could have been
accomplished in something under three hours. It took the Brigade over
ten hours. For the line of march lay across the very worst of the
shell-torn, tangled country enclosed in the great bend of the Somme,
and progress was most difficult and exhausting. Frequent halts were
necessary to rest the men, and restore order to the struggling columns.
Discovering the impossibility of crossing the river at Ommiécourt, the
Brigade made a wide detour to cross by the newly established bridge at
Buscourt. It arrived there just at the same time as the 7th Brigade
(Wisdom), which Rosenthal had also directed to the same point for the
same purpose. This occurrence illustrates the nature of the risks of
a hastily developed tactical plan. However, the good sense of the
Commanders on the spot obviated any serious confusion and the 7th
Brigade gave the 14th Brigade the right of way.
The 14th Brigade completed its march during the hours of falling
darkness and, passing through Cléry, came up on the right of the 6th
Brigade, in readiness for the combined attack by the two Divisions at
dawn on September 1st.
The night that followed was a stressful one for all Commanders.
Divisional Generals had to co-ordinate all action between their
Brigadiers, and their Artillery. The Brigadiers in turn had afterwards
to assemble their Battalion Commanders, and decide on detailed plans
of action for each separate unit. Distances were long, the country was
strange, roads were few and unfamiliar; so that it is not surprising
that the last conferences did not break up until well into the small
hours of September 1st. There was no sleep that night for any senior
officer in the battle area.
September 1st was a day full of great happenings and bloody hand to
hand fighting. The assault by the 6th Brigade passing over the line
won the day before by the 5th Brigade carried it well over the crest
of Mont St. Quentin, and confirmed for good and all our hold on that
imperious fortress. Few prisoners were taken, for it was bayonet work
over every inch of the advance, and the field was strewn all over with
enemy dead. The impetus of the 6th Brigade assault carried our line 600
yards to the east of the summit of the knoll.
It is difficult to allocate, in due proportion, the credit for the
capture of this important stronghold between the two gallant Brigades
concerned. It is true that the 6th Brigade did on September 1st achieve
the summit of the Mount; but it is equally true that it only completed
what the 5th Brigade had so wonderfully begun the day before. No one
will grudge to either of the two Brigades their share of the honour
that is due to both.
The action of the Second Division on that day was completed by the
bringing up of the 7th Brigade into a position of support behind the
6th Brigade, thereby relieving the 5th Brigade from further line duty.
Although the action of the individual Brigades of all the three battle
Divisions must necessarily be narrated separately and with some
attempt at a proper chronological sequence, yet it would be a mistake
to suppose that their actions were independent of each other. On the
contrary, they all operated as part of a comprehensive battle plan,
which necessarily took full account of the interdependence of the
course of events in different parts of the field.
Thus the advance on this day of the 6th Brigade materially assisted
the attack on Péronne by the 14th Brigade, while the progress of the
latter removed much trouble from the southern flank of the 6th Brigade.
The men of the 14th Brigade that day had their mettle up to a degree
which was astonishing. On the occasion of the great attack of August
8th, and ever since, it had been the cruel fate of this Brigade to be
the reserve unit of its Division on every occasion when there was any
serious fighting in hand. The Brigade felt its position very keenly.
As one Company Commander, who distinguished himself in that day's
fighting, afterwards picturesquely put it: "You see! We'd been trying
to buy a fight off the other fellows for a matter of three weeks. On
that day we got what we'd been looking for, and we made the most of
it."[18]
The 14th Brigade advanced to the assault at 6 a.m. concurrently with
the eastern thrust of the 6th Brigade. One Battalion, with two others
in support, was directed against St. Denis, while the fourth made
a direct attack on Péronne. Many belts of wire had to be struggled
through. There was much machine gun fire, from front and flanks, and
it looked as if further progress would be impossible. Nevertheless,
this gallant Brigade, by persistent effort, made itself master of the
western half of Péronne.
The attack on St. Denis at first made very slow progress, the enemy
holding out resolutely in the ruins of that hamlet, and in the adjacent
brickfields. During the day, the 15th Brigade made spirited attempts to
effect the crossing of the river, and to co-operate from the south.
The records of the events of these three days are confused and
discontinuous. Many of the men who could have filled in the gaps of the
story were unfortunately killed or evacuated as casualties. But from
the mass of reports, the salient facts emerge clearly.
The 15th Brigade succeeded, on September 2nd, in putting a Battalion
across the river, and this assisted the 14th Brigade to "mop up" the
remainder of the town of Péronne. Later the rest of the 15th Brigade
and two Battalions of the 8th Brigade (Tivey) were also drawn into the
fighting. St. Denis and the brickfields fell to us during this period.
Although the situation, from the point of view of the advance
eastwards, remained almost stationary, it was a time of fierce local
fighting. Many deeds of valour and sacrifice adorn the story.
It was late on September 3rd that the effects of this long-sustained
struggle became apparent. The whole of Péronne and most of the high
ground in its vicinity were, by then, definitely in our hands, and
although the little suburb of Flamicourt held out determinedly for
another day, the further resistance of the enemy began to fade away.
Doubtless the loss of Mont St. Quentin was a controlling factor in the
decision which was forced upon him to undertake a retreat, for with
that eminence in our possession, he could not have maintained himself
for many days in the town, nor would its retention have been of any
tactical value to him.
As an immediate result, the high ground of the Flamicourt spur just
south of Péronne fell into our hands on September 3rd, and the enemy
outposts spread along the banks of the marsh in front of the 32nd
Division sought safety from complete envelopment by a hasty withdrawal;
a number of their isolated posts were, however, left unwarned of this
retreat, so that these were, later on, captured by us from the rear.
I must now briefly turn to the doings of the Third Australian Division
during these four epic days. Its three Brigades (9th, 10th and 11th)
daily performed prodigies of valour. The Division carried our line,
inexorably, up the Bouchavesnes spur in a north-easterly direction. The
seizure of this very important ground not only powerfully aided but
also strongly confirmed our seizure of Mont St. Quentin.
The Division, having been given its general rôle, was necessarily left
to a large extent to decide for itself its detailed action from day to
day, seeing that it still had to perform the function, inevitable for a
flank Division, of a link with my neighbouring Corps. Fortunately the
arrival of a new, fresh Division (the 74th) from the Eastern theatre
of war, which came into the Third Corps and was promptly thrown in,
enabled that Corps to keep up fairly well with the general advance.
The British Third Army, too, was now beginning to make its pressure
felt, and was approaching the line of the Canal du Nord over a wide
front. The Third Division was therefore free to conform its forward
movement to that of the rest of the Australian Corps; its energetic
action gave me elbow room for the manoeuvring of so many Brigades in
the region of Cléry, and its capture of so much valuable ground east of
the Canal du Nord served greatly to widen the breach.
By the night of September 3rd, the main tactical purposes on which
the Corps had been launched on August 29th had been achieved in their
entirety. Their execution furnishes the finest example in the war
of spirited and successful Infantry action conducted by three whole
Divisions operating simultaneously side by side.
Lord Rawlinson has more than once referred to the operation as the
finest single feat of the war. Inevitably the dramatic and unlooked
for success of the Second Division in the rapid storming of the Mount
enthrals the imagination and overshadows all the other noteworthy
incidents of these pregnant days. But none will begrudge the rain of
congratulations which fell upon the head of Major-General Rosenthal.
A massive man, whose build belies his extraordinary physical energy,
he always was an egregious optimist, incapable of recognizing the
possibility of failure. That is why he invariably succeeded in all
that he undertook, and often embarked upon the apparently impossible.
An architect before the war, he served for the first two years as an
Artillery officer, both as a Brigade Commander and as a General of
Divisional Artillery. He gained his Infantry experience as Commander
of the 9th Brigade, and so was well qualified by versatile service to
assume the command of the Second Division. His leadership of the latter
contributed in no small measure to the fame which it has won.
The text of the congratulatory message issued on this occasion by the
Fourth Army read as follows:
"The capture of Mont St. Quentin by the Second Division is a feat
of arms worthy of the highest praise. The natural strength of the
position is immense, and the tactical value of it, in reference
to Péronne and the whole system of the Somme defences, cannot be
over-estimated. I am filled with admiration at the gallantry and
surpassing daring of the Second Division in winning this important
fortress, and I congratulate them with all my heart.
"RAWLINSON."
[Illustration: MAP E]
I am concerned nevertheless that the fine performance of the Fifth
Division should not be underrated. The circumstances under which
General Hobbs was called upon to intervene in the battle, at very short
notice, imposed upon him, personally, difficulties of no mean order. I
am prepared to admit quite frankly that the demands which I had to make
upon him, his Staff and his Division were severe.
Following upon four days of arduous pursuit, his troops were called
upon to undertake a long and difficult march over a most broken
country, to be followed by three days of intensive fighting of the most
severe character.
General Hobbs was, first and foremost, a lover of the Australian
soldiers, and their devoted servitor. He belonged to that type of
citizen-soldier who, before the war, had spent long years in preparing
himself for a day when his country would surely require his military
services. Like several of the most successful of Australia's generals,
he had specialized in Artillery, and was, in fact, selected as the
senior Artillery Commander of Australia's first contingent. That
fact alone was the stamp of his ability. While he would be the last
to lay claim to special brilliance, or outstanding military genius,
he nevertheless succeeded fully as the Commander of a Division, by
his sound common sense, and his sane attitude towards every problem
that confronted him. He possessed also the virtue of a large-hearted
sympathy for all subordinate to him; and that gave him a loyal
following, which carried him successfully through several great crises
in the affairs of the Fifth Division.
This period was one of those crises. When, late on the afternoon of
August 31st, he urged upon me with much earnestness the stress upon his
troops, and repeated the anxious representations of his Brigadiers--I
was compelled to harden my heart and to insist that it was imperative
to recognize a great opportunity and to seize it unflinchingly. His
response was loyal and whole-hearted. His Division followed the lead
which he thus gave them, and he led them to imperishable fame.
Considerable redispositions followed upon the transfer of my battle
front to the country east of the Somme. These, and the reasons which
governed their nature, chief among which was the resumption of the
enemy's rearward movement, I shall deal with in due course.
Battle problems on the grand scale were, for the moment, relegated to
the background, and there now arose a multitude of other problems,
almost equally burdensome, relating to the supply and maintenance of
the Corps.
Every Corps must be based upon a thoroughly reliable and efficient line
of supply, and for this a railway in first-class operating condition is
a prime essential. Every kind of requisite must be carried by rail to
some advanced distribution point called a "railhead." Thence supplies
are distributed by motor lorry to the areas still further forward.
The appropriate distance of the railhead behind the battle front is
conditioned by the available supply of motor lorries, and their range
of action. If the distance be too great the stress upon the mechanical
transport becomes so severe that it rapidly deteriorates, and an undue
proportion of lorries daily falls out of service. As the facilities
for repair in the mobile workshops are strictly limited, an excessive
rate of wastage among these vehicles soon dislocates the whole supply
arrangements.
The experience hitherto gained had demonstrated that a railhead could
not conveniently be allowed to fall behind our advance more than ten or
twelve miles. This limit had already been reached when the Corps front
arrived on the west bank of the Somme, and the strain upon the lorry
service was already great.
For a further deep advance of the whole Corps in pursuit of the enemy
towards the Hindenburg Line, still distant another fifteen miles, it
became imperative, therefore, that the railway service to Péronne
and beyond should be speedily reopened, or some equally efficient
alternative provided. The great lattice girder railway bridge at
Péronne had been irretrievably demolished. Engineers estimated that it
would take two months to restore it, and at least a month to provide
even a temporary deviation and crossing. Nevertheless, the work was put
in hand without delay.
An alternative possibility was to construct a new line of railway to
connect the existing military line at Bray to the Péronne railway
station, a length of new construction amounting to some six miles. It
was estimated that such a link could be built in a fortnight, and this
work also was commenced forthwith.
There was a third possibility. This was speedily to repair that
portion of the railway which lay west of the Somme, and to establish
a railhead near Péronne, but on the opposite bank of the river. This
proposal involved only a few days' work, for extensive sidings already
existed on the west bank, and had been left more or less undamaged by
the enemy. But it also involved the complete restoration of all road
traffic bridges, both at Péronne and at Brie, for the service of the
intense traffic which would ensue across the Somme from such a point of
departure.
The rebuilding of the crossings was, in any case, a matter of urgent
necessity. By this time all my heaviest guns had already been brought
up to the vicinity of the west bank of the Somme, and had there
perforce to wait; for a long detour, on the densely-crowded roads, to
cross the Somme, say as far back as Corbie, where bridges were strong
and grades were easy, was out of the question.
The problem, therefore, involved a stable and comprehensive
reconstruction; half measures would not meet the case. But half
measures were an inevitable necessity of the situation, to begin
with, because troops had to be fed, and their supplies could be
carried in no lighter way, in adequate quantities, than in the normal
horse-transport wagons.
The order of procedure had, therefore, to be, firstly, hastily to
reconstruct some sort of bridging, based generally upon the wreckage
of the original bridge, and strong enough to carry loads up to those
of horsed wagons; next to stay, strut and strengthen these temporary
bridges to fit them for the passage of the lighter guns, and finally to
reconstruct them in their entirety for the heaviest loads.
At a point such as the southern entrance to Péronne, where the
approaches could not be conveniently deviated, the difficulties of
such successive reconstructions, while the flow of traffic had to be
maintained, can hardly be fully realized.
For many days, in the early part of September, Brie, Eterpigny and
Péronne were scenes of feverish activity. Every available technical
unit that could be spared from other urgent duty was concentrated upon
this vital work. Most of the Engineer Field Companies, three of the
five Pioneer Battalions, both Tunnelling Companies, and all the Army
Troops Companies, laboured in relays, night and day.
Hundreds of tons of steel girders, of all lengths and sections, were
hurried up, by special lorry service. Pile-driving gear was hastily
improvised. The wreckage of the original bridges was overhauled for
sound, useful timbers. The torn and twisted steelwork was dragged out
of the way by horse or steam power, and tumbled in a confused mass into
the river bed. Hammer, saw and axe were wielded with a zest and vigour
rarely seen in peace-time construction. The whole work was supervised
by my Chief Engineer, Brigadier-General Foott, and was later, when the
advance of the Corps was resumed, completed by the Army authorities.
The speed and punctuality with which the first temporary viaducts were
completed and ready for use were exemplary, and reflect every credit
upon Foott and his helpers. Within forty-eight hours bridges usable for
ordinary supplies and for field guns became available, and thereafter
were rapidly strengthened by successive stages.
The whole work of restoration, in which the Australian technical
services played so prominent a part, won the highest praise from the
Field Marshal, who expressed his appreciation in a special message of
thanks to these services.
The congestion of traffic at the Péronne bottleneck was, however,
serious. Blocks occurred, reminiscent of those which are familiar in
the heart of London when the dense traffic is temporarily held up by
a passing procession. Marching troops always had the right of way;
and a Division on the move up to or back from the line meant a severe
super-load upon the already overtaxed road capacity.
Sometimes a block of traffic would occur for an hour at a time, and a
motley collection of vehicles, stretching back for miles, would pile up
on the roads. The capabilities of a very able road and traffic control
service, numbering hundreds of officers and men, acting under the
direction of my Provost Marshal, were often severely tested. More than
once my own motor car was unavoidably held up at this bottleneck for
half an hour at a time, on occasions, too, when the situation required
my urgent presence at some important meeting.
All these minor embarrassments arising from the passage by the
Australian Corps of a great military obstacle such as the Somme were,
however, soon dissipated. The Somme had loomed large, for many days, in
the minds of all of us--first as a problem of tactics, and next as a
problem of engineering. Before the end of the first week of September
the Somme had ceased to hold our further interest. It had become a
thing that was behind us, both in thought and in actuality.
The enemy was once more on the move, and it became our business to
press relentlessly on his heels.
FOOTNOTES:
[17] The following telegram, selected at random from the files of
September 1st, indicates the extraordinary mixture of units which the
enemy had collected to defend this vital point:
"To Australian Corps Intelligence from 2nd Division--sent September
1st at 7 p.m. Identifications from prisoners examined since noon:
28th R.I.R.; 65th I.R.; 161st I.R.; 94th I.R.; 95th I.R.; 96th
I.R.; Alexander Regt.; Augusta Regt.; 4th Bav. I.R.; 8th Bav. I.R.;
25th Bav. I.R.; 447th I.R.; 2nd G. Guard F.A.R.; 221st F.A.R.; 2nd
Co. M.G. Corps; 67th Pioneer Co.; 3rd Army Troops; 102nd Pioneer
Bn. of 2nd Guards Div.; 402nd M.W.Co.; 185th R.I.R. A pioneer of
the 23rd Co. has been retained for 5th Aust. Div. to remove charges
from bridges not yet blown. Prisoner 96th I.R. says Regt. came
up for counter-attack night 31-1 to retake Mt. St. Quentin, but
counter-attack did not come off, owing to attack expected from
us. All prisoners interrogated agree that line was to be held
at all costs. Regiments are now considerably intermingled and
disorganized."
(NOTE.--I.R.--Infanterie Regiment; R.I.R.--Reserve Infanterie Regiment;
M.W.Co.--Minenwerfer Compagnie; Bav.--Bavarian.)
[18] Mr. Hughes, the Commonwealth Prime Minister, visited the
battlefield of Mont St. Quentin, with a distinguished company, on
September 14th. The officer in question, standing near the summit
of the hill, was about to relate his experiences, and this was his
preamble.