PURSUIT
The design which I had formed after the battle of August 8th of driving
the enemy completely out of the bend of the Somme--but which I was
obliged to abandon for the time being because of the decision of the
Fourth Army to thrust in a south-easterly direction--was now about to
be realized. The effect of the battle of Chuignes, following so closely
upon the advance of the Third Army two days before, made it probable
that the enemy would decide upon a definite withdrawal to the line of
the Somme.
It now became my object to ensure, if he should attempt to do so,
firstly, that his withdrawal should be more precipitate than would
be agreeable to him, and, secondly, that when he reached that line
he should be accorded no breathing time to establish upon it a firm
defence from which he could hold us at bay for the remainder of the
fine weather.
The French Army took over from me on the night of the 23rd August the
whole of that portion of my front which still extended south of Lihons.
General Nollet, Commander of the 36th French Corps (34th and 35th
French Divisions), became my southern neighbour, displacing my Fourth
Division, and also a Canadian Division, for whose sector I had become
responsible since the departure of General Currie, a few days before.
During these redispositions, probably induced to do so by evidences
patent to him that large troop movements were in progress, the enemy
carried out a very heavy gas bombardment and maintained it for some
hours over the whole of the front which was being taken over by the
French.
The wind blowing from the south, the gas, which was unusually dense,
drifted over the whole areas both of the Fourth Australian and the 32nd
British Divisions, and caused a large number of gas casualties, which
weakened the available garrisons of these sectors.
The Second and Fifth Divisions were brought up on the night of August
26th to relieve the First Division, which had worthily earned a rest,
and by these redispositions my whole frontage, which, in spite of the
reduction effected, still exceeded nine miles, was organized to be
held by four Divisions, counting from south to north as follows: 32nd
Division, Fifth Division, Second Division and Third Division, the
latter lying north of the River Somme.
The First and Fourth Divisions were each sent back, the former to
a pleasant reach of the Somme near Chipilly, and the latter to the
neighbourhood of Amiens, there to have a long rest and to recuperate
after their strenuous labours. These two Divisions were, I had
resolved, to be kept in reserve for any _tour de force_, the need
for which might arise later. This disposition was based on intuition
rather than on reasoning; but the event proved that it was a fortunate
decision; for, at a juncture, three weeks later, when a great
opportunity presented itself, these two Divisions, then fully rested,
proved of priceless value.
The Third Division held my front north of the Somme, and their presence
there ensured my unchallenged tactical control of that important
river valley. Numerous crossings had been systematically destroyed
by the enemy, as he was being driven back from bend to bend, and as
systematically repaired by my indefatigable engineer and pioneer
services, as fast as the ground passed under our control.
Reconstruction of bridges and culverts is as tedious a business as
their demolition is expeditious. A charge of gun-cotton, placed in the
right spot, a primer, a short length of fuse, or an electric lead to
a press button are all that are needed, and a single sapper standing
by with a match, to be lighted at the last moment, can do all that is
necessary to provide three days' work for a whole Company of Engineers.
Nevertheless, the control of the river valley was of inestimable
advantage, for it enabled me to carry out a policy of continuous and
rapid repair. Consequently, during the whole of our subsequent advance,
every means of traversing the valley from south to north, which had
been tampered with, was soon restored, as fast as my infantry had made
good their advance beyond the ruined crossing.
This facility was to have an important bearing upon my freedom of
action, not many days later, when the Corps came head on to the north
and south stretch of the Somme, and found every bridge gone. That
circumstance alone would have proved an irretrievable misfortune, if
I had not had already available numerous restored crossings upon the
east and west reach of the river. For by that means, my ability to
pass troops and guns rapidly from one bank of the Somme to the other
remained unimpaired.
Before leaving the line, the First Division had captured Cappy and
advanced its line on the right to the western outskirts of Foucaucourt,
while the Third Division had possessed itself of Suzanne. This was
the situation when, on the night of August 26th, the Second and Fifth
Divisions came into the line. Conferences with the four line Divisions
were held both on the 25th and 26th August, in order to ensure
co-ordinate action for the process of hustling the enemy across the
Somme.
I was, at this stage, sorely perplexed by the uncertain attitude of
the Fourth Army. I was all for pushing on energetically, and received
General Rawlinson's approval to do so on August 24th; but on the very
next day he enunciated a diametrically opposite policy, which greatly
embarrassed me.
The gist of the Army attitude on the 25th may be thus expressed. The
presence of a new German Division, the 41st, of whom we had taken many
prisoners in Cappy, pointed to an intention on the part of the enemy
to reinforce. This negatived any intention to undertake a withdrawal.
This conclusion justified a revision of the Fourth Army policy. The
Army had done its fair share; it had drawn in upon its front all the
loose German reserves. Its resources in Tanks had been depleted, and
it would take a month to replace them. Other Armies would now take up
the burden, and the Fourth Army would now mark time, and await events
elsewhere. There was no object in hastening the enemy's evacuation of
the bad ground in the bend of the Somme, or in our taking possession
of it. There was a possibility of the French taking over more frontage
from us, and the Australian Corps front might in consequence be reduced
to a three-Division front, with three Divisions in Corps Reserve.
The course of events, in the next seven days, convinced me that the
results which were then achieved were totally unexpected by the Fourth
Army, and very vitally influenced the whole subsequent course of the
campaign. In point of fact, Lord Rawlinson quite frankly conceded to
me as much in express terms a week later. The appreciation made at
the time was doubtless an intentionally conservative one, but it did
not take into account the reserve of striking power which remained in
the Australian Corps, even after the past eighteen days of continuous
fighting, and even without the assistance of the Tanks.
There was only one saving clause in the Army attitude, and this
fortunately gave all the loophole necessary for the continued activity
which I desired to pursue. It was this: "Touch must be kept with
the enemy." This was of course a mere formality of tactics, and was
intended as no more than such. But it was sufficient to justify an
aggressive policy on my part.
As the result of my redispositions, completed by the night of August
27th, and of my conferences with the line Divisions, each Division
stood on that morning on a single Brigade front, with its two remaining
Brigades arranged in depth behind it. My orders were that in the event
of the enemy giving way, the line Brigade was to push on energetically,
and was to be kept in the line until it had reached the limits of its
endurance. The other two Brigades were to follow up more leisurely, but
to be prepared, each in turn, to relieve the line Brigade.
I had calculated that, by this method, each Brigade should be able to
function for at least two days on the frontage allotted; and that,
therefore, the present line Divisions could continue for at least six
days; and if the stress upon the troops had not been severe, they could
carry out a second rotation of Brigades for a second tour of six days.
The calculation was, in general terms, fully realized; and all of the
four line Divisions of that day did actually carry on for twelve days,
and two of them for an additional six days.
The Artillery resources of the Corps were throughout the whole of this
period fully maintained at the standard of the early days of August.
I still had at my disposal eighteen Brigades of Field Artillery; and
so was able to allot four Brigades of Artillery to each line Division,
while keeping two in Corps Reserve.
Early on the morning of August 27th, a policy of vigorous patrolling
all along our front was initiated. At several points, enemy posts which
were known to have been strongly held the night before were found to be
now unoccupied. Although reports varied along my front, they so fully
confirmed my anticipations, that without waiting to make any reference
to the Army, I ordered an immediate general advance along my whole
front.
There followed a merry and exciting three days of pursuit; for the
enemy was really on the run, and by nightfall on August 29th, not
a German who was not a prisoner remained west of the Somme between
Péronne and Brie.
In previous years, during the enemy's retreat from Bapaume to the
Hindenburg Line, we had had experience of his methods of withdrawal.
Then they were deliberate, and his rearguards so methodically and
resolutely held up the British advance, that the enemy had been able
not only to remove from the evacuated area every particle of his
warlike stores, which were of any value, but also to carry out a
systematic devastation of the whole area, even to the felling of all
the fruit trees, and the tearing up of all the railways for miles.
The present withdrawal was of a very different character. To begin
with, it had been forced upon him by the battle of Chuignes, and he
had to undertake it precipitately and without adequate preparation.
Secondly, he had an impassable river behind him, which could be crossed
only at three points, Brie, Eterpigny, and Péronne. Thirdly, he had in
front of him a Corps flushed with its recent victories, while he had
been suffering a succession of defeats and heavy losses.
Nevertheless, he put up a good fight, and employed well-considered
tactics. The German Machine Gun Corps was much the best of all his
services. The manner in which the machine gunners stood their ground,
serving their guns to the very last, and defying even the Juggernaut
menace of the Tanks, won the unstinted admiration of our men. During
these three days of retreat the enemy used his machine guns to the best
advantage, and they constituted the only obstacle to our rapid advance.
These tactics were not unexpected by me, and I had an answer ready.
Defying the whole traditions of Artillery tactics in open warfare, I
insisted upon two somewhat startling innovations. The first was to
break up battery control, by detaching even sections (two guns), to
come under the direct orders of Infantry Commanders for the purpose of
engaging with direct fire any machine-gun nest which was holding them
up.
The second was to insist that all batteries should carry 20 per cent.
of smoke shell. This elicited a storm of protest from the gunners.
Every shell carried which was not a high explosive or shrapnel shell
meant a shell less of destructive power, and, therefore, a shell
wasted. That had been the Gunnery School doctrine. But I imagine that
the test made at this epoch of the liberal use of smoke shell against
machine guns will lead to a revision of that doctrine.
Smoke shell proved of inestimable value in blinding the German machine
gunners. A few rounds judiciously placed screened the approach of our
Infantry, and many a machine-gun post was thereby rushed by us from
the flanks or even from the rear. General Hobbs (Fifth Division) and
General Rosenthal (Second Division), both of whom had formerly been
gunners, proved the strongest advocates for these smoke tactics.
By such means an energetic and successful pursuit was launched and
maintained. By the night of August 27th, our line already lay to the
east of the villages of Vermandovillers, Foucaucourt (on the main road)
and Fontaine. We also mastered the whole of the Cappy bend, including
the crossings of the Somme at Eclusier. The Fifth Division had a
particularly hard fight at Foucaucourt, which did not fall to us until
we had subjected it to a considerable bombardment. Tivoli Wood was the
chief obstacle encountered that day by the Second Division. The advance
of the 32nd Division also progressed smoothly.
During August 28th our advance was continued methodically,
and by that night the Corps front had reached the line
Génermont--Berry-en-Santerre--Estrées--Frise.
On August 29th the line of the Somme was reached, and all three
Divisions south of the Somme stood upon the high ground sloping down to
the Somme, with the river in sight from opposite Cléry, past Péronne
and as far south as St. Christ.
In the meantime the Third Division north of the Somme had marched
forward, in sympathetic step with the southern advance, successively
seizing Suzanne, Vaux, Curlu, Hem and Cléry. The Third Corps on my left
had followed up the general advance, though always lagging a little in
rear, thus keeping my left flank secure; and beyond the Third Corps,
the Third Army was approaching the line of the Canal du Nord, which
lay, as explained, in prolongation of the south-north course of the
Somme.
The war correspondents of this time were given to representing the
progress of the Australian Corps during these three days as a leisurely
advance, regulated in its pace by the speed of the retiring enemy. But
it was nothing of the kind.
On the contrary, it was his withdrawal which was regulated by the speed
of our advance. There was not a foot of ground which was not contested
by all the effort which the enemy was able to put forth. It is quite
true that his withdrawal was intentional; but it is not true that it
was conducted at the deliberate rate which was necessary to enable him
to withdraw in good order.
He was compelled to fight all the time and to withdraw in disorder. He
was forced to abandon guns and huge quantities of stores. The amount
of derelict artillery ammunition found scattered over the whole of
this considerable area alone reached hundreds of thousands of rounds,
distributed in hundreds of dumps and depots, as well as scores of tons
of empty artillery cartridge-cases, the brass of which had become of
priceless value to the enemy.
Regimental and even Divisional Headquarters were abandoned as they
stood, with all their furniture and mess equipment left intact. Signal
wire and telephone equipment remained installed in all directions,
hospitals and dressing-stations were left to their fate. The advance
yielded to us over 600 prisoners, some half-dozen field-guns, and large
numbers of smaller weapons.
The last two days of the advance led us across a maze of trenches and
the debris of the 1916 campaign. The weather was unfavourable, there
was much rain and an entire absence of any kind of shelter. As a result
the line Brigades had to put forth all their powers of endurance and
reached the Somme in a very tired condition.
In the meantime my air squadron had an exceptionally busy time. Contact
patrols were maintained throughout every hour of daylight. Difficult as
it was to identify the positions reached by our leading troops during
an organized battle, where their approximate positions and ultimate
objective lines were known beforehand, it was doubly so when no guide
whatever existed as to the probable extent of each day's advance, or as
to the amount of resistance likely to be encountered at different parts
of the front.
Yet it was just under these circumstances that rapid and reliable
information as to the progress of the various elements of our front
line troops was more important than ever, and no means for obtaining
such information was so expeditious as the Contact Aeroplane.
To assist the air observer in identifying our troops, the latter were
provided with flares, of colours which were varied from time to time
in order to minimize the risk of imitation by the enemy. The method of
their employment, whether singly or in pairs, or three at a time, was
also frequently varied.
These flares on being lit gave out a dense cloud of coloured smoke,
easily distinguishable from a moderate height. The contact plane, which
would carry coloured streamers so that the infantry could identify it
as flying on that particular duty, would, when ready to observe, blow
its horn and thereupon the foremost infantry would light their flares.
It was a method of inter-communication between air and ground, which,
after a little practice, came to be well understood and intelligently
carried out. By its means a Divisional or Brigade Commander was kept
accurately informed, with great promptitude, of the progress of each of
his front line units, in relation to the various woods, ruined mills,
and other obstacles which lay spread across their path.
But the Air Force had another interesting duty, which was to watch
the roads leading back from the enemy's front line to his rear areas.
During tranquil times little movement could ever be seen on the enemy's
roads in the hours of daylight, for the very good reason that he took
care to carry out all his transportation to and from his front zone
under cover of darkness.
Now, however, his needs pressed sorely upon him; and our air reports,
from this time onwards, became almost monotonous in their iteration of
the fact that large columns of transport were to be seen moving back in
an easterly direction. These were his retiring batteries or his convoys
of wagons carrying such stores as he was able to salve.
Occasionally, too, came reports of convoys, which looked like motor
lorries or buses, moving hurriedly westward towards the German front.
These were generally diagnosed by us as reinforcements which were being
continually hurried forward to replace his human wastage, which was
considerable both by direct losses from death, wounds and capture and
by reason of the fatigue of such a strenuous and nerve-racking retreat.
All this movement in the enemy's rearward areas was a legitimate object
of interest to my Artillery. But, unfortunately, most of it lay well
beyond the range of my lighter Ordnance. The mobile Field Artillery
was effective at no greater range than about four miles. The longer
range 60-pounders found it a formidable task to traverse such broken
country, while the still heavier tractor-drawn 6-inch guns found it
quite impossible.
The latter, and all the Heavy and Super-Heavy guns and howitzers were
tied down to the roads, and it proved a tremendous business to advance
them in sufficient time and numbers to make their influence felt upon
the present situation. I have nothing but praise for the admirable
manner in which Brigadier-General Fraser and his Heavy Artillery
Headquarters carried out the forward moves of the whole of his
extensive Artillery equipment and organization from August 8th onwards
to August 23rd. But the rapid advance of the battle line during the
last week of August left the great bulk of Heavy Artillery far behind.
This was not entirely or even appreciably a question of the rate of
movement of the great lumbering steam or motor-drawn heavy guns.
They could quite easily march their eight or ten miles a day if they
could have a clear road upon which to do it. But it was this question
of roads that dominated the whole situation during this period, and
subsequently until the end of the campaign of the Corps.
The construction and upkeep of roads throughout the Corps area had
been, even in the days of stationary warfare, a difficult problem. At a
time like the present, when the battle was moving forward from day to
day, it became one of the first magnitude.
The rate of our advance was controlled almost as much by the speed with
which main and secondary roads could be made practicable for traffic
as by the degree of resistance offered by the enemy. Obstacles had to
be removed, the debris of war cleared to one side, shell holes solidly
filled in, craters of mine explosions bridged or circumvented, culverts
repaired and drains freed of obstructions.
The road surfaces, speedily deteriorating under the strain and wear
of heavy motor lorry traffic, had to be kept constantly under repair.
The transportation of the necessary road stone for this purpose alone,
imposed a heavy burden upon the roads and impeded other urgent traffic.
The amount of road construction and reconstruction actually in hand
within the Corps area, at any one time, far exceeded that normally
required in peace time for any great city district.
The traffic on the roads was always of the most dense and varied
character. For the proper maintenance and supply of a large Army Corps
at least three good main roads, leading back to our sources of supply,
would have been no more than adequate; but I seldom had at my disposal
more than one such main road, which had often to be shared with an
adjoining Corps.
There was ever an endless stream of traffic, labouring slowly along
in both directions. On such a road as that leading east from Amiens
towards the battle front, the congestion was always extreme. Ammunition
lorries, regimental horsed transport, motor dispatch riders, marching
infantry, long strings of horses and mules going to and from water,
traction engines, convoy after convoy of motor buses, supply wagons,
mess carts, signal motor tenders, complete batteries of Artillery,
motor tractors, tanks, Staff motor cars and gangs of coolie labourers
surged steadily forward, in an amazing jumble, with never a moment's
pause.
Such were some of the difficulties with which I was beset in the rear
of my battle line. They were negligible compared with those which now
loomed in front of it.
The reach of the Somme which runs northerly from Ham past Brie to
Péronne and there turns westerly, differs entirely in its topographical
features from that picturesque Somme Valley along both of whose banks
the Corps had been fighting its way forward. The steep banks have
disappeared, and for a mile or so on either side the ground slopes
gently towards the river bed.
The river itself is not less than 1,000 yards wide, being, in fact, a
broad marsh, studded with islets which are overgrown with rushes, while
the stream of the river threads its way in numerous channels between
them. The marsh itself is no more than waist-deep, but the flowing
water is too deep to be waded.
Along the western side of this marsh runs the canalized river, or, as
it is here known, the Somme Canal, flowing between masonry-lined banks.
The construction of a crossing of such a marsh was, even in peace time,
a troublesome business. It meant, to begin with, a causeway solidly
founded upon a firm masonry bed sunk deep into the mud of the valley
bed. The canal itself and each rivulet required its separate bridge, in
spans varying from thirty to sixty feet.
What, therefore, came to be known as the Brie Bridge, situated on the
line of the main road from Amiens to St. Quentin, really consisted of
no less than eight separate bridges disposed at irregular intervals
along the line of the causeway, between the western and eastern banks
of the valley. The demolition of even the smallest of these eight
bridges would render the whole causeway unusable, and would prohibit
all traffic.
There exists an almost exactly similar arrangement of bridges at St.
Christ, about two miles to the south of Brie, but no other traffic
crossing to the north of Brie until Péronne is reached. There, both the
main road and the railway, which cross side by side, are provided with
large span lattice girder bridges, over the main canal, while the marsh
has been reclaimed where the town has encroached upon it. The river
overflow is led through the town in several smaller canals or drains,
all of them liberally bridged where crossed by roads and streets.
The Péronne bridges are, therefore, no less indispensable, and no less
easily rendered useless than those at Brie. Should such crossings be
denied to me, it would be just possible to pass infantry across the
valley, by night, by wading and swimming, or by the use of rafts,
always provided that no opposition were to be met with. But to pass
tanks or heavy guns, or even vehicles of the lightest description
across the marsh, would have been quite impossible.
The Somme threatened, therefore, to be a most formidable obstacle to my
further advance. It was incumbent upon me to assume that at the very
least one of each series of bridges would be demolished by the enemy in
his retreat. It would have been criminal folly on his part were it to
have been otherwise; and I had had previous evidence of the efficiency
of his engineer services.
Reconnaissances pushed out on the night of August 29th speedily
verified the assumption that some at least of the bridges had been
wrecked. It was ultimately ascertained that every single bridge
in every one of the crossings named had been methodically and
systematically blown to pieces.
There was only one tactical method by which such an obstacle could be
forced by a frontal operation. By bringing up sufficient Artillery to
dominate the enemy's defences on the east bank of the river valley,
it might have been possible to pass across sufficient infantry to
establish a wide bridge-head, behind which the ruined crossings could
be restored, probably under enemy Artillery fire.
But it would have been a costly enterprise, and fraught with every
prospect of failure, should the enemy be prepared to put up any sort of
a fight to prevent it.
The value to me of the possession of the whole of the Somme Valley from
Cléry westwards, and the rapid repair of the bridges therein which I
had been able to effect, will now become apparent. For it permitted the
crystallizing into action of a project for dealing with the present
situation, which had been vaguely forming in my mind ever since the day
when I took over the Chipilly spur.
This was the plan of turning the line of the Somme from the north,
instead of forcing it by direct assault from the west.
It may be argued that such a plan would have been equally practicable,
even if the left flank of the Australian Corps had hitherto remained
and now still lay south of the Somme, instead of well to the north
of it. In that case other Corps on the north would have carried out
that identical plan, which ultimately did achieve this important and
decisive result.
I very much doubt it.
I had also had some experience of the futility of relying too much upon
the sympathetic action of flank Corps, who usually had their hands full
enough with their own problems, and had little time to devote to the
needs of their neighbours. It would, moreover, have been disagreeable
and inexpedient in the extreme to seek a right of way through the
territory over which another Corps held jurisdiction. Corps Commanders
were inclined to be jealous of any encroachment upon their frontiers,
or upon the tactical problems in front of them.
Moreover, I wanted, more than anything else, that this should be an
exclusively Australian achievement.
The situation being as it was, I possessed freedom of action, elbow
room, and control not only of all the territory which I should require
to use, but also of all the Somme crossings west of Cléry.
[Illustration: Final Instructions to the Platoon--an incident of the
battle of August 8th, 1918. The platoon is waiting to advance to Phase
B of the battle.]
[Illustration: An Armoured Car--disabled near Bony, during the battle
of September 29th, 1918.]
The strategic object in view was to make the line of the Somme useless
to the enemy as a defensive line, and thereby render probable his
immediate further enforced retreat to the Hindenburg line.
The tactical process by which this was to be achieved was to be an
attack upon and the seizure of the key position of the whole line, the
dominating hill of Mont St. Quentin.
But the paramount consideration was that the attack must be delivered
_without delay_ and that the enemy should not be allowed a single hour
longer than necessary to establish himself upon that hill.
Often since those days, wondering at the success which came to the
Australian Corps at Mont St. Quentin, I have tried justly to estimate
the causes which won us that success. And I have always come back
to the same conclusion, that it was due firstly and chiefly to the
wonderful gallantry of the men who participated, secondly to the
rapidity with which our plans were put into action, and thirdly to the
sheer daring of the attempt.
Mont St. Quentin lies a mile north of Péronne. It stands as a sentinel
guarding the northern and western approaches to the town, a bastion of
solid defence against any advance from the west designed to encircle
it. The paintings and drawings of many artists who have visited the
historic spot will familiarize the world with its gentle contours.
Viewed from the west, from the vantage point of the high ground near
Biaches in the very angle of the bend of the river, Mont St. Quentin
constitutes no striking feature in the landscape. But standing upon the
hill itself one speedily realizes how fully its possession dominates
the whole of the approaches to it. So placed that both stretches
of the river can from it be commanded by fire, and giving full and
uninterrupted observation over all the country to the west and north
and south of it, the hill is ringed around with line upon line of wire
entanglements, and its forward slopes are glacis-like and bare of
almost any cover.
Estimated by the eye of an expert in tactics, it would surely be
reckoned as completely impregnable to the assault, unaided by Tanks, of
any infantry that should attempt it.
It was the seizure, by a sudden attack, of this tactical key that
was the kernel of the plan which now had to be evolved. The capture
of the town of Péronne was consequential upon it, though little less
formidable a task. The effect of both captures would be completely to
turn the whole line of the Somme to the south, and the line of the
Canal du Nord; to open a wide gate through which the remainder of the
Fourth and Third Armies could pour, so as to roll up the enemy's line
in both directions.
In view of the historical importance of the occasion, and the
controversies which have already risen regarding the genesis of the
conception of these plans, I make no apology for reproducing, _in
extenso_, a literal copy of the notes used at the conference which I
held in the late afternoon of August 29th at the Headquarters of the
Fifth Division, then situated in a group of bare sheds--but recently
vacated by the enemy--on the main east and west road, just south of
Proyart. The conference was attended by Lambert (32nd Division), Hobbs
(Fifth Division), Rosenthal (Second Division), and Gellibrand (Third
Division). Neither "Tanks" nor "Heavy Artillery" attended as they could
not, in any event, co-operate in the execution of the plan.
29. 8. 18.
PLAN FOR CROSSING THE SOMME
A. ALTERATION OF FRONTAGES.
_Defensive Front_: 32nd Division to take over on 30th from Fifth
Division front as far north as Ferme Lamire, total 7,500 yards, to
hold same defensively, place outposts on river line, demonstrate
actively as if aiming to cross Somme; if no resistance, endeavour
establish posts on far bank; otherwise demonstrate only. Use only
one Brigade; remainder of Division to rest and refit.
_Offensive Frontages_: Fifth Division to extend along canal bank
from Ferme Lamire to Biaches, frontage 4,000 yards. Second
Division to extend from Biaches for 4,700 yards to bridge at
Ommiécourt. Third Division: present front north of river.
B. OBJECTIVES.
All Divisions to continue eastward advance. Each Division to have
an immediate and an ultimate objective, thus:
Third Division: Immediate: High ground north-east of Cléry.
Ultimate: Bouchavesnes Spur.
Second Division: Immediate: Bridge Head at Halle. If
crossing there impossible
then cross behind front
of Third Division.
Ultimate: Mont St. Quentin.
Fifth Division: Immediate: Force crossing at Péronne
Bridges; if bridges gone,
follow Second Division
and aim at high ground
south of Péronne.
Ultimate: Wooded spur east of Péronne.
Whichever Division first succeeds in crossing Somme Valley, the
other Divisions to have right of way over the same crossings.
Each Division to employ only one Brigade until a satisfactory
footing is established on immediate objective.
Second Division to lead the north-east movement.
Artillery to stand as at present allotted, but liable to
re-allotment by me as operation develops.
The above brief notes require but little elucidation. It is to
be remembered that at the time they were prepared, no definite
information had yet been received as to the condition of any of the
Somme crossings, because at that hour the river bank had not yet been
reached, and fighting on the west bank of the Somme was still going on.
It has also to be remembered that these notes were only for my own
guidance in verbally expounding the plan, and were not actually issued
as written orders. Naturally many details, left unexpressed by the
notes, were filled in during the conference. Moreover I anticipated
that the whole operation would be one of a nature in which I would have
to intervene as the battle proceeded, in accordance with the varying
situation from time to time, and this actually proved to be necessary.
It will be noted that on August 29th I had already reached the definite
decision not to attempt to force the passage of the Somme south of
Péronne; the 32nd Division was, however, instructed to make every
demonstration of a desire to attempt it, the object being to divert the
attention of the enemy from the real point of attack.
This was to be launched from the direction of Cléry. In preparation for
it, the Second Division sent its reserve Brigade, the 5th (Martin), to
cross the river at Feuillères, on August 30th, to pass through the area
and front of the Third Division, and secure a bridge head on the Cléry
side of the river, opposite to the Ommiécourt bend. The object was to
exploit the possibility of using the Ommiécourt crossing, and if it
were found to be intact to use it for the purpose of crossing with the
remaining two Brigades that same night.
This move was successfully accomplished, although the 5th Brigade found
portion of the village of Cléry still occupied, and that the trench
systems to the east of it were still held in strength. After much
skilful fighting, the Brigade reached its allotted destination, with
slight casualties, capturing seven machine guns and 120 prisoners.
The bridge at Ommiécourt was found to be damaged, but repairable so
as to be usable by infantry on foot, and this work was at once put
in hand. The same night the rearrangement of the fronts of all four
Divisions in the line was carried out, and all was in readiness for the
daring attempt to break the line of the Somme.
During the afternoon of August 30th, General Rawlinson came to see me,
and I unfolded to him the details of the operations contemplated and
the arrangements made for the next day. I have already referred to the
pleasant and attractive personality of this distinguished soldier. His
qualities of broad outlook, searching insight, great sagacity, and
strong determination, tempered by a wise restraint, never failed to
impress me deeply. He always listened sympathetically, and responded
convincingly. On this occasion he was pleased to be pleasantly
satirical. "And so you think you're going to take Mont St. Quentin with
three battalions! What presumption! However, I don't think I ought to
stop you! So, go ahead, and try!--and I wish you luck!"