A LUKEWARM DEFENCE.
ULDALL'S SPEEDY REPLY--BREACH OF THE LAW--WEAK
ARGUMENTS--PERSONALITIES APPEALED AGAINST--EXPLANATIONS--AN APPEAL
TO MERCY--FALCKENSKJOLD'S OPINION OF THE AFFAIR--REVERDIL SPEAKS
HIS MIND--CONDUCT OF THE FAVOURITES--THE BRIBE TO HOLCK--COUNT
BERNSTORFF--THE FISCAL GENERAL'S REPLY--A SAVAGE OPPONENT.
On the very next day after Wiwet's indictment was handed in to the
commission, the following written defence was delivered to the judges.
It is clear that Advocate Uldall could not have produced a reply to
the indictment so quickly unless the accusation had been delivered to
him beforehand, which was not only a breach of the law, and proves the
haste with which condemnation and execution were desired, but also
supplies a further and striking proof of the plans of the conspirators.
After they had thrown their victims into chains, they hurried to play
out the judicial farce, and shed the blood for which they thirsted.
ULDALL'S DEFENCE OF COUNT STRUENSEE.
The command which his Majesty the King most graciously sent to me on
March 23, orders me to conduct this cause in a responsible manner, and
according to the law, on behalf of Count Struensee.
It is this duty which I shall now strive to fulfil with all the
moderation which the count owes to his judges in his defence.
Among the unfortunate circumstances which beset him at the present
moment, there is one which is the more painful to him, because it was
unexpected. This circumstance is, that the Fiscal General tries to
render all the count's actions contemptible and ridiculous.
That everything should be converted into a motive for finding him
guilty is a natural, though unfortunate, result of the situation in
which he finds himself placed. But that his external situation, his
origin, and his first position; his mode of thinking, even in instances
where it was correct, should be subjected to mockery--against this, at
least, he believed himself to be protected, if not out of compassion
for an unfortunate man, at any rate on account of the favour which the
king had formerly shown him, and in consideration of the applause which
his Majesty granted to the political principles in accordance with
which he, the count, acted.
There is hardly a circumstance, however insignificant it may be,
which has not been employed by the Fiscal General for the purpose of
rendering Count Struensee odious.
He is called a foreigner, although through the appointment of his
father as superintendent in Holstein, in Struensee's youth, the latter
became a royal subject. That he was not possessed of the Danish
language is certainly a defect, which, however, has also been found in
other ministers, although it has never before been constituted a state
crime.
If he had a share in the cabinet order which limits the granting
of "characters," and which is still in existence, I believe that
no patriot ever denied, or does deny, its necessity and advantage,
and if the character of a councilor of justice was not fitted for a
mathematician, as the count's brother was, this cannot be charged
against Count Struensee, because his brother had been Justiz-rath long
before he came here.
Even to religion, the only consolation left him in his misfortune, he
is not considered worthy to possess it.
It would lead too far were I to examine everything which has in such
a way been brought forward without ground in the Fiscal General's
indictment. Everybody knows that this mode of conviction, rendering
a cause ridiculous and odious, is not conclusive, because there is
nothing which cannot be rendered ridiculous in one way or the other;
and, moreover, most of the Fiscal General's imputations exceed that
which, by the king's command, is to be discussed before this commission.
Count Struensee is to be charged and convicted for crimes against the
laws of the land, and it is in this I have to defend him. As such, the
Fiscal General alleges nine various chief points, which are said to
be equally as many crimes of high treason. But as all these charges
generally either concern the state arrangements, and the form and
administration of the government, or are crimes against the person of
his Majesty the King and members of the royal house, I will give my
answers to them after the above divisions.
The first charge brought against Count Struensee, is the cabinet decree
of July 14, 1771, and the authority delivered to him by it.
In order to convict him of audacity in this, the Fiscal General employs
two different grounds: partly, Count Struensee's impudence in mixing
himself up, though a physician, in affairs of state, and in abolishing
the council, whence disorder in the affairs, oppression of the nation
and the nobility, and a decrease of the prosperity of the capital, are
said to have emanated: partly, that the power which he obtained was
royal, as he formed resolutions, and signed in the king's name, and had
it in his power to lay before the king the objections sent in against
the cabinet decrees, or not to do so, which is said to be opposed to
articles 3 and 26 of the _Lex Regia_, in which such a possession of
power is declared to be treason.
It appears as if the first of the grounds alleged by the Fiscal General
exceeds his competency to examine, and that of the commission to
decide. For, as the share which Count Struensee had in affairs only
emanated from the king's will, Count Struensee cannot be rendered
responsible for this, because the consequences must revert to his
Majesty.
An investigation, whether Count Struensee ought to give the king advice
in affairs of state, and what results this advice had, is in reality
an examination as to how his Majesty established the government; and
Count Struensee cannot be called to account for the advice he gave,
as it met with the king's approval. Still I do not see how this can
be made a crime on the part of Count Struensee. It is certainly true
that his original position did not seem to promise the dignity which
he eventually acquired. But history offers many instances of such
elevation, and, if the king fancied he deserved it, was not Struensee
at liberty to accept it?
The form of the council is no material portion of the Danish
constitution. That the king was dissatisfied with its arrangement, is
visible from many passages in the examination; and there can be no
better proof of this than that his Majesty signed the decree of its
abolition with his own hand. Even though Count Struensee advised it,
we find from Count Brandt's explanation to quest. 18, that several
persons considered his sentiments correct, and that the plan was that
the colleges should be heard in ordinary cases, and commissions in
extraordinary affairs, the final decision being left to the king; so
that it cannot be asserted that the royal power was thus rendered
greater or less than it should be according to the _Lex Regia_.
For a belief that affairs consequently were carried on with less
vigour than before, or that the nation was unequally oppressed by the
promotion of foreigners, neither the documents nor experience afford a
reason.
No other noble was prohibited from appearing at court except Count
Laurvig (Ahlefeldt Laurvig), who had met with the same fate once
before; and if several nobles retired to their estates, and Copenhagen
suffered through the declension of luxury, this may be ascribed to the
hard times rather than other causes.
If we were to examine the matter politically, the prosperity of the
two kingdoms could hardly be sought in the size of Copenhagen, and the
value of its buildings. Nor do I believe that the wise king, Frederick
IV., when he laid on Copenhagen a consumption tax double that of the
other cities in the country, so much intended the increase of his
revenues, as to prevent the too rapid growth of a single city, which
would at last attract to it all the sources of a livelihood. France and
England have long complained that their capitals insensibly swallowed
up everything; and experience has shown that the Duc de Sully reasoned
correctly, when he, in order to prevent this, decided that those French
nobles who were not employed in the public service should sooner serve
the state and themselves by good management of their estates, than ruin
themselves and other families by indolence and extravagance.
As regards the second of the Fiscal General's grounds--Count
Struensee's authority--it cannot be denied that his Majesty the King
was at liberty to grant his confidence to whom he pleased, and decide
to what extent he should confer it on Count Struensee.
The decree of July 14, 1771, states that the cabinet minister shall
draw up the commands which the king gives him verbally, and either lay
them before the king for signature, or issue them in the king's name
with the seal of the cabinet, after which they shall be obeyed by every
one.
It is not, therefore, the person of the cabinet minister, but the
orders given him by his Majesty himself, and which the king makes known
through him, that acquire value through this order.
The cabinet was nothing else but the king himself, and Count Struensee
was so far from apprehending that he should be confounded with it,
that, whenever any one wrote to him as cabinet minister on business
matters, he answered that application must be made to the cabinet or
the king. He especially remembers that this was the case with General
Huth. In the cabinet nothing took place, and not the slightest order
was issued from it save under royal authority. The king saw and heard
everything that was sent in from the colleges or elsewhere; and himself
gave the decision, sometimes in writing, sometimes verbally. Nothing
could escape his Majesty's attention, because affairs were repeatedly
brought before him: first, when the cabinet order was issued; secondly,
when the report was sent in about it by the persons concerned; and,
lastly, when the weekly extract of the cabinet orders was approved.
Everything was done in the king's name. His Majesty signed the decree
in question with his own hand, and from his own most gracious _motu
proprio_ appointed Count Struensee cabinet minister.
Just as there cannot lie in this the slightest supposition of a
surprise, so we cannot see in it any encroachment on the royal
authority. It seems, therefore, as if Count Struensee were reproached
more for what might have happened than for what really did happen,
for the Fiscal General dwells more particularly on the danger which
was to be apprehended, in the event of the count misusing the king's
confidence in issuing other orders than those which the king gave him.
In order to prevent this, it is said the _Lex Regia_ has commanded
the king to sign everything himself, and declared any man guilty of
encroachment on the king's supremacy who appropriated any function
opposed to this. But I trust I shall have no difficulty in proving
that this reasoning is incorrect. How most unfair a law would be that
punished a man because he possessed the opportunity for sinning,
although he never made an attempt to take advantage of the opportunity!
Hence Count Struensee cannot be punished because he might possibly have
misused the king's confidence, unless it is notorious that he did so.
The royal law never desired such a thing, for the two articles quoted
from it do not agree with it. It is true that article 7 orders that all
letters on business of the government shall be issued in no other name
but the king's, and under his seal, and that he must sign himself, if
he has attained his majority (his fourteenth year). Furthermore, it is
true that article 26, states that the man who acquires anything which
might encroach on the king's authority shall be regarded as an insulter
of his Majesty. But what is it that Count Struensee acquired, and which
was injurious to the king's supremacy? The count cannot be accused of
this by the first part of article 7 of the _Lex Regia_; for no one
will deny that the letters and decrees of the government were issued
in the king's name. But if it be true that his Majesty did not always
himself sign the cabinet decrees, it must be remembered that this point
concerns his Majesty, and no one else. It is clear that Count Struensee
cannot be made accountable because it did not always please his Majesty
to sign, and that the royal authority has suffered, or could suffer, no
encroachment, as it was dependent on the king's will whether he would
sign an order himself, or specially command Count Struensee to sign it
in his Majesty's name.
To this argument must be added, that the _Lex Regia_ does not regard
it as an important part of or an insult to the royal authority to sign
in the king's name, for article 9 prescribes that the regents should
sign in the event of the king's minority, although article 13 orders
them to take oath that they will maintain the supremacy uninjured, an
oath which would be contradictory if the signature formed a material
part of the supremacy: that, consequently, the _Lex Regia_, like other
states, for instance, France and Spain, regards the expedition, and
not the signature, as the true symbol of supremacy. Formerly this
was understood in such a way, as both the colleges and other royal
officials, in many instances, made the king's will known, and still do
so, in his name, but without his signature. Nor did any one represent
to Count Struensee that it was a thing contrary to the _Lex Regia_ to
do so. And, lastly, his Majesty's own special order of July 14, 1771,
is sufficient to remove the responsibility from him, even if there were
a crime in doing so, as it was only in accordance with his Majesty's
commands, and to prove his most submissive obedience to the king's will
that he acted thus, and were it otherwise, no one would be secured by a
royal order.
The Fiscal General, in points 5, 6, and 7, of his indictment, brings
forward several charges, in order to prove that Count Struensee really
misapplied the king's confidence in his signature. Of these instances,
the one referring to the dismissal of the body-guard is the first, and
it is even supposed that it was based on dangerous designs.
What was really the motive for this operation, namely, that the Guards
were in many respects injurious to the army, is seen both from Count
Struensee's answers and from the documents, to which he appeals in his
own memorial.
That it was done, however, without his Majesty's knowledge, or that
the latter was surprised by it, is, according to Count Struensee's
assurance, incorrect. As regards the cabinet order of December 21,
concerning the reduction, he positively remembers having read it to the
king before it was sent off; and further, that the king approved of it
with his own signature, after the college had sent in an appeal against
it; and his Majesty himself signed the order of December 24, for
dismissal, before it was sent to Lieutenant-General von Gähler, as it
was generally reported that the Guards refused to obey the first order.
As to the crime said to have been committed in omitting several of
the extracts from the cabinet decrees in this week, so that the king
might approve of the two concerning the body-guard, I do not understand
it, as his Majesty would sooner be surprised by a long report than by
a short extract, and the answers of Panning and Morack (the cabinet
secretaries) prove that this error must be ascribed to them rather
than to Struensee.
The second charge concerns the presents which Count Struensee is said
to have procured for himself and others, and more especially the
forgery which is said to have been committed in the accounts of the
special treasury for the months of April and May, 1771. As concerns the
gratifications, it is sufficient for Struensee's defence that the king
himself granted or approved of them, and Count Struensee is of opinion
that, if compared with those given on former occasions, they will not
be found extraordinary. As regards the falsification, he learns to
his deep grief that even his Majesty himself appears to bear witness
against him. But, as he solemnly asserts in his memorial that he was
never guilty of such things, he also hopes that he will be permitted to
quote the circumstances serving to prove his innocence.
The Fiscal General employs two suppositions to prove this forgery,
namely, that a cipher was added to each of the two amounts of 6,000
dollars, and that the gratification for Falckenskjold was inserted
at a later date. But that this is not correct is proved by the
document itself, in which the figures of all the four amounts and
Falckenskjold's name are written with the same ink as the approbation,
without mentioning that his Majesty (if we compare the document with
the approval of other calculations written afterwards) must have signed
higher up, if the line concerning Falckenskjold had not existed at
the time when the royal signature was appended. It is true that the
adding up seems to be written with a different ink, and the figure
3 in the 132,000 dollars to have been first a 2. But the former is
of no consequence when it is remarked, that the adding up took place
after the approval had been given, while the latter could easily occur
through an error in casting up, as Panning has regarded it in his
explanation, lit. I., p. 379.
If we add to this--1. That Count Struensee had no necessity to have
recourse to such a forgery, partly because his Majesty never refused
him what he asked in such matters; partly, because a hundred other
ways of enriching himself stood at his service, if he wished to act
dishonestly, of which not the slightest evidence has been brought
forward. 2. That he never made a secret of it, which might be supposed
in a dishonest action, either from Count von Schimmelmann, who paid
the money, or from Count Brandt, who, on the very same day thanked the
king for the 50,000 dollars which he had received, to which his Majesty
replied, it was but fair that he should make him a _sort_, leading
to the supposition that the sum was a considerable one (see Brandt's
answer to question 44, p. 250) and lastly, 3. That it could not be
concealed from the king, as credit was taken for the amount in the next
balance-sheet, in which the sum was again approved--I am of opinion
that this circumstance cannot be regarded as dishonesty, but that
everything really is as Count Struensee has explained it.
The third charge relates to the sale of the bouquet. As this affair
depended entirely on the will of her royal Majesty the Queen, and Count
Struensee declares that he never knew otherwise but that the sale
took place with the king's consent, and as he did not profit in the
slightest degree by it, he had not supposed that this would be alleged
as a crime against him.
These are the principal charges brought against Count Struensee as
regards his administration. For though the Fiscal General, in his
indictment, has touched on all sorts of small matters: for instance,
the appointment of Councillor of Justice Struensee to the College of
Finances, &c., as they all depended on the general principles which his
Majesty the King had accepted in the administration, and his Majesty
had given his special approval to their execution, it is unnecessary to
dwell on them.
On the other hand, I will in conclusion of this portion of the
indictment show, that the Fiscal General incorrectly charges Count
Struensee with having formed dangerous designs, and of wishing to
sustain himself in the most improper way in the post which his Majesty
entrusted to him.
As a proof of this, the dismissal of the body-guard and the loading of
the cannon are first alleged. It was proved in the examination that
the reasons for this were perfectly legal; it is also seen from the
confrontation of Major-General Gude and Count Struensee, that the
intention of the latter order was only to hold the populace in check,
for the sake of the public tranquillity, and that Count Struensee never
ordered Major-General Gude to take the latter precaution, but the
general was of opinion that it was merely a consequence of the general
reminder given him, "that everything must be tranquil and in order."
Equally little probable or proven is it that Count Struensee had
undertaken, or wished to undertake anything which would have procured
him an opportunity for escaping, if his supposed meditated design of
assuming the character of a protector had failed.
That nothing was attempted against the person of his royal Majesty
is proved by the documents and the acknowledgment of the Fiscal
General himself. And how could gratitude or caution have suggested so
detestable a thought to the count? It was the king alone to whom he
owed his fortune, and the confidence of his Majesty was the sole basis
of his respect and his security.
But if he could have been so malicious as to deny all his obligations,
where was the party he had formed to carry out his design? Would he
have been so incautious as to announce his intention to the whole
public? For such was the case with the loading of the cannon; and
would he not rather have taken precautions to secure himself against
such surprises as might easily take place, and really did take place,
especially as we see from Christian Näses' declaration and Count
Brandt's acknowledgment, that he had received some intimations to that
effect?
That Count Struensee employed other illegal means to support himself is
equally incorrect. It certainly seems as if Count Brandt were attached
to the king in order to watch him; but the latter declares exactly the
contrary, and that Count Struensee did not at all need him to support
himself. Equally little can it be concluded from point eight of the
indictment, that letters addressed to the king were to be delivered in
the cabinet; for, without mentioning that this order was given by the
king himself, and that, if it had any secret object, it ought to have
been given long before, Panning and Morack's statements prove that
the disorder in which letters and other papers lay about the king's
apartment was the sole cause for this order, and that his Majesty,
after this time, received his letters as punctually as before.
As regards the accusations, then, which have been brought against Count
Struensee with respect to public affairs, I hope I have proved that he
only acted according to the will of his Majesty; that it was not his
intention to acquire power at the expense of his royal Majesty; and
that, if he erred in one point or the other, it was not done through
petulance, or deserves the harsh expressions employed by the Fiscal
General, but that it is solely to be explained by the fallibility which
is inseparably connected with every man. Nowhere has anything been
found which raised a doubt as to the safety of the king, his family,
or his supremacy, or could give cause for the supposition that Count
Struensee wished to treat his king and benefactor in so shameful a
way. He declares most sacredly, even now, that his only desire was to
promote the king's welfare and the prosperity of the kingdoms.
I will now pass to the second portion of the charges, which relate
to the insults said to have been offered to the persons of the royal
house. As regards the "_éloignement_" in which her Majesty Queen
Juliana Maria and his royal highness the hereditary prince were
held, Count Struensee declares that he has given the true reason in
his answers to questions 486 and 469; that he never attempted to
maintain or increase it; that he was not aware of any other reason
for a different box being given the prince at the theatre, except
that the king did not wish to have the prince's suite in his box; and
that, lastly, so far as he could remember, he had no share in the
correspondence carried on, upon this subject, between Count Brandt and
Count Scheel.
As regards the education of his royal highness the prince royal,
I refer to the count's own memorial; he protests most sacredly
against ever having entertained such thoughts as the Fiscal General
imputes to him. In this matter, he is so conscious of the purity of
his intentions, that he is willing to submit it to the verdict of
experienced physicians, whether the prince's health has not been
improved by it. Moreover, it was the queen's will that this course
should be pursued; and Count Struensee more than once drew on himself
her displeasure, by representing to her that the right measure was
exceeded in it. (_Cfr._ letter F., pp. 361 and 362.)
As concerns the "passage" between his royal Majesty and Count
Brandt, which forms a charge in the Fiscal General's indictment,
the explanations of Count Struensee show that he could never have
conjectured that Count Brandt would undertake it in so audacious a way
as he did, but that the affair would be settled _en badinant_ between
the king and Brandt. His advice was to the effect that Brandt should
keep aloof from the king; and that Brandt did not, in the remotest
degree, expect Count Struensee's assent, or subsequent approval, in
this affair, is seen from the fact that he not only previously kept
secret the way in which he had resolved to go to work, as he merely
said "that he would demand an explanation of the king," but that,
afterwards, he also concealed the most aggravating portions of his
deed,--the circumstance with the riding-whip; his bolting the door;
and the challenging and abusive language which he employed. In so far,
then, as regards the share which Count Struensee had in this "passage,"
he hopes the more to be excused, because his Majesty the King, in such
private matters, did not wish to be regarded as king, but as a private
person, which was the reason why he, Count Struensee, did not oppose
Brandt's design, so far as it was known to him.
That it was never his "sentiment" to neglect the proper reverence in
intercourse with the king; and that no one can mention an instance of
it, strengthens his innocence in this case; for what the Fiscal General
alleges to the contrary only consists of mere gossip. Equally little
can Brandt's letter, quoted by the Fiscal General, serve as a proof
that Brandt was rewarded for his conduct to the king, as it was written
in September, 1771, and the "passage" with Brandt did not take place
till November of that year. And should not all this be a sufficient
justification for Count Struensee, he appeals to the kindness which his
Majesty has so frequently shown him, to obtain his pardon.
In the same way he throws himself at his Majesty's feet, and implores
his mercy for the crime against his Majesty's person, the first
mentioned by the Fiscal General, but hitherto unalluded to by me. It
is the only thing in which he knows that he consciously sinned against
his king; but he confesses, with contrition, that this crime is too
great for him to expect forgiveness of it. If, however, regard for
human weakness, a truly penitent feeling of his error, the deepest
grief at it, the tears with which he laments it, and the sighs which
he dedicates to the king and the welfare of his family, deserve any
compassion, he will not be found unworthy of it.
In all the rest he supposes that the law and his innocence will defend
him, and that for this reason he can expect an acquittal. But, in the
same way as in the last point, he seeks refuge in the king's mercy
alone; he begs this high court, who have witnessed the sincerity of
his grief and sorrow, to be kind enough to procure him the greatest
possible alleviation of his fate by a favourable representation of his
repentance to his Majesty.
ULDALL.
_Copenhagen, April 22, 1772._
This defence, though neatly written, is still so weak and lukewarm,
that it cannot protect its author from the suspicion that he had an
understanding with the conspirators, and that his defence was only
intended to throw dust in the eyes of Europe. Falckenskjold, who, as a
native, contemporary, and adherent of Struensee, and who, as unattached
to the court, is an impartial witness, expresses himself as follows on
the subject in his "Memoirs:"--
"The royal law supplied Uldall with an article which, by formally
authorising the king to suppress or create any council or office
he thought proper, consequently gave the right of proposing the
suppression of the privy council and of other offices which might
appear injurious to the interests of the monarchy, as well as the
creation of a cabinet minister. Further, Uldall did not develope all
the absurdity of the charge of forgery brought against his client. He
did not make use of the means he possessed to justify him about the
ill-treatment of the king, of which Brandt was accused: means the more
easy, because there was in this point no evidence against Struensee.
He ought to have discussed the reforms effected by this minister, and
have shown that far from being criminal and injurious, they generally
tended to the welfare of the state and the advantage of the monarch.
This examination would have given him occasion to display the conduct
of Struensee, and show him, as he really was, vigilant and anxious
to simplify affairs, so that the king might see and know them, and
decide them himself. It was very easy to heighten the merit of such
conduct by comparing it with that of previous ministers; by placing in
its true light that royal law by virtue of which every Danish monarch
binds himself on ascending the throne not to suffer any attack on his
power, and to maintain it in its integrity. It was not sufficient to
say, as if _en passant_, that the will of the king covered the acts
of Struensee's administration with an inviolable defence; he ought to
have made those who attacked them feel the consequences to which they
exposed themselves; he ought to have shown them in the royal law the
sword that menaced those who dared to condemn in Struensee the wishes
and orders of the king."[91]
But Uldall had been one of Struensee's opponents from the beginning,
and hence was most unfitted to be a defender; and that he consented to
be so, on being selected by the chief conspirator, throws a sufficient
light on his good will as a lawyer.
But what will my readers think of the two advocates, and the legal
members of the commission, when I state that the criminal code of
Christian V. prohibits every judge from listening to or trying charges
that dishonour members of the reigning family? Falckenskjold says about
this:--
"How could Uldall insert in his defence Struensee's declarations about
his relations with the queen? Was he ignorant of the Danish law that
nullified this declaration, and prohibited the judges from paying any
attention to it? How, if he was versed in the principles and duties of
his profession, did he dare, in a memoir intended to be made public,
to represent his client as demanding mercy for this pretended crime,
and imploring the intercession of his persecutor? And how was it he did
not feel that by acting thus he joined a perfidious cabal, which was
abusing the unhappy Struensee with deceitful hopes of escape, in order
to drag from him the means of ruining him more completely?"
Another witness to the shamefulness of the charges against Struensee
steps forward in honest Reverdil, himself no admirer of the favourite,
but who valued truth above everything. He carefully analyses the
charges. The one about the queen's bouquet was most unjust, he
considers. It belonged to the queen, and she ordered it to be sold. The
price it fetched was much lower than that paid for it, because princes
pay long prices for jewels, and sell them cheaply, especially those of
great value. The purpose for which it was sold was to get the money for
making the badges for the new Order of Matilda.
As regards the forgery, Reverdil's evidence is decidedly in favour
of Struensee. His argument, which seems to be conclusive, is to the
following effect:--
1. At the time when this account was made out, Struensee, overwhelmed
with business, had no secretary to assist him. Pleasure, audiences,
races, and attentions to the queen, occupied the greater part of his
time. He was ignorant of forms and their consequences: therefore, it is
very credible that he cast up the account incorrectly, corrected, and
presented it for signature with the erasures. The king signed without
looking, and useless crimes ought not to be supposed.
2. No other trait in Struensee's life denotes an ignoble scamp or
vile man: his character was rather to carry frankness to the verge of
effrontery and hardness.
3. On the other hand, it lay in the king's character to refuse any
pecuniary favour as long as he could, but he had no idea of the value
of money, so that it was as easy to obtain from him 60,000 crowns as
6,000. They had the bad faith to take his evidence in this affair, and
he declared that he remembered perfectly well having only given 6,000
crowns to each of the counts; but, with his malicious mania and his
hatred for Brandt, it was impossible to trust to the fidelity of his
memory, or the truth of his declarations.
4. Struensee replied to the charge with a good deal of candour; that
appearances, it is true, were against him, but they were deceitful;
and that, as he had already confessed more faults than were needed to
destroy him, he would not deny this one, if he had committed it. He
persisted in this language, without variation, to the end.
Still, while Reverdil acquits the favourites of the forgery, he has no
excuse for the affair itself. To obtain so large a sum from an imbecile
king, who was not of a generous temper: to obtain it at a time when the
Treasury was exhausted, the state loaded with debt, and when, under
pretext of economy, the favourites were making hundreds of families
miserable by arbitrary retrenchments, was no better than a swindle.
Reverdil was the more revolted when the trial made the fact known,
because he had heard Struensee and Brandt a thousand times upbraid
the prodigalities of the old court, and the presents lavished on the
favourites, especially Counts von Moltke and Holck. But neither of them
had received so large a sum in so short a time. The former enriched
himself in twenty years of constant favour, but a considerable portion
of his fortune consisted of the savings of his income, when he lived
cost free at court, as grand marshal: while the new favourites, after
expelling everybody, had established themselves at court, without any
apparent duties.
At those Hirschholm breakfasts, when only the elect were present, and
the guests liked so much to talk about the old ministry, as an occasion
to applaud the present saving, Reverdil frequently heard it mentioned,
as an extraordinary instance of profusion, that during the king's stay
at Paris, Bernstorff, aware that Count von Holck, the most extravagant
of men, was on his last legs, promised him 30,000 crowns, so that he
might not yield to the seductions of the French court, who wished to
employ him in detaching the king from the Russian alliance. It would
have been ridiculous for any other king to pay his favourite, lest he
should propose absurd and dangerous acts to him; but this conduct, when
recommended to Christian VII., was founded on reason, as a bounty of
30,000 crowns, at such a moment, might save the state.
In this case, at least, the form was decent: a perfectly upright
minister solicited the king in favour of a third party, and the
treasurer received his Majesty's orders to pay. But the gratification
granted to Struensee and Brandt had an entirely different character.
The same person solicited, decided, and countersigned. It was of no
use for him to say that it was once for all, and for the purpose of
securing an independent position. Who could answer that avidity was
not augmented by enjoyment? and with what face could the same man,
who forced the king to sign a decree that, henceforth, no retiring
pension should exceed 1,000 crowns, secure, after six months' office,
the capital of thrice as large an income? Such is the dangerous
seduction of unlimited power. Struensee, before he attained it, was not
only honourable, but noble and liberal, though his circumstances were
exceedingly limited.
No time was lost in the trial of the accused minister, for on April 23
the Fiscal General handed in his reply to Uldall's defence.
WIWET'S REPLY.
The order which his Majesty the King most graciously sent to me on
March 23, commanded me to indict Count Struensee for his crimes,
without mentioning in what they consisted: as I was able to learn them,
however, from the examinations and questions laid before the court, I
do not understand what Advocate Uldall means by his remarks, that most
of the imputations against Struensee exceed that which his Majesty
commanded this commission to investigate, for I believe I have a right
to answer everything that the commissioners considered themselves
empowered to ask.
Advocate Uldall also does me injustice when he carps at my historic
account of Count Struensee's behaviour, and for trying to make him in
every way ridiculous and contemptible. But Count Struensee finds my
reasons in my brief. It is my duty to give an historical introduction
to the facts, which are to be afterwards proved.
It is not creditable to discuss personal matters, when disputing about
property or things which do not affect the persons themselves. But when
a criminal has to be convicted whose head is at stake, we must not be
so sparing as Herr Uldall, as defender, desires, especially in things
which are not inventions, but everybody knows they have happened.
Everything must be brought to light. The style must be arranged in
accordance with the matter to be discussed, and Count Struensee cannot
be thoroughly convinced of his crimes, if he considers my charge
insulting to the man on whom his Majesty cast his favour.
I have not attacked him for being a foreigner, but because the business
he undertook was foreign to him. I will not allow with Advocate
Uldall that it is no state crime not to understand the language of
the country when a man holds such a station as Count Struensee. Herr
Uldall cannot produce any instance of it. Perhaps one man might be
found who did not understand the language like a native, but in that
case he occupied a station in which he did not require to understand
it.[92] I have alleged this, his ignorance of the language, as a proof
of his foolhardiness in accepting a post in which it was his duty to
talk with Danes and Norwegians, and to read their petitions, without
being compelled to trust to the fidelity of a translator. The count
must himself confess that he did not know the laws of the country;
was he not, therefore, deficient in the two "great things" which are
requisite to examine the demands of the nation? and can I be blamed
for mentioning that he, Struensee, had no religion, when his friend,
Count Brandt, acknowledges it, and even declares that he did not dare
propose attendance at church, solely through fear of Struensee? Ought
not every one who is about the king to fear God, as that is made a duty
of the king in article 1 of the royal law? Can any one deny that he was
bold and impudent? If he turned his attention to affairs of state when
he was a doctor of medicine, he was an indolent doctor, for a skilful
minister of state does not spring up like a mushroom, and in that case
how dared he take on himself to become physician in ordinary? But if he
devoted himself to medicine, how could he desire to become the highest
and sole authority in the affairs of the country? Can a man be treated
mildly whose principle it is that goodness injures a country? through
goodness mutual love is acquired. Which king is the more secure--the
one who is beloved, or the one before whom people tremble? _Oderint
dum metuant_ was the consolation of the tyrant, but he is amiable who
seeks his honour in love of his country. Therefore, I have called
things by their right name, and do not do so in order to display my
courage against a prisoner--for I never took pleasure in my neighbour's
misfortune--but in order to perform my duty.
Advocate Uldall has represented the count first from the side where his
crimes find an apparent excuse, so that that comes last in his reply
which stands first in my statement. I shall follow his example, and
concisely answer his defence.
As regards Struensee's crimes against the royal law, the counsel for
the defence entertains the same views as his principal, that the king
was able to do it. It is true that the king can select any adviser
he pleases, but is the man whom he selects as adviser permitted to
consent to things which have injurious results? The royal law states
the duty of the king and of his subjects. According to article 3, no
alteration can be made in it. If anything is done to the royal law,
the right of reigning is lost (I write juridically, and do not suppose
that the law is maintained by the sword). The King of Denmark is
sovereign on the conditions to which Frederick III. pledged himself,
and, as _primus adquirens_, was able in turn to pledge his descendants
and successors on the throne. In article 7 of the royal law, he
commanded that all government decrees and letters should be issued
in no other name but the king's, and that the king himself must sign
them, if he has attained his majority. In article 26, employed against
me, he determined the punishment of any man who attempted any almost
imperceptible encroachment on the king's authority. Hence it was Count
Struensee's duty, if he wished to be an honest adviser of the king,
to represent that it was not right to make known the king's will in
such a way, as it was contrary to the royal law, in which the king has
no power to make the slightest alterations: that the obedience of the
subjects ceases if the royal law is altered without their consent: that
hence the king ran the highest risk in acting thus, and it might cost
him, Struensee, his head.
That Count Struensee really misused the power which he appropriated,
I have clearly proved by his conduct in the order for the dissolution
of the body-guard, and also that in this instance he laid incorrect
statements before the king.
The other things that Herr Uldall mentions as agreeing with the royal
law, are not applicable here. I have shown that Count Struensee had
impure intentions in the abolition of the council, namely, to be alone,
and be able to do whatever he liked.
That he failed in the reverence which he owed his Majesty, has been
proved by witnesses. The falsification is so evident to everybody, that
only Count Struensee's confession of it is wanting, which he holds
back, however, because he does not wish to be regarded as a forger
after his death. That he afterwards brought the same sum under his
Majesty's notice cannot be employed in his defence, for there was no
special statement which could have reminded his royal Majesty of the
incorrectness.
As regards the bouquet, it is not denied that he was aware of the
sale, but he defends himself with his sacred assurance, that he
supposed the sale took place with the king's assent. The commission
is aware that the ornament did not fetch its full value, as one stone
alone in it was estimated at 18,000 dollars. He excuses his knowledge
of Brandt's conduct to the king, and pretends that he had not been so
fully aware of the affair before. All the rest consists of excuses and
palliations, which are only founded on his statements, but which have
been proved quite differently by me.
Consequently I refer to my former demands, and claim the verdict I
proposed.
F. W. WIWET.
_Copenhagen, April 23, 1772._
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 91: "Mémoires de Falckenskjold," p. 196.]
[Footnote 92: An allusion to Bernstorff as Minister of Foreign Affairs.]