beings who were once in this condition, we must attend to another
important consideration; which is, that when God at any time deals in
_mere equity_ with a moral agent, without the counteracting influence
of sovereign favour, the inevitable consequence is, that his liberty,
or free choice, will terminate upon his passive power. Hence the
_certainty_ of the futurition of moral evil, in all possible degrees
and circumstances, without any decretive efficiency in its
production.—If it be asked, why the exercise of _equity_ is assigned
as the occasion of this union, rather than _sovereignty_; or, why
leaving a free agent to the influence of his passive power should not
be considered a sovereign rather than an equitable act? The best
answer to this enquiry, is a definition of the two terms. By _equity_
then I mean the principle that gives to each his due; by
_sovereignty_, a right to do whatsoever is not inconsistent with
equity. And from this definition it must appear that there may he a
two-fold deviation from equity, _viz._ giving _more_ than is due, or
_less_ than is due; more good and less evil, or more evil and less
good than is equitable. The former of these, more good and less evil,
must needs be for the advantage of the creature; and therefore it may
be called a _gracious_ deviation. Without it, there would be no room
for either mercy or grace. The latter, more evil and less good than is
due, is properly called _injustice_, and is such a deviation from
equity as is not compatible with the divine character. Therefore, to
do us good _beyond_ our claim is an act of _sovereignty_; but to give
us neither more nor less than is our due is to deal with us in _pure
equity_.
9. Hence it follows, that when God deals with angels or men in
_sovereignty_, according to the definitions, he does them _good
beyond_ their claim. But to make _this_ to be the immediate _cause_ of
the sin of men and angels is absurd. On the other hand, it is
incompatible with the divine character, as before observed, to give
them less good and more evil than is their due; and therefore _this_
cannot be the cause of sin, as sure as God is incapable of exercising
injustice.—Wherefore, it remains that then alone can moral agents fall
into sin when dealt with in _pure equity_. In the act of defection, or
becoming sinful, they are equally free from being impelled by
injustice, and upheld by sovereign favour.
COROLLARIES.
1. All the _good_ and happiness in the universe of created beings are
the fruit of Sovereignty and Decree.
2. All the _moral evil_ and misery in the universe are the offspring
of _liberty_, a natural good, terminating or acting upon, or united to
_passive power_, a natural evil not counteracted by sovereignly
gracious acts on the disposition, or the seat of the moral principle,
which may be called analogically _the heart_.
3. As every act and degree of liberty is perfectly fore-known to God,
as the effect of his own decree, and every hypothetical tendency of
passive power, though itself not an object of decree, is equally
fore-known, it follows, that every sin is as accurately fore-known as
if decreed, and has an equally infallible ground of certain
futurition.
Footnote 239:
It is allowed that there is a difference between the _cause of sin_,
as a _principle_, and being a _sinner_; but when applied to an
_agent_, to be the author or the cause of sin, and to be a sinner, is
the same thing. Therefore, when applied to God, in no proper sense
whatever can it be said that he is the _author of sin_.—“If by _the
author of sin_ is meant (says President Edwards) the permitter, or a
_not hinderer_ of sin, and at the same time a disposer of the state of
events in such a manner, for wise, holy, and most excellent ends and
purposes, that sin infallibly follows: I say, if this be all that is
meant by the author of sin, I do not deny that God is the author of
sin, though I dislike and reject the phrase, as that which by use and
custom is apt to carry another sense.” Edwards on the Will, Part iv.
Sect. xi.
But though this acute and excellent writer disavows the use of the
phrase, he no where assigns the _true ground_ why it should not be
used. The truth is, he does not seem to have been aware of any
alternative between the _certain futurition_ of sin and its being
_decreed_. And his only method of warding off the most ruinous
consequences appears to have been adopted for want of a better, and
not from the satisfactory nature of that method. His view, in brief,
is this: God is a being of infinite goodness and wisdom; he can will
nothing but good; the system he hath adopted is the best; now, says
he, “if the will be good, and the object of his will be, all things
considered, good and best, then the choosing and willing it, is not
_willing evil_. And if so, then his ordering according to that will is
not _doing evil_.”
It is very seldom that this eminent author fails in his reasoning; but
here certainly he does fail. The phrases _willing evil_, and _doing
evil_, are not used in the same sense in both parts of the premises,
from whence the conclusion is inferred. A system, all things
considered, being best, is no good reason why each individual part of
it is good. And it may be forcibly retorted; a system which includes
an infinite evil as a part of its institution cannot be from God. Nor
can it be said that this is arguing against _fact_, without begging
the question, that God has _appointed the evil_ which is blended with
the good.—On the subject itself let the following things be
considered:
1. If choosing and willing a system in which _sin is a decreed part_
is not _willing evil_, because the system is good and best, all things
considered then it would inevitably follow, that sin, because such a
part of that system is _not an evil_. But, it may be said, It is
willing it for a _good end_. Does then a good _end_ or intention
destroy the _nature_ of sin? Was the sin of Paul or any other saint
_anihilated_ because he _sincerely aimed_ at the Glory of God? Or has
any _design_, however comprehensive, exalted or sincere, the _least
tendency_ to alter the _nature_ of sin?
2. Allowing as incontrovertible that the present system of things is
the best, all things considered, and that sin is actually blended with
it, it does not thence follow that the sin itself is _decreed_, or is
any part of divine appointment. For _not to hinder_ sin, is extremely
different from being the _cause_ or author of it. The one is perfectly
consistent with equity, the other would be an act of _injustice_.
3. It is a sentiment so repugnant to all analogical propriety, to _do
evil that good may come_, that it cannot be supposed a man of Mr.
Edwards’ piety would have adopted any thing like it, but from what
appeared to him an inevitable necessity. And indeed whoever assumes
the principle, that every event comes to pass from _decretive_
necessity, sin not excepted, must of course be driven to his
conclusion. But this valuable author had no need to recur to that
opinion, in order to establish his theory of _hypothetical_ necessity;
for this will stand on a rock, immoveably, without such aid.
4. In reality, the certain futurition of _good_, and that of _evil_,
arises from _different_, yea from diametrically _opposite_ causes. The
one flows from the operative will of God, and is fore-known to be
future because decreed, the other flows from a deficient or privative
cause, passive power, when united to liberty, as before explained,
which exists only in created beings, and in all these, as a contrast
to self-existence, independence, and all-sufficiency. Yet _this_ is
the subject of hypothetical tendencies and results no less than the
good to which it stands opposed, in all the boundless varieties of its
blendings; therefore no case can be so complicated, but to infinite
prescience the event must appear with _equal certainty_ as if decreed.
Footnote 240:
“_Equally impious and needless._” _Needless_, because the existence of
sin is fairly and fully accounted for on another principle; _impious_,
because it ascribes to God the worst of all principles, the causation
of sin. That God superintends, directs, and over-rules the actions of
men is worthy of him; and equally so that he does _not hinder_ the
existence of moral evil; but that he is a positive and efficacious
cause of moral evil, or that this is consistent with either his
justice or holiness can never be proved. Dr. Hopkins, indeed, says,
that “the attempt to _distinguish_ between the sinful volitions or
actions of men as natural and moral actions; and making God the origin
and cause of them considered as natural actions, and men the cause and
authors of the _depravity_ and sin which is in them, is, it is
believed, _unintelligible_—unless by making this distinction it be
meant, that in every sinful action, God is not the sinful cause of
it.” The author, however, candidly adds, “But if the contrary can be
made to appear, this doctrine, with all that is implied in it, shall
be given up and renounced.” As the removal of this principle, and the
establishment of the other, appear to me of the highest importance in
theology, a few remarks, in addition to those already made, may not be
superfluous, as tending to exhibit the principle here maintained in
different lights and connexions; and when all are properly examined,
it is probable they will not be wholly “_unintelligible_.”
1. God, JEHOVAH, is the infinite and eternal Essence, which is of
_absolute necessity_—the self-existent, independent, and
all-sufficient Being—from eternity to eternity generating his own
light and joy, called his only begotten Son; not from mere will, but
of the same necessity.
2. God in his boundless all-sufficiency views all _possibles_ with all
their positive and privative _tendencies_. That all possibles have
their _positive_ tendencies is as plain as that two added to three
make five. Were there no positive tendencies, there could be no
hypothetical certainty, no law of nature, no connexion between cause
and effect. And it is equally true, though not equally plain, that
there are _privative_ tendencies in all beings but that one who exists
of _absolute necessity_. To suppose the contrary, is the same as to
suppose that a creature _may be made_ independent, and all-sufficient.
But that is, every reasonable being must allow, _absolutely
impossible_, as implying the grossest contradiction. On this
demonstrated fact rests unavoidably the existence of that principle in
every created nature which I call _Passive Power_. Yet.
3. It does not follow that the mere collateral existence of these two
principles in the same subject must needs produce moral evil. Then
alone does this take place when the one terminates upon, or is united
to the other, without the interposition of sovereign favour. It is not
in the power of equity to assist. For the exercise of equity is to
give each his due; but to _prevent_ sin is not _due_ to the subject of
it, otherwise no one _could ever sin_ but on condition of _injustice_
in God.
4. After all, it may be objected, that the _scriptures_ ascribe to God
the causation of moral evil; as, hardening the heart of
Pharaoh—hardening whom he will—making the wicked for the day of
evil—appointing to destruction—determining the death of
Christ—delivering him by determinate counsel—doing all evil in a
city—making vessels to dishonour—fitting them for destruction, &c.—In
reply to this objection it must be considered, that whatever the
import of such representations may be, no interpretation which is
_unworthy of God_ can be the true meaning—that the idioms of the
sacred languages ascribing cause or operation to God must be
understood according to the nature of the subject—and, what is
particularly to our purpose, that active verbs which denote _making_,
_doing_, _causing_, and the like, often denote a _declaration_ of the
thing done, or that shall take place; or a _permission_ of it.
Take a few specimens. Thus Acts x. 15. “What God hath _cleansed_,”
means, what God hath _declared_ to be clean.—Isai. vi. 9, 10. The
prophet is commanded to tell the people, “understand not, perceive
not;” and he is ordered to “_make_ the heart of this people fat, to
_make_ their ears heavy, and to _shut_ their eyes.” And what can this
mean more than to _declare a fact_, either what they then were, or
what they would be?—So Jer. i. 10. The Prophet’s _declaration_ of what
should be, is called his _rooting_ out _pulling_ down, &c.—Ezek.
xliii. 3. The prophet says, “when I came to _destroy_ the city;” his
meaning undoubtedly is, When I came to prophecy or _declare_ that the
city should be destroyed.—Exod. v. 22. “Lord, wherefore hast thou
_evil entreated_ this people?” Moses means, Wherefore hast thou
_permitted_ them to be evil entreated?—Jer. iv. 10. “Lord God, thou
hast greatly _deceived_ this people;” that is, _permitted_ or not
hindered them to be deceived by the false Prophets.—Ezek. xiv. 9. “I
the Lord have _deceived_ that prophet.” Can any thing else be meant
than suffering him to deceive himself?—Matt. xi. 25. “Thou hast _hid_
these things” _i. e._ _not revealed_.——Thus also, Rom. ix. 18. “Whom
he will he _hardeneth_,” he suffereth to be hardened.—Rom. xi. 8. “God
_gave them_ a spirit of slumber,” _i. e._ permitted them to slumber. 2
Thes. ii. 11. “God shall _send_ them strong delusion, that they should
believe a lie;” _i. e._ shall _permit_ them to be deluded so that they
shall believe a lie.—Exod. vii. 3. &c. “And I will _harden_ Pharaoh’s
heart,” i. e. I will _suffer_ it to be hardened. Matt. x. 34, 35. “I
am not come to _send_ peace, but _a sword_; For I am come to _set_ a
man _at variance_ against his father,” That is, my coming shall be the
_innocent occasion_ of wars and variance.—Jude 4. “Who were before of
old _ordained_ to this condemnation;” _i. e._ _foretold_, or
_forewritten_, as the word signifies; _announced_ in the sacred pages,
and _proscribed_ by divine law.
But the passage above all others, which appears to countenance the
notion, that God is the _cause_ of sin, is 1 Pet. ii. 8. “A stone of
stumbling, and a rock of offence, even in them which stumble at the
word, being disobedient, _whereunto also they were appointed_.” _i.
e._ _unto which thing_, their stumbling, _they were appointed because
disobedient_. The Greek participle includes the cause of their
falling; as Heb. ii. 3. _Neglecting_ so great salvation, how shall we
escape? _To which_ not escaping, they _were appointed, for neglecting_
so great salvation. A striking _contrast_ to this we have, John vii.
17. “If any man will _do his will_, he shall _know_ of the doctrine;”
but the _disobedient_ shall, according to an awful but equitable
_appointment_, “stumble, and fall, and be broken, and be snared, and
be taken.”—(Isa. viii. 15.) We have a further illustration of this
meaning in Heb. iii. 18. “To whom sware he that they should not enter
into his rest, but to them that _believe_ not?” _i. e._ Who were
_appointed_ to destruction? The answer is, the _disobedient_; for the
original word is the same here as in Peter, under a different
inflection. And it is added, ver. 19. “So they could not enter in
_because_ of _unbelief_.”—Thus also Rom. xi. 7. “The rest _were
blinded_, or _hardened_;” _i. e._ were _suffered_ to be blind or hard.
And that this is the meaning is decided by ver. 20. “_Because of
unbelief_ they were broken off.”
Upon the whole, Peter intimates, that none should be offended at such
characters, men of learning and eminence rejecting the Messiah and his
gospel. Their end is what might be expected, as _foretold_ by the
prophets, according to God’s _righteous_ government, and his eternal
_appointment_, or _determination_, respecting all such offenders.
Their habitual unbelieving _disobedience_ was the _cause_, but their
actual stumbling at the word to their destruction was the natural, the
righteous, the appointed _effect_. To this they were appointed,
_placed_, or _set forth_ (as Pharaoh was _raised up_) by the righteous
judgment of God, who resisteth the proud and disobedient; in order to
shew forth the glory of his justice in them. They were personally
_appointed_ to exalted situations, being civil and ecclesiastical
_builders_; they were _suffered_ to reject Christ, in pure equity; and
thus were deservedly _constituted_ awful warnings to others.
Footnote 241:
This notion, perhaps more than any other, has been termed
_Baxterianism_, and yet it is not easy to say that Mr. Baxter ever
maintained it. He says indeed “all have so much (grace) as bringeth
and leaveth the success to man’s will;” and this in a discourse
wherein he allows that God hath “positively elected certain persons by
an absolute decree to overcome all their resistances of his Spirit,
and to draw them to Christ, and by Christ to himself, by such a power
and way as shall _infallibly_ convert and save them.” He moreover
says, “What if men cannot here tell how to resolve the question,
whether _any_ or _how many_ are ever converted or saved by that _mere
grace_ which we call _sufficient_, or rather _necessary_, and common
to those that are not converted; and whether man’s will ever make a
saving determining improvement of it?”—“And yet,” he adds, “this
question itself is formed on false suppositions and is capable of a
satisfactory solution.” Baxter’s Works, Vol. ii. p. 929.—On the
subject of this Note the author begs leave to refer his readers to
Doddridge’s Works, Vol. v. p. 238, 239, Notes.
Footnote 242:
The nature of God, his holy will, and our peculiar relation to him,
form an adamantine chain of obligation to duty which cannot with
impunity be broken; from which predestination is so far from releasing
us, that it forms another chain of gold that shall finally prevail;
and divine grace personally experienced is a silken cord to draw the
soul along in the path of duty. But do these powerful ties render
useless God’s _reasoning_ with sinners, his _exhortations_ to
repentance, to believing, to obedience, and to every particular branch
of duty? No: for these methods are the very means to attain the end,
and form a part of the decree itself.
END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.
Transcriber’s Notes:
Missing or obscured punctuation was corrected. The author's archaic
punctuation and spellings have been retained.
End of Project Gutenberg's A Body of Divinity, Vol. 1 of 4, by Thomas Ridgley