that we are elected; neither is it the duty of unregenerate persons, as
such to apply this privilege to themselves any more than to conclude
themselves rejected: But our business, is, so long as the purpose of God
remains a secret to us, to attend on the means of grace, hoping and
waiting for the display of divine power, in effectually calling us; and
afterwards for the Spirit’s testimony, or seal, to be set to it, whereby
he discovers his own work; and then it may, in some measure, be reckoned
a branch of his revealed will and will afford us matter of thanksgiving
and praise to him, and a foundation of peace and comfort in our own
souls. But this may be farther insisted on, when we come to consider the
improvement we ought to make of this doctrine. We proceed to consider
the next property of election.
4. It is free, and sovereign, or absolute, and unconditional; for that
which would be a reflection on the divine perfections, if applied to
God’s method of working, is, by no means, to be said concerning his
purpose to work, or, (which is the same) his decree of election;
therefore if there are no obligations laid on him by his creatures, to
display or perform any of his works of grace, but they are all free and
sovereign, then it follows, that the fore-sight of any thing that shall
be done by them, in time, could not be the motive, or reason of his
purpose, or decree, to save them, or of his choosing them to salvation.
This may be farther argued, from the independence of the divine nature:
if his nature and perfections are independent, his will must be so. But
more particularly,
(1.) The displays of God’s grace, in time, are expressly resolved into
his sovereign pleasure, in scripture, in Rom. ix. 15. _He saith to
Moses, I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy; and I will have
compassion on whom I will have compassion._ And there are many other
scriptures, which might be referred to, where all merit, or motives,
taken from the creature, which might be supposed to induce him to bestow
spiritual and saving blessings, are entirely excluded, and the whole is
resolved in to the glory of his own name, and in particular, of those
perfections which he designed herein to illustrate. This is applied,
even to the common blessings of providence; _Nevertheless, he saved them
for his name’s sake, that he might make his mighty power to be known_,
Psal. cvi. 8. and it is also applied to sparing mercy, or the exercise
of God’s patience, _For my name’s sake will I defer mine anger, and for
my praise will I refrain for thee, that I cut thee not off_, Isa.
xlviii. 9. and to pardoning mercy, _For thy name’s sake, O Lord, pardon
mine iniquity, for it is great_, Psal. xxv. 11. And when he is
represented as doing great things for his people, he puts them in mind,
at the same time, of their own vileness and unworthiness, that the
freeness and sovereignty of his grace, to them, might be more
conspicuous: Thus, when he tells them how he delivered Israel out of
Egypt, he puts them in mind of their idolatry in that land; therefore no
motive could be taken, from their behaviour towards him, which could
induce him to do this for them; as it is said, _But they rebelled
against me, and would not hearken unto me; they did not every man cast
away the abominations of their eyes, neither did they forsake the idols
of Egypt; then I said, I will pour out my fury upon them, to accomplish
my anger against them, in the midst of the land of Egypt. But I wrought,
for my name’s sake, that it should not be polluted before the heathen,
among whom they were, in whose sight I made myself known unto them, in
bringing them forth out of the land of Egypt_, Ezek. xx. 8, 9.
(2.) If the grace of God, and consequently his purpose relating
thereunto, were not absolute, free, and sovereign, then all the glory
thereof could not be attributed to him, neither would boasting be
excluded; but as the creature might be said to be a worker together with
God, so he would lay claim to a share, if not to the greatest part of
the honour, that will redound to him from it; which is directly contrary
to the divine perfections, and the great design of the gospel. This will
farther appear, if we consider,
_1st._ That a conditional purpose to bestow a benefit, cannot take
effect till the condition be performed, and accordingly it is said to
depend on it. This is obvious, from the known idea affixed to the word
_condition_, and the common signification thereof; it follows therefore,
_2dly._ That the performance of the condition is the next, or immediate
cause of a conditional purpose’s taking effect; and, to apply this to
the case before us,
_3dly._ If, on our performing the condition of God’s purpose to save us,
it be rendered effectual, which otherwise it would not have been,
(agreeably to the nature of a conditional purpose) then we are more
beholden to our own conduct, than the divine purpose, and so the glory
thereof will be due to ourselves; which would not only cast the highest
dishonour on the divine perfections, but it is contrary to the design of
the gospel, which is to stain the pride of all flesh, and take away all
occasions of glorying, from the creature. Thus the prophet Isaiah,
fore-telling the glory of the gospel-state, considers its tendency to
humble the pride of man, when he says, _The loftiness of man shall be
bowed down, and the haughtiness of men shall be made low, and the Lord
alone shall be exalted in that day_, Isa. ii. 17. and the apostle,
describing the nature of faith, considers its tendency _to exclude
boasting_; Rom. iii. 27. and our Saviour, speaking concerning the
discriminating grace of God, that appears in election, either in his
purpose relating to it, or in the execution thereof, says, _Ye have not
chosen me, but I have chosen you_, John xv. 16. that is, you have done
nothing that has laid any obligation on me to choose you by that act of
faith, whereby you are inclined to prefer me to all others; for this is
the consequence and result of my discriminating grace.
We shall now proceed to consider those arguments, which are generally
made use of by those, who are in the other way of thinking, to support
the conditionality of God’s purpose, as well as of his works of grace,
in opposition to what has been said concerning the freeness and
sovereignty thereof. They generally allege those scriptures for that
purpose, that are laid down in a conditional form; as when the apostle
speaks of such a confession of Christ _with the mouth_, as is attended
with _believing in the heart, that God raised him from the dead_, and
_calling on the name of the Lord_, as connected with salvation, Rom. x.
9, 13. and our Saviour says, that _whosoever believeth on him should not
perish, but have everlasting life_, John iii. 15. and that _he that
believeth shall be saved_, Mark xvi. 16. and elsewhere, _Except ye
repent, ye shall all likewise perish_, Luke xiii. 3. and many other
scriptures of the like nature; from whence they argue, that since the
dispensations of God’s providence, the gifts of his grace, and the
execution of his purpose are all conditional, the purpose itself must be
so. Were it but allowed that election is conditional whether it respects
the purpose or providence of God, we should meet with no opposition from
those who are on the other side of the question; but as such a purpose
to save, as is not absolute, peremptory, or independent on the will of
man, has many absurd consequences attending it, which are derogatory to
the glory of the divine sovereignty, as has been already considered; so
this cannot be the sense of those scriptures, that are laid down in a
conditional form, as those and such-like are, that we have but now
mentioned; for no sense of scripture can be true or just, that has the
least tendency to militate against any of the divine perfections; so
that there may without any strain or violence offered to the sense of
words, be another sense put upon these, and all other scriptures, in
which we have the like mode of speaking, whereby they may be explained,
agreeably to the analogy of faith; therefore let us consider,
1. That all such scriptures are to be understood as importing the
necessary connexion of things, so that one shall not be brought about
without the other; accordingly, repentance, faith, and all other graces,
are herein no otherwise considered, than as inseparably connected with
salvation; which depends upon one of those propositions, which was
before laid down, _viz._ that God having chosen to the end has also
chosen to the means. We are far from denying that faith and repentance
are necessary to salvation, as God never gives one without the other,
and consequently they are inseparably connected in his eternal purpose
relating thereunto. If nothing else were intended by a conditional
purpose than this, we would not offer any thing against it; but
certainly this would be to use words without their known or proper
ideas; and the word _condition_, as applicable to other things, is never
to be understood in this sense. There is a necessary connection between
God’s creating the world, and his upholding it, or between his creating
an intelligent creature, and his giving laws to him; but none ever
supposed one to be properly a condition of the other: so a king’s
determining to pardon a malefactor, is inseparably connected with his
pardoning him, and his pardon given forth, with his having a right to
his forfeited life; but it is not proper to say, one is a condition of
the other; so a person’s seeing is inseparably connected with his
opening his eyes; and speaking, with the motion of his lips; but we do
not say, when he determines to do both of them, that one is a condition
of the other. A condition, properly speaking is that which is not only
connected with the privilege that follows upon the performance thereof,
but it must be performed by a subject acting independently on him who
made the conditional overture, or promise.
If it be said, that a duty, which we are enabled to perform by God, who
promised the blessing connected with it, is properly a condition, we
will not contend about the propriety, or impropriety, of the word; but
inasmuch as it is taken by many, when applied to divine things, in the
same sense as in matters of a lower nature, and so used to signify the
dependence of the blessings promised, or the efficacy of the divine
purpose, relating thereunto, on our performance of the condition, which
is supposed to be in our own power, whereby we come to have a right and
title to eternal life; it is this that we principally militate against,
when we assert the absoluteness of God’s purpose.
2. Whatever ideas there may be contained in those scriptures, which are
brought to support the doctrine we are opposing, that contain in them
the nature of a condition, nothing more is intended thereby, but that
what is connected with salvation is a condition of our claim to it, or
expectation of it: In this sense, we will not deny faith and repentance
to be conditions of salvation, inasmuch as it would be an unwarrantable
instance of presumption, for impenitent and unbelieving sinners, to
pretend that they have a right to it, or to expect the end without the
means, since these are inseparably connected in God’s purpose, as well
as in all his dispensations of grace. This being laid down, as a general
rule for our understanding all those scriptures, which are usually
brought to prove that God’s purposes are sometimes conditional, we shall
farther illustrate it, by applying it to three or four other scriptures,
that are often brought in defence thereof, which we shall endeavour to
explain, consistently with the doctrine we are maintaining.
One is taken from Gen. xix. 22. where the angel bade Lot _escape to
Zoar_, telling him, that _he could not do any thing till he came
thither_. If we suppose this to have been a created angel, as most
divines do, yet he must be considered as fulfilling the purpose of God,
or acting pursuant to his commission; and therefore it is all one, to
our present argument, as though God had told Lot, that he could do
nothing till he was gone from that place. It is plain, that he had given
him to understand, that he should be preserved from the flames of Sodom,
and that, in order thereunto, he must flee for his life; and adds, that
he could do nothing, that is, he could not destroy Sodom, consistently
with the divine purpose to save him, till he was escaped out of the
place; for God did not design to preserve him alive (as he did the three
Hebrew captives, in Daniel) in the fire, but by his escaping from it;
one was as much fore-ordained as the other, or was designed as a means
conducive to it; and therefore the meaning of the text is, not that
God’s purpose, relating to Sodom’s destruction, was founded on Lot’s
escape, as an uncertain and dubious condition, depending on his own
will, abstracted from the divine determination relating to it; but he
designed that those two things should be connected together, and that
one should be antecedent to the other; and both of them, as well as
their respective connection, were the object of God’s absolute and
peremptory determination.
There is another scripture, sometimes brought to the same purpose, in
Gen. xxxii. 26. where the angel says to Jacob, _Let me go, for the day
breaketh_; and Jacob replies, _I will not let thee go, except thou bless
me_, which does not infer, that God’s determinations were dependent on
Jacob’s endeavour to detain him, or his willingness to let him depart;
but we must consider Jacob as an humble, yet importunate suppliant, as
it is said elsewhere, _Weeping and making supplication_, Hos. xii. 4.
_Let me go_, says God, appearing in the form of an angel, and speaking
after the manner of men, that he might give occasion to Jacob to express
a more ardent desire of his presence and blessing, as well as to signify
how unworthy he was of it; not as though he was undetermined before-hand
what to do, but since the grace which Jacob exercised, as well as the
blessing which he received, was God’s gift, and both were connected in
the execution of his purpose, we must conclude that the purpose itself
was free, sovereign, and unconditional.
Again, there is another scripture, in which God condescends to use a
mode of speaking, not much unlike to the other, in which he says to
Moses, speaking concerning Israel, in Exod. xxxii. 10. _This is a
stiff-necked people; now therefore let me alone, that my wrath may wax
hot against them, and that I may consume them_; we are not to suppose
that the whole event was to turn upon Moses’s prayer, as though God’s
purposing to save his people were dependent on it; or that that grace,
which inclined him to be importunate with God, did not take its rise
from him. Moses, indeed, when first he began to plead with God, knew not
whether his prayer would be prevalent or no; however, he addresses
himself, with an uncommon degree of importunity, for sparing mercy; and,
when God says, _Let me alone_, it signifies, that his people were
unworthy that any one should plead their cause; and, if God should mark
iniquity, then Moses’s intercession would be altogether in vain, and so
he might as well let him alone, in that respect, as ask for his mercy.
He does not, indeed, at first, tell him what he designed to do, that he
might aggravate their crime, but afterwards he answers his prayer in
Israel’s favour, and signifies that he would work, not for their sakes,
but for his own name’s sake; so that he takes occasion, on the one hand,
to set forth the people’s desert of punishment; and, on the other, the
freeness of his own grace.
There is but one scripture more that I shall mention, among many that
might have been brought, and that is what is said concerning our
Saviour, in Matt. xiii. 58. that _he could not do many mighty works
there_, at that time, in his own country, _because of their unbelief_?
where he speaks either of their not having a faith of miracles that was
sometimes required, in those for whom they were wrought: or else of the
unaccountable stupidity of that people, who were not convinced, by many
others that he had wrought before them; therefore he resolves to put a
stop to his hand, and not, for the present, to work so many miracles
amongst them, as otherways might have been expected: If we suppose that
their want of faith prevented his working them, this is not to be
considered as an unforeseen event. And as he had determined not to
confer this privilege upon them, or to continue to work miracles amongst
them, if those, which he had already wrought, were disregarded and
despised by their unbelief, we must conclude that he had a perfect
knowledge of this before-hand, and that his determinations were not
dependent on uncertain conditions, though he had resolved to act in such
a way, as was most for his own glory; and that there should be an
inseparable connexion between that faith, which was their duty, and his
continuing to exert divine power, as an ordinance adapted to excite it.
5. God’s purpose concerning election is unchangeable; this is the result
of his being infinitely perfect. Mutability is an imperfection that
belongs only to creatures: As it would be an instance of imperfection,
if there were the least change in God’s understanding, so as to know
more or less than he did from all eternity; the same must be said with
respect to his will, which cannot admit of any new determinations. There
are, indeed, many changes in the external dispensations of his
providence, which are the result of his will, as well as the effects of
his power; yet there is not the least appearance of mutability in his
purpose. We have before considered, in speaking concerning the
immutability of the divine nature[207], that whatever may be a reason
obliging men to alter their purposes, it cannot, in the least, take
place, so that God hereby should be obliged to alter his: No unforeseen
occurrence can render it expedient for him to change his mind, nor can
any superior power oblige him to do it; nor can any defect of power, to
bring about what he had designed, induce him to alter his purpose.
If it be objected to this, that the obstinacy of man’s will may do it;
that is to suppose his will exempted from the governing influence of
divine providence, and the contrary force, that offers resistance,
superior to it, which cannot be supposed, without detracting from the
glory of the divine perfections. It would be a very unworthy thought for
any one to conclude that God is one day of one mind, and another day
forced to be of the contrary; how far this is a necessary consequence
from that scheme of doctrine that we are opposing, let any one judge. It
will be very hard to clear it of this entanglement, which they are
obliged to do, or else all the absurdities that they fasten on the
doctrine of election, which are far from being unanswerable, will not be
sufficient to justify their prejudices against it.
They who are on the other side of the question, are sensible that they
have one difficulty to conflict with, namely, the inconsistency of God’s
infallible knowledge of future events, with a mutability of will
relating thereunto; or how the independency of the divine fore-knowledge
is consistent with the dependence and mutability of his will. To fence
against this, some have ventured to deny the divine prescience; but that
is to split against one rock, whilst endeavouring to avoid another.
Therefore others distinguish concerning the objects of the divine
prescience, and consider them, either as they are necessary or
contingent, and accordingly suppose that God has a certain foreknowledge
of the former; but his knowledge of the latter, (from the nature of the
things known) is uncertain, and consequently the determination of his
will is not unalterable. But this is to set bounds to the fore-knowledge
of God, with respect to its object, and, indeed, to exclude the free
actions of the creature from being the objects thereof, which is a
limiting and lessening of this perfection, and is directly contrary to
the idea of omniscience; and therefore we must insist on their proving
this to be consistent with the infinite perfection of God, which they
will find it very difficult to do; and to suppose, on the other hand,
that any thing is the object of God’s certain fore-knowledge, about
which his will is no way conversant, or only so, in such a way, as that
it is subject to change, according to the mutability of things, is
altogether as indefensible, and equally subversive of the independency,
wisdom, and sovereignty thereof.
_Object._ The most material objection against this doctrine, is take
from some scriptures, which seem to represent God as repenting, and
therein, as it is supposed, changing his purpose. Thus he is sometimes
said to repent, that he had bestowed some blessings upon men, when he
perceives how they have been abused by them, and accordingly he purposes
to bring evil on them; as we read, in Gen. vi. 6, 7. _It repented the
Lord that he had made man, and it grieved him at his heart; and the Lord
said, I will destroy man, whom I have created_; and, at other times he
is said to repent of the evil that he designed to bring upon them, and
alter his purpose in their favour; thus it is said, in Deut. xxxii. 36.
_The Lord shall judge his people, and repent himself for his servants;
when he seeth that their power is gone, and there is none shut up, or
left_; and in Joel ii. 13. _Rend your hearts, and not your garments, and
turn unto the Lord your God; for he is gracious and merciful, slow to
anger, and of great kindness, and repenteth him of the evil_; and in
Psal. xc. 13, _Return, O Lord, how long? and let it repent thee
concerning thy servants_; and in Jer. xviii. 8. _If that nation, against
whom I have pronounced, turn from their evil, I will repent of the evil
that I have thought to do unto them._ And we have a very remarkable
instance of this, in God’s sparing Nineveh, on their repentance, after
he had threatened, by the prophet Jonah, that _within forty days they
should be destroyed_.
_Answ._ It is true, there are many scriptures, in which repentance is
ascribed to God, which, if we consider nothing else but the grammatical
sense of the words, seem to favour the objection; but we are bound to
conclude, that such a sense of repentance, as that on which it is
founded, is inconsistent with the divine perfections, and therefore
those scriptures, referred to therein, cannot imply a change in God’s
purpose. And, indeed, there are other scriptures, which assert what is
directly contrary thereunto; as when it is said, in Numb, xxiii. 19.
_God is not a man, that he should lye, neither the son of man, that he
should repent; hath he said, and shall he not do it? or hath he spoken,
and shall he not make it good?_ And elsewhere, in 1 Sam. xv. 29. it is
said, _The strength of Israel will not lye, nor repent; for he is not a
man that he should repent_.