incomprehensible, not only because of the imperfection of our present
state, but because, as has been before observed, of the infinite
disproportion that there is between the object and our finite
capacities. In this respect we have before shewn that the perfections of
the divine nature cannot be comprehended, such as the immensity,
eternity, omnipresence, and simplicity of God; yet we are to believe
that he is thus infinitely perfect. And it seems equally reasonable to
suppose the doctrine of the Trinity to be incomprehensible; for the
mutual relation of the Father, Son, and Spirit, to each other, and their
distinct personality, are not the result of the divine will; these are
personal perfections, and therefore they are necessary, and their glory
infinite, as well as that of his essential perfections; and if we are
bound to believe one to be incomprehensible, why should we not as well
suppose the other to be so? or if there are some things which the light
of nature gives us some ideas of, concerning which we are
notwithstanding bound to confess that we know but little of them, for
the reason but now mentioned, why should it be thought strange, that
this doctrine, though the subject of pure revelation, should be equally
incomprehensible? This consequence appears so evident, that some of
them, who deny the doctrine of the Trinity to be incomprehensible, do
not stick to deny the perfections of the divine nature to be so, when
they maintain that there is nothing which is the object of faith but
what may be comprehended by us, which is to run such lengths in the
defence of their cause, as no one who hath the least degree of that
humility, which becomes a finite creature, should venture to do. But
they proceed yet farther, as the cause they defend seems to require it,
and say, that every doctrine which we cannot comprehend is to be
rejected by us, as though our understandings were to set bounds to the
truth and credibility of all things.
This, I think, is the true state of the question about mysteries in
Christianity: it is not whether the word _Mystery_ is never used in
scripture to signify what is incomprehensible; for if that could be
sufficiently proved, which I think hath not yet been done, we would
assert the doctrine of the Trinity to be more than a mystery, namely, an
incomprehensible doctrine; and the proof thereof seems absolutely
necessary, since the Antitrinitarians, and some of them with an air of
insult, conclude this to be our last resort, which we betake ourselves
to when they have beaten us out of all our other strong holds; and
therefore we may suppose, that this would be opposed with the greatest
warmth, but I do not find that it has hitherto been overthrown: and
indeed when they call it one of our most plausible pretences, as though
we laid the whole stress of the controversy upon it, it might be
expected that it should be attacked with stronger arguments than it
generally is. Sometimes they bend their force principally against the
sense of the word _Mystery_; and here they talk not only with an air of
insult, but profaneness, when they compare it with the abominable
mysteries of the heathen, which were not to be divulged to any but those
of them who were in the secret; and the doctrine of the Trinity, and
that of transubstantiation, are compared together, so that they are to
be reckoned equally mysterious, that is, according to their application
of the word, absurd and nonsensical. And this way of arguing has so far
prevailed among them, that no one must apply the word to any doctrines
of religion without exposing himself to scorn and ridicule; but this
will do no service to their cause, nor prejudice to our doctrine, in the
opinion of those who enquire into the truth thereof, with that
seriousness and impartiality, that the importance of the doctrine calls
for.[78]
The question therefore in controversy is; whether any doctrines of
religion may be deemed incomprehensible, that is, such as we can have no
adequate ideas of, because of the disproportion between them and our
finite minds? and whether the incommunicable perfections of God are not
to be reckoned among these incomprehensible doctrines? if they are not,
then it will be reasonable to demand that every thing relating to them
be particularly accounted for, and reduced to the standard of a finite
capacity; and if this cannot be done, but some things must be allowed to
be incomprehensible in religion, then it will be farther enquired, Why
should the doctrine of the Trinity be rejected, because we cannot
account for every thing that relates to the personal glory of God, any
more than we can for those things that respect his essential glory? or
may not some things, that are matter of pure revelation, be supposed to
exceed our capacities, and yet we be bound to believe them, as well as
other things which appear to be true, and at the same time,
incomprehensible, by the light of nature? But, that we may enter a
little more particularly into this argument, we shall consider the most
material objections that are brought against it, and what may be replied
to them.
_Object._ 1. It is objected that we take up with the bare sound of
words, without any manner of ideas affixed to them. And,
2. That it is unbecoming the divine wisdom and goodness to suppose that
God should give a revelation, and demand our belief thereof, as
necessary to salvation, when, at the same time, it is impossible for our
understandings to yield an assent to it, since nothing that is
unintelligible can be the object of faith.
3. That practical religion is designed to be promoted in the world
hereby, and therefore the will of man must follow the dictates of the
understanding, and not blindly embrace, and be conversant about we know
not what, which is to act unbecoming our own character as intelligent
creatures.
4. That the design of divine revelation is to improve our
understandings, and render our ideas of things more clear, and not to
entangle and perplex them.
_Answ._ 1. As to our using words without ideas, there is no Christian,
that I know of, who thinks there is any religion in the sound of words,
or that it is sufficient for us to take up with the word Trinity, or
Persons in the Godhead, without determining, in some measure, what we
understand thereby. We will therefore allow that faith supposes some
ideas of the object, namely, that we have some knowledge of what we
believe it to be: now our knowledge of things admits of various degrees;
some of which we only know that they are what they are determined, or
proved to be; if we proceed farther in our enquiries, and would know how
every thing is to be accounted for, that may justly be affirmed
concerning them, here our ideas are at a stand; yet this is not in the
least inconsistent with the belief of what we conclude them to be. For
the illustrating of which, let it be considered that we believe that
God’s eternity is without succession, his immensity without extension;
this we know and believe, because to assert the contrary would be to
ascribe imperfection to him. In this respect, our faith extends as far
as our ideas: but as for what exceeds them, we are bound to believe that
there is something in God, which exceeds the reach of a finite mind,
though we cannot comprehend, or fully describe it, as though it was not
infinite. And to apply this to the doctrine of the Trinity; it is one
thing, to say that the Father, Son, and Spirit, have the perfections of
the divine nature attributed to them in scripture, as well as distinct
personal characters and properties, and because the Godhead is but one,
that therefore these three are one, which we firmly believe, inasmuch as
it is so clearly revealed in scripture; and another thing, to say, that
we can fully describe all the properties of their divine personality,
which, though we cannot do, yet we believe that they subsist in an
incomprehensible manner. And while we compare them with finite persons,
as we do the perfections of God with those of the creature, we separate
from the one, as well as the other, whatever savours of imperfection.
2. As to the unintelligibleness of divine revelation, and its being
unbecoming the wisdom and goodness of God to communicate those doctrines
that are so, it may be replied, that we must distinguish between the
rendering a doctrine, which would be otherwise easy to be understood,
unintelligible, by the perplexity or difficulty of the style in which it
is delivered, and the imparting a doctrine which none can comprehend;
the former of these cannot be charged on any part of scripture, and it
is only a revelation, which is liable to such a charge, that could be
reckoned inconsistent with the wisdom and goodness of God. As to the
latter, the design of revelation is not to make us comprehend what is in
itself incomprehensible: as, for instance, God did not design, when he
made known his perfections in his word, to give us such a perfect
discovery of himself, that we might be said hereby to find him out unto
perfection, or that we should know as much of his glory as is possible
to be known, or as much as he knows of it himself; for that is to
suppose the understanding of man infinitely more perfect than it is.
Whatever is received, is received in proportion to the measure of that
which contains it; the whole ocean can communicate no more water than
what will fill the vessel, that is to contain it. Thus the infinite
perfections of God being such as cannot be contained in a finite mind,
we are not to suppose that our comprehending them was the design of
divine revelation; God, indeed, designed hereby that we should apprehend
some things of himself, namely, as much as should be subservient to the
great ends of religion; but not so much as might be inconsistent with
our humble confession, that _we are but of yesterday, and know,
comparatively, nothing_, Job viii. 9.
And this is applicable, not only to the essential, but the personal,
glory of God, _Who hath ascended into heaven, or descended? Who hath
gathered the wind in his fists? Who hath bound the waters in a garment?
Who hath established all the ends of the earth? What is his name, and
what is his Son’s name, if thou canst tell?_ Prov. xxx. 4. Our Saviour,
indeed, speaks of his having _ascended into heaven_, John iii. 13. as
having a comprehensive knowledge of all divine truths; but this he
affirms concerning himself as a divine person, exclusively of all
creatures.
Moreover, when it is said, in this objection, that God makes the
comprehensive knowledge of these things a term of salvation, this we
must take leave to deny; and we need not add any more as to that head,
since we have already considered what degree of knowledge is necessary
thereunto, namely, such as is subservient to religion, which teaches us
to adore what we apprehend to be the object thereof, though we cannot
comprehend it.
As to that part of the objection, that which is unintelligible, is not
the object of faith, we must distinguish before we grant or deny it;
therefore, since the object of faith is some proposition laid down, it
is one thing to say that a proposition cannot be assented to, when we
have no ideas of what is affirmed or denied in it; and another thing to
say that it is not believed, when we have ideas of several things
contained therein, of which some are affirmed, and others denied; as,
for instance, when we say God is an infinite Spirit, there is a positive
idea contained in that proposition, or some things affirmed therein,
_viz._ that he is able to put forth actions suitable to an intelligent
being; and there is something denied concerning him, to wit, his being
corporeal; and in concluding him to be an infinite Spirit, we deny that
they are limits of his understanding; all this we may truly be said to
understand and believe: but if we proceed farther, and enquire what it
is to have such an understanding, or will? this is not a proposition,
and consequently not the object of faith, as well as exceeds the reach
of our understanding. So as to the doctrine of the Trinity, when we
affirm that there is one God, and that the Father, Son, and Spirit, have
all the perfections of the Godhead; and that these perfections, and the
personality of each of them, are infinitely greater than what can be
found in the creature, this we yield our assent to; but if it be
enquired how far does God herein exceed all the ideas which we have of
finite perfections, or personality, here our understandings are at a
loss; but so far as this does not contain the form of a proposition, it
cannot, according to our common acceptation of the word, be said to be
the object of faith.
3. As to what concerns practical religion, the ideas we have of things
subservient to it are of two sorts; either such as engage our obedience,
or excite our adoration and admiration: as to the former of these, we
know what we are commanded to do; what it is to act, as becomes those
who are subject to a divine person, though we cannot comprehend those
infinite perfections, which lay us under the highest obligation to obey
him: as to the latter, the incomprehensibleness of the divine
personality, or perfections, has a direct tendency to excite our
admiration, and the infiniteness thereof our adoration. And, since all
religion may be reduced to these two heads, the subject matter of divine
revelation is so far from being inconsistent with it, that it tends to
promote it. Things commanded are not, as such, incomprehensible, as was
but now observed, and therefore not inconsistent with that obedience, or
subjection, which is contained in one branch thereof; and things
incomprehensible do not contain the form of a command, but rather excite
our admiration, and therefore they are not only consistent with, but
adapted to promote the other branch thereof. Is it not an instance of
religion to adore and magnify God, when we behold the display of his
perfections in his works? And is he less to be adored, or admired,
because we cannot comprehend them? Or should we not rather look upon
them with a greater degree of astonishment, than if they did not exceed
the reach of a finite mind? Must a person be able to measure the water
of the ocean, or number all the particles of matter that are contained
in the world; or can our ideas be no ways directed to shew forth the
Creator’s praise? Or must we be able to account for every thing that is
a mystery in nature; or can we not improve it to promote some of the
ends of practical religion, that we are engaged to thereby? May we not
say, with wonder, _O Lord, how manifold are thy works! in wisdom hast
thou made them all; the earth is full of thy riches?_ Psal. civ. 24. So
when we behold the personal glory of the Father, Son, and Spirit, as
displayed in the work of redemption, or as contained in scripture, which
is therein said to be an instance of his _manifold wisdom_, Eph. iii.
10. should we not admire it the more, inasmuch as it is, as the apostle
calls it, unsearchable? Therefore practical religion, as founded on
divine revelation, is not, in all the branches thereof, inconsistent
with the incomprehensibleness of those things, which are, some in one
respect, and others in another, the objects thereof.
And as to what is farther contained in this objection, concerning the
will’s following the dictates of the understanding, and practical
religion’s being seated therein, I own, that we must first know what we
are to do in matters of religion, before we can act; thus we must first
know what it is to worship, love, and obey, the Father, Son, and Spirit,
as also that these three divine persons are the object of worship, love,
and obedience, and then the will follows the dictates of the
understanding; but it is one thing to know these things, and another
thing to be able to comprehend the divine, essential, or personal glory,
which belongs to them, and is the foundation of these acts of religious
worship.
4. As to what is farther objected, concerning the design of divine
revelation’s being to improve our understanding; or, as it is sometimes
expressed, that it is an improvement upon the light of nature; this
seems to have a double aspect, or tendency, _viz._ to advance, or
depreciate, divine revelation.
1. If we take it in the former view, we freely own,
(1.) That it is a very great improvement upon the light of nature, and
that, either as we are led hereby, not only into the knowledge of many
things which could not be discovered by it, namely, the doctrine of the
Trinity, the incarnation of the Son of God, and that infinite
satisfaction which was given by him to the justice of God, in order to
our discharge from condemnation, as also that communion which believers
have with the Father, Son, and Spirit; and therefore, since the light of
nature gives us no discovery of these doctrines, divine revelation, and
particularly the gospel, makes a very great addition to those ideas
which we are led into by the light of nature. It is true, they both take
their rise from God, yet one excels the other, as much as the light of
the sun does that of a star; and is, as the Psalmist says, when
comparing them together, _perfect, converting the soul_; and _sure,
making wise the simple_, Psal. xix. 7.
(2.) That when the same truths are discovered by the light of nature,
and by divine revelation, the latter tends very much to improve our
ideas: thus when the light of nature leads us into the knowledge of the
being and perfections of God, his wisdom, power, and goodness, as
illustrated in the works of nature and providence, we have not so clear
ideas thereof, as we receive from the additional discoveries of them in
divine revelation; and in this respect one does not cloud or darken
those ideas which the other gives. But neither of these are designed by
those who bring this objection against the doctrine of the Trinity:
therefore we must suppose,
2. That they intend hereby to depreciate divine revelation, and then the
sense thereof is this; that though the light of nature leads mankind
into such a degree of the knowledge of divine truths, as is sufficient,
in its kind to salvation; so that they, who are destitute of divine
revelation, may thereby understand the terms of acceptance with God, and
the way which, if duly improved, would lead to heaven; yet God was
pleased to give some farther discovery of the same things by his word,
and, in this sense, the one is only an improvement upon the other, as it
makes the same truths, which were known, in some degree, without it more
clear, and frees them from those corruptions, or false glosses, which
the perverse reasonings of men have set upon them; whereas we, by
insisting on inexplicable mysteries, which we pretend to be founded on
divine revelation, though, in reality, they are not contained in it,
cloud and darken that light, and so make the way of salvation more
difficult, than it would otherwise be; and this certainly tends to
depreciate divine revelation, how plausible soever the words, at first
view, may appear to be; for it supposes those doctrines but now
mentioned, and many others of the like nature, not necessary to
salvation; so that this objection takes its first rise from the Deists,
however it may be applied, by the Anti-trinitarians, in militating
against the doctrine of the Trinity. Therefore, since it is principally
designed to overthrow this doctrine, by supposing it to be
unintelligible, and consequently, according to their method of
reasoning, in no sense the object of faith, the only reply which need be
made to it is, that the discoveries of the glory of God, by the light of
nature, are, in some respects, as incomprehensible as the doctrine of
the Trinity; which we are not, for that reason, obliged to disbelieve,
or reject; and therefore there is no advantage gained against our
argument, by supposing that the light of nature contains a discovery of
truths, plain, easy, and intelligible by all, in the full extent
thereof, and that the doctrine of the Trinity is otherwise, and
consequently must not be contained in divine revelation, and, as such,
cannot be defended by us.
4. Another thing that may be premised, before we enter on the proof of
the doctrine of the Trinity, is, that it is not contrary to reason,
though it be above it; neither are our reasoning powers, when directed
by scripture-revelation, altogether useless, in order to our attaining
such a degree of the knowledge thereof, as is necessary, and ought to be
endeavoured after. When a doctrine may be said to be above reason, has
been already considered, as well as that the doctrine of the Trinity is
so; and now we are obliged to obviate an objection, which is the most
popular one of any that is brought against it, namely, that it is an
absurd and irrational doctrine; and that they who maintain it must first
lay aside their reason, before they can be induced to believe it, for it
is as much as to say that three are equal to one; which is contrary to
the common sense of all mankind, or else, that we maintain a plurality
of gods, which is contrary to the very first principles of the light of
nature. And here we are reflected on, as though we demanded that our
antagonists should lay aside their reason, before we argue with them,
and then it is easy to determine on which side the argument will turn;
therefore, to make way for what might be said in defence of the doctrine
of the Trinity, we shall, under this head, consider,
(1.) When a doctrine may be said to be contrary to reason.
(2.) Shew that the doctrine of the Trinity is not so.
(3.) What is the use of reason, in establishing it, or any other
doctrines, which are the subject of pure revelation.
(1.) When we may conclude, that a doctrine is contrary to reason. This
it may be said to be, when it is contrary to the methods of reasoning
made use of by particular persons, which are not always just, and
therefore it does not follow, from hence, that it is false or absurd,
because our reasoning about it is so, but rather the contrary; so that
when they, on the other side of the question, tell us, with an air of
boasting, that if the doctrine we are maintaining could have been
accounted for, how comes it to pass that so many men of sense and
learning, as are to be found among the Anti-trinitarians, have not been
able to do it? But this is nothing to our present argument; therefore we
suppose that a doctrine is contrary to reason, when it contradicts some
of the first principles, which the mind of man cannot but yield its
assent to, as soon as ever it takes in the sense of the words which
contain them, without demanding any proof thereof; as that the whole is
greater than the part; and that a thing can be, and not be, at the same
time; or that two is more than one, &c. or when we can prove a thing to
be true to a demonstration, and yet suppose that a contradictory
proposition, in which the words are taken in the same sense, may be
equally true.[80]
(2.) That the doctrine of the Trinity is not contrary to reason. This
appears, inasmuch as we do not say that the three Persons in the Godhead
are one Person, or that the one divine Being is three divine Beings.
_Object._ But it is objected, that it is contrary to reason, which
establishes and proves the unity of the Godhead, to say that the divine
nature may be predicated of more than one, inasmuch as that infers a
plurality of Gods, and every distinct Person must be concluded to be a
distinct God; therefore the Trinitarian doctrine is down-right
Tritheism, and consequently contrary to reason; and here those words of
the Athanasian Creed are produced, as an instance hereof, namely, that
the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Ghost is God, yet there
are not three Gods, but one God; so, that the Father is Eternal, the Son
is Eternal, and the Holy Ghost Eternal, yet there are not three
Eternals, but one Eternal; and the Father Almighty, the Son Almighty,
and the Holy Ghost Almighty, yet are there not three Almighties, but one
Almighty. This they suppose, though without ground, to be a plain
contradiction.