THE REALITY OF WAR
THE
REALITY OF WAR
A COMPANION
TO CLAUSEWITZ
BY
MAJOR STEWART L. MURRAY
LATE GORDON HIGHLANDERS
POPULAR EDITION EDITED BY
A. HILLIARD ATTERIDGE
LONDON
HODDER AND STOUGHTON
WARWICK SQUARE, E.C.
HUGH REES, LTD.
5 REGENT STREET, S.W.
_Reprinted in 1914_
EDITOR'S PREFACE
Great books, the masterpieces of the special branch of knowledge with
which they deal, are often very big books; and busy men, who have not
unlimited time for reading, find it helpful to have some one who will
give them a general summary of a famous writer's teaching, and point
out the most important passages in which the author himself embodies
the very essence of his argument.
This is what Major Murray has done for the most important work on war
that was ever written. He does not give a mere dry summary of its
contents. He sets forth, in language so plain that even the civilian
reader or the youngest soldier can read it with interest, the essence
of the teaching of Clausewitz, and he embodies in his book the most
striking passages of the original work. He adds to each section of his
subject some useful criticisms, and at the end of the book he sums up
the effect of recent changes on the practice of war.
The book is a popular manual of the realities of war, which should be
read not only by soldiers, but by every one who takes an intelligent
interest in the great events of our time.
As to the practical value of the writings of Clausewitz, it may be
well to quote here the words of Mr. Spenser Wilkinson, the Professor
of Military History at Oxford, from his introduction to the original
edition of Major Murray's work:
"Clausewitz was a Prussian officer who first saw fighting as a boy in
1793, and whose experience of war lasted until 1815, when the great
war ended. He was then thirty-five and spent the next fifteen years in
trying to clear his mind on the subject of war, which he did by writing
a number of military histories and a systematic treatise 'On War.' At
the age of fifty he tied his manuscripts into a parcel, hoping to work
at them again on the conclusion of the duties for which he was ordered
from home. A little more than a year later he died at Breslau of
cholera, and the papers, to which he had never put the finishing touch,
were afterwards published by his widow.
"Part of the value of his work is due to the exceptional opportunities
which he enjoyed. When the war of 1806 began he had long been the
personal adjutant of one of the Prussian princes, and an intimate
friend of Scharnhorst, who was probably the greatest of Napoleon's
contemporaries. In the period of reorganization which followed
the Peace of Tilsit he made the acquaintance of Gneisenau, and of
almost all the officers who made their mark in the subsequent wars
of liberation. During the years of preparation he was Scharnhorst's
assistant, first in the Ministry of War and then on the General Staff.
During the campaign of 1812 he served with the Russian army as a
staff officer. Thus his experience during the four years of the Wars
of Liberation was that of one who was continually behind the scenes,
always in touch with the Governments and Generals, and therefore better
able than any one not so favourably placed to see everything in its
proper perspective, and to follow and appreciate the considerations
which directed the decisions both of statesmen and of the commanders
of armies. His personal character was of the finest mould, and his
writings have the sincerity, the absence of which makes it so difficult
to rely upon those of Napoleon.
"The ultimate test of the value of books is time. When Clausewitz
died, the two books on war which were thought the best were those of
the Archduke Charles of Austria and General Jomini. To-day the book
of Clausewitz, 'On War,' easily holds the first place. It is the
least technical of all the great books on war; from beginning to end
it is nothing but common sense applied to the subject, but for that
reason it is the hardest to digest, because common sense or a man's
natural instinctive judgment on any subject is exceedingly hard to
analyse and put into words. An exceptionally gifted man can go through
this process, but few can follow it for any length of time without a
distinct effort.
"Almost every good institution has arisen out of the effort to provide
a remedy for some evil, but in the imperfection of human nature nearly
every institution brings with it fresh evils, which in their turn have
to be counteracted. The modern spirit, with its hatred of nepotism
and its belief in knowledge, has grafted the examination system upon
every form of education from the lowest to the highest. The British
army shares in the benefits and in the disadvantages of the system,
of which, in the case of an officer, the danger to be guarded against
is that it tends to accustom a man to rely rather on his memory than
his intelligence, and to lean more on other people's thinking than on
his own. Clausewitz aimed at producing the very opposite result. He
does not offer specific solutions of the various problems of war lest
officers, in moments when their business is to decide and to act,
should be trying to recall his precepts instead of using their eyes and
their wits. His purpose rather is to enable them to understand what war
is. He believed that if a man had accustomed himself to think of war as
it really is, had got to know the different elements which go to make
it up, and to distinguish those that are important from those that are
comparative trifles, he would be more likely to know of himself what
to do in a given situation, and would be much less likely to confuse
himself by trying to remember what some general, long since dead, did
on some occasion in which after all the position was by no means the
same as that in which he finds himself."
What is said here of the soldier actually engaged in war, is true also
even of the onlooker who takes a patriotic interest in the progress of
a war in which his country is involved. Unless he has a clear idea of
the real character of modern war, and the principles on which success
or failure depend, he will be utterly unable to grasp the significance
of the events of which he reads each day. And it is of real importance
that in time of war every citizen should judge soundly the course of
events, for opinion influences action, and public opinion is made up of
the ideas of the units who compose the public. In this connection it is
well to bear in mind a point that is often overlooked, a point on which
Clausewitz insists in a singularly convincing passage--namely, the fact
that one of the main objects of a nation waging war is to force the
enemy's population into a state of mind favourable to submission. This
fact is sufficient proof of the importance of public opinion being
well informed not only as to the course of events, but also as to the
principles that give to these events their real significance.
CONTENTS
CHAPTER I
PAGE
THE LIFE OF CLAUSEWITZ 3
CHAPTER II
THE INFLUENCE OF CLAUSEWITZ ON MODERN
POLICY AND WAR 11
CHAPTER III
THE WRITINGS OF CLAUSEWITZ 23
CHAPTER IV
THE THEORY AND THE PRACTICE OF WAR 33
CHAPTER V
THE MAGNITUDE OF THE EFFORT REQUIRED
IN A MODERN NATIONAL WAR 47
CHAPTER VI
PUBLIC OPINION IN WAR 65
CHAPTER VII
THE NATURE OF WAR 79
CHAPTER VIII
WAR AS POLICY 119
CHAPTER IX
STRATEGY 137
CHAPTER X
THE EXECUTION OF STRATEGY 161
CHAPTER XI
TACTICS 177
CHAPTER XII
CHANGES SINCE THE DAYS OF CLAUSEWITZ 213
CHAPTER I
THE LIFE OF CLAUSEWITZ
In an endeavour, such as the present, to interest the British public in
even the greatest military writer, the first necessity is to show that
he was not a mere theorist or bookworm. The wide and varied experience
which the British officer gradually gains in so many different parts
of the world shows up the weak points of most theories, and produces
a certain distrust of them. Also a distrust of theory is undoubtedly
one of our national characteristics. Hence, in order to appeal to the
British officer or civilian, a writer must be a practical soldier.
Such was General Clausewitz: a practical soldier of very great
experience in the long series of wars 1793 to 1815, and one present
throughout that most awful of all campaigns, Napoleon's Russian
campaign in 1812.
"General Karl von Clausewitz was born near Magdeburg in 1780, and
entered the Prussian army as Fahnenjunker in 1792. He served in the
campaigns of 1793-1794 on the Rhine. In 1801 he entered the military
school at Berlin as an officer, and remained there till 1803. He here
attracted the notice of Scharnhorst. In the campaign of 1806 he served
as aide-de-camp to Prince Augustus of Prussia, was present at the
battle of Jena, and saw that awful retreat which ended a fortnight
later in the surrender at Prentzlau. Being wounded and captured, he
was sent into France as a prisoner till the end of the war." "On his
return (in November, 1807) he was placed on General Scharnhorst's
staff, and employed on the work then going on for the reorganization
of the Prussian army. In 1812 Clausewitz entered the Russian service,
was employed on the general staff, and was thus able to gain much
experience in the most gigantic of all the struggles of his time." "In
the spring campaign of 1813 (battles of Lutzen, Bautzen, etc.), he, as
a Russian officer, was attached to Blucher's staff; during the winter
campaign he found employment as chief-of-the-staff to Count Walmoden,
who fought against Davoust on the Lower Elbe, and the splendid action
of the Goerde was entirely the result of his able dispositions. In 1815
he again entered the Prussian service, and was chief-of-the-staff to
the III. Army Corps (Thielman), which at Ligny formed the left of the
line of battle, and at Wavre covered the rear of Blucher's army." "In
addition to this, we may say, considerable practical training (note,
enormous and varied indeed compared to any obtainable in the present
day), he also possessed a comprehensive and thorough knowledge of
military history, and also an uncommonly clear perception of general
history" (Von Caemmerer). After the Peace he was employed in a command
on the Rhine. In 1818 he became major-general, and was made Director of
the Military School at Berlin. Here he remained for some years. This
was the chief period of his writings. As General von Caemmerer, in his
"Development of Strategical Science," puts it: "This practical and
experienced, and at the same time highly cultured soldier, feels now,
in peaceful repose, as he himself confesses, the urgent need to develop
and systematize the whole world of thought which occupies him, yet also
resolves to keep secret till his death the fruit of his researches, in
order that his soul, which is thirsting for _Truth_, may be safely and
finally spared all temptations from subordinate considerations."
In 1830 he was appointed Director of Artillery at Breslau, and, having
no more time for writing, sealed up and put away his papers, unfinished
as they were. In the same year he was appointed chief-of-the-staff to
Field-Marshal Gneisenau's army. In the winter of that year war with
France was considered imminent, and Clausewitz had prospects of acting
as chief of the general staff of the Commander-in-Chief Gneisenau. He
then drew up two plans for war with France, which bear the stamp of
that practical knowledge of war and adaptation of means to ends which
distinguish his writings.
In the same year the war scare passed away, the army of Gneisenau was
disbanded, and Clausewitz returned to Breslau, where after a few days
he was seized with cholera, and died in November, 1831, aged only 51.
His works were published after his death by his widow.