GATES ON THE ALERT FOR A COMMAND—SCHUYLER UNDERMINED IN CONGRESS—PUT
ON HIS GUARD—COURTS A SCRUTINY BUT NOT BEFORE AN EXPECTED
ENGAGEMENT—SUMMONED WITH ST. CLAIR TO HEAD-QUARTERS—GATES APPOINTED
TO THE NORTHERN DEPARTMENT—WASHINGTON’S SPECULATIONS ON THE
SUCCESSES OF BURGOYNE—ILL-JUDGED MEDDLINGS OF CONGRESS WITH THE
COMMISSARIAT—COLONEL TRUMBULL RESIGNS IN CONSEQUENCE.
We have cited in a preceding page a letter from Washington to Gates at
Philadelphia, requiring his vigilant attention to the movements of the
enemy’s fleet; that ambitious officer, however, was engrossed at the
time by matters more important to his individual interests. The command
of the Northern department seemed again within his reach. The evacuation
of Ticonderoga had been imputed by many either to cowardice or treachery
on the part of General St. Clair, and the enemies of Schuyler had, for
some time past, been endeavoring to involve him in the disgrace of the
transaction. It is true he was absent from the fortress at the time,
zealously engaged, as we have shown, in procuring and forwarding
reinforcements and supplies; but it was alleged that the fort had been
evacuated by his order, and that, while there, he had made such
dispositions as plainly indicated an intention to deliver it to the
enemy. In the eagerness to excite popular feeling against him, old
slanders were revived, and the failure of the invasion of Canada, and
all the subsequent disasters in that quarter, were again laid to his
charge as commanding general of the Northern department. “In short,”
writes Schuyler in one of his letters, “every art is made use of to
destroy that confidence which it is so essential the army should have in
its general officers, and this too by people pretending to be friends to
the country.”[47]
These charges, which for some time existed merely in popular clamor, had
recently been taken up in Congress, and a strong demonstration had been
made against him by some of the New England delegates. “Your enemies in
this quarter,” writes his friend, the Hon. William Duer (July 29th);
“are leaving no means unessayed to blast your character, and to impute
to your appointment in that department a loss which, rightly
investigated, can be imputed to very different causes.
“Be not suprised if you should be desired to attend Congress, to give an
account of the loss of Ticonderoga. With respect to the result of the
inquiry I am under no apprehensions. Like gold tried in the fire, I
trust that you, my dear friend, will be found more pure and bright than
ever. * * * * * * From the nature of your department, and other
unavoidable causes, you have not had an opportunity, during the course
of this war, of evincing that spirit which _I_ and your more intimate
friends know you to possess; of this circumstance prejudice takes a
cruel advantage, and malice lends an easy ear to her dictates. A hint on
this subject is sufficient. You will not, I am sure, see this place till
your conduct gives the lie to this insinuation, as it has done before to
every other which your enemies have so industriously circulated.”[48]
Schuyler, in reply, expressed the most ardent wish that Congress would
order him to attend and give an account of his conduct. He wished his
friends to push for the closest scrutiny, confident that it would
redound to his honor. “I would not, however, wish the scrutiny to take
place immediately,” adds he, “as we shall probably soon have an
engagement, if we are so reinforced with militia as to give us a
probable chance of success. * * * Be assured, my dear friend, if a
general engagement takes place, whatever may be the event, you will not
have occasion to blush for your friend.”[49]
It seemed to be the object of Mr. Schuyler’s enemies to forestall his
having such a chance of distinguishing himself. The business was pushed
in Congress more urgently than even Mr. Duer had anticipated. Beside the
allegations against him in regard to Ticonderoga, his unpopularity in
the Eastern States was urged as a sufficient reason for discontinuing
him in his present command, as the troops from that quarter were
unwilling to serve under him. This had a great effect in the present
time of peril, with several of the delegates from the East, who
discredited the other charges against him. The consequence was, that
after long and ardent debates, in which some of the most eminent
delegates from New York, who intimately knew his worth, stood up in his
favor, it was resolved (Aug. 1st) that both General Schuyler and General
St. Clair should be summoned to head-quarters to account for the
misfortunes in the North, and that Washington should be directed to
order such general officer as he should think proper to succeed General
Schuyler in the command of the Northern department.
The very next day a letter was addressed to Washington by several of the
leading Eastern members, men of unquestionable good faith, such as
Samuel and John Adams, urging the appointment of Gates. “No man, in our
opinion,” said they, “will be more likely to restore harmony, order and
discipline, and retrieve our affairs in that quarter. He has, on
experience, acquired the confidence and stands high in the esteem of the
Eastern troops.”
Washington excused himself from making any nomination, alleging that the
Northern department had, in a great measure, been considered a separate
one; that, moreover, the situation of the department was delicate, and
might involve interesting and delicate consequences. The nomination,
therefore, was made by Congress; the Eastern influence prevailed, and
Gates received the appointment, so long the object of his aspirations,
if not intrigues.
Washington deeply regretted the removal of a noble-hearted man, with
whom he had acted so harmoniously, whose exertions had been so energetic
and unwearied, and who was so peculiarly fitted for the varied duties of
the department. He consoled himself, however, with the thought that the
excuse of want of confidence in the general officers, hitherto alleged
by the Eastern States for withholding reinforcements, would be obviated
by the presence of this man of their choice.
With the prevalent wisdom of his pen, he endeavored to allay the
distrusts and apprehensions awakened by the misfortune at Ticonderoga,
which he considered the worst consequence of that event. “If the matter
were coolly and dispassionately considered,” writes he to the council of
safety of the State of New York, “there would be nothing found so
formidable in General Burgoyne and the force under him, with all his
successes, to countenance the least degree of despondency; and
experience would show, that even the moderate exertions of the States
more immediately interested, would be sufficient to check his career,
and, perhaps, convert the advantages he has gained to his ruin. * * * *
If I do not give so effectual aid as I could wish to the Northern army,
it is not from want of inclination, nor from being too little impressed
with the importance of doing it; but because the state of affairs in
this quarter will not possibly admit of it. It would be the height of
impolicy to weaken ourselves too much here, in order to increase our
strength there; and it must certainly be considered more difficult, as
well as of greater moment, to control the main army of the enemy, than
an inferior and, I may say, dependent one; for it is pretty obvious that
if General Howe can be kept at bay, and prevented from effecting his
purposes, the successes of General Burgoyne, whatever they may be, must
be partial and temporary.”
The sagacity and foresight of this policy will be manifested by after
events.
On the same day on which the above letter was written, he officially
announced to Gates his appointment, and desired him to proceed
immediately to the place of his destination: wishing him success, and
that he “might speedily be able to restore the face of affairs in that
quarter.”
About this time took effect a measure of Congress, making a complete
change in the commissariat. This important and complicated department
had hitherto been under the management of one commissary-general,
Colonel Joseph Trumbull of Connecticut. By the new arrangement there
were to be two commissaries-general, one of purchases, the other of
issues; each to be appointed by Congress. They were to have several
deputy commissaries under them, but accountable to Congress, and to be
appointed and removed by that body. These, and many subordinate
arrangements, had been adopted in opposition to the opinion of
Washington, and, most unfortunately, were brought into operation in the
midst of this perplexed and critical campaign.
Their first effect was to cause the resignation of Colonel Trumbull, who
had been nominated commissary of purchases; and the entrance into office
of a number of inexperienced men. The ultimate effect was to paralyze
the organization of this vital department; to cause delay and confusion
in furnishing and forwarding supplies; and to retard and embarrass the
operations of the different armies throughout the year. Washington had
many dangers and difficulties to harass and perplex him throughout this
complicated campaign, and not among the least may be classed the
“stumblings of Congress.”
NOTE.
An author, eminent for his historical researches, expresses himself at
a loss to explain the prejudice existing against General Schuyler
among the people of the New England States. “There was not an
individual connected with the Revolution,” observes he, “concerning
whom there is more abundant evidence of his patriotism and unwearied
services in the cause of his country.”
Wilkinson, at that time a devoted follower of Gates, and likely to
know the influences that operated against his rival, traces this
prejudice up to times prior to the Revolution, when Schuyler acted as
commissioner on the part of New York in settling the partition line
between that colony and Massachusetts Bay. This gave rise to the feuds
and controversies concerning the Hampshire Grants, in which, according
to Wilkinson, the parties were distinguished by the designations of
Yankee and Yorker. The zealous exertions of Schuyler on behalf of New
York, gained him the ill will of the Hampshire grantees, and of
eastern men of the first rank with whom he came in collision. This
feeling survived the controversy, and existed among the militia from
those parts. On the other hand, Wilkinson observes, “It was General
Gates’s policy to favor the views of the inhabitants of the Hampshire
Grants, which made him popular with these people.”
Somewhat of the prejudice against Schuyler Wilkinson ascribes to
social habits and manners, “those of New England at the time being
democratic and puritanical, whilst in New York they were courtly and
aristocratical.” Schuyler was a man of the world, and of society,
cultivated, and well bred; he was an eléve too of Major-general
Bradstreet in the seven years’ war; and had imbibed notions of
military carriage and decorum in an aristocratic school; all this
rendered him impatient at times of the deficiencies in these respects
among the raw militia officers and made the latter consider him
haughty and reserved.