THE INFLUENCE OF CLAUSEWITZ ON MODERN POLICY AND WAR
From the day of their publication until now the influence of the
writings of Clausewitz has been steadily growing, till to-day it is
impossible to over-estimate the extent of that influence upon modern
military and political thought, especially in Germany. As General von
Caemmerer, in his "Development of Strategical Science," says: "Karl
von Clausewitz, the pupil and friend of Scharnhorst and the confidant
of Gneisenau, is in Germany generally recognized as the most prominent
theorist on war, as the real philosopher on war, to whom our famous
victors on the more modern battlefields owe their spiritual training."
Field-Marshal Moltke was "his most distinguished pupil," and adapted
the teaching of Clausewitz to the conditions of to-day.
General von der Goltz, in the introduction to his great work, "The
Nation in Arms," thus describes the veneration which he inspires: "A
military writer who, after Clausewitz, writes upon the subject of war,
runs the risk of being likened to a poet who, after Goethe, attempts a
_Faust_, or, after Shakespeare, a _Hamlet_. Everything important that
can be told about the nature of war can be found stereotyped in the
works which that great military genius has left behind him. Although
Clausewitz has himself described his book as being something as yet
incomplete, this remark of his must be taken to mean that he, too,
was subject to the fate of all aspiring spirits, and was forced to
feel that all he attained lay far beneath his ideal. For us, who knew
not what that ideal was, his labours are a complete work. I have,
accordingly, not attempted to write anything new, or of universal
applicability about the science of warfare, but have limited myself to
turning my attention to the military operations of our own day." One
can hardly imagine a stronger tribute of admiration.
And, as Moltke was Clausewitz's most distinguished pupil, so also
are all those trained in the school of Moltke pupils of Clausewitz,
including the most eminent of modern German military writers, such as
General von Blume, in his "Strategy"; Von der Goltz, in his "Nation in
Arms" and "The Conduct of War," who trained the Turkish General Staff
for the campaign of 1897 against Greece and the battle of Pharsalia,
etc.; General von Boguslawski; General von Verdy du Vernois, the
father of the study of Applied Tactics; General von Schlichting, in his
"Tactical and Strategical Principles of the Present"; General Meckel,
who trained the Japanese Staff, etc., etc.
We all remember the telegram sent to General Meckel by Marshal Oyama
after the battle of Liao-yang: "We hope you are proud of your pupils."
Some time ago, when asked to give a lecture at Aldershot to the
officers of the 2nd Division on Clausewitz, it struck me that it would
be very interesting, anxious as we all were then to know the causes
of the wonderful Japanese efficiency and success, if I could obtain a
pronouncement from General Meckel how far he had been influenced in his
teaching by Clausewitz. My friend Herr von Donat did me the favour to
write to General von Caemmerer and ask him if he could procure me such
a pronouncement which I might publish. General Meckel, whose death both
Japan and Germany have since had to mourn, most kindly consented, and
I esteem it a great honour to be allowed to quote part of his letter.
He said: "I, like every other German officer, have, consciously or
unconsciously, instructed in the spirit of Clausewitz. Clausewitz is
the _founder_ of that theory of war which resulted from the Napoleonic.
I maintain that _every one_ who nowadays either makes or teaches war
in a modern sense, bases himself upon Clausewitz, even if he is not
conscious of it." This opinion of General Meckel, to whose training of
the Japanese General Staff the success of the Japanese armies must be
largely attributed, is most interesting. It is not possible to give a
stronger or more up-to-date example of the magnitude of the influence
of Clausewitz.
In this connection I should like to make a short quotation from "The
War in the Far East," by the _Times_ military correspondent. In his
short but suggestive chapter on "Clausewitz in Manchuria" he says: "But
as all save one of the great battles in Manchuria have been waged by
the Japanese in close accordance with the spirit and almost the letter
of Clausewitz's doctrine, and as the same battles have been fought by
the Russians in absolute disregard of them (though his works had been
translated into Russian by General Dragomiroff long before the war),
it is certainly worth showing how reading and reflection may profit
one army, and how the neglect of this respectable practice may ruin
another." "Clausewitz in Manchuria"! That brings us up to date. It is a
far cry for his influence to have reached, and triumphed.
REFLECTIONS
Clausewitz wrote his book expressly for statesmen as well as soldiers.
We may be sure, therefore, that the influence of Clausewitz on the
Continent has penetrated the realm of policy little less widely than
the realm of war. From this thought arise many reflections. It will be
sufficient here to suggest one. I would suggest that we should regard
every foreign statesman, especially in Germany, as, consciously or
unconsciously, a disciple of Clausewitz. That is to say, we should
regard him as a man who, underneath everything else, underneath the
most pacific assurances for the present, considers war an unalterable
part of policy. He will regard war as part of the ordinary intercourse
of nations, and occasional warlike struggles as inevitable as
commercial struggles. He will consider war also as an instrument
of policy, which he himself may have to use, and to be studied
accordingly. He will consider it not as a thing merely for speeches,
but for practical use in furthering or defending the interests of his
State. He will regard war as the means by which some day his nation
shall impose its will upon another nation. He will be prepared to wait
and wait, to make "every imaginable preparation," and finally to let
loose war in its most absolute and ruthless character, war carried out
with the utmost means, the utmost energy, and the utmost effort of a
whole nation-in-arms, determined to achieve its political object and
compel submission to its will by force.
To talk to such a man of "the evils of war," or of "the burden of
armaments"; or to propose to him "disarmament" or "reduction of
armed forces," and so forth can only appear to him as the result of
"imperfect knowledge." He will not say so, but he will think so, and
act accordingly. To the partially instructed opponent of such a man
one can only say, "Let him that thinketh he standeth take heed lest he
fall."