Colonel Wyllie then goes on to say: "The company and its agents complain

of the many obstacles they have had to overcome in the form of hostility

and intrigue on the part of interested parties. Systematic attempts have

been made in Liberia to intimidate the gangs from going to San Thomé by

tales of cruelty practised by the Portuguese in the islands." More

especially it would appear that the "missionaries" have been advising

the Liberians not to accept the offers made to them. It is not

altogether surprising that they should do so, for the Portuguese have

acquired an evil reputation which it will take time to efface. To an

outside observer it would appear that an admirable opportunity is here

afforded for the Portuguese Government and the Anti-Slavery Society, who

are in close relation with many of the missionaries, to co-operate in

the attainment of a common object. Why should not the Portuguese

authorities invite some agents of the Anti-Slavery Society to visit the

islands and place before them evidence which will enable them

conscientiously to guarantee proper treatment to the Liberian labourers,

and why, when they are once convinced, should not those agents, far from

discouraging, encourage Liberians, and perhaps others, to go to San

Thomé? If this miracle could be effected--and with real good-will on

both sides it ought to be possible to effect it--a very great step in

advance would have been taken to solve this difficult problem. But in

order to realise such an ideal, mutual confidence would have to be

established. When the affairs of the Congo were under discussion the

Belgian air was thick with rumours that British humanitarianism was a

mere cloak to hide the greed of British merchants. Similar ideas are, it

would appear, now afloat at Lisbon. When men's pockets are touched they

are apt to become extremely suspicious of humanitarian intentions. Mr.

Wingfield, writing on August 17, 1912, said that the Portuguese

Government was not "convinced of the disinterestedness of all those who

criticise them," and he intimated that there were schemes on foot on the

part of British subjects to acquire "roças" in the islands "at very low

prices." It ought not to be difficult to convince the Portuguese

authorities that the agents employed by the Anti-Slavery Society are in

no way connected with any such projects. On the other hand, it would be

necessary that those agents should be very carefully chosen, that

besides being humanitarians they should have some knowledge of business,

and that they should enter upon their inquiry in a spirit of fairness,

and not with any preconceived intention to push to an extreme any

suspicions they may entertain of Portuguese acts and intentions. It is

suggested that the adoption of some such mode of proceeding as is here

indicated is worthy of consideration. The Foreign Office might very

properly act as an intermediary to bring the two parties together.

Finally, before leaving this branch of the subject, it is to be observed

that the difficulty of obtaining free labour has occurred elsewhere than

in the Portuguese possessions. It has generally admitted, at all events,

of a partial solution if the labourers are well treated and adequately

paid. Portuguese experience points to a similar conclusion. Mr.

Smallbones, writing on September 23, 1912, quotes the report of the

manager of the Lobito railway, in which the latter, after stating that

he has had no difficulty in obtaining all the labour he has required,

adds, "I attribute the facility in obtaining so large a supply of

labour, relatively cheaply, to the good food we supply them with, and

chiefly to the regularity with which payments in cash are effected, and

also to the justice with which they are treated."

The question of repatriation remains to be treated. It must, of course,

be remembered that repatriation is an act of justice to the men already

enslaved, but that, by itself, it does little or nothing towards solving

the main difficulties of the slavery problem. Mr. Wingfield, writing to

Sir Edward Grey on August 24, 1912, relates a conversation he had had

with Senhor Vasconcellos. "His Excellency first observed that they were

generally subjected to severe criticism in England, and said to be

fostering slavery because they did not at once repatriate all natives

who had served the term of their original contracts. Now they were

blamed for the misfortunes which resulted from their endeavour to act as

England was always suggesting that they should act!" His Excellency made

what Parliamentarians would call a good debating point, but the

complaint is obviously more specious than real, for what people in

England expect is not merely that the slaves should, if they wish it, be

repatriated, but that the repatriation should be conducted under

reasonably humane conditions. For the purposes of the present argument

it is needless to inquire whether the ghastly story adopted by the

Anti-Slavery Society on the strength of a statement in a Portuguese

newspaper, but denied by the Portuguese Government, that the corpses of

fifty repatriated men who had died of starvation were at one time to be

seen lying about in the outskirts of Benguella, be true or false.

Independently of this incident, all the evidence goes to show that

Colonel Wyllie is saying no more than the truth when he writes: "To

repatriate, _i.e._ to dump on the African mainland without previous

arrangement for his reception, protection, or safe conduct over his

further route, an Angolan or hinterland 'serviçal' who has spent years

of his life in San Thomé, is not merely to sentence him to death, but to

execute that sentence with the shortest possible delay." It is against

this system that those interested in the subject in England protested.

The Portuguese Government appear now to have recognised the justice of

their protests, for they have recently adopted a plan somewhat similar

to that initiated by the late Lord Salisbury for dealing with immigrant

coolies from India. By an Order in Council dated October 17, 1912, it

has been provided that repatriated "serviçaes" should receive a grant of

land and should be set up, free of charge, with agricultural implements

and seeds. This is certainly a step in the right direction. It is as yet

too early to say how far the plan will succeed, but if it is honestly

carried out it ought to go far towards solving the repatriation

question. Mr. Smallbones would appear justified in claiming that it

"should be given a fair trial before more heroic measures are applied."

The repatriation fund, which appears, to say the least, to have been

very badly administered, ought, without difficulty, to be able to meet

the expenses which the adoption of this plan will entail.

[Footnote 105: Mr. E.W. Brooks subsequently wrote to _The Spectator_ to

explain that "the letter in question was in no sense an official letter

from the Society of Friends. It was the product of one small meeting of

that body, which appears to have been misinformed by one or more of its

members, and was in no sense a letter from the Society of Friends,

which, on the subject of Portuguese Slavery, is officially represented

by its Anti-Slavery Committee, of which he is himself the Honorary

Secretary."]

XXV

ENGLAND AND ISLAM

_"The Spectator," August 23, 1913_

Amidst the many important remarks made by Sir Edward Grey in his recent

Parliamentary statement on the affairs of the Balkan Peninsula, none

deserve greater attention than those which dealt with the duties and

responsibilities of England towards Mohammedans in general. It was,

indeed, high time that some clear and authoritative declaration of

principle on this important subject should be made by a Minister of the

Crown. We are constantly being reminded that King George V. is the

greatest Mohammedan ruler in the world, that some seventy millions of

his subjects in India are Moslems, and that the inhabitants of Egypt are

also, for the most part, followers of the Prophet of Arabia. It is not

infrequently maintained that it is a duty incumbent on Great Britain to

defend the interests and to secure the welfare of Moslems all over the

world because a very large number of their co-religionists are British

subjects and reside in British territory. It is not at all surprising

that this claim should be advanced, but it is manifestly one which

cannot be admitted without very great and important qualifications.

Moreover, it is one which, from a European point of view, represents a

somewhat belated order of ideas. It is true that community of religion

constitutes the main bond of union between Russia and the population of

the Balkan Peninsula, but apart from the fact that no such community of

religious thought exists between Christian England and Moslem or Hindu

India, it is to be noted that, generally speaking, the tie of a common

creed, which played so important a part in European politics and

diplomacy during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, has now been

greatly weakened, even if it has not disappeared altogether. It has been

supplanted almost everywhere by the bond of nationality. No practical

politician would now argue that, if the Protestants of Holland or Sweden

had any special causes for complaint, a direct responsibility rested on

their co-religionists in Germany or England to see that those grievances

were redressed. No Roman Catholic nation would now advance a claim to

interfere in the affairs of Ireland on the ground that the majority of

the population of that country are Roman Catholics.

This transformation of political thought and action has not yet taken

place in the East. It may be, as some competent observers are disposed

to think, that the principle of nationality is gaining ground in Eastern

countries, but it has certainly not as yet taken firm root. The bond

which holds Moslem societies together is still religious rather than

patriotic. Its binding strength has been greatly enhanced by two

circumstances. One is that Mecca is to the Moslem far more than

Jerusalem is to the Christian or to the Jew. From Delhi to Zanzibar,

from Constantinople to Java, every devout Moslem turns when he prays to

what Mr. Stanley Lane-Poole aptly calls the "cradle of his creed." The

other circumstance is that, although, as Mr. Hughes has said, "we have

not seen a single work of authority, nor met with a single man of

learning who has ever attempted to prove that the Sultans of Turkey are

rightful Caliphs," at the same time the spiritual authority usurped by

Selim I. is generally recognised throughout Islam, with the result not

only that unity of thought has been engendered amongst Moslems, but also

that religion has to a great extent been incorporated into politics, and

identified with the maintenance of a special form of government in a

portion of the Moslem world.

The growth of the principle of nationality in those eastern countries

which are under western dominion might not inconceivably raise political

issues of considerable magnitude, but in the discussions which have from

time to time taken place on this subject the inconveniences and even

danger caused by the universality of a non-national bond based on

community of religion have perhaps been somewhat unduly neglected. These

inconveniences have, however, always existed. That the policy which led

to the Crimean War and generally the prolonged tension which existed

between England and Russia were due to the British connection with India

is universally recognised. It would be difficult to differentiate the

causes of that tension, and to say how far it was, on the one hand, due

to purely strategical considerations, or, on the other hand, to a desire

to meet the wishes and satisfy the aspirations of the many millions of

Moslems who are British subjects. Since, however, the general diplomatic

relations between England and Russia have, fortunately for both

countries, been placed on a footing of more assured confidence and

friendship than any which have existed for a long time past, strategical

considerations have greatly diminished in importance. The natural result

has been that the alternative plea for regarding Near Eastern affairs

from the point of view of Indian interests has acquired greater

prominence. Those who have been closely in touch with the affairs of

the Near East, and have watched the gradual decay of Turkey, have for

some while past foreseen that the time was inevitably approaching when

British statesmen and the British nation would be forced by the

necessities of the situation to give a definite answer to the question

how far their diplomatic action in Europe would have to be governed by

the alleged obligation to conciliate Moslem opinion in India. That

question received, to a certain limited extent, a practical answer when

Bulgaria declared war on Turkey and when not a voice was raised in this

country to urge that the policy which dictated the Crimean War should be

rehabilitated.

The answer, however, is not yet complete. England is now apparently

expected by many Moslems to separate herself from the Concert of Europe,

and not impossibly to imperil the peace of the world, in order that the

Turks should continue in occupation of Adrianople. The secretary of the

Punjab Moslem League has informed us through the medium of the press

that unless this is done the efforts of the extreme Indian Nationalists

to secure the sympathies of Mohammedans in India "will meet with growing

success."

It was in reality to this challenge that Sir Edward Grey replied. His

answer was decisive, and left no manner of doubt as to the policy which

the British Government intends to pursue. It will almost certainly meet

with well-nigh universal approval in this country. After explaining that

the racial sentiments and religious feelings of Moslem subjects of the

Crown would be respected and have full scope, that British policy would

never be one of intolerance or wanton and unprovoked aggression against

a Mohammedan Power, and that the British Government would never join in

any outrage on Mohammedan feelings and sentiments in any part of the

world, Sir Edward Grey added, "We cannot undertake the duty of

protecting Mohammedan Powers outside the British dominions from the

consequences of their own action.... To suppose that we can undertake

the protection of and are bound to regulate our European policy so as to

side with a Mussulman Power when that Mussulman Power rejects the advice

given to it, that is not a claim we can admit."

These are wise words, and it is greatly to be hoped that not only the

Moslems of Turkey, but also those inhabiting other countries, will read,

mark, learn, and inwardly digest them. Notably, the Moslems of India

should recognise that, with the collapse of Turkish power in Europe, a

new order of things has arisen, that the change which the attitude of

England towards Turkey has undergone is the necessary consequence of

that collapse, and that it does not in the smallest degree connote

unfriendliness to Islam. In fact, they must now endeavour to separate

Islamism from politics. With the single exception of the occupation of

Cyprus, which, as Lord Goschen very truly said at the time, "prevented

British Ambassadors from showing 'clean hands' to the Sultan in proof of

the unselfishness of British action," the policy of England in the Near

East has been actuated, ever since the close of the Napoleonic wars, by

a sincere and wholly disinterested desire to save Turkish statesmen from

the consequences of their own folly. In this cause no effort has been

spared, even to the shedding of the best blood of England. All has been

in vain. History does not relate a more striking instance of the truth

of the old Latin saying that self-deception is the first step on the

road to ruin. Advice tendered in the best interests of the Ottoman

Empire has been persistently rejected. The Turks, who have always been

strangers in Europe, have shown conspicuous inability to comply with the

elementary requirements of European civilisation, and have at last

failed to maintain that military efficiency which has, from the days

when they crossed the Bosphorus, been the sole mainstay of their power

and position. It is, as Sir Edward Grey pointed out, unreasonable to

expect that we should now save them from the consequences of their own

action. Whether Moslems all over the world will or should still continue

to regard the Sultan of Turkey as their spiritual head is a matter on

which it would be presumptuous for a Christian to offer any opinion, but

however this may be, Indian Moslems would do well to recognise the fact

that circumstances, and not the hostility of Great Britain or of any

other foreign Power, have materially altered the position of the Sultan

in so far as the world of politics and diplomacy is concerned. Whether

the statesman in whose hands the destinies of Turkey now lie at once

abandon Adrianople, or whether they continue to remain there for a time

with the certainty that they will be sowing the seeds of further

bloodshed in the near future, one thing is certain. It is that the days

of Turkey as an European Power are numbered. Asia must henceforth be her

sphere of action.

That these truths should be unpalatable to Indian Moslems is but

natural; neither is it possible to withhold some sympathy from them in

the distress which they must now feel at the partial wreck of the most

important Moslem State which the world has yet seen. But facts, however

distasteful, have to be faced, and it would be truly deplorable if the

non-recognition of those facts should lead our Moslem fellow-subjects

in India to resent the action of the British Government and to adopt a

line of conduct from which they have nothing to gain and everything to

lose. But whatever that line of conduct may be, the duty of the British

Government and nation is clear. Their European policy, whilst allowing

all due weight to Indian interests and sentiment, must in the main be

guided by general considerations based on the necessities of civilised

progress throughout the world, and on the interests and welfare of the

British Empire as a whole. The idea that that policy should be diverted

from its course in order to subserve the cause of a single Moslem Power

which has rejected British advice is, as Sir Edward Grey very rightly

remarked, wholly inadmissible.

XXVI

SOME INDIAN PROBLEMS[106]

_"The Spectator," August 30, 1913_

In spite of the optimism at times displayed in dealing with Indian

affairs, which may be justified on grounds which are often, to say the

least, plausible, it is impossible to ignore the fact that the general

condition of India gives cause for serious reflection, if not for grave

anxiety. We are told on all sides that the East is rapidly awakening

from its torpid slumbers--even to the extent of forgetting that

characteristically Oriental habit of thought embodied in the Arabic

proverb, "Slowness is from God, hurry from the Devil." If this be so, we

must expect that, year by year, problems of ever-increasing complexity

will arise which will tax to the utmost the statesmanship of those

Western nations who are most brought in contact with Eastern peoples.

In these circumstances, it is specially desirable that the different

points of view from which Indian questions may be regarded should be

laid before the British public by representatives of various schools of

thought. But a short time ago a very able Socialist member of Parliament

(Mr. Ramsay MacDonald) gave to the world the impressions he had derived

whilst he was "careering over the plains of Rajputana," and paying

hurried visits to other parts of India. His views, although manifestly

in some degree the result of preconceived opinions, and somewhat tainted

with the dogmatism which is characteristic of the political school of

thought to which he belongs, exhibit at the same time habits of acute

observation and powers of rapid--sometimes unduly rapid--generalisation.

Neither are they, on the whole, so prejudiced as might have been

expected from the antecedents and political connections of the author.

More recently we have had in a work written by Mr. Mallik, which was

lately reviewed in these columns, a striking specimen of one of those

pernicious by-products which are the natural and unavoidable outcome of

Eastern and Western contact. We have now to deal with a work of a very

different type. Many of the very difficult problems which Mr. Mitra

discusses in his interesting series of _Anglo-Indian Studies_ open up a

wide field for differences of opinion, but whatever views may be

entertained about them, all must recognise not only that no kind of

exception can be taken to the general spirit in which Mr. Mitra

approaches Indian subjects, but also that his observations are the

result of deep reflection, and of an honest endeavour to improve rather

than exacerbate racial relations. His remarks are, therefore, well

worthy of consideration.

Mr. Mitra shows a perfectly legitimate pride in the past history of his

country. He tells us how Hindu international lawyers anticipated Grotius

by some thirty centuries, how the Mahabharata embodies many of the

principles adopted by the Hague Conference, how India preceded Europe in

her knowledge of all the arts and sciences, even including that of

medicine, and how "Hindu drama was in its heyday before the theatres of

England, France, or Spain could be said to exist." But Mr. Mitra's

ardent patriotism does not blind him to the realities of the present

situation. A very intelligent Frenchman, M. Paul Boell, who visited

India a few years ago, came to the conclusion that the real Indian

question was not whether the English were justified in staying in the

country, but whether they could find any moral justification for

withdrawing from it. Mr. Mitra arrives at much the same conclusion as M.

Boell. "If the English were to withdraw from India to-morrow," he says,

"I fear that, notwithstanding all the peace precepts of our Mahabharata,

and in spite of the stupendous philosophy and so-called fatalism of the

Hindus, our Maharajahs would speedily be at each other's throats, as

they were before the _pax Britannica_ was established there." Moreover,

he asserts a principle of vital importance, which is but too often

ignored by his countrymen, and even at times by those who sympathise

with them in England. "Education and knowledge," he says, "can be pumped

into the student, but there is no royal road for instruction in

'capacity of management.' A Clive, with inferior education, may be a

better manager of men or of an industrial concern than the most learned

student." In other words, character rather than intellect is the

foundation not only of national but also of individual greatness--a

profound truth which is brought home every day to those who are engaged

in the actual management of public affairs, especially in the East. Mr.

Mitra, moreover, makes various praiseworthy efforts to dispel certain

illusions frequently nourished by some of his countrymen, and to

diminish the width of the religious gulf which separates the rulers from

the ruled. He quotes with approval Sir Rajendra Mookerjee's complete,

albeit facile, exposure of the fallacy, dear to the hearts of many

Indian press writers and platform speakers, that Indian interests suffer

by the introduction of British capital into India. "It is wise," Sir

Rajendra said, "to allow British capitalists to interest themselves in

our industries and thus take an active part in their development." He

prefers to dwell on the points of similarity which unite rather than on

the differences which separate Hinduism and Christianity. "The two

religions," he says, "have so much in common when one gets down to

essentials that it seems to me this ought to furnish a great bond of

sympathy between the two peoples," and he urges that "every attempt

should be made to utilise the Hindu University to remove the spirit of

segregation which unquestionably exists between the Christian Government

in India and its Hindu subjects, and thus pave the way to harmonious

co-operation between the Aryan rulers and the ruled in India."

Political and Literary essays, 1908-1913 · 第 21 / 24 段