delivered in scripture, notwithstanding those seeming contradictions
wherewith they may be charged. In the objects of sense, the
contrariety of appearances doth not lessen the certainty of things.
The stars to our sight seem but glittering sparks, yet they are
immense bodies. And it is one thing to be assured of a truth, another
to answer to all the difficulties that encounter it: a mean
understanding is capable of the first; the second is so difficult,
that in clear things the profoundest philosophers may not be able to
untie all the intricate and knotty objections which may be urged
against them. ’Tis sufficient the belief of supernatural mysteries is
built on the veracity and power of God; this makes them prudently
credible: this resolves all doubts, and produces such a stability of
spirit, as nothing can shake. A sincere believer is assured, that all
opposition against revealed truths is fallacious, though he cannot
discover the fallacy. Now the transcendent mysteries of the Christian
religion, the Trinity of persons in the divine nature, the incarnation
of the Son of God, are clearly set down in the scripture. And although
subtile and obstinate opponents have used many guilty arts to dispirit
and enervate those texts by an inferior sense, and have rackt them
with violence to make them speak according to their prejudices, yet
all is vain, the evidence of truth is victorious. A heathen, who
considers not the gospel as a divine revelation, but merely as a
doctrine delivered in writings, and judges of its sense by natural
light, will acknowledge that those things are delivered in it: And
notwithstanding those who usurp a sovereign authority to themselves,
to judge of divine mysteries according to their own apprehensions,
deny them as mere contradictions, yet they can never conclude them
impossible: for no certain argument can be alledged against the being
of a thing without a clear knowledge of its nature: Now, although we
may understand the nature of man, we do not the nature of God, the
œconomy of the persons, and his power to unite himself to a nature
below him.
“It is true, no article of faith is really repugnant to reason; for
God is the author of natural, as well as of supernatural, light, and
he cannot contradict himself: They are emanations from him, and though
different, yet not destructive of each other. But we must distinguish
between those things that are above reason and incomprehensible, and
things that are against reason and utterly inconceivable: Some things
are above reason in regard of their transcendent excellency, or
distance from us; the divine essence, the eternal decrees, the
hypostatical union, are such high and glorious objects, that it is an
impossible enterprise to comprehend them: the intellectual eye is
dazzled with their overpowering light. We can have but an imperfect
knowledge of them; and there is no just cause of wonder that
supernatural revelation should speak incomprehensible things of God.
For he is a singular and admirable Being, infinitely above the
ordinary course of nature. The maxims of philosophy are not to be
extended to him. We must adore what we cannot fully understand. But
those things are against reason, and utterly inconceivable, that
involve a contradiction, and have a natural repugnancy to our
understandings, which cannot conceive any thing that is formally
impossible: and there is no such doctrine in the Christian religion.
“3. We must distinguish between reason corrupted, and right reason.
Since the fall, the clearness of the human understanding is lost, and
the light that remains is eclipsed by the interposition of sensual
lust. The carnal mind cannot, out of ignorance, and will not from
pride and other malignant habits, receive things spiritual. And from
hence arises many suspicions and doubts, (concerning supernatural
verities) the shadows of darkened reason, and of dying faith. If any
divine mystery seems incredible, it is from the corruption of our
reason, not from reason itself; from its darkness, not its light. And
as reason is obliged to correct the errors of sense, when it is
deceived either by some vicious quality in the organ, or by the
distance of the object, or by the falseness of the medium, that
corrupts the image in conveying of it. So it is the office of faith to
reform the judgment of reason, when either from its own weakness, or
the height of things spiritual, it is mistaken about them. For this
end supernatural revelation was given, not to extinguish reason, but
to redress it, and enrich it with the discovery of heavenly things.
Faith is called wisdom and knowledge: it doth not quench the vigour of
the faculty wherein it is seated, but elevates it, and gives it a
spiritual perception of those things that are most distant from its
commerce. It doth not lead us through a mist to the inheritance of the
saints in light.”
BATES.
Footnote 79:
Infinitus, immensus & soli sibi tantus, quantus est notus, nobis vero
ad intellectum pectus angustum est, & ideò sic cum dignè estimamus,
cùm inaestimabilem dicimus. _Min. Fel._
Footnote 80:
He who has marked the differences between truth and error, good and
evil, made them discoverable, and formed human minds susceptible of
their impressions, thereby discovers his will that we should attend to
them, and has made it our duty to do so. With this sentiment sacred
revelation is expressly accordant; “prove all things, hold fast that
which is good.” The Gospel requires not faith without evidence, it
demands no more assent than is proportioned to the weight of
probability, and charges as a crime only our refusing to attend to the
evidence, or our coming to it with hearts prejudiced against, and
therefore insensible to, its evidence. The exercise of reason is
essential to faith, for how sudden soever our convictions, still it is
the judgment which is convinced.
Yet reason has her due province; she may and ought to ascertain the
genuineness, authenticity, and divine authority of the scriptures.
When this is done, she cannot correctly delay her assent, because she
may not fully comprehend the promises or works of God, for this would
require wisdom no less than Divine. But suppose she should presume to
try them, by what balances shall she weigh them? To what shall she
compare them? To the reasons and fitness of things? what are these but
circumstances and relations springing from the works of God? His
creation originated from his wisdom and power, and is ever dependent
on them. This is therefore to circumscribe infinite wisdom by what has
been already discovered of it; it is to limit infinite power from
effecting any thing which it has not hitherto accomplished. Such
judgment is not the work of reason, it is irrational. Reason can only
make an induction, where there exists premises from which a conclusion
can be drawn; but here her limits are exceeded, she has no standard by
which she can measure infinity. By reasoning we justly infer from the
works of God, many of his glorious moral, as well as natural,
perfections; we gather that he is holy, just, true, and good, and we
may fairly say that he will never depart from such rectitude, but that
all his works will be conformed to such principles. We can go no
farther than unto generals, we have no right to question any word or
act of his, and say it is not conformed to such perfections, because
this would suppose that we possess infinite wisdom. He may have ways
of solving our difficulties and objections, with which we are not
acquainted. Such judgment is not only irrational, but arrogant, as it
is an extension of the claims of reason beyond her just limits. Our
duty in such case is exemplified in the father of the faithful. At
God’s command we must, like him, sacrifice our Isaacs, and leave to
him both to accomplish his promises and to justify the action. It is
evident that the doctrine of the Trinity is but partially revealed to
man, but sufficiently to let him into a competent knowledge of the
plan of redemption.
Footnote 81:
_Vid. Epist. 2. ad Dionys._
Footnote 82:
_Vid. Euseb. Præp. Evang. Lib. XIII. cap. 12._
Footnote 83:
_Vid. Huet. Concord. Ration. & Fid. Lib. II. cap. 3._
Footnote 84:
_See Dr. Berriman’s Historical account, &c. page 94._
Footnote 85:
“Philo uses not the name for his derivative Being in the Godhead,
which we see the other Jews of the time using in the Gospels. He
speaks not of him, by his natural appellation of the Son of God. No!
He takes up another title for him, which indeed was known equally to
other Jews, or Philo could not possibly have adopted it; which was
known equally to the Gentiles, as I shall show hereafter; but which
was known only to the scholars of either. He calls him ‘the LOGOS of
God.’ This is a name, that can be borrowed, together with the idea
annexed to it, only from the Jews, or from the common ancestors of
them and of the Gentiles; that answers exactly to the _Dabar_ of
Jehovah in the Hebrew Scriptures, and to the _Memra_ of Jehovah in the
Chaldee paraphrasts upon them; and signifies merely ‘the WORD of God.’
This name has been since introduced into our religion, by one of the
inspired teachers of it. And notwithstanding the ductility of the
Greek language in this instance, which would allow it to be rendered
either the _Word_ or the _Reason_ of God; yet the English Bible, with
a strict adherence to propriety, and in full conformity to the ancient
Christians and ancient Jews, has rejected the accidental
signification, and embraced only the immediate and the genuine. Yet,
even now, the name is confined in its use to the more improved
intellects among us. And it must therefore have peculiarly been, in
the days of Philo, the _philosophical_ denomination of Him, who was
_popularly_ called the Son of God.
“The use of the name of Logos, or Word, by Philo and by St. John in
concurrence, sufficiently marks the knowledge of the name among the
Jews. But the total silence concerning it, by the Jewish writers of
the three first Gospels; the equal silence of the introduced Jews
concerning it, in all the four; and the _acknowledged_ use of it
through all the Jewish records of our religion, merely by St. John
himself; prove it to have been familiar to a few only. It is indeed
too mysterious in its allusion, and too reducible into metaphor in its
import, to have ever been the common and ordinary appellation for the
Son of God. Originating from the _spiritual_ principle of connexion,
betwixt the first and the second Being in the Godhead; marking this,
by a _spiritual_ idea of connexion; and considering it to be as close
and as necessary as the _Word_ is to the energetick _Mind_ of God,
which cannot bury its intellectual energies in silence, but must put
them forth in speech; it is too _spiritual_ in itself, to be addressed
to the faith of the multitude. If with so full a reference to our
_bodily_ ideas, and so positive a _filiation_ of the Second Being to
the First, we have seen the grossness of Arian criticism endeavouring
to resolve the doctrine into the mere dust of a figure; how much more
ready would it have been to do so, if we had only such a _spiritual_
denomination as this, for the second? This would certainly have been
considered by it, as too unsubstantial for distinct personality, and
therefore too evanescent for equal divinity.
“St. John indeed adopted this philosophical title, for the
denomination of the Son of God; only in one solemn and prefatory
passage of his Gospel, in two slight and incidental passages of his
Epistles, and in one of his Book of revelations. Even there, the use
of the popular instead of the philosophical name, in the three Gospels
antecedent to his, precluded all probability of misconstruction. Yet,
not content with this, he formed an additional barrier. At the same
instant in which he speaks of the Logos, he asserts him to be distinct
from God the Father, and yet to be equally God with him. ‘In the
beginning,’ he says, ‘was THE WORD; and THE WORD was _with_ God; and
THE WORD was GOD.’ Having thus secured the two grand points relating
to the Logos, he can have nothing more to say upon the subject, than
to repeat what he has stated, for impressing the deeper conviction. He
accordingly repeats it. His personality he impresses again, thus; ‘THE
SAME was in the beginning _with_ God.’ His divinity also he again
inculcates, thus: ‘ALL THINGS WERE MADE BY HIM, and WITHOUT HIM WAS
NOT ANY THING MADE THAT WAS MADE.’ Here the very repetition itself, of
enforcing his claim to divinity, by ascribing the creation to him; is
plainly an union of two clauses, each announcing him as the Creator of
the universe, and one doubling over the other. And the uncreated
nature of his own existence is the more strongly enforced upon the
mind, by being contrasted with the created nature of all other
existences. These were MADE, but he himself WAS; _made_ by Him, who
_was_ with God, and _was_ God. Nor would all this precaution suffice,
in the opinion of St. John. He must place still stronger fences
against the dangerous spirit of error. He therefore goes on to say, in
confirmation of his personality and divinity, and in application of
all to our Saviour: ‘HE was in the world, and THE WORLD WAS MADE BY
HIM, and the world knew him not; HE came unto HIS OWN [PROPER
DOMAINS,] and HIS OWN [PROPER DOMESTICKS] received him not.’ And he
closes all, with judiciously drawing the several parts of his
assertions before into one full point; and with additionally
explaining his philosophical term, by a direct reference of it to that
popular one which he uses ever afterwards: ‘and THE WORD was made
flesh, and dwelt among us; and we beheld his glory, the glory as of
THE ONLY BEGOTTEN OF THE FATHER, full of grace and truth.’
“Yet, when such guards were requisite, what induced St. John to use
this philosophical title at all? The reason was assuredly this. The
title was in high repute, and in familiar use, among the refined
spirits of the age; and his Gospel was peculiarly calculated for the
service of _such_. The almost perpetual recurrence of the appellation
in Philo’s works shows evidently the use and the repute in which it
was, among the more spiritualized of the Jews. St. John therefore
adopted it himself, for the more easy access to _their_ conviction. It
was also congenial, probably, of itself to the spiritualized state of
St. John’s mind. He, who has dwelt so much more than the other
Evangelists upon the _doctrines_ of our Saviour; and who has drawn out
so many of them, in all their spiritual refinement of ideas; would
naturally prefer the _spiritual_ term of relationship for God the Son
and God the Father, before the _bodily_, whenever the intellect was
raised enough to receive it, and whenever the use of it was
sufficiently guarded from danger. These were two reasons, I suppose,
that induced St. John to use it a _few_ times. And these were equally
(I suppose) the reasons, that induced him, with all his guards, to use
it only a few.
“Nor let us be told, in the rashness of Arian absurdity, that we
misunderstand St. John in this interpretation of his words. If reason
is capable of explaining words, and if St. John was capable of
conveying his meaning in words to the ear of reason; then we may
boldly appeal to the common sense of mankind, and insist upon the
truth of our interpretation. Common sense indeed hath _already_
determined the point, in an impartial person, in an enemy, in a
Heathen. I allude to that extraordinary approbation, which was given
by a Heathen of the third century to this passage of St. John. ‘Of
modern philosophers,’ says Eusebius, ‘_Amelius_ is an eminent one,
being himself, if ever there was one, a zealot for the philosophy of
Plato; and he called the Divine of the Hebrews _a Barbarian_, as if he
would not condescend to make mention of the Evangelist John by name.’
Such is Eusebius’s account of our referee. But what are the terms of
his award? They are these. ‘And such indeed was the Logos,’ he says,
‘by whom, a perpetual existence, the things created were created, as
also Heraclitus has said; and who by Jupiter, _the Barbarian_ says,
being constituted in the rank and dignity of a Principle, is with God
and is God, by whom all things absolutely were created; in whom the
created living thing, and life, and existence, had a birth, and fell
into a body, and putting on flesh appeared a man; and, after showing
the greatness of his nature, and being wholly dissolved, is again
deified and is God, such as he was before he was brought down into the
body and the flesh and a man. These things, if translated out of _the
Barbarian’s_ theology, not as shaded over there, but on the contrary
as placed in full view, would be plain.’ In this very singular and
very valuable comment upon St. John’s Gospel in general, and upon his
preface in particular, we may see, through the harsh and obscure
language of the whole, some circumstances of great moment. The bold
air of arrogance in the blinded Heathen over the illuminated Divine
must strike at once upon every eye. But the Logos appears, from him,
to have been known to the _philosophers_ of antiquity _later_ than the
Gospel; and known too as a perpetual Existence, and the Maker of the
world. St. John also is witnessed by a Heathen, and by one who put him
down for a Barbarian, to have represented the Logos as THE MAKER OF
ALL THINGS, as WITH GOD, and as GOD; as one likewise, ‘_in whom_ the
created living Thing,’ or the human soul of our Saviour, ‘and’ even
‘Life and Existence’ themselves, those primogenial principles of
Deity, ‘had _a birth_, and _fell into a body_, and _putting on flesh
appeared a man_,’ who was therefore man and God in one; who
accordingly ‘showed the greatness of his nature’ by his miracles, was
‘wholly dissolved,’ and then ‘was _again_ DEIFIED, and IS GOD,’ even
‘SUCH AS HE WAS, before he was _brought down into the body_ and _the
flesh_ and _a man_.’ And St. John is attested to have declared this,
‘not even as _shaded over_,’ but ‘on the contrary as _placed in full
view_.’ We have thus a testimony to _the plain meaning_ of St. John,
and to the _evident Godhead_ of his Logos, a _Godhead_ equally
_before_ and _after_ his death; most unquestionable in its nature,
very early in its age, and peculiarly forcible in its import. St.
John, we see, is referred to in a language, that shows him to have
been well known to the Grecian cotemporaries of Amelius, as a writer,
as a foreigner, and as a marked assertor of _Divinity_ for his Logos.”
WHITAKER.
Footnote 86:
_Vid. Forbes. Instruct. Hist. Theol. Lib. I. cap. 2 §. 8._
Footnote 87:
_Vid. Curcell in Quattern. Dissert. de Voc. Trinit. personæ ge._
Footnote 88:
_Vid. Calv. Institut. Lib. I. cap. 13. §. 5._
Footnote 89:
“The doctrine of a plurality appears in the very first words of
inspiration. God would not record the history of _creation_, without
informing the Church that the character of Creator was by no means to
be confined to one person. It has often been observed, that this is
taught in the words rendered _God created_, where we have a noun in
the plural joined with a verb in the singular number, plainly
expressing a plurality in unity. That this is the genuine sense of the
passage appears from the work ascribed, in the next verse, to the
Spirit of God, who is said to have ‘moved on the face of the waters.’
By modern Jews, whom some Christians have followed, this expression
has been rendered, ‘a wind of God,’ or ‘a mighty wind.’ But the
firmament, or expanse, was not created till the second day. This
includes the atmosphere which surrounds our earth: for the fowl is
said to ‘fly above the earth in the open firmament of heaven.’ Now, it
cannot reasonably be supposed that there could be a mighty wind, or
any wind at all, before the existence of an atmosphere.
“If we turn to the gospel-history, we find a third person mentioned as
engaged in the work of creation. ‘All things were made by’ that Word,
who ‘in the beginning existed with God.’
“This plurality appears still more expressly, when the sacred
historian gives an account of the creation of man: ‘And God said, Let
_us_ make man in _our_ image, after _our_ likeness.’ But it is a
plurality in unity: ‘So God created man in _his_ own image.’ It has
been justly observed, that to this the language of Elihu, and of the
royal Preacher, agrees: ‘None saith, Where is God my _Makers_;’ and,
‘Remember now thy _Creators_.’ Nothing can be more absurd than the
various attempts which have been made to shew, that this language may
be otherwise understood. God could never speak in this manner to
angels, or to any second causes. For to whomsoever these words were
addressed, they must have been co-operators with God in this divine
work. They must have assisted him in making man. Philo the Jew
expressly says that these words, _Let us make_, declare a plurality.
That the Jewish writers in general view this language as including a
mystery, not to be made known to the vulgar, and indeed studiously
concealed by them, from their abhorrence of Christianity, has been
elsewhere demonstrated. It is therefore unnecessary to enlarge here. I
shall only add, that the modern Jews are so fully convinced that the
doctrine of a plurality is contained in these words, as to wish to
alter the reading. Instead of _Let us make man_, they incline to read,
_Let man be made_; although the Samaritan text, the Septuagint, the
Talmudists, and all their translations, whether ancient or modern,
express the language in the same manner with our version.
“The same important doctrine is introduced in the history of the
_Fall_. That three-one God, who said, ‘Let us make man after our
image,’ in the same character laments the loss of this image. ‘JEHOVAH
God said, Behold, the man is become as one of us;’ or, as some read
the passage, ‘Behold the man, who was as one of us!’ Here Philo
observes; ‘These words, _as one of us_, are not put for one, but for
more than one.’ The learned Allix has remarked that the ancient Jewish
writers maintain, that God ‘speaks not this to the angels, who had no
common likeness to the unity or essence of God, but to Him who was the
celestial Adam, who is one with God.’ To whom this character applies,
we learn from the Targum of Jonathan on the place, who here speaks of
‘the only begotten in heaven.’
“This doctrine is also taught in the history of the _Confusion of
Tongues_. ‘JEHOVAH said,—Go to, let us go down, and there confound
their language.’ Here the Jews repeat their contemptible subterfuge,
that God addresses his ‘house of judgment,’ that is, created angels.
For it is an established doctrine with them, that ‘God does nothing
without previously consulting with his family above.’ But it has
justly been observed, that these words, if spoken to angels, would
imply that God were one of them, or that he descended in the same
manner with them, by a real change of place. Besides, in a moment to
change one language into many, and to infuse these into the minds of
men, who were utter strangers to them before, so that they should
entirely forget their former modes of speech, is a work that far
surpasses the power of angels, and can be accomplished by no being but
that God, with whom to will and to do is the same.
“It must be evident to every one, who reads the history of the Old
Testament with any degree of attention, that an _Angel_ is often
introduced as speaking the language, performing the works, and
accepting the worship, which exclusively belong to the Supreme Being.
In other words, one, who is undoubtedly a divine person, often appears
in a delegated character. Now, while it was the will of God in this
manner constantly to remind his Church of the economy of redemption,
he at the same time taught her a distinction of persons in the divine
essence. It was this Angel who appeared to Abraham on different
occasions, to Hagar, to Jacob, to Moses, to Joshua, to the Israelites
at Bochim, to Gideon, to Manoah and his wife. But I enter not into a
particular consideration of these appearances, having endeavoured to
illustrate the character of this divine Messenger in another place.
There it has also been proved, that the law was given to the
Israelites at Mount Sinai by the second person of the adorable
Trinity, in the character of the Angel of JEHOVAH. It deserves
particular attention, that at the very time that the God of Israel
gave his people a law, by which they were to be distinguished from all
the idolatrous nations around, one special design of which was to
preserve the doctrine of the divine unity;—at the very time that he
pronounced that leading precept, ‘Thou shalt have no other gods before
me;’ he, according to the Sacred History, viewed in its connexion,
sustained the character of an Angel, and was pleased to communicate
the knowledge of this fact to his people. How can these apparent
contradictions be reconciled, but by admitting that it was the will of
God to reveal himself to his church, as at the same time possessing
essential unity and personal plurality?