against that uneasiness and anxiety of mind, which we often have about
the event of things, especially when they seem to run counter to our
expectation. Thus when there is but a very melancholy prospect before
us, as to what concerns the glory of God in the world, and the
flourishing state of his church in it, upon which we are ready to say
with Joshua, _Lord, what wilt thou do unto thy great name?_ Josh. vii.
9. or when we have many sad thoughts of heart about the rising
generation, and are in doubt whether they will adhere to, or abandon,
the interest of Christ; when we are ready to fear whether there will be
a reserve of faithful men, who will stand up for his gospel, and fill
the places of those who are called off the stage, after having served
their generation by the will of God; or when we are too much oppressed
with carking cares about our outward condition in the world, when, like
Christ’s disciples, we are immoderately thoughtful _what we shall eat,
what we shall drink, or wherewithal we shall be clothed_, Matth. vi. 31.
or how we shall be able to conflict with the difficulties that lie
before us: our great relief against all this solicitude is to be derived
from the faithfulness of God; for since godliness has the promise
annexed to it, of _the life that now is_, as well as of _that which is
to come_, 1 Tim. iv. 18. this promise shall have its accomplishment, so
far as shall most redound to God’s glory, and our real advantage.
(5.) The consideration of the faithfulness of God should be improved, to
humble, and fill us with shame and confusion of face, when we consider
how treacherously we have dealt with him, how unsteadfast we have been
in his covenant, how often we have broke our own promises and
resolutions that we would walk more closely with him, how frequently we
have backslidden from him, contrary to all the engagements which we have
been laid under. Have we found any unfaithfulness in him? Has he, in the
least instance, been worse than his word? as God says, when he reproves
his people, _What iniquity have your fathers found in me, that they are
gone far from me, and have walked after vanity, and are become vain?_
Jer. ii. 5.
Footnote 48:
His ideas are not the effects, but causes of things. Vide post p. 124,
125.
Footnote 49:
There is not succession in His ideas, but he exists in every point of
time.
Footnote 50:
Effects spring from _power_, not _laws_, and prove a _virtual_, or
influential, revelation, an _essential_ ubiquity.
Footnote 51:
Quest. xv. and xviii.
Footnote 52:
Quest. lxvii.
Footnote 53:
Vide Edwards on Free-will, part I. sect. IV.
Footnote 54:
The Divine knowledge is as undeniable as the Divine existence, and as
certain as human knowledge. “He that formed the eye doth he not see?
He that planted the ear doth he not hear? He that teacheth man
knowledge doth he not know?” But though human knowledge proves the
Divine, as the effect does its cause, it by no means follows, that
they are similar. Our knowledge principally consists of the images of
things in the mind, or springs from them; but if the Divine knowledge
were such, it would result that things were prior to his knowledge,
and so that he is not the Creator of them; all things must therefore
be the representations of his ideas, as an edifice represents the plan
of the skilful architect. On this account our knowledge is
superficial, extending only to the external appearances of things; but
their intimate natures are known to him, who made them conformed to
his original ideas. Our knowledge is circumscribed, extending only to
the things which are the objects of our senses, or which have been
described to us; but the universe, with all its parts, the greatest
and the smallest things, are all known to him, who called them into
existence, and moulded them according to his own plan. Our knowledge
embraces only the things which are, or have been; with respect to the
future, we can know nothing, except as he, upon whom it depends, shall
reveal it to us; or as we may draw inferences from his course of
action in former instances. But the Creator knows not only the past
and the present, but the future. He knows the future, because it
wholly depends on him; and nothing can take place without him,
otherwise it is independent of God, but this is incompatible with his
supremacy. If he know not the future, his knowledge is imperfect; if
he is to know hereafter what he does not now know, he is increasing in
knowledge, this would argue imperfection; if his knowledge be
imperfect, he is imperfect; and if he be imperfect, he is not God.—But
all things to come are to be what he designs they shall be; there
accompanies his knowledge of the future, also a purpose, that the
thing designed shall be effectuated; and his wisdom and power being
infinite guarantee the accomplishment of his purposes.
To be the subjects of foreknowledge, such as has been mentioned,
implies the absolute certainty of the things, or occurrences, thus
foreknown. A failure in their production, would not less prove
imperfection, than a defect of the foreknowledge of them. Contingency
belongs not to the things in futurity, but to the defective knowledge
of imperfect beings, and is always proportional to our ignorance.
That the future is categorically certain with God, appears by the
invariable succession of effects to their causes in the natural world;
miracles themselves may not be exceptions; but would always, it is
probable, flow from the same causes, which are occult from us. The
voluntary actions of moral agents, how uncertain soever to themselves,
are also not exceptions from the Divine knowledge and purposes; “He
doth his will in the army of Heaven, and among the inhabitants of the
earth”; “The wrath of man praises him, and the remainder he doth
restrain.” Every prophecy, which has been fulfilled, so far as it was
accomplished by the voluntary actions of men, proves the certainty of
the divine foreknowledge, the absolute certainty of the then future
event, and that the will of man is among the various means, which God
is pleased to make use of to accomplish his purposes.
If there be such certainty in God’s foreknowledge, and in the events
themselves in the Kingdom of Providence, we may reasonably expect his
conduct will be similar in the Kingdom of Grace; and the more
especially if man’s salvation from first to last springs from, and is
carried on, and accomplished by him.
Footnote 55:
As knowledge is a faculty of which wisdom is the due exercise, the
proofs of divine wisdom are so many evidences of the knowledge of God.
Wisdom consists in the choice of the best ends, and the selection of
means most suitable to attain them. The testimonies of the wisdom of
God must therefore be as numerous and various, as the works of his
creation. The mutual relations and subserviency of one thing to
another; as the heat of the sun, to produce rain; both, to produce
vegetation; and all, to sustain life; ensation, digestion, muscular
motion, the circulation of the fluids, and, still more, intelligence,
and above all, the moral faculty, or power of distinguishing good and
evil, are unequivocal proofs of the wisdom, and consequently of the
knowledge, of God.—_He that formed the eye, doth he not see: he that
planted the ear, &c._
Mortal artificers are deemed to understand their own work, though
ignorant of the formation of the materials and instruments they use:
but the Creator uses no mean or material which he has not formed. He
therefore knows, from the globe to the particle of dust or fluid, and
from the largest living creature to the smallest insect. He has
knowledge equally of the other worlds of this system, and every
system; of all things in heaven, earth, and hell.
Our knowledge is conversant about his works; he knows all things which
are known to us, and those things which have not come to our
knowledge.
He formed and sustains the human mind, and knows the thoughts: this is
necessary to him as our Judge. He knows equally all spiritual
creatures, and sustains his holy spirits in holiness.
Our knowledge springs from things; but things spring from his
purposes: they are, because he knows them; otherwise they existed
before his knowledge, and so independently of him.
We know but the external appearances, he the intimate nature of
things. We inquire into the properties of things by our senses, by
comparing them, by analizing, &c: but nothing possesses a property
which he did not purpose and give; otherwise his hands have wrought
more than he intended. We look up through effects unto their causes:
he looks down through intermediate causes, and sees them all to be
effects from him.
We are furnished with memories to bring up ideas, being only able to
contemplate a part at a time; but his comprehension embraces all
things.
He never changes; his purposes of the future embrace eternity: all
things that are really future are certain, because his purposes cannot
fail of accomplishment. But all future things to us are contingent,
except as he has revealed their certainty. That the future is known to
him, also appears by the accomplishment of every prophecy.
But man’s sin receives hereby no apology. He gives the brutal creation
the capacity of deriving pleasure from gratification of sense, and
provides for such appetites. He offers to man, pleasures which are
intellectual: he has tendered him the means, and requires man to seek
his spiritual happiness in God. When he refuses and withholds his
return of service from God, man is alone to blame. And the more
numerous and powerful the motives which he resists, the guilt is the
greater. The divine foreknowledge of this is no excuse for man. When
the Lord overpowers man’s evil with good, the glory of man’s salvation
belongs to God.
Footnote 56:
_See Ray’s Wisdom of God in the Works of Creation, and Derham’s
Physico-Theology._ See also Fenelon, Newenlyle, Paley, and Adams’s
Philosophy.
Footnote 57:
See Page 46.
Footnote 58:
See Quest. clvi. and clvii.
Footnote 59:
_Quest. xvi. xvii. xxi. and xxx._
Footnote 60:
_The Quest. xliv. and lxxi._
Footnote 61:
_Quest. xxix. and lxxix._
Footnote 62:
All the good which we behold in Creation, Providence, and redemption,
flows from goodness in God, and are the proofs of this attribute. If
all the evil, which we discover, springs from the liberty given to
creatures to conform, or not, to the revealed will; or if all moral
evil be productive of good, _the remainder being restrained_; then the
evil, which exists, is no exception to the proofs of Divine goodness.
What Deity now is, he always was; he has not derived his goodness; he
is not a compounded being; his goodness therefore belongs to his
essence. His goodness has been distinguished into _immanent_ and
_communicative_. The latter discovers to us the former, but his
communicative goodness, though flowing in ten thousand streams, and
incalculable, is less than his immanent, which is an eternal fountain
of excellency.
Infinite knowledge discerns things as they are, and a perfect being
will esteem that to be best, which is so; God therefore discerns, and
esteems his own immanent goodness as infinitely exceeding all the
good, which appears in his works, for the excellency in these is but
an imperfect representation of himself. The happiness of Deity must
consist consequently in his own self-complacency; _he made all things
for his pleasure, or glory_, but they are only so far pleasing, as
they reflect his own picture to himself. Yet when we suppose Deity to
be the subject of motives, we are ever in danger of erring.
Divine communicative goodness has been termed _benevolence_ when in
intention, _beneficence_ when carried into effect. This is nearly the
same as _moral rectitude_, because the government of the Universe
must, that it may produce the good of the whole, be administered in
righteousness. The correct administration of justice in rewarding
every good, if there be merit in a creature, and punishing every evil
is no less an effect of benevolence, than the conferring of benefits,
which are purely gratuitous. In like manner the punishment of
offenders in civil society has for its object general utility, whether
we imagine the power which judges and inflicts, to spring from the
social compact, or to have been ordained of God.
The cutting off of flagrant offenders, as by the deluge, the
destruction of Sodom, &c. has been obviously designed to prevent the
spreading contagion of sin. But there is a time appointed, unto which
all things are tending, and unto which men generally refer the wrongs
they sustain, in which perfect justice shall be administered. Some
attributes of Deity seem to be ground of terror, and others of love;
but God is one; he is subject to no perturbation of mind; his wrath
and indignation are but other terms for his steady and unchangeable
goodness, bearing down the evil, which sinful creatures oppose to his
purposes of general advantage. Those acts of justice which are
accounted by the guilty to be unnecessary severity, are deemed, by
glorified saints and angels, the effects of that goodness, which they
make the subject of their Hallelujahs. Thus the highest proof of God’s
goodness consisted in his not sparing his own Son, nor abating any
thing from the demands of his law. After this all hopes that Divine
goodness shall favour the finally impenitent must be utterly vain.
Footnote 63:
“Mark iii. 11, v. 7; Luke viii. 28; and Mat. viii. 29. These
extraordinary personages in the New Testament, are not called
_devils_, Διαβολοι, in the original; that word never occurring in the
Christian scriptures, but in the singular number, and as applied to
one Being alone. They are called _dæmons_, Δαιμονες or Δαιμονια. Yet
they are plainly devils in fact; being called Unclean Spirits, though
sometimes only Spirits (Mark ix. 20; and Luke x. 20;) and showing
themselves to be devils, by their whole history. In Mat. xii. 24 and
26 particularly, the Pharisees say ‘our Saviour casts out devils,
(dæmons) by Beelzebub the prince of the devils (dæmons);’ and our
Saviour replies, that then ‘Satan casts out Satan.’ See also Luke x.
17-18; where the apostles rejoicing declare, ‘even the devils (dæmons)
are subject unto us;’ and our Saviour says unto them, ‘I beheld Satan
as lightning fall from heaven.’ So very false in itself, and directly
contradicted by the very words of our Saviour, is that hypothesis of
Dr. Campbell’s in his new translation of the Gospels; which asserts
these possessions of the New Testament to be nowhere attributed to the
devil, and which avers the dominion or authority of the devil to be
nowhere ascribed to the dæmons! Beelzebub is expressly called the
_prince_ of the dæmons, the dæmons are expressly denominated _Satan_
with him, and these are only inferior devils subordinate to the great
one. And though the word _dæmons_ (as Dr. Campbell urges) might
critically be more exact in a translation; yet the word _devils_
better accords, with the usages of our language and the course of our
ideas. Exactness therefore has been properly sacrificed to utility.”
WHITAKER.
Footnote 64:
_See Quest. xx._
Quest. VIII.
QUEST. VIII. _Are there more Gods than one?_
ANSW. There is but one only, the living and true God.
I. In this answer, God is described as the living and true God. As life
is the greatest excellency belonging to the nature of any finite being,
upon which account some have concluded that the lowest degree thereof
renders a creature more excellent in itself, than the most glorious
creatures that are without it; and inasmuch as intelligent creatures
have a superior excellency to all others, because that which gives life
to them, or the principle by which they act as such, is most excellent;
so the life of God is that whereby he infinitely excels all finite
beings; therefore, when he is called the living God, this is not one
single perfection of the divine nature, but it is expressive of all his
divine perfections. Thus when God represents himself, in scripture, as
giving his people the highest assurance of any thing which he designs to
do, he useth the form of an oath, and sweareth by his life, _As I live_;
or, _as truly as I live_, Isa. xlix. 18. and Numb. xiv. 21. which
imports the same thing, as when he says, _I have sworn by myself_, Gen.
xxii. 16. so that when he is called the living God, his glory is set
forth, as a God of infinite perfection: but this has been considered
under the last answer.
Therefore we may farther observe, that when God is styled the living
God, it connotes the display of all his perfections, as life is a
principle of action; and hereby he is distinguished from lifeless idols,
who were reputed gods by their stupid and profane worshippers. Thus the
apostle lays down both the terms of opposition, when he speaks to some,
as having _turned from idols_, or false gods, _to serve the living and
true God_, 1 Thess. i. 9. Here we might consider the origin and progress
of idolatry, as men were inclined to _worship the creature more than the
Creator_, Rom. i. 25. or _to do service to them, who, by nature, are no
gods_, Gal. iv. 8. and shew how some seemed to have been destitute of
common sense, as they were of true religion, when they not only
worshipped God by idols, of their own making, but prayed to them, and
said, _Deliver us, for ye are our gods_; this the prophet takes notice
of, Isa. xliv. 17. and exposes their unaccountable stupidity, by
observing to them that these gods were first growing among the trees of
the forest, then cut down with their own hands, and fashioned into their
designed form, and part thereof cast into the fire, as destined for
common uses. These were lifeless gods, without a metaphor, and their
senseless worshippers but one remove from them, as the Psalmist says,
_They that make them are like unto them, and so is every one that
trusteth in them_, Psal. cxv. 8. But this we shall have occasion to
insist on in a following part of this work[65], and therefore shall pass
it over at present, and consider,
II. The unity of the Godhead. Scripture is very express in asserting
this: thus it is said, _The Lord our God is one Lord_, Deut. vi. 4. and,
_I, even I, am he; and there is no God with me_, chap. xxxii. 39. and,
_The Lord he is God; there is none else besides him_, chap. iv. 35. and
elsewhere, _Thou art God alone_, Psal. lxxxvi. 10. And this is a truth,
not barely founded on a few places of scripture that expressly assert
it, but it may be deduced from every part thereof; yea, it is instamped
on the very nature of man, and may be as plainly proved, from the light
of nature, as that there is a God; and every one of the divine
perfections, which were particularly considered under the last answer,
will supply us with arguments to confirm our faith therein: but that
this may farther appear, let it be considered,
1. That the idea of a God implies that he is the first cause of all
things, in which respect he is opposed to the creature; it follows,
therefore, that he was from all eternity. Now there can be no more than
one being, who is without beginning, and who gave being to all other
things, which appears from the very nature of the thing; for if there
are more Gods, then they must derive their being from him, and then they
are a part of his creation, and consequently not gods, for God and the
creature are infinitely opposed to each other: and since there is but
one independent being, who is in and of himself, and derives his
perfections from no other, therefore there can be but one God.
2. There is but one being, who is the ultimate end of all things, which
necessarily follows from his being their Creator; for he that produced
them out of nothing must be supposed to have designed some valuable end
hereby, which, ultimately considered, cannot be any thing short of
himself, for that is inconsistent with the wisdom and sovereignty that
is contained in the idea of a Creator; therefore he is said to have
_made all things for himself_, Prov. xvi. 4. and consequently the glory
that results from thence is unalienable, and so cannot be ascribed to
any other God; therefore to suppose that there are other gods, is to
ascribe a divine nature to them, divested of that glory which is
essential to it. And to this we may add, that if God be the ultimate end
of all things, he is to be glorified as such, and all worship is to
terminate in him; and we must proclaim him to be our chief good, and
only portion and happiness, which is plainly inconsistent with a
plurality of gods. Besides, he that is the object of adoration must be
worshipped, and _loved with all our heart, soul, strength, and mind_,
Luke x. 27. our affections must not be divided between him and any
other. Therefore since man is under a natural obligation to give supreme
worship to him, it follows that there is no other God that has a right
to it, and therefore that he is the only true God.
3. Infinite perfection being implied in the idea of a God, as has been
proved under the last answer, it is certain that it cannot belong to
more than one; for as it implies that this perfection is boundless, so
it denotes that he sets bounds to the perfections of all others;
therefore, if there are more Gods than one, their perfections must be
limited, and consequently that which is not infinite is not God. And as
infinite perfection implies in it all perfection, so it cannot be
divided among many, for then no being, that has only a part thereof,
could be said to be thus perfect; therefore, since there is but one that
is so, it follows that there is no other God besides him.
4. Since omnipotency is a divine attribute, there can be but one
almighty being, and therefore but one God; which will farther appear, if
we consider, that if there were more Gods than one, all of them must be
said to be able to do all things, and then the same individual power,
that is exerted by one, must be exerted by another, than which nothing
is more absurd. And it will also follow, that he, who cannot do that
which is said to be done by another, is not almighty, or able to do all
things, and consequently that he is not God.
5. There is but one being, who has an absolute sovereign will, who,
though he can controul all others, is himself subject to no controul;
who has a natural right to give laws to all who are his subjects, but is
subject to none himself; for absolute dominion and subjection are as
opposite as light and darkness. Two persons may as well be said to give
being to each other, as to have a right to give laws to each other.
Moreover, if there were more Gods than one, then there would be a
confusion in the government of the world; for whatever one decrees,
another may reverse; or whatever is done by one, the contrary might be
done by the other, for that is the consequence from a sovereignty of
will. And as there might be opposite things commanded, or forbidden,
pursuant to the different wills of a plurality of gods, so the same
thing, with respect to those who are under an obligation to yield
obedience, would be both a sin and a duty, and the same persons would be
both condemned and justified for the same action.
6. There is but one being, who is, as God is often said to be, the best
and the greatest; therefore, if there were more Gods than one, either
one must be supposed to be more excellent than another, or both equally
excellent. If we suppose the former of these, then he, who is not the
most excellent, is not God; and if the latter, that their excellencies
are equal, then infinite perfection would be divided, which is contrary
to the idea thereof, as was before hinted; as well as to what is
expressly said by God, _To whom will ye liken me, or shall I be equal?
saith the Holy One_, Isa. xl. 25. From these, and several other
arguments to the same purpose, which might have been taken from every
one of the divine attributes, and from all essential and relative glory
which belongs to him, the unity of the divine essence appears, even to a
demonstration. And indeed to assert that there are more Gods than one
is, in effect, to say that there is no God; so the apostle deems it,
when he tells the church at Ephesus, that, before their conversion, when
they worshipped other gods, _they were without God in the world_, which
implies as much as that they were atheists therein, as the words αθεοι
ἐν τω κόσμω may, with equal propriety, be rendered.[66]