left for a covenant of grace between the Father, Son, and Spirit? Has
not the Father given to the Son a people for whom he should be
obedient unto death, for whom he should give his life a ransom, for
whom he should rise, live, and reign till all his enemies be subdued,
and to whom Christ has engaged to give eternal life? If we reject
predestination to life, what meaning is there in his office of
_surety_? Is not Jesus a surety for his people? But what is a surety?
It is one who undertakes for another. What does Jesus undertake to do?
He undertakes not only to become incarnate for them, to obey the law,
to endure the contradiction of sinners and cope with the rigid demands
of equity, but also to justify many, to give them life, to keep them
from every rapacious hand, to purify them by his blood, to save them
from sin and hell, and to bring them to the beatific vision of his
glory.
In a word, take away this doctrine, and you take away the foundation
of God—the foundation of his covenant—the foundation of his temple,
the church—the foundation of the saints’ hope and joy. But, blessed be
God, his foundation standeth sure, having this seal, The Lord knoweth
them that are his. Known unto God are all his ways, and all his people
from the beginning. Blind chance and impotent free will shall never be
the partners of his throne.
We next come to notice
III. Some objections which may be, and often are, made to this
doctrine. And
1. If this doctrine be true, it is urged by some, God would then be an
arbitrary and partial being. This objection supposes that God has _no
right_ to be so; but on the contrary, nothing appears more worthy of
him than to exercise arbitrary power, and to manifest partiality. No
such right is vested in man, as to do what he pleases, while he
disdains to consult any other will than his own. But whose will beside
his own can the infinitely perfect God consult? Who hath known the
mind of the Lord, or who hath been his counsellor? Or, who hath first
given to him, and it shall be recompensed unto him again? For of him,
and through him, and to him are all things; to whom be glory for ever.
Let us appeal to facts. Are there not marks of high sovereignty and
holy partiality through universal nature? Are they not visible in the
heavens above, and in this lower world? Is there not a greater light
that rules the day, and the lesser lights that rule the night? And
does not one star differ from another star in glory? Are not these
marks visible in the operations of providence, in the persons of men,
their corporeal forms and mental endowments? Are they not constantly
seen in the history of nations, the changes of empires, and the
dispensations of grace to different tribes of men? How conspicuous is
this in God’s conduct towards Abraham and his posterity for a series
of ages, and afterwards in the calling of the Gentiles? And how
becoming in us to adopt the same language with the apostle Paul on
that occasion: “O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and
knowledge of God! how unsearchable are his judgments, and his ways
past finding out!” And is not the same partiality visible at this very
day? Yet is he holy in all his works, and righteous in all his ways.
2. It is objected, If this doctrine be true, then is man reduced to a
mere machine. No, a mere machine has no sensibility, no consciousness,
no reason, and no will. But he is acted upon, they say, and therefore
not an agent. Is it then essential to an agent not to be acted upon?
Then there is but one agent in the universe; for every thing but the
first cause is acted upon more or less. The fact is, there is no
contrariety in these two things. Angels and men are acted upon, yet
they are moral agents. The holy agency upon them respects chiefly
their _disposition_ itself, but the agency they exert is the
_exercise_ of their faculties, will, and disposition. Whether their
disposition be good or bad, still they are agents. If this be made
good, it must be by sovereign influence; and then the agency and
choice will be good: but if this be bad, the agency is bad too.
But granting to the objector that the objects of predestination are,
in the sense now mentioned, machines, or instruments in the hand of
divine sovereignty; what then? I fain would know what better lot can
be assigned us than to be instruments in the hand of a predestinating
God? I solemnly protest that I desire no better, no other lot. And who
can describe the nature of this high privilege! This people have I
formed for myself, they shall shew forth my praise. O the blessedness
of being entirely passive in the hand of that God who predestinates
nothing but good? Was Paul obliged to the Lord, or was he not, for
arresting him in the midst of his wicked career? Has that man any
reason to complain, who is restrained from wickedness, but compelled
to embrace happiness? Then, say some, his will would be forced. O no!
this by no means follows. My people, saith the Lord, shall be willing
in the day of my power. Surely God can put his Holy Spirit in either
man or child without forcing the will. And let there be but the
active, regenerating renewing presence of this divine agent, the
choice of good will be no more compelled, or the will no more forced,
than in the most free acts of which the human mind is capable.
3. This doctrine, it is said, tends to licentiousness.—This is an
assertion which has been often made, but, I apprehend, never fairly
proved; for it is contrary to universal experience. Turn your eyes to
a vast army, headed by experienced officers—what is the language of
nature and experience? You uniformly find great generals anxious to
impress the sentiment on the minds of their troops that they are
_destined_ to victory. What gives rise to this kind of oratory? What
is the philosophy of such rhetoric? It is founded in the nature of
man, and confirmed by the experience of ages, that confidence in a
favourable issue animates exertion.
Consult a serious christian, who, through a long pilgrimage, has
believed this doctrine. Will he deliberately tell you that it has this
tendency, or that he has found this effect in his own experience? No,
he will tell you nothing gives him more courage and vigour against
sin.—It is not when in a dry, backsliding frame of mind, or when
verging to licentiousness, that he can rest in this doctrine; but when
he is most resolved for God and heaven—when most diligent in the high
way of holiness. Then, indeed, he can say, I know that all things work
together for my good—my predestination includes conformity to Christ,
my calling, my justification, and warfare against sin. If God be for
me, who can be against me? Who shall lay any thing to my charge? It is
God that justifieth. Who is he that condemneth? It is Christ that
died, is risen, and maketh intercession. Who shall separate me from
the love of Christ? Shall tribulation, or distress, or famine, or
persecution, or nakedness, or peril, or sword? Nay, in all these
things I am more than conqueror through him that loved me. For I am
persuaded, that neither death, nor life, nor angels, nor
principalities, nor powers, nor things present, nor things to come,
nor height, nor depth, nor any other creature, shall be able to
separate me from the love of God which is in Christ Jesus my Lord.
4. Some would insinuate, that though this doctrine be true, yet it
should not be preached, because it is a secret in the mind of God. But
I hope it has been proved, that as a _doctrine_ it is not a secret,
but is revealed in the holy scriptures, and supported by the soundest
arguments. The objects, indeed, or the persons who are predestinated,
are known to God only before they bear fruit, By their _fruits_ WE can
come to know them, in the _ordinary_ course of things; nor is it any
part of the doctrine asserted, that it belongs to man to ascertain the
individual objects any farther than by character.
But there are other ends to be answered by this doctrine.—To be in the
way to eternal glory is an unspeakable privilege; and it is the proper
part of a christian to enquire into the cause of it. His own humility
and gratitude are involved in it. The honour of God, the wisdom of his
counsel, and the lustre of his grace; the offices of Christ, the
surety of a better covenant, and the good Shepherd of the sheep; his
powerful intercession, and his government over all things to the
church—all are involved in the proper declaration of this truth.—Once
more,
5. This doctrine, it may be said, is dangerous, in proportion as it is
insisted upon, in that it prevents the more needful enquiry, “Am I
born again!” Yes, there would be danger, if _all_ the attention of
ministers and people, or even a disproportionate share of it were
confined to this. But, thou mistaken objector, because there are some
who will take the bread of children and cast it away, are the children
not to be fed? Because there were corrupt men disposed to turn the
grace of God into lasciviousness, would you rob any child of God of
this holy triumph. He will choose our inheritance for us! The Lord
will not cast off his people, neither will he forsake his inheritance.
For the Lord is our defence, the Holy One of Israel is our King. I
will trust and not be afraid, for the Lord Jehovah is my strength and
my song, he also is become my salvation.——For the same reason that we
ought not to be ashamed of the gospel of Christ, we need not, we ought
not to be ashamed of this doctrine.
I would now offer
IV. A few practical uses of the subject. And,
1. This doctrine is a source of great comfort, when contrasted with
the fickleness of men, and the perpetual vicissitudes of the world.
The lot may be cast, but the Lord is the disposer of it. He worketh
all things after the counsel of his own will. His counsel shall stand,
and he doeth, and will do, all his pleasure. The wrath of man shall
praise him, and the remainder of wrath he will restrain. All things
work together for good to them who love God, to them who are the
called according to his purpose. He doeth all things well.
After viewing the present perturbed state of the world, the
revolutions of empire, the devastations of war, the alarms of
invasion, the degradation of some, and the exaltation of other
characters—how pleasing and consolatory to view a steady hand
over-ruling, guiding, and influencing all! Providence is “as it were a
wheel in the middle of a wheel.”—As for their rings, they are so high
that they are dreadful, and are full of eyes round about them. But how
delightful to reflect, that within these perpetually revolving wheels
there is an immoveable centre! God’s aim is steady, he is of one mind,
who can turn him?
2. As the predestination for which we contend is only to _good_, it
affords the most pleasing view of the divine character. God is love.
In him is no such inconsistency as is but too frequently found among
men. He is not a fountain sending forth at the same place both sweet
water and bitter, yielding both salt water and fresh. With the utmost
safety and confidence may a humble soul commit itself into the arms of
such a being. No one has any thing to fear from God but the proud and
rebellious, the unbelieving and impenitent. And surely bad must be the
doctrine that speaks peace to the wicked.
3. As in the present case the end, and the way leading to it, are
inseparable; every reason and argument, every alarming topic, every
scriptural exhortation, and every obligation to duty, are in full
force. They who represent these things as inconsistent with
predestination, either have a wrong view of the subject, or care not
what they say nor whereof they affirm. Obligation to duty is founded
on widely and totally different considerations.[242]
God sustains, with respect to man, a twofold character, the one is
that of an equitable governor, the other that of a sovereign disposer.
Answerably to this, man sustains a twofold character also; that of an
accountable agent, and that of a disposable subject. As _passive_ in
the hand of a sovereign God, he is necessitated to good, in proportion
as goodness attaches to him; and in the heirs of salvation this is
predestination to life. As _active_, or a moral agent, man is treated
according to the rules of reason and equity, yet mingled with
undeserved favours. So that every man is, in these different respects,
at once the subject of liberty and necessity.
Equally vague and unprofitable, therefore, is all controversy on the
subject now alluded to while one side contends for _liberty_ and the
other for _necessity_ to the usual exclusion of the opposite. Neither
can be wholly right. For, as sure as God disposes of a man for final
good, the doctrine of necessity is true; and as sure as a man is a
transgressor of divine law, and thus is fitted for destruction, he is
_free_ from all _decretive_ necessity. Therefore,
4. Here is no room for the impious inference, that when we do evil we
are predestinated to it. Let no man say when he is tempted, I am
tempted of God; for as God cannot be tempted with evil, so neither
tempteth he any man; but every man is tempted when he is drawn away of
his own lust, and enticed. Then when lust hath conceived, it bringeth
forth sin; and sin when it is finished, bringeth forth death. Do not
err, my beloved brethren; every good gift, and every perfect gift is
from above, and cometh down from the Father of lights, with whom is no
variableness, neither shadow of turning.—But evil, in whatever person,
in whatever place, at whatever time, in whatever form or degree, is
from a quarter diametrically opposite.—On the contrary,
5. When at any time we are engaged in the work of God, in any thing
whatever that is morally good, then are we employed in the execution
of the divine purposes; for there is no good done in time but was
decreed to be done, in all its circumstances, from eternity. Even all
the actions of the wicked, except the deformity or sinfulness which is
in them, are also worthy of God to predestinate. This consideration,
every one must allow, is a great incentive to virtue and holiness.
This remark is applicable both to ministers and people. Are ministers
engaged in preaching the law for conviction, the promises for
encouragement, and the unsearchable riches of Christ for consolation;
are they urging, according to scripture commands and example,
repentance towards God and faith in our Lord Jesus Christ; do they
enforce christian duties, teaching the disciples all things whatsoever
our Lord and lawgiver has commanded; do they warn sinners to flee from
the wrath to come, or invite the burdened and heavy laden to seek rest
in the meek and lowly, the merciful and loving Saviour? They are in
all this only the instruments of a sovereign God, or the _appointed
means_ whereby he executes his eternal purposes. Again, has God
enjoined the necessity of repentance, faith, holiness, obedience, and
perseverance; poverty of spirit, holy mourning, purity of heart, love
to enemies, &c? our personal compliance, which is evermore of grace,
is only the _decreed method_ of bringing us to that eternal glory
which is the end. Once more,
6. This doctrine properly guarded, and rightly understood, shews with
peculiar force the true ground of repentance, and the obligations of
gratitude and holiness.—If the sinfulness of no action is decreed, but
proceeds wholly from that in us which is opposite to God and his will,
whether secret or revealed, rectoral or decretive, what can be more
binding and reasonable than repentance toward God? And if all good,
whether natural, supernatural, moral or spiritual, in ourselves and
others, in time and to eternity proceed from God’s predestination,
what a foundation is there laid for gratitude! Put on, therefore, as
the elect of God, holy and beloved, bowels of mercies, kindness,
humbleness of mind, meekness, long-suffering. Give all diligence to
make your calling and election sure. And let the peace of God rule in
your hearts, to the which also ye are called in one body, and be ye
thankful. And whatsoever ye do in word or deed, do all in the name of
the Lord Jesus, giving thanks to God and the Father by him. _Amen._
DR. WILLIAMS.
Footnote 238:
Predestination _to Death_ or _misery_, as the end, and to _sin_ as the
means, I call “an impure mixture;” a _mixture_, because its connexion
with Predestination to life is arbitrary and forced;—impure, because
the supposition itself is a foul aspersion of the divine character.
St. Augustine, Calvin, Perkins, Twisse, Rutherford, &c. &c. though
highly valuable and excellent men, upon the whole, were not free from
this impure mixture of doctrine. But of all modern authors, if we
except the philosophical Necessarians, Hobbes, Collins, Hume, Hartley,
Priestly, &c. Dr. Hopkins, of America seems the most open in his
avowal of the sentiment, that _sin and misery_ are _decreed_ in the
same manner as holiness and happiness, in order to produce the
greatest general good. The substance of his reasoning is thus
expressed by himself: “All future existences, events, and actions,
must have a cause of their futurition, or there must be a reason why
they are future, or certainly to take place, rather than not. This
cause must be the _divine decree_ determining their future existence,
or it must be in the future _existences themselves_. But the future
existences could not he the cause of their own futurition; for this
supposes them to exist as a cause, and to have influence, before they
have any existence, even from eternity.—The cause therefore can be
nothing but _divine decree_, determining their future existence,
without which nothing could be future, consequently nothing could be
known to be future.”—See his System of doctrines, 2 vol. 8vo.
especially Vol. i p. 110-217.
On the sentiment itself, by whomsoever held, I would offer the
following strictures:
1. It is a mere assumption, that _sin_, which the above proposition
avowedly includes, has no possible _cause_ of its futurition but
either the divine decree, or the future existences themselves. For
though God’s decrees are the cause of our being, faculties, and
volitions, none of these, nor any thing else that can he traced to
divine causation, will constitute _sin_. Nor yet is it true that sin
is the _cause of itself_; for then sin would be self-existent. It
follows therefore that it must have another origin than either the
divine decree or its own existence.
2. It is equally plain that the _cause_ of sin is not itself morally
evil; For this would involve a contradiction, making cause and effect
to be the same thing. Nor yet can the cause be morally good. For as
from truth nothing but truth can legitimately proceed, so from good
nothing but good can flow. Evil, indeed, is _related_ to good, but not
as cause and effect. Though evil could not follow were there no
infinite good, no creature, no will, no freedom, yet something else
must be sought as the matrix, where the monster sin is generated and
fostered, and which, morally considered, is neither good nor
evil.—Therefore,
3. We assert, that the _origin of moral evil_ is to be found in the
_union_ of two principles, neither of which considered alone partakes
of a _moral_ character. These two principles are _Liberty_ and
_Passive Power_. Liberty, it is manifest is morally neither good nor
bad, but is a mere natural instrument, if I may so speak, and may be
termed a _natural good_ of which God is the author and decreer. On the
contrary, Passive Power is a _natural evil_ of which God is not the
author or decreer, yet morally considered is not evil. But this term,
being little understood, requires further explanation; at least it is
incumbent on me to shew in what sense I use it. My design is not to
vindicate the use of it by others, but I adopt it to convey a specific
idea, for which I find no other word or phrase more appropriate. By
‘Passive Power,’ then, I mean, That which is of _unavoidable
necessity_ found in every creature, as such, in direct opposition to
the self-existence, independence, and all-sufficiency of God. In other
words, It is that _tendency_ to nihility, physically considered, and
to defection, morally considered, which of _absolute necessity_
belongs to every dependent or created nature. That there is such a
principle is self-evident, nor is it probable that any reasonable
being will ever controvert its existence. Now, it is demonstrable that
this, from the definition, cannot be the object of divine decree, or
of will; for it is stated to be of _absolute_ or _unavoidable_
necessity; besides, it is absurd to suppose that God has decreed, or
produces, any thing the existence of which stands in _direct
contrariety_ to himself. That it is not a _moral_ evil is plain, for
the _holiest_ creatures are subjects of it—God alone is exempt.
4. Let it be further observed, that the First Cause, being goodness
itself, impels, whether decretively or efficiently, to _good only_;
and of this character is even our being necessitated to exercise our
volitions. Yet, when the exercise of liberty, in itself innocent,
_unites_ with passive power, the fruit or offspring of this union is
moral evil. This, I am fully persuaded, is the true solution of this
question, _Whence cometh moral evil?_ If any person shall think proper
candidly to assign his reasons to the contrary, due regard shall be
paid to them,
5. If it be asked, where lies the difference between _decreeing_ and
_permitting_ sin to take place? I answer, the difference is, that the
one would be an act of _injustice_, the other is _doing nothing_. So
that until it can be shewn that there is no difference between
injustice and doing nothing, there is no force in the objection. That
to necessitate sin decretively would be an act of injustice, and
therefore incompatible with the divine character, is, I think,
demonstrable; for, it would be to decree to destruction _antecedently_
to desert—to _annihilate_ the sinfulness of any act, making its evil
nature to consist in its effects—and to destroy the immutable essences
of good and evil. Whereas to _permit_, or to _suffer_ to take place
without prevention, is _not to act not to decree_. To ‘decree to
permit,’ therefore, is a contradiction in terms.
6. But, it has been said, the _event_ is the same to the sinner,
whether he hurried on to sin and misery by a decretive impulse, or
these effects are not prevented when in the power of omnipotence to
interpose. This objection would have some weight, if the _happiness_
of the creature were the only, or even the _principal_ end of God in
creation. But this not being the case, its weight vanishes. To
illustrate this we may suppose, that the _event_ of a man’s execution
is well known to a judge; but, instead of proceeding on the principles
of law and equity, and to effect conviction and condemnation according
to legal evidence, he orders the man to be executed clandestinely
without any equitable process, under pretence that it could make no
difference to the sufferer, for the _event_ of his execution was
_certain_! Besides, the spirit of the objection reflects on God’s
_actual_ dealings with his creatures, in every instance of their
sufferings; because it is in the power of omnipotence to interpose.
And in fact, it must be allowed, either that the _happiness_ of the
Creature is not the _chief_ end of creation, or that the permission of
sin is an act of injustice. But the case is plain, that his own glory
is the chief end of creation and government, and that there is no
injustice in the permission of sin.
7. It may be said, If the union of liberty with passive power be the
origin of moral evil, and if the holiest creatures in heaven are both
free and the subjects of passive power, how is it that they do not
sin! If both are united in the same persons, does the one never
terminate upon; or unite itself to the other? In answer to this
enquiry, we must distinguish between _having_ the principle, and being
under its influence without control. Though the spirits of the just,
and holy angels, have in them the principle, as the condition of their
created existence, yet it is counteracted by sovereign favour. They
may say, as well as Paul, by the grace of God we are what we are. The
object of divine support is the _disposition_, or the _seat_ of moral
action; this being made good, or pure, or holy, prior to all acts of
the will, effectually counteracts the influence of passive power. The
Liberty and choice of a heavenly being therefore, terminating on such
a disposition, no acts but such as are holy can ensue. Hence,