BRITISH INVASION FROM CANADA—THE PLAN—COMPOSITION OF THE INVADING
ARMY—SCHUYLER ON THE ALERT—HIS SPECULATIONS AS TO THE ENEMY’S
DESIGNS—BURGOYNE ON LAKE CHAMPLAIN—HIS WAR-SPEECH TO
HIS INDIAN ALLIES—SIGNS OF HIS APPROACH DESCRIED FROM
TICONDEROGA—CORRESPONDENCE ON THE SUBJECT BETWEEN ST. CLAIR, MAJOR
LIVINGSTON, AND SCHUYLER—BURGOYNE INTRENCHES NEAR TICONDEROGA—HIS
PROCLAMATION—SCHUYLER’S EXERTIONS AT ALBANY TO FORWARD
REINFORCEMENTS—HEARS THAT TICONDEROGA IS EVACUATED—MYSTERIOUS
DISAPPEARANCE OF ST. CLAIR AND HIS TROOPS—AMAZEMENT AND CONCERN OF
WASHINGTON—ORDERS REINFORCEMENTS TO SCHUYLER AT FORT EDWARD, AND TO
PUTNAM AT PEEKSKILL—ADVANCES WITH HIS MAIN ARMY TO THE CLOVE—HIS
HOPEFUL SPIRIT MANIFESTED.
The armament advancing against Ticonderoga, of which General St. Clair
had given intelligence, was not a mere diversion, but a regular
invasion; the plan of which had been devised by the king, Lord George
Germain, and General Burgoyne the latter having returned to England from
Canada in the preceding year. The junction of the two armies,—that in
Canada and that under General Howe in New York,—was considered the
speediest mode of quelling the rebellion; and as the security and good
government of Canada required the presence of Governor Sir Guy Carleton,
three thousand men were to remain there with him: the residue of the
army was to be employed upon two expeditions; the one under General
Burgoyne, who was to force his way to Albany, the other under
Lieutenant-colonel St. Leger, who was to make a diversion on the Mohawk
River.
The invading army was composed of three thousand seven hundred and
twenty-four British rank and file, three thousand sixteen Germans,
mostly Brunswickers, two hundred and fifty Canadians, and four hundred
Indians; beside these there were four hundred and seventy-three
artillery men, in all nearly eight thousand men. The army was admirably
appointed. Its brass train of artillery was extolled as perhaps the
finest ever allotted to an army of the size. General Phillips, who
commanded the artillery, had gained great reputation in the wars in
Germany. Brigadiers-general Fraser, Powel, and Hamilton, were also
officers of distinguished merit. So was Major-general the Baron
Riedesel, a Brunswicker, who commanded the German troops.
While Burgoyne with the main force proceeded from St. Johns, Colonel St.
Leger, with a detachment of regulars and Canadians about seven hundred
strong, was to land at Oswego, and, guided by Sir John Johnson at the
head of his loyalist volunteers, tory refugees from his former
neighborhood, and a body of Indians, was to enter the Mohawk country,
draw the attention of General Schuyler in that direction, attack Fort
Stanwix, and, having ravaged the valley of the Mohawk, rejoin Burgoyne
at Albany; where it was expected they would make a triumphant junction
with the army of Sir William Howe.
General Burgoyne left St. Johns on the 16th of June. Some idea may be
formed of his buoyant anticipation of a triumphant progress through the
country, by the manifold and lumbering appurtenances of a European camp
with which his army was encumbered. In this respect he had committed the
same error in his campaign through a wilderness of lakes and forests,
that had once embarrassed the unfortunate Braddock in his march across
the mountains of Virginia.
Schuyler was uncertain as to the plans and force of the enemy. If
information gathered from scouts and a captured spy might be relied on,
Ticonderoga would soon be attacked; but he trusted the garrison was
sufficient to maintain it. This information he transmitted to Washington
from Fort Edward on the 16th, the very day that Burgoyne embarked at St.
Johns.
On the following day Schuyler was at Ticonderoga. The works were not in
such a state of forwardness as he had anticipated, owing to the tardy
arrival of troops, and the want of a sufficient number of artificers.
The works in question related chiefly to Mount Independence, a high
circular hill on the east side of the lake, immediately opposite to the
old fort, and considered the most defensible. A star fort with pickets
crowned the summit of the hill, which was table land; half way down the
side of a hill was a battery, and at its foot were strongly intrenched
works well mounted with cannon. Here the French General de Fermois, who
had charge of this fort, was posted.
As this part of Lake Champlain is narrow, a connection was kept up
between the two forts by a floating bridge, supported on twenty-two
sunken piers in caissons, formed of very strong timber. Between the
piers were separate floats, fifty feet long and twelve feet wide,
strongly connected by iron chains and rivets. On the north side of the
bridge was a boom, composed of large pieces of timber, secured by
riveted bolts, and beside this was a double iron chain with links an
inch and a half square. The bridge, boom, and chain were four hundred
yards in length. This immense work, the labor of months, on which no
expense had been spared, was intended, while it afforded a communication
between the two forts, to protect the upper part of the lake,
presenting, under cover of their guns, a barrier, which it was presumed
no hostile ship would be able to break through.
Having noted the state of affairs and the wants of the garrison,
Schuyler hastened to Fort George, whence he sent on provisions for
upwards of sixty days; and from the banks of the Hudson additional
carpenters and working cattle. “Business will now go on in better train,
and I hope with much more spirit,” writes he to Congress; “and I trust
we shall still be able to put every thing in such order as to give the
enemy a good reception, and, I hope a repulse, should they attempt a
real attack, which I conjecture will not be soon, if at all; although I
expect they will approach with their fleet to keep us in alarm, and to
draw our attention from other quarters where they may mean a real
attack.”
His idea was that, while their fleet and a small body of troops might
appear before Ticonderoga, and keep up continual alarms, the main army
might march from St. Francois or St. Johns towards the Connecticut
River, and make an attempt on the Eastern States. “A manœuvre of this
kind,” observes he, “would be in General Burgoyne’s way, and, if
successful, would be attended with much honor to him. * * * * I am the
more confirmed in this conjecture, as the enemy cannot be ignorant how
very difficult, if not impossible, it will be for them to penetrate to
Albany, unless in losing Ticonderoga we should lose not only all our
cannon, but most of the army designed for this department.”
In the mean time, Burgoyne, with his amphibious and semibarbarous
armament, was advancing up the lake. On the 21st of June he encamped at
the river Boquet, several miles north of Crown Point; here he gave a war
feast to his savage allies, and made them a speech in that pompous and
half poetical vein in which it is the absurd practice to address our
savages, and which is commonly reduced to flat prose by their
interpreters. At the same time he was strenuous in enjoining humanity
toward prisoners, dwelling on the difference between ordinary wars
carried on against a common enemy, and this against a country in
rebellion, where the hostile parties were of the same blood, and loyal
subjects of the crown might be confounded with the rebellious. It was a
speech intended to excite their ardor, but restrain their cruelty; a
difficult medium to attain with Indian warriors.
The garrison at Ticonderoga, meanwhile, were anxiously on the look-out.
Their fortress, built on a hill, commanded an extensive prospect over
the bright and beautiful lake and its surrounding forests, but there
were long points and promontories at a distance to intercept the view.
By the 24th, scouts began to bring in word of the approaching foe. Bark
canoes had been seen filled with white men and savages. Then three
vessels under sail, and one at anchor, above Split Rock, and behind it
the radeau Thunderer, noted in the last year’s naval fight. Anon came
word of encampments sufficient for a large body of troops, on both sides
of Gilliland’s Creek, with bateaux plying about its waters, and painted
warriors gliding about in canoes; while a number of smokes rising out of
the forest at a distance beyond, gave signs of an Indian camp.
St. Clair wrote word of all this to Schuyler, and that it was supposed
the enemy were waiting the arrival of more force; he did not, however,
think they intended to attack, but to harass, for the purpose of giving
confidence to the Indians.
Schuyler transmitted a copy of St. Clair’s letter to Washington. “If the
enemy’s object is not to attack Ticonderoga,” writes he, “I suspect
their movement is intended to cover an attempt on New Hampshire, or the
Mohawk River, or to cut off the communication between Fort Edward and
Fort George, or perhaps all three, the more to distract us and divide
our force.” He urged Washington for reinforcements as soon as possible.
At the same time he wrote to St. Clair, to keep scouts on the east side
of the lake near the road leading from St. Johns to New Hampshire, and
on the west, on the road leading to the north branch of the Hudson. This
done, he hastened to Albany to forward reinforcements and bring up the
militia.
While there, he received word from St. Clair, that the enemy’s fleet and
army were arrived at Crown Point, and had sent off detachments, one up
Otter Creek to cut off the communication by Skenesborough; and another
on the west side of the lake to cut off Fort George. It was evident a
real attack on Ticonderoga was intended. Claims for assistance came
hurrying on from other quarters. A large force (St. Leger’s) was said to
be arrived at Oswego, and Sir John Johnson with his myrmidons on his way
to attack Fort Schuyler, the garrison of which was weak and poorly
supplied with cannon.
Schuyler bestirs himself with his usual zeal amid the thickening alarms.
He writes urgent letters to the committee of safety of New York, to
General Putnam at Peekskill, to the Governor of Connecticut, to the
President of Massachusetts, to the committee of Berkshire, and lastly to
Washington, stating the impending dangers and imploring reinforcements.
He exhorts General Herkimer to keep the militia of Tryon County in
readiness to protect the western frontier and to check the inroad of Sir
John Johnson, and he assures St. Clair that he will move to his aid with
the militia of New York, as soon as he can collect them.
Dangers accumulate at Ticonderoga according to advices from St. Clair
(28th). Seven of the enemy’s vessels are lying at Crown Point; the rest
of their fleet is probably but a little lower down. Morning guns are
heard distinctly at various places. Some troops have debarked and
encamped at Chimney Point. There is no prospect, he says, of being able
to defend Ticonderoga unless militia come in, and he has thought of
calling in those from Berkshire. “Should the enemy invest and blockade
us,” writes he, “we are infallibly ruined; we shall be obliged to
abandon this side (of the lake), and then they will soon force the other
from us, nor do I see that a retreat will in any shape be practicable.
Every thing, however, shall be done that is practicable to frustrate the
enemy’s designs; but what can be expected from troops ill armed, naked,
and unaccoutred?”
Schuyler’s aide-de-camp, Major Livingston,[35] who had been detained at
Ticonderoga by indisposition, writes to him (June 30th) in a different
vein, and presents a young man’s view of affairs.
“The enemy, after giving us several alarms, made their appearance early
this morning off Three Mile Point, in eighteen gunboats, and about nine
landed a party of two or three hundred Indians and Canadians. These soon
fell in with a scout from us, but being superior in number, obliged them
to retreat, though without any loss on our side. The Indians then
marched to the front of the French lines, drove in a picket guard, and
came so near as to wound two men who were standing behind the works.
They have stopped the communication between this and Lake George.
“We have a fair view of their boats, but cannot see that they have
brought many regulars with them. At least the number of red coats in
them is very small. The wind having been contrary for several days, has
prevented their fleet from coming up. The first fair breeze I shall
expect to see them. Many bets are depending that we shall be attacked in
the course of this week. Our troops are determined, and in great
spirits. They wish to be permitted to drive the savages from Three Mile
Point, but General St. Clair chooses to act on the sure side, and risk
nothing. The few alarms we have had have been of great service in making
the men alert and vigilant; but I am afraid the enemy will repeat them
so frequently as to throw them into their former indolence and
inattention. General St. Clair has taken the precaution to move most of
the stores to the mount [Independence]. This moment two ships and as
many sloops have hove in sight. The spirits of the men seem to increase
in proportion to the number of the enemy.
“I cannot but esteem myself fortunate that indisposition prevented my
returning with you, as it has given me an opportunity of being present
at a battle, in which I promise myself the pleasure of seeing our army
flushed with victory.”[36]
The enemy came advancing up the lake on the 30th, their main body under
Burgoyne on the west side, the German reserve under Baron Riedesel on
the east; communication being maintained by frigates and gunboats,
which, in a manner, kept pace between them. It was a magnificent array
of warlike means; and the sound of drum and trumpet along the shores,
and now and then the thundering of a cannon from the ships, were
singularly in contrast with the usual silence of a region little better
than a wilderness.
On the 1st of July, Burgoyne encamped four miles north of Ticonderoga,
and began to intrench, and to throw a boom across the lake. His advanced
guard under General Fraser took post at Three Mile Point, and the ships
anchored just out of gunshot of the fort.
Here he issued a proclamation still more magniloquent than his speech to
the Indians, denouncing woe to all who should persist in rebellion, and
laying particular stress upon his means, with the aid of the Indians, to
overtake the hardiest enemies of Great Britain and America wherever they
might lurk.
General St. Clair was a gallant Scotchman, who had seen service in the
old French war as well as in this, and beheld the force arrayed against
him without dismay. It is true his garrison was not so numerous as it
had been represented to Washington, not exceeding three thousand five
hundred men, of whom nine hundred were militia. They were badly equipped
also, and few had bayonets; yet, as Major Livingston reported, they were
in good heart. St. Clair confided, however, in the strength of his
position and the works which had been constructed in connection with it,
and trusted he should be able to resist any attempt to take it by storm.
Schuyler at this time was at Albany, sending up reinforcements of
Continental troops and militia, and awaiting the arrival of further
reinforcements, for which sloops had been sent down to Peekskill.
He was endeavoring also to provide for the security of the department in
other quarters. The savages had been scalping in the neighborhood of
Fort Schuyler; a set of renegade Indians were harassing the settlements
on the Susquehanna; and the threatenings of Brant, the famous Indian
chief, and the prospect of a British inroad by the way of Oswego, had
spread terror through Tryon County, the inhabitants of which called upon
him for support.
“The enemy are harassing us in every quarter of this department,” writes
he. “I am however, happily, thank God, in full health and spirits to
enable me to extend my attention to those various quarters, and hope we
shall all do well.”[37]
The enemy’s manœuvre of intrenching themselves and throwing a boom
across the lake, of which St. Clair informed him, made him doubt of
their being in great force, or intending a serious attack. “I shall have
great hopes,” writes he to St. Clair, “if General Burgoyne continues in
the vicinity of your post until we get up, and dares risk an engagement,
we shall give a good account of him.”[38]
To General Herkimer, who commanded the militia in Tryon County, he
writes in the same encouraging strain. “From intelligence which I have
just now received from Ticonderoga, I am not very apprehensive that any
great effort will be made against the Mohawk River. I shall, however,
keep a watchful eye to the preservation of the western quarter, and have
therefore directed Colonel Van Schaick to remain in Tryon County with
the [Continental] troops under his command.
“If we act with vigor and spirit, we have nothing to fear; but if once
despondency takes place, the worst consequences are to be apprehended.
It is, therefore, incumbent on you to labor to keep up the spirits of
the people.”
In the mean time he awaited the arrival of the troops from Peekskill
with impatience. On the 5th they had not appeared. “The moment they do,”
writes he, “I shall move with them. If they do not arrive by to-morrow,
I go without them, and will do the best I can with the militia.” He
actually did set out at 8 o’clock on the morning of the 7th.
Such was the state of affairs in the north, of which Washington from
time to time had been informed. An attack on Ticonderoga appeared to be
impending; but as the garrison was in good heart, the commander
resolute, and troops were on the way to reinforce him, a spirited, and
perhaps successful resistance was anticipated by Washington. His
surprise may therefore be imagined, on receiving a letter from Schuyler
dated July 7th, conveying the astounding intelligence that Ticonderoga
was evacuated!
Schuyler had just received the news at Stillwater on the Hudson when on
his way with reinforcements for the fortress. The first account was so
vague that Washington hoped it might prove incorrect. It was confirmed
by another letter from Schuyler, dated on the 9th at Fort Edward. A part
of the garrison had been pursued by a detachment of the enemy as far as
Fort Anne in that neighborhood, where the latter had been repulsed; as
to St. Clair himself and the main part of his forces, they had thrown
themselves into the forest, and nothing was known what had become of
them!
“I am here,” writes Schuyler, “at the head of a handful of men, not
above fifteen hundred, with little ammunition, not above five rounds to
a man, having neither balls, nor lead to make any. The country is in the
deepest consternation; no carriages to remove the stores from Fort
George, which I expect every moment to hear is attacked; and what adds
to my distress is, that a report prevails that I had given orders for
the evacuation of Ticonderoga.”
Washington was totally at a loss to account for St. Clair’s movement. To
abandon a fortress which he had recently pronounced so defensible; and
to abandon it apparently without firing a gun! and then the strange
uncertainty as to his subsequent fortunes, and the whereabouts of
himself and the main body of his troops! “The affair,” writes
Washington, “is so mysterious that it baffles even conjecture.”
His first attention was to supply the wants of General Schuyler. An
express was sent to Springfield for musket cartridges, gunpowder, lead,
and cartridge papers. Ten pieces of artillery with harness and proper
officers were to be forwarded from Peekskill, as well as intrenching
tools. Of tents he had none to furnish, neither could heavy cannon be
spared from the defence of the Highlands.
Six hundred recruits, on their march from Massachusetts to Peekskill,
were ordered to repair to the reinforcement of Schuyler; this was all
the force that Washington could venture at this moment to send to his
aid; but this addition to his troops, supposing those under St. Clair
should have come in, and any number of militia have turned out, would
probably form an army equal, if not superior, to that said to be under
Burgoyne. Beside, it was Washington’s idea that the latter would suspend
his operations until General Howe should make a movement in concert.
Supposing that movement would be an immediate attempt against the
Highlands, he ordered Sullivan with his division to Peekskill to
reinforce General Putnam. At the same time he advanced with his main
army to Pompton, and thence to the Clove, a rugged defile through the
Highlands on the west side of the Hudson. Here he encamped within
eighteen miles of the river, to watch, and be at hand to oppose the
designs of Sir William Howe, whatever might be their direction.
On the morning of the 14th came another letter from Schuyler, dated Fort
Edward, July 10th. He had that morning received the first tidings of St.
Clair and his missing troops, and of their being fifty miles east of
him.
Washington hailed the intelligence with that hopeful spirit which
improved every ray of light in the darkest moments. “I am happy to
hear,” writes he, “that General St. Clair and his army are not in the
hands of the enemy. I really feared they had become prisoners. The
evacuation of Ticonderoga and Mount Independence is an event of chagrin
and surprise not apprehended, nor within the compass of my
reasoning. * * * This stroke is severe indeed, and has distressed us
much. But, notwithstanding things at present have a dark and gloomy
aspect, I hope a spirited opposition will check the progress of General
Burgoyne’s army, and that the confidence derived from his success, will
hurry him into measures that will in their consequences be favorable to
us. _We should never despair. Our situation before has been unpromising
and has changed for the better, so I trust it will again. If new
difficulties arise, we must only put forth new exertions, and proportion
our efforts to the exigency of the times._”
His spirit of candor and moderation is evinced in another letter. “I
will not condemn or even pass censure upon any officer unheard, but I
think it a duty which General St. Clair owes to his own character, to
insist upon an opportunity of giving his reasons for his sudden
evacuation of a post, which, but a few days before, he, by his own
letters, thought tenable, at least for a while. People at a distance are
apt to form wrong conjectures, and if General St. Clair has good reasons
for the step he has taken, I think the sooner he justifies himself the
better. I have mentioned these matters, because he may not know that his
conduct is looked upon as very unaccountable by all ranks of people in
this part of the country. If he is reprehensible, the public have an
undoubted right to call for that justice which is due from an officer,
who betrays or gives up his post in an unwarrantable manner.”[39]
Having stated the various measures adopted by Washington for the aid of
the Northern army at this critical juncture, we will leave him at his
encampment in the Clove, anxiously watching the movements of the fleet
and the lower army, while we turn to the north, to explain the
mysterious retreat of General St. Clair.