persons in all respects alike, is wonderful, and the result of divine
wisdom: for even this is necessary for society, and our performing the
duties we owe to one another.
8. The union of this body with the soul, which is a spirit of a very
different nature, can never be sufficiently admired or accounted for;
but gives us occasion herein to own a superior, infinitely wise being.
Which leads us,
III. To consider how the being of God may be evinced from the nature of
the soul of man. He is said, Zech. xii. 1. _To have formed the spirit of
man within him._ And hereby his power and wisdom, and consequently his
being, is declared. For,
1. The nature of a spiritual substance is much less known than that of
bodies; and therefore that which we cannot fully understand, we must
admire.
If the wisdom and power of God is visible in the structure of our
bodies, it is much more so in the formation of our souls; and since we
cannot fully describe what they are, and know little of them but by
their effects, certainly we could not form them; and therefore there is
a God, who is the _Father of spirits_.
2. The powers and capacities of the soul are various, and very
extensive.
(1.) It can frame ideas of things superior to its own nature, and can
employ itself in contemplating and beholding the order, beauty, and
connexion of all those things in the world, which are, as it were, a
book, in which we may read the divine perfections, and improve them to
the best purposes.
(2.) It takes in the vast compass of things past, which it can reflect
on and remember, with satisfaction, or regret: and it can look forward
to things to come, which it can expect, and accordingly conceive
pleasure or uneasiness in the forethoughts thereof.
(3.) It can chuse or embrace what is good, or fly from and reject what
is evil and hurtful to it.
(4.) It is capable of moral government, of conducting itself according
to the principles of reason, and certain rules enjoined it for the
attaining the highest end.
(5.) It is capable of religion, and so can argue that there is a God,
and give him the glory that is due to his name, and be happy in the
enjoyment of him.
(6.) It is immortal, and therefore cannot be destroyed by any creature;
for none but God has an absolute sovereignty over the spirits of men;
_No man hath power over the spirit to retain the spirit; neither hath he
power in the day of death_, Eccles. viii. 8.
IV. From the nature and office of conscience, which is that whereby the
soul takes a view of itself, and its own actions, as good or evil; and
considers itself as under a law to a superior being, from whom it
expects rewards or punishments; and this evidently proves a God. For,
1. Conscience is oftentimes distressed or comforted by its reflection on
those actions, which no man on earth can know: and therefore when it
fears punishment for those crimes, which come not under the cognizance
of human laws, the uneasiness that it finds in itself, and its dread of
punishment, plainly discovers that it is apprehensive of a divine being,
who has been offended, whose wrath and resentment it fears. All the
endeavours that men can use to bribe, blind, or stupify their
consciences, will not prevent these fears; but the sad apprehension of
deserved punishment, from one whom they conceive to know all things,
even the most secret crimes committed, this makes persons uneasy,
whether they will or no. Whithersoever they fly, or what amusement
soever they betake themselves to, conscience will still follow them with
its accusations and dread of divine wrath: _The wicked are like the
troubled sea, when it cannot rest_, Isa. lvii. 20. _A dreadful sound is
in his ears; in prosperity the destroyer shall come upon him_, Job xv.
21. _Terrors take hold of him as waters, a tempest stealeth him away in
the night. The east-wind carrieth him away, and he departeth; and as a
storm hurleth him out of his place. For God shall cast upon him, and not
spare; he would fain flee out of his hand_, Job xxvii. 20, 21, 22. _The
wicked flee when no man pursueth_, Prov. xxviii. 1.
And this is universal, there are none but are, some time or other,
liable to these fears, arising from self-reflection, and the dictates of
conscience; the most advanced circumstances in the world will not
fortify against, or deliver from them, Acts xxiv. 25. _As Paul reasoned
of righteousness, temperance, and judgment to come, Felix trembled._
Even Pharaoh himself, the most hard-hearted sinner in the world, who
would fain have forced a belief upon himself that there is no God, and
boldly said, _Who is the Lord, that I should obey him?_ yet he could not
ward off the conviction that there is a God, which his own conscience
suggested. Therefore he was forced to say, Exod. ix. 27. _I have sinned
this time; the Lord is righteous, and I and my people are wicked._ And
indeed all the pleasures that any can take in the world, who give
themselves up to the most luxurious way of living, cannot prevent their
trembling, when conscience suggests some things terrible to them for
their sins. Thus Belshazzar, when in the midst of his jollity and
drinking wine, having made a great feast to a thousand of his lords,
when he saw the finger of a man’s hand upon the wall, it is said, Dan.
v. 6. _The king’s countenance was changed, and his thoughts troubled
him; so that the joints of his loins were loosed, and his knees smote
one against another._
Thus concerning those dictates of conscience, which make men very
uneasy, whereby wicked men are forced to own that there is a God,
whether they will or no; we now proceed to consider good men, as having
frequently such serenity of mind and peace of conscience, as affords
them farther matter of conviction concerning this truth. It is, indeed,
a privilege that they enjoy, who have the light of scripture revelation,
and so it might have been considered under a following head; but since
it is opposed to what was but now brought, as a proof of the being of a
God, we may here observe, that some have that composure of mind, in
believing and walking closely with God, as tends to confirm them yet
more in this truth. For,
(1.) This composure of mind abides under all the troubles and
disappointments they meet with in the world: those things which tend to
disturb the peace of other men, do not so much affect them; _He shall
not be afraid of evil tidings; his heart is fixed, trusting in the
Lord_, Psal. cxii. 7. And as this peace abides under all the troubles of
life, so it does not leave them, but is sometimes more abundant, when
they draw nigh to death.
(2.) It is a regular and orderly peace that they have, accompanied with
grace, so that conscience is most quiet when the soul is most holy;
which shews that there is a hand of God in working or speaking this
peace, as designing thereby to encourage and own that grace which he has
wrought in them: Rom. x. 13. _thus the God of hope_ is said _to fill us
with all joy and peace in believing_.
(3.) Let them labour never so much after it, they can never attain this
peace, without a divine intimation, or God’s speaking peace to their
souls; therefore when he is pleased, for wise ends, to withdraw from
them, they are destitute of it; so that God is hereby known by his
works, or by those influences of his grace, whereby he gives peace to
conscience.
V. The being of a God appears from those vast and boundless desires,
which are implanted in the soul; so that it can take up its rest, and
meet with full satisfaction, in nothing short of a being of infinite
perfection: therefore there is such an one, which is God. This will
farther appear if we consider,
1. We find, by experience, that though the soul, at present, be
entertained, and meets with some satisfaction in creature-enjoyments,
yet it still craves and desires more, of what kind soever they be; and
the reason is, because they are not commensurate to its desires; _The
eye is not satisfied with seeing, nor the ear with hearing_, Eccles. i.
8. _That which is wanting cannot be numbered_, ver. 15.
2. We cannot rationally suppose that such boundless desires should be
implanted in the soul, and yet that there should be nothing sufficient
to satisfy them; for then the most excellent creature in this lower
world would be, in some respects, more miserable than other creatures of
a lower order, which obtain their ultimate desire. Thus the Psalmist,
speaking of the brute creatures, says, Psal. civ. 28. _They are filled
with good_; that is, they have all that they crave. Therefore,
3. There must be one that is infinitely good, who can satisfy these
desires, considered in their utmost extent; and that is God, the
fountain of all blessedness.
VI. The being of a God may be farther evinced, from the consent of all
nations to this truth. Now that which all mankind agrees in, must be
founded in the nature of man, and that which is so, is evident from the
light of nature. It is true, there are many who have thus _known God,
who have not worshipped and glorified him as God; but have been vain in
their imaginations, and have changed the truth of God into a lie, and
worshipped and served the creature more than the Creator_, as the
apostle says, Rom. i. 21, 25. But it doth not follow from hence, that
the heathen, who were guilty of idolatry, had no notion of a God in
general, but rather the contrary; that there is something in the nature
of man, which suggests, that they ought to worship some divine being,
whom they could not, by the light of nature, sufficiently know, and
therefore they did service to those who were by nature no gods; however,
this proves that they were not wholly destitute of some ideas of a God,
which therefore are common to all mankind. Now that all nations have had
some discerning that there is a God, appears,
1. From the credit that is to be given to all ancient history; which
sufficiently discovers that men, in all ages, have owned and worshipped
something that they called a God, though they knew not the true God.
2. The heathen themselves, as may easily be understood from their own
writings, reckoned atheism a detestable crime, for this reason, because
contrary to the light of nature; and therefore some of them have
asserted, that there is no nation in the world so barbarous, and void of
reason, as to have no notion of a God.
3. We may consider also, that no changes in the world, or in the
circumstances of men, have wholly erased this principle: whatever
changes there have been in the external modes of worship, or in those
things which have been received by tradition, still this principle has
remained unalterable, that there is a God. Therefore the being of a God
may be proved by the consent of all nations.
_Object._ 1. But it is objected to this, that there have been some
speculative atheists in the world. History gives us an account of this;
and we are informed, that there are some whole countries in Africa and
America, where there is no worship, and, as to what appears to us, no
notion of a God. Therefore the being of a God cannot be proved by the
consent of all nations.
_Answ._ 1. As to the first branch of this objection, that there have
been some speculative atheists in the world; it is true, history
furnishes us with instances of persons who have been deemed so, yet
their number has been very inconsiderable; so that it will not follow
from hence, that the idea of a God is not some way or other, impressed
upon the heart of man. Might it not as well be said, that, because some
few are born idiots, therefore reason is not natural to man, or
universal? And it may be farther observed, that they who are branded
with the character of atheists in ancient history, or such as appear to
be atheists in our day by their conversation, are rather practical
atheists than speculative. We do not deny, that many in all ages have,
and now do, assert, and pretend to prove, that there is no God; but it
is plain that they discover, at some times, such fear and distress of
conscience, as is sufficient to disprove what they pretend to defend by
arguments.
2. As to the second branch of the objection, that there are some parts
of the world, where the people seem to be so stupid, as not to own or
worship a God; this is hard to be proved; neither have any, that have
asserted it, had that familiarity with them, as to be able to determine
what their sentiments are about this matter.
But suppose it were true in fact, that some nations have no notion of a
God or religion, nothing could be argued from it, but that such nations
are barbarous and brutish, and though they have the principle of reason,
do not act like reasonable creatures; and it is sufficient to our
purpose to assert, that all men, acting like reasonable creatures, or
who argue from those principles of reason, that they are born with, may
from thence conclude that there is a God.
_Object._ 2. It is farther objected by atheists against the being of
God, and indeed against all religion, which is founded thereon, that
both one and the other took its rise from human policy, that hereby the
world, being amused with such-like speculations, might be restrained
from those irregularities, which were inconsistent with the well-being
of civil government; and that this was readily received, and propagated
by tradition, and so by an implicit faith transmitted from one
generation to another, among those who enquired not into the reason of
what they believed; and that all this was supported by fear, which fixed
their belief in this matter: so that human policy invented, tradition
propagated, and fear rooted in the minds of men, what we call the
natural ideas of God and religion.
_Answ._ This is a vile insinuation, but much in the mouths of atheists,
without any shadow of reason, or attempt to prove it; and indeed it may
be easily disproved. Therefore,
1. It appears that the notices we have of the being of a God, are not in
the least founded in state policy, as a trick of men, to keep up some
religion in the world, as necessary for the support of civil government.
For,
If the notion of a God, and religion consequential hereon, were a
contrivance of human policy, it would follow,
(1.) That it must be either the invention of one single man, or else it
was the result of the contrivance of many convened together in a joint
assembly of men, in confederacy, to impose on the world.
If it was the invention of one man, who was he? when and where did he
live? What history gives the least account of him? or when was the world
without all knowledge of a deity, and some religion, that we may know,
at least, in what age this notion first sprang up, or was contrived? Or
could the contrivance of one man be so universally complied with, and
yet none pretend to know who he was, or when he lived? And if it was the
contrivance of a number of men convened together, how was this possible,
and yet the thing not be discovered? or how could the princes of the
earth, who were at the head of this contrivance, have mutual
intelligence, or be convened together? By whose authority did they meet?
or what was the occasion thereof?
(2.) It is morally impossible, that such a piece of state policy should
be made use of to deceive the world, and universally take place, and yet
none in any age ever discover the imposture. The world could never be so
imposed on, and yet not know by whom; the plot would certainly have been
confessed by some who were in the secret.
(3.) If human policy had first invented this notion, certainly the
princes and great men of the world, who had a hand in it, would have
exempted themselves from any obligation to own a God, or any form of
worship, whereby they acknowledge him their superior; for impostors
generally design to beguile others, but to exempt themselves from what
they bind them to. If any of the princes, or great men of the world, had
invented this opinion, that there is a God, and that he is to be
worshipped, their pride would have led them to persuade the world that
they were gods themselves, and ought to be worshipped; they would never
have included themselves in the obligation to own a subjection to God,
if the notion of a God had, for political ends, been invented by them.
(4.) If the belief of a God was invented by human policy, how came it to
be universally received by the world? It is certain, that it was not
propagated by persecution; for though there has been persecution to
inforce particular modes of worship, yet there never was any such method
used to inforce the belief of a God, for that took place without any
need thereof, it being instamped on the nature of man.
If therefore it was not propagated by force, neither was the belief of a
God spread through the world by fraud, what are those arts which are
pretended to have been used to propagate it? It took its rise, say they,
from human policy; but the politicians not known, nor the arts they used
to persuade the world that there is a God found out. How unreasonable
therefore is this objection, or rather cavil, against a deity, when the
atheists pretend that it was the result of human policy!
2. It appears that the belief of a God was not propagated in the world
merely by tradition, and so received by implicit faith. For,
(1.) Those notions that have been received with implicit faith by
tradition, from generation to generation, are not pretended to be proved
by reason; but the belief of a God is founded on the highest reason; so
that if no one in the world believed it besides myself, I am bound to
believe it, or else must no longer lay claim to that reason which is
natural to mankind, and should rather shew myself a brute than a man.
(2.) No schemes of religion, that were propagated merely by tradition,
have been universally received; for tradition respects particular
nations, or a particular set of men, who have propagated them. But as
has been before considered the belief of a God has universally
prevailed. Moreover, if the belief of a God was thus spread by tradition
through the world, why was not the mode of worship settled, that so
there might be but one religion in the world? The reason is, because
their respective modes of worship were received, by the heathen, by
tradition: whereas the belief of a God was not so, but is rooted in the
nature of man.
(3.) Whatever has been received only by tradition, has not continued in
the world in all the turns, changes, and overthrow of particular
nations, that received it; but the belief of a God has continued in the
world throughout all the ages and changes thereof: therefore it is not
founded in tradition, but by the light of nature.
3. It appears, moreover, that the belief of a God could not take its
first rise merely from fear of punishment, which men expected would be
inflicted by him, though that be a strong argument to establish us in
the belief thereof. For,
(1.) A liableness to punishment for crimes committed, supposes that
there is a God, who is offended by sin, and from whom punishment is
expected. Therefore as the effect cannot give being to the cause, so
fear could not be the first ground and reason of the belief of a God.
But,
(2.) The principal idea which mankind has of God, and that which is most
natural to us, is, that of an infinitely amiable object, and so we
conceive of him, as a being of infinite goodness, 1 John iv. 8. _God is
love._ Thus we conceive of him, as the spring of all we enjoy and hope
for; and as for fear, that is only what arises in the breasts of wicked
men, and is founded in the secondary ideas we have of him; to wit, as
taking vengeance, supposing he is offended. But they who do not offend
him are not afraid of his vengeance; and the sentiments of the worst of
men are not to be our rule in judging concerning the being of a God. If
these believe that there is a God, only because they fear him, others
believe him to be the fountain of all blessedness, and as such they love
him: therefore the ideas that men have of the being of a God, did not
arise from fear.
VII. The being of a God, may be proved from the works of providence,
whereby the world is governed, as well as preserved from returning to
its first nothing. It is that which supplies all creatures with those
things that their respective natures or necessities require: creatures
could no more provide for themselves than they could make themselves;
therefore he that provides all things for them is God. All finite beings
have their respective wants, whether they are sensible thereof or no;
and he must be all-sufficient that can fill or supply the necessities of
all things, and such an one is God.
Thus the Psalmist speaks of this God, as supplying the necessities of
_beasts and creeping things_; who are said, _to wait upon him, that he
may give them their meat in due season_, Psal. civ. 25, 27. Psal. cxlv.
15,16.
In considering the providence of God, whereby his being is evinced, we
may observe,
1. The extraordinary dispensations thereof, when things happen contrary
to the common course, and fixed laws of nature, as when miracles have
been wrought. These are undeniable proofs of the being of a God; for
herein a check or stop is put to the course of nature, the fixed order
or laws thereof controuled or inverted; and this none can do but he who
is the God and author thereof. To deny that miracles have been wrought,
is little better than scepticism; since it hath been proved, by the most
unquestionable testimony, contained not only in scripture, but in other
writings, and is confessed, even by those who deny the principal things
designed to be confirmed thereby. It is true, they were never wrought
with an immediate design to prove that there is a God, since that is
sufficiently demonstrated without them; but in as much as they have been
wrought with other views, the being of a God, whose immediate power has
been exerted therein, appears beyond all contradiction.
2. This may be proved from the common dispensations of providence, which
we daily behold and experience in the world.
These we call common, because they contain nothing miraculous, or
contrary to the laws of nature: they are indeed wonderful, and have in
them the traces and footsteps of infinite wisdom and sovereignty, and
therefore prove that there is a God. For,
(1.) It cannot otherwise be accounted for, that so many things should
befal us, or others in the world, that are altogether unlooked for. Thus
one is cast down, and a blast thrown on all his endeavours, and another
raised beyond his expectation, Psal. lxxv. 6, 7. _Promotion cometh
neither from the east, nor from the west, nor from the south. But God is
the judge; he putteth down one, and setteth up another._
(2.) The wisest and best concerted schemes of men are often baffled, and
brought to nought, by some unexpected occurrence of providence, which
argues a divine controul, as God says, 1 Cor. i. 19. _I will destroy the
wisdom of the wise, and will bring to nothing the understanding of the
prudent._ And who is it that can turn the counsels of men into
foolishness; but an infinitely wise God?
VIII. The being of a God may be proved by the foretelling future events,
which have come to pass accordingly. For,
1. No creature can, by his own wisdom or sagacity, foretel future
contingent events with a certain peremptory and infallible knowledge,
and not by mere conjecture, Isa. xli. 24. _Shew the things that are to
come hereafter, that we may know that ye are gods._ And the reason is
plain, because our knowledge reaches no farther than to see effects, and
judge of them in and by their causes. Thus we may easily foretel that
necessary causes will produce those effects that are agreeable to their
nature: but when the effect is not necessary, but contingent, or purely
arbitrary, then we have nothing to judge by, and therefore cannot come
to the knowledge of things future, without an intimation given us
thereof, by him who orders and disposes of all things, and that is God:
and therefore to foretel things to come in this sense, is an evident
proof of the being of God.
2. That there have been such predictions, and that the things foretold
have come to pass accordingly, is very obvious from scripture: and if it
be highly reasonable to believe that which is so well attested, as
scripture is, we are bound from hence to conclude that there is a God.