consequently all scripture-revelation, we will only suppose that they
whom we contend with will allow that some contingent events have been
foretold; and then it will follow, that this could be done no other way,
but by some intimation from one that is omniscient, and that is God.
IX. The being of a God appears from his providing for the necessities of
all living. Here let us consider,
1. That there is a natural instinct in all creatures, to take care of
and provide for their young, before they are capable of providing for
themselves. This is not only observable in mankind, as the prophet says,
Isa. xlix. 15. _Can a woman forget her sucking child?_ but also in the
lower sort of creatures; and among them in those who are naturally most
fierce and savage, even they provide for their young with extraordinary
diligence, and sometimes neglect, and almost starve, themselves to
provide for them, and sometimes endanger their own lives to defend them.
2. They bring forth their young at the most convenient season of the
year, when the grass begins to spring to supply them with food, and when
the fowls of the air may get a livelihood by picking up the seed that is
sown, and not covered by the earth, and when the trees begin to put
forth their fruits to supply and feed them.
3. When they bring forth their young, there is a providence that
provides the breast, the paps, the udder replenished with, milk to feed
them; and there is a natural instinct in their young, without
instruction, to desire to receive their nourishment that way.
4. Providence has furnished many of the beasts of the fields with
weapons for their defence, and has given others a natural swiftness to
fly from danger, and has provided holes and caverns in the earth to
secure them from those that pursue them. And this cannot be the effect
of mere chance, but it is an evident proof of the being of a God.
5. Providence is, in a peculiar manner, concerned for the supply of man,
the noblest of all creatures in the world; _He giveth food to all
flesh_, Psal. cxxxvi. 25. _Thou preservest man and beast_, Psal. xxxvi.
6. The earth is stored with variety of food; and whereas the poor, which
is the greater part of mankind, cannot purchase those far-fetched, or
costly dainties, which are the support of luxury, these may, by their
industry, provide that food which is most common, and with which the
earth is plentifully stored, whereby their lives and health are as well
maintained, as the rich, who fare deliciously every day; and if their
families increase, and a greater number is to be provided for, they
generally have a supply in proportion to their increasing number.
6. Providence has stored the earth with various medicines, and given
skill to men to use them as a relief against the many sicknesses that we
are exposed to. All these things, and innumerable other instances that
might be given, argue the care and bounty, and consequently prove the
being of God, whose tender mercies are over all his works.
Here let us consider how the providence of God provides for the safety
of man against those things that threaten his ruin.
The contrariety and opposition of things one to another would bring with
them inevitable destruction, did not providence prevent it. As,
(1.) Those things, which are the greatest blessings of nature, would be
destructive, were there not a providence: as the sun that enlightens and
cherishes the world by its heat and influence, would be of no advantage,
were it situate at too great a distance, and would burn it up if it were
too near. So the sea would swallow up, and bring a deluge on the earth,
if God had not, by his decree, fixed it within certain bounds, and made
the shore an inclosure to it, and said hitherto shalt thou go and no
farther.
(2.) The elements are advantageous to us, by their due temperature and
mixture; but, were it otherwise, they would be destructive. So the
various humours and jarring principles in our bodies would tend to
destroy us, but that they are so mixed, as the God of nature, has
tempered and disposed them, for the preservation of life and health.
(3.) The wild beasts would destroy us, had not God put the fear and
dread of man into them, or, at least, caused them not to desire to be
where men live; the forests and desert places, remote from cities, being
allotted for them; and some creatures would be destructive to men, by
the increase of their number, did they not devour one another. And
insects would destroy the fruits of the earth, did not one season of the
year help forward their destruction, as another tends to breed them.
(4.) Men by reason of their contrary tempers and interests, and that
malice and envy, which is the consequence of our first apostacy, would
destroy one another, if there were not a providence that restrains them,
and gives a check to that wickedness that is natural to them, whereby
the world is kept in a greater measure of peace than otherwise it would
be; hence, the Psalmist says, Psal. lxxvi. 10. _Surely the wrath of man
shall praise thee; the remainder of wrath shalt thou restrain._
_Object._ It is objected, by atheists, against the being of a God, that
the wicked are observed to prosper, in the world, and the righteous are
oppressed. This temptation the Psalmist was almost overcome by; as he
says, _my feet were almost gone; my steps had well nigh slipt. For I was
envious at the foolish, when I saw the prosperity of the wicked_, Psal.
lxxiii. 2, 3.
_Answ._ To this it may be answered,
1. That the idea of infinite sovereignty is included in that of a God;
and this distribution of good and evil, if made at any time, without
regard to the deserts of men, argues the sovereignty of providence; and
therefore proves that there is a God, who gives no account of his
matters, but has an absolute right to do what he will with his own.
2. There is a display of infinite wisdom in these dispensations of
providence, in that the good man is made better by affliction, as hereby
the kindness and care of providence appears; and the wicked man is
forced to own, by his daily experience, that all the outward blessings
he enjoys in this world, cannot make him easy or happy, or be a
sufficient portion for him.
3. Outward prosperity doth not prevent or remove inward remorse, or
terror of conscience, which embitters the joys of the wicked; _A
dreadful sound is in his ears; in prosperity the destroyer shall come
upon him_, Job xv. 21. _Even in laughter the heart is sorrowful; and the
end of that mirth is heaviness_, Prov. xiv. 13. And, on the other hand,
outward trouble in the godly is not inconsistent with spiritual joy and
inward peace, which is more than a balance for all the distresses they
labour under; it is said, _The heart knoweth his own bitterness, and a
stranger doth not intermeddle with his joy_, Prov. xiv. 10. _He shall be
satisfied from himself_, ver. 14.
4. We are not to judge of things according to their present appearance,
when we determine a person happy or miserable, but are to consider the
end thereof, since every thing is well that ends well. Thus the
Psalmist, who, as was before observed, was staggered at the prosperity
of the wicked, had his faith established, by considering the different
events of things. Concerning the wicked he says Psal. lxxiii. 18, 19,
20. _Thou didst set them in slippery places; thou castedst them down to
destruction. How are they brought into desolation, as in a moment! they
are utterly consumed with terrors. As a dream when one awaketh: so, O
Lord, when thou awakest, thou shalt despise their image_; which is a
very beautiful expression, representing all their happiness as
imaginary, a vain dream, and such as is worthy to be contemned: but as
for the righteous, he represents them as under the special protection
and guidance of God here, and at last received to glory, and there
enjoying him as their everlasting portion.
Having considered how the light of nature, and the works of God prove
his being, we shall proceed to shew how this appears from scripture, as
it is observed in this answer, that the word and Spirit only do
sufficiently and effectually reveal him unto men for their salvation.
The arguments hitherto laid down are directed more especially to those
who are not convinced that there is a God, and consequently deny the
divine original of scripture: but this argument supposes a conviction of
both; but yet it must not be supposed unnecessary, in as much as we are
oftentimes exposed to many temptations, which tend to stagger our faith;
so that though we may not peremptorily deny that there is a God, yet we
may desire some additional evidence of his being and perfections, beyond
what the light of nature affords; and this we have in scripture. Herein
the glory of God shines forth with the greatest lustre, and we have an
account of works more glorious than those of nature, included in the way
of salvation by a Mediator. The light of nature, indeed, proves that
there is a God; but the word of God discovers him to us as a reconciled
God and Father to all who believe, and is also attended with those
internal convictions and evidences of this truth, which are the peculiar
gifts and graces of the Holy Spirit; and therefore it is well observed,
that this knowledge only is sufficient and effectual to salvation; which
leads us to consider the insufficiency of the light of nature to answer
this end. The knowledge of God, that may be attained thereby, is
sufficient, indeed, in some measure, to restrain our corrupt passions,
and it is conducive to the peace and welfare of civil societies: it
affords some conviction of sin, and, in some respects, leaves men
without excuse, and renders their condemnation less aggravated than that
of those who sin against gospel light; but yet it is insufficient to
salvation, since it is a truth of universal extent, that _there is
salvation in no other, but in Christ_, Acts iv. 12. and that it is _life
eternal to know_ not only _the true God, but Jesus Christ, whom he hath
sent_, John xvii. 3. and this cannot be known by the light of nature,
but by divine revelation; which leads us to consider in what respect the
knowledge of God, as it is contained in and derived from scripture, is
sufficient to salvation.
Here we do not assert the sufficiency thereof, exclusive of the aids of
divine grace, so as to oppose the word to the Spirit: therefore it is
said, in this answer, that the word and Spirit of God alone can reveal
him to men sufficiently to their salvation. The word is a sufficient
rule, so that we need no other to be a standard of our faith, and to
direct us in the way to eternal life; but it is the Spirit that enables
us to regard, understand, and apply this rule, and to walk according to
it: these two are not to be separated; the Spirit doth not save any
without the word,[14] and the word is not effectual to salvation, unless
made so by the Spirit.
That nothing short of scripture-revelation is sufficient to salvation,
will appear, if we compare it with the natural knowledge we have of God.
For,
1. Though the light of nature shews us that there is a God, it doth not
fully display his perfections, so as they are manifested in scripture,
wherein God is beheld in the face of Christ.
2. Neither doth it discover any thing of the doctrine of a Trinity of
persons in the divine essence, who are equally the object of faith: nor
doth it give us any intimation of Christ, as the Lord our righteousness,
in whom we obtain forgiveness of sins: this is known only by
scripture-revelation; therefore, since this is necessary to salvation,
we are bound to conclude that the scripture alone is sufficient to lead
to it.
3. The light of nature suggests, it is true, that God is to be
worshipped; but there is an instituted way of worshipping him, which
depends wholly on divine revelation; and since this is necessary, it
proves the necessity of scripture.
4. There is no salvation without communion with God; or he that does not
enjoy him here, shall not enjoy him for ever hereafter. Now the
enjoyment of God is what we attain by faith, which is founded on
scripture. Thus the apostle says, 1 John i. 3. _That which we have seen
and heard, declare we unto you, that ye also may have fellowship with
us; and truly our fellowship is with the Father, and with his son Jesus
Christ._
But since it is one thing to say, that the knowledge of God, which is
derived from scripture, is sufficient to salvation in an objective way;
that is, that it is a sufficient rule to lead us to salvation, and
another thing to say, that it is made effectual thereunto: we are now to
inquire when it is made so. In answer to which, let us consider, that
the doctrines contained in scripture are made effectual to salvation;
not by all the skill or wisdom of men representing them in their truest
light, nor by all the power of reasoning, which we are capable of,
without the aids of divine grace, but they are made effectual by the
Spirit; and this he does,
(1.) By the internal illumination of the mind, giving a spiritual
discerning of divine truth, which the natural man receiveth not, as the
apostle says, 1 Cor. ii. 14. and it is called, 2 Cor. iv. 6. _a shining
into our hearts, to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God,
in the face of Jesus Christ_.
(2.) By subduing the obstinate will of man, and so enabling it to yield
to a ready, chearful, and universal obedience to the divine commands
contained in scripture; and, in particular, inclining it to own Christ’s
authority, as king of saints; and to say, as converted Paul did, _Lord,
what wilt thou have me to do?_ Acts ix. 6.
(3.) He works upon our affections, exciting in us holy desires after God
and Christ, and a very high esteem and value for divine truth, and
removes all those prejudices which are in our minds against it, opens
and enlarges our hearts to receive the word, and comply with all the
commands thereof, thus, Acts xvi. 14. _The Lord opened the heart of
Lydia, that she attended to the things that were spoken of Paul._ So
David prays, Psal. cxix. 18. compared with v. 5. _Open thou mine eyes,
that I may behold wondrous things out of thy law. O that my ways were
directed to keep thy statutes!_
Footnote 9:
“As for _our own existence_, we perceive it so plainly, and so
certainly, that it neither needs, nor is capable of any proof. For
nothing can be more evident to us than our own existence; _I think, I
reason, I feel pleasure and pain_: can any of these be more evident to
me, than my own existence? If I doubt of all other things, that very
doubt makes me perceive my own _existence_, and will not suffer me to
doubt of that. For if I know _I feel pain_, it is evident I have as
certain perception of my own existence, as of the existence of the
pain I feel: or, if I know _I doubt_, I have as certain perception of
the existence of the thing doubting, as of that thought which I call
_doubt_. Experience then convinces us, that _we have an intuitive
knowledge of our own existence_, and an internal infallible perception
that we are. In every act of sensation, reasoning or thinking, we are
conscious to ourselves of our own being, and, in this matter, come not
short of the highest degree of _certainty_.”——
“In the next place, man knows by an intuitive certainty, that bare
_nothing can no more produce any real being, than it can be equal to
two right angles_. If a man knows not that non-entity, or the absence
of all being, cannot be equal to two right angles, it is impossible he
should know any demonstration in Euclid. If, therefore, we know there
is some real being, and that non-entity cannot produce any real being,
it is an evident demonstration, that from eternity there has been
something; since what was not from eternity, had a beginning, and what
had a beginning, must be produced by something else.
“Next, it is evident, that what had its being and beginning from
another, must also have all that which is in, and belongs to its being
from another too. All the powers it has must be owing to, and received
from the same source. This eternal source, then, of all being, must
also be the source and original of all power; and so _this eternal
Being must be also the most powerful_.
“Again, a man finds in himself _perception_ and _knowledge_. We have
then got one step farther; and we are certain now, that there is not
only some being, but some knowing intelligent being in the world.
“There was a time, then, when there was no knowing being, and when
knowledge began to be; or else there has been also _a knowing being
from eternity_. If it be said, there was a time when no being had any
knowledge, when that eternal Being was void of all understanding: I
reply, that then it was impossible there should ever have been any
knowledge; it being as impossible that things wholly void of
knowledge, and operating blindly, and without any perception, should
produce a knowing being, as it is impossible that a triangle should
make itself three angles bigger than two right ones. For it is as
repugnant to the _idea_ of senseless matter, that it should put into
itself sense, perception and knowledge, as it is repugnant to the
_idea_ of a triangle, that it should put into itself greater angles
than two right ones.
“Thus, from the consideration of ourselves, and what we infallibly
find in our own constitutions, our reason leads us to the knowledge of
this certain and evident truth, that _there is an eternal, most
powerful, and most knowing being_; which whether any one will please
to call _God_, it matters not. The thing is evident, and from this
_idea_ duly considered, will easily be deduced all those other
attributes, which we ought to ascribe to this eternal Being. If,
nevertheless, any one should be found so senselessly arrogant, as to
suppose man alone knowing and wise, but yet the product of mere
ignorance and chance; and that all the rest of the universe acted only
by that blind hap-hazard: I shall leave with him that very rational
and emphatical rebuke of _Tully, l. 2. de leg._ to be considered at
his leisure.
“What can be more sillily arrogant and misbecoming than for a man to
think that he has a mind and understanding in him, but yet in all the
universe beside there is no such thing? Or that those things, which
with the utmost stretch of his reason he can scarce comprehend, should
be moved and managed without any reason at all?” _Quid est enim
verius, quam neminem esse oportere tam stulte arrogantem, ut in se
mentem et rationem putet inesse, in cœlo mundoque non putet? Aut ea
quæ vix summa ingenii ratione comprehendat, nulla ratione moveri
putet?_
“From what has been said, it is plain to me, we have a more certain
knowledge of the existence of a God, than of any thing our senses have
not immediately discovered to us. Nay, I presume I may say, that we
more certainly know that there is a God than that there is any thing
else without us. When I say we _know_, I mean there is such a
knowledge within our reach, which we cannot miss, if we will but apply
our minds to that, as we do to several other inquiries.”
LOCKE.
Footnote 10:
“In crossing a heath, suppose I pitched my foot against a _stone_, and
were asked how the stone came to be there, I might possibly answer,
that, for any thing I knew to the contrary, it had lain there for
ever; nor would it, perhaps, be very easy to shew the absurdity of
this answer. But suppose I had found a _watch_ upon the ground, and it
should be enquired how the watch happened to be in that place, I
should hardly think of the answer which I had before given, that, for
any thing I knew, the watch might have always been there. Yet, why
should not this answer serve for the watch, as well as for the stone?
Why is it not as admissible in the second case, as in the first? For
this reason, and for no other, _viz._ that, when we come to inspect
the watch, we perceive (what we could not discover in the stone) that
its several parts are framed, and put together for a purpose, _e. g._
that they are so formed and adjusted as to produce motion, and that
motion so regulated as to point out the hour of the day; that, if the
several parts had been differently shaped from what they are, of a
different size from what they are, or placed after any other manner,
or in any other order, than that in which they are placed, either no
motion at all would have been carried on in the machine, or none which
would have answered the use, that is now served by it. To reckon up a
few of the plainest of these parts, and of their offices, all tending
to one result: We see a cylindrical box, containing a coiled elastic
spring, which, by its endeavour to relax itself, turns round the box.
We next observe a flexible chain (artificially wrought for the sake of
flexure) communicating the action of the spring from the box to the
fusee. We then find a series of wheels, the teeth of which catch in,
and apply to, each other, conducting the motion from the fusee to the
balance, and from the balance to the pointer; and at the same time, by
the size and shape of those wheels, so regulating that motion, as to
terminate in causing an index, by an equable and measured progression,
to pass over a given space in a given time. We take notice that the
wheels are made of brass, in order to keep them from rust; the springs
of steel, no other metal being so elastic; that over the face of the
watch there is placed a glass, a material employed in no other part of
the work, but, in the room of which, if there had been any other than
a transparent substance, the hour could not be seen without opening
the case. This mechanism being observed (it requires indeed an
examination of the instrument, and perhaps some previous knowledge of
the subject, to perceive and understand it; but being once, as we have
said, observed and understood,) the inference, we think, is
inevitable; that the watch must have had a maker; that there must have
existed, at some time, and at some place or other, an artificer, or
artificers who formed it for the purpose which we find it actually to
answer; who comprehended its construction, and designed its use.
“I. Nor would it, I apprehend, weaken the conclusion that we had never
seen a watch made; that we had never known an artist capable of making
one; that we were altogether incapable of executing such a piece of
workmanship ourselves, or of understanding in what manner it was
performed: all this being no more than what is true of some exquisite
remains of some ancient art, of some lost arts, and, to the generality
of mankind, of the more curious productions of modern manufacture.
Does one man in a million know how oval frames are turned? Ignorance
of this kind exalts our opinion of the unseen and unknown artist’s
skill, if he be unseen and unknown, but raises no doubts in our minds
of the existence and agency of such an artist, at some former time,
and in some place or other. Nor can I perceive that it varies at all,
the inference, whether the question arise concerning a human agent, or
concerning an agent of a different species, or an agent possessing, in
some respects, a different nature.
“II. Neither, secondly, would it invalidate our conclusion, that the
watch sometimes went wrong, or that it seldom went exactly right. The
purpose of the machinery, the design, and the designer, might be
evident, and in the case supposed would be evident, in whatever way we
accounted for the irregularity of the movement, or whether we could
account for it or not. It is not necessary that a machine be perfect,
in order to shew with what design it was made: still less necessary,
where the only question is, whether it were made with any design at
all.