scripture, but as it may be demonstrated by the light of nature, it will
be necessary that we obviate an objection that may be brought against
this latter method of proving it, _viz._
_Object._ If the unity of the Godhead might be known by the dictates of
nature, or demonstrated by other arguments, besides those which are
matter of pure revelation, how comes it to pass that the heathen owned,
and worshipped, a plurality of gods? and as it was not one particular
sect among them that did so, but this abominable practice universally
obtained, where revealed religion was not known, therefore, though this
be an undoubted truth, yet it is not founded in the light of nature.
_Answ._ That they did so is beyond dispute, especially after idolatry
had continued a few ages in the world, and so had extinguished those
principles of revealed religion, which mankind, before this, were
favoured with; yet it must be considered, that though the ignorant and
unthinking multitude, among them, believed every thing to be a God,
which the custom of the countries where they lived had induced them to
pay divine adoration to, yet the wiser sort of them, however guilty of
idolatry, by paying a lower kind of worship to them, have,
notwithstanding, maintained the unity of the Godhead, or that there is
one God superior to them all, whom they often call the father of gods
and men; to whom probably the Athenians erected that altar, as the
apostle Paul observes, with this inscription, To THE UNKNOWN GOD;
because he says, in the words immediately following, _Whom therefore ye
ignorantly worship, him declare I unto you_, Acts xvii. 23.
This appears from what they assert to the same purpose, whereby they
plainly discover their belief of but one supreme God, who has all the
incommunicable perfections of the divine nature, however, in other
instances, their conduct seemed to run counter to their method of
reasoning: thus it appears, by their writings, that many of them assert
that there is a God, who is the first cause, or beginning, of all
things; and that he was from eternity, or in the beginning, and that
time took its rise from him; that he is the living God, the fountain of
life, and the best of all beings[67]: Also, that this God is
self-sufficient, and therefore it is absurd to suppose that he stands in
need of, or can receive advantage from, any one[68]; and that he is the
chief good, or contains in himself whatever is good, and that by him all
things consist; and that no one hath enough in himself to secure his own
safety and happiness, which is to be derived from him[69].
And there are others also, who plainly assert the unity of God in as
strong terms, as though they had learned it from divine revelation,
calling him, the beginning, the end, and author of all things; who was
before, and is above all things, the Lord of all, the fountain of life,
light, and all good, yea, goodness itself; the most excellent being; and
many other expressions to the like purpose. I could multiply quotations
for the proof of this, from Proclus, Porphyry, Iamblicus, Plotinus,
Plutarch, Epictetus, and several others; but this has been already done
by other hands[70]; by which it appears, that though they mention other
gods, they suppose them to be little more than titular or honorary gods;
or at least persons, who were the peculiar favourites of God, and
admitted to the participation of divine honours, as well as employed in
some part of the government of the world. They frequently speak of them
as having derived their being from God, whom they call the cause of
causes, the God of gods. Some of them speak of God in the singular
number, throughout the greatest part of their writings, and only make
mention of the gods occasionally, especially when they treat of those
works that become a God, or the greatest honours that are due to him;
thus Seneca and Plato, and, in particular, the latter of them says,
concerning himself[71], that when he wrote any thing in a grave and
serious manner, his custom was, to preface his epistles with the mention
of one God; though, it is true, when he wrote otherwise, he used the
common mode of speaking, and talked of other gods; and it is observed,
in his writings, that he sometimes uses this phrase; If it please God,
or by the help of God, not the gods.
But, notwithstanding this, they were all idolaters, for they joined in
the rites of worship performed to the false gods of their respective
countries; yea, Socrates himself, who fell under the displeasure of the
Athenians, for asserting the unity of the Godhead, which cost him his
life, did not refuse to pay some religious honour to the heathen gods.
So that it is plain they paid some religious worship to them, but it was
of an inferior and subordinate nature, not much unlike to that which the
Papists give to saints and angels: but they are far from setting them
upon a level with God; for they confess they were but men, who formerly
lived in this world; they give an account of their birth and parentage;
where they lived and died; write the history of their lives, and what
procured them the honour they suppose them after death advanced to[72];
how some of them obtained it, as the reward of virtue, or in
commemoration of the good they had done to the world in their life: as
some were advanced to this honour, who were the inventors of arts,
beneficial to mankind, or were successful in wars, or a public blessing
to the country where they lived, others had this honour conferred upon
them, especially among the Romans, at the request of their surviving
friends; and this was done after Julius Cæsar’s time, by the decree of
the senate, who, at the same time, when they ranked them among the
number of their gods, appointed also the rites of worship that should be
paid to them; and some of the Roman emperors obliged the senate to deify
them while they were alive. These things are very largely insisted on,
by many ancient and modern writers[73]; so that, upon the whole, it
plainly appears, that, whatever they say of a plurality of gods, the
wiser sort among the heathen did not deny the unity of the divine
essence, in the highest and most proper sense; and, inasmuch as they
received the knowledge hereof from the light of nature, we may from
hence conclude that this truth might be known that way, as well as by
divine revelation.
We shall conclude with some practical inferences from the doctrine
contained in this answer.
1. Since he, who is the object of our worship, is the living God; this
reproves that lifeless formal way, in which many address themselves to
him, in the performance of religious duties, without that reverence and
due regard to the divine perfections, which are contained in this
character of the Godhead. It is also a very great aggravation, not only
of apostacy, but of any degree of backsliding, in those who have made a
profession of religion; that it is a _departure from the living God_,
Heb. iii. 12. Is he the God and giver of life, and shall we forsake him,
who _has the words of eternal life_, John vi. 68. whose sovereign will
has the sole disposal thereof?
Again, this consideration, of his being the living God, renders his
judgments most terrible, and his wrath insupportable; as the apostle
says, _It is a fearful thing to fall into the hands of the living God_,
Heb. x. 31.
2. From his being the true God, we infer, that all hypocrisy, both in
heart and life, is to be avoided; and we should draw nigh to him with a
true heart and faith unfeigned; and not like those whom the prophet
reproves, when he says, God was _near in their mouth, and far from their
reins_, Jer. xii. 2.
Moreover, let us take heed that we do not set up an idol in our hearts,
in opposition to him as the true God: whatever has a greater share in
our affections than God, or is set up in competition with him, that is,
to us, a god, and is therefore inconsistent with our paying that regard
which is due to him; as our Saviour says, _Ye cannot serve God and
mammon_, Mat. vi. 24. and, upon this account, covetousness is styled
idolatry, Col. iii. 5. as the world is loved more than him; and we read
of some _whose God is their belly_, Phil. iii. 19. who make provision
for the flesh, to fulfil the lusts thereof, as though this was their
chief good. And when we confide in any thing below him, in a religious
way, or expect that from the creature which is only to be found in him;
or when we esteem men as lords of our faith; or when his sovereignty, or
right to govern us, is called in question, while we presumptuously, or
wilfully, rebel against him; this is, in effect, a dethroning, or
denying him to be the true God: but more of this when we consider the
sins forbidden in the first commandment[74].
3. From the unity of the Godhead, we may infer, that we ought to take
heed that we do not entertain any conceptions of the divine Being, which
are inconsistent herewith; therefore, as we are not to assert a
plurality of gods, so we are not to think or speak of God in such a way
as tends to overthrow the simplicity of the divine nature; therefore we
must not conceive that it is compounded of various parts, all which,
being taken together, tend to constitute the divine essence; which gives
occasion to that known aphorism, generally laid down by those who treat
of this subject, that _whatever is in God, is God_; which we must reckon
as one of the incomprehensibles of the divine Being, which when we
attempt to speak of, we only give an evident proof of the imperfection
of our finite understandings, and that we cannot order our words, by
reason of darkness: however, it is necessary, when we lay down this
proposition, that we signify what we intend hereby, that so we may not
be supposed to use words without ideas; and especially that we may, in
some measure, account for those modes of speaking, which are agreeable
to scripture, which so often describes God as having a plurality of
perfections, and those, in some respects, distinct; and yet, at the same
time, that we may not hereby be led to infer a plurality of gods. Here
let it be considered,
(1.) That we have not the least similitude, or resemblance, of this in
any finite being. Every thing below God is composed of parts, some of
which we call integral, as all the parts of matter taken together
constitute the whole; others are called essential, as when we say an
intelligent being has various powers or properties which are essential
to it; so that it would not be complete without every one of them; and
that these are all of them distinct, so that we cannot say whatever is
in the soul of man is the soul, but every one of those powers, or
properties, taken together, constitute the man; but this is by no means
to be applied to the divine Being; therefore,
(2.) When we conceive of God, as holy, powerful, just, good, &c. we must
not suppose that these perfections are so many ingredients in the divine
Being, or that, when taken together, they constitute it, as the whole is
constituted of its parts; for then every one of them would have no other
than a partial perfection, and consequently the essential glory of one
of those attributes would not be equal to the glory of the divine Being,
which is supposed to consist of them all; and therefore there would be
something in God less than God, or a divine perfection less than all the
divine perfections taken together, which we are not to suppose. These
are the properties of composition; and therefore, when we speak of God
as a simple or uncompounded Being, we cannot forbear to mention them as
what are inconsistent with his perfection as such.
Neither are the divine perfections distinct or different from one
another, as the various parts of which the whole is constituted are said
to be distinct; which follows from the former, since the divine essence
has no parts; therefore we are not to suppose, that the divine
attributes, considered as they are in God, are so distinguished, as one
thing, or being, is from another; or as wisdom, power, justice, mercy,
&c. are in men; for that would be to suppose the divine Being as having
several distinct, infinitely perfect beings contained in it, which is
contrary to its simplicity or unity; or, at least, if we call it one, it
would be only so by participation and dependence, as a general or
complex idea is said to be one, which partakes of, and depends on, all
those particular or simple ideas that are contained in it; or, to
illustrate it by numbers, as one hundred is one, as it contains such a
number of units in it, as are, all taken together, equal to a hundred;
this is not what we mean, when we say God is one.
Moreover, when we speak of the divine perfections, as being in God, we
suppose them all essential to him, as opposed to what is accidental. Now
an accident is generally described, as what belongs, or is superadded,
to a being or subject, which it might have existed without, or have been
destitute of, and yet sustained no loss of that perfection, which is
essential to it: thus, wisdom, holiness, justice, faithfulness, are
accidents in men; so that they who have them not, do not cease to be
men, or to have the essential perfection of the human nature: but this
is by no means to be applied to the divine Being and attributes; for to
suppose God to be destitute of any of them, is as much as to say that he
is not infinitely perfect, or that he is not God. This, I think, is
generally intended, when it is said, _whatever is in God, is God_;
which, because it may be reckoned by some to be a metaphysical
speculation, I should have avoided to mention, had it not been, in some
respects, necessary, since the unity of God cannot well be conceived of,
unless his simplicity be defended; and I do not see how that can be
maintained, if this proposition be not duly considered. If I have used
more words than are needful, or repeated the same ideas too often, in
attempting to explain it, I have done it to avoid some scholastic modes
of speaking, or with a design to render what has been said more
intelligible; but to this we may add,
(3.) That when we speak of the divine perfections as many, or distinct
from one another, as we often do, and have scripture warrant to justify
us therein, namely, when we speak of the justice of God, as different
from his mercy, or these, from his power, wisdom, faithfulness, &c. this
must not be deemed inconsistent with what has been said concerning the
divine simplicity: and therefore let it be considered, that the nature
and perfections of God are incomprehensible; and therefore all the ideas
which we have of them are taken from our comparing them with some small
resemblance that there is thereof in intelligent creatures, and, at the
same time, separating from them whatever argues imperfection.
And from hence it follows, that we are not supposed to know, or be able
to describe, what God is in himself, and, as I humbly conceive, never
shall: such knowledge as this is too great for any but a divine person;
therefore our conceptions of him are taken from and conformed to those
various ways, by which he condescends to make himself visible, or known
to us, namely, by various acts conversant about certain objects, in
which he is said to manifest his perfections: thus, when an effect is
produced, we call that perfection that produces it his power; or as the
divine acts are otherwise distinguished with respect to the objects, or
the manner of his glorifying himself therein, these we call his wisdom,
justice, goodness, &c. And this is what we mean, when we speak of
various perfections in God; though some suppose that they express
themselves more agreeably to the nature of the subject, or to the
simplicity of God, in that, whenever they speak of any of the divine
perfections, they speak of them in such a way, as that they are
denominated from the effect thereof; as when they take occasion to
mention the power of God, they call it God acting powerfully; or of his
justice or faithfulness, they express those perfections by, God acting
justly or faithfully[75]. But however we express ourselves, when we
speak of the distinct perfections of the divine nature, this is what we
principally intend thereby: and here our thoughts must stop, and make
what is too great for a finite mind to conceive of the subject of our
admiration, and adore what we cannot comprehend: such knowledge is too
wonderful for us; it is high, we cannot attain to it.
Footnote 65:
_See Quest._ cv.
Footnote 66:
“As gravity is the common quality of all bodies, arising not from the
nature and properties of matter, nor to be explained without the
agency of a foreign cause, yet producing numberless uniform effects in
the corporeal system, it is in all reason to be attributed to one
contrivance, rather than the different designs of two or more partial
independent causes. What a vast variety of appearances in nature
depend on this one? The self-balanced earth hangs upon its centre; the
mountains are set fast; there is a perpetual flux and reflux of the
sea; vapours continually arise; the clouds are balanced till by their
own weight they descend in rain; animals breathe and move; the
heavenly bodies hold their stations, and go on in their constant
course, by the force of gravity, after the _ordinance_ of that wisdom
which appointed them this law. Now when we see a multitude of effects
proceeding from one Cause, effects so various in their kind and so
important, a Cause simple and unvaried in all the diversity produced
by it, can we avoid ascribing this to an unity of intelligence, if
there be intelligence in it all? For could we suppose different
independent beings, acting with different designs, and by distinct
operations to have formed the several parts of the world, and the
several species of creatures which are in it, what reason can be
imagined why they should all be governed by, and all necessarily
depend upon, one law? The Maker of the sun, or, if a partial cause of
nature could be supposed to have an understanding large enough for it,
the Contriver of the whole visible heavens, must, one would think,
have finished his scheme independently on any other, without borrowing
aid from the work of another God. In like manner the Gods of the seas
and of the dry land, and the Creator of animals, would have completed
their several systems, each by itself, not depending on any other for
its order and preservation. Whereas, on the contrary, we see in fact
they are none of them independent, but all held together by the common
bond of gravity. The heavens and the earth continue in their
situations at a proper distance from each other by the force of this
law; the sea keeps within its channels; and animals live and move by
it. All which lead us to acknowledge one directing Counsel in the
whole frame. For what but an understanding which comprehends the whole
extent of nature, reaching from the utmost circuit of heaven to the
centre of the earth, could have fixed such a common law, so necessary
to all its parts, that without it not one of them could subsist, nor
the harmony of the whole be preserved? The strict cohesion of the
parts which constitute particular bodies requires a peculiar cement,
different from that of the gravitating force; and as it can never be
explained by the nature and properties of matter itself, and is
absolutely necessary to the forms and the uses of bodies in the
several far distant regions of the world, it must in like manner be
attributed to the contrivance of an understanding, and the agency of a
power, which takes in the whole corporeal system, not to a partial
cause, limited in its intelligence and operation.
“_2dly_, The beautiful order and harmony of the universe, since it
must be acknowledged to be the work of understanding, has all the
appearance which is necessary to satisfy any fair inquirer, of its
being formed under the direction of one governing wisdom. Disconcerted
counsels can never produce harmony. If a plurality of intelligent
causes pursue each his separate design, disunion will continually
cleave to their works; but when we see an intire piece made up of many
parts, all corresponding to each other, and conspiring together so as
to answer one common end, we naturally conclude unity of design. As a
work of art is formed according to the preconceived idea of a
designing artificer, without which it has not its necessary intireness
and uniformity, the same may be observed in the works of nature. A
tree is as much one as a house; an animal as complete a system in it
self, (only much more curiously framed,) as a clock. If we carry our
views farther into nature, and take in whole regions of the universe,
with all their contents, the same characters of unity are still
visible. The earth itself is not a confused mass, or a medley of
incoherent and unrelated parts, but a well contrived fabric, fitted
and plainly designed for use. If we consider what a multitude of
living creatures are in it, of different kinds and degrees of
perfection, each sort having proper apartments assigned them, where
they dwell conveniently together, with suitable provision made for
them, and instincts directing them to the use of it; if we consider
the interests of the several kinds, not interfering in the main, but
rather serviceable to each other, furnished with necessary defences
against the inconveniences to which they are liable, either by the
preventing care of nature, which without any thought of their own has
provided for their safety, by the appointed advantages of their
situation, or by an implanted wisdom directing them to find out the
means of it; and if we consider the constant interposition of the same
liberal intelligent nature, appearing by the daily new productions
from the same fertile womb of the earth, whereby the returning wants
of animals are relieved with fresh supplies, all the species of living
things having the common benefit of the air, without which they could
not subsist, and the light of the sun, which cannot at once illuminate
the whole globe, being dispensed among them with so good œconomy, that
they have every one what is sufficient to guide them in the exercise
of their proper functions, that they may fulfil the purposes of their
beings;—when we consider all this, can we doubt but the earth is
disposed and governed by one intending Cause? If in a large house,
wherein are many mansions, and a vast variety of inhabitants, there
appears exact order, all from the highest to the lowest continually
attending their proper business, and all lodged and constantly
provided for suitably to their several conditions, we find ourselves
obliged to acknowledge one wise œconomy. And if in a great city or
commonwealth there be a perfectly regular administration, so that not
only the whole society enjoys an undisturbed peace, but every member
has the station assigned him which he is best qualified to fill; the
unenvied chiefs constantly attend their more important cares, served
by the busy inferiors, who have all a suitable accommodation, and food
convenient for them, the very meanest ministering to the public
utility and protected by the public care; if, I say, in such a
community we must conclude there is a ruling Counsel, which if not
naturally, yet is politically one, and, unless united, could not
produce such harmony and order, much more have we reason to recognize
one governing Intelligence in the earth, in which there are so many
ranks of beings disposed of in the most convenient manner, having all
their several provinces appointed to them, and their several kinds and
degrees of enjoyment liberally provided for, without encroaching upon,
but rather being mutually useful to each other, according to a settled
and obvious subordination. What else can account for this but a
sovereign Wisdom, a common provident nature, presiding over, and
caring for the whole?