and Holy Ghost, are God, we do not say they are distinct Gods, for the
distinction between them respects their personality, not their deity:
and when we assert that they are all Eternal, or Almighty, we do not
suppose that their duration, or power, are distinct; and the same may be
said of all other divine perfections that are attributed to them, the
perfections are the same in all of them, though the persons are
distinct. So that the charge of Tritheism lies in a narrow compass: they
say that there is one divine Being, so do we; and to this they add, that
this divine Being is a divine person, since existence and personality
are the same; therefore, if there are more divine Persons, there must be
more Gods; this consequence they maintain, but we deny. But how do they
prove it? The proof amounts to no more than this; that there is no
instance in finite things, when we speak of angels or men, to whom alone
personality can be applied, of any distinct persons, but at the same
time their beings are distinct; therefore it must be so with respect to
the divine persons. This we are bound to deny, since our ideas of
personality and existence are not the same; therefore, how inseparable
soever they may be in what respects creatures, we may have distinct
ideas of them, when we speak of the divine being and personality of the
Father, Son, and Spirit. Here it will, doubtless, be demanded, that we
determine wherein the difference consists; or, in particular, since
every distinct finite person is a distinct being, what there is in the
divine personality, that should exclude the Father, Son, and Spirit,
from being distinct beings, because distinct persons; so that when we
conclude that there is a small or faint resemblance between divine and
human personality, we must be able to comprehend, and fully to describe,
that infinite disproportion that is between them, or else must be
charged with using words without any manner of ideas annexed to them,
and so our cause must fall to the ground. If, indeed, the divine
personality were finite, like that of the creature, then it might be
required that a finite mind should account for it: but since it is not
so, but incomprehensible, we are bound to believe what we cannot
comprehend.
But have we no ideas at all of the distinct personality of the Father,
Son, and Spirit? To this we may answer; that we have finite ideas
thereof, and more than these we have not of any of the divine
perfections. We are taught, by scripture, to say that they are distinct
persons; and we know what those personal characters, or properties, from
whence our ideas take their rise, signify, when applied to men; but, at
the same time, abstract, in our thoughts, every thing from them that
argues imperfection; or, in short, our conceptions hereof proceed in the
same way, as when we think of any of the perfections of the divine
nature: these, as well as the divine personality, are equally
incomprehensible; yet, while we say they are infinitely more than can be
in any creature, we, notwithstanding, retain such ideas of them, as tend
to answer those ends of religion, which suppose that we apprehend
something of them that is conducive hereunto. We are now to consider,
(3.) The use of reason in proving or defending the doctrine of the
Trinity, or any other doctrines of pure revelation. They could not,
indeed, have been at first discovered by reason, nor can every thing
that is revealed be comprehended by it, yet our reason is not to be laid
aside as useless; therefore some call it a servant to faith. Thus
revelation discovers what doctrines we are to believe, demands our
assent to them, and reason offers a convincing proof that we are under
an indispensable obligation to give it: it proves the doctrine to be
true, and such as is worthy of God, as it is derived from him, the
fountain of truth and wisdom; and this office of reason, or the
subserviency thereof to our faith, is certainly necessary, since what is
false cannot be the object of faith in general; and nothing unworthy of
God can be the matter of divine revelation, nor consequently the object
of a divine faith.
Now, in order to reason’s judging of the truth of things, it first
considers the sense of words; what ideas are designed to be conveyed
thereby, and whether they are contrary to the common sense of mankind;
and if it appears that they are not, it proceeds to enquire into those
evidences that may give conviction, and enforce our belief thereof; and
leads us into the nature of the truths revealed, receives them as
instamped with the authority of God, and considers them as agreeable to
his perfections, and farther leads us into his design of revealing them,
and what we are to infer from them; and in doing this it connects things
together, observes the dependence of one thing on another, what is the
importance thereof, and how they are to be improved to answer the best
purposes.
Now this may be applied particularly to the doctrine of the Trinity; for
it contains in it no absurdity contradictory to reason, as has been
already proved; and the evidences on which our faith herein is founded
will be farther considered, when we prove it to be a scripture doctrine,
by the express words thereof, agreeable to the mind of the Holy Ghost,
or by just consequences deduced from it; by which it will farther
appear, that it is necessary for us to use our reason in stating those
doctrines, which are neither founded on, nor can be comprehended by it.
5. We are now to consider from whence the doctrine of the Trinity is to
be deduced, or where we are to search for that knowledge thereof, which
we are to acquiesce in. And here it must be observed, that it cannot be
learnt from the light of nature, for then we should certainly be able to
behold some traces or footsteps thereof in the works of creation and
providence, that so this might be understood thereby, as well as the
power, wisdom, and goodness of God, as the cause is known by its effect;
but we should never have known that God made all things by his essential
word, _without whom nothing was made, that was made_, as the evangelist
speaks, John i. 3. had we not received this doctrine from divine
revelation: likewise, we should never have known that the Spirit, as a
distinct Person from the Father, created all things, and performed
several other works, by which his personal glory is demonstrated, had we
not received the account which we have thereof from scripture. The light
of nature could discover to us, indeed, that God, who is a Spirit, or
incorporeal Being, has produced many effects worthy of himself; but we
could not have known hereby, that the word Spirit signifies a distinct
person, which we are beholden to divine revelation for.
And as for the work of our redemption, in which, more than in all the
other divine works, the personal glory of the Father, Son, and Spirit,
is demonstrated, we could have known as little of that by the light of
nature, as we do the persons to whom it is attributed. But I am sensible
that it will be objected to this,
_Object._ 1. That our first parents knew the doctrine of the Trinity as
soon as they were created, otherwise they could not have given that
distinct glory to the Persons in the Godhead that is due to them; and if
we are required, not only to worship the divine Being, but to worship
the Father, Son, and Spirit; and, if this worship is due from us, as
creatures, and not merely as fallen and redeemed; then it will follow
from hence, that our first parents must know the doctrine of the
Trinity: but this they did not know by divine revelation; therefore they
knew it by the light of nature.
_Answ._ We will allow every thing contained in this objection, excepting
that they did not know this by divine revelation; for certainly they had
some ideas conveyed this way at first, otherwise they could not have
known any thing that related to instituted worship, which, it is plain,
they did. And shall it be reckoned any absurdity to suppose that they
received this doctrine of the Trinity by divine revelation, though we
have no particular account thereof, in that short history which Moses
gives us of things relating to the state of innocency? It is therefore
sufficient to our purpose, to suppose that it was agreeable to the
wisdom and goodness of God to make known to them this important truth,
and consequently that he did so, though not by the light of nature.
_Object._ 2. It is farther objected, that the heathen knew something of
the doctrine of the Trinity, as appears by their writings, though they
were unacquainted with scripture. To support this objection, they refer
to several mystical expressions in the works of Plato, which seem to
look that way, when he speaks of three principles; one whereof he calls
goodness, or a being that is good; the second he calls his word, or
reason; and the third a spirit, which diffuses its influence throughout
the whole system of beings, and calls him sometimes the soul of the
world; and in other places, he speaks of them as having a distinct
sovereignty.[81] And he supposes the first of these to be the cause of
things most great and excellent; the second, the cause of things of an
inferior nature; the third, of things yet more inferior; and some of his
followers plainly call them three hypostases; and sometimes, Father,
Word, and Spirit.
_Answ._ The account which Plato and his followers seem to have given of
the doctrine of the Trinity does not appear to have been taken from the
light of nature, and therefore this makes nothing to the objection. We
have sufficient ground to conclude that Plato travelled into Egypt, with
a design to make improvements in knowledge; and some suppose, that there
he saw some translation of a part of the Bible into Greek,[82] more
ancient than that which is commonly attributed to the LXX, which was not
compiled till an hundred years after his time. But whether he did this,
or no, is uncertain: it is true, he used several expressions, which are
contained in the books of Moses, and took the plan of his laws from
thence; upon which account some have called him a second Moses, speaking
Greek: but whether he received his notions more immediately from
scripture, or by conversation with the Jews, of whom a great number
settled in Egypt, after Gedaliah’s death, is not material; however, it
is sufficiently evident, that he had not all of them, in a way of
reasoning, from the light of nature: and as for his followers, such as
Plotinus, Proclus, Porphyry, and others, they lived in those ages, when
Christianity prevailed in the world, though none of them pretended to be
Christians; and one of them was the most inveterate enemy to
Christianity that lived; yet these might well be supposed to make their
master Plato speak several things, as to this mystery, which he never
intended, were it only to persuade the Christians to believe that he was
not inferior to Moses, or any other recorded in scripture.
Thus having answered the objections, we shall take leave to consider how
unwarily some divines, who have defended the doctrine of the Trinity,
have not only asserted that Plato understood a great a deal of it, but
have made use of this, as an answer to the Anti-trinitarian objection
before mentioned, that the doctrine of the Trinity is unintelligible;
and they have taken a great deal of pleasure in accounting for this
doctrine in such a way as these philosophers have done:[83] and some of
them have taken notice of a few dark hints, which they have met with in
some of the poetical fictions, and from thence concluded that there was
something of the Trinity known, even by the Heathen in general: thus
when the word three is mentioned by them, and applied to some things,
which they relate concerning their gods; or when they speak of gods
delighting in an unequal number, or in the number three. But this is too
gross to be particularly mentioned, lest it should give us an unbecoming
idea of this divine mystery, or of those who have better arguments than
these to defend it.
The reflection which I would make on this is, that what they call an
advantage to the doctrine has been certainly very detrimental to it;
and, as a late learned divine observes, has tended only to pervert the
simplicity of the Christian faith with mixtures of philosophy and vain
deceit.[84] And I doubt not but the apostle had an eye to this, among
other corruptions, which they who were attached to the Heathen
philosophy began to bring into their scheme of divinity, and would
notoriously do in after ages, which he purposely fences against, when he
says, _Beware, lest any man spoil you, through philosophy and vain
deceit, after the tradition of men, after the rudiments of the world,
and not after Christ_, Col. ii. 8. And this corruption so much
prevailed, that it has given occasion to some of the Anti-trinitarians,
to reproach the doctrine of the Trinity, as though it were a system of
Platonism. And it is their being too fond of using Plato’s words, in
explaining the doctrine of the Trinity, that has given occasion to some
of the fathers to be suspected, as though they were less favourable to
the scripture account thereof; by which means the adversaries have laid
claim to them as their own; and produced some unwary expressions out of
Justin Martyr, and others, supposing them to be in the Arian scheme,
who, in other parts of their writings, appear to be remote from it.[85]
And this leads us to consider the method which some divines have taken,
in using similitudes to explain the doctrine of the Trinity, which, at
best, tend only to illustrate, and not to prove a doctrine: and we can
hardly make use of this method of illustrating this doctrine, without
conveying some ideas, which are unbecoming, if not subversive thereof;
and while we pretend to explain that which is in itself inexplicable, we
do no service to the truth.
I shall here give a short specimen of this matter, that hereby we may
see how some have unwarily weakened the cause which they have been
maintaining. Some have taken a similitude from three of the divine
perfections, _viz._ that there are three invisibles of God; power,
wisdom, and goodness. Power creates, wisdom governs, and goodness
conserves; and so they have gone on to explain this doctrine, till they
had almost given it into the hands of the Sabellians: and, indeed, they
might have instanced in more divine perfections than three, had it been
to their purpose.
Again, others have explained this doctrine by some resemblance which
they apprehend to be of it in man; and so they speak of the soul as a
principle of a threefold life, rational, sensitive, and vegetative.
Others speak of three causes concurring to produce the same effect; such
as the efficient, constitutive and final cause. Others have taken their
similitude from inanimate things; as the sun, in which there is light,
heat, and motion, which are inseparably connected together, and tend to
produce the same effects.
Moreover, others illustrate it by a similitude, taken from a fountain,
in which there is the spring in the bowels of the earth, the water
bubbling out of the earth, and the stream diffusing itself in a
perpetual course, receiving all it communicates from the fountain. I am
sorry there is occasion to caution any against this method of explaining
the doctrine of the Trinity. But these, and many other similitudes of
the like nature, we find in the writings of some, who consider not what
a handle they give to the common enemy. There are, indeed, in most of
them, three things, which are said, in different respects, to be one;
but we may observe, that all these similitudes, and others of the like
nature, brought to illustrate this doctrine, lead us to think of the
whole divided into those parts, of which they consist, whereof they take
notice of the number three; or they speak of three properties of the
same thing; and if their wit and fancy saw it needful to speak of more
than three, the same method of illustrating would serve their purpose,
as much as it does the end for which they bring it. Therefore I would
conclude this head, by using the words of God to Job, _Who is this that
darkeneth counsel by words without knowledge?_ Job xxxviii. 2. Who are
these, that, by pretending to illustrate the doctrine of the Trinity by
similitudes, do that, which, though very foreign to their design, tends
to pervert it?
6. We shall now consider what general rules may be observed for our
understanding those scriptures, on which our faith, with respect to the
doctrine of the Trinity, is founded; and since it is a doctrine of pure
revelation, as has been before observed, we must keep close to
scripture, even to the words thereof, where they are express and
distinct, as to this matter; and to consequences deduced from it, so far
as they are just, and self-evident; and, at the same time, while we are
sensible that we cannot comprehend this mystery, we must take care that
we pretend not to be wise above what is revealed. Now there are some
rules, which may be of use to us, in our enquiries into the sense of
scripture concerning this doctrine; as,
(1.) We must not suppose that the words of scripture, relating
thereunto, are to be taken in a sense, which can be known by none but
criticks, as though it were designed only for them to understand; or
that the unlearned part of the world should be left in the dark, or led
astray, as to several things contained in this important doctrine. Thus
we are not to suppose that we are at a loss as to the proper sense of
the word God; or could hardly know how to direct our faith and worship,
founded thereon, without the help of criticism; or, for want of being
acquainted with some distinctions, concerning one that may be called God
by nature, or the supreme God, and others who may be called gods by
office, or subordinate gods, we should be led to ascribe divine honour
where it is not due; or else we must be able to distinguish also
concerning worship, and, instead of honouring the Son as we honour the
Father, must give him an inferior kind of divine worship, short of what
is due to the Father. This we have no scripture warrant for; neither are
we led by the scriptures to have any notion of a middle being between
God and the creature, or one that is not properly God, so as the Father
is, and yet more than a creature, as though there were a medium between
finite and infinite; neither are we led, by scripture, to conceive of
any being, that has an eternal duration, whose eternity is supposed to
be before time, and yet not the same with the eternal duration of the
Father. These things we shall have occasion to mention in their proper
place, and therefore need make no farther use of them at present, but
only to observe, from hence, how intelligible the scripture would be in
what relates to this doctrine, if the words thereof had not a plain and
determinate sense; but we must make use of these methods of reasoning,
if we would arrive to the meaning thereof.
(2.) If some divine perfections are attributed in scripture to the Son
and Spirit, all the perfections of the divine nature, may, by a just
consequence from thence, be proved to belong to them, by reason of the
simplicity and unity thereof: therefore, if we can prove, from
scripture, that they have some perfections ascribed to them, which, I
hope, it will not be a difficult matter to do, we are not to suppose
that our argument is defective, or that the doctrine of the Trinity is
not sufficiently maintained, if we cannot produce a scripture to prove
every perfection of the divine nature to be ascribed to them.
(3.) When any thing is mentioned in scripture, concerning our Saviour,
or the Holy Spirit, which argues an inferiority to the Father, this is
to be understood consistently with other scriptures, which speak of
their having the same divine nature; since scripture does not, in the
least, contradict itself; and how this may be done, will be farther
considered under a following head.
(4.) If we have sufficient arguments to convince us of the truth of this
doctrine, our faith ought not to be shaken, though we cannot fully
understand the sense of some scriptures, which are brought to support
the contrary; not that we are to suppose that the scripture gives
countenance to two opposite doctrines: but a person may be fully
satisfied concerning the sense of those scriptures that contain the
doctrine of the Trinity, and yet not be supposed perfectly to understand
the meaning of every word or phrase used in scripture, or of some
particular texts, which are sometimes brought to support the contrary
doctrine; so that objections may be brought, which he is not able
readily to reply to. Shall he therefore deny the truth, because he
cannot remove all the difficulties that seem to lie in the way of it?
That would be to part with it at too easy a rate, which, when he has
done, he will find greater difficulties attending the contrary scheme of
doctrine. Do they object, that we believe things contrary to reason,
because we assert the incomprehensibleness of divine mysteries? or that
we are Tritheists, because we believe that there are three Persons in
the Godhead, and cannot exactly determine the difference between divine
and human personality? We could, on the other hand, point at some
difficulties, that they cannot easily surmount. What shall we think of
the head of giving divine worship to our Saviour, when, at the same
time, they deny him to have those perfections, that denominate him God
in the same sense as the Father is so called? The Socinians found it
very difficult, when the matter was disputed among themselves, to
reconcile their practice with their sentiments, when they worshipped
him, whose Deity they denied. And the Arians will find that this
objection equally affects their scheme; and it will be no less difficult
for them to reconcile Christ’s character, as Redeemer, Governor of the
world, Judge of quick and dead, with their low ideas of him, when
denying his proper Deity. These things we only mention occasionally at
present, that it may not be thought that the doctrine of the Trinity is
exposed to greater difficulties than the contrary doctrine, to the end
that they who are not furnished with all those qualifications, which are
necessary for its defence, may not reckon those arguments, by which they
have been convinced of the truth thereof, less valid, because they are
not able, at present, to answer all the objections that may be brought
against them.
(5.) The weight of several arguments, taken from scripture, to prove
this doctrine, is to be considered, as well as the arguments themselves;
we do not pretend that every one of them is equally conclusive; there
are some, which are oftentimes brought to support it, which we can lay
no great stress upon, and therefore shall omit to mention them, among
other arguments brought to that purpose, lest we should give occasion to
the adversary to insult, or conclude that we take any thing for an
argument that has been brought as such to prove this doctrine. Therefore
we will not pretend to prove, or peremptorily to determine, that the
doctrine of the Trinity is contained in those words of the Psalmist,
Psal. xxxiii. 6. _By the word of the Lord were the heavens made, and all
the Hosts of them by the breath of his mouth._ Nor will we pretend to
prove this doctrine from the threefold repetition of the word Jehovah,
in the form of benediction to be used by the high priest, Numb. vi. 24,
25, 26. _The Lord bless thee, and keep thee; the Lord make his face to
shine upon thee, and be gracious unto thee; the Lord lift up his
countenance upon thee, and give thee peace._ Nor do we lay any stress on
the three-fold repetition of the word _Holy, holy, holy, is the Lord of
Hosts_, Isa. vi. 3. though we shall shew, in its proper place, that
there are several things in this chapter, which prove this doctrine.
However, if at any time, together with arguments that are more
conclusive, we bring some that are less so; this use may be made of it,
to shew how the scripture way of speaking is consistent therewith in
those places that do not so directly prove it. This we thought proper to
mention, because it is a very common thing for those, who cannot answer
the most weighty arguments that are brought to support a doctrine, to
bend their greatest force against those which have the least strength;
and then to triumph, as though they had gained the victory, when they
have only done it in what respects that which is less material.