CAPTURE OF GENERAL PRESCOTT—PROFFERED IN EXCHANGE FOR
LEE—REINFORCEMENTS TO SCHUYLER—ARNOLD SENT TO THE NORTH—EASTERN
MILITIA TO REPAIR TO SARATOGA—FURTHER REINFORCEMENTS—GENERALS
LINCOLN AND ARNOLD RECOMMENDED FOR PARTICULAR SERVICES—WASHINGTON’S
MEASURES AND SUGGESTIONS FOR THE NORTHERN CAMPAIGN—BRITISH FLEET
PUTS TO SEA—CONJECTURES AS TO ITS DESTINATION—A FEIGNED
LETTER—APPEARANCE AND DISAPPEARANCE OF THE FLEET—ORDERS AND COUNTER
ORDERS OF WASHINGTON—ENCAMPS AT GERMANTOWN—ANXIETY FOR THE SECURITY
OF THE HIGHLANDS—GEORGE CLINTON ON GUARD—CALL ON CONNECTICUT.
A spirited exploit to the eastward was performed during the prevalence
of adverse news from the North. General Prescott had command of the
British forces in Rhode Island. His harsh treatment of Colonel Ethan
Allen, and his haughty and arrogant conduct on various occasions, had
rendered him peculiarly odious to the Americans. Lieutenant-colonel
Barton, who was stationed with a force of Rhode Island militia on the
mainland, received word that Prescott was quartered at a country house
near the western shore of the island, about four miles from Newport,
totally unconscious of danger, though in a very exposed situation. He
determined, if possible, to surprise and capture him. Forty resolute men
joined him in the enterprise. Embarking at night in two boats at Warwick
Neck, they pulled quietly across the bay with muffled oars, undiscovered
by the ships of war and guard boats; landed in silence; eluded the
vigilance of the guard stationed near the house; captured the sentry at
the door, and surprised the general in his bed. His aide-de-camp leaped
from the window, but was likewise taken. Colonel Barton returned with
equal silence and address, and arrived safe at Warwick with his
prisoners. A sword was voted to him by Congress, and he received a
colonel’s commission in the regular army.
Washington hailed the capture of Prescott as a peculiarly fortunate
circumstance, furnishing him with an equivalent for General Lee. He
accordingly wrote to Sir William Howe, proposing the exchange. “This
proposition,” writes he, “being agreeable to the letter and spirit of
the agreement subsisting between us, will, I hope, have your
approbation. I am the more induced to expect it, as it will not only
remove one ground of controversy between us, but in its consequences
effect the exchanges of Lieutenant-colonel Campbell and the Hessian
officers, for a like number of ours of equal rank in your possession.”
No immediate reply was received to this letter, Sir William Howe being
at sea; in the mean time Prescott remained in durance. “I would have him
genteelly accommodated, but strongly guarded,” writes Washington. “I
would not admit him to parole, as General Howe has not thought proper to
grant General Lee that indulgence.”[43]
Washington continued his anxious exertions to counteract the operations
of the enemy; forwarding artillery and ammunition to Schuyler, with all
the camp furniture that could be spared from his own encampment and from
Peekskill. A part of Nixon’s brigade was all the reinforcement he could
afford in his present situation. “To weaken this army more than is
prudent,” writes he, “would perhaps bring destruction upon it, and I
look upon the keeping it upon a respectable footing as the only means of
preventing a junction of Howe’s and Burgoyne’s armies, which, if
effected, may have the most fatal consequences.”
Schuyler had earnestly desired the assistance of an active officer well
acquainted with the country. Washington sent him Arnold. “I need not,”
writes he, “enlarge upon his well-known activity, conduct and bravery.
The proofs he has given of all these have gained him the confidence of
the public and of the army, the Eastern troops in particular.”
The question of rank, about which Arnold was so tenacious, was yet
unsettled, and though, had his promotion been regular, he would have
been superior in command to General St. Clair, he assured Washington
that, on the present occasion, his claim should create no dispute.
Schuyler, in the mean time, aided by Kosciuszko the Pole, who was
engineer in his department, had selected two positions on Moses Creek,
four miles below Fort Edward; where the troops which had retreated from
Ticonderoga, and part of the militia, were throwing up works.
To impede the advance of the enemy, he had caused trees to be felled
into Wood Creek, so as to render it unnavigable, and the roads between
Fort Edward and Fort Anne to be broken up; the cattle in that direction
to be brought away, and the forage destroyed. He had drawn off the
garrison from Fort George, who left the buildings in flames.
“Strengthened by that garrison, who are in good health,” writes he, “and
if the militia, who are here, or an equal number, can be prevailed on to
stay, and the enemy give me a few days more, which I think they will be
obliged to do, I shall not be apprehensive that they will be able to
force the posts I am about to occupy.”
Washington cheered on his faithful coadjutor. His reply to Schuyler
(July 22d) was full of that confident hope, founded on sagacious
forecast, with which he was prone to animate his generals in times of
doubt and difficulty. “Though our affairs for some days past have worn a
dark and gloomy aspect, I yet look forward to a fortunate and happy
change. I trust General Burgoyne’s army will meet sooner or later an
effectual check, and, as I suggested before, that the success he has had
will precipitate his ruin. From your accounts, he appears to be pursuing
that line of conduct, which, of all others, is most favorable to us; I
mean acting in detachment. This conduct will certainly give room for
enterprise on our part, and expose his parties to great hazard. Could we
be so happy as to cut one of them off, supposing it should not exceed
four, five, or six hundred men, it would inspirit the people, and do
away much of their present anxiety. In such an event they would lose
sight of past misfortunes, and, urged at the same time by a regard to
their own security, they would fly to arms and afford every aid in their
power.”
While he thus suggested bold enterprises, he cautioned Schuyler not to
repose too much confidence in the works he was projecting, so as to
collect in them a large quantity of stores. “I begin to consider lines
as a kind of trap;” writes he, “and not to answer the valuable purposes
expected from them, unless they are in passes which cannot be avoided by
the enemy.”
In circulars addressed to the brigadier-generals of militia in the
western parts of Massachusetts and Connecticut, he warned them that the
evacuation of Ticonderoga had opened a door by which the enemy, unless
vigorously opposed, might penetrate the northern part of the State of
New York, and the western parts of New Hampshire and Massachusetts, and,
forming a junction with General Howe, cut off the communication between
the Eastern and Northern States. “It cannot be supposed,” adds he, “that
the small number of Continental troops assembled at Fort Edward, is
alone sufficient to check the progress of the enemy. To the militia,
therefore, must we look for support in this time of trial; and I trust
that you will immediately upon receipt of this, if you have not done it
already, march with at least one third of the militia under your
command, and rendezvous at Saratoga, unless directed to some other place
by General Schuyler or General Arnold.”
Washington now ordered that all the vessels and river craft, not
required at Albany, should be sent down to New Windsor and Fishkill, and
kept in readiness; for he knew not how soon the movements of General
Howe might render it suddenly necessary to transport part of his forces
up the Hudson.
Further letters from Schuyler urged the increasing exigencies of his
situation. It was harvest time. The militia, impatient at being detained
from their rural labors, were leaving him in great numbers. In a council
of general officers, it had been thought advisable to give leave of
absence to half, lest the whole should depart. He feared those who
remained would do so but a few days. The enemy were steadily employed
cutting a road toward him from Skenesborough. From the number of horse
they were reported to have, and to expect, they might intend to bring
their provisions on horseback. If so, they would be able to move with
expedition. In this position of affairs, he urged to be reinforced as
speedily as possible.
Washington, in reply, informed him that he had ordered a further
reinforcement of General Glover’s brigade, which was all he could
possibly furnish in his own exigencies. He trusted affairs with Schuyler
would soon wear a more smiling aspect, that the Eastern States, who were
so deeply concerned in the matter, would exert themselves, by effectual
succors, to enable him to check the progress of the enemy, and repel a
danger by which they were immediately threatened. From the information
he had received, he supposed the force of the enemy to be little more
than five thousand. “They seem,” said he, “to be unprovided with waggons
to transport the immense quantity of baggage and warlike apparatus,
without which they cannot pretend to penetrate the country. You mention
their having a great number of horses, but they must nevertheless
require a considerable number of waggons, as there are many things which
cannot be transported on horses. They can never think of advancing
without securing their rear, and the force with which they can act
against you, will be greatly reduced by detachments necessary for that
purpose; and as they have to cut out their passage, and to remove the
impediments you have thrown in their way, before they can proceed, this
circumstance, with the encumbrance they must feel in their baggage,
stores, &c., will inevitably retard their march, and give you leisure
and opportunity to prepare a good reception for them. * * * * I have
directed General Lincoln to repair to you as speedily as the state of
his health, which is not very perfect, will permit; this gentleman has
always supported the character of a judicious, brave, active officer,
and he is exceedingly popular in the State of Massachusetts, to which he
belongs he will have a degree of influence over the militia which cannot
fail of being highly advantageous. I have intended him more particularly
for the command of the militia, and I promise myself it will have a
powerful tendency to make them turn out with more cheerfulness, and to
inspire them with perseverance to remain in the field, and with
fortitude and spirit to do their duty while in it.”[44]
Washington highly approved of a measure suggested by Schuyler, of
stationing a body of troops somewhere about the Hampshire Grants
(Vermont), so as to be in the rear or on the flank of Burgoyne, should
he advance. It would make the latter, he said, very circumspect in his
advances, if it did not entirely prevent them. It would keep him in
continual anxiety for his rear, and oblige him to leave the posts behind
him much stronger than he would otherwise do. He advised that General
Lincoln should have the command of the corps thus posted, “as no person
could be more proper for it.”
He recommended, moreover, that in case the enemy should make any
formidable movement in the neighborhood of Fort Schuyler (Stanwix), on
the Mohawk River, General Arnold, or some other sensible, spirited
officer, should be sent to take charge of that post, keep up the spirits
of the inhabitants, and cultivate and improve the favorable disposition
of the Indians.
The reader will find in the sequel what a propitious effect all these
measures had upon the fortunes of the Northern campaign, and with what
admirable foresight Washington calculated all its chances. Due credit
must also be given to the sagacious counsels and executive energy of
Schuyler; who suggested some of the best moves in the campaign, and
carried them vigorously into action. Never was Washington more ably and
loyally seconded by any of his generals.
But now the attention of the commander-in-chief is called to the
seaboard. On the 23d of July, the fleet, so long the object of watchful
solicitude, actually put to sea. The force embarked, according to
subsequent accounts, consisted of thirty-six British and Hessian
battalions, including the light-infantry and grenadiers, with a powerful
artillery; a New York corps of provincials, or royalists, called the
Queen’s Rangers, and a regiment of light-horse; between fifteen and
eighteen thousand men in all. The force left with General Sir Henry
Clinton for the protection of New York, consisted of seventeen
battalions, a regiment of light-horse, and the remainder of the
provincial corps.[45]
The destination of the fleet was still a matter of conjecture. Just
after it had sailed, a young man presented himself at one of General
Putnam’s outposts. He had been a prisoner in New York, he said, but had
received his liberty and a large reward on undertaking to be the bearer
of a letter from General Howe to Burgoyne. This letter his feelings of
patriotism prompted him to deliver up to General Putnam. The letter was
immediately transmitted by the general to Washington. It was in the
handwriting of Howe, and bore his signature. In it he informed Burgoyne,
that, instead of any designs up the Hudson, he was bound to the east
against Boston. “If,” said he, “according to my expectations, we may
succeed in getting possession of it, I shall, without loss of time,
proceed to co-operate with you in the defeat of the rebel army opposed
to you. Clinton is sufficiently strong to amuse Washington and Putnam. I
am now making demonstrations to the southward, which I think will have
the full effect in carrying our plan into execution.”
Washington at once pronounced the letter a feint. “No stronger proof
could be given,” said he, “that Howe is not going to the eastward. The
letter was evidently intended to fall into our hands. If there were not
too great a risk of the dispersion of their fleet, I should think their
putting to sea a mere manœuvre to deceive, and the North River still
their object. I am persuaded, more than ever, that Philadelphia is the
place of destination.”
He now set out with his army for the Delaware, ordering Sullivan and
Stirling with their divisions to cross the Hudson from Peekskill, and
proceed towards Philadelphia. Every movement and order showed his doubt
and perplexity, and the circumspection with which he had to proceed. On
the 30th, he writes from Coryell’s Ferry, about thirty miles from
Philadelphia, to General Gates, who was in that city: “As we are yet
uncertain as to the real destination of the enemy, though the Delaware
seems the most probable, I have thought it prudent to halt the army at
this place, Howell’s Ferry, and Trenton, at least till the fleet
actually enters the bay and puts the matter beyond a doubt. From hence
we can be on the proper ground to oppose them before they can possibly
make their arrangements and dispositions for an attack. * * * That the
post in the Highlands may not be left too much exposed, I have ordered
General Sullivan’s division to halt at Morristown, whence it will march
southward if there should be occasion, or northward upon the first
advice that the enemy should be throwing any force up the North River.
General Howe’s in a manner abandoning General Burgoyne, is so
unaccountable a matter, that, till I am fully assured it is so, _I
cannot help casting my eyes continually behind me_. As I shall pay no
regard to any flying reports of the appearance of the fleet, I shall
expect an account of it from you, the moment you have ascertained it to
your satisfaction.”
On the 31st, he was informed that the enemy’s fleet of two hundred and
twenty-eight sail, had arrived the day previous at the Capes of
Delaware. He instantly wrote to Putnam to hurry on two brigades, which
had crossed the river, and to let Schuyler and the commanders in the
Eastern States know that they had nothing to fear from Howe, and might
bend all their forces, Continental and militia, against Burgoyne. In the
mean time he moved his camp to Germantown, about six miles from
Philadelphia, to be at hand for the defence of that city.
The very next day came word, by express, that the fleet had again sailed
out of the Capes, and apparently shaped its course eastward. “This
surprising event gives me the greatest anxiety,” writes he to Putnam
(Aug. 1), “and unless every possible exertion is made, may be productive
of the happiest consequences to the enemy and the most injurious to
us. * * * The importance of preventing Mr. Howe’s getting possession of
the Highlands by a _coup de main_, is infinite to America; and, in the
present situation of things, every effort that can be thought of must be
used. The probability of his going to the eastward is exceedingly small,
and the ill effects that might attend such a step inconsiderable, in
comparison with those that would inevitably attend a successful stroke
on the Highlands.”
Under this impression Washington sent orders to Sullivan to hasten back
with his division and the two brigades which had recently left Peekskill
and to recross the Hudson to that post as speedily as possible,
intending to forward the rest of the army with all the expedition in his
power. He wrote, also, to General George Clinton, to reinforce Putnam
with as many of the New York militia as could be collected. Clinton, be
it observed, had just been installed Governor of the State of New York;
the first person elevated to that office under the Constitution. He
still continued in actual command of the militia of the State, and it
was with great satisfaction that Washington subsequently learnt he had
determined to resume the command of Fort Montgomery in the Highlands:
“There cannot be a more proper man,” writes he, “on every account.”
Washington, moreover, requested Putnam to send an express to Governor
Trumbull, urging assistance from the militia of his State without a
moment’s loss of time. “Connecticut cannot be in more danger through any
channel than this, and every motive of its own interest and the general
good demands its utmost endeavors to give you effectual assistance.
Governor Trumbull will, I trust, be sensible of this.”
And here we take occasion to observe, that there could be no surer
reliance for aid in time of danger than the patriotism of Governor
Trumbull; nor were there men more ready to obey a sudden appeal to arms
than the yeomanry of Connecticut; however much their hearts might
subsequently yearn toward the farms and firesides they had so promptly
abandoned. No portion of the Union was more severely tasked, throughout
the Revolution, for military services; and Washington avowed, when the
great struggle was over, that, “if all the States had done their duty as
well as the little State of Connecticut, the war would have been ended
long ago.”[46]