ordained to eternal life, is not inconsistent with that scripture, 1
Tim. ii. 4. in which it is said, that _he will have all men to be
saved_; so that, as will be farther observed elsewhere,[204] it respects
either God’s determining that salvation should be applied to all sorts
of men, or else his declaring by his revealed will, that it is the duty
of all men to believe, and to acknowledge the truth, as made known to
them in the gospel.
6. They who are elected to salvation, are chosen in Christ: thus it is
expressly said, in Eph. i. 4. _He hath chosen us in him, before the
foundations of the world._ We are not to suppose that the apostle
intends hereby, that we are chosen for the sake of Christ, as though any
of his mediatorial acts were the ground and reason thereof; for election
is an act of sovereign grace, or is resolved into the good pleasure of
the will of God, and is not to be accounted a purchased blessing;
therefore when we speak of the concern of the Mediator, with relation
hereunto, this is to be considered as a means ordained by God, to bring
his elect to salvation rather than the foundation of their election.
This proposition necessarily follows from the former; for if they, who
are chosen to the end, are chosen to the means, then Christ’s
mediatorial acts being the highest and first means of salvation, God’s
eternal purpose respects this, as subservient thereunto.
There are some very considerable divines,[205] who distinguish between
our being chosen in Christ, as an Head, and being chosen in him as a
Redeemer; and accordingly, they conclude, that there are two distinct
relations, in which the elect are said to stand to Christ, both which
are mentioned by the apostle, when he says, _Christ is the Head of the
church, and the Saviour of the body_, Eph. v. 23. and they are also
mentioned distinctly elsewhere, _He is the Head of the body, the
church_, and then it follows, that he _made peace through the blood of
the cross_, Col. i. 18, 19, 20. and they add, that the elect are
considered as his members, without any regard had to their fallen state;
and that the blessings contained therein, are such as render their
condition more honourable and glorious, than otherwise it would have
been, had they been only considered as creatures, without any relation
to him as their Head; and this Headship of Christ they extend not only
to men, but to the holy angels, whom they suppose to be chosen, in this
respect, in Christ, as well as men, and that it is owing hereunto that
they have the grace of confirmation conferred upon them; and it also
follows, from hence, that Christ would have been the Head of the
election of grace, though man had not fallen, and that our fallen state
rendered that other relation of Christ to his elect necessary; so that
as they are chosen to salvation, they are chosen in him as a Redeemer,
designed to bring about his great work for them, and, for this end, set
up, as it is expressed, _from everlasting_, Prov. viii. 23.
This distinction of Christ’s double relation to the elect, is,
doubtless, designed by those who thus explain this doctrine to advance
his glory; notwithstanding it remains still a matter of doubt to me,
whether Christ’s Headship over his church be not a branch of his
Mediatorial glory; and, if so, it will be very difficult to prove that a
Mediator respects any other than man, and him more particularly
considered as fallen; and accordingly, God did not design hereby to
advance him to an higher condition, than what was barely the result of
his being a creature, but to deliver him from that state of sin and
misery, into which he foresaw that he would plunge himself. Therefore,
in considering the order of God’s eternal purpose, relating to the
salvation of his people, we must suppose that he first designed to
glorify all his perfections in their redemption and salvation; and, in
order hereunto, he fore-ordained, or appointed Christ to be their great
Mediator, in whom he would be glorified, and by whom this work was to be
brought about: He appointed him to be their Head, Surety, and Redeemer;
first, to purchase salvation for them; and then, to make them meet for
it, in the same order in which it is brought about by him in the
execution thereof; so that, as the glory of God, in the salvation of the
elect, was the end, Christ’s redemption was the means more immediately
conducive thereunto, and, as such, he is said to be fore-ordained, to
wit, to perform those offices that he executes as Mediator, 1 Pet. i.
20. and as Christ, when he was manifested in the flesh, did all things
for his people, that were necessary to bring them to glory, he is, in
God’s purpose, considered as the great Mediator, by whom he designed
this work should be brought about: thus he is set forth in the gospel,
as a propitiation for sin; and the apostle seems to speak of it, as what
was the result of God’s purpose, in Rom. iii. 25. whom God hath _set
forth_ to be a propitiation; the Greek word[206] properly signifies, as
it is observed in the marginal reference, _fore-ordained_ so to be; and
accordingly, we must consider him as from all eternity in God’s purpose,
appointed to be the federal Head of those who are said to be chosen in
him, and to have all the concerns of the divine glory, relating to their
salvation, committed to his management.
V. We shall now consider the properties of election, and how the divine
perfections are displayed therein, agreeably to what is said concerning
it in scripture.
1. As it is taken for the purpose of God, relating to the sanctification
or salvation of men, as distinguished from the execution thereof, it is
eternal: This is evident, because God is eternal, his purposes must be
concluded to be of equal duration with his existence; for we cannot
suppose that an infinitely wise and sovereign Being existed from all
eternity, without any fore-thought, or resolution what to do, for that
would be to suppose him to have been undetermined, or unresolved, when
he first gave being to all things; nor is it to be supposed that there
are any new determinations in the divine will, for that would argue him
to be imperfect, since this would be an instance of mutability in him,
as much as it would be for him to alter his purpose; but neither of
these are agreeable to the idea of an infinitely perfect Being.
Moreover, if God’s purpose, with respect to the salvation of men were
not eternal, then it must be considered as a new after-thought arising
in the divine mind, which, as to its first rise, is but, as it were, of
yesterday, and consequently he would have something in him that is
finite. If it be contrary to his omniscience to have new ideas of
things, it is equally contrary to the sovereignty of his will to have
new determinations, therefore all his purposes were eternal.
2. God’s purpose relating to election, is infinitely wise and holy. This
appears from the footsteps of infinite wisdom, and holiness, which are
visible in the execution thereof, namely, in bringing men to grace and
glory; nothing is more conspicuous than the glory of these perfections
in the work of redemption, and the application thereof; as hereby the
salvation of man is brought about in such a way, that the glory of all
the divine perfections is secured, and the means made use of, as
conducive thereunto, the most proper that could have been used,
therefore it is a work of infinite wisdom. And inasmuch as herein God
discovers the infinite opposition of his nature to sin, and thereby
advances the glory of his holiness, it follows from hence, that these
perfections of the divine nature had their respective concern, if we may
so express it, in the purpose relating hereunto; for whatever glory is
demonstrated in the execution of his purpose, that was certainly before
included in the purpose itself.
3. The purpose of God, relating to the final state of man, is secret, or
cannot be known, till he is pleased to discover it. Nothing is more
obvious than this; for even the purposes or resolutions of creatures are
secret, till they are made known by them: thus the apostle says, _What
man knoweth the things of a man_, that is, what he designs to do, _save
the spirit of a man, which is in him_? and infers, in the following
words, _so the things of God knoweth no man, but the Spirit of God_, 1
Cor. ii. 12. and elsewhere he says, _Who hath known the mind of the
Lord? or who hath been his councellor?_ Rom. xi. 34. And, for this
reason, it is called, _The mystery of his will_, Eph. i. 9. and this
also follows from its being eternal, therefore it was hid in God, from
before the foundation of the world, and consequently would for ever have
been so, had he not, by his works, or word, made some discoveries
thereof, to those whom he first brought into being, and then gave some
intimations of his purpose to them.
Therefore it could not have been known that God had purposed to save
any, had he not revealed this in the gospel: much less have any
particular persons ground to conclude themselves to be elected, without
first observing those intimations which God has given, whereby they may
arrive at the knowledge thereof. This head ought to be duly considered,
by those who deny, and are prejudiced against this doctrine, though it
be generally neglected in the methods they take to oppose it; for they
will not consider the distinction we make between God’s having chosen a
person to eternal life, and a person’s having a right to conclude that
he is thus chosen; but take it for granted, that if there be such a
thing as election, that we must necessarily determine ourselves to be
the objects thereof, and ought to regulate our future conduct
accordingly. It is from thence they conclude, that the doctrine of
election leads men to presumption, or gives them occasion to say, that
they may live as they list; whereas we suppose that it is an instance of
presumption in any one to determine that he is elected, unless there be
some discovery hereof made to him; and this discovery cannot take its
rise from God, unless it be accompanied with that holiness, which is,
from the nature of the thing, inconsistent with our being led hereby to
licentiousness. And here we take occasion to consider, that God does not
make known his secret purpose, relating to this matter, to any, by
inspiration, especially since that extraordinary dispensation of
providence is ceased; and, indeed, it never was his ordinary way to
discover it hereby to those, who, in other instances, were favoured with
the gift of inspiration. The means therefore by which we come to the
knowledge hereof, is, by God’s giving certain marks, or evidences of
grace, or by shewing us the effects of the divine power, in calling and
sanctifying us, whereby we have a warrant to conclude that we were
chosen to eternal life; and, whilst we make a right improvement thereof,
and conclude that our judgment, concerning our state, is rightly
founded, or not, by the holiness of our lives, we are in no danger of
abusing this great and important doctrine, to the dishonour of God, or
our own destruction.
This leads us to consider a distinction, which we are often obliged to
make use of, when we speak concerning the will of God, as secret or
revealed, by which we account for the sense of many scriptures, and take
occasion from it to answer several objections that are brought against
this doctrine. I am sensible that there is nothing advanced in defence
thereof, which they, who are in the other way of thinking, are more
prejudiced against, than this distinction, which they suppose to contain
a reproachful idea of the divine Majesty, and is the foundation of many
popular prejudices against the doctrine we are defending, as though we
hereby intended that God has a secret meaning, different from what he
reveals; or that we are not to judge of his intentions by those
discoveries which he makes thereof, which it would be the highest
reproach to charge any creature with, and contrary to that sincerity
which he cannot be destitute of, but he is hereby rendered the object of
detestation; therefore no one, who conceives of an holy God, in such a
way as he ought to do, can entertain a thought, as though the least
appearance thereof were applicable to him. However, this is the common
misrepresentation that is made of this distinction. Whether it arises
from its being not sufficiently explained by some; or a fixed resolution
to decry the doctrine of election, and render it odious, as it must
certainly be, if supported by a distinction, understood in so vile a
sense, I will not determine. However, that we may remove this prejudice,
and consider how it is to be understood, in a sense more agreeable to
the divine perfections, we shall proceed to explain it; and here we may
observe,
_First_, That the will of God is sometimes taken, in scripture, for that
which he has, from all eternity, determined, which is unchangeable, and
shall certainly come to pass, which is impossible for any creature to
disannul, resist, or render ineffectual; and it is such a branch of
divine sovereignty, that to deny it, would be, in effect, to deny him to
be God. This the apostle intends, when he represents the malicious and
obstinate sinner as replying against God, and defending himself in his
bold crimes, by saying, _Why doth he yet find fault; for who hath
resisted his will?_ Rom. ix. 19, 20, 21, 22. In answer to which, he
asserts the sovereignty of God, and that he is not accountable to any
for what he does, nor to be controuled by them; and this is also
intended in another scripture, in Eph. i. 11. where it is said, that
_God worketh all things after the counsel of his own will_; and
elsewhere he says, _My counsel shall stand, and I will do all my
pleasure_, Isa. xlvi. 10. This will of God is the rule of his own
acting, and, as it determines the event of things, it is impossible for
him to act contrary to it; and it is equally disagreeable to his
perfections, to signify to his creatures, that he determines to do one
thing, but will do another; therefore, in this sense, we are far from
asserting that there is a revealed will of God, which contradicts his
secret.
_Secondly_, We often read, in scripture, of the will of God, as taken
for what he has prescribed to us, as a rule of duty; and also of our
judging concerning the apparent event of things.
(1.) The will of God may be considered as a rule of duty, which is a
well-known and proper sense of his revealed will: thus our Saviour
teaches us to pray, _Let thy will be done on earth, as it is in heaven_;
by which he principally intends his revealed will, _or law_. Enable us
to yield obedience to thy law, in our measure, as thou art perfectly
obeyed in heaven. So our Saviour says, _Whosoever shall do the will of
God, the same is my brother, and my sister, and mother_, Mark iii. 35.
which can be meant of no other than his revealed will, or of his law, in
which it is contained; because no one can act contrary to God’s
determination, which is that sense of his will, contained in the
foregoing head; and, consequently, a doing his will, in that sense,
would not have been laid down as a distinguishing character of those
whom Christ preferred above all, who were related to him in the bonds of
nature.
Again the apostle understands the will of God in this sense, when he
says, _Thou knowest his will_, Rom. ii. 18. where he speaks to the Jews,
who were instructed out of the law, in which it is contained; and
elsewhere, Eph. vi. 6. he speaks of his will, as what is to be obeyed,
and therefore gives this description of faithful servants, that they _do
the will of God_, namely, what he has commanded, _from the heart_. And
there are many other scriptures thus to be understood; and this we call
his revealed will, as it is the rule of duty and obedience.
(2.) The revealed will of God may be considered as a rule which he has
given us, whereby we are to judge of the apparent event of things. I
make this a branch of God’s revealed will, inasmuch as sometimes he
condescends to discover future events to his creatures, which otherwise
they could never have known; but yet there is a difference, as to the
manner of their judging thereof, pursuant to the intimations which he
has given them. Accordingly, when God has told us expressly, that this
or that particular thing shall come to pass, then we are infallibly sure
concerning the event, and need no other rule to judge of it, but by
considering it as revealed: As when God has said, that there shall be a
general resurrection of the dead, and that Christ shall come to
judgment, and receive his redeemed, and sanctified ones, to heaven, to
behold his glory, we are infallibly assured of these events, because
they are expressly revealed; and, when we speak of the secret and
revealed will of God, as applicable to things of this nature, we intend
nothing else hereby but what all will allow of, _viz._ that what would
have been for ever a secret, had it not been discovered, is now
revealed, and therefore ceases to be so; and in that sense, the revealed
will of God, in all respects, agrees with his secret; in this case, we
suppose that God expressly revealed the event.
But there are other instances, in which the event of things is not
expressly revealed; as when God has only discovered to us what is the
rule of our duty. Nevertheless, since it is natural for man, when any
duty is commanded, to pass some judgment concerning the event thereof;
and, inasmuch as we suppose the event not expressly revealed, it
follows, that the judgment, which we pass concerning it, is only what
appears to us, or what, according to our rule of judging, seems to be
the probable event of things. In this case we are not infallibly assured
concerning it; and when we pass a judgment relating thereunto, we may
conclude that some consequences may attend our present duty, which,
perhaps, will never come to pass. As if a general of an army gives forth
a command to his soldiers, to march towards the enemy, they will readily
conclude, that he designs, by this command, that they should enter on
some action, which, had he expressly told them, he must either change
his purpose, or else the event must certainly happen; but, inasmuch as
he has not discovered this to them, all the judgment that they can form,
at present, concerning it, is only such, as is founded on the appearance
of things, and the event might probably afterwards shew, without any
impeachment of his veracity or conduct herein, that his only design was
to try whether his soldiers would obey the word of command, or not. Or
if a king should order a number of malefactors to the place of
execution, without discovering the event thereof, the apparent event is
their immediate death; but if, pursuant to his secret purpose, he
resolved, there to give forth a pardon to them, it cannot be supposed
that he changed his purpose; but the event makes it appear, that his
purpose was not then known; whatever the apparent event might be, his
real design was to humble them for their crimes, and afterwards to
pardon them.
It is only in such-like instances as these, that we apply this
distinction to the doctrine that we are maintaining; and therefore it
must be a very great stretch, of malicious insinuation, for any one to
suppose, that hereby we charge God with insincerity in those
declarations of his revealed will, by which we pass a probable judgment
concerning the event of things. But to apply this to particular
instances. God commanded Abraham to offer up his son Isaac, Gen. xxii.
2. whereas it is certain, unless we suppose that he altered his purpose,
that he intended, not that he should lay his hand upon him, but, when
Isaac was upon the altar, to forbid him to do it. Here was a great and a
difficult duty, which Abraham was to perform pursuant to God’s revealed
will, which was the rule of his obedience; had Abraham known, before
this, that God designed to hold his hand, and prevent him from striking
the fatal blow, it had been no trial of his faith; for it would have
been no difficult matter for him to have done every thing else. The holy
patriarch knew well enough that God could prevent him from doing it; but
this he had no ground to conclude, because he had no divine intimation
concerning it; therefore that which appeared to him to be the event, was
the loss of his son, and he reconciled this with the truth of the
promise before given him, that _in Isaac his seed should be called_, by
supposing that God, at some time or other, would _raise him from the
dead_, as the apostle observes, Heb. xi. 19. therefore that which
Abraham concluded as judging, not by an express revelation, but by the
voice of providence, was, that Isaac must be slain by his hand: But this
was contrary to the real event, as is evident, from the account thereof
in scripture; and, consequently since the real event was agreeable to
the divine determination, as all events are, it follows, that there is a
difference between the will of God, determining the event of things,
which shall certainly come to pass accordingly; and the revelation of
his will, relating to what is the creatures present duty, which may, at
the same time, appear to them, when judging only by the command, which
is the rule of duty, and some circumstances that attend it, to be
contrary to what will afterwards appear to have been the real design of
God therein. God’s real design was to try Abraham’s faith, and to
prevent him from slaying his son, when he had given a proof of his
readiness to obey him; but this remained, at first, a secret to Abraham,
and the apparent design was, that he should slay him. Therefore there is
a foundation for this distinction, as thus explained, concerning the
secret and revealed will of God; the former belongs not to us, nor are
we to take our measures from it, as being unknown: and, when the latter
appears contrary to it, we must distinguish between two things, that are
contrary in the same, and different respects; or between the judgment
which we pass concerning events, which are apparent to us, and, at most,
are only probable and conjectural, as we judge of the consequence of a
duty commanded; and those events, which, though they are infallibly
certain, yet are not revealed, nor can be known, till they come to pass.
In this sense we understand the distinction between God’s secret and
revealed will, when they seem to oppose each other; which it was
necessary for us thus to explain, inasmuch as we shall frequently have
occasion to mention, and apply it, when we account for the difference
that there seems to be, between the purpose of God, relating to the
event of things, and our present views thereof, whereby we may
understand and account for the difficulties contained in several
scriptures, which I would have mentioned in this place, for the farther
illustration hereof, had it been necessary. But this is sufficient to
explain and vindicate it from the prejudices entertained against it, by
those who are disposed to misrepresent what is said in defence of this
doctrine.
From what has been said, concerning God’s secret and revealed will, we
may infer,
_1st_, That it is a great boldness, and unwarrantable instance of
presumption, for any one to enter into, or judge of God’s secret
purpose, so as peremptorily to determine, beyond the present appearance
of things, that this or that shall certainly come to pass, till he makes
them known; for _secret things belong unto the Lord our God, but those
things which are revealed belong unto us, and to our children forever_,
Deut. xxiv. 29. Therefore no one ought to determine that he is elected
to salvation, before the work of grace is wrought, and, some way or
other, made visible to him; or, on the other hand, to determine that he
is rejected or reprobated, when he has no other ground to go upon, but
uncertain conjecture, which would be a means to drive him to despair:
that some are, indeed, elected, and others rejected, is no secret
because God has revealed this in his word; so that we may assert it as a
proposition, undoubtedly true, when we do not apply it to particular
persons; and therefore this doctrine has not that pernicious tendency,
which many pretend that it has.